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This was an appeal from the decision of the Divisional Court, reported 34 W. R. 531, diseharpinga rule niai to quash the order of the Noithuinberland Quarter Sessions. It appeared from the special case that the appellants had been assessed to the poor on a gross estimated rental in respect of the land and works occupied by them of £590, the rateable value being set down at £501. It was admitted before the justices that, in arriving at the rateable value of the premises, certain machinery had been taken into consideration as enhancing the value of the premises, and that the whole of such machinery was the property of the appellants and not of the land owners. There was no intention on the part of the appellants of making such machinery part of the soil or bereditaments or permanently annexing it thereto. The machines were all capable of being, and wars in fact from time to time, bought, sold, removed, and renewed as separate and distinct articles without iuj ury to themselves or to the main structure. Some of the machinery was not physically attached to the premises at all, but rested upon them by its own weight. In other cases the machinery was attached by brick seatings or by screws fixed into concrete foundations but merely for the purpose of being steadied whilst working. The question for the court was whether, in arriving at the rateable value of the premises, such machinery had been rightly taken into consideration. It was urged for the appellants that it was impossible to take such machinery into consideration without really rating it, and that the test as to what chattels could or could not be rated was whether or not they were permanently attached to the premises so as to become part of the hereditaments.

Tns Cora’: (Lord Esrum, M.R., and Lorss, L.JJ), in dismissing the appeal and upholding the decision of the Divisional Court, said that the whole of the decisions appeared to be perfectly consistent, and to express the same rule as to rating though in somewhat different words. They considered that things which were on the premises for the purpose

of making, and which, in fact, made, them fit as premises for the purpose for which they were used, ought to be taken into account in estimating the rateable value ; or, in other words, things which, lllJl8r8 expressly excluded, would pass by a demise of the premises between landlord and tenant. Physical annexation had never been treated as the test, and they considered that the court of quarter sessions had rightly taken into consideration the whole of this machinery as enhancing the rateable value of the premises in question.——Cousss1., Sir Horace Dtlfty, Q.C., R. T. In.-id, Q.C., and /'1/ril Darld ,~ Sir R. E. Webster, A.G. , IV. Graham, and Earls Humilhm. Somicrrons, Flu: Q Lcmibiftcr, for Laaribiiter Q Ilarrey, Newcastle-om Tyne ; Cromnan, ('1-o.~.vnmn, Q I’r¢'¢lmrd, for Kidmn, ]lIrKen:i':.i, Q Kidson, Sunderland.

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The main question in this case was whether, in the winding up of a company under the Companies Acts, a transaction can be set aside as a fraudulent preference at the instance, and for tho benefit, of a particular class of the creditors of the company, not for the general benefit of all the creditors. Section 164 of the Companies Act, 1862, provides that “Buy such conveyance, . . . ayment, execution, or other act relating to property as would, ii) made or done by or against any Individual trader, be deemed, in the event of his bankruptcy, to have been made or done byway of undue or fraudulent preference of the creditors of such trader, shall, if inadeor done by or against any company, be deemed, in the event of such company being wound up under this Act, to have been made or done by way of undue or fraudulent preference of the creditors of such company, and shall be invalid accordingly,” and the presentation of the winding-up petition is to be deemed to correspond with the act of bankruptcy in the case of an individual trader. In LUMm Cooper (10 Oh. 510) it was held that the doctrine of fraudulent preference couldin bankruptcy be asserted only for the benefit of the Whole body of the creditors of the bankrupt. ln the present case the plaintiff, a debenture-holder of the company, sought on behalf and for the benefit of himself and the other debenture-holders, to set aside a payment of £3,000 made by the company shortly before the commencement of the winding-up order to two of their directors, on account of a debt due from the company to them. Bacon, V.C., held (31 Ch. D. 425) “mt E-1’ f""‘1fl Caoprr applied, and that the payment could not be set aside for the benefit of some only of the creditors.

Tris Corsr or-1Ai-i'sr\L (Corron, L.J., Harman, l’., and Fin‘. L.J.) atflrmed the decision. Corrox, L.J., said that section 164 provided that Bu act which would be a fraudulent preference in bankruptcy should be considered _such in the winding up of a company, so that money recovered under aelarm on account of fraudulent preference would be recovered for the general creditors as if it had been recovered by the trustee in bank"1Pt¢y- That the doctrine of fraudulent preference could not be taken ldflutage of by a mortgagee, but only for the benefit of the whole body °f Qftditors. was decided n Ea: parts Cooper, and the principle of that d€(!ll10flfl8pl1kdi40th0 present case. Harman, P., and Fm, L.J., con23:3:-~—Q(g'X8ZLa1;a;'mi'1igt|gi, Q.C'., and J. G. Icing ; Brmnwell Daria;

. . ., an ~10”. 0l.l('lTUlt F. H. Boner ~ Lice; I’/Ilerson Bow, ¢ 00.; Linda Q Co. 8' /’ ’

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In this case a question was raised as to which it appeared that there was no direct authority—viz., whether, since the Wills Act, a general devise operates as an execution of a special power of appointment over real estate, the testator having, both at the date of his will and at his death, no other real estate to which the general devise could apply. Under the will and codicil of Thomas Mills, who died in 1865, certain real estate was devised to the use of trustees upon trust for his son W. B. Mills for life. and after his decease upon such trusts as his son should by deed or will appoint, so only that every such appointment be made in favour of some one or more of his children or other issue born in his lifetime, and in default upon trust for such children equally. W. B. Mills, by his will dated in November, 1884, after aippointing trustees and executors, devised and bequeathed all his real an personal estate not thereby otherwise disposed of, upon trust for sale an conversion, and to pay his funeral and testamentary expenses and debts and leglacies, and to invest the residue and to stand possessed of £7,000, part t ereof, upon trust for his wife for life, and then for his children by her or their issue as she should appoint, and in default upon trust for all his children by her, and failing such to his son and daughter bya first marriage. And as to £3,500, upon trust for that daughter, and the residue to his son. W. B. lilills died in March, 1886. He had no real estate other than that devised to him by the will of Thomas Mills, and the question was whether he had exercised the power of appointment thereby given to him. It was contended, on behalf of the son, that the power was exercised by the general devise of real estate, on the ground that, before the Wills Act, a gift of real estate, where a testator had no real estate of his own, but had a power of appointing real estate, was sufficient to p)ass the land subject to the power. And that although the Wills Act, y making a will speak from t e death, removed the reason for this, which was that otherwise there would be nothing else upon which the devise could operate, there was nothing in the Wills Act to alter the existing rule ; and that the intention of the Act was to enlarge the operation of devises and bequests. On the other hand_ it was contended, on behalf of the persons entitled in default of appointment, that the question of whether a power of appointment had or had not been exercised was always one of intention, whether _with reference to real_or to personal estate, and that as, since the Wills Act, a general devise carried after-acquired real estate, there was no longer any ground for inferring from a general devise any more than from a gens-r_al bequest; an intention of exercising a power of appointment. For this purpose there must in all cases be a reference either to the power or to the property subject to the power.

KAY, J., after taking time to consider the question, decided that the power had not been exercised. His lordship said that it was strange that the question had not been determined before, but that _he could not discover any decision in point. The question was one of intention, and the intention of a testator could be inferred only from the words of his will and from the surrounding circumstances known lllm at the date of his will, which the rases shewed the court was at liberty to regard. It was noticeable here that the objects of the general devise were, fl great extent, outside the terms of the power, and the enlarged operation which the \Vills Act gave to a general devise was also a very important circumstance to be considered. The testator here had, at the date of his will, no other real estate. lf he had afterwards acquired any it would have passed thereby, unless the general devise could have been read us applying exclusively to the property the subject of the power, which, since the Wills Act, seemed impossible. I nder the old law the reason for holding that the power was exercised was that otherwise the words could have no operation, but it could not be said now that a general devise was wholly inoperative if it passed real estate afterwards acquired, although the testato: had, at the date of l'|lB Will, no other _real estate._ In his lordship’s opinion anything like a general rule for discovering intention was objectionable, and the suggestion that the \Vills Act was intended_to enlarge the operation of devises was fallacious, as, the reason for inferring the intention being removed by the Act, the presumption of such intantion ceased. The burden of proof was on t ose w c alleged that the power had been exercised. O_u the evidence, his opinion was that tge testator did not intend to exercise the_power.V—Coi'x.Y<zr., Inf]/1 {syn ; ll. M . ]r’o1/cr:<,' Cree. Souciroas, W. H. Jul/.\; ”'al.n)If, llewlly, d‘ 1-'/WW.‘ 5'“ if Son.

JARRET v. 1lUN'.l'ER.—Kay, J., 22nd and 25th November.

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A contract for sale stated that the defendant was the purchaser and had aid a deposit to G. 1'. Lawson, and that Lawson, “ as the solicitor for the gender ” and the defendant agreed to complete according to tho conditions: The conditions spoke of the person _se1ling as _“th_s vendoliy and drscribed Lawson as the vendor's solicitor. At this time E. hJarret was the legal owner and Lawson the beneficial oqger of ts: premises. The fourth condition provided that the title shou commeiqm with a conveyance, which, it was asserted, would have shewn on Otfihat nation that_ Jarret was the legal owner; and the evldiincs fproved that before signing‘ the cggtlract the defendant was verbal y in orme Lawson was e equi e owner. _ _ , _ Kn, J ., said that the vendor was _not sumciently d0iCl'll)€3] 112 ta :31“ tract, from the WOIdlg§‘ of which indeed it vggmdtalppcsr Ont-Ed into the , was not the vendor. e fourth condition eon no e IHJP

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It appi ared that the plaintiffs were the lessees under a building agreement under seal made in 1875, and the covenants of which were to be performed during a period which would expire in 1885. 1_’ending an application by ihc defendants for power to take tho land comprised in the agreement, the plaintifis entered into a parol agreement with the lessors for extension of the period during which the building covenants were to be performed, and negotiations also took place as to alteration of the class of house to be built. In 1883 the defendants purchased from the lessors the_ land comprised in the agreement. In 1834 the defendants_ga_ve the plaintiffs notice to treat, and in 1886 took possession. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had notice of the parol agreement, but this the defendants denied, and stated that they had bought subject to the original agreement only. The plaintiffs claimed compensation and an injunction. The defendants took out a summons for leave to serve on the lessors a thirdparty notice under R. S. 0., 1883, XVL, 48. By the aflidavit in support of their summons the defendants stated that they were advised that, in the event of the plaintiffs succeeding in establishing their claim to relief in the action on the footing of the alleged parol agreement, they were enfilled to be indemnified against such claim by the lessors, either by a reduction of the purchase-money payable to the lessors or otherwise ; and the defendants submitted that R. S. C., 1883, XV 1., 48, when providing that the defendant applying should claim to be entitled “to contribution or indemnity against a person not party to the action,” did not require that the indemnity should be an indemnity in the strict legal sense, and they relied on Crlrs/mre v. North-E/ml:-m Railway ('0. (29 Ch. D. 341) as an authority shewing that all that was required was that the defendants should have a substantial case of relief as against third parties for the whole or part of the damages claimed in the action.

Ciiirrv, J., said that it was not, of course, sufficient for the defendants merely to state that they claimed indemnity over, but they must shew a reasonable case upon which they might succeed upon their claim for indemnity. The court would not, however, go into the claim and decide finally whether it was well founded or not, but if it saw that there was a fair ground for putting forward the claim as a claim of indemnity, then the court should grant the requisite leave, but not otherwise. The construction piit by the applicants on the rule would reduce to silence the condition contained in it that the leave of the court must be obtained. The authorities, however, shewed that the rule used the term indemnity in the sense that the defendant applying for leave must shew the court that he has a claim for indemnity on a contract, either express or implied, or a right to an indemnity founded on some rule of equity. A statement that the issue between the defendant and the third party was analogous to that between the plaintiff and defendant was not suillcient. It might have been perhaps proper that all such questions should be tried in one action. But those who framed the rule in the first instance (Rules of 1875, XVII., 1'7) found that it would lead to embarrassment of the plaintiff, and the rule was, therefore, modified to its present form. He was, satisfied that the applicants were not entitled against the lessors to indemnity in the lcilal sense of the word. They had no contract. express or implied, for indemnity, nor equitable right to indemnity. He, therefore, held there was no ground for saying that the applicants were entitled to indemnity as against the lessors when they were seeking to join as third parties, and refused their application, with costs.—Coui~:.-rat, Inca, Q.C., and Clare ; Rom:-r, Q 0., and 7Vcorl’roofe. Sonicrroiis, Mason ; Robinson, Pro-.\-/rm, it Stow, for Iiuwlands g 00., Birmingham.

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o _the Trustee Ac_t, 1850. Such an order could be made either on petition or on motion. The better mode of procedure was, how"ET, bY P°ti$1°11v 91°91“? in the very simplest cases. As the winding up was not terminated, there could_be no c aim against the fund on the pai-t_ of the ex- liquidator s trustees in bankruptcy for remuneration for his services. He should, however, in making an order as prayed direct that the order be not drawn up within a week, and that notice be served on the trusteesm bfl-l1i{1'11PtCy.—C0l‘riSBL,Hume C. Pmimz. SOLICITORS, Field, Roscoe, Q Co.

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jurisdiction, in an application under section 4 of 27 8.: '28 Vict. c. 1_l2, to appoint a receiver. The petitioner had, in July, 1886, recovered judgment against the debtor for £622 12s. 8d. In August he sued outa writ of alegil. On the 3rd of October the sheriff caused an inquisitionto be made, and it was found that the debtor was seised in fee of three houses, of which the aggregate yearly rent was £62, and the houses were on the same day delivered in execution. A petition was thereupon presented for B518 0! $50 1101184"! "9 having been “ actually delivered in execution " under section 4 of 27 8: 28 Vict. c. 112. There was also a prayer in the petition that a receiver might be appointed until the sale, and reliance was placed upon Mason V. Westoby (34 \V. R. 498, 32 Oh. D. 206). The debtor did _not appear.

Sriunisc, J., made an order for sale (see the form given in Seton on Decrees, at p. 1140). Bat his lordship held, after consideration, that he had no jurisdiction to appoint a receiver upon a petition for sale under the above-named statute. He therefore refused_ the application, without prejudice to the right of the petitioner to apply in the action.-Coi'ussi., C’. 1‘. Mitchell. SOLXCXTORS, Simpson, Palmer, §- Winder.

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Corrnionr — Israiuuznaxr — Isrnatocvroax Iruvmrrion ——MINL'Tl Inscar.

This was an interlocutory motion for an injunction to restrain the infringement by the defendant of the plaintiffs‘ copyright. The plaintiffs were the owners of the copyright in a number of poems written by Praed. The defendant published a selection of Praed's poems which contained some of those in which the plaintiffs had the copyright. The plaintiffs complained of this, and an arrangement was entered into that the defendant should discontinue the sale of his selection, and should pay the plaintiffs a royalty on the copies which he had already sold. This W118 done, and the defendant afterwards re-issued his selection with the omission from it of twenty-one poems which had been previously pointed out to him as subject to the plaintiffs’ copyright. But the selection, as re-issued, contained eight other poems which were also subject to the plaintiffs’ copyright. The plaintiffs brought this action to restrain the defendant from selling his selection as re-issued, and they now moved for an injunction until the trial. Previously to the issue of the writ the plaintiffs‘ solicitor had suggested that the defendant should pay a royalty to the plaintiffs. Having regard to this suggestion and to the comparatively 8I:11Bii1B.m0i1l'lt of the matter alleged to be pirated in the defendant s re-issue se ection,

NORTH, J., on the undertaking of the defendant to keep an account. and to abide by any order which the court might think fit to make as to the payment of a royalty to the plaintiffs, declined to grant an interlocutory injunction.—Cous'ssi., Ereritt, Q.C., and G. T. Millar ,- 1;‘. Fowl. Snucirous, Aslim-st, Morri-\', Q 6'0. ,' Heat/icr Q Sons.

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This was a petition for the appointment of a new trustee of awili 1!! addition to two trustees appointed by the will, they being the only trustees thereby appointed. On the authority of Rn Ilnwkm urg/‘s T HM (L. R. 10 Eq. 4.5),

Noarii, J., held that there was jurisdiction under the Trustee Actf-0 appoint an additional trustee simplirilcr, though there was no vacancy In the existing number of trustees to be supplied. His lordship B180 expressed an opinion that, under sub-section 2 of section 31 of the Conveyancing Act, 188l, which provides that, “on an appointment of a new trustee, the number of trustees may be increased,” an additional trustee could not be appointed except when an! appointment was being made i° fill up a vacancy in the existing number of trustecs.—Cocnssi., Farwell. Soucirous, Pritrhard, Englrfiefd, §- Co.

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action, to advance thé sum of £10,300 on the securityif a mortgage 119°“ an t t l

es a e va ued at £80,000. Kay, J., in the administration action, directed an inquiry whether a good title could be made to the hereditaments. Mr. Oasson, the conveyancing counsel before whom the title WM laid, observed that the mortgagors, who were trustees of a portions term, were only empowered to mortgage for the term of 1,000 years, and stated that, unless arrangements could be made for the mortgage being in 1'96 iwhicilvwas not done), the opinion of tlie judge would have to be taken, &‘1;ld-Teififzéd 150 the decision in Re Boyzi’.i Srttlerl Estates (1-1 Ch. D. 626)

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This was an action for the rectification of a written agreement, and for damages for the breach by the defendant of the agreement as rectified. The agreement as it stood provided for the building by the plaintiff, within nine months from its date, of .\'i.t houses on a piece of land belonging to the defendant, and that, within three months from the completion of the houses, the defendant would build a bridge over a river. He also agreed to grant the plaintiff a lease at a certain rent. The laintifi alleged that the agreement really entered into was that he should build four houses, and that, by a mistake for which the defendant was responsible, the word “six” had been written in the agreement. The defendant had not built the bridge within three months from the completion of the four houses. The plaintiff asked to have the agreement rectified by substituting the word "four" for “six,” and he claimed damages for the non-building of the bridge by the defendant. The defendant alleged that the real agreement was for the building of ii: houses on the land, and that he had committed no default in not building the bridge. He did not plead the Statute of Frauds. On behalf of the defendant it was contended that parol evidence could not be admitted to vary the terms of a written executory contract, and that, at any rate, the plaintiff could not in one action obtain rectification of the agreement and relief in the nature of specific performance of the agreement as rectified ; and it was urged that the doctrine of part performance did not apply when the possession of the plaintiff was referable to, and consistent with, the written agreement.

Noiu-i~i,J., held that paiol evidence was admissible. He said that he did not feel the slightest difficulty in admitting evidence for the purpose of shewing that the word “ six" in the agreement ought to have been written "four," nor, if he should hold that the agreement oughtto be rectified, the case being one in which the Statute of Frauds was not pleaded, or could, by reason of the part performance, be pleaded, in going on to give consequential relief on the footing of the agreement as rectified, on Ihe principle pointed out in Fry on Specific Performance (2nd ed.), par. 799. Curivssn, C0:e1is-Hardy, Q.O., and C. Barton Jolhfa; €;i_'{5~'1>1;; Q3-1 and BM/I, Q.C. S0i.ici'roiis, Hepburn, Son, Q (.'u!z'lvf¢; H. S.

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Ai~i>oi.\"nias-r or New TRUSTEES-DISTINCT Snrs or Tiwsrass—Tiwsrsa Aer, l850—Couvs\'ar<cmo Act, 1882, a. 5.

This was a petition for the appointment of new trustees cf a will on the retirement of the only surviving trustee. Part of the trust property was given o_n tnist for J. for life, with remainder to her daughter at twentyone, with remainder as J . should appoint, with remainders over. Another part of the property was given on trust for J . for life, with remainder to her daughter at twenty-one ; with remainder in trust for E. and M. at twenty-one, with benefit of survivorship, with remainders over. Another part of the property _was given on trust for E. and M. in equal shares, with_benefit of survivorship in case of death under twenty-one, with remainders over. Another part of the property was given on trust for M. at twenty-one, with remainder on trust for E. at twenty-one, with remainder on the trusts declared of the first part of the property for J . and her daughter, with remainder over. The daughter of J. was under twenty-one; E. had attained twenty-one, but M. was under twenty-one. The petition asked for the appointment of A. and B. as trustees of the will as to those parts of the property in which J. and her daughter were primarily interested, and for the apppintment of B. and as trustees as to those parts of the property in whic E. and M. were primarily interested.

Noni-ii, J., at_first felt some doubt whether the trusts could be said to be "distinct," inasmuch as in certain events the trusts of different parts 0! the property would become identical, but ultimately he made the a_pp.untmsnt asked f0l‘.—COL'Nsl!L, IVaggm,- F. Bugs/tows,‘ G. Hi'lI¢r. bOLICI'l'0B8, Van Simdau Q Ca. ; Mason g Son.

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The question in this case was as to whether the special Act under which the "PPcllant company was formed had been repealed as to the regulations as to keeping the nniiual statement of account by section 35 of the (rasworks Clauses Act of 1871. By section 3 of the special Act of 1865 The company were hound to make up their accounts to a certain date and publish them in some newspaper, and also to transmit a copy to the clerk of the _peace for the county of Warwick. Other and very different regulations are provided by the Gasworks Clauses Act of 1847, under which undertakers of gasworks have to furnish to any applicant a copy of their annual statement of account on demand at their ofllce. That Act Was incorporated in the special Act, save in so far as it was inconsistent with ‘It. By section 1 of the Gasworks Clauses Act, 1871, that Act and the (_rssworks Clauses Act of 1847, are to be construed together, and the Pfqvisions of the Act of 1871 are to repeal and supersede such of the proYLBIODS of the earlier Act as are inconsistent with those of the latter.

t was contended that the provisions of the Act of 1871, as to furnishing a tifiatement of_the accounts to applicants similar to those of the Act of §4_7» W916 binding upon the company, and that a neglect of these pro"lions had rendered them liable to certain penalties. The justices for

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the borough of Leamington, on information preferred by the respondent, convicted the com any. On a sal from that decision,

Tun Occur (Srslluiss and Sim-u, JJ.) held that the provisions of the special Act had not been repealed lay the Gasworks Clauses Act of 1871. A definite provision had been ma e by the special Act and that fact rendered the case distinguishable from the case of Dudley GaslLiqIit Co. v. Warmin ton (29 W. R. 680), where there were no s cia rovisions as to agccounts contained in the special Act. Tl10l\?el0l‘dBElp§ reversed the decision and quashed the conviction.—Coimsai., Shiress Wilt, Q.C.; Dugdale, Q.C., and Noble. Soniciroas, Henry Tyrrell for II. C’. Prmmzm, Leamington ; Gregory, Rowrlifas, Q (Jo.

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This was an application for a prohibition to the judge of the City of London Court, and a question arose as to the sufilciency of ii certificate for costs on the higher scale given by that judge. An action had been brought for goods sold and delivered, and was twice tried, once before the judge alone and afterwards by the judge with a jury. The defendant obtained a verdict and judgment on both occasions, and the judge certified finally as follows:—“ Costs on the higher scale. Question of character.” The plaintiff applied ior a prohibition to the Divisional Court, and the matter was sent back to the judge below, the court desiring further information. Thereupon tho judge of the City of London Court sent up a statement of his reasons to the effect that he “ considered it a question of general or publicimportance that adefendaut accused practically of swearing fslsel should not be punished in costs while he succeeded on the merits." Iyhe learned judge added that “he intended to certify under 45 & 46 Vict. e. 57, s. 5, as well as imder the London (City) Small Debts Extension Act, 1852 "

Tns Couar (STEPHBN and A. L. Siiirii, JJ.) held that the certificate was insufficient. S-rsi-i-in.\', J., said that the statute 45 & 46 Vict. c. 57, s. 5, permitted a certificate for costs on the higher scale to be given when there was a novel or difficult point of law involved, or when the question was of general or public importance. It could not be said that it was a question of public importance whether a defendant in such an action had spoken the truth. Probably the only certificate which could satisfy the court would be one which followed the exact words of the statute. Whether such a certificate could be upset on aflidavit the learned judge declined to say. A. L. Snirii, J., concurred.-—Conxsiii., Steplim Lyn:/:. SOLICITOB, Jloqjm.

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This was an application for leave to serve.a writ out of the jurisdiction. The proposed action was one by underwriters against a policy-holder, claiming a declaration that the policy was void on the ground of fraud, and asking for an injunction to restrain the defendant from taking any proceedings on the policy. The defendant resided in Scotland. Day, J ., made an order giving leave to the plaintiff to serve a_ writ in Scotland. Subsequently Field, J ., rescinded the order, and set aside the writ Issued under it. It was argued, on behalf of the plaintiffs, that they were entitled to leave to serve a writ out of the jurisdiction under R. _S. 0., 1883, ord. 11, r. 1, siio-section (f). It was necessary for underwnteis to take the initiative in cases like this: Lisbon-Brrlyn Gold Firld Ca. v. Lfnidle, o2 L. T. N. S. 796, and Tozicr v. Hawkins, 15 Q. B. D. 650, were relied on._

Ti-is Coca’: dismissed the appeal. Huiinnasros, B., said the main question was whether this sort of claim came within ord. ll, r. 1, subsection (f). The words of the sub-section m_ight seem to suggest that it would sometimes apply to such a claim as this. _But the cases cit/ed differed from the present case. There the plaintiffs were threatened with imminent danger, in one case of having a winding-ug petition presented, in the other the publication of libellous post-cards. ut here there was no impending danger or threat of damage. It was an action of_qma timet, because at some time an action may be brought. Maxis-rr, J. , said itwas clear that this case did not come within sub-section (R), which aplplied where an injunction was sought as to anything to done with1n_t e jhlirlsdictlom but what the plaintiff here sought to restrain was something w ich may be dons without the jurisdiction. It could not_be intended that they should restrain the defendant from bringing an action in England and yet leave him free to proceed in Scotland.—Coi::~'sni., J. G. lhzrziea ,- Hollams. Soi.iTORS, Star/mi Q Jupp; Walton, Bubb, 4' J0/Imvm

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ing. The counsel for the husband relied upon the provisions of section 5 of the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1886 (49 & 50 Vict. c. 27_), which authorizes the court “on the application of the mother of any infant," to “make such order as it may think fit regarding the custody of such infant, and the right of access thereto of either parent, having regard to the welfare of the infant and to the conduct of the parties, and to the wishes as well of the mother as of the father.” Barnes v. Barnes rmrl Beaumont (16 W. R. 283, 1 P. & D. 463) was referred to. _

Burr, J., said it was clear that the section relied upon had no bearing on the case, as it could not affect the discretion of the court in dealing with questionsas to custody of children in pending divorce suits. H_e declined to make any order for the removal of the children from their aunt‘s custody.—-Covr<sar., Witt; Man. Sonicrrcris, Hanbury, Hutton, 4Wliittiny; Ii. B. Barrett.

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In this case a question arose on the construction of section 48 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, which provides that “ Every conveyance or transfer of property, or charge thereon made, every payment made . . . by any person unable to pay his debts as they become due from his own money in favour of any creditor . . . with a ricur of giving such creditor a preference over the other creditors, shall, if the person making . . . the same is adjudged bankrupt on a bankruptcy petition presented within three months after the date of making . . . the same, be deemed fraudulent and void as against the trustee in the bankruptcy.” In the present case the bankrupt was a stockbroker, and he had, in December, 188-1, been employed by the trustees of a marriage settlement, one of whom was T., his own solicitor, to sell some securities and reinvest the proceeds of sale in other specified securities. The bankrupt effected the sale and received the purchase-money, but the re-purchase was not completed because, as the bankrupt represented, and as was really the fact, the jobber with whom he had contracted was not able at once to procure the required stock. On the 26th of March T. had an interview with the bankrupt, in the course of which he admitted that he had misappropriated some securities which had been in his hands as one of the trustees of a will, and that he had obtained money from his bankers by means of transfers which he had forged. On learning this T. told the bankrupt that he could not trust his statement as to the reason for the non-completion of the re-investment of the purchase-money of the securities which he had sold for the trustees of the marriage settlement, and demanded immediate payment of the purchase-money, threatening that, if it was not paid, he would at once issue a summons against the bankrupt before the Lord Mayor. The bankrupt thereupon gave T. a cheque for £3,000. On the 28th of Mai-ch the bankrupt committed an act of bankruptcy by absconding from his place of business, and on the 21st of April he was adjudicated a bankrupt on a petition presented on the 8th of April. The trustee in the bankruptcy sought to set aside the payment of the £3,000 as a fraudulent preference, and also on the ground that it was made with notice to T. of a prior act of bankruptcy, that act of bankruptcy being the execution by the bankrupt on the 23rd of March ofa mortgage to T. by way of security to him in respect of a breach of trust _which the bankrupt had committed by misappropriating some bonds which had been in is possession as co-trustee with T. of another will. The execution of this mortgage was said to be a fraudulent preference, and, therefore, an act of bankruptcy. Cave, J., refused to set aside the payment of the £3,000 on either ground, and the Court of Appeal (Lord Esher, llI.R., and Lindley and Lopes, L.JJ.) affirmed the decision. It was argued on behalf of the trustee that, under section -18 as interpreted by Em purtc cam/i (2.2 cu. 1). 69), the court, has not now t5 inquire into the motives of a debtor who makes a payment which is alleged to be a fraudulent preference, but that, if the debtor is insolvent and the effect of the payment is to prefer the creditor, the payment is void as a fraudulent preference whatever the debtor's actual motiv

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_ _ a e.pay_ment should be made with the view of givmg apreference—that is, with the intent to give a preference. The court must look at the debtor’:- mind and try to find out what his intent was, _and in order to do that it could not throw over the tests which had previously to the Act been adopted by great judges, The con;-1; must take into account the fact that the debtor was threatened with somethmg which he did not like, _1n order to see whether he paid the creditor to get rid of that thing, or simply prefer him to the other (;redjf,°|-5_ ghe courg mpst take into account his intention to repair the evil he had

oniaé gnréli that was the predominant motive in his mind, the court OM} Q y say that he intended to prefer the creditor. He did it to satisfy his own conscience. It was impossible to lay down all the matters that should be taken into account. Here the bankrupt, when he paid the £3,000 '10 T-, W88 111 )1 p0slti_0n_ of danger, when exposure was imminent.

e was threatened with a criminal prosecution. He made the 9, ment not to prefer T., but to get rid of that exposure and danger withliivgich he; was threatened. The payment, therefore, was not a fraudulent reference. As to the deed of the 2-3rd of March the bankrupt as trustge had been guilty of gross and fraudulent breaches of trust. The reliition between him and T. was not that of debtor and creditor but that of defaulting trustee and honest co-trustee Therefore the chs as t this

deed, was not within section 48 at all. Iharoisr, L.J., said tlsiit Eizmrze

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This was an appeal from two orders made by Mr. Registrar Gitfard—the one refusing to discharge a receiving order which hi-id been made against C., and the other refusing an application for a stay of all proceedings under the order. The first application was made under section 104 of the Bankruptcy Act. 1883; the second was made under section 109. Section 10-1 provides that “every court having jurisdiction in bankruptcy under this Act may review, rescind, or vary any order made by it in its bankruptcy jurisdiction" ; and by section 109, “ The Court may at any time, for sutficient reason, make an order staying the proceedings under a bankruptcy petition, either altogether or for a limited time, on such terms and subject to such conditions as the court maythink just." The debtor had been engaged in building operations. A receiving order was made against him on the 2nd of November. There had been 167 bankruptcy petitions against him, but 152 of them had been dismissed before the 2nd of November, and three others had been adjourned a1'm' die. Ten were appointed to come on for hearing on the 2nd of November, and two to come on on the 12th and 19th of November respectively. The debts amounted in all to about £150,000. On the 2nd of November eight out of the ten petitioning creditors were content to have their petitions dismissed if all the ten were dismissed, while the other two wished for time. The registrar made a receiving order, refusing to grant an adjournment which was asked for. An appeal from this order was dismissed on the 12th of November. Subsequently to this the debts of the ten petitioning creditors were satisfied, and on the 15th of November an application was made to the registrar to rescind the receiving order, when all t e petitioning creditors, except the three whose petitions had been adjourned sine div, consented, creditors to the amount of £100,000 consenting to the application. The other creditors had not then had any notice of the application. On the 22nd of November the registrar refused to rescind the receiving order, on the ground that the consent of all the creditors ought to have been obtained, and he also refused a subsequent application by the debtor for a stay of all proceedings under the receiving order for two mouths, in order that the consent of the other creditors might be obtained. The consent of creditors to the ninount of £136,700 had by this time been obtained. Before the hearing of the present appeal the consent of creditors to the amount of £1-13.000 out of £150,000 had been obtained to the rescission of the receiving order. There only remained creditors to the amount of £7,000, the number of whom exceeded thirty. The debtor's assets consisted almost entirely of houses, which were mortgaged, the mortgagees being in most cases in possession.

Tris Covnr (Lord Esuiin, M.R., and Lmnnnr and L01’1ZS,L.JJ.) held that the registrar was right in refusing to rescind the receiving order, but they granted a partial stay of proceedings under the order. Lord Esusa, l\I.B., said that it was not alleged that the receiving order was wrongly made. The registrar, when asked to rescind the order, was exercising a judicial discretion in the matter, and the court ought not to interfere unless it was clear that that discretion had been wrongly exercised. The registrar did not intend to say that unless all the creditors consented he could not, as a matter of law, in any case rescind the order, but he only refused, under the circumstances of the present case, to rescind it. His lordship was of opinion that it was not essential, as an absolute rule applicable to every case, that the consent of every creditor must be obtained before a receiving order could be rescinded, but in the circumstances of the present case he thought the registrar was right. It was startling to find creditors to the amount of £143,000 consenting, with nothing to rely upon except the promise of the debtor. It was the duty of the court not to accede to every rash wish of creditors, Creditors to the extent of £7,000 had not consented, and had had no notice of the application, and the registrar was right in refusing to rescind the receiving order without any notice to th-am. The effect of staying all the proceedings under the receiving order would be to give the debtor absolute control over his property, when he might mortgage it further. It would, however, be hard on the debtor if he had not the opportunity of obtaining the consent of the other creditors, and applying to the registrar again. The court would pursue a middle course, and would stay all advertisements in the _0a:ette for two months, the result of which would be to It-BY the first meeting of the creditors. In this way the ofilcial receiver would stlll be able to exercise his powers for the benefit of the creditors and W protect the property, and all unnecessary publicity would be avoided. LlNI_1L_EY, L.J., said_ that it would not be right in this case to rescind tllfl receiving order, which was made for the benefit of all the creditors, without giving notice to the creditors for the £7,000. If the court stayed all Pl'°°@°d"18B It Would paralyze the action of the oflicisl receiver, and the best course was to stay all advertisements for two months, with liberty l0

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Mr. J vs-rics Srariiiis has been elected Treasurer of the Inner Temple
for the ensuing year.

Mr. Lvioi CANADO, LL.D., has been appointed one of Her Majesty’s
Judges for the Island of Malta.

Mr. Justice STIRLING and Mr. Justice KEKE\\'XCH have received the
honour of Knighthood.

Mr. Aivriiuii Giurrrrii Purim LEWIS, barrister, has been appointed a Magistrate for the town and county of the town of I-Iaverfordwest. Mr. Lewis is the only son of the Right Rev. Richard Lewis, D.D., Bishop of Llandafi, and was born in 1848. He was educated at Eton and at University College, Oxford. He was called to the bar at Lincoln’s-inn in Michaelmas erm, 1873, and he practises on the South Wales and Chester Circuit, and at the Glamorganshire, Pembrokeshire, and Carmarthensbire Sessions. Mr. Lewis is registrar of the diocese of Llandafi, and oflicial of the Archdeaconry of St. David's.

Mr. THOMAS Hssnr Bsrcnsn, solicitor, of Cardiif and Penarth, has been appointed a Commissioner to administer Oaths in the Supreme Court of Judicature.

Mr. Mivrriiaw RIGHTON Wrnn, solicitor (of the firm of Webb & Sons), of Barbican-chambers, Barbican, has been appointed a Commissioner to administer Oaths in the Supreme Court of Judicature.

Mr. JAPHETH TICKLB, solicitor, of 4, Grocers’ Hall-court, has been elected a Common Councilman for the \Vard of Cheap.

Mr. Giionos Esornsn, solicitor, of Goole and Howden, has been ap-
pointed Clerk to the Goole School Board. Mr. England was admitted a
solicitor in 1866.

Mr. Hasiw ANDREWS, solicitor (of the firm of Tindall & Andrews), 18,
Essex-street, Strand, has been appointed a Commissioner to administer
Oaths m the Supreme Court of Judicature.

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v Mr. Henry Matthews, M.P., was entertained at dinner on Wednesday
m the Inner Temple-hall by the members of the Oxford Circuit on his
apsointment as Home Secretary. Mr. Staveley Hill, Q C., M.P., presided,
an was supported, among others, by Mr. Baron Huddleston, and Sir
Henry James, M.P.

_The following _are the circuits chosen by the judges for the ensuing
winter assizes, which are expected to commence about the llth of January
next—viz.,_South-Eastern Circuit, Grove, J .; Home Circuit, Denman, J . ;
Western Circuit, Deuman and Mathew, JJ.; Midland Circuit, Field, J . , and
H_udd_leston, Oxford Circuit, Manisty and Grantham, JJ. ; Northern
Circuit, Hawkins and A. L. Smith, JJ.; North Wales Circuit, Stephen,
J3; South Wales Circuit, Wills, J. ; North-Eastern Circuit, Cave and Day,

The following appointments have been made by the Council of Legal Education, for the year ending the l0th of January, l888:-Jurisprudeuce, including International Law, Public and Private—R.oman Lawand Constitutional Law and Legal History—Joint Professors, Frederic Harrison, Esq, James Bryce, Esq.; Joint Examiners, \V. A. Hunter, EH}, J. E._C. Munro, Esié. Equity—Proiessor, H. A. Gifiard, Esq., Q.U. ; Examiner, Wm. Spee , Esq., Q.C. The Law of Real and Personal 1‘:roperty—Professor, 1'hoe. C. Wright, Esq. ; Examiner, C. J . Elton, l~.sq.: _ Q.C. The Common Law—Professor, Frederick Pollock, Esq. ; Examiner, R. G. Arbuthnot, Esq.

1$_ is stated that application is intended to be made in the ensuing session of Parliament for an Act to authorize the Commissioners of Works t° _li¢_qulre, by compulsory purchase or otherwise, certain lands and buildings in the parish of St. Clement Danes, and to construct on the site buildings to he used as oflices in connection with the Bankruptcy Court, or such other purposes as may he necessary for the public service, and as ml! be prescribed by the Treasury or by the intended Act. The property 10 acquired is described as lying to the south of King’s College Bvflpltal, and bounded respectively on the north-east by Carey-street, on the south-east in part by vacant ground belonging to the commissioners, and forming part ot the site acquired for the Royal Courts of Justice, and "1 P11I¢,by_ Cleinent’s-inn chambers ; on the south-west in part by Clement s-inn gardens and chambers, and in part by buildings on the south-side of C ement’s-inn passage; on the north-west in part by the Pmltll-east wall of the vestry-hall of the parish of St. Clement Danes, and "1 Elli by property belonging to and occupied by the buildings of King's 9° qge Hospital; and on the north by property also belonging to the hospital and similarly occupied.

A_Ppll0(-ltlblll are invited for an issue of 30,000 preference and 30,000 Q§dl{lal'_y_ shares of £5 each of the Thames, Medway, and Orwell Steam ‘ "18fltl0n Co (Limited). The company is formed to provide an entirely {WW fleet of passenger steamers, fitted with all modern appliances and lfifirovements, for the traflic on the River Thames. The preference shares

be entitled to a cumulative preferential dividend of 5 per cent. . Plyable out of th




Due Arrnsi. Comrr Arrssi. Oouirr Mr. Justice Mr. Justice
' N o. 1. No. 2. KAY. Cmrrr.
Mon. Dec. 8 Mr. Pugh Mr. Koo Mr. Lavie Mr. Carrington
Tuesday 7 Lavia Clowes Pugh Jackson
Wednesday 8 Beul Koo Lavie Carrington
Thu.rsday.. 9 Leach Clowes Pugh Jackson
Friday .... .. 10 Kins: Koe Lavie Carrington
Saturday .. ll Godfrey Clowes Pugh Jackson
i Mr. J iistice Mr. Justice Mr. J nstioe
Noivrn. STIRLING. Knxawioii.
Monday, December 6 Mr. Godfrey Kr. Ward Mr. Leach
Tuesday .. 7 King Peinberton Bcal
Wednesday 8 Godfrey Ward Leach
Thursday 9 King Pembcrton Beal
F 11¢-18)’ - 10 Godfrey Ward Leach
Saturday . 11 King Pemberton Beal

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Covrrrr PALATINE or Lsncssran.
Uxniurrirn IN CnA.\'ci:air.

No.1 Runway Horst. Baxsrir Buinniso SOC[El‘Y.—Il2 bcin: discovered that
the registered name of the society is the No, 1 Rail\\'a§' Hotel Beiieiit Building
Society. and not the No. 1 Railway Hotel Benefit uilding, AO0X'iDZtJll, his
Honour has, by an order dated Nov 8, directed that the said petn should be
amended as to the name of the society, and be advertised again, and that the
order for winding up should be drawn ii? at the expiration of seven days after
such advertisement. Slater it Sons, anchester. agents for Hall 8: Co, Ac-
cringtoii, solcrs for the joint oflicial liquidators and the petner

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e profits of the company.

Minister. Dec 15. Heston a son. Bunlem

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