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D BOND. CHARLES FREDERICK, Carisbrooke, I W, Club Proprietor. Newport and Ryde Pet Aug 11 Ord Au 19

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HAMMICK, HORATIO HONNIWILL, Pall'Mall, Wine Merchant. High Court. Pet I

July 30. Ord Sept 2

HARRISON,JAMES, Belgrave, Leicester, no occupation. Leicester. Pet Aug 13 I

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HOOPEL, W’, Kilburn, Builder. High Court. Pet July 8. Ord Sept 2

Howss, ROBERT, Frampton Cotterell, Gloucester, Beer Retailer. Bristol. Pet
Aug 29. Ord Sept 2 _
HUGHES, J OIIN, Birmingham, Grocer. Birmingham. Pet Sept 1. Ord Sept 2

JAMES, ELIZA, Newport, Salop, Cooper. Stafford. Pet Aug 20. Ord Sept 1
JARVIS, THOMAS, Derby, out of business. Leicester. Pet July 29. Ord Aug 18
J ONES. J onN, Pentre, Glamorganshire, Boot Maker. Pontyprldd. Pet Aug 18.

O d S t 1

Krirzaig, Mgr ANNE, Rhyl, Dealer in Fancy Goods. Bangor. Pet Sept 2. Ord Sc t 2

LANOsTgN, ALFRED, Birmingham, Coal Dealer. Birmingham. Pet Aug 30. Pet Sept l

LIwisnToN, WiLLI.uI, EDWARD LEVEBTON, and JAMES LEVERTON, Aberavon, Glamorganshire, Builders. Neath. Pet Aug 30. Ord Sept 1

MASON. JOSEPH FREDERICK, Holman rd, Battersea, Fancy Confectioner. WandsWorth. Pet May 16. Ord Aug 2 _ _

MERCER, ALFRED, Lutterwoi-th, Le cestersliire, Surgeon’s Assistant. Leicester. Pct July 27. Ord Aug 24

Moams, WALTER OWENS, Stoke upon Trent, Grocer. Stoke upon Trent. Pet Sept 3. Ord Sept 3

PARKER. ROBERT FosTEn, Skipton, Bank Manager. Bradford. Pet Aug 4. Ord S

Pnansgigtésoaos, Middlesborough. Milkseller. Stockton on Tees and Middlesb h. Pet Aug 31. Ord Aug 31

PnILLi(I>‘s(.nI1%ILLI.iiI DANIEL, Llanbadarn Odwyn, Corn Merchant. Carmarthen. Pet July 15. Ord Seplt 2 v

PRATT. ISAAC, Blyth. Nort umberland, Boot Manufacturer. Newcastle on Tyne. Ord Aug 26. Ord Sept 2 _

PRICE. J ginr, Llansadwrn, Carmarthenshire, Farmer. Carniarthen. Pet Sept 3.

S t 3

PR1TL%€'E. €*yILLi.uI JAMES, Chadwell Heath, Essex, Wheelwright. Chelmsiorii. Pet June 27. Ord Sept 3 _

Pnosssn, HOWELL, Swansea, Stonemason. Swansea. Pet Aug 30. Ord Aug 31

QUELCH, WILLIAM HENRY, Sittin gbourne, Boot Maker. Rochester. Pet Aug 22. Ord Aug 31

RODINsoN, EDWARD, Stretford, Lancashire, Potato Dealer. Manchester. Pet Sept 2. Ord Segt 2 _ _

ROBSON, Jason, Sout Shields, Builder. Newcastle on Tyne. Pet July 6. Ord Sept 1 ,

ROLLINOS, WILLIAM, Forston st, Hoxton, Lime Merchant. High Court. Pet 111%; 16. Ord Sept 1 _ _

RUFF. ILLIAM, Little Staughton, Bedfordshire, Machinist. Bedtord. Pet

July 22 Ord Se it 1 SMITH, ALEXANDER, Hunslet, Leeds, Builder. Leeds. Pet Aug 31. Ord Sept 1 SMITH, FRANCIS, Bedtord, Solicitor. Bedtord. Pet Sept 1. Ord Sept 3 SNOOIX WILI.IAM. Southsea, Watchmaker. Portsmouth. Pet Aug 20. Ord

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The following amended notice is substituted for that published in the

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CtraimN'rT0PIcs .. 731 THE BANKRUPTCY Aer, 13331135

Tm: Law or GIFTs INTER Vrvos .. 732 WINDING-UP NOTICES .. :35

CORRESPONDENCE 733 CR1-‘.DITORS' Noricas 735

LEGAL NEWS .......... .. 734 BANKRUPTCY NOTICES . 735 PUBLIC GENERAL Srartrrss.

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Ur ro run PRESENT riiia the work of the Vacation Judge in court has been heavier than has been experienced for several years. For three consecutive weeks Mr. Justice KEKE\VICH has had to sit on Friday as well as on Wednesday. It is understood also that the Vacation work done in the Chancery chambers has exceeded that of former years. A diminution of business usually occurs about the present period of the Vacation, and it is not probable that Mr. Justice CHARLES will be compelled to devote more than one day a week to the court work during his term.

Mn. JUSTICE Kaxi:wicii’s term of sitting as Vacation Judge having come to an end, we may, perhaps, without any great impropriety, be permitted to adopt the unusual course of referring to his mode of performance of the diflicult duties falling on the solitary representative of the High Court. We desire to say that in our opinion it would not be easy to overpraise the common sense, promptness, and ability with which the business has been discharged this Vacation. The reason why we desire to say this is to be found in the observations which we felt it our duty to make on the appointment of this learned judge. We are bound to acknowledge, and we have great pleasure in acknowledging, that if we could only have had a prophetic vision we should have congratulated the profession on the appointment.

THERE si-:i-:iis to have been a rather serious omission in Lord Bii.iiiwi=:Li.’s exposition, in the House of Lords, on Wednesday, of the law relating to the circumstances under which police oificcrs are justified in killing people. There can be no doubt that, as the learned lord said, if the policeman’s life “ was imperilled; if he did not know but what his life would be sacrificed, or the lives of his comrades lying on the ground, the policeman had a right to resist the people, even to the extent of taking the lives of those committing the illegality.” But we do not find that he added that the justification will not extend beyond the actual continuance of the necessity which alone warrants it, and that if the policeman kills after the necessity has ceased it is manslaughter at least (1 East P. C., p. 293). Lord Bimii\\'i:LL no doubt assumed the continuance of the necessity, but it appears to be very essential that the limitation should be expressed. It appears, indeed, that the whole question-—even in cases where the police are acting in the proper execution of their duty, and dforfwrl In the case put by Lord BRAMWELL, of the police being “in the wrong; interfering and doing things which they had no right to do ”—-hinges on the existence, at the time of flie homicide, of a

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Sncrioi: 5 of the t)‘onvey_ancing Act, 1882, has hitherto shared the liberal construction which, by a sort of tacit agreement, has been byestowed on Lord Csiims’ latest Acts. Thus in Re Halberznglon s .Ti"usts (35 W. R. 285, 34 Oh. D. 211) separate trustees were appointed for parts of the trust property which for the time being were held on distinct trusts, although in certain events the wholeof the property would be held on the same trusts. In Re Pumas Trusts (33 ‘V, R. 564, 28 Ch. D. 725) a separate set of new trustees was appointed by the court to act, in conjunction with a continuing trustee of a will, in relation to a part of the trust property held on distinct trusts. That case has been assumed in some quarters to be an authority for the proposition that an appointment may be made under section 5, although there is no appointment of new trustees for the whole of the trust property; but as the appointment was made on petition presented under the Trustee Act, the decision is in reality no authority on the point in question. The words of section 5 are “On an appointment of new trustees a separate set of trustees may be appointed,” &c.; and, if strictly construed, the provision is only applicable to cases where occasion arises for the appointment of new trustees for the whole of the trust property. In Savilc v. Cou er (35 W. R. 829) the trustees of a will desired to retire from this trusts relating to a distinct trust fund and to appoint separate trustees of that fund, but to continue trustees of the rest of the trust property. Mr. Justice Noiirii, adopting the strict construction above referred to, held that this could not be done. We think it may be doubted whether the draftsman of section 5 had any idea of limiting in this way the operation of that provision. The probability is that, merely by way of introducing a new subject, he adopted the phrase used in section 31 (2) (3) (4) of the Conveyancing Act, 1881. However this may be, it is now settled that trustees cannot retire from the trusts relating to a distinct part of the trust property in order to have separate trustees appointed for such part, while the original trustees remain trustees as to the rest. It may be suggested, however, that it does not follow that where vacancies have occurred in the trust, so that occasion arises for the appointment of new trustees of the whole property, separate trustees may not be appointed for each of the distinct parts to act in each case with a continuing trustee. The circumstances necessary to bring the section into operation appear to be the death, incapacity, or retirement from the whole qf the trusls of all or some of the old trustees.

A CORRESPONDENT to whom we have frequently been indebted for valuable communications on conveyancing matters, sends _us this week a copy of a trustees’ indemnity clause, which he says has to some extent been introduced into trust instruments during the last few years. The terms of the clause relating to the matters we referred to_ last week are as follow :-“Nor shall any trustee under this settlement, or _his representatives, be in any way liable or accountable for anythmg in connection with this settlement, or the trusts, powers, or provisions thereof, or the trust funds or property sub]ect_theT§t°, °1' °fl1°1" wise relating thereto respectively, short of his mdividual actual fraud." This clause (which we do not understand to have_ the entire approval of our correspondent) seems to us to be both _too wide and too indefinite. It appears to extend beyond acts done m the management of the trust property, and, if effective, would apparently cover mistakes negligent but not fraudulent, in the ascertainment of the persoiis beneficially entitled to income or capital. The creator of a trust does not want to leave the destination of the trust property to the discretion of his trustees, however willing he may be to leave the management of it to thein. As we pointed out last week, what is wanted is_a clause limited to the management of the property as distinguished from the ascertaintipeptflpf the persons beneficially mterested, and _it seems to IE 8- d6 mode of framing such a clause is to specify in detail t e groun i on which a trustee may at present be made _liable for afcts <31 management, and expressly to exclude liability in respect o eac of them. The history of the ancient indemnity clause shews,dto_o, that this is the only safe course. The old_ clause purpogtef tall general terms to protect the trustees from liabihty m respi;c_1o <1 acts and receipts of their co-trustees, and in cases Of the 81 "T9 °

reasonable necessity. 1, agents properly intrusted with the control of the trust funds, and

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the deficiency of authorized securities; but the judges (except Lord NORTHINGTON) refused to attach any potency to the clause; it was considered as merely expressing the general rule of the courts. The result of the section in Lord St. Leonards’ Act embodying the clause is well stated by Mr. Diivinsoir when he remarks that “ it might, with much the same result, have been enacted that every deed, &c., should be construed as if it did not contain the clause in question.” But a very different result ensued from the special clause exonerating trustees from responsibility for allowing property to be under the control of their cotrustee which was framed by Messrs. Hares and JABMAN. In this clause there was added to the old general words an explicit statement of the circumstances to which it was intended to relate; and in Wilkins v. Hogg (3 Giff. 116; aflirmed 10 W. R. 47) the clause was held to be effectual for the indemnity of the trustees (see also Pass v. Dundao, 29 W. R. 332). The lesson is that, if you want to be safe, you must specify in detail the liabilities to be excluded. As we suggested last week, there shouldbe addeda proviso setting out for the information of the trustees all the liabilities relating to management (if any) which are not intended to be covered by the clause. The reason why such a clause has not been hitherto adopted is the notion entertained by conveyancers that its insertion would endanger the security of the trust property. They treat trustees very much as the judicial “ sacrificial priests ” -—referred to by our lively last week's correspondent—treat them—viz., as aclass of imprudent, negligent, unbusiness-like, and generally evil-disposed persons, with regard to whom it is necessary to keep up every safeguard which the courts have constructed. But we think we may safely say that, in acting thus, conveyancers habitually contravene the wishes and intentions of the creators of trusts. They do not wish to make the trustees insurers of the trust property; they do desire to have as trustees persons who are known to be prudent, cautious, upright, and business-like ; and it is on these qualities that they rely for the proper management of the trust property. But the direct effect of the present rules relating to trustees’ liability is to prevent persons possessing these qualities from accepting the duties of trustee, and the object of the clause we proposed is to afiord a means of inducing them to undertake those duties. We should add that we have not overlooked the words in brackets at the commencement of the clause sent by our correspondent: we have not quoted them because we do not at present see that they add any additional security. A trustee always accepts oflice on the terms contained in the trust deed, and calling one of those terms an “ express condition ” does not seem to make any difierence.

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Ir is ro iin nornn that the grievance referred to in Mr. Honimusn’s question in tho House of Commons on Tuesday with regard to the delay which occurs in printing Acts of Parliament will not be lost sight of. In former years we have drawn attention to the matter, and we have had frequent occasion to observe the delay which has occurred. It so happened, however, that when the question was asked there was no great reason for complaint. At 1'-l1e_t1me of writing we believe that the last Act of this session which is obtainable in print is cap. 34, which was passed on the 23rd of last month, and has been in print since the 28th of last month—quite a creditable performance. An Act of Parliament commences from the _Royal Assent, “ where no other commencement shall be therein provided” (33 Geo. 3, c. 13), and as modern _Acts_ very commonly inflict new penalties and impose 119$! ldutles) _1l5 1B_ more than “inconvenient” (as Mr. Honnousn I‘; fill’ PM 1t)._ it is un]ust and unreasonable that knowledge °_ cse penalties and duties should be withheld (as sometimes happens) for weeks after they have been imposed. What We do _not und_ei-stand is the reason for the delay, and who is T5!1_B1l_>le 5011!i- It cannot be supposed that a great printing mice 15 1'1°°P°bl° °f t_‘1"1111B out u batch of Acts within a few days

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, d » _ a en c lgspgntpf the Acts, made up after Acts have received the Royal

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NOTWITHSIANDING the strong dislike to the word “promoter " expressed by Lord Justice Cotton in Ladyzvell Mining Go. v. Brooke: (35 W. R. 785), we venture to think that that word, if indefinite, is nevertheless indispensable. It is a pity that it has been perverted from its original and simple meaning. Lord Bramwell laid it down that “ the word is not a word of art ; it must be understood by lawyers as it would be by laymen ” (Twycross v. Grant, 25 W. R. 701, 2 O. P. D. 503); but it has, nevertheless, c‘ome to include a person who agrees to purchase property on behalf of an intended company, and has, therefore, gradually had attached to it the idea of a person in a fiduciary relation to the company. This ambiguous sense of the word “ promoter ” renders the observations to be found in some of the text-books very misleading. It is sometimes, for instance, said that a promoter occupies a fiduciary relation to the company he promotes, and is, therefore, accountable to the company for any secret profit he makes out of his position. The decision in Lad;/well Mining Go. v. Brookes lays down no new principles, but is particularly useful as shewing the different character of the liability incurred under different circumstances by a promoter (using that word, as we shall do throughout, in its original meaning) who is also a vendor to the company.

If the circumstances are such as to shew that at the time when the promoter bought the property which he afterwards sold to the company he bought, not for himself, but for the company afterwards formed, then the case is the ordinary one of a purchase by an agent; the contract is that of the company, and the company can only be required to pay the price for the property which their agent paid. Under these circumstances, therefore, if the promoter has resold to the company at an advanced price, the company may keep the property and call upon the promoter to repay the profit he made on the transaction.

It is, however, for the company to prove the circumstances constituting the relationship of principal and agent, and one important point is, that this relationship must be shewn by the company to exist at the time of the purchase of the properly by the promoter. It will not be suflicient to shew merely that some time between his purchase and the time of his resale to the company he incurred a fiduciary relationship to the company. And in order to shew such a relationship at the time of the purchase it will not be sufficient to prove that at that time it was intended that a company should be formed to take over the property; or that the promoter intended to sell the propertyto the company, and not to use or work it himself; or even to shew that a part of the purchase-money was to be provided for by shares of the company (see Gover’s case, 24 W. R. 125, l Ch. D. 182); and it seems also that little weight will be attached to the circumstance that a very short interval of time elapsed between the contract of purchase by the promoter and the contract of resale by him to the company (see the judgment of Cotton, L.J., in the present case, and the judgment of Lord Cairns in Erlrmgefs case, 27 W. R. 65, 3 App. Gas. 1218). If it appears that the contract of purchase by the promoter was absolute, and not dependent on any company being formed, and that no part of the purchase-money was to be provided for out of the funds of the company or by means of shares of the company, but that the whole purchase-money was _1l1 fact paid by the promoter out of his own money, these facts will be strong evidence to shew that at the time of the purchase by the promoter there was no relation of principal and agent between him and the company.

But, although the promoter may not have purchased as agent for the company, he is, if he becomes a director of the company (85 he always does), under an obligation to inform the company_of the profit he is making, and if he does not give this information the company are entitled to have their contract for purchase from him set aside. But they are not entitled to require the promoter to ha-.1111 over the profit he has made and to keep the property at the prlcfi he paid for it. Their rights, under these circumstances, are confined to having their contract for purchase set aside.

This is the case even though, owing to the fact that the pr0P@\lY purchased is no longer capable of being dealt with, the contract cannot be set aside. In Re Cape Breton Go. (38 '\V. R. 783» 29 Ch. D. 795) the property which the promoter had resold to the company at a large profit had, before the commencement of PW‘ ceedings against the promoter, been sold by the liquidator of the

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company at a heavy loss; it was held by the Court of Appeal that, although the company would have been entitled to rescind the contract, yet, as rescission had become impossible, no relief could be given against the promoter, since he could not be treated as having been, at the time of his purchase of the property, a trustee for, or agent of, the company. In Ladgwcll Mining 00. v. Brookes the purchase by the company from the promoter was of a leasehold mine, but, before proceedings were taken to set aside the purchase, the lessor had recovered judgment against the company in an action of ejectment for a forfeiture; and it was held that, as rescission had thus become impossible, there was no remedy against the promoter.

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Gift of a deed creating a chose in action.—“ A man may give or grant his deed to another, and such a grant by parol is good. . . . If a man hath an obligation, though he cannot grant the thing in action, yet he may give or grant the deed—viz., the parchment and wax—-to another, who may cancel and use the same at his pleasure” (Co. Litt. 232 a., 6.): see Kelsoclt v. Nicholson (Cro. El. 478, 496).

Where a policy on life or a bond is given and actually handed over to a donee, the policy or bond itself passes, but not the money secured by it: Runmiens v. Hare (1 Ex. D. 169); Barton v. Gainer 3 H. & N. 387 ' Hozues v. The Prudential Assurance Co.

),

T. N. S. Erlwqrds v._Jone.s-(1d)tIy.d& Cr}; 22f6)d d

ere an equi e mor gage is crea e y eposi o ee s a gift of the deeds by the mortgagee is void: Rs Richardson (30 Ch. D. 396) ~ the reason being that the deeds are not pledged to the person with whom they are deposited; he has no property in them, and therefore cannot transfer the ownership o_f them, except by transferring the ownership of the charge to which they are accessory.

C1';'/"t of a chose in action by zlcliverg of tlie instrument creatélrig or evidencin it.——The reader who has studied the passage in e Introductiongto Conveyancing, already referred to, will observe that the phrase, “ chose in action,” is ambiguous. It may mean (1) the right to recover money; (2) the money itself which is recoverable; (3) the instrument evidencing the title to the chose in action. As a matter of convenience, in this section we shall confinglthe phrasi “ cllpss in afctizgn ” to its second fieglningt b

ere are t ree 'n action, w ic mus e carefully distinguishedc: a(§ll)s€’h<:,:re0s1ffiei right to the chose in action passes by the delivery of the instrument; (2) Where the chase in action is assignable in equity only ; (3) Where the chose in action is assignable at law.

_ Negotiable instruments.—-A chose in action of the first class con-
sists of the money secured by a cheque, a promissory note, a bank
note, a bill of exchange, the bonds of certain foreign Governments, or
other negotiable instrument; and the gift of the instrument passes
the pioperty in, or the right to recover, the clzose in action to the
donee: McUull0cli v. Bland (2 Giff. 428); Langleg v. Thomas
(26 L. J. Ch. 609); Bottle v. Knoclcer (46 L. J. Oh. 159 ; same
we. 25 w. R. 209).
thTl(1iere is, hofivever, a distinction bptween ai clileqiée drawndby

eonoron' bk ‘ teoneean a cheque drawn bys aoslviiiingdil ifiid lgliveiivliynthg donor to the donee. The former is merely an order to obtain a certain sum of money ; it makes no difierence whether the money is in the hands of the banker or of anyone else. It is worth nothing till it is acted upon ; and» therefore, if the donor dies before it is presented the donee can take nothing, as the gift was never complete during his lifetime gzeglyislg Peng, Dyer, 49a); see also the reiiirkg Ozf R'0£1tn§I

--.in ~'t¢.K 6E. t .200- ea.-fir we (13 E‘l- 489(lz,Lboth cagd/se o(f doiilatihnspmor/is) éawz; but the Prim Oiple appears to be applicable to gifts inter oiluos. Where, how""1 the cheque was presented for payment during the life Of the d°l1°1'i B-11d payment was refused because the bankers doubted the authenticity of the donor’s signature it was held that the gift W95 Valid: Bromleg v. Brunton (6 Eq. 7275). On the other band E °he‘lu9 drawn by a stranger “ to bearer” or “to order,” if it be end°T59d by the payee where given by the donor to the donee, passes the right to recover the money for which the cheque is drawn» Blld, therefore, acts as an effectual gift.

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But a eliose in action of this nature does not pass by an instrument purporting to assign it if the instrument of title is not handed over. Thus, an indorsement on a packet of Austrian bonds which pass by delivery, signed by the owner of the bonds, “The first five numbers of these Austrian bonds belong to and are the property of A.,” did not pass them: Trimmer v. Danbg (25 L. J. Ch. N. S. 424). See also Brillge v. Bridge (I6 Beav. 315), as to the Columbian bonds.

Bearing in mind that a court of equity never gives any assistance to a volunteer, the provisions of the 24th section of the Judicature Act, 1873, will not assist the donee of a chose in action, but the 25th section, sub-section (6), providing that “any absolute assignment by writing under the hand of the assignor . . . of any debt or other legal chose in action of which express notice in writing shall be given to the debtor . . . shall be effectual at law . . . to pass and transfer the legal right to such debt or cliosc in action from the date of such notice . . . ” applies to a voluntary transfer.

Chose in action assignable in eguitg onlg.—A chose in action of the second class, which is assignable in equity only, does not pass by the delivery of the instrument creating it. Thus the money secured by a policy on life: 1101088 v. Prudential Assurance Co. (49 L. T. N. S. 133), Rummens v. Hare (1 Ex. D. 169), Barton v. Gainer (3 H. & N. 387); by an ordinary money bond: Edwards v. Jones (1 My. & Cr. 226); by an ordinary money bond on which judgment had been entered up: Patterson v. Williams (L. & Goo. Ca. temp. Plunk. 95); by a tumpike bond: Searle v. Law (15 Sim. 95) did not pass by the delivery of the policy or bond, notwithstanding that, in some of the cases, there was an informal written assignment of the money, and the strongest evidence of intention that it was intended to pass as a gift.

Release of debt to (lebtor.—There appears, howeyer, to be a distinction where an instrument creating a legal debt is handed to the debtor as a gift, for this appears to extinguish the debt at law : Richards v. Sgms (2 Eq. Ca. A_b. 617; same case, Barnard Ch. Rep. 90) (the report in 2 Atk. 319 is on another point). See this case discussed in Bgrn v. God/‘reg (4 Ves., at p. 1l_)) ; in Cross v. Sprigg (6 Ha., at p. 556); and see the observations of Turner, L.J., in his judgment in Taglor v. Manners(l Ch. App., at p. 56). Similarly the cancelling of a mortgage or a bond or the destruction of a promissory note_by the mortgagee, obligee, or payee is some evidence of an intention to release the debt: Harrison v. Owen (1 Atk. 520); Ala-ager v. Close (10 1169- 6'6 Welsb. 576); Gilbert v. Wetlierell (2 Sim. & St. 254); but consider the cases collected at E. & O. Interpretation 21, which appear to shew plhat, if thetdeed 1S_t(3B.1108ll€d by the mortgagee or obligee, he can ring no ac ion on i . _

In connection with this subject it should be pointed out that ths mere fact of a creditor saying to the debtor ‘ I forgive the debt does not amount to a release, beecause, on an action fr!" the degit, the defence is merely equitable: Cross v. Sgrigg (6 H8» 515 la Peace v. Hains (11 Ha. 151). _If, however, t e debtor be p_act-1 in such a position that the debt is gone at law, these words Vfilll be suflicient: Consider the luminous judgment of -T914591» ME Strong v. Bird (18 Eq. 315). There a creditor fcgglilye gbte t and appointed the debtor her executor, which release e d fit 11 law, but not in equity: Ingle v. Ric/zards (28 Beav. {'3i6(g);)au 1 jive; held that, as the debt was gone at 111W. 5° H133‘ the 9 r 283"“? no assistance from a court of equity, the f°I‘8"'°"°95 °P°m e as B

ift.

8 Accordingly, where a loan had been made by A.h to 1%., a letter
written from A. to B. stating “ You must know W B11 gage IS’?
the money I never could intend it as a loan, but as _1;l19;i_:1°: E
gift, and I hope you Wlll live many yea" ¢° e"1°Yb118 IN I‘;

amount to a release of the debt: Knapp v. Burna g( - -
305 . .
Vilhere the instrument creating the debt is not under lssv-1. %
writing under the hand of the creditor may °Pemt%‘“ “30°“:e°

the debt and films créfte 8 Elf? Ag???" 7- P.‘/" (5 eano )'

is case a . .

selltfhldthigi-nthesihlitrument creaging the debt is under scalp!‘ 110$, the course of conduct of the parties may amount in5gq\11i[Q':‘_ release of the debt: Flower y. Zllm-fin (2 1\_I_y_- & 07- 4 B) > 1?}/g_ V. Major (1 Drew. 165); Ieomans v. Wltlrrrms (35 ear. 1 same case, 1 Eq. 184). .

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The release may be conditional on the happening of an event : Ashton v. Pya (5 Ves. 350 note); Peace v. Hains (ll Ha. 151).

Choses in action assignable at law in a statute;-_~y manner. —A chose in aclion of the third dass, which is assignable at law, does not pass unless an assignment in the proper form is made.

This rule has been applied to an assignment of £3 per Cent. Bank Annuities: Colman v. San-cl (1 Ves. jun. 50; same case, 3 Br. Ch. 12), Beech v. Keep (18 Beav. 285); where a power of attorney for the transfer of stock had, by the direction of the donor, been exercised by the trustees, in whose name it was standng: Coningham v. Plunkett (2 Y. & C. C. C. 246), or by the intending donor: Peck/iam v. Taylor (31 Beav. 250), but no transfer was made during the donor's lifetime; to an assignment of turnpike bonds and shares in companies: Searle v. Lane (15 Sim. 95); a canal share: Antrobus v. Smith (12 Ves. 39); East India Stock and shares in an insurance company: Dillon v. Cobben (4 My. & Cr. 647); a railway debenture subsequently converted into railway stock: ltloore v. Moore (l8 Eq. 474); shares in a bank: Jlilroy v. Lorrl (4 De G. F. & J. 264).

The case of Bland v. lilacculloch (9 W. R. 65) presents much difliculty; probably the report is incorrect. There A. purchased debentures and handed them over to B., who lived with him as his wife, she going with him to the brokers and receiving the receipts. B. cut off the coupons as they were required and went with A. to receive the dividends. It was proved that prior to the purchase A. had promised to give the debentures to B., and had subsequently often spoken of them as being her property. It was held by Stuart, V.C., that a valid gift of the debentures had been made to According to the report in 2 Gifi. 428 the subject of the gift was not debentures but securities passing by

delivery, if this latter report is correct the decision presents no difliculty.

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This is the sixth Public Libraries Act, the first being the Public Libraries Act, 18nd (18 19 Vict. c. 70.) Its main provision is that which allows lending libraries to be established at the cost of the public without the obligation of maintaining a separate building for it. The Act als_o_ substitutes the borrowing machinery of the Public Health Act, L810, for that of the Companies Clauses Act, 1845, and abolishes the rating machinery of the Towns Improvement Clauses Act» 1647, which l1ad_ already been abolished as to municipal boroughs by ‘F11? Pdbllc Libraries Act, 1866. There are also a. set of provisions Xiablmg ‘ districts ” in the metropolis to adopt the Public Libraries

"B, but the separate powers of separate parishes are carefully gesefived. consolidation B_ill on this subject has been presented to

iir anlienti in many successive sessions, and the present Act shews E2561 pwain y than ever how desirable it is that such a Bill should pass

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“ youth ” is given, and while some judges or justices would deem any person under thirty to be a “ youth,” others would draw the line far more closely. The power of releasing is entirely discretionary. The court may, instead of sentencing, . . . direct “ that the offender be released on his enterin into a recognizance, with or without sureties, and during such period as the court may direct, to appear and receive judgment when called upon, and in the meantime to keep! the peace and be of good behaviour.” Now what difference does t is make in the law F

In regard to indictable offences, no very great difference, as judges of assize have long had and exercised, though sparingly, the curious power, not given by any statute, of releasing on recognizance to appear and receive judgment at any time when called upon any person whatever convicted of an offence whatever except murder and the few other offences for which a minimum punishment is prescribed by statute. This power, however, was never possessed, or at least never exercised, by courts of summary jurisdiction until the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879, by section 16, expressly enacted that in the case of any offence punishable on summary conviction, “ if the court think that, though the charge is proved, the offence was, in the particular case, of so trifling a. nature that it is inexpedient to inflict any punishment,” the court may either (1) dismiss the information or (2), “ upon convicting the person charged, may discharge him conditionally on his giving security, with or without sureties, to appear for sentence when called upon, or to be of good behaviour, and either without payment of damages and costs, or subject to the pay ment of such damages and costs, or either of them, as the court shall think reasonable." There is no express repeal either of the common law power of the judge of assize or of the statutory “power of the justices under the above section of the Summary J uri 'ction Act, 1879. Is there any implied repeal, and to what extent? This is a very diflieult question, but we think cn the whole that the larger jurisdiction of releasing persons remains, but that in the cases where both the old and the new law are applicable ~—that is, where the offender is s. youth and it appears to the court to be expedient to put the new Act in operation for the reasons therein given—-only the new Act can be allowed to operate, and the old power to exact a recognizance to come up for judgment at any time is displaced b the more limited power of enforcing a recognizance within a fixedy period.

The supplemental powers of the Act appear to be entirely new. Under these an offender failing to observe any of the conditions of his recognizance may be apprehended under a warrant issued by any court of ammnar_1/ jurz'sdicti'on, and either upon remand committed to prison in order that he may be brought before the court before which he was bound to appear for judgment or released on bail. There is also a provision that, before directing the release of an offender, the court must be satisfied “ that the offender or his surety has a fixed place of abode or regular occupation in the county or place for which the court acts, or in which the offender is likely to live during the period named for the observance of the conditions.

A more slovenly Act of Parliament than this “ Probation of First Offenders Act, 1887,” it has seldom been our bad fortune to peruse.

MARGARINE.

50 & 51 Vicr. o. 29.—Aiv Aer FOR THE BETTER PREVENTION or THE FRAUDULENT SALE 01- MARGARINE;

After aprotracted contest upon the question whether the substance to be tabooed by the Legislature should be described as “ Butterme,’ “ Margarine," and a division in the House of Lords, upon the motion of Lord Deninsn, that it should be described as “ Rine,” “Margarine ” has won the day, and the present Act, in 13 sections, protects butter properly so called, and hedges round the sale of margarine by all manner of restrictions. Defining margarine as meaning “ all substances, whether compounds or otherwise, prepared in imitation of butter, and whether mixed with butter or not,” it enacts that “ no such substance shall be lawfully ” [what is the use of the word “la.wfu1ly”] sold, except under the name of margarine, and under the conditions set forth in the Act. The words “ prepared in imitation of butter " raise a considerable doubt. Do they mean “ fraudulentlY prepared," so that no conviction can be obtained unless the dealer can be shewn to have had an intention to deceive P or do they 1116011 merely “prepared so as to resemble,” so that n conviction may take place irrespective of the intentions of the dealer ? Taking the word! by themselves, we think a court would give the more favourable construction to them, and even taking them in connection with the leading 890iii°lJB Of the Act, we rather incline to the opinion that the m0I_‘° severe construction ought not to prevail. The title of the Statute, it 19 hardly necessary to point out, cannot be relied on. The conditions oi d°°lin8 fife that packages containing margarine must be marked H m'"'8*1l'{IlB" ; that imported margarine and mar arine forwarded by “Y public conveyance must be duly consignedg as such, and $115

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