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(OLICITORS.-A fine Suite of Offices (three or five Rooms) to be Let, at New Stonebuildings, Chancery-lane, close to the Law Courts and the Chancery-lane Safe Deposit; lighted by electric light; every convenience; moderate rent. Use of elegant Arbitration Rooms in same Building at reduced Terms.-Apply at the Collector's Office, in the Hall of 63 and 64, Chancery-lane.

HAMBERS, Residential or otherwise.

CH

Splendid suite of three or five rooms to be Let at Newtone-buildings, Chancery-lane; well fitted; lighted by electric light; convenient for the Law Courts, theatres, &c.; moderate rent.-Apply at the Collector's Office, in the Hall of 63 and 61, Chancerylane.

BARRISTERS andto others Seeking

splendid Suite of two, three, or five rooms to be Let, in a fine Building quite near the Law Courts, and adjoining the Chancery-lane Safe Deposit. Lighted by electric light and every convenience; moderate rent. Apply at the Collector's Office, in the Hall of 63 and 64, Chancery-lane.

GROUND FLOOR. Fine large Premises

to be Let in Lincoln's-inn-fields; well suited to Solicitors, Barristers, Law Stationers. and others desiring to be near the Law Courts; splendid situation; moderate rent. Apply to Attendant, 3 and 4. Lincoln's inn-fields; or at the Collector's Office, in the Hall of 63 and 64, Chancery-lane.

-

RESIDENTIAL CHAMBERS to be LET

in Lincoln's-inn-fields, fitted with every convenience; bath room (hot and cold water); key and use of square; splendid situation; moderate rent.Apply to the Attendant, on the premises, 3 and 4, Lincoln's-inn-fields; or at the Collector's Office, in the Hall of 63, Chancery-lane.

FREEHOLD

BUILDING

GROUND,

City of London, in the new approach to Billingsgate Market.-The Commissioners of Sewers of the City of London will meet in the Guildhall of the said city on Tuesday, the 25th of October, 1887, at half-past 12 o'clock precisely, to receive TENDERS for taking on BUILDING LEASES, for a term of 80 years, several plots of very valuable FREEHOLD GROUND in Monument-yard and between Pudding. lane and Botolph-lane, and abutting upon the new street extension to Billingsgate Market.

Further particulars, with conditions and printed forms of proposal, may be had on application at the office of the Engineer to the Commission, in the Guildhall.

The Commissioners do not bind themselves to accept the highest or any proposal

Persons making proposals must attend personally, or by a duly authorized agent, on the above-mentioned day, at half-past 12 o'clock precisely, and the parties whose offers are accepted will be required to execute an agreement and bond at the same time. Proposals must be endorsed on the outside Tender for Ground," and be delivered in, addressed to the undersigned, before 12 o'clock on the said day of treaty. HENRY BLAKE, Principal Clerk.

Sewers Office, Guildhall, August, 1887.

BRIGHTON.

Upset price £8,000.-Highly attractive, very valuable and important Freehold Property, on the King'sroad, directly facing the sea, and situate about midway between the West Pier and western lawns and promenade, in unquestionably the best, most cheerful, and favourite situation of the whole sea front of the town, and with the advantage of immediate possession.

MESSRS. JENNER & DELL are favoured

with instructions to SELL by AUCTION, at the OLD SHIP HOTEL, Brighton, on TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 8th, 1887, at Three o'clock precisely, the choicely - situated and commandingly - placed FREEHOLD MANSION, known as West Cliffhouse, for many years the residence of the late Elizabeth, Lady Abinger, occupying an unrivalled position and most valuable site, comprising the whole frontage of the King's-road, between Oriental-place and Montpelier-road, and having a depth and frontage to Oriental-place of 106 feet, and a depth and frontage to Montpelier-road of 115 feet. The mansion, which is detached and slightly removed from the front, with garden intervening, commands charming and uninterrupted views of the sea and coast, and contains the unique and superior accommodation of three handsome drawing rooms. noble dining room, capital billiard room, conservatory, and aviary, all on the ground floor and communicating, 13 bed rooms, commends itself as a most choice site for the erection of residential flats, a club, hotel, or other building where large space and prominence of position are desirable.

THE

THE MORTGAGE INSURANCE COR-
PORATION, LIMITED.

AMOUNT OF CAPITAL SUBSCRIBED, £710,000
Offices of the Corporation-
Winchester House, Old Broad-street, E.C.
Rt. Hon. E. PLEYDELL BOUVERIE, Chairman.
Sir SYDNEY H. WATERLOW, Bart., Deputy-Chairman.
Policies are now being issued by this Corporation
insuring Mortgages of Freehold and Leasehold
of Mortgage Debentures and
Property, holders
Debenture Stock, against loss of principal and in-
These Policies will be of especial advantage to
Trustees who may be held responsible for losses
consequent upon their Investments.

terest.

Mortgagors insuring with the Corporation will also be enabled to obtain Advances at the lowest possible rate of interest.

The Corporation also grants Policies to Leaseholders insuring the return of the Amount invested at the expiration of their leases or at any fixed periods. For particulars and conditions of Insurance apply to the Secretary. By order, JAS. C. PRINSEP, Secretary.

MPERIAL FIRE INSURANCE COM

and spacious offices. The property also particularly M

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FARMER, & BRIDGEWATER beg to announce that their SALES of LANDED ESTATES, Investments, Town, Suburban, and Country Houses, Business Premises, Building Land, Ground-rents, Advowsons, Reversions Stocks, Shares, and other Properties, will be held at the

PANY. Established 1803.

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Auction Mart, Tokenhouse-yard, near the Bank of Eng. Get Office-11, Lombard-street, London, E.C.

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FARMER, & BRIDGEWATER'S LIST of ESTATES and HOUSES to be SOLD or LET, including Landed Estates, Town and Country Residences, Hunting and Shooting Quarters, Farms, Ground Rents, Rent Charges, House Property and Investments generally, is published on the first day of each month, and may be obtained, free of charge, at their offices, 80, Cheapside, E.C., or will be sent by post in return for three stamps.Particulars for insertion should be received not later than four days previous to the end of the preceding month.

MESSRS. PUTTICK & SIMPSON, Literary

and Fine Art Auctioneers, 47, Leicester-square London, W.C., beg to inform Executors, Trustees, Solicitors, and the Trade, that their Season for the

Law Courts Branch-21, Fleet-street, E.C. Established 1821. Subscribed Capital, Two Millions. DIRECTORS:

CHAIRMAN-BEAUMONT W. LUBBOCK, Esq. DEPUTY-CHAIRMAN-JOHN B. MARTIN, Esq Rt. Hon. Lord Adding-| John Hunter, Esq. ton. George Lake, Esq. Henry Bonham Carter, Rt. Hon. G. J. ShawEsq. Lefevre, M.P. Wm. Hill Dawson. Esq. Charles F. Devas, Esq. Alban G. H. Gibbs, Esq. James Goodson, Esq. John J. Hamilton, Esq. Thomson Hankey, Esq. Richard M. Harvey, Esq. Henry Vigne, Esq. MANAGER OF FIRE DEPARTMENT-F. J. Marsden. ACTUARY AND SECRETARY-T. G. C. Browne. Share Capital at present paid up and in

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by Auction of Libraries of and Music K

Engravings, Paintings, and other works connected with the Fine Arts, Musical Instruments, and all descriptions of Valuable Property, will commence on October 17, and that their warehouses are open daily for the reception of goods consigned to them for sale. Messrs. P. & S. will hold several important Sales during the Season, and will include small properties in appropriate Sales, thus affording the same advantages to small as to large consignments. Libraries and other properties catalogued, arranged, and valued for Probate and Legacy Duty, or for Public or Private Sale.

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IRKBECK BANK.Southampton-buildings, Chancery-lane. THREE per CENT. INTEREST allowed on DEPOSITS, repayable on demand.

TWO per CENT. INTEREST on CURRENT ACCOUNTS calculated on the minimum monthly balances, when not drawn below £100.

The Bank undertakes for its Customers, free of Charge, the Custody of Deeds, Writings, and other Securities and Valuables; the collection of Bills of Exchange, Dividends, and Coupons; and the purchase and sale of Stocks, Shares, and Annuities. Letters of Credit and Circular Notes issued.

The BIRKBECK ALMANACK, with full particu lars, post-free, on application.

FRANCIS RAVENSCROFT, Manager.

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Statute of Merton, which the lord might lawfully exercise apart from the Act. Section 31 does not in any way cut down the 784 rights given by the Statute of Merton, but only obliges the lord to give public notice, by means of advertisements, of his intention to exercise them. There is another point on which we do not find ourselves entirely in agreement with our correspondent. If we

784

The Solicitors' Journal and Reporter. had arrived at the conclusion at which he has arrived, we should

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IF IT WERE NECESSARY to add to the already overwhelming evidence in support of the conclusion that another judge is required in order that the business of the Chancery Division may be satisfactorily disposed of, such evidence may be found in the fact that during the year 1875-6 the then four judges of the Chancery Division and the Lord Chancellor sat on 761 days and disposed of 1,942 actions, &c., and 4,905 interlocutory applications; whereas ten years later, in 1885-6, the five judges of the Chancery Division, with Mr. Justice BUTT as an additional judge, sat on 1,232 days and disposed of only 1,355 actions, &c., and 4,147 interlocutory matters. The trial of actions by oral evidence is, of course, one chief reason why actions are not so rapidly disposed of nowadays; and so long as that system is continued, no expectation can be entertained that the work will be more quickly disposed of with the existing number of judges. It cannot be anticipated that the proposals recently made that shorthand writers should be employed to take verbatim notes of the evidence will commend itself to the majority of the judges. This is a point which involves as well the convenience of the judges as the question of expense to suitors. To the latter class the costs of litigation are already sufficiently onerous, and her Majesty's Treasury is not likely to come forward and pay the salaries of sworn shorthand writers which would probably exceed in amount the salaries of a judge

and his officers.

WE PRINT in another column a letter from a learned correspondent offering an explanation of the extraordinary passage in the last Copyhold Act (50 & 51 Vict. c. 73), s. 6, to which we drew attention in our last number. We cannot, however, find in the other Act which he cites (39 & 40 Vict. c. 56, s. 31), anything to bear out the interpretation which he puts upon it. That Act the Commons Act, 1876-is an enabling Act, permitting inclosures to be made, with the assent of the Land Commissioners, in the manner therein prescribed; but it does not appear to interfere with any right to inclose, existing either at the common law or by the

not have arrived at it "satisfactorily." We understand him to suggest that the meaning of the section is that, in manors where a special custom exists permitting the lord, with the assent of the homage, to grant parcels of the waste de novo to be held by copy of court roll, such a grant shall in future, though made with the assent of the Land Commissioners, take effect to create a freehold instead of a copyhold. If this is the Act's meaning, the passage cited is, in our humble opinion, a scandalous example of bad draftsmanship; and we should only abstain (supposing that to be its meaning) from styling it a glaring scandal, because such blundering has become too common for any single example to be very conspicuous. How can land which by the hypothesis is made freehold, or, to be very precise, held "as" freehold, by the operation of the grant itself, "cease" to be something which it never was? Would any rational draftsman, wishing to express the meaning our correspondent suggests, intentionally use language which compels recourse to his "eo instanti" hypothesis, or (if this is our correspondent's supposition) which causes that hypothesis to hang upon the use of the word "as"? As citizens we may be much inclined to favour any interpretation which avoids the confiscation of vested interests; as lawyers we cannot help feeling much shocked at the thought of being forced to avoid it by such an expedient.

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SIR HENRY JAMES, the author of the Corrupt Practices Act, 1883, has written a letter to the Times on the "Templecombe Free Lunch," in which he points out that the provision of food and drink free of cost at a political meeting and the payment of money for railway expenses are a violation of the spirit of the above-mentioned Act. So far we should think most people, looking at the matter apart from considerations of party, will agree with the learned writer. But he further expresses an opinion that the "direct provisions" of the Act have been infringed, and expresses a hope that, if it should be proved upon an election petition that the feasted electors were solicited to record their votes for the Liberal candidates before them, "there will be judges strong enough to say that the candidate who has reaped the advantage of such an appeal has not been elected by pure or legal means. If there were candidates present at the free lunch, or concerned in its promotion, there may possibly be ground for this hope; but we confess we find it difficult to see how a candidate who merely reaps the advantage of the free lunch exhortations, without having been in any way party or privy, by himself or his agents, to the free lunch, can be hit. In order to render him responsible the promoters of the free lunch must be shewn to be his agents. He "must be proved (either by himself or his authorized agent) to have employed the persons in question to act on his behalf, or to have to some extent put himself in their hands, or to have made common cause with them for the purpose of promoting his election" (per GROVE, J., Taunton Election, 2 O'M. & H. 74). It is perhaps conceivable that a candidate who accepted the assistance of the associations by whom the tickets for the free lunch were distributed might be held to have adopted their previous acts, particularly if an election occurred shortly after the free lunch ; but this would certainly be a strong construction. The liability of the promoters and recipients of the free lunch is, however, quite a different matter. Section 1 of the Act of 1883 provides that "any person who corruptly [that is, with the motive, by means of treating, to produce an effect on the elector: Hereford Election, 1 O'M. & H. 195], by himself or any other person, either before, during, or after an election, directly or indirectly gives or provides, or pays wholly or in part the expense of giving or providing any meat, drink, entertainment, or provision to or for any person, for the purpose of corruptly influencing that person or any other person to give or refrain from giving his vote at the election shall be guilty of treating," and is rendered liable to the severe penalties and disqualifications mentioned in section 6. Moreover, by section 1 (2), every elector who

corruptly accepts or takes any such meat, drink, entertainment, or provision, is also made guilty of treating. And, by section 36, every person guilty of a corrupt practice at an election is prohibited from voting at such election, and, if he votes, his vote is to be void. Possibly Sir HENRY JAMES's remark may have been made with reference to this last liability.

of a trustee proper.

In any

to avoid the deed. For some reason or other the mortgagee stipulated
that when all the moneys secured had been repaid he should in-
dorse the fact upon the bill of sale and then keep it in his own
possession. What the exact use of this could be, except for
vexatious purposes, is not clear. It was suggested that it was a
stipulation originally devised by some money lender in order to
obstruct legal proceedings subsequently taken by the
grantor of the bill of sale to obtain redress for wrongs
suffered during the continuance of the security.
case it could have very little effect one way or the other,
and this was pleaded on behalf of the bill of sale. But the
court would have none of it. Much or little, it altered the legal
relations of the parties from what they would be under the statutory
form, and this was sufficient. It was provided, again, that the
grantor of the bill of sale should keep down the interest upon any
mortgages which might be subsisting upon the premises where the
goods from time to time should be. This is apparently for the
maintenance of the security, and so it was argued, inasmuch as
under such mortgages there might be a power of distress over the
goods. But granting that the stipulation was good so far, yet in
its actual form it went much farther, for it bound the grantor to
pay the interest on all mortgages, whether they contained such a
power of distress or not, and irrespective of whether they were
granted by himself.

THE POST of examiner to the court so much sought after and expected to be exceedingly lucrative, can scarcely answer expectations. The total amount of fees received by the examiners in the year ending with October, 1886, was £1,861, and in the previous year £1,721. About 20 of the 25 examiners originally appointed still retain their posts, and any person can calculate for himself what are the average receipts of each.

DURING THE LAST three years there has been a gradual decrease securities and cash together, the total amount on the books of the in the amount of the funds in court belonging to suitors. Adding Paymaster-General, shewn by the three latest returns, is £78,866,104, £78,360,326, and £75,877,581, shewing a decrease of nearly three millions sterling.

IN COMMENTING last week upon the case of Magnus v. Queensland National Bank (36 Ch. D. 25) we pointed out the danger that a mortgagee runs of re-conveying the mortgaged property to the wrong person. At first sight it seems to follow that he is bound at his peril to discover who is entitled to the equity of redemption, but it has been expressly laid down that this is a burden which the courts will not impose upon him. Thus in Cholmondeley v. Clinton (2 Jac. & W. 185) his position was distinguished from that "The estate is not committed to his care, nor has he the means of preventing or being acquainted with the changes which the title to the equity of redemption may undergo, either by act of the mortgagor, without his privity, or by operation of law, by descent, forfeiture, or otherwise.' In that case the interest had been regularly paid by a person who had no title, and it was considered that the neglect of the true owner was sufficient to warrant the mortgagee in conveying the property to the apparent owner of the equity of redemption. Again, the equity of redemption is frequently divided among several persons, and the question arises how far the mortgagee is bound upon a re-conveyance to protect their interests. This also has been decided in a manner favourable to him, as is clear from Lord HATHERLEY'S judgment in Pearce v. Morris (5 Ch. 230): "It would be very mischievous to mortgagees if the court were to hold that they were bound to inquire into the titles of all the persons who have got other interests in the equity of redemption, or that, if they accepted their money without a suit, it was at their peril, because they had been constituted trustees for other parties. It would also involve mortgagors in a vast amount of litigation and costs, which would be entirely unnecessary in most cases. Hence it was decided that, though a mortgagee is not entitled to convey absolutely to a mere stranger to the estate, yet he is bound to convey to any person having an interest in the estate which gives a right to redeem. Or, as was said more generally, "All that either the court or the mortgagee has to attend to is, that in fact the person tendering the money has an interest, whatever it may be, in the equity of redemption." Of course the re-conveyance is not to such person absolutely, and if the position of the other parties is not exactly stated, yet, at least, the deed must shew that IS COMPULSION REALLY NECESSARY FOR THE the party redeeming has a partial interest only, and is to hold subject to the right of redemption of all the persons who hold other interests. But while the mortgagee is thus relieved from the duty of following strictly the devolution of the equity of Ir seems to be generally expected that the Land Transfer Bill redemption when the owner for the time being does not assert his will be re-introduced next session. If it is, we may hope to see rights, or of settling the interests of the various persons holding it in the consolidated form so universally recommended by all partial interests therein, yet he is bound to be cognizant of facts critics during the last session. But it is not of its form so much actually brought to his notice, and to act upon them. In the case as of its substance that we now desire to speak. The form is only referred to last week the mortgage was in January, 1882, and the a question of labour, all admit consolidation to be desirable; the re-transfer in February; yet the mortgagees, without any inquiry, only doubt is whether it will be considered worth while to undertransferred to a stranger at the direction of one only of the mort- take it at the present stage. As to the substance of the measure, gagors. A good example, too, is afforded by the case of West it is evident from the numerous expressions of opinion that have London Commercial Bank v. Reliance Permanent Building Society flowed in from all sides that there is still much debateable matter (29 Ch. D. 954). There the first mortgagees had received from left open to discussion. We propose to occupy the present breaththe second mortgagees notice of their incumbrance, but in forget-ing space in collecting some observations on a few of the most fulness of this they concurred with the mortgagor in effecting a salient points that seem to admit of further consideration. sale. But inasmuch as the second mortgagees were the persons entitled to redeem, and the first mortgagees had had notice, they became, upon being paid off, trustees for the second mortgagees, and so were liable for the loss of their security. It appears, then, that a mortgagee will be safe if he acts upon a reasonable probability as to the rights of parties, taking care to observe such actual notices of subsequent incumbrances as are served upon him. When there is a real dispute as to rights, it is for the courts to settle it, and not the mortgagee.

THE CASE of Watson v. Strickland (35 W. R. 763, 19 Q. B. D. 391) is another illustration of the danger of putting too much into a bill of sale. Two provisions had been inserted either of which was sufficient

ESTABLISHMENT OF REGISTRATION OF TITLE ?

I.

In the first place it will be well to state what we consider to be beyond the province of profitable discussion now. It is clearly no exaggeration to say that the whole question of registration of title to land has entered upon an entirely new phase since this time last year. It will be remembered, for instance, by those who have watched the matter for any length of time, that up to the moment of the Chancellor's speech from the woolsack, little more than six months ago, it was a matter of uncertainty whether the Government scheme, spoken of in two speeches from the throne, and adumbrated by Cabinet Ministers in numerous platform speeches for the best part of two years, would or would not be a reverter to the system of registration of deeds, and, if not, it was still open to doubt what species of registration of title would be adopted, and what means would be chosen to preserve the

measure from remaining to so large an extent a dead letter as its predecessors of 1862 and 1875.

Now, however, there cannot be two opinions as to the general direction that the reforms will take when it pleases the Legislature to carry them. Lord Halsbury said in his opening speech that registration of deeds was dead-and in so saying he killed it. The consensus of all parties in favour of registration of title in some form or other-whether right or wrong-is now so obviously determined, that on this point at least we venture to submit that further discussion would be now perfectly futile. Therefore, for one thing, we propose to eschew entirely all general objections to registration of title as a whole. If it be a bad system its imperfections must be left to be demonstrated in practice: the powers that be are determined to be satisfied with nothing short of this. Therefore, in the following observations it will be assumed, for simplicity's sake, that registration is a good thing, and that the only question is how to introduce it with least trouble and friction during the transition period.

Two other lesser points seem also to be settled for the presentnamely, that the system of absolute title hitherto pursued must be modified, and that the nature of the title conferred on the registered owner must be more in the nature of a warranty by the Government against loss-guaranteed title, as it has been named for distinction-and, as a concomitant, that an insurance fund must be established. This principle has been found to work very well in Australasia: the mistakes made are very trifling (under three thousand pounds worth in over twenty years for the whole of Australia and New Zealand), the insurance charge is nothing to compare with the cost of unregistered conveyancing, and the various funds are growing out of all proportion to the demands made upon them. Some critics appear to think that to make provision for possible error is the mark of a reckless and inconsiderate system. We must admit that our own view is entirely the opposite. Mistakes of some kind must attend all human operations. They may be kept down to a small amount by reasonable vigilance, but after a certain point the vigilance becomes more oppressive than the risk. At this point the insurance principle steps in and completes the edifice. Both these two latter points have been very exhaustively dealt with in recent publications, to which we would refer our readers who still entertain doubts on the subject, and to which we have ourselves nothing to add.

There is, however, one point left of first-rate importance, and one on which solicitors, as a body, have expressed a most decided opinion, which we venture to think has not been at all exhaustively treated as yet-namely, the question of compulsion. In their report on the Bill the Committee of the Incorporated Law Society say:-" Compulsion is unjust and should be unnecessary, and if a system of registration cannot be worked except by pressure of compulsion, it will be because it has not been made suitable to the requirements of the country, and will hamper instead of facilitate the dealings with real estate" (p. 2). This is not the popular view, however; the general public are of a directly contrary opinion, but we venture to say, as the result of much study, that we have not yet met with any reasoned defence of the popular view which does not, more or less, break down when examined. The opinion has, however, been so long, so often, and so positively expressed, that it is necessary to go somewhat deeply into the question in order to trace out the process by which the public mind has become impervious to so plausible a statement as that put forward by the Committee of the Incorporated Law Society in the passage just quoted.

To the Legislator charged with the duty of passing the Bill through both Houses of Parliament the question is doubtless one of extreme difficulty. On the one hand it is well known that the late Bill was displeasing to many of the supporters of the system of registration because it was not compulsory enough. On the other hand it can hardly be doubted that landowners (an influential, though perhaps a more silent, body, in the Legislature) were rendered not a little nervous by the compulsory clauses, and this nervousness has probably been increased by the interval for reflection which has now ensued, and possibly by the unmistakable disapproval which their solicitors, as a body, are now taking every occasion to emphasize.

One undoubted obstacle to the success of a voluntary system has been very much lessened during the past year. We do not hesitate to say that the passage of last year's Bill through the

House of Lords-to whatever cause it be attributed-has made it impossible for the bulk of the profession to ignore the system of registration of title. That they have ignored it hitherto can hardly be denied. It is a most unusual thing to find a solicitor who has any exact knowledge of it, or who is not easily led into the gravest misconceptions regarding its features. For instance, it is a frequent mistake, even among those who have given some attention to the subject, to suppose that it has no counterpart to the banker's mortgage by deposit of deeds-witness a letter from an esteemed correspondent in our last week's issue. As a fact, every system of registration that we know of makes express provision for these mortgages, and it is reported from Australia that they are used just as often under the new system as they were formerly, and that, in fact, the banker is in an easier and also a safer position, holding an equitable charge with deposit of certificate, than he is in England lending on a deposit of deeds.

We will now consider the various arguments that adduced in favour of compulsion.

may be The short case for compulsion is generally thus stated:-Two attempts have been made to establish the system in this country: those attempts failed because they were voluntary: compulsion is therefore the only alternative. Now not withstanding the high authority which can be quoted in support of this view, and notwithstanding the almost universal acceptance it obtains outside the legal profession, we hope we may be permitted still to doubt its correctness, and to dwell upon some aspects of the subject which tend to justify that doubt.

To trace the gradual steps by which the idea of compelling all landowners to register possessory titles has come to be accepted as the only possible way of getting estates registered involves a short retrospect, because in the course of the last thirty years an entire change has taken place in the mode in which the question is generally looked at. All early authorities agree in considering it as in the first place a landowner's question: for instance, the Report of the Registration and Conveyancing Commission of 1850, p. 6, runs thus: "We ought to consider as a burden upon land whatever has the effect of diminishing its value or detracting from its ready and convenient application to the wants or requirements of its owner. The fear of delay as well as of expense is a more effective cause of the depreciation of land than the apprehension that the title may be insecure. The experience of the delay especially which so often attends sales and transfers, by deterring some persons from making investments in land, and others from lending money on mortgage, materially diminishes the value of landed property. Expedients which may afford to purchasers or lenders protection against fraud will secure a great and direct benefit to landowners by the increased value of their possessions."

But in practice under the Act of 1862 this result did not occur. For one thing, the costs of registration always greatly exceeded the costs of a sale under ordinary conditions of sale, and, for another, it seems that no efficient means was hit upon for causing purchasers to contribute anything towards the amount so spent. Consequently, vendors having nothing to gain by registering before a sale, and purchasers having equally no motive for registering after, the landowners, as a body, preferred to retain the old system. Solicitors say the costs were occasioned by difficulties made in the Land Registry Office. The officers of the registry say they were caused by the carelessness of the solicitors-the result was the same either way.

Then it was that the suggestion was first made, of which so much has been heard since, that solicitors selfishly opposed registration in order to retain their own lucrative business of preparing abstracts of title. That so good a measure as the Act of 1862 was believed to be could fall by its Own weight was hardly supposed possible. Accordingly the Royal Commission of 1868 (Report 1870) devoted much attention to the inquiries as to the attitude of solicitors. It is true some solicitors (more desirous apparently of a reputation for personal candour than jealous of the honour of their profession) inclined to indorse the discreditable view just mentioned, but the commissioners themselves, in their report, came to an entirely different opinion-namely this (the passage has been often quoted, but its moral has been little attended to), "There is always in all callings of life a large number of individuals who dislike and suspect all change as such, but these always follow when a lead has once been made in a good direction, and it is clear in this case

that the dislike to the existing system proceeds from men who have honestly tried to work it, and who wish for some workable system, and are in such a position that their houses would not only have set an example which, if successful, others must eventually follow, but would of themselves have supplied ths registry with as much business as its present staff could discharge" (p. xvi., para. 20). A more complete acquittal could hardly have been given.

SEPARATION DEEDS.

III.

So far we have seen that there is now no objection to separation deeds on the ground of public policy; that, so far as relates to the separation proper, they will probably be enforced equally against the husband and the wife; and that in this respect the wife can contract as though she were a feme sole. It remains to consider her capacity to enter into the auxiliary agreements with regard to property which usually form part of the deed.

not be the subject of further proceedings. In the latter case a husband was released from his agreement not to sue on the ground that it had been entered into upon a false declaration of innocence by the wife. So, too, the contract is subjected to the ordinary rules as to consideration; and this may be a benefit received by one party, as the covenant by the wife not to sue for nullity of marriage on the ground of impotency in Wilson v. Wilson (1 H. L. C. 538), or an obligation or burden incurred by another, as the trustee's covenant to indemnify the husband in Stephens v. Olive (2 Bro. C. C. 90), or the execution of the deed by the husband, in Jones v. Waite (5 Bing. N. C. 341). So, too, the release of an interest in property will be a good consideration, as in Logan v. Birkett (1 M. & K. 220), where the release by the husband of his interest in future-acquired property of the wife was held to be a good consideration for an annuity granted to him by her and charged upon her separate estate.

credit.

It is to be noticed that the effect of the separation deed is confined to its proper object, the release of the husband and wife from the mutual duty of cohabitation. There is no change in their legal position with reference to the outside world. This important It has been pointed out that the general capacity of a wife to point was decided in Marshall v. Rutton (1800, 8 T. R. 545). act as a feme sole in the compromise of a matrimonial suit was That was an action of assumpsit for goods supplied to the wife recognized in Vansittart v. Vansittart (4 K. & J. 62), but, as was after separation, but Lord Kenyon, C.J., refused to recognize her there said, "subject, of course, to this limitation, that her capacity liability on the ground that the husband and wife could not by to contract is confined to the matters as to which she is to be consid-contract change their legal position, and so the wife could not ered a feme sole, and to the purposes for which she is so considered" become liable to be sued. An apparent exception to this occurs (p. 71) Upon this limitation stress was laid in Cahill v. Cahill when a separate maintenance is provided for the wife, for this (8 App. Cas. 431), and this constitutes now the leading case on the puts an end to her implied authority to pledge her husband's subject. There, upon a compromise of the husband's suit for This, however, is simply on the ground that the restitution of conjugal rights, it was stipulated that the wife authority is delegated, and not inherent, and that when a separate should release part of her jointure charged upon the husband's provision has been made for her on the terms that she shall apply real estate, but no deed was acknowledged in the manner proper So it was put by Lush, J., in Eastland v. Burchell (3 Q. B. D. for nothing more it is impossible to imply any further authority. for the conveyance of such an interest by a married woman. It was contended that, as this was one of the terms of a separation 435). deed, the ordinary formalities might be dispensed with, and espeWe have considered the portion of the deed relating to separation cially that, as the wife was living in independence of her husband, proper, and to the pecuniary or other arrangements necessitated there was no necessity for those safeguards which contemplated, thereby; the future peace of the parties is frequently secured by a Of course, this proand were made to provide against, her dependence upon him. But covenant that neither shall molest the other. this was decisively rejected by Lord Selborne, C., in an elaborate hibits all personal interference; and in Sanders v. Rodway judgment, and he was followed by the other Law Lords. The dis- (16 Beav. 207), where the husband threatened to get possession of ability of coverture, he said, sprang, not from the wife's depend- his wife by force, he was restrained by injunction. ence on her husband, but from the fact that the two were one in law. question, however, is to decide what amount of annoyance, short The wife was, however, capable of suing, and of being sued, of personal interference, will amount to molestation within the either with her husband or by her next friend, and, as a consecovenant. The mere giving of trouble is not sufficient, for this quence of this, could be bound by a compromise. Hence arose may be done in pursuance of a legal right. Thus, in Thomas v. the possibility of her conveying her lands by a fine. But when Everard (6 H. & N. 448), a suit by the wife for judicial separafines were abolished and the system of conveying lands by deeds tion was held not to be a breach of her covenant not to molest, separately acknowledged was introduced, then the disability of although it might have been different had her suit been brought married women was strictly defined by the Legislature. Nor is for the purpose of securing increased alimony. But the question this in any way altered by the fact that the conveyance is a prowas exhaustively discussed in Fearon v. Earl of Aylesford (14 vision in a separation deed. Upon the compromise of a matri-Q. B. D. 792), and this is now the leading case on the subject. monial suit, husband and wife may each contract as they like with The principle there laid down is embodied in the following passage regard to their own property; but the wife is bound by the same from the judgment of Brett, M.R. :limitations that affect her contracts with a stranger.

Hence it is clear that before the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, the capacity of a woman to contract with her husband in a separation deed in regard to her property was already fully recognized. For the purpose of such contract she was regarded as a feme sole, but for all other purposes, such as the actual conveyance of property, she was still under the disabilities of a married woman. The chief effect of the Act, then, so far as we are concerned, is to place her in the position of a feme sole with regard to all her property, or, in the case of women married before 1882, with regard to property acquired since then. The intervention of a trustee for all the main purposes of the deed is quite unnecessary, though if he covenants to indemnify the husband against the wife's debts, that is still a valuable consideration to support any settlement made by the husband as against creditors. In other respects, too, the contract is subjected to the ordinary rules of contracts. Thus it will be interpreted according to the intention of the parties as expressed in its words: Rowley v. Rowley (1 Sc. & D. 63), and it is vitiated by fraud: Brown v. Brown (7 Eq. 185). In the former case a wife had compromised a divorce suit, and had agreed not to institute other proceedings in the Divorce Court. It was held that misconduct of the husband before the agreement, though not then known to the wife, could

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"What kind of act must be done in order to constitute a molestation? I am of opinion that the act done by the wife, or by her authority, must be which is, in fact, an annoyance; or, to put the latter proposition into an act which is done with intent to annoy, and does, in fact, annoy; or another shape, that it must be an act done by her with a knowledge that what she is so doing must of itself, without more, annoy her husband, or annoy a husband with ordinary and reasonable feeling.'

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The latter proposition, as the Master of the Rolls remarked, is, indeed, included in the former, since a person must be held to intend the known consequences of his own act. In the case in question it was contended that notorious adultery was a molestation, but unless the wife knows that this will come to the knowledge of her husband it does not come within the above rule. to mere adultery, it was held, without hesitation, that this is no molestation, for it would be contrary to fact to suppose that it is committed with the intention of annoying the husband; and, if this is so, the subsequent birth of a child cannot increase the original offence. It would be different, indeed, if the spurious child was held out to the world as legitimate, and it was the failure to produce evidence of this which decided the case.

As to the variation of the terms of the deed and its entire avoidance, the law seems well settled. A variation is, in general, only possible in case of a subsequent dissolution of the marriage, and this may take place, notwithstanding the separation, should

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