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the material fact to the plaintiff. He ought not to effect an insur- pp. 42, 57).

ancc for the plaintiff concealing the fact, but we doubt whether,
legally, his obligation went further: what his moral d

uty might or be is a nice question. To whom was the alleged duty? To the un plaintiff, not to an underwriter, because this agent etfected no 19 insurance. But how could there be such a duty towards the plain- the tiff in any legal sense ? W1

The question that at once arises is, why is the plaintifl to be c affected by the knowledge of the first a ent the olic not havin

s . p_ Y s did been efl’ected by such agent but by another ? It is quite obvious, , reg as it seems to us, that there is need of some further reason than ere

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The creditor cannot enforce the provisions of either section ll
section 13 of I & 2 Vict. c. 110 against purchasers unless and
til there has been due registration of the judgment under section
of that Act (ante, p. 57), nor, after the expiration of five yearsfrom
original registration, unless there has been a re-registration
thin five years before the execution of the conveyance (2 & 3 Vict.

. 11, s. 4; 18Vict. c. 15, s. 6 ; ante, p.58). But l 8: 2 Vict.e. 110
not repeal the earlier statutes, and, where a judgment was not
istcred, purchasers remained liable to the old law, so that the
ditor was entitled in such a case to enforce such rights as he

that which governs the case where it is the agent through whom would have had before the Act of l 8: 2 Vict., either by docketing

the policy in question has been effected who has been guilty of the his
concealment, for the reasons there given will not apply. What is B

the principle suggested by the judgments of the majority? It e

- - . . . 7 fi'ec appears to be that of general ex edienc that it is e

Judgment or by affecting the purchaser with notice (ante, . 25). 2 8: 3 Vict. c. 11, however, the dockets were closed, and by the t of 18 Vict. c. 15, s. 4, judgments entered up before 1 & 2 ct. c. 110 were required to be registered in order to affect

_ p y; xpeclient, Vi
havmg regard to the general results, that insurers should stand in purchasers (anls, p. 58).

no better position by reason_of the concealment from them by their

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the one particular purpose of effecting an insurance on a particular -ud

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0 protected by 18 Vict. c. 15, s. 5, from the new law, where the
gment, though registered under 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 19, had

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it, such as the afl’airs of a particular ship, and a person employed to (a
effect one particular contract. We can understand that it may be
expedient, having regard to the ordinary probabilities of business 1
and the general effect, to impute the knowledge of a captain to his ‘i to
owner, as in Gladstone v. Ii’in_q (1 M. & S. 35), but it does not th
seem to us to follow that it is so necessary from the expediency of

e protection so given extended to the remedies under the old law
rite, p. 58).

Purchasers without notice were protected from the operation of
& 2 Vict. c. 110 by 2 & 3 Vict. c. 11, s. 5, but in such terms as
leave them still liable to such rights as were enforceable under
e old law upon a docketed judgment (ante, p. 58). It has been

the thing to impute to the insurer the knowledge of anybody he often pointed out (see Dam V' & P" 5th ed" 456) that want of

may have casually emplo ed reviousl to endeavour to effect no

tice is very difficult to prove, and cannot in practice be safely

insurance. It is obviousytbatpin the ode class of cases there mighlt relied upon

be a frequent risk of wilful and deliberate detention of facts from

Eject of contract for mle.—ThB rules above stated flx the

Insureby their e 1 1 - rd t t th -,1 b tt -t- rights of the parties as to judgments prior to a contract of sale. But
to insure, of whiclip£y$8,:j1dObeel;nZ$,gtab1::nlingered: giorsclulil? when A. has contracted to sell lands to B., the latter has become

stances, that they should take advantage, and also the possibility in

equity the owner of the lands; and it follows, from the princi

of “tended i ounce which it would be im onible to dis rave plea laid down above (pp. 4, 42), thata creditor, under any judgment
bull, cases giggle, to that which we are discullsing we do lat M; entered up after the date of th_e contract, can have no rights en.
that the same risk a,.ise,,_ It seems to us very arguable that it forceable against the beneficial interest in the lands sold, for it has
was, as it were, a mere accident that the plaintiff had previously ceasedbe1°“g l’° the lludgmem debtorBut (Mel P4) E B
tried to effect a policy through a broker who happened to obtain han°u°° °f such ajltdgmentl he cannot safely pay hm P-um ase-
knowledge of 8 Particular fact’ and when that brokerls emP10y_ money to A., or, as it is sometimes put, the creditor has a lien upon

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he can have no charge under section 13, even though he may have L


btained delivery in execution of estates and interests a moiety of

which was extendible under the old law.

23 §- 24 Vict. 0. 38.—This Act, which was passed for the benefit

of purchasers and mortgagees,.and does not affect the rights and (XVL) JUDGMEN-rS' liabilities as between u judgment creditor and the debtor himself, II. Tun Monnnx Law or Jvnoiuizirrs (continued). applies to judgments entered up after the 23rd of July, 1850 (and

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”_' “Q, and on or he/‘ore July 23, 1860 (23 J‘ 24 Vict. c. 3B).——
_bl10l1 interests, legal or equitable, as are capable of being delivered
111 legal execution under an clegit (ante, p. 41) can be taken as
flgfllnst the debtor from the date of entering up the judgment, and
S lfgfilllfit purchasers from the date oi registration in the register
of Judgments (1 & 2 Vict. c. iio, ss. 11, 19, ante, pp. 42, 51).
I_n the case of interests incapable of being taken in legal execu-
ll°l1, as where there is not a simple trust of the whole beneficial
tllterest for the debtor, e._//., where he has onlyan equit of redemp-
tn (@7115, Pp- 4, _42), the creditor can, from the same dates respec-
"617, obtain equitable execution by the appointment of a receiver
("Mei P- 42) as under the old law (ante, pp. 24, 25).

chThe creditor also acquires, from the same dates respectively, a
marge (enforceable at the expiration of one year from entering up
. ° Judgment) upon the lands of the judgment debtor, includ-
Iflg estates and interests therein which are incapable of being

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past). Its purpose, as it recites, was plum? fl'eBl1°1d, c°PYh°1}l»
and customary estates on the same footing with leasehold estates In
respect of judgments as ayamst purchasers and_morl_yoyees, and to
enable them to ascertain when execution had issued, and to pro-
tect them from delay in the execution of the writ. It enacts
(section 1) that no judgments to be entered up after the passing of
the Act shall affect any land, of whatever tenure, _as to purchasers
or mortgagees, whether they have notice of such _;_ud_q:nents or not,
unless a writ or “ other due process of execution _ sha.ll_ have
been issued and registered (in the manner mentioned in section 2)
before the execution of the conveyance or mortgage and the pay
ment of the purchase or mortgage-moneg, and unless such execulizion
or other process shall be executed up pl-It lfl_ f°l9 "M111" '8
calendar months from the time when it was registered-

By section 5 “judgment” in this Act includes regutrrad decrees,



orders of courts of equity and bankruptcy, and other orders having


the operation of a judgment. “ Rules " are not mentioned. There is no provision for re-registration of executions. _

This Act does not repeal 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110 or 2_&_3 Vict. 011 ; and it would appear that udgments coming within it must be registered and re-registered in the registry of judgments under those Acts. This seems to be assumed by the terms of the 2nd section, which directs the execution to be registered in the name of the person “ in whose behalf the judqnzerzt . .' . _ ivaf registered ; ” and there is no provision such as that contained in 21 8: 28 Vict. c. 112, s. 3 (past), negativing the necessity of registering the judgment.

It has been suggested that 23 & 24 Vict. c. 38 applies only interests which can be taken in legal execution under an eieyzt, and that, therefore, a purchaser might be liable to the creditor’s charge underl 8: 2 Vict. e. 110, s. 13, upon a registered judgment, though no registered writ of execution be found. But similar words in 27 & 28 Viet. c. 112 ( post) were held not to be so limited : Hutton v. Hayzoood (9 Ch. 233). The Act mentions “other due process of execution,” and it has been held that the appointment of a receiver is a delivery in execution of such interests as cannot be taken in legal execution : Hutton v. Haywood (ubi sup). The words of 23 & 24 Vict. c.' 38 are that no judgment “ shall affect any land " until a writ or process of execution is registered; and it is submitted that for the protection of purchasers, such registration is required in order to give the creditor a right to enforce the charge under 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 13: see Wallis v. Morris (12 W. R. 997), where Roinilly, M.R., said that “ the Act would not allow the creditor to keep his judgment hanging over the heads of other people. He must issue execution or his charge could not affect a purchaser; the Act expressly stated that, and applied whether the interest was legal or equitable." It was held in that case that the Act applied to an equity of redemption, which is incapable of being taken in legal execution. The charge under section 13 of 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110 could not, however, be enforced until the expiration of one year from the entering up of the judgment, whereas process of execution registered under 23 & 24 Vict. c. 38 is not to affect a purchaser unless it is put in force within three months. \Vhere legal delivery in execution was impossible, the Act might be complied with by obtaining the appointment of a receiver pending the expiration of the year, as in Yescomba v. Lamlor (7 \V. R. 534, 28 Beav. 80, Dart, -174), and thus the object of limiting the length of search in all cases under the Act to v. period of three months would be attained. And, though a writ of execution cannot be re-registered, yet, apparently, ii second writ, or subsequent writs on the same judgment, could be registered: see Pask on Judgm. Suppl., p. 9n. “The real object of the Act was to prevent the issuing of writs and the nonexecution of them. It was to protect purchasers from that state of things ”: per Lindley, L.J., in Re Pope (34 W. R. 693, 55 L. 369). “Under this statute a registered judgment, under which the land has not been actually delivered in execution, was made a charge upon the land only while a writ of execution was in f01'0EfV1Z.,. for a period of three calendar months from the date of registration of the writ” : Dart, V. & P. 485).

CORRESPONDENCE. SOLICITORS AND HOUSE AGENTS. [To the Editor of the Solicitors’ Journal.]

Sir,—Som_e months ago the legal profession here was pained and surprised by seeing thata solicitor. practising in the town froni which I write, had caused his name as a solicitor to be aflixed to the entrance of certain house agent’s oflices, who carry on their business in one of the suburbs about a._ inile and a. half from the s0licitor's own oflice in the town: 'i_l;l;pnspj11pilt;p)p1j3i(p:;ipnpi:§1p)1=i£1;isthe premises, so far as is known, apart

Undlgnified and objectionable as this method of obtaining work is it appears to be growing here. A firm of solicitors who are practisiii i and have ofiices in the centre of the town, have aflixcd their narnefi as solicitors to_thc ofl-lee entrance of a trade protection society not 1; quarter of a mile from tho solicitor’s own oifices. The inana er of the Trade Protection Society is an ex-law clerk and has 1198-Xgl l1 the tradesmen of the town as subscribers to the Trade Pr teyt'a

Society. In this case the solicitors whose names ap earo at: thn entrance have no ofi-ices on the premises apart froni) the debt


collecting agency of the Trade Protection Society. It is not _very diificult to see through these transparent devices. That there is an understanding between the parties in each case is apparent. _ _

I shall be glad to hear what _the opinion of the profession is on this practice, as I was under the impression that people of this classhouse agents. debt collectors, &c.—-wepe in the _profession kept at a distance, and generally looked upon with suspicion.

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Wednesday, the 24th day of November. 1536

1Vhereas, from the present state of the business before Mr. Justice Chitty, Mr. Justice North, Mr. Justice Stirling, and Mr. Justice Kekewich respectively, it is expedient that a. portion of the causes assigned to Mr. Justice Chitty, Mr. Justice North» and Ml‘Justioe Stirling should for the purpose of trial or_hear1ng only be transferred to Mr. Justice Kekewich ; now I, the Right Honourable Hardinge Stanley, Baron Halsbury, Lord High Chancellor of _Great Britain, do hereby order that the several causes set_ forth in the schedules hereto be accordingly transferred from _the said Mr. Justice Chitty, Mr. Justice North, and Mr. Justice Stirling, to Mr. Justice Kekewich, for the purpose of trial or hearing only, and be marked in the cause books accordingly. And this order is to be drawn up by the registrar and set up in the several oifices of the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice.

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Howlett v Medway Navigation Proprietors 1885 H 3,327 May 20 In re Turner, deceased Cork v Hutchinson 1886 T 550 May 20 Perren v Baker 1886 P 246 June 3

Wright v Horrocks 1885 W 4,279 June 4

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Kinnears Patents, Limited v Allbright 1886 K 268 July 22 Golonyav Bath 1885 G 2,778 July 24

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\ there existed a doctrine that a description of the thing assigned might be so vague that the court would hold that nothing passed un or the assignment. Book debts meant debts arising in a trade or business where it was usual to keep books in which the debts ought to bc entered, and were not confined to debts which had been actually entered in the books. If tho_descriptiou had been confined to book debts arising in the same business, carried on in the same premises, or per-ha s carried on anywhere, the description would not be too vague. But here the description was altogether too vague, and the assignment was consequently invalid. The plaintiff, therefore, was entitled to judgment. Lisnnar and Loras, L.JJ., concurred.—Covxsi;i., Sir E. C'IM‘kzv, S.G., and Muir film-1:¢n:ie; Finlay/, Q.C., and Adkins. Soucirous, Solmlor to the Board of Trade," Robiiison, I’;-¢-shni, Q Slow, for J. J. Bagrmll, Birmingham.

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This was an appeal from the decision of North, J. (anlc, p. 28). The action was a foreclosure one, and the plaintiff, who was the first mortgagee, applied to North, J ., for an order of foreclosure absolute against the mortgagor. The second mortgagee had been already absolutely foreclosed. A receiver had been appointed in the action, and he had received rents and royalties (the property being mining property), the greater part of which had been paid into court, but a balance remained in his hands. Part of the money had been received since the date of the chief olerkls certificate. The judgment, at the trial, allowed the second mortgagee and the mortgagorsuccessive periods for redemption, and it contained a provision that any erson redeeming, or the plaintiff in the event of foreclosure, should be at liberty to apply in chambers for payment or transfer of any money in court or in the hands of the receiver. It was contended on behalf of the plaintiff that this special provision distinguished the case from Jmnor-Fuxt v. Nvedlmrn (34 \V. R. 409, 709; 31 Ch. D. 500, 32 Oh. D. 582 ; 30 Sonicroiis’ Jovaxan, 255, 271, 418, 449), and that the plaintifi was entitled to have the forclosure made absolute at once, without directing any fresh account or enlarging the time for redemption, and that he was entitled to the whole of the money in court and in the receiver's hands. North, J ., held that the case could not be distinguished from Jenner-Fuel v. Nmllmm. And he directed a further account to be taken, and allowed the mortgagor one month from the date of the fresh certificate, for redemption.

Tun Conn-r oi-'_Ai-riz.\i. (Cori-ox and Fiw, L.JJ.) reversed the decision, holding that, by reason of the above special provision in the judgment, the plaintiff was clearly entitled to that which he asked. The court could not go behind the judgment, but probably the reason for inserting this very special clause was that the judge th ought that the royalties were in the nature of ro1‘pwr of the estate.—Cousssi., J. G. Wood Soucrroas, Peacock Q Goddard.

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Snrrnan La.\'i>—Psasox HAVING P0\\'ER.~' or Texas-r sou Lira-—Taiiai~'r roa Lira sciusc-r TO Tuvsr sou Ac-cv.\iI.'i.a'rion or R.BNTS—SB'l"l‘LBD Limp Acr, 1882, ss. 2 (7), 58 (1) (rr.).

This was an appeal from a decision of Chitty, J. (30 SOL1Cl‘l'0R§' J ounnan. 44), the question being whether a tenant for life of land, subject to a trust for the accumulation of the whole rents for a term, was a person having the powers of tenant for life under the Settled Land Act, 1882. By his will, made in April, 1881, a testator devised his estate to trustees, on trust to accumulate the rents and profits for twenty years, and apply them in improving and managing and increasing the estates, and at the end of that period to convey them to his son. Section 58, sub-section 1, of the Act provides that “Each person as follows shall, when the estate or interest of either of them is in possession, have the powers of a tenant for life under this Act, as if each of them were a tenant for life as defined in this Act—namely: . . . (vi_.) A tenant for his own or any other life . . . whose estate . . . is subject to a trust for accumulation. of income for payment of debts or other purpose”; and by section 2, sub-section 7, “ a person being tenant for life . . . shall be deemed to be such uotwithstauduig that, under the settlement or otherwise, the settled land, or his estate or interest therein, is inoumbered or charged in any manner and_to any extent." Chitty, J., held that the son was not a person having tzie powers of a tenant for life.

Ti-is Cocnr O1’A1’1'B.\L (Cnr'ro.\', L.J., Hs.\'.\'a.\', I"., and Fur, L.J.) afiirmed the decision. Con-ox, L.J., said that any of tho persons enumerated in section 58 must be able to say, if he was have the powers of the Act, that his estate or inter-.-st was in possession. Subsection 7 of section 2, and the decisions upon it, shewed that niero charges would not prevent a man from being tenant for life in possession, because he had a present immediate right to pay off the charges, and the court would not inquire into their amount. But under the present will the trustees were obliged to appropriate all the rents and profits, and the son had no right to possession, or to any part of the rents or profits. If sub-section 1 (vi.) of section 5-5' was to apply, the son must shew an immodiaie present right to an estate for life, subject only to a trust for accumulation. Here the entire rents were to be taken for particular purposes for twenty years, and during that time the son had no right to intervene. It was argued that he came within the Act because he had the first estate of freehold. But the legal estate was in the trustees, with the whole beneficial interest, for twenty years, dli1‘ll1g.Wl'l1Cl1 time the son had pg interest or estate. If the trustees were to misapply the rents so as to rfis his future interest, he could come to the court to restrain them; butt at

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The question in this case was whether s. company, having under the provisions of their articles of association issued preference shares with a fixed preferential dividend, can afterwards, without the consent of all the holders of preference shares, reduce the whole of their capital, including the preference capital, with a corresponding reduction of the dividend on that capital. The company was registered in 1872 for the purpose of establishing telegraphic communication between this country and Spain, with a nominal capital of £130,000 in £10 shares. By the articles of association power was given, with the previous sanction of a special ineetin , to increase the capital by the issue of new shares with a preferential gividend, and also from time to time to reduce the capital and to alter the amount and denomination of its shares. In 1874 t e directors were authorized by special resolutions to increase the capital by 6,000 new shares of £10 each, such shares to be entitled to a preferential dividend of ten per cent. per aiinum, and the deficiency in payment of such dividend in any year to be made up out of the profits of any succeeding ear. All the 6.000 new shares were issued and paid up in full. No dividend on the ordinary shares had been paid since the 30th of June, 1882, but the ten per cent. dividend on the preference shares was paid down to the 30th of June, 1884, since which time the company had ceased to pay it, and had placed to a reserve fund nearly the whole of their annual profits. One o the conipany’s submarine cables had broken down, and in September, 1886, tho directors called a meeting of the shareholders to consider a proposed reduction of capital. The circular calling the meeting pointed out that the examination of the cable having resulted in shewiiig that it could not be advantageously restored, the company had now to adopt one of two altematives advised by counsel, and either discontinue the payment of dividend on all the shares, including the preference shares, until sufficient money was accumulated to lay a new cable, or else take ste s to write off a proper amount of the existing capital as unrepresented) by assets, and that as the former alternative wou d involve the suspension of all dividends for fen years, the better course appeared to be to reduce the cs ital by writing off £5 pxer share on all t e sharel—in other words, to redliice the capital by one- alf. At a meeting of the shareholders on the 30th of September it was resolved, by a majority of the ordinary and preference shareholders, that, in consequence of the abandonment of the company's original cable, the capital should be reduced in the manner proposed. This resolution was duly confirmed. The plaintiff, who was a holder of both reference and ordinary shares, protested and voted against the resolugion on the ground that the effect of the resolution would be to deprive the preference shareholders of £3,000 per annum, or half thc dividend they would be entitled to receive un er the conditions upon which the preference shares were issued, and to put it into the pockets of the ordinary shareholders. The resolutions having been carried, the plaintiff brought this action, on behalf of himself and the other holders of preference shares in the com(pany, against the company and their directors, to restrain the defen ants from acting on the resolutions. Bacon, V.C., granted the injunction.

The COURT or Ai=i>sai. _(Co'i-roiv and Frw, L.JJ.) reversed the decision and dissolved the injunction. Corrox, L.J., said that, at the time when this company was formed, the Companies Act, 1867--which enables any company limited by_sl_1ares, by special resolution, if authorized so to do by its regulations as originally framed or as altered by special resolution, to reduce its capitel—was in operation ; and the operation of the articles of association, which authorized the company, by special resolution, from time to time to reduce its capital, must regarded in respect of that Act. The question really was whether, having regard to the contract between the company and the preference shareholders, it was competent by subsequent resolution to reduce the amount of the capital. It was argued that the _m_ere existence of preference shares entitled “to a fixed prefer

ential dividend of ten per cent. per annuin" was in itself conclusive again st the power to reduce it. In his lordship‘s opinion that contention could not prevail. Under the Act of 1867 (section 9) power was given generally to reduce the capital, and the articles of association of this ¢°mP*"‘Y P!°'lf3e(l that all capital raised by the creation of new shares should be considered as part of the original capiial, and should be subject to the same provisions in all respects as if it had been part oi’ the original capital. If_the capital should be lost, wholly or partially, or the company bGlBD‘lB subject to a Wllldlha-11% order, the loss must be borne, not only by the ordinary shareholders, ut by the preference shareholders also. But it was said that the contract between the company and the preference rhareholdcrs would be broken unless the preference shareholders were to continue to receive the same amount of dividend as they had hitherto done; _that it must be regarded as if there had been a contract to grant a perpetual annuity of £6,000 a year: and, accordingly, that the company were not entitled, by a reduction of their capital, to cut off any portion of t at annuity, though, so long as the full amount of ihe annuity should be preserved. the company might, if they pleased, reduce their capital. While the effect of the Act of 1867 must not be destroyed, the directors ought to be prevented from evading their contract. It could not be successfully contended that the contract for the issue of 6,000 new shares I

with a fixed preferential dividend of ten per oent., would be broken by reducing tho value of the shares from £10 to £§a_ each. The dividend guaranteed was, in his lordship‘s opinion, not a dividend of ell per share, but a dividend of ten per cent. on the caplmli Bllqiji ii °_°§P1|Fal were reduced, the bargain would still be performed by giving a dividend of ten per cent. on the amount of the greference shares, though that amount had been reduced by one-half. pecial provisions for reducing the ca ital were contained in the articles of association, and those who entered) into contracts with the company ought $0 be wfllidflod 85 knowing the provisions of the Act of 1867, s. 0, and that these provisions applied to preference as well as to ordinary shares. It was contended, however. that the Companies Act, 1877, had rendered it impossible to do effectually what was proposed be_ done by these resolutions. But, when the contract was entered into in 187-i, the Act of 1867 only was in operation, and there had been decisions under that Act that the proposed reduction of capital could be legally effected. Opposed to those decisions was that of Jesse], M.R., in The Ebbw I’/ilc Cu. (-l Ch. D. 827). The Act of 1877 did not deal with that as being the l_aw, but declared what was to be the operation of the Act of 1867 in questions of reductions of capital. And, if it were necessary to def/ermine the question, his lordship was by no means satisfied that the view taken by J esscl, M.R., was correct. On the true construction of the resolutions of 1874, which embodied the bargain with the preference shareholders, he

was of opinion that there was no rescission o that contract in what was

proposed to be done by the directors, and nothing to prevent that which

was a simple reduction of capital. ln his lordship's opinion a judge had

full discretion to sanction an order for reduction of capital, and the order

might be refused when it would bear hardly upon existing interests or was not being done for an honest purpose. Fav, L.J., concurred. The

words of the Act of 1867 were wide and general, and, at the time when that Act passed, it was a well-known fact that preference shares were in existence. It was impossible, therefore, to conclude that the Legislature,

with full knowledge of that fact, did not intend that preference, equally

with other shares, should be included in its operation.—Cnusssi., Rvghy,

Q.U., and ]’ Beale; Brinkley, Q.G. ; Marten, Q.C., and H. B. Howard.

Souciruas, Murray, HMl¢'bi//x, Q Mirling; Blunt Q Lawforrl.

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In this case an important question arose as to the rights of bankers with respect to securities deposited with them by a person who holds them for a limited purpose. The action claimed a declaration that certain bonds and securities, the plroperty of the plaintiff S., which he had handed over to the plaintiff . as his agent for the purpose of raising money, were a security in the hands of several banking oompanies, who were defendants, for such an amount only as was actually owing by S. and E. to M., a money-dealer. M. had advanced money to the p aiiitiffs on the bonds and other securities deposited with him_ by E., and had afterwards deposited them with the banks as security for advances made by them to himself. The banks claimed to hold the securities as a security for what was due to them by M. They alleged s general custom or practice in the City of London for money-lendersto pledge securities deposited with them by borrowers to bankers en bloc, so as to make the securities a pledge, not merely for the actual advances made to the original borrower by the money-lender, but for the whole amount which might be owing by the money-lender to the banks with whom he had deposited the securities. In November, 1882, S. supplied E. with certain securities to be used in raising a loan of £20,000 for a joint speculation. E. informed S. that he would get the money from M., a money-dealer, who, in conjunction with a bank or banks, would find the money. S. accordingly executed blank transfers of certain railway stock, which were given to E. and handed over by him to M. in exchange for a loan. M., in accordance with his usual practice, pledged the stock with certain banks, filling in, as transferees, the names of oflicers of the banks, and the transfers were duly registered. Bonds payable to bearer were also supplied by S. to E. for a similar purpofle, and in April, 1883, a further advance was obtained from M. M. pledged the securities of S. with three banks who were defendants to the action, together with the securities of other customers, on the terms that each and all of the securities should be answerable for the debts due by him to the banks respectively, the securities being changed at the S0001! Exchange settling-day, and M. being bound, when required, to keep up I margin. There was evidence that this was done in accordance with I1 practice prevailing in the City of London. M. stop ed payment indlflyi 1b83. l‘here were then in the hands of one of the banks certain railwal stock supplied by S. ; in the hands of another bank certain bonds payBb1° to bearer; and in the hands of the third bank certain railway stock and bonds. The securities had been- realized by the banks. The action was brought by S. and E., as co-plaintiffs, against the three banks and the trustee in bankruptcy of M., to redeem the securities on payment only of the balance owing to M. from E. On behalf of the plaintiffs it was contended that. under the circumstances, the banking companies mlliii have known that M. was dealing with securities which were not his own, and that, though some of the securities were negotiable and the others were actually registered in the names of trustees for the banks, the equity of the real owner remained. On behalf of the banks it was contended that S. and E. both knew in fact what hi. was doing, 11115 authorized him to do it, and that, at any rate, E. knew it, and was acting within the authority given him by S., which was to raise the money f""F""'1"P "W10; 8115» further, that, even if neither of them knew M-'5


course of dealing, inasmuch as they had gone on the London market to

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Nov. 27, I886. ' THE SOLICITO



there was a good legal custom in the City of London tor money-dealers tried, and tho plaintifi obtained judgment for a perpetual injunction, and topledge the securities of borrowers from themin tho way that M. had an inquiry as to dama e . Th d f d d’

pledged the plaintiEs' securities to the defendant banks. Pearson, J

g s e e en ant id not appear at the trial d his solicitor on the record ceased to act for him. About the time of h . . .

issed the action, on the ground that S had in fact authorized E td t e trial the plamtiff learnt that the defendant had committed breaches of deal with the securities as if they were his own; and that E., in his his undertaking, and, being unable to find the defendant, served a copy dealings with M., was perfectly aware of M.'s course of dealing with the of the present notice of motion on the defendant’s solicitor on the record.

obtain the loan they were bound by the custom of that market, and that signed by the defendant’s solicitor. In November, 1886, the action was
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hanks, and must be taken to have authorized it, and that it the

securities had been his own he could not have succeeded in his claim. S., X

as his principal, was equally bound.

e question arose whether this was sufliciont service under R. S. 0., LIV., 2, and LXVIL, 7, or whether personal service was reciuired. Ciirrrr, J ., said that, so long as anything remained for wor ing out tho

Tns Oovar OI-‘ Ar-1-nan (Oorrou, Bo\vs\', and Fnv, L.JJ.) aifirmed judgment, service on the solicitor on the record was sufllcient. It was the decision, though on a more general ground. Corrou, L.J., also immaterial that the breach complained of was of an undertaking and

said that, although the evidence showed the course of dealing n

ot of an 1D]llllClil0Il, for it was not necessary to shew that the person

adopted by M. and other money-dealers in the City of London, yet no sought to be attached had knowledge of his undertaking. for he must be

such general practice had been_ proved to exist as would be binding

resumed to have known that he had given the undertaking, whereas in

P upon_the borrowers who dealt with them unless they had notice of the the case of an ll1]lll1ClZ10l1 obtained against him, service of the order upon practice. That E. knew what the course of practice was, at any rate, him gave him knowledge of the order made. He therefore gave liberty to

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melegal estate m them some of the bonas were payable to Qearery and liusband was in Queensland, where he had been since 1874, and without

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ny fixed abode. It appcared that four trustees were ?p0lnted when the e

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Pasci-icr—No-i-ici-: uP MOTl0N—NOTICE or PLACE wanna MOTION \\-ounn
Bl Hlaun—Bsavrca or Arrimvirs IN Svi>i>oi:'r—Anniiass 1-on. Sniwrcn
-Lo)mon Aossr sun COUNTRY SOLrci'r0n—R. S. C., 1883, XIL, 10;
LII-. 4; LXVIL, 2; LXX., 1.

The vacation judge made an order for attachment against the defendant
for contempt of court, and this was an" application that the order might
be discharged on the ground of irregularity and that the applicant might
be liberated. Tho notice of motion stated that the court would be '
Ilwved “ at the Royal Courts of Justice " and it was contended that this
was not a suflicient description. The iiecond oint was that the aflidavits
in 5“PPort of ihe motion had not been properly served inasmuch as they
were not served with the notice of motion on the I.0IlCl0Il agents at the
address for service, but were served separately on the country solicitor.

Kn, J., said that the notice of motion was suflicient but the afiidavits had not been pr erly served within ord 52 r 4- ord I2 r 10- ord. 67. r. 2. They ihouldohave been served with the hoiic-e, of niotihnat the address for service. Therefore the order was voidable under ord 70 r. 1' but it was thoroughly deserved and ho would not set it aside. biit woiild in the Otorcise of his discretion, order the defendant to beset at libeilty. No %:9itl;-]“C°l‘NIIL, Oswald ; Swi'nfm Endy. Soucrroiis, Torr, J/mewaya,

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he consent of any persons to act as trustees in the place of the gentlemen who wished to retire.

CHITTY, J., referred to the case of Re Gordian-’s T;-um (W. N., 1886, p. 140), where North, J ., had declined to decrease the number ot trustees and said that he was inclined to think that the court could, even in the absence of special circumstances, reduce the number of trustees, and that many such orders had been made. If, however, special circumstances were required, he considered that the fact of one trust/ee having disclaimcd and the difilculty of getting ersons to act were special circumstances, and the order should be madlh according to the prayer of the petition.Coi‘r~'si-:L, W. E. Jllozlvy. Souciroas, Taylor, Mason, g- Taylor.

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The secretary of a building society entered into a mortgage with his society to secure advances. The mortgage was in the form usual to such cases, and was to secure the principal money advanced, its repayment by instalments, the interest, subscriptions, “ and other moneys." The secretary subsequently embezzled money from the society, which endeavoured to prevent an assignee of the equity of redemption on the mortgage from

redeeming except on his paying the sums embezzled, and the sums due

for some goods supplied to the secretary, arguing that “ other moneys "

included such sums.

STIRLING, J., held that the moneys embezzled and the moneys due for goods supplied were not r_'/'usdcm gram‘; with the moneys specified to be secured, that they were not included in the mortgage, and that the assignee, consequently, could redeem without paying the moneys embezzled and the moneys due for goods B‘llppll€d.'—COUNSBL, Graimm Hastings, Q.C., and Gatey; W. I’:/lrson, Q..C., and E. Cutler. Sonic!-roas, J. E. Q H. Scott, for Gruliam Q S/isplm-d, Sunderland ; .7‘. Soullignte 4

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The question in this case was whether an order directing the defendant to secure the pa ment of a sum of money by the execution of a first mortgage was suéciently obeyed by the mere execution of the mortgage without handing over the title deeds. Two actions had been brought by the plaintiif against the defendant, one in the Queen's Bench Division for damages for breach of romise of marriage, the other in the Chancery Division by which she cllhimed a partnership in the defendant's business. Both the actions were compromised, and the terms of compromise were embodied in an order, dated the 28th of June, 1886, by which it was by consent ordered that the actions should bc stayed, and that the plaintifi should, among other things, pay to the defendant a certain weekly sum so longas s e should remain unmarried, such weekly payment to be secured by a first mortgage on certain leasehold houses to which the plaintiff was entitled. A mortgage by demise had been prepared by the plaintiff and executed by the defendant, but, he declined to hand over the title deeds. _

STIRLING, J ., said that he read the order as an undertaking on the part of the plaintiff to give to the defendant such a security as first mortgagees ordinarily have. To execute the mortgage without handing over the title deeds was to give an imperfect security, for the mortgagor, having the title deeds,_was in a position to deal with the property, and 71191;: might be committed, or, at all events, the rights of_the mortgagee] 11115“ be prejudiced. The defendant was, thereiorc, entitled to hajvée i‘l_6[ o deeds delivered up to her.—Coi-ussn, ]’ca1'a'0II, Q.C-, and if W-_ H';¢.v{|'n_qs, Q.O., Sfufflelzl, and H. Irrrr//. Soiicirom, 1?. IIJLIIIIIQIJ


on or an interim myunction, and that the registrar’s book was

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