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For the official receiver acting as interim receiver of the property of a debtor under section 10 in addition to the per-centage chargeable on realizations, on every order

And, in addition, where the order is in force for a longer period than fourteen days, for every seven days, after the first fourteen, and for every fraction of seven days For each notice by an official receiver to a creditor of a first or any other meeting, or sitting of the court For each notice by an official receiver to a creditor of an adjourned meeting or an adjourned sitting of the

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£ s. d. trustee under the provisions of sections 159, 160, and 161, the fees payable shall be :

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100 010

006 For the official receiver supervising a special manager or the carrying on of a debtor's business a fee according to the following scale :

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For every order of administration under section 122, two shillings in the pound on the total amount of the debts scheduled from time to £1 per week. time, excluding any fraction of a pound in such total. 2 99

If the gross assets are estimated by the official receiver not to exceed £500

If to exceed £500 but not to exceed £5,000

If to exceed £5,000 but not to exceed £10,000
If to exceed £10,000 but not to exceed £20,000
If to exceed £20,000

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Room for meeting or adjourned meeting of creditors summoned by official receiver, for each creditor to whom notice has been given of such meeting, but not exceeding in summary administrations £2 for each meeting; and in non-summary administrations not exceeding £5 for each meeting

Travelling, keeping possession, and other reasonable expenses of official receiver, the amount disbursed For official stationery, printing, books, forms, and postages, each estate:

For every ten creditors or fraction of twenty

For every ten applications to debtors to an estate, or fraction of ten

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We, the undersigned Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, do hereby sanction the foregoing scales of fees and percentages, and do direct that the fees to be taken by stamps shall be those mentioned in Table A., and that the fees mentioned in Tables s. d. B., C., D., and E. shall be taken in money, except that such of the fees and allowances referred to in Table D. as have hitherto been taken by stamps shall continue to be taken by stamps: the stamps to be used shall be Bankruptcy fee stamps, with the exception of the penny stamp on every special proxy or voting paper which may be a Postage and Inland Revenue Stamp.

010

And we further direct that wherever practicable the stamp shall be affixed or the money paid in respect of every fee mentioned in Tables A., B., C., and D., before the proceding is had in respect of which the fee is payable, and that the charge to be made by the London Gazette for the insertion of each notice authorized by the 0 10 0 Act or Rules shall be five shillings. (Signed) SIDNEY HERBERT, 020

On every payment under section 162 of money out of the bankruptcy estates account threepence on each pound or fraction of a pound to be charged as follows:

Where the money consists of unclaimed dividends, on each dividend paid out;

Where the money consists of undistributed funds or balances, on the amount paid out.

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If serviceable by post

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Dated the 25th day of October, 1886.

ORDER AS TO STAMPS.

W. H. WALROND.

Order as to the fees and per-centages which are required to be taken for bankruptcy proceedings in the High Court of Justice and Court of Appeal by means of stamps, amending the previous order on the same subject, published in the supplement to the London Gazette.

Whereas by section three of the Public Offices Fees Act, 1879, it is provided that the Treasury may from time to time make, and when made, revoke, alter, and add to, regulations for all or any of the 0 60 following purposes respecting fees in any public office-that is to

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Executing every warrant of seizure, or search warrant, or warrant of apprehension, or order of commitment within two miles of court Keeping possession under a warrant, for each day the man is actually in possession; including affidavit of possession being actually kept

(not less than 3s. 6d. of the above sum is to be paid to the man in possession, and his receipt produced.)

High bailiff's or (in the London district) officer's man, travelling to place of possession, or to execute a warrant of or order of commitment, or to serve a summons or subpoena, or for any other purpose specially directed by the court, per mile

His time, per day, where distance exceeds 10 miles
His expenses, per day

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say,

(1.) Regulating the manner in which the fees taken in money are to be taken, accounted for, and paid over.

(3.)

(2.) Determining the use of impressed or adhesive stamps, and the mode of cancellation of adhesive stamps. Regulating the use of stamps and prescribing the application thereof to documents from time to time in use, and requiring documents to be used for the purpose of such stamps. Provided that so far as they relate to the office of any court of law, they shall be made with the consent of the Lord Chancellor.

Now we, the undersigned, being two of the lords of her Majesty's Treasury, do, with the concurrence of the Lord Chancellor, hereby give notice and order and direct:

That from and after the 25th day of October, 1886, in lieu of any regulations on the subject heretofore in force, the stamps used for denoting the fees and per-centages described in the schedule hereto subjoined shall, so far as they are payable in regard to proceedings in the High Court of Justice and Court of Appeal, be of the character and be applied and otherwise dealt with as prescribed by such 6 schedule. And we do further enjoin that this order shall be binding on all courts, offices, and persons whom such regulations may in any way affect.

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The fees and allowances payable on proceedings had after the 24th day of October, 1886, in respect of any matter which was pending in any court having jurisdiction in bankruptcy on the thirty-first day of December, 1883, shall be the same as if those proceedings had been taken before such last-mentioned day, and shall be applied to the same purposes: Provided that where the official receiver acts as

The adhesive stamps herein referred to shall be of the description overprinted with the word "Bankruptcy,' except where otherwise provided. They shall be cancelled by the various court or other officials by perforation, or in such manner as the Commissioners of Inland Revenue may from time to time direct. The impressed stamps also shall be of such character as the said Commissioners may adopt for the purpose.

The official forms with impressed or adhesive stamps (as the case may be) required in respect of any proceedings herein referred to may be obtained at the Inland Revenue Offices, Royal Courts of Justice. Persons may, however, in addition, have their own forms stamped at that office or at the corresponding office at Somerset House.

The Schedule above referred to.

Document to
be stamped.

Character of stamp to be used.

Every declaration by a debtor Declaration. Impressed.

of inability to pay his debts Every bankruptcy notice Every bankruptcy petition Every bond with sureties Every affidavit (or report) filed other than proof of debts.

Every subpoena or summons
under section 27.
For taking an affidavit or an
affirmation, or attestation
upon honour in lieu of an
affidavit or a declaration,
except for proof of debts;
and in addition thereto for
each exhibit therein re-
ferred to.

Notice

Petition
Bond.
Affidavit

Subpoena or

summons.

Affidavit

Every proof of debt above Proof. £2.

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Impressed.

Impressed.
Impressed.
Impressed or
adhesive.

Impressed.
Impressed or
adhesive.

Impressed or
adhesive.

Every petition under section

Petition
order.

or Impressed.

125 of the Act and every

order of administration

under section 125 (4).

Regulations and
Observations.

CASES OF THE WEEK.

HUGHES v. LITTLE-0.A. No. 1, 25th and 26th October,
BILL OF SALE-STATEMENT OF CONSIDERATION-FORM IN SCHEDULE-BILL
OF SALE GIVEN BY WAY OF INDEMNITY-BILLS OF SALE ACT (1878)
AMENDMENT ACT, 1882 (45 & 46 VICT. c. 43), s. 9-NOTICE OF APPEAL-
R. S. C., 1883, LVIII., 3

This was an interpleader issue to try the right to certain goods seized in
execution by the defendant and claimed by the plaintiff under a bill of
sale. The bill of sale stated that, "in consideration of the grantee having,
at the request of the grantor, become guarantee, and having signed a
promissory note for the payment of a sum of £45 obtained by the grantor
from W. J. Boyes, of which £32, or thereabouts, is now owing, and also
of the grantee having, at the like request of the grantor, paid" certain
sums amounting to £40, the grantor assigned to the grantee the chattels
by way of security for the payment of the £40, and any moneys the
grantee might be called upon to pay in respect of the guarantee, and interest
thereon at the rate of £5 per cent. per annum, and the grantor agreed to
pay to the grantee the principal sum, with the interest then due, by
monthly payments of £2 on the first of every month. The execution
creditor contended that the bill of sale was void (1) on the ground that
the consideration was not sufficiently set forth within section 8 of the
Bills of Sale Act, 1878; and (2) on the ground that it was not in accord-
ance with the form within section 9 of the Bills of Sale Act (1878) Amend-
ment Act, 1882. The Queen's Bench Division (Manisty and Mathew,
JJ.), affirming the judgment of the county court judge in favour of the
plaintiff, held the bill of sale valid, but gave leave to appeal (34 W. R.
703). This judgment was delivered on the 2nd of June. The de-
fendant, the execution creditor, gave notice of appeal on the 15th of June
for the 29th of June. A preliminary objection was taken that the notice
time. THE COURT (LORD ESHER, M.R., LINDLEY and LOPES, L.JJ.) over-
ruled the objection, and held that the decision of the Divisional Court
was a "final order" within ord. 58, r. 3, and that the fourteen day notice
of appeal was good. On the merits, THE COURT said that the objection
that the consideration was not properly set forth because the words
"of which £32, or thereabouts, is now owing "could not be sustained.
The consideration was the grantee become guarantee, and there was
nothing untrue in the statement. As to the objection that the bill of sale
was void as not being in accordance with the form, the bill of sale came
within the express terms of section 9, as it was given to secure the payment
of money by the grantor to the grantee, which the grantee would become
liable to pay for and at the request of the grantor. The bill of sale, there-
fore, came within section 9, and as the time of payment was not stated, and
so was uncertain, and the sum to be paid also uncertain and contingent,
the bill of sale was not in the prescribed form, and so was void. No
doubt it was impossible to bring this transaction within the form, but
that was no reason for declining to apply the plain provisions of section
9. The judgment must be reversed, and entered for the execution cred-
itor, the defendant.-COUNSEL, Sills; Clay. SOLICITORS, Dodd, Longstaffe,
Son, & Fenwick, for C. Heywood & Son, Manchester; Grundy, Izod, &
Grundy, for Toy & Broadbent, Ashton-under-Lyne.

Every special proxy or voting Proxy or vot- Impressed or A Postage or In- ought to have been a four days' notice, and so was invalid and out of

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trustee, bankrupt, or officer

of the Court.

.Impressed.

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land Revenue
stamp may be
used.

SIDNEY HERBERT,
W. H. WALROND,
Two of the Lords of Her
Majesty's Treasury.

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BLAIBERG v. BECKETT-C.A., No. 1, 27th October.

BILL OF SALE-STIPULATION FOR THE MAINTENANCE OR DEFEASANCE OF THE SECURITY-MEANING OF-BILLS OF SALE ACT (1878) AMENDMENT ACT, 1882 (45 & 46 VICT. c. 43), s. 9-FORM IN SCHEDULE.

This case raised the question as to the meaning of the words in the "terms for the form in the schedule to the Bills of Sale Act, 1882, maintenance or defeasance of the security." The bill of sale, after giving the grantee power to seize and sell (inter alia) on default in payment by the grantor or on breach of any covenant therein contained and necessary for maintaining the security, provided that " upon any such sale the purchaser should not be bound to see or inquire whether any such default had been made as aforesaid." The defendant, the execution creditor, contended that this clause was not authorized by the form, and so the bill of sale was void under section 9 of the Bills of Sale Act, 1882. The plaintiff, the bill of sale holder, contended that this was a clause for the maintenance of the security," as it helped the grantee to obtain his money and facilitated the sale; or, at any rate, it was for its "defeasance, as it promoted the accomplishment of the object of the security, the word "defeasance" not being used in its strict legal sense. Fry, L.J., before whom the case was tried without a jury, gave judgment for the defendant, holding the bill of sale to be void on the authority of Blaiberg v. Parsons (17 Q. B. D. 336). On appeal this judgment was affirmed. LORD ESHER, M.R., said that a stipulation with regard to a ance" of the security. It was a stipulation in full accomplishment of the security. The late Master of the Rolls in Ex parte Popplewell (31 W. R. 35, 21 Ch. D. 73), defined a defeasance as something which defeated the operation of a deed, but was contained in some other deed or document; if contained in the same deed it was called a condition. If, therefore, the clause, instead of defeating, fulfilled the operation of the deed, it could not be a "defeasance" or a condition in the nature of a defeasance. The word "defeasance" in the form meant a condition in the nature of a defeasance-that was, something which defeated the operation of the deed, and not something which carried it out. The clause here was a fulfilment of the security in favour of the grantee. Then as to the word "maintenance,' a power to enter and sell might be said to be for the maintenance of the security. But this stipulation only came into effect after the sale of the security when no further security was wanted. It could not, there

In a case of Young v. Holloway, before Mr. Justice Butt, on Tuesday, Mr. Middleton, on the part of the plaintiff, stated that it would not be necessary to ask his lordship to make an order on the solicitors who pre-sale, when the power to sell had arisen, could not be one for the "defeaspared the will to attend and be examined concerning their knowledge of the testamentary documents and papers of the deceased, as, since motion for them to do so had been placed on the paper, those gentlemen had filed an affidavit from which it appeared that they have handed over the testamentary papers in question in their possession to another solicitor who was acting for one of the defendants, and that these documents had been filed. The plaintiff had, however, been put to considerable expense in the matter in order to bring it before the court, and he (Mr. Middleton) therefore asked for costs against the solicitors for having refused to produce the documents when asked to do so. Mr. Justice Butt: When do you allege the solicitors handed over the papers in question? Mr. Middleton: Some time after the notice of motion was given and put in the paper. After some discussion Mr. Justice Butt declined to condemn the solicitors in costs as desired. He would make no order as to costs.

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fore, be said to be for the maintenance of the security. Accordingly it did not come within the scope of the provisions allowed to be added to the bill of sale by the form. Further, it was not a mere harmless clause, but it gave the bill of sale a legal effect different from that which would result from the form in the schedule. A purchaser who knew that he was buying from a bill of sale holder would ordinarily, if he bought without seeing that default had been made, take the risk, as a remedy would lie in equity against him at the suit of the grantor to recover the goods if no default had been made. But here the clause took away any uch remedy, and left the grantor to sue the grantee on his personal covenant to sell only on default. The case, therefore, came within Ex parte Stanford (34 W. R. 507, 17 Q. B. D. 259), and the bill of sale was void. LINDLEY and LOPES, L.JJ., concurred.-COUNSEL, H. Reed; Crump, Q.C., and Harper. SOLICITORS, R. F. Hill & Co.; N. White.

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by means of calls) should provide for the rent during the period for which
the receiver had possession of the premises. If the liquidator had been in
possession as such the application would have been right, but he retained
the possession in the character of receiver. He, or those for whom he was
acting in that capacity, ought to have paid the rent for the time during
which the landlord was kept out of possession. It was true that the com-
pany, as mortgagors, had an ultimate right to the mortgaged property,
but that did not make the receiver's possession of the premises the posses-
sion of the company. The persons prima facie benefited by the receiver's
possession were the mortgagees for whom he was acting. The appeal
must be dismissed, but without prejudice to any application by the land-
lord to be paid the rent out of the proceeds of the sale of the chattels.
BOWEN, L.J., concurred. FRY, L.J., said that the application was, in
substance, that the mortgagors should pay the rent of land of which their
mortgagees had retained possession in order to realize their security. It
room which the receiver had hired for the purpose of selling the chattels.
-COUNSEL, J. Chester; Bramwell Davis. SOLICITORS, W. Sturt; Lindo.
Re KESWICK OLD BREWERY CO. (LIM.)-Chitty, J., 25th
October.

Re COMMERCIAL BANK OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA-C. A., No. 2, would be as reasonable that the company should pay the rent of any 25th October.

COMPANY-WINDING-UP ORDER-RIGHT OF APPEAL.

NO REGISTERED OFFICE OR PLACE OF BUSINESS-SERVICE OF PETITION
-DIRECTIONS OF THE COURT.

A petition was presented to wind up the Keswick Old Brewery Co. by two creditors and two shareholders of the company. The company had neither a registered office nor a place of business: an application was consequently made to the court by the petitioners for directions how to serve the petition. There were only eight shareholders of the company. CHITTR, J., directed the petition to be served on the secretary and two principal shareholders, and letters to be sent to the other shareholders (not being petitioners) informing them of the petition.- COUNSEL, Ashton Cross. SOLICITORS, Speechly, Mumford, & Landon.

DELAY-WAIVER-DISTINCT MISREPRESENTATIONS.

A question arose in this case as to the right of a company to appeal from a winding-up order. The application was made in the name of the company for leave to appeal (notwithstanding the expiration of the proper time) from an order for the compulsory winding up of the company made COMPANY-WINDING-UP PETITION-GEN. ORD., NOVEMBER, 1862, R. 3— by North, J., on the 8th of June. An order appointing an official liquidator had been since made. On behalf of the official liquidator the preliminary objection was taken that, the company being no longer in existence, and the official liquidator being the only person who was entitled to use its name, the company had no locus standi to appeal from the order. It was also urged that there would be no one responsible for costs. THE COURT (BOWEN and FRY, L.JJ.) thought the objection a valid one, but suggested that the application might be made in the name of a contributory. It was then arranged that the notice of motion should be amended by substituting the name of a shareholder who had been a director as the applicant, and the application was then heard on its merits. The company was incorporated in South Australia by a statute of the colony, and was not registered in England. It had carried on business in Australia, and had also had a branch office in London, the business of which was managed by local directors. North, J., on the 8th of June, 1886, made a winding-up order in the common form, declining to limit the operation of the order to the English creditors and English assets. But he expressed an opinion that the court would have ample power to prevent any injustice being done by the order, and that the winding up in this country ought to be only auxiliary to a winding up which was proceeding in Australia, though the proceedings there were commenced after the English petition was presented. An official liquidator was afterwards appointed by North, J. On the 11th of August the chief clerk directed that advertisements should be issued for creditors to come in and prove their debts, this direction not being limited to English creditors. It was urged in support of the application that the direction given by the chief clerk was inconsistent with the view which North, J., had expressed as to the mode in which the winding-up order should be worked out, and that therefore that order ought to be expressly limited to English creditors and English assets. THE COURT (BOWEN and FRY, L.JJ.) refused the application, on the ground that the applicant had failed to shew that any injustice| would result to him, or to those whom he represented, by his not being able to appeal from the original order, or to explain satisfactorily his delay in making the application. If the chief clerk had given any direc-ing that second misrepresentation, there was neither any allegation of tions which were inconsistent with the view expressed by North, J., the proper course was to apply to him.-COUNSEL, Cookson, Q.C., and Stock; Cozens-Hardy, Q.C., and H. Burton Buckley; Gatey. SOLICITORS, Edwin Andrew; Hancock, Sharp, & Hales.

NOTE:-It should be observed that, in Re Diamond Fuel Co. (13 Ch. D. 400), the Court of Appeal (James, Baggallay, and Thesiger, L.JJ.) overruled a similar objection to an appeal presented by a company from a winding-up order after the appointment of an official liquidator, but said that it should be understood for the future that, whenever an order absolute for winding up a company had been made, and that order was appealed from by the company itself, without anyone else being made responsible for costs, the court would be ready to entertain an application for security for costs. This case was not cited on the present occasion.] Re THE LONDON CELLULOID CO.-C. A., No. 2, 27th October. COMPANY-WINDING UP-LANDLORD-OCCUPATION OF PREMISES AFTER WINDING UP ORDER-LEAVE TO PROVE FOR RENT-POSSESSION BY RECEIVER IN DEBENTURE-HOLDERS' ACTION.

This was a claim by the landlord of premises which had been occupied by a company which had been ordered to be wound up, to prove in the liquidation in respect of the rent of the premises since the winding-up order, on the ground that they had been occupied for the benefit of the company. The person who had been appointed liquidator had also been appointed receiver in an action brought by debenture-holders of the company to realize their security. An order had been made in the winding up giving the landlord leave to enter on the premises as against the liquidator. In the debenture-holders' action an order was made that the receiver should sell the chattels comprised in plaintiffs' security which were on the premises, and, by a subsequent order, leave was given to him to bring on to the premises, and sell there some other chattels in the security which were in another place. When these orders were made the landlord did not oppose them, nor did he ask that his rent might be provided for out of the proceeds of sale. Bacon, V.C., refused the application, and THE COURT OF APPEAL (COTTON, BOWEN, and FRY, L.JJ.) affirmed his decision. COTTON, L.J., said that the landlord was asking that the company (that is, the shareholders, for the payment could only be made

Re LONDON AND PROVINCIAL ELECTRIC LIGHTING AND
POWER CO. (LIM.); HALE'S CASE-Chitty, J., 26th October.
COMPANY-FRAUDULENT PROSPECTUS-SHARE REGISTER-CONTRIBUTORY—
This was an application by a shareholder named Hale for the removal
of his name from the register of shareholders, and, the company being in
liquidation, the liquidator opposed such application. Mr. Hale alleged
two distinct misrepresentations, and the court held that, as to cne mis-
representation, his application was made too late, and the liquidator con-
tended that Mr. Hale was, therefore, precluded from raising any case upon
the second misrepresentation (Whitehouse's case, 15 W. R. 892, 3 Eq. 790).
CHITTY, J., said that the general rule of law was that a contract of this
kind was avoidable at the option of the person misled, provided he came
promptly to the court. Otherwise his case failed, as the court considered
him to have adopted the contract. As regarded the first misrepresenta-
tion, there was no doubt that the applicant had delayed too long in coming
to the court, for, although the misrepresentation was discovered by Mr.
Hale in the month of August, he did not make his application to the
court until the following February. But the matter did not end there.
Mr. Hale relied on a second misrepresentation in the prospectus. Regard-
delay on Mr. Hale's part, nor any allegation that the second misrepresen-
tation was connected with the first one. Then counsel for the liquidator
argued that, because Mr. Hale had failed in the first misrepresentation on
the ground of delay, he was, therefore, precluded from raising a case on
the second misrepresentation. Whitehouse's case had been cited, but his
lordship declined to assent to the interpretation which counsel had put
upon it. It had been cited to prove that the waiver of one point by a
shareholder was a waiver of all; but, in his lordship's view, the waiver in
Whitehouse's case was held only to extend to all points of discrepancy
between the prospectus and the memorandum and articles of association.
Accordingly, Mr. Hale was not precluded from raising a case upon the
second misrepresentation, and was, consequently, entitled to have his
name removed from the register.-COUNSEL, Romer, Q.C., and Maidlow ;
Ince, Q.C., and Ribton. SOLICITORS, Ford Lloyd; Edward Lee.

Re THE MYSORE REEFS GOLD MINING CO.-C. A. No. 2, 24th
October.

COMPANY-WINDING UP-REMUNERATION OF OFFICIAL LIQUIDATOR-
REGULATION OF 1868.

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The question in this case was to the remuneration to be allowed to an official liquidator. The "Regulation adopted by the Master of the Rolls and the Vice-Chancellors and sanctioned and approved by the Lord Chancellor in 1868 (vide 3 Ch., p. 64; Palmer's Winding-up Forms, p. 76), provides that, in fixing the amount of the liquidator's remuneration, "the judge will, subject as hereinafter mentioned, be guided by the following scaie" (inter alia):-"When the assets shall amount to £5,000 and not to £10,000," " per day of eight hours £4"; and "when the assets shall amount to £50,000 and not to £100,000, per day of eight hours £8." In the present case the property and assets of the company had been taken over by a new company in consideration of the new company undertaking (1) to issue to the shareholders of the old company, on their applying for it, a £1 share, credited with 15s. paid up, for each fully paid-up £1 share held by them in the old company; (2) to pay the debts of the old company and the expenses of winding it up. Under this agreement the new company allotted 85,000 shares, credited with 15s. paid up on each, the total

number of shares in the old company having been between 90,000 and 100,000. It was admitted that, at the date of the agreement-viz., December, 1885, the shares of the old company were worth 18. 6d. each, and that, at the date of allotment by the new company, the value was 16s. The debts of the old company and the expenses of the winding up amounted to between £6,000 and £7,000. The liquidator contended that the payments by the new company of these debts and expenses and the allotment of the 85,000 shares was equivalent to the payment by the new company of a sum exceeding £70,000 as the price for which the property of the old company was sold; and he claimed to be entitled to have his remuneration fixed as for assets between £50,000 and £100,000, at the rate of £8 a day. The new company contended that the shares allotted by them should not be taken into account, the agreement having been really a scheme for the resuscitation of the company, entitling the shareholders to retain their shares subject to a further liability for 5s. per share, such of the shareholders as did not choose to take shares in the new company losing all interest in the assets of the old company, and that the liquidator's remuneration should be fixed as for assets between £5,000 and £10,000, at the rate of £4 a day. Chitty, J., decided in favour of the liquidator's contention. THE COURT OF APPEAL (COTTON, BOWEN, and FRY, L.JJ.) affirmed the decision. COTTON, L.J., said that the regulation as to the mode of remunerating official liquidators was not a general order, nor was it binding on the judges by Act of Parliament or otherwise, but it was to be taken as a guide to the judges in the exercise of their discretion. The notes to the regulation stated that, in special circumstances, the judge might alter the scale, shewing that the regulation was only to serve as a general rule for the guidance of judges in fixing the scale upon which a liquidator's remuneration should be calculated. Generally, therefore, it would be wrong to depart from the regulation. What was the meaning of the words, "Where the assets divisible among the unsecured creditors shall amount to"? Clearly they did not mean where the assets divided amounted to such and such a sum; they meant assets not mortgaged and free to be paid to unsecured creditors or shareholders. The present case did not come strictly under the regulation, because the assets had not been realized in the ordinary way, but by analogy the amount secured by the agreement between the old and new companies for the old company and for those shareholders who were willing to take advantage of the option, would come within it. The shares allotted ought not to be disregarded. Chitty, J., had decided rightly that, in assessing the liquidator's remuneration, there must be taken into account, not what was paid to the liquidator for division, but what went to the shareholders who wished to take advantage of the offer made to all by the new company. BOWEN and FRY, L.JJ., concurred.-COUNSEL, Ince. Q.C., and Grosvenor Woods; Macnaghten, Q.C., and H. Burton Buckley. SOLICITORS, Snell, Son, & Greenip; H. Montagu.

THE NEWPORT (MON.) SHIPWAY, &c., CO. (LIM.) v. PAYNTER -Kay, J., 28th October.

PRACTICE-STATEMENT OF CLAIM-PARTICULARS OF FRAUD AND MISREPRESENTATION-R. S. C., 1883, XIX., 6, 7.

This was an application by the defendants that the plaintiff company might be ordered to give further and better particulars in writing of certain improper, wrong, fraudulent, and false entries, and of misrepresentation alleged by them in their statement of claim. In September, 1883, the plaintiff company purchased from the defendants their business of engineers and ship repairers, and an agreement was then entered into between them by which it was agreed that the defendants should take the purchase-money partly in cash and partly in shares of the plaintiff company, and that the defendants, R. E. Paynter and J. Summers, should be employed by the company as general manager and manager of the engineering department respectively for the space of two years, and the agreement contained a guarantee by the two defendants that the net profits of the company for the two years next following should amount to a sum sufficient to pay a dividend of not less than £7 10s. per cent., and that if they did not the defendants would make good the deficiency. The present action was brought by the plaintiff company for damages for fraud and misrepresentation. The plaintiff company, by its statement of claim, alleged that the defendants had systematically, from the time the company commenced business, caused false entries to be made in the books of the company. The defendants, after delivery of the statement of claim, applied for particulars of the alleged false entries, and an order was made requiring the plaintiff company to give such particulars. In compliance with this order the plaintiff company delivered particulars consisting of a list of entries from the books, which were alleged by it to be fraudulent. The defendants now applied that the company might be required to deliver further and better particulars. On behalf of the defendants it was contended that it was not sufficient for the company to give a mere list of entries which they alleged to be false, but that the company ought to go further and say in what respect they were false, and that the court had ample power to require this to be done by ord. 19, rr. 6, 7. KAY, J., said that the allegation made by the company was that the defendants had designedly made false entries, which were either wholly fictitious or which were fictitious to some material extent. Particulars of these alleged false entries were given. On the part of the defendants it was said that they ought to know in what respect these entries were alleged to be false. But the plea of the plaintiffs was that these entries were false, and unless they were able to prove that they were not merely wrong but false they would not succeed at the trial. The application must be dismissed, with costs.-COUNSEL, Swinfen Eady; R. Woodfall. SOLICITORS, Stocken & Jupp, for Williams & Co., Newport, Monmouth; Gibbs & White, for Joseph Gibbs, Newport, Monmouth.

LESLIE v. CAVE-North, J., 26th October. DISCOVERY-PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS-DEPOSIT IN COURT-AFFIDAVIT OF DOCUMENTS-COPY DELIVERED-R. S. C., 1883, LXV., 27 (54). This was a motion by the plaintiffs that the defendant might be ordered to deposit in court such of the documents mentioned in the schedules to an affidavit of documents which he had made, and had thereby admitted to be in his possession or power, as he had obtained from the executrix of the late solicitor of the plaintiffs' predecessors in title, and all others of the said documents which consisted of original documents relating to the title of the plaintiffs to certain estates mentioned in the statement of claim in the action. The plaintiffs were in possession of the estates in question, to which the defendant claimed to be the rightful heir. The action was brought to restrain the defendant from trespassing on the estates, from interfering with the plaintiffs in the collection of the rents from the tenants, and from issuing or publishing circular letters containing false representations calculated to injure the title of the plaintiffs to the estates. The defendant had given notice to the tenants of some of the estates to pay their rents to him, and had in other ways interfered with the collection of the rents by the plaintiffs. He had obtained from the executrix of the former solicitor of some of the plaintiffs' predecessors in title, by representing that he was the true owner of the estates, various documents of title to the estates which had been in that solicitor's possession. There was also evidence that the defendant was a man in impecunious circumstances. The defendant had delivered a defence and counter-claim for the recovery and possession of the estate. Under these circumstances, the plaintiffs asked that, instead of the common order for production of documents, an order might be made as above stated for the deposit of documents in court. NORTH, J., said that, under the old practice of the Court of Chancery, the rule was that documents which were to be produced were always ordered to be deposited in court. This was found to be inconvenient, and the modern practice of ordering the documents to be produced at the office of the solicitor of the party who was to produce them was substituted. But his lordship thought that the old practice ought still to be followed in any case which called for it. He thought that in the present instance a prima facie case had been made for following the old practice, and he should order the defendant to deposit in court such of the original documents in his possession relating to the title of the plaintiffs as he could not shew that he did not obtain from the executrix of the deceased solicitor in the way alleged. Another point arose in the case. Rule 27 (54) of order 65 provides that "it shall not be necessary to take an office copy of an affidavit of discovery of documents, and the copy delivered by the party filing it may be used as against such party." When the case was first opened the copy of the defendant's affidavit of documents delivered by him to the plaintiff was not in court, but the plaintiffs' counsel were only furnished with a copy of the delivered copy. Although the defendant's counsel admitted that that copy was an accurate copy of the delivered copy, NORTH, J., declined to proceed with the hearing of the motion until he was furnished with the delivered copy.-COUNSEL, Cookson, Q.C., and Ingpen; Erichsen. SOLICITORS, Arnold & Co.; S. J. Woodhouse Smith.

JONES v. EVANS-North, J., 26th October. PRACTICE-NEXT FRIEND OF INFANT-SECURITY FOR COSTS. This was a summons by some of the defendants that the next friend of the plaintiff (who was an infant) might be ordered to give security for costs, or that he might be removed from the office of next friend. The grounds alleged for the application were that the next friend was an entire stranger to the family of the infant, and that he was a person of no means. The action was for the administration of an estate, and the defendants. The present application was made by those three defendants. writ alleged that breaches of trust had been committed by three of the The summons was issued in July, and early in August a statement of claim was delivered by the plaintiff. NORTH, J., refused the application. He said that the writ had given the applicants full notice of the case which was intended to be raised against them, and the statement of claim was delivered more than two months ago, and yet the applicants had not them was not well founded. They did not suggest that the action ought filed any affidavit suggesting that the case which was to be raised against to be stayed as not being for the interest of the infant plaintiff. There was, prima facie, good ground for the action. The impecuniosity of the him or requiring him to give security for costs, nor was the fact that he next friend of an infant was not of itself sufficient ground for removing was a stranger to the family a sufficient ground for removing him when the action was prima facie for the benefit of the infant.-COUNSEL, CozensHardy, Q.C., and Ratcliffe; Cookson, Q.C., and Daniel Jones. SOLICITORS, John Nicholls & Co.; Jackson & Wright.

PHOSPHOR BRONZE CO. v. GOSPEL OAK, &c., WIRE CO.-
Q. B. Div., 25th October.

R S. C., 1883, LXV., 12-COSTS ON COUNTY COURT SCALE-RECOVERING 66 IN THE ACTION" MORE THAN £50.

This was an appeal from a decision of Field, J., in chambers ordering a review of taxation. The action was brought to recover £75 for goods sold and delivered. The defendants pleaded that they were entitled to return such of the goods as were not equal to contract, and that none of the goods were equal to contract. After the delivery of pleadings a compromise was arrived at, by which it was agreed that the defendants should return goods to the value of £29, and pay for the rest. Further proceedings having been taken in the action, and the execution of the compromise being disputed, an order was made directing that the question whether the action had, or had not, been compromised should be tried by a judge,

who should give judgment according to the terms of the compromise, or, if he found there had been none, should treat the hearing as the trial of the action. Under this order the case came before Cavc, J., who found that the action had been compromised on the terms above stated, and gave judgment for the plaintiffs for £27, with costs. On taxation it was contended for the defendants that less than £50 had been recovered, and that, consequently, the plaintiffs were only entitled to costs on the county court scale. The master adopted this view. Field, J., on appeal, held that the £29, the value of the goods returned, must be taken into account, and that the plaintiff had, therefore, recovered "in the action more than £50. Counsel for defendants now contended that the goods had not been recovered in the action, the defendants, as to them, having succeeded in their defence, which was that the goods had only been delivered on approval, and that the property had not passed. THE COURT (MATHEW and A. L. SMITH, JJ.) dismissed the appeal, being of opinion that in this case more than £50 had been recovered in the action.-COUNSEL, Asquith; B. F. Williams, Q.C.-Times.

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THE GAS LIGHT AND COKE CO. v. HERBERT SMITH & CO.Q. B. Div., 26th October.

EXEMPTION FROM DISTRESS-GAS FITTINGS-GASWORKS CLAUSES ACT, 1847 (10 VICT., c. 15, s. 14).

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The defendants, having levied a distress upon the premises of a tenant, seized and sold a gas cooking-stove which the tenant held on hire from the plaintiff company. The 14th section of the Gasworks Clauses Act, 1847, which empowers gas companies to let for hire "any meter any fittings for the gas," provides that "such meter and fittings shall not be subject to distress. In The Gas Light and Coke Co. v. Hardy (30 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 655), it was held that a gas-stove for warming purposes was a 'fitting for the gas" within the meaning of these words and the similar provisions of the subsequent statutes. It was now sought to exclude from this decision the case of a stove for cooking, containing, besides the burners and the chamber in which the gas was consumed, other chambers, together with grates, hot plates, and sach arrangements, for the reception of cooking utensils. STEPHEN, J., said he thought the gas-stove clearly came within the judgment of the Court of Appeal. It was not necessary to put such a fine edge on language that it must apply to one thing and could not apply to another. The general use of the term " gas-fitting" seemed plain enough. If he (the learned judge) had to define it, he should say it was an instrument used to receive or burn gas, and with such accessories as might be necessary in order to obtain the benefit of the combustion. If a distinction were to be drawn between the burners in this stove and the drawers and grates, so that the latter would be taken out and exempted from distress, it would certainly be a most inconvenient distinction. When, however, they came to a machine like a gas engine, it seemed to his lordship that they came to something which was much more than an instrument for receiving and burning gas. This iror. box, with its grates and drawers, was substantially one thing, and as it was used for the reception and combustion of gas, his lordship held it was within the section, and exempt from distress.-COUNSEL, Sir R. Webster, A.G., and Danckwerts; Lumley Smith, Q.C., and Cecil Chapman-Times.

DOMESDAY BOOK.

Domesday or the Domesday period. The earliest of all the documents exhibited dated back to about the year 1000, and was a statement of the number of hides of land in the different divisions of England south of the Humber. It is written on a single page of vellum. A Cotton MSS., known as the "Inquisitio Cantabrigiensis," is a copy of the original survey of Cambridgeshire as returned by the jurors to King William. In the evening the society met in Lincoln's-inn Hall, where two papers were read on Domesday subjects by Mr. Stuart A. Moore and Mr. J. | Horace Round.

ON Monday last the members of the Royal Historical Society met at the Record Office to view the two volumes of the Domesday Book and to hear a lecture by Mr. Hubert Hall on their history. The books, says the Standard, are bound in thick steel-mounted boards, rest on blue velvet cushions, and are preserved in separate glass cases. The first volume is a folio of three hundred and eighty-two pages of vellum, fourteen and a-half by nine and three-quarter inches, with five fly leaves at the beginning and four at the end. The writing is in double column, and of great beauty and legibility. Age, probably, has given the work a brown colour; many of the capital and smaller letters are shaded with red ink; there are some sentences, entries, and words altogether in red, and some entries, both in black and red, have been deleted by a red-ink stroke being drawn through them. This volume contains the survey of thirty-one counties, and is a transcript or analysis of the reports supplied by the King's Justiciaries or Commissioners, who were sent into every county and shire to ascertain the condition of the Kingdom, with the help of juries summoned in each hundred, consisting of the sheriffs, lords of manors, reeves or overseers of hundreds, bailiffs, and the villeins of the villages-in short, with the help of every grade of society, from the barons to the class immediately above the serfs. Three of the leaves are smaller than the others, the reason being that they had been added to complete a portion of the record which could not be got into the space allotted to it. One leaf has a small portion cut off, but it was so mutilated before the record was written; and a third leaf is in the wrong place. The second volume is not in folio, but quarto, 10 by 6 inches, and written, as it were, currente calamo, and in single column. It is far behind the first volume in clerical beauty and finish. The three counties of Essex, Norfolk, and Suffolk, which it describes, are not included among the thirty-one counties in the folio volume, and the manuscript is believed to consist of the original reports of the Commissioners, and not of abridgments or compilations of their reports like the folio. In neither volume will there be found any account of Northumberland, Cumberland, Westmorland, and Durham. Numerous other manu scripts were exhibited. In the evening a lecture was delivered by Canon Isaac Taylor on "Early English Village Life.” On Tuesday the society visited the British Museum to view the manuscripts there relating to

THE BILLS OF SALE ACT, 1882. BY JAMES WHITE, LL.D.

II.

I NOW come to consider the question, "What is an accordance with the statutory form?" This is a question of extreme uncertainty and difficulty. I propose to go through the form, discussing its various parts in connection with the decided cases, passing over the question as to truly stating the consideration. I do not think there is any real difficulty in stating the consideration truly, as required by the Act. It would, perhaps, be thought that no difficulty could arise as to the grantees, but in Melville v. Stringer (32 W. R. 890), a bill of sale to several grantees to secure amounts due to them severally was held void, as not being in accordance with the statutory form, on the ground that the sancta simplicitas required by that form was destroyed. Bowen, L.J., says, "A substantial part of the form is that the property must be assigned to the person who finds the money, and that to such person repayment is to be made of the money borrowed, and therefore I do not think that a bill of sale is within the Act if the money is lent by one person and made repayable to another person, or if the property is assigned by it to one person and repayment is to be to another, or if the assignment of the property is to one person to secure repayment to another." In fact, the judgment of Bowen, L.J., goes to the full extent of saying that a bill of sale to several persons not joint creditors is invalid.

Next we come to the parcels. Here we have to note section 4 of the Act, which requires a schedule of the goods to be annexed or written on the bill of sale, and provides that, except as against the grantor, the bill of sale shall be void in respect of chattels not specifically described in the schedule. Now this schedule must be not a general schedule or general description, but a "specific inventory which would put down the number of articles, but not all in one item. There must be a specific inventory of each class of goods, though not of each article in detail" (per Brett, M.R., in Roberts v. Roberts, 32 W. R. 605), in which case a bill of sale was held void as to goods described in the schedule as "household furniture and effects, implements of husbandry." The deed need not state where the goods are (Ex parte Hill, L. R. 17 Q. B. D. 74).

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Next, by section 4, a bill of sale is void (except as against the grantor) in respect of any chattels specifically described in the schedule, of which the grantor is not the true owner at the time of the execution of the bill of sale. There have not been, so far as I am aware, any cases on the construction of this section; clearly it prevents the use of the old commonform parcels " and all other goods, &c., which shall at any time during the continuance of this security be brought into or upon the said premises, either in addition to or in substitution for the goods, &c., hereby assigned." We shall see presently whether it is possible to make a bill of sale cover goods substituted for the goods described in the schedule. Next we come to the words "by way of security for the payment of the sum of £ and interest thereon at the rate of £ per cent. per annum "[or whatever else may be the rate]. Now, on these words, combined with the covenant for payment which immediately follows them, we have a considerable number of decisions. The covenant for payment is to pay "the principal sum aforesaid, together with interest then due, by equal payments of £ on the day of [or whatever else may be the stipulated times or time of payment]. "Whatever else must be the rate" has been held to mean that in any event the interest must be rateable. So in the leading case of Davis v. Burton (32 W. R. 423), a bill of sale to secure £300, and £180 as capitalized interest, "being at the rate of £60 per cent. per annum," by instalments, was held void because, in the event of the breach of any of the covenants, "all moneys secured by the bill of sale were immediately to become due, so that in that event the rate of interest would be enormously more than sixty per cent. It was, in fact, impossible to say from the instrument what the rate of interest might be (see also Ex parte Pearce, 32 W. R. 187). In Thorp v. Cregveen (33 W. R. 844), £5 was charged for interest, and the rate was not stated. The bill of sale was held good by the Divisional Court, but this was disapproved by the Court of Appeal in Myers v. Elliott (34 W. R. 339), where £15 was charged for "interest and bonus," and the rate was not stated. The bill of sale was held void on the same ground as in Davis v. Burton-viz., that the rate of interest was not statedinterest could not be distinguished from bonus. So in Goldstrom v. Tallerman (34 W. R. 459), where the bill of sale was held void because, on the construction of it, it was not clear whether the interest (£60 per cent.) was payable by equal instalments with the principal, or by diminishing payments on the principal for the time being owing. In this bill of sale there was a provision that, if instalments were in arrear, interest should be paid on them; and the bill was held void on this ground also. In Lumley v. Simmons (34 W. R. 759), interest was made payable at "the rate of 1s. in the £ per month"; it was held that this was in accordance with the form,

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