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Wood's Ships' Woodite Protection The Forest Iron and Steel Co.,
Co., Limited, In re

726 Limited. v. The Barry Dock and
Buffalo Bill's Wild West Co. v.

Railway Co. ...

.. 726
726 Doré v. Pecorini

Jonas v. Long ..............





lish made BOOK OUT,



with his opponent in an action would be guilty of contempt of court. In Jonas v. Long, however, the respondent did not appear, and there appears to have been no dispute as to the place where the assault was committed, and Mr. Justice KEKEWICH accordingly ordered a commitment, but directed that the facts which constituted

the alleged contempt should be set forth in the order. The Solicitors' Journal and Reporter.

A CORRESPONDENT of a daily newspaper professes to be greatly LONDON, SEPTEMBER 3, 1887.

perplexed by the mystic words," without prejudice," which have

recently come under his notice in a solicitor's letter. He wants to CURRENT TOPICS.

know what is the precise value and efficacy of this expression, and MR. CAYLEY SHADWELL, whose death we announce this week, letters ? There is no reason why lawyers should have a monopoly

why, if it has any efficacy, its use should be confined to lawyers' must have been almost the oldest surviving member of the bar, of the phrase, except that they know its value and laymen do not; having been born in 1798, and called in 1825, during the Chan- and that the occasions for its use occur more frequently in lawyers' cellorship of Lord ELDON. He constituted an additional link letters than in laymen's letters. The expression, as we underwith an older professional generation, through having been secre- stand it, is merely a convenient substitute for a long formula. tary to his elder brother, Sir LANCELOT SHADWELL, when Vice- Instead of writing, "The proposal I am about to make is not to be Chancellor. By a curious coincidence Mr. Loftus TOTTENHAM taken or used in any way as implying any admission of your WIGRAM, Q.C., a younger brother of Vice-Chancellor Sir JAMES client's claim, or any waiver or abandonment of my client's rights WIGRAM, who was for many years a colleague of Sir LANCELOT or contention, and, if rejected, is to be considered as never having SHADWELI, is still alive. He is in his eighty-fourth year, was been made," the lawyer simply writes" without prejudice." He called to the bar in 1828, and is the oldest Queen's Counsel. Mr. knows that the meaning of the expression in this respect is so well CHARLES ROMILLY, whose death we also record, was the brother of understood, so perfectly established by professional usage, as to another well known equity Judge of a somewhat later date.

render a proposal introduced by these two words harmless to his

client in case of subsequent legal proceedings. Nothing has proexpenditure out of the poor-rates in connection with the recent lawyers of this phrase. We are bound to admit, however, that in

CERTAIN METROPOLITAN RATRPAYERS, who entertain objections to bably been so efficacious in preventing or settling litigation as the
Jubilee celebrations, have endeavoured to avoid payment of their two respects the effect of the expression is not so well understo
rates when summoned before a magistrate to show cause why
payment of such rates should not be enforced, by impugning the offer introduced by the words " without prejudice" cannot be used

even by lawyers, as it ought to be. It is perfectly clear that an
validity of the rates on the ground of the illegal expenditure of the in the course of subsequent litigation by the person to whom it was
funds so raised, and have sought to summon and examine the rate made ; but is the person who made it at liberty to use the fact of
collectors and other parochial officials. These champions of paro- the offer having been made and rejected, supposing the rejection of the
chial economy have, however, found themselves to be too late in offer is not expressly “ without prejudice ?” We should think he is
taking their objections to the validity of the rate, for it was not; but we do not know that there is any general understanding in
decided in Reg. V. Justices of Kingston-upon-Thames (6 W. R. 551, the profession to this effect. The other point relates to a very preva-
E. B. & E. 256), that justices of the peace, when called upon to lent delusion as to the efficacy of the phrase. It is ineffectual to
enforce a poor-rate by distress, cannot consider any objections to prevent the consequences which the law attaches to acts. If, for
the validity of the rate which might have been raised in the ordi-, instance (to take the commonest example), a landlord, in accepting
nary way on an appeal. It was also held in Reg. V. Justices of rent due after he has become aware of a forfeiture, writes that he
Kent (16 L. T. N.S. 672) that an order for a distress warrant does so " without prejudice," this will not prevent the forfeiture
for non-payment of a poor-rate cannot be appealed against on from being waived (see Croft v. Lumley, 5 E. & B. 648, 6 H. L.
grounds which would have been open to the appellant on the appeal Cas. 672).
against the rate itself.

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THE NEWLY APPOINTED STIPENDIARY MAGISTRATE at West Ham has ANOTHER CASE of contempt of court, consisting of alleged threatening been called upon to decide a somewhat intricate question in congestures and abusive language used by one solicitor to another on nection with the unsavoury subject of knackers and horse leaving the room before Mr. Justice KEKEWICH in the case of Jonasv. Long at the his premises for the purpose of slaughtering horses, whose corpses

one of the judges of the High Court, came slaughterers' licences. The defendant was proved to have used Chancery Vacation Sittings on Wednesday. It may be remem. were devoted, in some instances, to the sustenance of cats and bered that the same question came before Mr. Justice Chitty about dogs, but, in the majority of cases, were proved to have been sold six weeks ago in Kirby v. Webb, where it was alleged in the to butchers and sausage makers in various parts of London, and he affidavit that the defendant's solicitor had struck the plaintiff's was summoned by the Corporation of West Ham, as the urban solicitor " on leaving the taxing master's room; judge adjourned the motion for committal on the ground that the slaughterhouse without a licence. The Public Health Act, 1875

" but the learned sanitary authority, for using and occupying his premises as a affidavit was too vague, and that the exact place where the assault (38 & 39 Vict. c. 55), incorporates, by section, 169 the provisions was committed ought to bave been described. The case was, of the Towns Improvement Clauses Act, 1847 (10 & 11 Vict. c. however, afterwards settled by an apology and the payment of 34), with respect to slaughterhouses, and section 126 of the lastcourt, 50 far as regards interference with a solicitor in an action, slaughterhouse or knacker's yard” within a town or district submos fully considered in Republic of Costa Rica v. Erlanger (36 ject to the Act which was not in such use or occupation at the time tion of Malins, V.C.) held that the defendants' solicitor had not general Act, and has so continued ever since, without a licence for been guilty of contempt of court in causing the plaintiffs' solicitor, that purpose from the local authority ; and that any person using as who had called for a draft bond which he had left for approval as a a slaughterhouse or knacker's yard without such licence any place fecurity for costs, to be turned out of his office, after refusing to within those limits not used as such at the passing of the special leave when requested to do so. JESSEL, M. R., observed that there Act, and so continued to be used ever since, shall be liable to a tration attempt either to terrorise or to interfere with the adminis- penalty of £5; and the following sections contain other provitration of justice ; and he added that the jurisdiction to commit in sions, including a power of making bye-laws for the regulation be most carefully watched; while MELLISH, J., ridiculed the idea that the defendent was duly licensed to use his premises as a knacker's every solicitor who might lose his temper while in conversation | yard, and the main question was whether such a licence ex

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tended to a place where horses were slaughtered for the purpose on the assignment of a naval officer's full-pay, it was as much of human food. It did not appear that the defendant's present protected as half-pay, since it was given in order to enable him to business had been carried on at the same place before the date discharge his present duties, and that a fund which was not assignof the passing of the Public Health Act, 1875, or continuously able could not be attached. Lord Justice Bowen laid down that since that time; and the magistrate held that, since the sections either an assignment or an attachment of such full-pay would be of the Towns Improvement Clauses Act, 1874, which had been incor- equally opposed to public policy. porated into the Public Health Act, 1875, drew a clear distinction between a knacker's yard and a slaughterhouse, a licence to carry on a knacker's yard did not include a licence to kill horses for human food, and he accordingly imposed a fine. It is certainly desirable, as a matter of public policy, that the pre- THE EFFECT OF A JUDGMENT AGAINST A JOINT

CONTRACTOR. paration and sale of horseflesh for human food should be conducted with as much publicity as possible ; but notice of appeal has The recent case of Cambefort v. Chapman (35 W. R. 838, 19 been given, and the case will no doubt find its way to the Queen's Q. B. D. 229) raised a question which has on several occasions Bench Division.

given rise to controversy_namely, the effect of a judgment against one of two joint contractors in a subsequent action against the

other. In King v. Hoare (13 M. & W. 494) the Court of THE QUESTION whether the half-pay or full-pay of officers in the Exchequer held that the subsisting judgment was a bar to the army and navy is liable to execution or attachment has been raised second action, Parke, B., observing that “the judgment of a court on two occasions during the past legal year. The Army Act, 1881 of record changes the nature of that cause of action, and prevents (44 & 45 Vict. c. 58), provides by section 141 that “every assign- its being the subject of another suit; and the cause of action, being ment of, and every charge on, and every agreement to assign or single, cannot afterwards be divided into two." He also pointed charge, any deferred pay or military reward payable to any officer out that it was the same cause of action, whether against one peror soldier of any of her Majesty's forces, or any pension, allowance, son or two. This decision was acted upon almost without quesor relief payable to any such officer or soldier,

or to any tion for about thirty-five years, notwithstanding a doubt expressed person in respect of any military service, shall, except as far as the by Knight Bruce, V.C., in Ex parte Waterfall (4 De G. & S. 199); same is made in pursuance of a Royal warrant for the benefit of the but in Kendall v. Hamilton (28 W. R. 97, 4 App. Cas. 505) family entitled thereto, or as may be authorised by any Act for the an attempt was made to get it overruled by a decision of the time being in force, be void." This section was discussed in Birch House of Lords. The case was twice argued, and all the authorip. Birch (32 W. R. 96, 8 C. P. D. 163), which was a divorce suit ties were fully discussed ; and it was urged that the technical in which the respondent had failed to comply with an order for the grounds upon which the judge in King v. Hoare had proceeded payment of costs and maintenance. The respondent was a retired could not be now acted upon, in view of the provision in section 25, officer of the Indian Army, and was in receipt of a pension for past sub-section 11, of the Judicature Act, 1873, that the rules of services. A writ of sequestration was issued against his pension, but equity should always prevail when in conflict with the rules of the Sir JAMES HANNEN refused to restrain the respondent and his agents common law. This view was accepted by Lord Penzance, who from receiving the pension, and to direct payment thereof to the also observed that King v. Hoare had never received the sanction of sequestrators. He referred to the above-quoted section of the a court of appeal, and that the Judicature Acts had removed the Army Act, 1881, and to a corresponding provision in an Indian right of a joint contractor, when sued upon a joint contract, to Act (23 of 1871, s. 12), an indicating the intention of the have his co-contractor joined as a defendant. Six other law lords Legislature that such a pension should be placed on the same were, however, of a different opinion. Lord Cairns expressed him, footing as half-pay or an allowance for maintenance to a public self as satisfied with the grounds upon which King v. Hoare had civil officer. Lucas y. Harris (35 W. R. 112, 18 Q. B. D. 129) been decided, and did not think that the Judicature Acts, by was a similar case, since the two defendants were also pensioned abolishing pleas in abatement, had changed a joint right of action officers of the Indian Army, their pensions being expressly protected into a right to bring several separate actions. Lord Hatherley from assignment and execution by the Indian enactment to which thought that it would be difficult, after so many years had elapsed, we have already referred. The plaintiff having recovered judg- to shake the authority of King v. Hoare, and that the rule adopted ment, an order had been made in chambers for the appointment of in that case was not a mere rule of procedure. Lord Selborne a receiver of the defendants' pensions, which order was upheld by a remarked that the principle that an action cannot be maintained for divisional court, but was reversed by the Court of Appeal. Lord a cause which has passed in rem judicatam could not be affected by. Esues expressed his concurrence with the decision in Birch v. Birch, any of the changes of procedure introduced by the Judicature Acts ; and laid down that the pensions could not be the subject of an and Lord Blackburn, though admitting that the defence was not order for a receiver, although he declined to express an opinion as "a meritorious one,” held that King v. Hoare was rightly decided, to what would be the effeet upon the pensioner of an and that its authority was not affected by subsequent legislation. adjudication of bankruptcy against the defendants. Lord Justice LINDLEY said that, although section 141 of the certain bills of exchange which had been accepted by a partner

In Cambefort v. Chapman, the question arose in connection with Army Act, 1881, did not expressly forbid an execution or after the dissolution of the firm of which he had been a member. an attachment, its intention would be defeated by the ap- The plaintiffs sold goods to a firm which consisted of W. and the Lord Penzance had granted a writ of sequestration against the the plaintiffs were not aware, W. accepted in the name of the firm

In Dent v. Dent (1. P. & D. 366) defendant. After the dissolution of the partnership, of which fact half-pay of an officer in the Indian Navy for past services ; but in the bills which had been drawn by the plaintiffs for the price of that case there was no statutory prohibition of assignment or the goods. The plaintiffs, having recovered judgment on the bills attachment, and the Indian Navy had ceased to exist, so that the in default of appearance, but having been unable to obtain satisrespondent could not possibly be called on to serve again. Lord faction of the judgment, sued the defendant for the price of the Justice Lopes also pointed out that the words " charge on" ap- goods. The judgment against the firm on the bills having been peared sufficient to extend to the consequences of a judgment. Lucas pleaded in bar, Mr. Justice Mathew entered judgment for the 5. Harris thus seems to establish that allowances in consideration of defendant, on the authority of King v. Hoare and Kendalliv future services cannot be transferred, but that retiring pensions for Hamilton. past services may be dealt with in any way, in the absence of some judgment for the plaintiff or for a new trial, reliance was placed

On an application to a divisional court to enter statutory restriction. A similar question as to full-pay was raised by the plaintiff's' counsel on Drake v. Mitchell (3 East, 251), in Apthorpe v. Apthorpe (35 W. R. 728), which was a husband's where it was held that an unsatisfied judgment on a bill of exchange; suit for restitution of conjugal rights." The respondent was a given for a debt secured by the joint corenant of the defendant and petition having been dismissed, Mr. Justice Burr had refused to three covenantors on their joint covenant. It was also contended order the petitioner's full-pay to be attached to meet the wife's that the judgment against the firm, being unsatisfied, could not Justice Corror said that, though there was no statutory restriction goods sold and the bills of exchange had given rise to separate and


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distinct causes of action. Mr. Justice Field expressed his regret cited as being authorities as to gifts inter vivos, really relate to
at being compelled to decide in favour of the defendant, who had donations mortis causâ. In Shepherd's Touchstone, p. 227 note, it
had the benefit of the contract between the plaintiffs and the firm is said: “By the civil law a gift of goods is not good without
but he could not escape from the authority of Kendall v. Hamilton, delivery. Yet in our law it is otherwise (per Coke, C.J., Wortes
where King v. Hoare met with the approval of thə majority of v. Clifton, 1 Roll Rep. 61).” Mr. Preston, citing this case, Shep.
the law lords. The contract in the present case was one joint Touch. 227 (note), adds " when there is a deed.” In Irons v.
contract, and not a joint and several contract; and the maxim, Smallpiece (2 B. & Ald., at 554), Abbott, C.5., considered that
Nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causâ, applied as much to actions the dictu of Coke applies to a gift by deed as distinguished
upon the same contract as to the case of a person sued twice for from a gift by parol. Jenkins Cent. 109, ca. ix., says: “A gift
the same cause of action. He distinguished Drake v. Mitchell as of anything without consideration is good; but it is revocable
being a case where the giving of a bill of exchange could not sus before the delivery to the donee of the thing given, Donatio
pend an existing remedy in respect of a covenant; and he held that for perficitur possessione accipientis." The fact of the learned
the plaintiffs to recover would be "not consistent with our legal author making the quotation appears to shew that he had the
system.” Mr. Justice Manisty observed that in Drake v. Mitchell the civil law in his mind. The learned editors (Patteson, J., and
bill of exchange was a collateral security, and that the same defences Williams, J.) of Williams' Saunders say, in the note (d) to
were open in an action on the bills as in an action for goods sold Wilbrahum . Snow (vol. 2, p. 47): "It may still be held
and delivered. He quoted a passage from "Byles on Bills” (14th that a donee, by a parol gift, acquires such a special property
ed., p. 313), where it was laid down that judgment on a bill of as to be able to maintain an action against a mere wrongdoer,
exchange is an extinguishment of the original debt; and he though the donor may resume the thing given.' So that they
added, with reference to King v. Hoare, that he was "not at all appear to agree with Jenkins.
sure that that rule of law is not in all respects equitable and There appears to be a further confusion between a gift of a per-

sonal chattel and of a chose in action. We shall discuss gifts of the
Having regard to the authority of Kendall v. Hamilton, it latter nature separately, confining our remarks at present to per-
was hardly to be expected that an attempt to set aside the authority sonal chattels.
of King v. Hoare would now have much chance of success. The

Notwithstanding the dicta, “ Delivery of possession is the only circumstance that one of the actions was brought upon bills of admissible evidence of the gift of a personal chattel” (per Plunket, exchange was the only distinguishing feature in Cambefort v. C., Patterson v. Williams, L. & Goo. Ca. Temp. Plunk., at p. 99), and Chapman; but to have held that there were two separate causes of " a gift at law or in equity supposes some act to pass the property ; in action would have been to determine the case upon a ground as donations inter vivos, if the subject is capable of delivery, delivery." “ technical” as those which have subjected the decision in King v. (per Plumer, M.R., Hooper v. Goodwin, 1 Swans., at p. 491), Hoare to so much hostile criticism.

Irons v. Smallpiece (2 B. & Ald. 551) is, we believe, the first case in which it was held that delivery is essential to a parol gift of personal chattels. By the law of England, in order to transfer

property by gifts, there must be either a deed or instrument of gift, THE LAW OF GIFTS INTER VIVOS.

or there must be an actual delivery of the thing to the donee. Here

the gift is merely verbal, and differs from a donatio mortis causa IV.

only in this respect—that the latter is subject to a condition that Gifts of chattels. There are two principal sources whence our if the donor live the thing shall be restored to him. Now it is a unwritten law is derived—viz., Roman law, and customs prevalent well-established rule at law that a donatio mortis causd does not all over England, which, being common to all places, have given transfer the property without an actual delivery" (per Abbott, C.J., rise to what is called common law. The civil, or Roman, law is who cites Bunn v. Markham (2 Marsh. 532), a case on a donatió founded on principles many of which are not recognized by the mortis causa). In the principal case Holroyd, J., says: “In order common law, and very great confusion has arisen from treating deci- to change property by a gift of this nature there must be a change sions on those branches of English law which are founded on the of possession." civil law as applicable to cases which depend on the common law. The correctness of the statement in Irons v. Smallpiece, that a

An example of the distinction between Roman and common law verbal gift of a chattel is incomplete till delivery, is denied by will be found in Blackburn on Sales, chap. 3, where the learned Parke, B., in Waud v. Audland (16 M. & W., at p. 870). See also author, in discussing the doctrine of bargain and sale, points out the opinion of Maule, J. (Lunn v. Thornton, 1 Ć. B., atp. 381), which that it is a principle of Roman law " that property cannot be has been cited as opposed to the decision of Parke, B., as to transferred by any agreement unless there be an overt act of delivery. It appears, however, that in the place in question delivery of possession, and that this principle is not recognized Maule, J., only differs from Parke, B., on another point not being by English law."

discussed in this place. This distinction must be carefully remembered in our present In Shower v. Pilck (4 Ex. 478) the plaintiff's testator said to discussion ; cases have often arisen where, even in judicial decisions, the defendant, who had possession of his plate: "I will give you gifts inter vivos and donations mortis causâ have been confounded all the plate that is mine.” Held, in an action of trover by the and yet the validity of gifts inter vivos depends upon the common executor, that this did not amount to a gift, Alderson, B., saying: law, that of donations mortis causâ on the Roman law.

“ To pass the property there must be both a gift and a delivery. Gifts of both classes have this in common- -(1) that they must Here there is hardly a gift, for the words are in the future tense be made voluntarily by the donor; (2) that they must be accepted by Rolfe, B., saying, " There must be a delivery to make the gift the donee ; the difference between them consists in this-viz., that, as valid. Here there is a mere statement that the goods which the donations mortis causâ are governed by Roman law, actual delivery defendant has in her possession the owner will give her.” It should of the chattels to the donee is essential to the validity of the gift; be observed that in the opinion of both the barons the words did while, in the case of a gift inter vivos, the question whether actual not amount to an offer; so that their remarks as to delivery were delivery, is essential has been a matter of animated controversy, mere obiter dicta (see post, Chattel not in the possession of the though it now appears to be decided that this is not the case. donor). There is a further difference, not necessary to be discussed for our In Bourne v. Fosbrooke (18 C. B. N. S. 515), although it is stated present purpose, arising from the fact that a donatio mortis causa | by Erle, C.J., that it is “ a rule of law that personal chattels cannot is in its nature conditional, and is not intended to be effectual pass by-paro1 gift without actual transfer of the possession,” this unless the donor dies of the illness during which it is given. was a mere obiter dictum, as the jury found that the goods had

Delivery. The question whether a gift of personal chattels been delivered by the donor to the donee. requires to be perfected by delivery to the donee is one of consider In Winter v. Winter (9 W. R. 747) the current of judicial able difficulty, a difficulty that has been increased by confusing a opinion began to turn. There was no evidence of formal delivery gift inter vivos with a donatio mortis causâ. For instance, the of the chattel by the donor to the donee, but there was evidence dictum of Lord Loughborough, in Tate v. Hilbert (2 Ves.jun.'120) that the latter had taken possession. The court decided that the that merely "saying "I give, without an act, does not transfer the gift was complete, Crompton, J., saying: " Actual delivery of a property” and Miller v. Miller (3 P. Wms. $56), which are often I chattel is not necessary in a gift inter vivos. It is sufficient



to complete a gift inter vivos that the conduct of the parties should taking given by. him before Chitty, J., on the 12th of August last, shew that the ownership of the chattel has been changed.

This was a motion for leave to issue a writ of attachment against

George Sanger for breach of the undertaking, whereby he undertook not We now come to Re Harcourt, Danby v. Tucker (31 W. R. to use or permit to be used in any entertainment of his the name of 578), where it was laid down by Pollock, B. (at p. 580), that “The Buffalo Bill, so as to be calculated to induce the belief that Buffalo Bill question to be determined is not whether there has been an actual was Col. W. F. Cody, commonly known as Buffalo Bill, nor to use or handing over of property manually, but whether, looking at all the permit to be used in any entertainment of his the words "Wild West surrounding circumstances of the case, and looking particularly at any such manner as to induce the belief that the defendant's representathe nature and character of the chattel which is proposed to be programme of the defendant had the words “This great equestrian given, there has or has not been a clear intention expressed on the scene has never been attempted in any other establishment." Those part of the donor to give, and a clear intention on the part of the

words had been struck out, būt, subsequently to the undertaking, Sanger recipient to receive and act upon such gift. Whenever such published photographs and programmes of his entertainment at Olympia a case should arise again I am confident that that would be taining the following notices : "Grand Olympia and Scenes from the Far the basis of the decision of a court of common law; and, of West," “Royal Olympia Scenes from Buffalo Bill and the Far West.' course, the same result would follow in a court of equity.” - Part 3.-Scenes from the Wi!d West-Great trial vf skill by the In this case Mrs. Harcourt was absolutely entitled to pictures Indians Great equestrian exercises by the female Indians—The mail and plate. At her death labels in her handwriting were found on its perilous journey through the Wild West-Attacked by Indians

-The arrival of Buffalo Bill and the cowboys—Great encounterplaced on two of the pictures, to the effect that they belonged to The Indians driven off–Buffalo Bill and the cowboys' triumphant escort her sister, Mrs. Holwell. There was no evidence as to what were of the mail. Grand concluding tableau.-The halt of the cowboys in the the circumstances under which, or by whom, the labels were Far West-A night surprise by the Indians-Buffalo Bill to the rescueaffixed.

But the court held that what had been done amounted to Total defeat of the Indians--Buffalo Bill and his noble steed carried upon a gift by Mrs. Harcourt to Mrs. Holwell.

a dars by the cowboys.". The plaintiff was informed that the defend

ant had committed breaches of the undertaking in photographs and proIn the same case it was decided that the handing over by the

On behalf of the defendant it was contended that the motion donor to the donee of one of several articles intended to be com was grounded on a letter of the 19th of August, which was vulgar prised in a gift was sufficient delivery of the whole.

and offensive, but was not written by the defendant. The defendant was In Re Ridgway (15 Q. B. D.) Cave, J., says (at p. 449), after entitled to use the words. Buffalo Bill” and “Wild West," but not so as

"No connection citing Re Harcourt, "I am of opinion that it is going too far to with Buffalo Bill at the American Exhibition." say that retention of possession by the donor is conclusive proof

KekewICH, J., said that when the case came on before Chitty, J., on the that there is no immediate present gift ; although, undoubtedly, 12th of August, the defendant gave an undertaking not to use or permit unless explained, or its effect destroyed by other circumstances, it to be used in any entertainment of his the name of Buffalo Bill so as to be is strong evidence against the existence of such an intention. The calculated to induce the belief that Buffalo Bill was Colonel W. F. Cody applicants must, however, prove circumstances from which it can commonly known as Buffalo Bill), nor to use or permit to be used in any fairly be inferred that the donor intended to make an immediate induce the belief the defendant's representation of the Wild West was the

entertainment of his the words “Wild West” in any such manner as to gift, so that the thing given then ceased to be the donor's, and plaintiff's representation. After that date the defendant issued a probecame the property of the donee.Consider Jones v. Lock gramme or advertisement, and his lordship understood that it was handed (L. R. 1 Ch. 25), where, notwithstanding actual words of gift and to persons visiting the entertainment. It differed slightly, but not subdelivery of a cheque to a baby, it was held that no gift was stantially, from the documents used before. The following paragraphs intended.

inserted : “Grand Olympia

Scenes from
West-Royal Olympia Scenes

Buffalo Bill and the Far Reference should be made to Farington v. Parker (L. R. 4 Eq. West.” It would be a reasonable conclusion for anyone to come to that 116), where jewels were assigned to a trustee upon trust for such the plaintiff, Col. W. F. Cody, was the person going to perform at the person as G., a married woman, should appoint in writing, and in defendant's entertainment. But in part 3 of the programme he found default of appointment upon trust for her during her life for her the charge of infringing the undertaking; but on looking at the four items

“Scenes from the Wild West.” Thatalone would not be sufficient to ground separate use, and to be at her absolute disposal, and her receipt, or under this head he found item 3, “The Mail on its Perilous Journey that of the person to whom she should direct the jewels to be through the Wild West-Attacked by Indians—The Arrival of Buffalo delivered, to be a good discharge. G. gave the jewels to V. without Bill and the Cowboys-Great Encounter-The Indians driven offany direction in writing. It was held on the construction of the deed Buffalo Bill and the Cowboys' Triumphant Escort of the Mail." That that G. had two powers, one to dispose of the jewels in writing, gave the defendant credit for not understanding the view of the court

was a distinct infringement of the defendant's undertaking. His lordship one to dispose of them as she pleased, and that the gift was valid with regard to colourable imitation, and should put down his breach of under the second power.

the undertaking to ignorance ; and if Mr. Marten did not insist upon The result of the authorities appears to be that a gift of personal his strict rights he should make the order according to the notice of motion, chattels can be made without delivery to the donee or any person

the defendant to pay the costs. The writ of attachment not to issue for å on his behalf ; but that if no delivery is made a clear intention must Q.o., and Wood Hill; Latham, Q.o., and Bryan Farrer. SOLICITORS,

week, to enable the defendant to purge his contempt.-Counsel, Marten, be expressed by the donor to give, and by the donee to accept, the Janson, Cobb, g Pearson ; Lewis & Lewis. subject-matter of the gift.


RAILWAY CLAUSES CONSOLIDATION Act, 1845 (8 Vict. c. 20), ss. 49, 51.

In the case of The Forest Iron and Steel Company (Limited) v. The Barry

Dock and Railway Co., before Kekewich, J., on the 31st of August, a question CASES BEFORE THE VACATION JUDGE.

arose as to the right of a railway company to build a bridge over a private

carriage road not in accordance with the provisions of section 49 of the RailCOMPANY-INSOLVENT-CREDITOR'S Petition-No STATUTORY DEMAND

way Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845. This was a motion on behalf of the ACTION AGAINST PETITIONER.

plaintiffs to restrain the railway company from interfering with their

tramway by means of the bridge. For the plaintiffs it was contended In the case of In re Wood's Ships' Woodite Protection Co., Limited, before they cited Anttorney - General v. Mid Kent Railway Co. (L. R. 3 Ch. 100), wat

that the defendants were bound to make the bridge of certain dimensions. against whom an action had been commenced by the company for specific wisudes consolidation Act, 1845, had no application ; the land belonged to performance of an agreement, was entitled to an order to wind up the company. It was contended for the company that it was not insolvent, ject of compensation. Section 51 of the Railway Clauses Consolidation and there had been no statutory demand for payment of the debt. The company was in posseseion of a valuable patent, which they had not had

gave company power to block up or alter å road. KEKEWICH, J., made the winding-up order, not to be delivered for a

Kekewich, J., said that the plaintiffs were quite right to bring the week, and on the question of the appointment of a liquidator referred it He should make no order except the costs be costs in the action.

motion to prevent the defendants saying that they had chosen to lie by. to the chief clerk with special directions. ---COUNSEL, Millar, Q.o., and Counsel, E. Ford ; Marten, Q.C., and Kenyon Parker. Solicitors, Torr, Boome; Kirby ; Seddon. SOLICITORS, A. Pulbrook ; Gedge, Kirby, f Millett.

Janeways, f Co., for James A. Corbett, Cardiff ; Downing & Handcock.








time to test.


Nuisance—RESTAURANT-KITCHEN-OFFENSIVE SMELLS—INJUNCTION. In the case of Buffalo Bill's Wild West Co. v. Sanger, before In the case of Doré v. Pecorini, before Kekewich, J., on the 31st of whether the defendant had committed a breach of tiam certain undero I neighbour from causing noxious vapours to injure his premises. The

to August, a question arose as to the right of a plaintiff to restrain his

motion was for an injunction to restrain the defendant, who kept a Mr. Costelloe is the only son of Mr. Martin Richard Costelloe, of Glasgow, restaurant, from causing or continuing the nuisance arising from the and was born in 1854. noxious and offensive odours from the defendant's premises until further gow, and at Balliol College, Oxford, where he graduated first class in

He was educated at the University of Glas. order.

classics in 1873. He was called to the bar at Lincoln's-inn in January, KEKEWICH, J., granted an injunction restraining the defendant, his 1881, and he is a member of the Northern Circuit. servants and workmen, from using, or allowing to be used, No. 14, Parkside, or anything therein, so as to allow the escape of noxious vapours

Mr.James PATRICK O'GORMAN Mahon, barrister, who has been elected M.P. to the injury of the plaintiff. The plaintiff must have his costs.- Counsel, for the county of Carlow in the Home Rule interest, is the son of Mr. Patrick Ogle; Ingpen. SOLICITORS, F. A. Foster f Co.

Mahon, of Mahonborough, Clare, and was born in 1803. He was educated

at Trinity College, Dublin, and he was called to the bar in Ireland in PRACTICB-CONTEMPT OF COURT-ASSAULT-SERVICE-PRECINCTS OF THE

1803. He was M.P. for the county of Clare in 1830 and 1831, for the COURT-SOLICITOR.

borough of Ennis from 1847 till 1852, and again for Clare from 1879 till

1885. He is a magistrate and deputy-lieutenant for the county of Olare. In the case of Jonas v. Long, before Kekewich, J., on the 31st of Sir Samuel WALKER GRIFFITHS, Q.O., K.C.M.G., who has been appointed August, a question arose as to an assault committed within the pre- Colonial Treasurer of Queensland, was born in 1845. He was called to cincts of the court. It was a motion to commit George Johnson, of the bar in Queensland in 1867, and he became a Queen's Counsel for the 16, Union-court, Old Broad-street, a solicitor, for assaulting a solicitor colony in 1876. He was Attorney-General of Queensland from 1874 till within the precincts of the court. The motion stood over from Wed. 1878, and Colonial Secretary from 1883 till 1886. nesday, August 24—(see SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, Saturday, August 27, 1887)—to enable the applicant to post two registered letters to the

Mr. GEORGE ELLIOTT, barrister, has been appointed Lecturer in Mercanrespondent, addressed to his private and business address respectively, and tile Law to the Young Men's Christian Association. Mr. Elliott is the containing the notice of motion and affidavits. Mr. Charles Robinson, solici- eldest son of Mr. George Elliott, and was born in 1861. He was called to tor, said that after a summons had been heard by the judge, the respond the bar at the Inner Temple in January, 1882, and he is a member of the ent, George Johnson, used abusive language to him in the passages of the South-Eastern Circuit. Royal Courts, and put himself in a threatening attitude, and he had to call the police to his protection. It was contended that there were two kinds of contempt-first, assault or improper conduct in the presence of

PARTNERSHIPS DISSOLVED. the judge; secondly, conduct to intimidate and obstruct the course of Hier JACOB and CHARLES EDWARD TAYLOR, solicitors (Jacob & Taylor), justice within the precincts of the court. Reference was made to Kirby Cardiff and Abergavenny. June 24. All debts due to and owing by the

: Webb (the Times, July 14, 1887); Republic of Costa Rica v. Erlanger said late firm will be received and paid by the said Hier Jacob. (36 L. T. N. S. 333, 46 L. J. Ch. 375), Ex parte Wilton (1 Dowl. N. S.

[Gazette, Aug. 26.] ¢05). Mr. Johnson did not appear.

JOHN JAMES DALLAS and JOHN TOMLINSON, solicitors (Dallas & TomlinKEKEWICH, J., said that the applicant was entitled to the order in the son), 102, Fishergate, Preston. Aug. 27. absence of the respondent. The respondent, if he had got anything to JOHN KNIGHT and ARTHUR GRANVILLE HANROTT, solicitors (John say, could move to discharge the order. The contempt should appear on Knight & Co.), 53, Moorgate-street, London. Aug. 26. All debts owing the order. The order would recite the particular facts contained in Mr.

to or by the said firm will be received and paid by John Knight, who will Robinson's affidavit, and then it would go, the court being of opinion that continue to carry on the business under the style of John Knight & Co. that conduct was contempt of court.-COUNSEL, Johnston Watson. SOLICITORS, Robinson $ Dees.

EDWARD MACKESON, WELLINGTON TAYLOR, and ALFRED HENRY ARNOULD, solicitors (Mackeson, Taylor, & Arnould), 59, Lincoln's-inn-fields, W.C. Aug. 29.

[Gazette, Aug. 30.]



The number of failures in England and Wales gazetted during the OBITUARY.

week ending Saturday, August 27, was 74. The number in the Mr. MARTIN SCALE, solicitor, of Neath, died on the 23rd ult. Mr. Scale corresponding week of last year was 95, shewing a decrease of was the son of Mr. Richard Scale, and was born in 1834. He was admitted 21, being a net increase in 1887, to date, of 41. The number a solicitor in 1861, having served' his articles with Mr. Johns, of Haver- of bills of sale published in England and Wales for the week fordwest. He afterwards became managing clerk to Mr. David Randell, ending August 27, was 252. The number in the corresponding week of of Neath, to whose practice he ultimately succeeded. Mr. Scale was in last year was 244, shewing an increase of 8, being a net increase in partnership with his younger brother, Mr. Gilbert Francis Scale. He was 1887, to date, of 140. The number published in Ireland for the same a perpetual commissioner for Glamorganshire, and he had an extensive week was 9. The number in the corresponding week of last year was practice, being solicitor for many of the leading families in the county. 17, shewing a decrease of 8, being a net decrease in 1887, to date, of He was clerk to the Neath and Kenfig Local Boards, and registrar of

162.- From Kemp's Mercantile Gazette. births and deaths for the Neath District. He had also been eight times appointed under-sheriff for Glamorganshire. Mr. Scale was unmarried. He was buried at Llantwrt Cemetery on the 26th ult.

Mr. CHARLES ROMILLY, late Clerk of the Crown in Chancery, died at his residence, 29, Wilton-crescent, on the 26th ult., in his eightieth year.

WINDING UP NOTICES. Mr. Romilly' was the fifth son of Sir Samuel Romilly, Q.C., M.P.,

London Gazette.-FRIDAY, August 26. and brother of the first Lord Romilly. He was born in 1808. He was

JOINT STOCK COMPANIES. called to the bar at the Inner Temple in Hilary Term, 1836. He was

LIMITED IN CHANCERY. principal secretary to Lord Cottenham when Lord Chancellor, and he LEIPSIC HALLE AND DISTRICT ICE CO, LIMITED.-North, J., has, by an order was Clerk of the Crown in Chancery from 1850 till 1880. Mr. Romilly dated Aug 3, appointed Baker Philip Daniels, 57, Moorgate st, to be official was married in 1842 to Lady Georgiana Russell, eldest daughter of the sixth Duke of Bedford, but he had been a widower since 1867. He leaves five NIEMAN CORNISH & Co, LIMITED-By an order made by Kekewich, J., dated Aug sons. His eldest son, Mr. John Romilly, was called to the bar at Gray's-inn

17, it was ordered that the company be wound up. Wolferstan & Avery, Ironin Michaelmas Term, 1865, and is now secretary to the Historical Manu

monger lane, Cheapside, solors for petnr scripts Commission. His fifth son, Mr. Alfred Romilly, was ealled to the

COUNTY PALATINE OF LANCASTER. bar at Lincoln's-inn in January, 1879.

LIMITED IN CHANCERY Mr. Cayley SHADWELL, barrister, died at his residence, 25, Abercorn. ALEXANDRA HOTEL, LIVERPOOL, HOTEL CO, LIMITED-Petition for winding up, place, St. John's Wood, on the 26th ult., in his ninetieth year. Mr. presented Aug 19, directed to be heard at the Chancery Office, Winckley st, Shadwell, who was almost the oldest surviving member of the bar, was the

Preston, on Tuesday, Sept 6. Harris, Liverpool, solor for petnr fourth son of Mr. Lancelot Shadwell, barrister, and brother of the late

FRIENDLY SOCIETIES DISSOLVED. Vice-Chancellor Sir Lancelot Shadwell. He was born in 1798, and he was BRITANNIA FEMALE AMICABLE FRIENDLY SOCIETY, Wesleyan Schoolroom, Izsley educated at Trinity College, Cambridge. He was called to the bar at Lin.

st, Redditch, Worcester. Aug 24 coln’s-inn in Michaelmas Term, 1825, and he formerly practised in the

Court of Chancery. Mr. Shadwell was secretary to his brother while Vice-

London Gazette.-TUESDAY, August 30.


BRITISH, COLONIAL, AND GENERAL INVESTMENT TRUST, LIMITED-Pet for Mr. JAMES HENRY Pawson, solicitor, of Doncaster, Rotherham, and

winding, up, presented Aug 29, directed to be heard before Chitty, J., on Sept

14. Whitfield, Finsbury pavement, solor for petner Thorne, has been appointed Clerk to the Don Drainage Commissioners. COLCHESTER TRAMWAYS Co, LIMITED-Pet for winding up, presented Aug Mr. Pawson was admitted a solicitor in 1881.

24, directed to be heard before Kekewich, J., on Sept 7. Atkinson & Dresser, borough, has been appointed Clerk to the Knaresborough Improvement OMOL. ARTHUR WILLIAM GILling, solicitor, of Harrogate and Knares- CONDENSE, WORT" AND BREWING COMPANEO, LIMITED -Pet for winding up,

presented Aug 27, directed to be heard before the Vacation Judge on WedCommissioners. Mr. Gilling was admitted a solicitor in 1881.

nesday, Sept 7. Philbrick & Free, New Bond st, solors for petners

CUNARD CYCLE CO, LIMITED-Pet for winding up, presented Aug 23, Mr. BENJAMIN FRANCIS Conn COSTELLOE, barrister, has been appointed

directed to be heard before Kekewich, J, on Wednesday, Sept 7. Smith & Co,

Bread st, Cheapside, for Stirk & Brewer, Wolverhampton, solors for petner an Assistant Commissioner on the Markets and Tolls 'Rights Commission. HOME AND FOREIGN MINES TRUST, LIMITED-Pet for winding up, pre


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