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had been previous negligence on the part of the bank. In Cholmondeley v. Clinton (2 Jac. & W. 186) it was laid down that, upon payment of the mortgage-money, the mortgagee is under an implied trust to surrender the estate to the person entitled to demand it, a doctrine which was followed in Pearce v. Morris (5 Ch. 227). Now this the bank had not done. The retransfer should have been to A., B., and C., but, without any authority from them, it was made to a stranger. Hence arose the possibility of the subsequent loss, and although this might have been averted by the diligence of the trustees, yet, when it occurred, the court held that the liability fell on the bank which first made it possible. There is clearly as much care required in getting rid of a security as in taking one.

FEW QUESTIONS probably in recent times have so vexed the minds of trustees of agricultural lands as that of the remission of rents. It is a pity, therefore, that the Scotch Act on this subject which was passed last session was not at the same time made applicable to England. By that it is provided that "trustees shall have power to make abatement or reduction, either temporary or permanent, of the rent stipulated in any lease of lands let for agricultural or pastoral occupation, or for both purposes, and to accept renunciations of leases of any such subjects." Of course, this simply confers upon trustees a power which they must in these times exercise in some way or other. If they wish to be perfectly safe, they must doubtless obtain the sanction of the court, thereby further increasing the loss which the estate has to bear. In practice we believe that it is usually considered sufficient to obtain a report from a surveyor in the neighbourhood that the proposed reduction of rent is reasonable and proper, with the idea that this report will be a sufficient protection to the trustee should his conduct ever be called in question. All the same the trustee is acting at his own risk, and, considering how great already are the liabilities of trustees, it is unfortunate that this particular burden could not have been removed. The Scotch members are understood to have special facilities for passing their own particular Bills in a way not granted to their English and Irish brethren. But when such Bills are of general as well as local importance, it is not unreasonable to wish that the benefit could be extended to the whole country. It will not be too late, however, if a similar Act is passed in some future session, for the third section deals with remissions of rent already made, providing "that no abatement or reduction of rent, or acceptance of renunciation of any such lease, heretofore made by trustees, shall be liable to be challenged, which would have been lawful if made after the passing hereof." This is an admission that the Act has been passed none too soon for Scotland, and makes the omission with regard to England and Ireland all the more glaring.

WHAT IS THE MEANING of the latter part of section 6 of the Copyhold Act of last session (50 & 51 Vict. c. 73)? The first portion provides that, after the passing of the Act, it shall not be lawful for any lord, without the consent of the Land Commissioners, to grant land not previously of copyhold tenure to any person to hold by copy of court roll. The section then proceeds, 66 and whenever any such grant has been lawfully made, the land therein comprised shall cease to be of copy hold tenure, and shall be vested in the grantee thereof to hold for the interest granted as in free and common socage." Does this mean that wherever, before the passing of the Act, such a grant has been " 'lawfully made" the prescribed result shall follow? That would be a rather startling instance of confiscation, but the words as they stand bear that meaning. Or is it possible that "lawfully" is a misprint for "unlawfully," and that the provision means that wherever, after the passing of the Act, such a grant shall be unlawfully made, the prescribed result shall follow? The latter would seem to be the more probable intention, but how is it to be reconciled with

the words of the section?

BEFORE LITIGATING the question whether the half-pay or full pay of officers in the army and navy or the pension of any retired Government servant can be attached or sequestrated, it may be

worth while for intending litigants to ascertain whether the court will have any power to enforce its order. There is a case (reported in 3 Ex. D. 323) in which the court ordered sequestration of the pension of a county court judge. Notwithstanding this order, we believe that the authorities refused to pay the pension to any person other than the retired judge, and that the order of the court has ever since remained a dead-letter. Those who are interested in any such case may find it worth their while to make inquiries on the subject.

SEPARATION DEEDS.

II.

WE have seen how the objection to separation deeds on the ground of public policy was finally removed by Wilson v. Wilson (1 H. L. C. 538), and we have also noticed that the validity of the auxiliary arrangements in such deeds, relating to property, was thus fully established. Two points, however, remained to be determined-first, how far the courts would actually assist in enforcing the part of the deed relating to separation; and, next, how far the wife was affected by her general incapacity to contract. For the first of these questions it will be sufficient to consider the manner in which that part of the deed affects the husband, and when this has been settled, the wife's position will depend upon he determination of the second.

It is the duty of either spouse to cohabit with the other, and it is the ordinary right of that other to insist on its performance. In some cases, indeed, the courts have not refused to sanction methods of enforcing the right on the part of the stronger spouse which are as little creditable to the humanity of the law as to the chivalry of the husband. Thus, in Re Cochrane (8 Dowl. 630), the husband had seized his wife by stratagem and was keeping her in durance vile at his lodgings; nevertheless the court contented itself by saying that he had not exceeded his legal rights, and that though she might be a prisoner all her life, she had only her own contumacy to thank for it. However, it was held in Rex v. Mead (1758, 1 Burr. 542) that a separation deed was good to stop conduct of this kind at any rate. In this case John Wilkes had his wife Mary brought up on a habeas corpus, but it appeared that on account of the ill-treatment of her husband she had given him a great sum to allow her to live apart, and articles of separation had been executed, and he had covenanted never to disturb her or any person with whom she should live. It was stated that the habeas corpus was taken out with a view to seizing her. Hereupon the court held this ageement to be a formal renunciation by the husband of his marital right to seize her, or force her back to live with him; and any attempt to do so would be a breach of the peace, or, if made on her return from Westminster Hall, a contempt of court. But although the deed may be a bar to such oldfashioned measures, we have still to consider how it affects the ordinary peaceful remedy of an action for the restitution of conjugal rights.

been admitted, there ought to be no difficulty in carrying out their It would seem that when once the validity of separation deeds has main object; they must therefore constitute a bar to either party attempting to enforce by litigation rights which have been expressly renounced, and this view seems to have commended itself to the courts. the husband. Of the capacity to contract in his case there is no We are here considering specially the position of doubt; the only question relates to the enforcing of the contract. This was raised in Hunt v. Hunt (1861, 4 De G. F. & J. 221). There the husband, who had covenanted in the separation deed not to compel his wife to return to cohabitation, afterwards sued for restitution of conjugal rights. The wife moved for an injunction to restrain the suit, and this was granted by Lord Westbury, C. After pointing out the lengths to which the courts had gone in enforcing separation deeds, even when executory only, he dealt with the objection that the busband could not be prevented from suing, though he might be liable in damages for breach of his covenant. But if such were the case the deed would be useless, as conjugal rights must be restored, and the object of the covenant would be defeated. Hence, he had no doubt that equity would give its own peculiar remedy to enforce by injunction a covenant which was good at law, more especially as the injunction was

addressed, not to the court in which the suit was pending, but to
the husband personally. Accordingly, the late Master of the Rolls
treated the point as settled law in Besant v. Wood (12 Ch. D.
620), and so the matter would now rest but for an unfortunate
interpolation of Lord Selborne, C., in the argument in Cahill v.
Cahill (8 App. Cas. 421). This we had better give in full :-
"Hunt. Hunt is the only case in which an injunction has been granted
at the suit of a wife to restrain the husband from carrying on his suit for
the restitution of conjugal rights, the husband having covenanted not to
compel the wife to cohabit with him by any legal proceedings. An appeal
to this House from that decision was fully argued, and everything which
fell from the law lords (except Lord Westbury), in an unusually strong
House, was favourable to the appellant, as I myself know, from having
argued the case. But Lord Westbury persuaded the House to put some
question to the judges, and, meanwhile, the husband died, so that the
case came to an end. Sir G. Jessel seems to have followed that authority
in Besant v. Wood."

regard to the wife's separate estate, and that that exception ex-
tended to any circumstances where she was to be regarded as a
feme sole. Now, when she is suing for a divorce, and is thus at
arm's length with her husband, she must, for the purpose of the
settlement of the suit, be regarded as a feme sole; nor can there
be any necessity for the intervention of a trustee, as it would not
be in accordance with public policy to make a wife procure a third
The same argument
person to contract for her with her husband.
was adopted by Sir G. Jessel in Besant v. Wood (supra). Where
a married woman is allowed to sue, as in divorce or for restitution
of conjugal rights, she must be allowed to compromise the suit;
and if she can compromise the suit after it has commenced she can
also compromise it before it begins-that is, she can contract not
to sue at all. More briefly, he said :—

"It seems to me to follow as a necessary corollary to the right to sue by herself that she must have the right to contract not to sue, and I should think there would be no difficulty at all about it" (page 622).

Accordingly there seems to be little doubt that if the covenant not to sue can be enforced at all it can be enforced against the wife as well as against the husband. Moreover, the covenant may bind the wife although not made expressly with her. Thus in Clark v. Clark (supra) it was made between the husband and the trustee. But the wife was a party to the deed in which the agreement was recited, and she had for some time taken the benefit of it. Hence it was held to bind her.

We have seen that the covenant not to sue was formerly enforced by injunction, but since the Judicature Act (1873, s. 24 (5)) prohibited injunctions to restrain pending actions this has been impossible, and by Marshall v. Marshall (5 P. D. 19) the more convenient practice has been introduced of pleading the deed itself as a defence in the original action.

LEGISLATION OF THE YEAR.
ALLOTMENTS.

ALLOTMENTS FOR THE LABOURING CLASSES.

The present Act is one of the most important of the late session. Prior Allotment Acts, from 59 Geo. 3, c. 12 to the Extension Act of 1882, authorized the letting in allotments of what was, in some sense, public land already; the essential feature of the present Act is that it authorizes public authorities to acquire new land for that purpose; and this new land may be acquired to any amount, and, in certain circumstances, by compulsory purchase. The only restrictions are the discretion of the local authorities and the obligation that the acquisition of the land may be expected, from the rent which is likely to be

What it was that inclined the lords against the decision we are not told, but there stands the casual dictum of Lord Selborne to throw doubt upon the very plain rule laid down by Lord Westbury, and adopted by Sir G. Jessel, that when a husband expressly releases his wife from the duty of cohabitation he shall not be allowed afterwards to impose it upon her against her will. The balance of authority, however, is clearly in support of Hunt v. Hunt. The whole matter is very clearly put by Mr. Vaizey in his recent work on Settlements (Vol. II., p. 1443). He there arrays the authorities on either side, pointing out finally that Lord Westbury's decision has been twice followed in the Probate Division of the High Court to which the jurisdiction in matrimonial causes is now given-namely, in Marshall v. Marshall (5 P. D. 19) and in Clark v. Clark (10 P. D. 188). In the latter case it was said by Bowen, L.J., that there was nothing in Cahill v. Cahill to destroy the decision in Besant v. Wood, and that until the House of Lords declared the law to be otherwise, a contract not to sue for restitution of conjugal rights must be enforced. Assuming, then, that such a covenant will be enforced against the husband, we must now consider how far it will be enforced against the wife, and also her position with regard to the auxiliary provisions of the deed. The objection founded upon her incapacity 50 & 51 VICT. c. 48.-AN ACT TO FACILITATE THE PROVISION OF to contract was overcome at first by introducing a third party as trustee. With him the husband's covenant for the wife's maintenance was made, and he, on the other hand, covenanted with the husband to indemnify him against his wife's debts. So long ago as 1786 it was settled by Stephens v. Olive (2 Bro. C. C. 90) that this latter covenant was a valuable consideration to support the deed against creditors and purchasers, and we have seen how the former was firmly established in Rodney v. Chambers (1802, 2 East. 283). So, too, we have seen that while the court rejected the possibility of a contract between husband and wife simply, it was bound to support it when drawn up with the intervention of a trustee. This was the case in Legard v. Johnson (1797, 3 Ves. 352) and St. John v. St. John (1805, 11 Ves. 532). It was even thought that the trustee's covenant of indemnity was an essential part of the deed, and so late as 1841 we find Lord Langdale, M.R., considering this point in Frampton v. Frampton (4 Beav. 287), and asking whether the contract was merely with the trustee and his covenant the only consideration. This was natural while the deed itself was struggling for bare recognition; it was the auxiliary covenants that supported it, if anything did, and these were, therefore, bound to justify themselves strictly. But after the principle of separation deeds had been fully established the tide turned, and it was thought that a contract in a separation deed might be supported in order to effectuate the intention of the deed even though the contract itself was invalid. So, at least, it was argued in Cahill v. Cahill (8 App. Cas. 420), where a married woman had released an interest in real estate without a deed separately acknowledged. This, however, was not allowed; the validity of each part of the deed must be separately inquired into and established, and hence it is necessary to ascertain exactly the extent to which the wife's capacity to contract has been admitted. For this purpose we will consider first how far the wife is bound by her agreement to live apart from her husband, or in other words not to sue for a restitution of conjugal rights.

The question was considered in Vansittart v. Vansittart (1858, 4 K. & J. 62), where judgment was given by Sir W. Page Wood, V.C. To the general rule that there can be no contract between husband and wife he remarked that there was an exception with

obtained, to be remunerative.

"that the circum

The machinery for putting the Act into force is as follows:-By section 2 any six Parliamentary electors or ratepayers of an urban or rural district may represent to the authority of their district (which authority is in urban districts the town council or local board, and in rural districts the guardians of the union) stances of the district are such that it is the duty" of such authority "to take proceedings under the Act." Thereupon, such authority need hardly point out, impose a duty enforceable by mandamus. If "shall take the representation into consideration," which words, we such authority "are of opinion ""that there is a demand for allotments for the labouring population" in the district, and that such allotments cannot be obtained at a reasonable rent and on reasonable conditions" by voluntary arrangement between the owners and the applicants, they shall

"By purchase or hire acquire any suitable land which may be available,
whether within or without their district, adequate to provide a sufficient
number of allotments, and shall let such land in allotments to perscns belonging
to the labouring population resident in the district, and desiring to take the
same.
,"

enforceable by mandamus, the words "are of opinion" being of too
We may observe in passing that we do not think this duty will be
discretion-conferring a character, for it would be next to impossible
for a court to say that an opinion had been malâ fide arrived at, and
a court would probably decline to consider such a question.
The restriction upon the acquisition of land by agreement is as
follows:-

"A sanitary authority shall not under this Act acquire land for allotments. save at such price or rent that, in the opinion of the sanitary authority, all expenses, except such expenses as are incurred in making roads to be used by the public, incurred by the sanitary authority in acquiring the land and other

wise in relation to the allotments may reasonably be expected to be recouped out of the rents obtained in respect thereof."

Sanguine authorities will, of course, not be debarred by this

restriction, but prudent authorities will, no doubt, be long before forming the " opinion" which is necessary to remove it.

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So much for purchase or hire by agreement. As to compulsory purchase, the Legislature has been very cautious. The Lands Clauses Act is incorporated, but its compulsory powers cannot be put in force without the interposition of the "county authority," which, by section 16, is defined as any representative body elected by the inhabitants of the county which may be established and until such representative body is established" its powers and duties under the Act are, by the same section, to be exercised and performed by the Local Government Board. In case the compulsory powers should be required, that board may, on petition by the local authority, institute an inquiry and make a provisional order for the purpose, which order is to be confirmed by a Bill which they are to be bound to introduce. The price to be paid is to be fixed by arbitration only, and, in favour of the owners, it is provided that neither parks nor gardens may be taken, and that the taking of an undue quantity of land from any one owner is, as far as practicable, to be avoided. The allotments are to be managed under regulations to be made by the sanitary authority under the supervision of the Local Government Board, and the rents (section 7) shall be fixed at an amount not less than such as may reasonably be expected to ensure the sanitary authority from loss." It is expressly provided (section 7, subsection 3) that "one person shall not hold any allotment or allotments exceeding one acre, and an allotment shall not be sub-let," but it is very sensibly added that if an allotment cannot be let in accordance with the provisions of the Act [i.e., to a resident labourer], it may be let "to any person whatever at the best annual rent that may be obtained for the same." The erection of buildings "other than a toolhouse, shed, greenhouse, fowlhouse, or pigstye" is prohibited, and the removal of fruit trees for which no compensation is payable is allowed. The recovery of rent or possession is provided for by allowing (not enjoining) the sanitary authority to determine the tenancy on breach of the regulations or on non-payment of rent for not less than forty days.

46

A very important section of the Act (section 10, sub-section 4) confers upon the local authorities power to borrow money for the purposes of the Act, and incorporates for this purpose sections 233, 234, and 236 to 239 of the Public Health Act, 1875, and the same section (sub-section 6) directs separate accounts to be kept of the receipts and expenditure under the Act.

The only other provisions which it is necessary to call attention to on the present occasion are those of section 13, by which" allotment wardens" or "allotment trustees" acting under existing statutes may transfer their powers to authorities under the new Act, and we have no doubt that the wardens and trustees in question will in many cases hasten to avail themselves of these provisions.

REVIEWS.

BILLS OF EXCHANGE.

A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF BILLS OF EXCHANGE, PROMISSORY NOTES, AND CHEQUES. By His Honour JUDGE CHALMERS. THIRD EDITION. Stevens & Sons.

The position of this excellent work is unique. Useful as it was in its original form, when it was published as the author's digest of the existing law, its utility has been vastly increased by the fact that it now comes before us as the law itself. The change is well expressed in the following words of the preface:-" In the Introduction to the last edition I pointed out that the general propositions of the digest could only be considered as law in so far as they were correct and logical deductions from the decided cases. Now the position is reversed. The cases decided before the Act are only law in so far as they can be shewn to be correct and logical deductions from the general propositions of the Act." In the introduction to the present edition the author gives an interesting account of the manner in which this change was brought about. To a digest of the law no reasonable objection can now be urged; the only question is, How is it to be effected? The answer to this is twofold. The particular branch of the law which is to be digested must closely concern some well-defined body of persons of sufficient influence to get their wishes attended to in Parliament, and the draftsman selected for the work must be content to present the law simply as it is. Such, at least, was the secret of Judge Chalmer's success. Certain amendments, to correct acknowledged faults or to fill patent gaps, there must be; but this difficulty was overcome by admitting such only as were supported by the unanimous approval of the committee which reported on the Bill. We have for once an excellent example of commonsense legislation, carried out for a well-defined object of public utility, and spoilt by no external considerations. One point in particular shews the business-like purpose of the committee. Before

any amendment was formally put and agreed to, the whole Bill was first gone through informally and all the intended amendments considered. It was thus possible for the draftsman to give these their proper form and position in the Bill before they were put as actual amendments. It is clear, then, that we have here an excellent example of a digest in which Parliament gave every facility to the draftsman's work. Upon the original ability of that everything depended, and of that ability there is no question. One proof of this is found in the fact that, although the Act has been in operation for nearly five years, yet there has been hardly any litigation upon it. Judge Chalmers says, with pardonable pride, that the Law Reports contain only one direct decision upon it—namely, Re Gillespie (18 Q. B. D. 286) (misprinted 246, at p. xxxix.), and, upon referring to that, it will be found that a case not provided for by section 57 was held to be covered by the general words of section 97.

In the book itself everything is done to explain the law. In the first place the provisions of the Act are well arranged, clear, and minute. As examples of this we may refer to the regulations of sections 41 and 45 respecting presentment for acceptance and presentment for payment. In the next place these are followed by concise illustrations which give us the actual circumstances upon which the law has been based, and where it is clear that there was no intention on the part of the Legislature to alter the previous law, it is probable that these will be allowed their due weight in interpreting it. After these we have explanatory notes, and the author, recognizing the international character of the branch of the law with which he is dealing, has referred continually to the German Exchange Law and to the French Code, noting their points of similarity and divergence in respect to each other and to English law. The usefulness of the book is further increased by the fact that, in certain matters which could not be included in the Act, the author has, nevertheless, supplied a series of rules framed with equal care and in the same manner explained by illustrations and notes. Examples of this will be found in the rules as to Impeachment of Value (p. 85), Rights of Action and Proof (p. 111), and Transmission by Act of Law (p. 114). The various other matters included in the book will be found equally satisfactory. Altogether, as a statement and explanation of the law, it will be found singularly useful.

BEFORE TRIAL.

BEFORE TRIAL: WHAT SHOULD BE DONE BY A CLIENT, SOLICITOR, AND COUNSEL, FROM A BARRISTER'S POINT OF VIEW. By RICHARD HARRIS, Barrister-at-Law. Waterlow Brothers & Layton.

Mr. Harris is already well known by his "Hints on Advocacy," his "Illustrations in Advocacy," and other works. In these he has established a reputation for a peculiar manner of treating legal subjects. His special department is the practical side of a lawyer's business, and upon this he offers to his readers a considerable amount of shrewdness and common sense, presented in a style which would be more truly humorous and popular did it not aim too obviously and continually at these qualities. Still, they are, in general, so wanting in the books which form a lawyer's daily intellectual food, that it may not be wise to quarrel with an author because he tries to furnish us with something more entertaining. The present work purports to deal with "What should be done by client, solicitor, and counsel, from a barrister's point of view," and, doubtless, if each of the three followed the advice here given, the case would be a bad one indeed which their united efforts would not win. In general, it may be said the client is to go at once to a solicitor and be straightforward with him; the solicitor is to be moderate in his claims for fear of prejudicing the jury by exaggeration, to be cautious in interlocutory proceedings for fear of shewing his hand to his opponent and enabling him to prepare his defence, and to be careful in choosing his counsel for fear of paying a big fee, and being left, in the end, without an advocate; while as to counsel, he is to look on every case as a work of art, to discover the proper arrangement and proportion of its parts by patient labour, and to prepare to meet every difficult or weak point. At the beginning of the book it is shewn that mere honesty will not win the day unless it fights the knavery opposed to it with legal tact and ingenuity; but to state that your opponent's knavery is in direct proportion to his piety introduces a kind of wit neither very dignified nor very original. The same remark will apply to a good deal besides, but, as we have already said, we must be thankful for what is really racy and entertaining, and submit to what is bad. All the various stages of the cause up to trial are carefully examined; particulars, pleadings, evidence, interrogatories, discovery, and inspection, preparing the brief, choosing counsel, and many other matters, and upon each a quantity of advice is given which abundantly testifies the author's experience and common sense. In particular we may notice the examples he gives of injudicious interrogatories, by which the adversary learns what points you wish to examine him on, and gets

them up accordingly; and his advice never to ask for discovery and inspection of documents until your adversary has already, by his pleadings or affidavits, tied himself to a certain version of the matter in dispute. In the chapter on the choice of counsel, Mr. Harris urges the wisdom of employing someone from the briefless multitude in preference to running after a popular man whose business precludes the possibility of his doing the case properly. What avails all the skill and ingenuity which have been shewn in its preparation if it falls at last into the hands of a pilot who has no knowledge of the dangers it will encounter? As he truly remarks, the qualities necessary for the successful conduct of a case are a clear mind, careful attention, and common sense, and these are as likely to be found in the back rows as among the favoured few in front, with the advantage that when found they are sure to be available at the right moment. In the interest of clients we hope that the rest of the advice which Mr. Harris so plentifully gives will be followed more faithfully than this particular piece is likely to be.

REGISTRATION CASES.

A DIGEST OF PARLIAMENTARY AND MUNICIPAL REGISTRATION CASES. SECOND EDITION. By J. J. H. SAINT, Esq., B.A., Barrister-at-Law, Recorder of Leicester. Butterworths.

This is a second edition of Mr. Saint's well-known digest of the various cases that have been decided on the subject of registration of voters. The utility of this work to revising barristers, registration agents, and others engaged in the work of registration is already well established, and can hardly be over-estimated. It is, of course, impossible to carry round, when engaged in the work of revision, the volumes of the law reports in which registration cases are contained, and, although the various text-books, no doubt, contain references to all the cases, those references are necessarily extremely brief, and in many cases it is hardly possible to gather from them exactly what was the point decided. Mr. Saint's book gives, in a condensed form, the facts and point decided in each case on the subject. The cases are arranged under various appropriate headings so as to facilitate reference to them, and the index appears to be a reasonably full one. The mode in which the cases are digested seems to us to be very accurate and satisfactory, so far as we have had an opportunity of examining the work.

CORRESPONDENCE.

THE LAND TRANSFER BILL.

To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,-If, as you suggest in your last number, the Land Transfer Bill of last session is to be re-introduced next year, I hope the principal efforts of the profession will be directed to secure the withdrawal of those clauses which aim at making the registration of all instruments affecting land compulsory. I am quite aware of the importance the Lord Chancellor and most of the supporters of the measure attach to those clauses; I know that it may seem almost a hopeless task to obtain their abandonment, and yet it does seem to me to be of such vital importance, not so much to our profession as to those classes whose interests it is our duty to protect, that these clauses should be got rid of, that I hope those who specially represent us will persevere in the efforts that were made when the Bill was last before Parliament to get it amended in this particular.

I am quite free to confess that I do not believe any such measure will reduce the gains of the profession. On the contrary, my own idea is that Lord Halsbury's Bill becoming law would lead to business, litigious and other, that would be far from unprofitable. But, after all, it is not our mere pecuniary interests that should influence us-we have to consider the consequences to our clients, and it is because I feel convinced that an Act which seeks to compel the registration of every instrument dealing with land will lead to immense confusion and difficulty, and hamper and often prevent sales, especially of small properties, that I ask you to allow me to explain my reasons for attaching so much importance to the elimination of the compulsory clauses.

That a well-considered scheme for the registration of title in some shape might succeed I have little doubt. There are many properties whose owners might conveniently be entered on a register and provision made that all dealings with properties once so registered not noticed on the register should be postponed to such as were registered, but then the success or failure of such a registry must very much depend upon the way it is managed.

This, then, brings me to what I look on as the first objection to compulsion. If a registry be established open to all the world, but existing contemporaneously with the present methods of conveyancing, the officials would have an incentive to make their practice as

simple and inexpensive as possible; red tape would be eschewed, and landowners tempted by a procedure insuring convenience and speed to make use of the registry. If the registrars were paid by fees, they would be still more anxious to make the system popular; but in any event it would probably be worked on entirely different lines from those which would be adopted under a system of compulsory registration. If the registry has a monopoly, we shall have technical and troublesome rules, heavy fees, and most serious delays. But if the compulsory clauses are retained, do the authors of the Bill suppose no method will be found to evade them? One might suppose that the Lord Chancellor had forgotten the result of the struggles in times past between the Legislature and the lawyers, and that it had escaped him that Acts passed to hamper the landowners have not unfrequently been defeated by the ingenuity of conveyancers. To one such measure I may perhaps call attention-the 27 Hen. 8, c. 16, providing for the inrolment of every bargain and sale of freeholds; and to the method by which Mr. Serjeant Moore and the great draftsmen who followed him succeeded in evading that statute by the familiar lease and release. Are the conveyancers of the present day less astute than their predecessors?

That occasions will arise when it will be desired to evade the Act who can doubt? To say nothing of the desire to insure the privacy, in many cases, of dealings with land, will large landowners, when about to sell small outlying plots, be willing to register their titles in order to do so? If clause 2 of the Bill of last session becomes law, I suspect such sales will be allowed to rest upon contracts accom panied by possession and undertakings to permit the purchaser to take proceedings for trespass, ejectment, and the like in the name of the confusion, difficulty, and litigation that must ensue, if, as I the vendor. Let any such practice once become common, and conceive believe will be the case, owners of land offer a passive resistance to the Act, and insist on their advisers finding means to evade it, for in any cases there will, I am satisfied, be a very great dislike to register. Then, again, suppose the land duly registered and fully subjected whole volume would be requisite to discuss all the troubles that registo the operation of the Act, will all the difficulties be at an end? A tration may give rise to; but I may perhaps name one. In the country, more especially in districts where there are many small here to formal mortgages, but to loans for short periods on equitable properties, loans on security of land are very frequent. I do not refer charges. Such loans are very commonly made on a deposit of deeds, with no other evidence of indebtedness than a promissory note, and such transactions are very generally carried out without the intervention of a solicitor. The country bankers constantly make advances, as they term it," on deeds," and when the loan is repaid the deeds are handed to the lender, and there the matter ends. Under the proposed Act, in all such cases there must be a charge registered, and in addition to the expense thus occasioned there will be the cost of clearing the register when the debt is discharged. In practice this will, I suspect, be frequently neglected. That it is neglected in some countries where registration prevails I can say from my own experience, and I can speak, too, to the trouble, delay, and expense

thus occasioned.

In the face of objections such as those I have mentioned, is it too much to hope that by united and vigorous efforts we may succeed in modifying the compulsory clauses? I am quite aware that I have advanced only a few of the many arguments that might be used, and that what I have written has been said, and with more force and effect, before.

arguments must be repeated and fallacies corrected again and again. Does anyone seriously imagine that if a scheme for simplifying the transfer of land can be suggested, and an Act passed embodying it, whether by means of a system of registration or not, all the solicitors in England would be able to prevent landowners from adopting it, or does anyone suppose they would try to do so? Have we not ample evidence of the causes which led to the disuse of the existing registry, and of the difficulties and cost which everyone who attempted to make use of the Act of 1875 experienced. Is there any ground for the suggestion that it was the opposition of the profession that rendered that Act a dead letter, rather than its inherent faults? The Legislature has established compulsory registration of instruments dealing with one kind of property and has simplified the instruments themselves in a most complete and searching way. I don't know if the Lord Chancellor considers that the outcome of that legislation—I refer of course to the Bills of Sale Acts-is encouraging. Absit omen! H. Hereford, Oct. 3.

But if we are to succeed we must not relax our efforts, and old

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.]

Sir, I have not followed the articles and correspondence which have appeared in your columns on this subject, but I have noticed that there is to be a radical upsetting of the present order of things, and that the chief, if not only, object to be gained thereby is the

reduction of cost on transfer owing to repeated investigations of title. I have also observed that it seems necessary to provide an insurance fund to make good losses arising from the remedy proposed not being a sufficient protection to transferees.

It may already have occurred to some of your correspondents that, by giving a purchaser, under the present system, the benefit of an insurance fund, he would be willing to dispense with an investigation of the vendor's title and thus be independent of any land transfer scheme. Perhaps some of your readers who have given the question consideration will say whether the above idea is capable of being practically worked out. If it is, the cost of transfer need not be greater than under a land transfer scheme, and transfers could be made in less time and without any fear of secrets being disclosed. B.

THE MIDDLESEX REGISTRY. [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir, I do not desire to enter into any further contest with the Middlesex Registry pending the return to the existing mandamus at my instance; but, having regard to the discussion at the July meeting of the Law Society, on the complaint of the solicitor to the Metropolitan Board of Works, re the registration of their deeds, and to the fact that circumstances have placed me in a position to ratify such complaint, I should be glad to get the views of my professional friends.

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By section 6 of the Statute of Anne the registrar is required, inter alia, to keep an 'alphabetical calendar of all parishes within the county with reference to the number of every memorial concerning the hereditaments in every such parish." I have just completed a trifling personal purchase from a Middlesex Land Co. possessing a large number of plots in various parts of the county, and a regular batch of conveyances are about to be registered on sales effected by such company. Now, of course, if the company sells, say, a hundred lots in the North, and another hundred in the South, it would appreciably save time, in making searches, if north and south parishes were kept distinct as required by the Act. We all know too well that such distinct registers are not kept at Great James-street, and the excuse given there (by way of "confession and avoidance" as the late Mr. Chitty would have said) is that many years ago, at the "generally expressed wish of the profession," the double register of name and parish was amalgamated! If the Legislature in Queen Anne's time considered it desirable that the two registers should be kept separate, it is much more needed now when it is no uncommon thing for a Middlesex Land Society to sell a hundred lots at one auction. If the Middlesex Registry is to be continued at all, this question, together with the neglected public index and attractive private one, must be seriously considered at the first suitable opportunity. FRANCIS K. MUNTON.

95a, Queen Victoria-street, Oct. 3.

FIRES IN THEATRES.

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,-We shall never have effective precautions against these disasters, in spite of legislation, until managers are made to feel, by a verdict with heavy damages, that they are under just the same liability as railway companies who invite the public to enter carriages in which, or on the road over which they are to travel, some defect exists which ought to have been provided against.

I have no doubt managers of theatres may be made liable, both civilly and criminally, who invite the public to enter while they are not duly and properly protected from all reasonable risk from fire. Oct. 5. CAMPBELL'S ACT.

ACCORD AND SATISFACTION.

With regard to the query of our correspondent "Subscriber" (ante, p. 744), and our note, "J. G. G." writes:

66

Will you allow me to refer you and your correspondent to Anson on Contracts, part 5, chap. 2, where it is laid down that the acceptance of a negotiable instrument may be an absolute or conditional discharge, and that if accepted expressly or impliedly in discharge of all existing liabilities and dishonoured, the creditor's only remedy is to sue upon it.

"I take it, in fact, that if a cheque be accepted in discharge of all previous claims it is a case of accord and satisfaction; and that, on the cheque being dishonoured, the only remedy is on the new contract evidenced by the cheque, the consideration for which was the discharge of the previous one."

[Of course, this is so; but it appeared to us that the words indorsed on the cheque in our correspondent's case-' "In settlement of account to date"-referred to the acceptance of half the claim in satisfaction of the whole, and not to the acceptance of the cheque as an absolute discharge.-ED. S.J.]

CASES BEFORE THE VACATION JUDGE

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MUNICIPAL CORPORATION REVISING ASSESSORS ELECTION-MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS Act, 1882 (45 & 46 VICT. c. 50), s. 7, SUB-SECTION 1; s. 62, SUB-SECTION 2; s. 70, SUB-SECTION 2-JURISDICTION.

In the case of the Municipal Corporations Act, 1882, and the Election of Revising Assessors for the Borough of Higham Ferrers, before Charles, J., on the 30th ult., the question arose whether the election of revising assessors was a municipal election. This was a motion ex parte on behalf of a ratepayer and burgess of the newly-created borough of Higham Ferrers, in the county of Northampton, asking the court to grant a prerogative writ of mandamus directing the corporation to proceed to the election of revising assessors. Sub-section 2 of section 62 of the Municipal Corporations Act, 1882, provides that the election shall take place on the 1st of March. Notice of the election was duly posted, but, by some oversight, no proper nomination papers were handed in, so that, when the time came to revise the lists, it was found that there were no revising assessors. The list must be revised in the first fifteen days of October, and there must be six days' notice of the election. Sub-section 2 of section 70 of the Act provides that, if a municipal election is not held on the appointed day, or within the appointed time, or on the next day after that day, or the expiration of that time, or becomes void, the municipal corporation shall not thereby be dissolved or be disabled from electing, but held on a day appointed by the court. The application was made to Charles, the High Court may, on motion, grant a mandamus for the election to be J., as exercising his jurisdiction as a judge of the Queen's Bench Division, to grant a mandamus. The application was made with the consent of the corporation. Reference was made to the case of The Borough of Cardigan under the Municipal Corporations Act, 1835 (reported in the Times of the 25th of March, 1879). The reason why they had waited so long was that it did not occur to anyone that no revising assessors had been appointed. until the time came to revise the lists. The corporation was a new one, the limits of which were not included within a Parliamentary borough. Charles, J., doubted whether a municipal election included the election of interpretation clauses of the Act of 1882, section 7, sub-section 1, correvising assessors. Marten, Q.C., as amicus curia, said that, under the porate office meant the office of mayor, alderman, councillor, elective auditor, or revising assessor, and a municipal election meant an election to a corporate office.

CHARLES, J., granted a mandamus directing the corporation to hold the election on Wednesday, the 12th of October.—COUNSEL, H. Terrell. SOLICITORS, Kingsford, Dorman, & Co.

NUISANCE-SEWAGE-INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTION-BALANCE OF CONVENience -PUBLIC HEALTH Acr, 1875 (38 & 39 VICT. c. 55), s. 27-RIVERS POLLU TION ACT, 1876 (39 & 40 VICT. c. 75), s. 3.

In the case of Thompson v. The Mayor and Corporation of Stratford-uponAvon, before Charles, J., on the 30th ult., the question was as to restraining a corporation from committing a nuisance by the use of certain land as a sewage farm. This was a motion on behalf of Mr. William Thompson, an architect, of Evesham-road, Stratford-on-Avon, to restrain the defendants, their servants and workmen, from using or permitting to be used a certain piece of land, their property, situate within the borough of Stratford-upon-Avon, and upon the south-west side of the East and West Junction Railway, and in the neighbourhood of certain land and a messuage and hereditaments of the plaintiff, situate at the corner of Evesham-road and Sanctus-street, within the said borough, as a sewage farm, or otherwise so as to cause or be a nuisance to the plaintiff and the occupiers of his said messuage, or his workmen or servants, and from causing or permitting noxious, offensive, or deleterious smelis and vapours to escape or emanate from the said sewage farm or any part thereof, so as to be or constitute a nuisance to the plaintiff, or such occupiers or workmen or servants as aforesaid, or to cause damage, annoyance, or injury to the plaintiff or his property. The defendants were sued as the urban sanitary authority of Stratford-upon-Avon. For the plaintiffs it was said that the Public Health Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 55), s. 27, did not permit the corporation to commit a nuisance. Under the Rivers Pollution Act, 1876 (39 & 40 Vict. c. 75), s. 3, the corporation, if they shewed that they were using the best practical means to render the sewage matter harmless, could get leave from the Local Government Board to carry the sewage into the river. The plaintiff had made out a case; the defendants had only said that they had mitigated a nuisance. The Metropolitan Asylums District v. Hill (6 App. Cas. 193) was cited.

CHARLES, J., said that he was not satisfied in this case that the plaintiff was entitled to an interlocutory injunction; having regard to the balance of convenience, he made no order, except that the costs be costs in the action.-COUNSEL, Marten, Q.C., and Brinton; Latham, Q.C., and Baker. SOLICITORS, Routh, Stacey, & Castle, for Henry Thompson & Son, Grantham; Sharpe, Parkers, Pritchard, & Co.

PRACTICE-BANK OF ENGLAND-STOCKS-INJUNCTION.

In the case of Taunton v. Falla, before Charles, J., on the 30th ult., the question arose as to the practice of the court with regard to the description of stock, the transfer of which it was sought to restrain. It was a motion on behalf of Charles E. Taunton and Thomas C. Mitchell, the Peter Falla, the administrator of the estate of Thomas Orange, and the trustees under the sequestration of P. F. Payne, to restrain the defendant, Bank of England from dealing with certain stocks and funds. On the 23rd of September last Charles, J., granted an interim injunction over the 28th of September restraining the bank from the transfer of any stocks or funds standing in the name of Thomas Orange, of St. Lawrence

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