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an option of appealing either under that procedure or under the Act originally giving the appeal, as they might be advised. But the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1884, not only enacts that in future the uniform procedure of the Act of 1879 must of necessity be followed in all cases, but repeals a string of enactments, and amongst them the part of section 23 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875, which regulates the procedure on appeal, leaving unrepealed those words only which give the right of appeal. Is the appeal under the Margarine Act to be conducted under the Act of 1879 as amended by the Act of 1884, or is it to be conducted under the Act of 1875, s. 23, simpliciter? On the whole, we incline to think that the rule of Reg. v. Smith (21 W. R. 282, 8 Q B. 146), that where an earlier Act is incorporated in a later, the repeal of the earlier Act does not repeal the incorporated part so far as regards the later Act, would apply to an appeal under the Margarine Act, but the point is a

doubtful one.

THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION for the creation of a union for the protection of literary and artistic works which was ratified last month between England, France, Germany, Belgium, Spain, Switzerland, and several small States, to a considerable extent supersedes the existing conventions with several of these Powers, but it is expressly provided that such conventions, so far as they confer on authors more extended powers than those secured by the usion and are not contrary to the new convention, shall be maintained. The general effect of the new convention is to give to every author in all the countries ratifying the convention the same copyright which he has in his own country. As it is expressed in article 2, "Authors of any of the countries of the union, or their lawful representatives, shall enjoy in the other countries for their works, whether published in one of those countries or unpublished, the rights which the respective laws do now or may hereafter grant to natives." And under the definitions of article 4 the protection thus given is extended to "every production whatsoever in the literary, scientific, or artistic domain which can be published by any mode of impression or reproduction." Provision is

made for the accession to the convention of other countries on request to that effect. But the most novel feature of the convention is the establishment of an international office under the name of

"The office of the International Union for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works." This office, the expenses of which are to be borne by the administrations of all the countries of the union, is placed under the authority of the Swiss Confederation, and is to work under its direction. The organization of the office is to be fixed by a regulation to be drawn up by the Government of the Swiss Confederation; and it appears that its functions are to be to collect, arrange, and publish all kinds of information relative to the protection of the rights of authors in their literary and artistic works, to study general questions of utility likely to be of interest to the union, and to edit a periodical publication. Interesting questions are likely to arise with regard to this international publication. Who will be responsible for the occasional libels which it may contain, and will it be written in the extraordinary language in which the English version of the convention is couched ?

THE DECISION of Mr. Justice NORTH in Easton v. London Joint Stock Bank, that refresher fees to counsel may be allowed on appeals from the Chancery Division, appears to us to be reasonable, though we are not quite clear that it is a correct interpretation of the rules of court. In Svendsen v. Wallace (34 W. R. 151, 16 Q. B. D. 27) it was held that the power of a taxing master to allow refreshers is not limited to the cases specified in ord. 65, r. 27, sub-rule 48, and that such refreshers might, therefore, be allowed on the hearing of an appeal from the Queen's Bench Division, although no oral evidence was taken. "I have no doubt," Mr. Justice DAY said, "that an argument in the Court of Appeal comes under the general term [of sub-rule 30] work and labour.'" That sub-rule, however, is limited to "work and labour in respect of which fees have heretofore been allowed," and although refreshers were allowed in the old Exchequer Chamber they were not allowed in the Chancery Appeal Court. But as Mr. Justice NORTH pointed out, the Court of Appeal is now one court, entertaining appeals from all the divisions of the High Court, and it

would be very inconvenient if the amount of the costs was to be regulated, not by the work done, but by the circumstance from which court the appeal came.

STAMP DUTY ADJUDICATIONS.

THERE is an impression abroad that, for some reason or other, the adjudications on stamp duty by the Commissioners of Inland Revenue, under section 18 of the Stamp Act, 1870, have recently become somewhat eccentric. The eccentricity, if we may judge from the information which has reached us is, not in the direc tion of a low rate of duty, but manifests itself in strange, farfetched contentions that an instrument which, in fact and in substance, plainly falls under one head of duty may, by a warping of the definition of another kind of instrument, be subjected to a higher duty. We do not undertake to say whether the impression to which we refer is or is not well founded. We believe we are right in saying that it exists, and the reports of the present year furnish an extremely good instance of the tendency to which we refer.

In Thames Conservators v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue (35 W. R. 274, 18 Q. B. D. 278) the facts were these. The Conservators, by agreement in writing, signed by their secretary, agreed to grant permission, during their pleasure, to a company to construct a new jetty at Northfleet, in consideration of an annual payment of £77. The company on their part agreed to accept such permissive grant on the terms and conditions thereof; to pay £77 yearly so long as the jetty was allowed to remain, and to remove the jetty at any time on receiving notice in writing from the Conservators requiring them to do so. The instrument was stamped with a 6d. agreement stamp, and was submitted for adjudication. The Commissioners, taking perhaps a loftier flight of imagination than is their wont, converted this licence into "an instrument of conveyance on sale." It was chargeable, they held, with ad valorem duty of £7 15s., calculated on the amount of £77, payable yearly for an indefinite period, in accordance with section 72, sub-section 2, of the Stamp Act, 1870.

Their reasons for this decision may, we suppose, be gathered from the arguments urged by their counsel on the appeal to the High Court. Section 70 of the Stamp Act, 1870, defines "conveyance or sale "as including "every instrument . . whereby any property upon the sale thereof is legally or equitably transferred to, or vested in, the purchaser." Here, said the learned counsel, there was a transfer of a right for money: a right is property; hence there was a transfer of property to a purchaser. We really think that if the counsel who were retained to urge this so-called argument had any sense of humour they must have argued with their tongues in their cheeks. How on earth can a simple licence to do something on the property of another, which licence cannot be assigned, be called a transfer of property? How can such a licence, grinted in consideration of a yearly payment, be called a sale of property? The court, at all events, had no doubt on the point, and held that the instrument was only chargeable as an agreement with a 6d. stamp. We are not concerned to discuss the alternative contentions raised by the Commissioners, evidently in the anticipation that their adjudication could not stand. We cite the case merely as an instance of the extraordinary nature of the adjudications which may nowadays proceed from the Commissioners.

We venture to submit that section 18 of the Stamp Act, 1870, was not intended as a means of enabling the Commissioners or their advisers to exercise their ingenuity in straining the provisions of the Stamp Act in order to obtain a few extra pounds for the revenue. It was intended as a means of enabling people who are doubtful about the proper stamp to be placed upon an instrument to obtain a fair, semi-judicial interpretation of the provisions of the Act. The object which the adjudication stamp was originally intended to fulfil is well stated by Mr. Dowell (who as assistantsolicitor of Inland Revenue was one of the best authorities on the subject) as follows:-"The stamp was introduced in 1850. The complicated state of the stamp laws at that time rendered it in many cases a matter of difficulty to determine the proper amount of duty payable; the best intentions could not prevent occasional mistakes; and no solicitor was ever secure that, on an investigation

of title or on production in court, an instrument might not prove to be defective in stamp. To meet these cases of doubt power was, by special enactment, given to the Commissioners" to adjudicate the duty (History of the Stamp Duties, p. 112). Since 1870 the person who submits an instrument for adjudication is bound to have it stamped in accordance with the Commissioners' assessment, and his only remedy for an eccentric adjudication is the expensive one of an appeal to the High Court. In common fairness the Commissioners or their advisers should consider that they are in the position, as regards adjudication, of a semi-judicial authority, and not of officers whose duty it is to screw out of the applicant as much stamp duty as they possibly can. And we think that they should not forget that, in the majority of cases, there is no practical appeal from their assessment, the amount at stake not being sufficient to warrant the cost.

The result of the distrust occasioned by such interpretations as that to which we have referred is likely to be to put a stop to applications for adjudication. Whether this will be advantageous to the revenue or not we will not venture to say, but it will certainly be felt as a hardship by solicitors.

IS COMPULSION REALLY NECESSARY FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF REGISTRATION OF TITLE?

III.

OUR last article brought us to the consideration of the more refined reason for demanding compulsion which has latterly recommended itself to the authorities-namely, that registration is no benefit to the present generation of landowners.

As to this view of the matter, we cannot help hazarding the surmise that if compulsion had not been previously determined upon for some other reason, we should have heard little or nothing about it; for it appears to us, in the mouth of an advocate of registration, to be nothing less than a most damaging misrepresentation of the system, arising solely from defective apprehension of its claims and characteristics. If registration be introduced with care and economy in the arrangement of its details (without which it will be useless alike to the present and the future landowner), it is just as likely to prove beneficial to this generation as to any other. For instance, if possessory titles are (as they may be) admitted to the register without any preliminary evidence at all, the whole process will amount to no more than the furnishing of a description of the property, sufficiently clear for index purposes, and the name of the proprietor (with a schedule of incumbrances, perhaps, where any exist). Every purchaser might thus register his estate immediately on completion of the purchase at a very small expense, with the result that in about twenty years' time (and many a present purchaser expects to live twenty years) he would have a practically absolute title, ready for sale or mortgage at greatly reduced rates. Even if the only sale contemplated were the ordinary sale by trustees after the present proprietor's own death, surely the saving of £50 or £100 to his children's estate would seldom be regarded as "no benefit." Thus far with possessory title only, but it has also been pointed out in recent works that, under the system proposed by the Bill of merely guaranteeing titles rather than declaring them indefeasible, an absolute title need cost no more in money and time than a sale costs now, and so absolute titles might be obtained on the occasion of sales, and perhaps of mortgages too, at very little (if any) increased cost. This result has been observed in actual practice on the registration of many complicated titles under the Torrens Acts. Here, then, is another obvious benefit to the present landowner if registration is what it professes to be. Or, lastly, if the system of confirmations does what is expected of it, a property will be ready for sale or mortgage with absolute title in five years' time at an expense hardly greater than that of a mere possessory title. Is this no benefit to the present landowner? We are aware that some believe that the confirmation system will prove difficult and expensive; but these are not among the supporters of the Bill, with whom alone we are now arguing. In fact, to give this argument its full force, landowners must appear to be among the most ignorant and improvident persons in the whole community; whereas it is well known that the exact reverse is the truthwitness the elaborate developing of estates for building, the drainage, the plantation, the reclamation that we see going on daily.

So far from the present landowner being unwilling to spend money for the benefit of future generations, there is probably no class in the community so uniformly addicted to the practice. So far from the present purchaser being careless about making provision for future sales and mortgages, he is, in reality, only too ready to spend money and to take trouble in improving his selling titlewitness all those expensive and tedious pilgrimages which are taken by purchasers to obtain evidence of titles which they are themselves perfectly satisfied with, solely with an eye to satisfying possible future purchasers and mortgagees.

We have dwelt on this topic because it appears to us that those who use the argument in question do not quite see what force it has as a weapon against themselves. To the mind of any person not originally favourable to registration it simply suggests the question, Is it not the benefit itself (present or future) that is doubtful rather than the landowners' due appreciation of it? If the benefit were clear its futurity would not prevent landowners from availing themselves of it; if it be not clear compulsion is less than justifiable.

Thus the two most popular arguments for compulsion are greatly invalidated by inspection. Let us pass on to consider the third. It is said that to shrink from insisting upon the immediate universality which compulsion would produce is much the same as to shrink from getting into the water before learning to swim; to ask that compulsion be deferred until the system has been tried and has been proved to be successful is to prevent the possibility of such proof ever arising; in short, that registration to be successful must be universal. As long as the system is optional (it is said) it is never worth while for professional men to make a serious study of the Act; the result of this is that when the few registered titles that exist are dealt with, the parties experience all kinds of inconvenience, expense, and delay owing to their own and their legal advisers want of familiarity with the system.

In reply it may be urged that the Torrens Acts in Australia were successful from the first. In South Australia, a very small colony in 1857-its population being under 100,000-over 1,000 voluntary applications (proportionally equal to somewhere about 200,000 for England) were made in the first eighteen months. It is perfectly true that in England hitherto registration has been, if not opposed, still substantially ignored by English landowners and their advisers. While the eager and irresponsible have been becoming more and more enthusiastic about it as a theory, the learned and experienced have, at any rate till a very short while ago, been more and more persistently neglecting it in practice. The reason of this we believe (with Lord Thring) to have been that no effort was made in 1875 to counteract the blighting effect of the failure of 1862, or to make the system sufficiently known, or to smooth the way through the office of Land Registry. Is it reasonable to conclude that a new voluntary system, free from these disadvantages, would meet with a similar fate? It seems to us, on a survey of all the arguments in favour of compulsion, that the Committee of the Incorporated Law Society were justified in saying that if a system of registration cannot be worked except by pressure of compulsion, it will be because it has not been made suitable to the requirements of the country, and will hamper, instead of facilitate, the dealings with real estate.

It remains, however, to consider the practical position of matters as regards the Bill of last session. We may all be convinced that compulsion is equally unnecessary and undesirable, but we must look at the probable course of events. There can be no doubt that it is intended to re-introduce the Bill next session, and there is no use in shutting our eyes to the probability that, when re-introduced, it will be found to contain the compulsion clause. must take into account the fact that a large proportion of our legislators are apparently at present in favour of compulsion. What course should be taken by the profession? There are one or two considerations which should be borne in mind on this subject.

We

First, it should be remembered that the species of compulsion contained in last session's Bill is by no means the most stringent that has been devised. It may be well for the profession to consider it respectfully, lest a worse thing happen to them. Let us pause for a moment to explain exactly what we mean. The compulsion contemplated by the Bill was of a potential rather than an actual character; it left the matter practically in the hands of the Lord Chancellor himself; it might never be applied; when applied, it admitted of gradual and partial application. It provided that

LEGISLATION OF THE YEAR. RESIGNATION OF INCUMBENTS.

absolute titles should not be granted without much circumspection. The comments of the extremists on these features of the Bill are well exemplified by Mr. Arthur Arnold's article in the Fortnightly Review of July. If politicians of this type had their way, compul- 50 & 51 VICT. c. 23.—AN ACT TO AMEND THE INCUMBENTS RESIGsion would be unconditional, immediate, and universal, and absolute titles would be granted on the lapse of some undetermined period whose outside limit they propose, apparently, to fix at about six months from receipt of the applicant's statement that he is in rightful possession as owner in fee.

Secondly, should the Bill pass into law substantially in the form promulgated last session, it is impossible to repress the conjecture that the nearness or remoteness of the incidence of compulsion may largely be determined by the progress of voluntary registration during the preparatory interval that will elapse after the defining of a district. Further, it is scarcely necessary to add that the rate of this progress will be largely determined by the attitude assumed by the profession, and the advice given by them to their clients. If the will of the Legislature is to confer on the Lord Chancellor any compulsory powers, it stands to reason that if the solicitors permit their clients to continue to ignore the system, those powers will be exercised; and, if exercised, the profession will have itself to thank for whatever evils compulsion may bring in its train. But if by any means the landowners can be induced to adopt registration voluntarily in sufficient numbers to give it obviously the fair trial it is supposed to want, we should suppose that the authorities and the public will probably be satisfied, and disinclined to court the obvious risks which compulsory enforcement of the Act seems likely to bring.

There are two or three principal ways in which the almost indispensable assistance of solicitors in giving voluntary registration a fair trial of this kind can be supplied quite consistently with due regard to the interest of their clients.

(1) Purchases of land intended to be held separately, or in conjunction with land likely to be sold or mortgaged, might be registered by the purchaser with possessory title, provided the cost be trifling. (2) If ordinary good holding titles are accepted and guaranteed by the registry at a reasonable price, some scheme for conducting ordinary sales through the registry to result (at the joint expense of vendor and purchaser) in an absolute title for the purchaser, might be arranged without serious difficulty. The class of property that seems especially suitable for registration is, doubtless, estates (of every kind) which are intended to be held separately, and which will be likely to be separately mortgaged or sold in the more or less immediate future. Most town holdings, and a very considerable proportion of the smaller country holdings, are of this Another class of property, at first sight most suitable for absolute title, has not unfrequently disappointed its proprietors and persons dealing with it when registered-namely, estates about to be laid out for building purposes. The difficulties, however, appear to have lain in the somewhat inadequate preparation made by the enactments for the practical process of cutting up registered estates. If this defect is removed, and a convenient process (like that actually in use under the Torrens Acts) for dividing estates on the register be devised, this class of lands, too, will afford a sufficiently promising field for the operations of the Land

class.

Transfer Board.

The cases where we should hesitate to recommend registration offhand woull be those where the land purchased is to be brought into settlement or is to form part of other estates not registered or not intended for the market.

The practical bearing of these observations will be seen to be shortly this, that if the profession see their way to advising their clients to register voluntarily, still more if they could give the authorities any trustworthy guarantee to that effect, it is possible that actual compulsion may be deferred or dropped, although the power of putting it in force may be retained. It must, however, be clearly understood that we do not speak with any authority on this point; we merely venture to give form to ideas which have presented themselves to us of late in connection with the matter. Our readers have now the materials for judging whether their forces will be most advantageously devoted to the endeavour to oppose the Bill or the compulsory clauses of it, or to rendering unnecessary the enforcement of those clauses, the mere passage of which may possibly suffice to ward off a far greater danger.

NATION ACT, 1871.

More than a dozen Bills affecting the clergy were introduced into Of these only three passed, and the Parliament last session. present Act is the only one worth notice amongst them. The Act of 1871 (34 & 35 Vict. c. 44), by s. 8, allows retiring incumbents to receive such sum by way of pension as shall be fixed by commissioners up to one-third of the annual value of the benefice resigned. The present Act contains amendments of the Act of 1871, providing (1) that the pension, if the income of the benefice is derived from tithe rent-charge or glebe, is to vary and be regulated by the tithe averages; (2) that the salary of any curate who is compulsorily employed, and also annual payments in respect of terminable mortgages are to be provided for out of the income to be incumbent has not settled with his successor for dilapidations, left to the incoming incumbent, and (3) that if the retiring the successor may deduct the amount due for dilapidations from the pension. The result of all which amendments will be that pensions in a large majority of cases will be very small indeed. If the Church Patronage Bill which passed the House of Lords last session should come before the House of Commons next year, an opportunity will arise for better providing for resigning incumbents.

TRUCK AMENDMENT.

30 & 51 VICT. c. 46.-AN ACT TO AMEND AND EXTEND THE LAW RELATING TO TRUCK.

law" of truck," or payment of wages otherwise than in coin. The This compact little statute effects many important changes in the old Truck Act of 1831 (1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 37), which was itself a consolidating statute, being preceded by an Act 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 36, repealing all the many prior enactments on the subject, has long been unsuitable to modern law from the mere fact of having been passed prior to the Summary Jurisdiction Acts. The present Act opens by widely extending the operation of truck law. The Act of 1831 merely applied to workmen in certain specified trades. The present Act extends the law of truck to all workmen to whom the Employers and Workmen Act of 1875 applies-that is to say, servant, employed under a contract with an employer personally speaking generally, to every person, except a domestic or menial to execute work by manual labour, and also charges (section 13, sub-section 2) inspectors of factories and mines with the duty of enforcing the law (which no doubt is in many places a dead letter) within their districts so far as respects factories, workshops and mines; so that, excepting agricultural labourers, the great majority of servants in England will have a public prosecutor to protect them. Section 4 provides that nothing in the two Acts shall render illegal a contract with a servant in husbandry for giving him food, drink, not being intoxicating, a cottage, or other allowances or privileges in addition to money wages as a remuneration for his services." The important question, veiled under the Act of 1831 beneath general words, must now arise sooner or later whether the usual allowances of beer and cider to agricultural labourers are illegal or not, and, upon the whole, we incline to think that such allowances would generally be held illegal. The question would depend upon whether the workman would have entered into the service had he expected that the drink would not be given, and, inconsistent with gratuities, we cannot but think that this question looking to the words "remuneration for his services," which are would, in most cases, be decided against masters, though the point is a very difficult one. Other sections prohibit deduction of discount where wages are paid by custom in advance, and deductions for sharpening tools except by special agreement, and provide for an audit of the deductions allowed by the Act of 1831 for medicine, education, and tools, and apply the law to persons making up linen and woollen, &c., articles, under the value of £5, at their own homes for sale to trade buyers.

The repeals are mostly formal, and consequent upon the substitution of the procedure under the Summary Jurisdiction Acts for the now obsolete procedure contained in the Act of 1831. With regard to legal procedure generally, it may be noticed that the 4th section of the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879, has the effect of allowing the minimum penalty of five pounds to be mitigated to any amount, that certiorari is excluded by the Act of 1831; and that there will be no appeal from the imposition of the fines, the Act of 1831 providing none, and the Summary Jurisdiction Act of 1879 only allowing an appeal in this Act appear to authorize, the Act of 1831 expressly restricting case imprisonment be adjudged, which neither the Act of 1831 or the punishment even for a third offence to a fine only.

The only other enactment to which attention need be called is the

12th, whereby, following the precedent of the Factory and Workshop Act, s. 87, and other modern Acts, it is provided that an employer, whose agent is the guilty person, may exempt himself from the penalties of the Acts upon laying such information as will lead to the conviction of the actual offender.

BOUNDARIES.

50 & 51 Vict. c. 61.-AN ACT FOR APPOINTING COMMISSIONERS TO INQUIRE AND REPORT AS ΤΟ THE BOUNDARIES OF CERTAIN AREAS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN ENGLAND.

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This Act is, of course, less important in itself than what it is expected to lead to. A new and symmetrical system of local government has long been the object of both political parties, and all who have studied the subject are agreed that a thorough rearrangement of boundaries must first be accomplished. The present Act constitutes a Boundary Commission composed of Earl Brownlow, Parliamentary Secretary of the Local Government Board, Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, the author of a Boundaries Bill under another Government, Lord Basing, Sir H. Selwin-Ibbetson, and Mr. Hibbert, who are at once by themselves, or by assistant commissioners appointed by them," to inquire as to the best mode of (1) so adjusting the boundaries of each county, and other areas of local government, "as to arrange that no union, borough, sanitary district, or parish, shall be situate in more than one county"; (2) of dealing with detached parts of counties; and (3) of dealing with the cases where a borough is not an urban sanitary district and is wholly or partly comprised in an urban sanitary district; also (4) "as to any alteration of boundaries, combination of areas, or administrative arrangements incidental to or consequential on any alteration which they may recommend in the boundaries of any county, union, borough, sanitary district, or parish." The powers of the Commissioners are to cease at the end of 1888, and do not extend to the Metropolis. It will be observed that nothing is said as to Parliamentary electoral divisions, petty sessional divisions, or coroner's districts, and it seems that it would be technically outside the scope of the Commission to inquire into the boundaries of those areas. The report of the Commission will, we hope, be followed by Areas Act," with a schedule mapping out the whole of England into areas, and distinguishing the purposes for which the areas are to

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REVIEWS.
CONVEYANCING.

words are "to hold." This form has passed into such common usage that it is now impossible to change it, and we cannot object to the editor using it; but it contains a double inaccuracy: the old form, "to have and to hold," contained the habendum and tenendum in an abbreviated form; the tenendum became useless in conveyances of freeholds after the Statute of Quia Emptores, and might properly have been omitted, instead of which the modern form omits the words which represent the habendum, and retains the words "to hold," which represent the tenendum; add to which, that, as has been pointed out by an eminent conveyancer in a sheet privately circulated, the Latin “habendum” is not properly translated by “to hold "; it ought rather to have been translated" to be held."

But, lastly, we would ask, Why does the editor follow the bad example of Lord St. Leonards, and sometimes connect the cases by feel convinced that if the editor knew how much the phrase annoys the words "and so"? This criticism may appear captious, but we some readers he would avoid it for the future.

MERCHANDISE MARKS ACT.

THE MERCHANDISE MARKS ACT, 1887, WITH NOTES AND AN INTRODUCTION. By ALBERT GRAY, Barrister-at-Law. W. Clowes & Sons (Limited).

This is a useful little edition of an important new Act, preceded by a well-written introduction of some thirty pages, and followed by appendices containing abstracts of statutory enactments relating to the marking of particular classes of goods, foreign and colonial laws on the subject, and the Convention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property, with an index. The Act is printed in a convenient form, and the notes contain many suggestions and hints with regard to the interpretation of the Act. The variations from the old Act of 1862 are generally noted, and the provisions of the new Act are freely illustrated by appropriate examples, especially with regard to the use on goods of names of places, the improper use of which is now made a criminal offence. Mr. Gray appears to consider that any trade-mark may now be infringed with impunity so long as it is not registered. We cannot take this view, at all events in cases in which any reputation has been acquired by the unregistered mark, having regard to the provisions of section 3, sub-section (2), which clearly points to misrepresentations made by the improper use of unregistered marks and treats them as false trade descriptions. Again, having regard to section 5, sub-section (1) (d.), we think it very questionable whether the use of "false trade descriptions" in advertisements will be free from liabilities. With these exceptions Mr. Gray seems to be a reasonably safe guide to the intricacies of an Act which is not by any means easy to interpret.

A SELECTION OF PRECEDENTS IN CONVEYANCING, TAKEN FROM
MODERN MANUSCRIPT COLLECTIONS AND DRAFTS IN ACTUAL
PRACTICE, WITH DISSERTATIONS AND PRACTICAL NOTES BY THE
CASES OF THE WEEK.
LATE W. M. BYTHEWOOD, THOMAS JARMAN, AND GEORGE SWEET,
Barristers-at-Law. Fourth Edition. By LEOPOLD GEORGE GORDON
BOSWELL v. COAKS-C.A. No. 2, 26th October.
ON COSTS-DATE FROM
ROBBINS, Barrister-at-Law. Vol. 4, MORTMAIN-POWERS OF AT-JUDGMENT DEBT-INTEREST-Interest
TORNEY. H. Sweet & Sons.
INTEREST RUNS-ACTION DISMISSED BEFORE THE 24TH OF OCTOBER, 1853
-MATTER 66
THEN PROCEEDING "--R. S. C., 1883, XLII., 14, 16-
APPENDIX H., FORM NO. 1, NOTE-PREFACE TO RULES.

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This volume, which contains the headings "Mortmain," "Notices,' "Partition," Partnership and Companies," "Patent and Copyright," and "Powers of Attorney," will form a very useful addition to the conveyancer's library. The dissertations contained in it are of very great value. We cannot, perhaps, give higher praise to them than by saying that they are not unworthy of their predecessors in former editions of this work, a remark which those of our readers who are old enough to have studied the former editions will know to Juean very high praise. We are not aware of any work that treats the subjects of "Partition" and "Powers of Attorney" so fully and accurately as the present volume.

WHICH

with costs before the 24th of October, 1883, interest on the taxed cots, The question in this case was whether, in an action which was dismiss d payable by the plaintiffs, was to run from the date of the judgment or from the date of the taxing master's certificate. The certificate was not made till more than four years after the date of the judgment. On the 19th of March, 1883, Fry, J., dismissed the action with costs. The Court of Appeal reversed this decision, but the House of Lords subsequently restored it. The taxing master's certificate, as to the costs of one of the defendants, was made on the 30th of July, 1887. By the old practice of the Court of Chancery, differing in this respect from the practice of the Common Law Courts, interest on costs ran only from the date of the Chancery practice in this respect, but an alteration was made by the certificate. The Rules of the Supreme Court of 1875 adopted the rules of 1883. In the Note to Form No. 1 (writ of fi. fa.) in Appendix H. to the rules of 1883, it is stated that the interest on the costs is to run from the day of the judgment or order, or day on which money is directed to be paid, or day from which interest is directed by the order to run, as the case may be.' Those rules came into operation on the 24th of into operation on that day, and "shall also apply, so far as may be practicable (unless otherwise expressly provided), to all proceedings taken after that day in all causes and matters then pending.' North, J., held (ante, p. 703), that the rules of 1883 applied, and that interest must run from the date of the judgment. On the appeal it was argued that the action, having been dismissed in March, 1883, was at an end before October, 1883, and that the old rules applied.

The very size of the bock renders it somewhat difficult to give an extract which will be a fair specimen of the editor's method of treating his subject; perhaps the discussion at p. 15 shewing that a licence in mortmain which enables a charity to which it refers to take property does not enable an intending donor to give property which, by reason of 9 Geo. 3, c. 36, he could not otherwise give; at p. 861, as to what powers of attorney can be given by a married woman; at p. 277, as to each partner's lien on the partnership prop- October, 1883. The preface to the rules provides that they shall come erty-will enable the reader to form a fair idea of the editor's style. The collection of precedents in "Patent and Copyright," and in "Powers of Attorney," appears to be very good. The precedent xx., at p. 497, being a deed executed on the dissolution of partnership on efflux of time, where one partner takes all the assets, but a formal assignment is dispensed with to avoid stamp duty, is a good specimen of the editor's power of dealing with the most difficult form of draft. It may usefully be compared with a somewhat similar precedent at 2 Key & Elphinstone Comp. 339.

We observe that the editor adopts the form of habendum introduced, we believe, by Mr. Wolstenholme, in which the only operative

"

THE COURT OF APPEAL (COTTON, LINDLEY, and LOPES, L.JJ.) affirmed the decision. COTTON, L.J., said that though, when an action was dismissed, it was at an end for some purposes-as regarded, for instance, the determination of the rights of the parties-yet it was still pending for the purpose of working out and enforcing the judgment of the court.

Therefore this action was "pending" on the 24th of October, 1883, and the new rules applied. North, J., was also right in holding that, though rule 14 of order 42 said that "the forms in Appendix H. shall be used, with such variations as circumstances may require," the forms must be followed in the absence of a special direction of the judge to the contrary. If an action was dismissed without costs, of course the provisions as to enforcing payment of costs and interest on them would be omitted from the writ. Though the rights of the parties depended on the judgment, there was no vested right as regarded practice at the moment of the judgment, but the judgment must be worked out according to the rules and practice of the court at the time when it had to be worked out. LINDLEY and LOPES, L.JJ., concurred.-COUNSEL, Cookson, Q.C., and A. G. Langley; Cozens-Hardy, Q.C., and Methold. SOLICITORS, Whites, Renard, & Co.; Johnson & Master.

BEST v. APPLEGATE.-North, J., 25th October. MORTGAGE-FORECLOSURE-ORDER FOR DELIVERY OF POSSESSION-ORIGINATING SUMMONS-R. S. C., 1883, XVIII. 2; LV. 5A. (DECEMBER, 1885). The question in this case was whether, in a foreclosure action, commenced by originating summons under rule 5a. (December, 1885) of order 55 of the R. S. C., 1883, the defendants having made default in redeeming the mortgaged premises at the time appointed by the foreclosure, an order for the delivery of possession to the plaintiff by some of the defendants of part of the mortgaged premises, of which those defendants were in possession, could be made upon motion by the plaintiff in the absence of those defendants, the summons not having asked for delivery of possession. The notice of motion asked that the order for foreclosure might be made absolute, and that the defendants who were in possession might be ordered to deliver possession to the plaintiff. The defendants had been served with notice of the motion, but they did not appear. The defendants in possession were some of the mortgagors. North, J., felt some difficulty in ordering delivery of possession in the absence of the defendants, as the summons had not asked for it. The plaintiff's counsel cited Salter v. Edgar (30 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 322, W. N., 1886, p. 47) and Lacon v. Tyrrell (W. N., 1887, p. 71) as precedents for making the order under such circumstances. Each of the cases was cited from the Weekly Notes. In the former case the action was commenced by writ, but neither the writ nor the statement of claim asked for delivery of possession. In that case Chitty, J., is reported to have held that, on making the foreclosure absolute, an order for delivery of possession could be made against the mortgagor, though it could not have been made against a third party. In the second case a similar order was made by Stirling, J., in an action commenced by summons.

NORTH, J., said that he could hardly understand how there was jurisdiction to order delivery of possession when the summons did not ask for it. But he would follow the cases cited, if the registrar should find, on looking at the actual orders made, that they were precedents for what was asked.-COUNSEL, Jason Smith. SOLICITORS, Morten, Cutler, & Co.

October.

Re JACKSON AND WOODBURN'S CONTRACT-North, J., 25th VENDOR AND PURCHASER-NOTICE TO RESCIND CONTRACT-JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE VALIDITY ON SUMMONS-VENDOR AND PURCHASER ACT, 1874, s. 9.

This was a summons by a purchaser of real estate, under the Vendor and Purchaser Act, 1874, asking for a declaration that the vendor was not entitled to rescind the contract for sale. The vendor had given notice to rescind, proposing to do so under a power reserved to him in the contract. The preliminary question was raised whether there was jurisdiction to determine the validity of the notice of rescission upon a summons under the Act. Section 9 excepts from the power given to raise questions between a vendor and purchaser by summons questions affecting the existence or validity of the contract."

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NORTH, J., held that those words of exception refer to the existence or validity of the contract in its inception, and that there was jurisdiction to determine the validity of the notice of rescission.

The summons had been adjourned into court from chambers without any discussion before the chief clerk, and under these circumstances NORTH, J., held that the objection as to jurisdiction, which was taken for the first time when the case was opened in court, was not taken too late.-COUNSEL, Levett; T. L. Wilkinson. SOLICITORS, Burton, Yeates, & Co.; Indermaur & Brown

EASTON v. THE LONDON JOINT STOCK BANK - North, J., 25th October.

COSTS-TAXATION-REFRESHER FBES-APPEAL FROM CHANCERY DIVISION— R.S. C., 1883, LXV., 27, SUB-RULES 30, 37, 48.

The question in this case was whether, on the hearing of an appeal from the Chancery Division, refresher fees to counsel can be allowed when the hearing of the appeal occupies more than one day. In the Court of Chancery refreshers were originally unknown, but such fees were formerly allowed on the trials of common law actions and on the hearing of appeals to the Exchequer Chamber. After oral evidence was introduced into the Court of Chancery refreshers were also introduced, the reason for allowing them being explained by Jessel, M.R, in Harrison v. Wearing (11 Ch. D. 206). Rule 27 of order 65 provides, by sub-rule 48, for the allowance of refreshers "when any cause or matter is to be tried or heard upon viva voce evidence in open court," but makes no reference to the hearing of an appeal. But sub-rule 30 provides that "As to any work and labour properly performed and not herein provided for, and in respect of

which fees have heretofore been allowed, the same or similar fees are to be allowed for such work and labour as have heretofore been allowed." And, by sub-rule 37, "The rules, orders, and practice of any court whose jurisdiction is transferred to the High Court of Justice or Court of Appeal relating to costs, and the allowance of the fees of solicitors and attorneys, and the taxation of costs, existing prior to the commencement of the principal Act, shall, in so far as they are not inconsistent with the principal Act and these rules, remain in force and be applicable to the costs of the same or analogous proceedings, and to the allowance of the fees of solicitors of the Supreme Court, and the taxation of costs in the High Court of Justice and Court of Appeal." In Svendsen v. Wallace (34 W. R. 151, 16 Q. B. D. 27), decided since 1883, it was held by a Divisional Court of the Queen's Bench Division that refreshers couldbe allowed on the hearing of an appeal from that division, though the taxing master had been of a contrary opinion. In the present case the appeal was from the Chancery Division, and the hearing of the appeal had occupied four days. The action was dismissed with costs, and on the taxation the defendants claimed refresher fees paid to their counsel for three days, relying on Svendsen v. Wallace. The taxing master (Mr. Wainwright) held that that case did not apply to appeals from the Chaucery Division, and disallowed the refreshers, without exercising any discretion, on the ground that he had no power to allow them. He said :-" In the Court of Chancery, before the oral examination of witnesses in that court, daily refreshers were not allowed nor paid. In Harrison v. Wearing the decision and reasoning of Jessel, M.R., are quite opposed to the allowance of daily refreshers on appeals."

NORTH, J., held that Svendsen v. Wallace applied, and that there was jurisdiction to allow refreshers, if the taxing master, in the exercise of his discretion, should think fit to allow them. The learned judge said that the Court of Appeal is one court, entertaining appeals from all the divisions of the High Court, the Bankruptcy, the Palatine Court, and other jurisdictions, and in nearly all cises there was no viva voce evidence on the hearing of an appeal. It would be very inconvenient if the amount of the costs was to be regulated, not by the work done, but by the circumstance from which court the appeal came. The Rules of 1883 were a code regulating the practice in the High Court and the Court of Appeal generally. He thought the line which the taxing master had drawn could not be maintained. The rule ought to be the same from whatever court the appeal might come. In other cases the Court of Appeal had held that when the practice had been different in courts whose jurisdiction was transferred to the High Court, the more convenient practice ought to be adopted by the High Court after the transfer. He thought the rules made no distinction between the different divisions.— COUNSEL, W. D. Rawlins; Grosvenor Woods. SOLICITORS, Clarke, Rawlins, & Co.; West, King, Adams, & Co.

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This was an appeal from a decision of North, J. (ante, p 662). When the appeal was called on, no one appeared in support of it, and it was dismissed.

Re PEACE AND ELLIS.-North, J., 26th October. SOLICITOR-COSTS-SALE BY AUCTION-" CONDUCTING FEE "-COMMISSION TO AUCTIONEER PAID BY CLIENT-RIGHT OF SOLICITOR TO CHARGE FOR WORK DONE BEFORE SALE-SOLICITORS' REMUNERATION ACT, 1881 (44 & 45 VICT. C44)-REMUNERATION ORDER, AUGUST, 1882, CLAUSE 2; SCHEDULE I., PART I.; RULE 11; SCHEDULE II.

The question in this case was whether the solicitors of the vendor of property sold by auction were entitled to charge for work done by them prior to the sale, an auctioneer having been employed at the expense of the client to conduct the sale, the solicitors having in their bill of costs claimed the “conducting fee" prescribed by Part I. of Schedule I. to the Remuneration Order. Rule 11 in Schedule I. provides that "the scale for conducting a sale by auction shall apply only in cases where no commission is paid by the client to an auctioneer." In the present case the property was sold in three lots. The bill of the vendor's (solicitors contained the following items: "Fee on preparing advertisement for sale of property of which you are mortgagee, inserting advertisement in papers, preparing conditions of sale, deducing title thereto, and completing conveyance thereof, as follows:

Lot 1, purchase-money, £320 Lot 2, purchase-money, £127 Lot 3, purchase-money, £535

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£10 5s.

£10 Os. £13 15s."

The bill also contained some items for disbursements, one of which was for "auctioneer's charges £10 18." This sum was made up of a fee of £3 38. to the auctioneer for each lot, and a sum of 12s. for expenses out of pocket. The taxing master disallowed in respect of the three lots respectively the sums of £5, £5, and £5 10s. In the taxing master's answers to objections he said, an auctioneer was employed who conducted the sale, and was paid (by the client) his usual commission. The solicitors are, therefore, not entitled to charge 'conducting fees,' but only the fees for 'contract, deducing title, and completing.' This being a taxation under the Solicitors' Act, I have no power to amend the bill, which, otherwise, I should have done, by allowing the solicitors three guiueas for their trouble in instructing the auctioneer, and any other labour not covered by the scale fees allowed."

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