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an option of appealing either under that procedure or under the Act originally giving the appeal, as they might be advised. But the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1884, not only enacts that in future the uniform procedure of the Act of l_879 must of necessity be followed in all cases, but repeals a string of enactments, and amongst them the part of section 23 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875, which regulates the procedure on appeal, leaving unrepealed those words only which give the right of appeal. Is the appeal under the Margarine Act to be con_du_cted under the Act of 1579 as amended by the Act of 1884', _or is it to be conducted under the Act of 1875, s. 23, simplmter? Cu the whole, we incline to think that the rule of Reg: v. Smith (21 W. R. 282, 8 Q B. 146), that where ai_i earlier Act is incorporated in a later, the repeal of the earlier Act does not repeal the incorporated part so far as regards the later Act, 'wo_uld apply to an appeal under the Margarine Act, but the point is a doubtful one.

Tan IXTERNATIONAL CONVENTION for the creation of a union for the protection of literary and artistic works which was ratified last month between England, France, Germany, Belgium, Spain, Switzerland, and several small States, to a considerable extent supersedes the existing conventions with several of these Powers, but it is expressly provided that such conventions, so far as they confer on authors more cxl/ended powers than those secured by the u iion and are not contrary to the new convention, shall be maintained. The general eifect of the new convention is to give to every author in all the countries ratifying the convention the same copyright which he has in his own country. As it is expressed in article 2, “Authors of any of the countries of the union, or their lawful representatives, shall enjoy in the other countries for their works, whether published in one of those countries or unpublished, the rights which the respective laws do now or may hereafter grant to natives.” And under the definitions of article 4 the protection thus given is extended to “every production whatsoever in the literary, scientific, or artistic domain which can be published by any mode of impression or reproduction.” Provision is made for the accession to the convention of other countries on request to that effect. But the most novel feature of the convention is the establishment of an international ofiice under the name of “ The office of the International Union for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.” This oflice, the expenses of which are to be borne by the administrations of all the countries of the union, is placed under the authority of the Swiss Confederation, and is to work under its direction. The organization of the office is to be fixed by a regulation to be drawn up by the Government of the Swiss Confederation ; and it appears that its functions are to be to collect, arrange, and publish all kinds of information relative to the protection of the rights of authors in their literary and artistic works, to study general questions of utility likely to be of interest to the union, and to edit a periodical publication. Interesting questions are likely to arise with regard to 1-his international publication. W_ho will be responsible for the occasional libels which it may contain, and will it be written in the extraordinary language in which the English version of the convention is couched ?

THE DECISION of Mr. Justice Noarn in Eaaton v. London Joint Slack Bank, that refresher_fees to counsel may be allowed on appeals from the Chancery Division, appears to us to be reasonable, though we are not quite clear that it is n correct interpretation of the rules of court. In Svemlsen v. Wallace (34 W. R. 151 16 Q. B. D. 27) it was held that the power of a taxing miister to allow refreshers is not limited to the cases specified in ord. 65, 1'- 27, sub-rule 48, and that such refreshers might, therefore, be flllowol 011 the hearing of an appeal from the Queen’s Bench Division, although no oral evidence was taken. “I have no doubt," Ml? Justice DAY Said, “ that an argument in the Court of Appeal comes under the general term [of sub-rule 30] ‘ work and labour.‘ " That sub-rule, however, is limited to “work and labo in respect of which fees have heretofore been allowed ” and althou uli refrcshors were allowed in the old Exchequer Chainber the g not allowed in the Chancery Appeal Court. But as Mr ii wtire Noam pointed out, the Court of Appeal is now one con ustwe mm»; appeals from all cs» divisions 0: the Hivh omit’ ziiidei;

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would be very inconvenient if the amount of the costs was to be regulated, not by the work done, but by the circumstance from which court the appeal came.

STAMP DUTY ADIUDICATIONS.

Tnnaa is an impression abroad that, for some reason or other, the adjudications on stamp duty by the Commissioners of Inland Revenue, under section 18 of the Stamp Act, 1870, have recently become somewhat eccentric. The eccentricity, if we may judge from the information which has reached us is, not in the direction of a low rate of duty, but manifests itself in strange, farfetched contentions that an instrument which, in fact and in substance, plainly falls under one head of duty may, by a warping of the definition of another kind of instrument, be subjected to a higher duty. We do not undertake to say whether the impression to which we refer is or is not well founded. We believe we are right in saying that it exists, and the reports of the present year furnish an extremely good instance of the tendency to which we refer.

In Thames Uonservators v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue (35 W. R. 274, 18 Q- B. D. 278) the facts were these. The Conservators, by agreement in writing, signed by their secretary, agreed to grant permission, during their pleasure, to a company to construct a new jetty at Northfieet, in consideration of an annual payment of £77. The company on their part agreed to accept such permissive grant on the terms and conditions thereof ; to pay £77 yearly so long as the jetty was allowed to remain, and to remove the jetty at any time on receiving notice in writing from the Conservators requiring them to do so. The instrument was stamped with a 6d. agreement stamp, and was submitted for adjudication. The Commissioners, taking perhaps a loftier flight of imagination than is their wont, converted this licence into “an instrument of conveyance on sale.” It was chargeable, they held, with ad valoram duty of £7 15s., calculated on the amount of £77, payable yearly for an indefinite period, in accordance with section 72, sub-section 2, of the Stamp Act, 1870.

Their reasons for this decision may, we suppose, be gathered from the arguments urged by their counsel on the appeal to the High Court. Section 70 of the Stamp Act, 1870, defines “conveyance or sale ” as including “ every instrument . . . whereby any property upon the sale thereof is legally or equitably transferred to, or vested in, the purchaser.” Here, said the learned counsel, there was a transfer of a right for money: a right is _p;0p9ll3Y § hence there was a transfer of property to a purchaser. e really think that if the counsel who were retained to urge this so-called argument had any sense of humour they must have argued with their tongues in their cheeks. How on earth can a simple licence to do something on the property of another, which licence cannot be assigned, be called a transfer of property? How can such a licence, grinted in consideration of a yearly payment, be called a sale of property? The court, at all events, had no doubt on thfl point, and held that the instrument was only chargeable 68 811 agreement with a 6d. stamp. We are not concerned to discuss the alternative contentions raised by the Commissioners, evidently _iii the anticipation that their adjudication could not stand. We cite the case merely as an instance of the extraordinary nature of the adjudications which may nowadays proceed from the Commissioners.

We venture to submit that section 18 of the Stamp Act, 1370, was not intended as a means of enabling the Commissioners 01‘ their advisers to exercise their ingenuity in straining the pr0V1@1°l1@ of the Stamp Act in order to obtain a few extra pounds for the revenue. It was intended as a means of enabling people who BIB doubtful about the proper stamp to be placed upon an instrumellli to obtain a fair, semi-judicial interpretation of the provisi_0l1B °f the Act. The object which the adjudication stamp was originally intended to fulfil is well stated by Mr. Dowell (who as assistantsolicitor of Inland Revenue was one of the best authorities on the subject) as follows :—“ The stamp was introduced in 1850. _Tl}0 complicated state of the stamp laws at that time rendered it 111 many cases a matter of difficulty to determine the proper amount of duty payable; the best intentions could not prevent occasioiial mistakes; and no solicitor was ever secure that, on an investigation

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of title or on production in court, an instrument might not prove to be defective in stamp. To meet these cases of doubt power was, by special enactment, given to the Commissioners " to adjudicate the duty (History of the Stamp Duties, p. 112). Binee 1870 the person who submits an instrument for adjudication is bound to have it stamped in accordance with the Commissioners’ assessment, and his only remedy for an eccentric adjudication is the expensive one of an appeal to the High Court. In common fairness the Commissioners or their advisers should consider that they are in the position, as regards adjudication, of a semi-judicial authority, and not of oificers whose duty it is to screw out of the applicant as much stam duty as they possibly can. And we think that they should not fbrget that, in the majority of cases, there is no practical appeal from their assessment, the amount at stake not being sufficient to warrant the cost.

The result of the distrust occasioned by such interpretations as that to which we have referred is likely to be to put a stop to applications for adjudication. Whether this will be advantageous to the revenue or not we will not venture to say, but it will certainly be felt as a hardship by solicitors.

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IS COMPULSION REALLY NECESSARY FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF REGISTRATION OF TITLE? III.

Ova last article brought us to the consideration of the more refined reason for demanding compulsion which has latterly recommended itself to the authorities—namely, that registration is no

benefit to the present generation of landowners.

As to this view of the matter, we cannot help hazarding the surmise that if compulsion had not been previously determined upon for some other reason, we should have heard little or nothing about it; for it appears to us, in the mouth of an advocate of registration, to be nothing less than a most damaging misrepresentation of the system, arising solely from defective apprehension of its claims and characteristics. If registration be introduced with care and economy in the arrangement of its details (without which it will be useless alike to the present and the future landowner), it is just as likely to prove beneficial to this generation as to any other. For instance, if possessory titles are (as they may be) admitted to the register without any preliminary evidence at all, the whole process will amount to no more than the furnishing of a description of the property, sufiiciently clear for index purposes, and the name of the proprietor (with a schedule of incumbrances, perhaps, where any exist). Every purchaser might thus register his estate immediately on completion of the purchase at a very small expense, with the result that in about twenty years’ time (and many a present purchaser expects to live twenty years) he would have a practically absolute title, ready for sale or mortgage at greatly reduced rates. Even if the only sale contemplated were the ordinary sale by trustees after the present proprietor's own death, surely the saving of £50 or £100 to his children's estate would seldom be regarded as “no benefit." Thus far with possessory title only, but it has also been pointed out in recent works that, under the system proposed by the Bill of merely guaranteeing titles rather than declaring them indefeasible, an absolute title need cost no more in money and time than a sale costs now, and so absolute titles might be obtained on the occasion of sales, and perhaps of mortgages too, at very little any) increased cost. This result has been observed in actual practice on the registration of many complicated titles under the Torrens Acts. Here, then, is another obvious benefit to the present landowner if registration is what it professes to be. Or, lastly, if the system of confirmations does what is expected of it, a property will be ready for sale or mortgage with absolute title in five years’ time at an expense hardly greater than that of a mere possessory title. Is this no benefit to the present landowner? We are aware that some believe that the confirmation system will prove difficult and expensive; but these are not among the supporters of the Bill, with whom alone we are now arguing. In fact, to give this argumcnt its full force, landowners must appear to be among the most Ignorant and improvident ersons in the whole community; whereas it is well known that the exact reverse is the truthwitness the elaborate developing of estates for building, the drainage, the plantation, the reclamation that we see going on daily.

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So far from the present landowner being imwilling to spend money for the benefit of future generations, there is probably no class in the community so uniformly addicted to the practice. So far from the present purchaser being careless about making provision for future sales and mortgages, he is, in reality, only too ready to spend money and to take trouble in improving his selling titlewitness all those expensive and tedious pilgrimages which are taken by purchasers to obtain evidence of titles which they are themselves perfectly satisfied with, solely with an eye to satisfying possible future purchasers and mortgagees.

We have dwelt on this topic because it appears to us that those who use the argument in question do not quite see what force it has as a weapon against themselves. To the mind of any person not originally favourable to registration it simply suggests the question, Is it not the benefit itself (present or future) that is doubtful rather than the landowners’ due appreciation of it? If the benefit were clear its futnrity would not prevent landowners from availing themselves of it; if it be not clear compulsion is less than justifiable.

Thus the two most popular arguments for compulsion are greatly invalidated by inspection. Let us pass on to consider _the third. It is said that to shrink from insisting _upon the immediate universalit which compulsion would produce is much the same as to shrink iiom getting into the water before learning to swim ; _to ask that compulsion be deferred until the system has bee_n_tried and has been proved to be successful is to prevent the possibility of such proof ever arising; in short, that registration to be §ucce.ssf'z{l must be universal. As long as the system is optional (it _is said) it is never worth while for professional men to make a serious study of the Act; the result of this is that _when the few registered titles that exist are dealt with, the parties experience all kinds of inconvenience, expense, and delay owing to their own and their legal advisers want of familiarity with the system. ' _

In reply it may be urged that the Torrens Acts in Australia were successful from the first. In South Australia, a very small colony in 1857—its population. being under 100,000—-over 1,000 voluntary applications (proportiorially equal to somewhere about 200,000 for England) were made in the first eighteen months. I_t is perfectly true that in England hitherto registration has been, if not opposed, still substantially ignored by English landowners End their advisers. While the e_age_r and irresponsible have been becoming more and more enthusiastic about it as a theory, the learned and experienced have, at any rate till a yery short_ while ago, been more and more persistently neglectmg it in practice. The reason of this we believe (with Lord Thring)_to have been that no effort was made in 1875 to counteract the blighting effect of the failure of 1862, or to make the system sufliciently known, or to smooth the way through the oflice of Laud Registry. Is it reasonable to conclude that a new voluntary system, free from these disadvantages, would meet with a similar fate? It seems to us, on a survey of all the arguments in favour_of compulsion, that the Qomuptgeefo the Incorporated L_aw Society were justified in saymg t a i 1; system of registration cannot_ be worked except by_ tI)1£)elBB1:.Xl;6t lp compulsion, it will be because it has not been made E111 taf ei-rt tee requirements o_f the cpungy, and will hamper, instea o ao i a , th(ill1:;iI]d!;§1:S,wIill1Wlf3e:6!‘?Bt0 Zonsider the practical position _of naatttfireé as regards the Bill of last session. We may pp cgjngince mu; compulsion is equally unnecessary and un esira 8, ud vggt that look at the probable course of events. There can e niotho is no it is intended to re-mtroduce the Bill nexpsessijolp "uh 9: int!“ use in shutting our eyes to the plbflb11tY t air, W ‘in Se" we duced, it will be found to contain the colmpu sion crpiign .of our must take into account the fact that a arge propolsion what legislators are apparently Hi? Present m f“Y°u1,,° $59re '0“ or course should be taken by the professioii _ d ere tpfis “Feet two considerations which should be borne in rnln f 011 1 _on Jwn:

First, it should be remembered that the species ost¢1>1omP“t°éhat has tained in last session’s Bill is by no means the most_ 25611“ id“ it been devised. It may be _well for the professioiiet 00 sine for respectfully, lest a_worse thing happen to them. upflps cona moment to explain exactly what we mean. The c<LmP 51°“ctu8l templated by the Bill was of a potential rather tdanfaphaL°rd character; it left the matter practically in the han s o Fed _t Chancellor himself; it might never be _applwd; When Biggl phlt admitted of gradual and partial application. It provi A

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absolute titles should not be granted without much circuinspcction. The comments of the extremists on these features of the Bill are well exemplified by Mr. Arthur Arnold’s article in the Fortnightly Review of July. If politicians of this type had_ their way, compulsion would be unconditional, immediate, and universal, apd absolute titles would be granted on the lapse of some undetermined period whose outside limit they propose, apparently, to fix at about six months from receipt of the applicant's statement that he is in rightful possession as owner in fee.

Secondly, should the Bill pass into law substantially in the form promulgated last session, it is impossible to repress the con_]ect.ure that the nearness or remoteness of the incidence of compulsion may largely be determined by the progress of voluntary registration during the preparatory interval that will elapse after the defining of a district. Further, it is scarcely necessary to add that the rate of this progress will be largely determined by the attitude assumed by the profession, and the advice given by them to their clients. If the will of the Legislature is to confer on the Lord Chancellor any compulsory powers, it stands to reason that if the solicitors permit their clients to continue to ignore the system, those powers will be exercised; and, if exercised, the profession will have itself to thank for whatever evils compulsion may bring in its train. But if by any means the landowners can be induced to adopt registration voluntarily in sufficient numbers to give it obviously the fair trial it is supposed to want, we should suppose that the authorities and the public will probably be satisfied, and disinclined to court the obvious risks which compulsory enforcement of the Act seems likely to bring.

There are two or three principal ways in which the almost indispensable assistance of solicitors in giving voluntary registration a fair trial of this kind can be supplied quite consistently with due regard to the interest of their clients.

(1) Purchases of land intended to be held separately, or in conjunction with land likely to be sold or mortgaged, might be registered by the purchaser with possessory title, provided the cost be trifling.

(2) If ordinary good holding titles are accepted and guaranteed by the registry at a reasonable price, some scheme for conducting ordinary sales through the registry to result (at the joint expense of vendor and purchaser) in an absolute title for the purchaser, might be arranged without serious difliculty. The class of property that seems especially suitable for registration is, doubtless, estates (of every kind) which are intended to be held separately, and which will be likely to be separately mortgaged or sold in the more or less immediate future. Most town holdings, and a very cpnsiderable proportion of the smaller country holdings, are of this c ass.

Another class of property, at first sight most suitable for absolute title, has not unfrequently disappointed its proprietors and persons dealing with it when registered—namel_v, estates about to be laid out for building purposes. The difliculties, however, appear to have lain in the somewhat inadequate preparation made by the enactments for the practical process of cutting up registered estates. If this defect is removed, and a convenient process (like that actually in use under the Torrens Acts) for dividing estates on the register be devised, this class of lands, too, will afford a sufliciently promising field for the operations of the Land Transfer Board.

The cases where we should hesitate to recommend registration offhand woull be those where the land purchased is to be brought into_settlenient or is to form part of other estates not registered or not intended for the market.

The practical bearing of these observations will be seen to be shortly this, that if the profession see their way to advising their clients to register voluntarily, slill more if t/my oauld ying flu; authorities any Irusfivarl/iy guarantee to that effect, it is possible that actual compulsion may be deferred or dropped, although the power of putting it in force may be retained. It must however he clearly understood that we do not speak with any aiithority oii this point; we merely venture to give form to ideas which have presented themselves to us of late in connection with the matte;-_

Our readers have now the materials for judging whether their forces will be _ most advantageously devoted to the endeavour to oppose the Bill or the compulsory clauses of it, or to rendering unnecessary the enforcement of those clauses the mgr

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LEGISLATION OF THE YEAR. RESIGNATION OF INCUMBENTS.

50 & 51 Vicr. o. 23.—Aiv Aer T0 AMEND Tun INCUMBENTS RasmNATION Aer, 1871.

More than a dozen Bills affecting the clergy were introduced into Parliament last session. Of these only three passed, and the present Act is the only one worth notice amongst them. The Act of 1871 (31 & 35 Vict. c. =14), by s. S, allows retiring incumbents to receive such sum by way of pension as shall be fixed by commissioners up to one-third of the annual value of the benefice resigned. The

resent Act contains amendments of the Act of 1871, providing fl) that the pension, if the income of the beneficc is derived from tithe ren t-charge or glebe, is to vary and be regulated by the tithe averages; (2) that the salary of any curate who is compnlsorily employed, and also annual payments in respect of terminabls mortgages are to be provided for out of the income to be left to the incoming incumbent, and (3) that if the retiring incumbent has not settled with his successor for dilapidations, the successor may deduct the amount due for dilapidations from the pension. The result of all which amendments will be that pensions in a large majority of cases will be very small indeed. If the Church Patronage Bill which passed the House of Lords last session should come before the House of Commons next year, an opportunity will arise for better providing for resigning incumbents.

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This compact little statute eifects many important changes in the law “ of truck,” or payment of wages otherwise than in_ coin. The old Truck Act of 1831 (1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 37), which was itself a consolidating statute, being preceded by an Act 1 8: 2 Will. 4, c. 36, repealing all the many prior enactments on the subject, has long been unsuitable to modern law from the mere fact of having been passed prior to the Summary Jurisdiction Acts. The present Act opens by widely extending the operation of truck law. The Act of 1831 merely applied to workmen in certain specified trades. The present Act extends the law of truck to all workmen _to whom the Employers and Workmen Act of 1875 app1ies—th_at is to say, speaking generally, to every person, except a domestic or menial servant, employed under a contract with an employer persollv-1lY to execute work by manual labour, and also charges (section 15. sub-section 2) inspectors of factories and mines with the duty of enforcing the law (which no doubt is in many places u dead letter) within their districts so far as respects factories, workshops and mines; so that, excepting agricultural labourers, the great majority of servants in England will have a public prosecutor to protect them. Section 4 provides that nothing in the two Acts shall render illegal a contract with a servant in husbandry for giving him fwd, drink, not being i'nto1:icati'ng, a. cottage, or other allowances or privileges in ruldition to money wages as a remuneration for his services.” The important question, veiled under the Act of 1531 beneath general words, must now arise sooner or later whether the usual allowances of beer and cider to agricultural labourers are illegal or not, and, upon the whole, we incline to think that such allowances would generally be held illegal. The question would depend upon whether the workman would have entered into the service had he expected that the drink would not be given; ind» looking to the words “remuneration for his services,” _which are inconsistent with gratuities, we cannot but think that this qn9_8tl0P would, in most cases, be decided against masters, though the point is u very difiicult one. Other sections prohibit deduction of discount where wages are paid by custom in advance, and deductions for sharpening tools except by special agreement, and provide fol: B11 audit of the deductions allowed by the Act of 1831 for medicine» education, and tools, and apply the law to persons making up 11119" and woollen, &c., articles, under the value of £5, at their own homes for sale to trade buyers. ,

The repeals are mostly formal, and consequent upon the substitution of the procedure under the Summary Jurisdiction Acts for tho now obsolete procedure contained in the Act of 1831. With regard l"° legal procedure generally, it may be noticed that the ~1th section Of the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879, has the effect of allowing the ininimum penalty of five pounds to be mitigated to any aniou_nt, 5115'? certiorari is excluded by the Act of 1831 ; and that there will be no appeal from the imposition of the fines, the Act of 1831 providing non_e, und. the Summary Jurisdiction Act of 1879 only allowing an appeal in case imprisonment be adjudged, which neither the Act of l3_31_ °T this Act appear to authorize, the Act of 1831 ex ressly restricting the punishment even for a third oifence to a fine onl) . _

The only other enactment to which attention need be called is the

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12th, whereby, following the precedent of the Factory and Worlrhop Act, s. 87, and other modern Acts, it is provided that an employer whose agent is the guilty person, may exempt himself from the pfilmltififl Of the Acts upon layin such information as will lead to the conviction of the actual offender.

BOUNDARIES.

50 & 51 Vict. c. 6l.—AN Aer ron Arroinrmo Comrrssronnns T0 INQUIRE inn) REPORT AS T0 THE BOUNDARIES or CERTAIN Aams or Loom. GOVERNMENT nv ENGLAND.

This Act is, of course, less important in itself than what it is expected to lead to. A new _a.nd symmetrical system of local government has long been the 0l)_]8Cb of both political parties, and all who have studied the subject are agreed that a thorough rearrangement_of boundaries must first be accomplished. The present Act constitutes a Boundary Commission composed of Earl Brownlow, Parhamentary Secretary of the Local Government Board, Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, the author of a Boundaries Bill under another Government, Lord Basing, Sir H. Selwin-Ibbetson, and Mr. I-Iibhert, who are at once “ by themselves, or by assistant commissioners appointed by them,” to inquire as to the best mode of (1) so ad]ust1ng the boundaries of each county, and other areas of local government, ‘_‘ as to arrange that no union, borough, sanitary district, or_ parish, shall be situate in more than one county ”; (2) of dealing with detached parts of counties; and (3) of dealing with the cases where a borough is not an urban sanitary district and is wholly or partly comprised in an urban sanitary district; also (4) ‘_‘as to any alteration of boundaries, combination of areas, or administrative arrangements incidental to or consequential on any alteration which they may recommend in the boimdaries of any county, union, borough, sanitary district, or parish.” The powers of the Commissioners are to cease at the end of 1888, and do not extend to the Metropolis. It will be observed that nothing is said as to Parliamentary electoral divisions, petty sessional divisions, or coroner’s districts, and it seems that it would be technically outside the scope of the Commission to inquire into the boundaries of those areas. The report of the Commission will, we hope, be followed by an “ Areas Act,” with a schedule mapping out the whole of England auto algae, and distinguishing the purposes for which the areas are to

e use .

REVIE WS. convsrsncme.

A Satacrios or PRECEDBNTS IN CONVEYANOING, TAKEN raoir Monaim NIANUSCBIPT COLLECTIONS AND DRAFTS IN ACTUAL PRACTICE, wirn DISSERTATIONS AND PRACTICAL Norse BY run LATE W. M. BYTIIEWOOD, THOMAS J4 RMAN, AND Gr-zones SWEET, Barristers-at-Law. Fourth Edition. By Laorow Gnonoa Gonnon‘ ROBBINS, Barrister-at-Law. Vol. 4, NIOIITM.-\IN——POWERS or ATTORNEY. H. Sweet & Sons.

This volume, which contains the headings “ Mortmain,” “Notices,” “_P*1fl-115i0i1,” “ Partnership and Companies,” “ Patent and Copy“Ebb” and "Powers of Attorney,” will form a very useful addition to the conveyancer’s library. The dissertations contained in it are of very ireat value. We cannot, perhaps, give higher praise to rhem than Y saying that they are not unworthy of their predecessors in former editions of this work, a remark which those of our readers Who are old enough to have studied the former editions will know to "lei"-1 very high praise. We are not aware of any work that treats the subjects of “ Partition " and “ Powers of Attorney" so fully and accurately as the present volume.

The very size of the book renders it somewhat diflicult to give an extract which will be a fair specimen of the editor’s method of treat1l1g_ his subject ; perhaps the discussion at p. 15 shewing that B licence in mortmain which enables a charity to which if reffiffl t0 wk? Property does not enable an intending donor to give property which, by reason of 9 Geo. 3, c. 36, he could not otherwise give; at P- 361, B8 to what powers of attorney can be given by a married w°"1B11 ; Bt p. 277, as to each partner’s lien on the partnership property—will enable the reader to form a fair idea of the editor’s style. H The collection of precedents in “ Patent and Copyright,” 8-Ild in

Powers of Attomey," appears to be very good. The precedent xx., at P- 497, being a deed executed on the dissolution of partnership on %il1_u1 of time, where one partner takes all the assets, but a formal Pfifllglnment is dispensed with to avoid stamp duty, is a good specimen °f t e editor's power of dealing with the most difiicult form of draft. Itmy usefully be compared with a somewhat similar precedent at 2 KW & Elphinstone Comp. 339.

We observe that the editor adopts the form of luzbemlum introd“°ed, we believe, by Mr. Wolstenholme, in which the only operative

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words are “ to'hold.’l This form has passed into such common usage that it is_now impossible to change it. and we cannot object to the editor using it; but it contains a double inaccuracy: the old form,

to have and to hold," contained the haZu.>1uIu1n and tenemlum in an abbreviated form; the tenmdum became useless in conveyances of freeholds after the Statute of Quin EInpt0’I‘C8, and might properly have been omitted, instead of which the modern form omits the words which represent the habewlum, and retains the words “ to hold," which represent the tencmluin ,' add to which, that, as has been pointed out by an eminent conveyaiicer in a sheet privately circulated, the Latin “ hubendum ” is not properly translated by “ to hold ” ; it ought rather to have been translated “ to be held.”

But. lastly. W6 W0l1ld ask, Why does the editor follow the bad example of Lord St. Leonards, and sometimes connect the cases by the words “ and so”? This criticism may appear captions, but we feel convinced that if the editor knew how much the phrase annoys some readers he would avoid it for the future.

MERCHANDISE MARKS ACT.

THE MERCIIANDISE Mruixs Aer, 1887, WITH NOTES axo Av InTRODUCTION. By ALBERT GRAY, Barrister-at-Law. W. Clowes & Sons (Limited).

This is a useful little edition of an important new Act, preceded by

a well-written introduction of some thirty pages, and followed by

appendices containing abstracts of statutory enactments relating to

the marking of particular classes of goods, foreign and colonial laws on the subject, and the Convention of Paris for the Protection of

Industrial Property, with an index. The Act is printed in a con

venient form, and the notes contain many suggestions and hints with

regard to the interpretation of the Act. The variations from the old

Act of 1862 are generally noted, and the provisions of the new Act

are freely illustrated by appropriate examples, especially with regard

to the use on goods of names of places, the improper use of wh~ch is now made a criminal offence. Mr. Gray appears to consider that any trade-mark may now be infringed with im unity so long as it is not registered. We cannot take this view, at all) events in cases in which any reputation has been acquired by the unregistered mark, having regard to the provisions of section 3, sub-section (2), which clearly points to misrepresentations made by the improper use of 11.fl!‘€gi?1tered marks and treats them as false trade descriptions. Again, having regard to section 5, sub-section (1) ((1.), we think it very questionable whether the use of “ false trade descriptions ” in advertisements will be free from liabilities. With these exceptions Mr. Gray seems to be a reasonably safe guide to the intricacies of an Act which is not by any means easy to interpret.

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with costs e ore e . _ payable by the plaintiffs, was to run from the date of the Judgment or froin the date of the taxing master's certificate. The_ cgrtificaée vs? pang

made till more than four years_after the date of the Ju gmen .

19th of March, 1883, Fry, J_.,_d1BmlEB6d the action with costs. The Court of Appeal reversed this decision, but the House of Lords subsequcmly restored it. The taxing master's certificate, as to the costs of one of the defendants, was made on the 30th of July, 1887. By the old practice of the Court of Chancery, differing in this respect from the practice of the Common Law Courts, inteiest on costs ran only froni_thc date Of The certificate. The Rules _of the Supreme Court of 1815 adopted tpe Chancery practice in this respect, but an alteration ‘was niadg by inc rules of 1883. In the Note to Form No. (W119 °f]'- f"-) 111 ~_PP‘=11‘"X H to the rules of 1883, it is stated that the interest on the costs is to run f I the da of thejudgrnent or order, or day on which money is dlffifilrd thoiil id dr da from which interest is directed by the order to run. as the 605,; hwy bfl " Those rules came into operation on the 2-lth of October, 1883. The preface to theiules provides {hat thpy shall “cola: into operation on that day, and shall also app yfi B0 cad: Trike,‘ practicable (unless otherwise expressly provided), 1:1 nllliqorth QJI Mid after that day in all causes and matters then P63 thg interest inns; mu (‘"'"i P-7O3)' um" ‘hi.’ rules 011883 appliedml it was ar ued that the from the date of the 3udgment. _On the Bpptgg t 8% and bdum

' h vin been dismissed in March, 18 , W85 B

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Therefore this action was “ pending" on the 24th of October, 1883, and the new rules applied. North, J ., was also right in holding that, though rule 14 of order 42 said that “ the forms in Appendix H. shall be used, with such variations as circumstances may require,” the forms must be followed in the absence of a special direction of the judge to the contrary. If an action was dismissed without_costs, of course the pt0Vlsl0l1s as to enforcing payment of costs and interest on them would be omitted from the writ. Though the rights of the parties depended on the judgment, there was no vested right as regarded practice at the moment of the judgment, but the judgment must be worked out according to the rules and practice of the court at the time when it had to be worked out. LINDLEY and Lorss, L. JJ., CODCl1l'l'9d.—-COUNSEL, Cool.-mn, t_.),.G.. and A. G. Langley; Uozem-Hardy, Q.C., and Msthold. Soi.icii'ons, IV/sites, Ream‘/1, j- Co. ; Jolnmm 5- Raster.

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The question in this case was whether, in a foreclosure action, oommenced by originating summons under rule 5a. (December, 1885) of order 55 of the R. S. C., 1883, the defendants having made default in redeeming the mortgaged premises at the time appointed by the foreclosure, an order for the delivery of possession to the plaintifi by some of the defendants of part of the mortgaged premises, of which those defendants were in possession, could be made upon motion by the plaintiff in the absence of those defendants, the summons not having asked for delivery of possession. The notice of motion asked that the order for foreclosure might be made absolute, and that the defendants who were in possession might be ordered to deliver possession to the plaintiff. The defendants had been served with notice of the motion, but they did not appear. The defendants iii possession were some of the mortgagors. North, J., felt some difliculty in ordering delivery of possession in the absence of the defendants, as the summons had not asked for it. The plaintiffs counsel cited Salter v. Edgar (30 Sor.ici'rons’ JOURNAL, 322, W. N., 1886, . 47) and Lacan v. Tyrnll (W. N. , 1887, p. 71) as precedents for making are order under such circumstances. Each of the cases was cited from the Weekly Notes. In the former case the action was commenced by writ, but neither the writ nor the statement of claim asked for delivery of possession. In that case Chitty, J., is reported to have held that, on making the foreclosure absolute, an order for delivery of possession could be made against the mortgagor, though it could not have been made against a third party. In the second case a similar order was made by Stirling, J., in an action commenced by summons.

_Nom'ri, J., said that he could hardly understand how there was jurisdiction to order delivery of possession when the summons did not ask for it. _But he would follow the cases cited, if the registrar should find, on looking at the actual orders made, that they were precedents for what was asked.—Cour<ssL, Jason Smith. SoLici-roiis, lllorten, Cutler, 4- Co.

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This was a summons by a . purchaser of real estate, under the Vendor and Purchaser _Act, 1874, asking for a declaration that the vendor was not entitled to rescmd the contract for sale. The vendor had given notice to rescind, proposing to do so under _a power reserved to him in the contract. l‘he preliminary question was raised whether there was jurisdiction to determine the validity of the notice of rescission upon a summons under the Act. Section 9 excepts from the power given to raise questions between a vendor and purchaser by summons “ questions affecting the existence or validity of the contract."

Ifi°_BT". J‘! held that those words of exception refer to the existence or validity of_the contract in its inception, and that there was jurisdiction to determine the validity of the notice of rescission.

The summons had been _adjourned into court from chambers without any discussion before the chief clerk, and under these circumstances f liililiirg, J.,_held that the objection as to jurisdiction, which was taken lg? _eCOrst tll1l6;;Vl1€l1 the case was opened in court, was not taken too 00I"d;;‘;::‘Lr,g 51’/Slug’; T. L. Wilkirisori. Soucirons, Burton, Ycales, §

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which fees have heretofore been allowed, the same or similar fees are to be allowed for such work and labour as have heretofore been allowed." And, by sub-rule 37, “The rules, orders, and practice of any court whose jurisdiction is transferred to the High Court of Justice or Court of Appeal relating to costs, and the allowance of the fees of solicitors and attorneys, and the taxation of costs, existing prior to the commencement of the principal Act, shall, in so far as they are not inconsistent with the principal Act and these rules, remain in force and be applicable to the costs of the same or analogous proceedings, and to the allowance of the fees of solicitors of the Supreme Court, and the taxation of costs in the High Court of Justice and Court of Appeal.” In Svsndsen v. Wallace (34. W. lt. 151, 16 Q. B. D. 27), decided since 1883, it was held by a Divisional Court of the Q.ueen’s Bench Division that refreshers couldbe allowed on the hearing of an appeal from that division, though the taxing master had been of a contrary opinion. In the present case the appeal was from the Chancery Division, and the hearing of the appeal had occupied four days. The action was dismissed with costs, and on the taxation the defendants claimed refresher fees paid to their counsel for three days, relying on Svemlscn v. Wallace. The taxing master (Mr. Wainwright) held that that case did not apply to appeals from the Chancery Division, and disallowed the refreshers,without exercising any discretion, on the ground that he had no owar to allow them. He said:—“In the Court of Chancery, before tge oral examination of witnesses in that court, daily refreshers were not allowed nor paid. In 1.'{arrison v. Wearing the decision and reasoning of Jessel, M.R., are quite opposed to the allowance of daily refreshers on appeals.”

Norvrir, J ., held that Svcmilmi v. Wallzzrc applied, and that there was jurisdiction to allow refreshers, if the taxing master, in the exercise of his discretion, should think fit to allow them. The learned judge said that the Court of Appeal is one court, entertaining appeals from all the divisions of the High Court, the Bankruptcy, the Palatine Court, and other jurisdictions, and in nearly all cases there was no uivd vofe evidence on the hearing of an appeal. It would be very inconvenient if the amount of the costs was to be regulated, not by the work done, but by the circumstance from which court the appeal came. The Rules of 1883 were a code regulating the practice in the High Court and the Court of Appeal generally. He thought the line which the taxing master had drawn could not be maintained. The rule ought to be the same from whatever court the appeal might come. In other cases the Court of Appeal had held that when the practice had been diflerentin courts whose jurisdiction was transferred to the High Court, the more convenient practice ought to be adopted by the High Court after the transfer. He thought the rules made no distinction between the diiferent divisions.Couusst, W. D. Rawlins,- Grosvmar Woods. Soticiroas, Clarke, llawlms, Q‘ 00.; West, King, Adams, §< C0.

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The question in this case was whether the solicitors of the vendor of property sold by auction were entitled to charge for work done bi them prior to the sale, an auctioneer having been employed at the 6396115°f the client to conduct the sale, the solicitors having in their bill of costs claimed the “ conducting fee ” prescribed by Part . of Schedule I. to the Remuneration Order. Rule ll in Schedule I. provides that “ the scale _f01‘ conducting a sale by auction shall apply only in oases where no O0ml11.l551°n is paid by tho client to an auctioneer.’ In the present case tho 1?|‘°P°1"Y was sold in three lots. The bill of the vendor’s (solicitors COl1l'1B1.IJ6dtll? following items: “ Fee on preparing advertisement for sale of prop6I$7_ ° which you are mortgagee, inserting advertisement in PEPE", PI°P*m“_g conditions of sale, deducing title thereto, and completing conveyanw thereof, as follows:

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The bill also contained some items for disbursements, one of which was 1'0! “ auctioneer's charges £10 1s." This sum was made up of a fee of £3 3s. 00 the auctioneer for each lot and a sum of 12s for expenses out of P°°k°l' The taxing master disallowed in respect of the three lots respectivflli ‘he sums of £5, £5, and £5 10s. In the taxin master's answers to <>bi@<='-i°'“‘ he said, “ an auctioneer was employed wlio conducted the sale» and was paid (by the client) his usual commission. The solicitors He, llheretonh not entitled to charge ‘conducting fees ' but only the fees for ‘contract, deducing title, and completing.‘ This being a taxation Elder. Eh? Solicitors’ Act, I have no ower to amend the bill which, ° am '

should have donc, by allowillg the solicitors three guiiieas for their trouble in insgucting the auctioneer, and any other labour not covered by lb’ “ale ees a owed.’

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