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with his opponent in an action would be guilty of contempt of court. In Jonas v. Long, however, the respondent did not appear, and there appears to have been no dispute as to the place where

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The Solicitors’ Journal and Reporter. LONDON, SEPTEMBER 3, I887.


Mn. CAYLEY Sns.uwi:Lr. whose death we ann ' must have been almost the oldest surviving m(:i1ii1li§rb]i“l;hhvlfa1i-, having been born in 179s, and called in 1825, during as ciisiil cellorship of Lord Emorr. He constituted an additional link with an older professional generation, through having been secretary to his elder brother, Sir _Laivcai.o-r SHADWI-ILL, when Vice%l718DO8llOl'. By a curious coincidence_Mr. Lon-Us Ton-“HAM WIGRAM, QC., a younger brother of Vice-Chancellor Sir JAMES

IGBAM, who was for many years a colleague of Sir Limcnroy SHADWELL, is still alive. He is in his eighty-fourth year, was gelled to the bar in 1828, and is the oldest Queen's Counsel. Mr.

HARLE8 ROMILLY, whose death we also record, was the bi-other of another well known equity Judge of a somewhat later date.

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Gsnrim METROPOLITAN RATFIAYERS, who entertain objections to expenditure out of the poor-rates in connection with the recent Jubilee celebrations, have endeavoured to avoid payment of their rates when summoned before a magistrate to show cause why payment of such rates should not be enforced, by impngning the yalidity of the rates on the ground of the illegal expenditure of the unds so raised, and have sought to summon and examine the rate cgllectors and other parochial oificials. These champions of paroE: gal economy have,_however, found_ themselves to be too late in d" {"8 their objections to the_validity of the rate, for it was Eeogled in Roy. v. Jusltceaof Kingston-upon-Thames (6 W. R. 551, if . & E. 256), that Justices of the peace, when called upon to ‘ch 0rce_a' poor-rate by dis_tress,_cannot consider any objections to e validity of the rate which might have been raised in the ordi}“Y Way on an appeal. It was also held in Reg. v. Justices if f*"i (15 L. T. N.S. 672) that an order for a distress warrant or non-payment of a poor-rate cannot be appealed against on Emunds which would have been open to the appellant on the appeal °8a1l1st the rate itself.


ANOTHER CASE of contempt of court, consistingof alleged threatening gestures and abusive language used by one solicitor to another on beqving the room of one of the judges of the High Court, came Ci ore Mr. J usti_ce Ki;_iii~:_wiciI in the case of Jonas v. long at the b ancery Vacation Sittings on Wednesday. It may be remem

fired that the some question came before Mr. Justice CBIITY about E1; dweFl" 5111 Kirby v. Webb, where it was alleged in the *1 ]_ l}V1t that the_ defendant’s solicitor had struck the plnintifi’s i°d‘°‘t°1' _ on leaving the taxing master’s room ; ” but the learned 13189 fidjourned the motion for committal on the ground that the 3 dflvlt was too vague, and that the exact place where the assault Eras committed ought to have been described. The case was, °W°"°T» afterwards settled by an apology and the payment of mats bl’ the defendant’s solicitor. The question of contempt of °°‘“'l5» 80 far as _regards interference with a solicitor in an action, E35 fully considered in Republic of Costa Rica v. Erlanger (36 signfN' 3- 332), where the Court of Appeal (reversing the decib ° MATIFS1 V-C-) held that the defendants’ solicitor had not “fin 81111?-y of contempt of court in causing the plaintiffs’ solicitor, 1 0 had called for a draft bond which he had left for approval as a le§u"tY for costs, to be turned out of his oflice, after refusing to W Ye when requested to do so. J ESSEL, M.R., observed that there tux‘, 11° aliifmpt either to terrorise or to interfere with the adminisme£°1\ Of jpstrce; and he added that the jurisdiction to commit in bemoflzses being practically arbitrary and unlimited," ought to eve 5 °*}Y?fi111ywatchsd;w1ii1eMsiiisii,L.J., ridiculedtheideathat 1'Y!°ll01t0I' who might lose his temper while in conversation


the assault was_committed, and Mr. Justice KEKE\\'ICH accordingly ordered a commitment, but directed that the facts which constituted the alleged contempt should be set forth in the order.

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A CORRESPONDENT of a daily newspaper professes to be greatly perplexed by the mystic words, “without prejudice,” which have recently come imder his notice in a solicitor’s letter. He wants to know what is the precise value and elficacy of this expression, and why, if it has any eflicacy, its use should be confined to lawyers’ letters? There is no reason why lawyers should have a monopoly of the phrase, except that they know its value and laymen do not, and that the occasions for its use occur more frequently in lawyers’ letters_than in 1aymen’s letters. The expression, as we understand it, is merely a convenient substitute for a long formula. Instead of writing, “ The proposal I am about to make is not to be taken or used in any way as implying any admission of your c1ient’s claim, or any waiver or abandonment of my client’s rights or contention, and, if rejected, is to be considered as never having been made," the lawyer simply writes “without prejudice.” He knows that the meaning of the expression in this respect is so well understood, so perfectly established by professional usage, as to render a proposal introduced by these two words harmless to his client in case of subsequent legal proceedings. Nothing has probably been so efiicacious in preventing or settling litigation as the opportunity for compromise afforded by the general adoption by lawyers of this phrase. We are bound to admit, however, that in two respects the effect of the expression is not so well understood, even by lawyers, as it ought to be. It is perfectly clear that an offer introduced by the words “ without prejudice” cannot be used in the course of subsequent litigation by the person to whom it was made ; but is the person who made it at liberty to use the fact of the offer having been madeand rejected, supposing the rejection of the offer is not expressly “ without prejudice ? ” We should think he is not; but we do not know that there is any general understanding in the profession to this effect. The other point relates to a very prevalent delusion as to the eflicacy of the phrase. It is ineffectual to prevent tho consequences which the law attaches to acts. If, for instance (to take the commonest example), a landlord, in accepting rent due after he has become aware of a forfeiture, writes that he does so “ without prejudice,” this will not prevent the forfeiture from being waived (see Urqft v. Lumley, 5 E. & B. 648, 6 H. L. Gas. 672).

THE NEWLY .u-romriin ETIPENDIARY MAGISTRATE at West Ham has been called upon to decide a somewhat intricate question in connection with the unsavoury subject of knackers’ and horse slaughterers’ licences. The defendant was proved to have used his premises for the purpose of slaughtering horses, whose corpses were devoted, in some instances, to the sustenance of cats and dogs, but, in the majority of cases, were proved to have been sold to butchers and sausage makers in various parts of London, and he was summoned by the Corporation of West Ham, as the urban sanitary authority, for using and occupying his premises as a slaughterhouse without a l.ICEl10Q_,, The Pu_bl.ic Health Act, _1_875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 55), incorporates, by section, 169 the provisions of the Towns Improvement Clauses Act, 184? (10 & 11 Vict. c. 34), with respect to slaughterhouses, and section 126 of the lastnamed Act provides that no place shall be used or occupied “ as a slaughterhouse or knackcr’s yard ” within a town or district s_ubject to the Act which was not in such use or occupation at the time of the passing of the special Act adopting the provisions of the general Act, and has so continued ever since, without a licence for that purpose from the local authority ;' and that any person usmg as a slaughterhouse or knackcr’s yard without such licence any place within those limits not used as such at the passing of the special Act, and so continued to be used ever since, shal1_be liable to _a penalty of £5; and the following sections contain other pro_visions, including a power of making bye-laws for the regulation of slaughterhouses and linackers' yards: It V_VBB fldlllltlied thlt the defendant was duly licensed to use his premises as a_knacker’ s yard, and the main question was whether such a licence ex.


tended to a place where horses were slaughtered for the purpose of human food. It did not appear that the defendant's present business had been carried on at the same place before the date of the passing of the Public Health Act, 1875, or continuously since that time; and the magistrate held that, since the sections of the Towns Improvement Clauses Act, 1874, which had been incorporated into the Public Health Act, 1875, drew a clear distinction between a knacker’s yard and a slaughterhouse, a licence carry on a knacker's yard did not include a licence to kill horses for human food, and he accordingly imposed a fine. It is certainly desirable, as a matter of public policy, that the preparation and sale of horseflesh for human food should be conducted with as much publicity as possible; but notice of appeal has been given, and the case will no doubt find its way to the Queen’s Bench Division.

Tim QUESTION whether the half-pay or full-pay of oflicers in the army and navy is liable to execution or attachment has been raised on two occasions during the past legal year. The Army Act, 1881 (44 & 45 Vict. c. 58), provides by section 141 that “ every assignment of, and every charge on, and every agreement to assign or charge. any deferred pay or military reward payable to any oflicer or soldier of any of her Majesty’s forces, or any pension, allowance, or relief payable to any such oflicer or soldier, . . . or to any person in respect of any military service, shall, except as far as the same is made in pursuance of a Royal warrant for the benefit of the family entitled thereto, or as may be authorised by any Act for the time being in force, be void.” This section was discussed in Birch v. Birch (32 W. R. 96, 8 C. P. D. 163), which was a divorce suit in which the respondent had failed to comply with an order for the payment of costs and maintenance. The respondent was a retired ofllcer of the Indian Army, and was in receipt of a pension for past services. A writ of sequestration was issued against his pension, but Sir J.iunsHaNnn1v refused to restrain the respondent and his agents from receiving the pension, and to direct payment thereof to the sequestrators. He referred to the above-quoted section of the Army Act, 1881, and to a corresponding provision in an Indian Act (23 of 1871, s. 12), as indicating the intention of the Legislature that such a pension should be placed on the same footing as half-pay or an allowance for maintenance to a public civil officer. Lucas v. Harris (35 W. R. 112, 18 Q. B. D. 129) was a similar case, since the two defendants were also pensioned officers of the Indian Army, their pensions being expressly protected from assignment arid execution by the Indian enactment to which we have already referred. The plaintiff having recovered judgment,_an order had been made in chambers for the appointment of a_receiver of the defendants’ pensions, which order was upheld by a divisional court, but was reversed by the Court of Appeal. Lord Esiiizuexpressed his concurrence with the decision in Birch v. Birch, and laid down that the pensions could not be the subject of an

order for a receiver, although he declined to ex ress a ' '

p n opinion as to I what_ would he the efieet upon the pensioner of an ad udi t '

j_ ca ion of banlrruptcy against the defendants. Lord Justice LINDLEY said that, although section 141 of the Army Act, l881_, did not expressly forbid an execution or an_ attachment, its intention would be defeated by the ap

pointment of a receiver. In Dent v. Dent (l P. & D. 366

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p y an o cer in the Indian Navy for past services; but in that case there was no_ statutory prohibition of assignment or attachment, and the Indian Navy had ceased to exist, so that the respondent could not possibly be called on to serve again. Lord Justice LOPES also pointed out that the words "charge on” appeared sufllcient to extend to the consequences of a ' d t. L

_ _ ]ll gmen ucas v. .HlZT7‘l8 thus seems to establish that allowances in consideration of future services c t b

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on the assignment of a naval 0flicer’s full-pay, it was as much protected as half-pay, since it was given in order to enable him to discharge his present duties, and that a fund which was not assignable could not be attached. Lord Justice Bowen laid down that either an assignment or an attachment of such full-pay would be equally opposed to public policy.

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Tar: recent case of Oambefbrt v. C/iapmnn (35 W. R. 838, 19 Q. B. D. 229) raised a question which has on several occasions given rise to controversy--namely, the elfect of a judgment against one of two joint contractors in a subsequent action against the other. In King v. Hours (I3 M. & W. 494) the Court of Exchequer held that the subsisting judgment was a bar to the second action, Parke, B., observing that “ the judgment of a court of record changes the nature of that cause of action, and prevents its being the subject of another suit; and the cause of action, being single, cannot afterwards be divided into two." He also pointed out that it was the same cause of action, whether against one person or two. This decision was acted upon almost without question for about thirty-five years, notwithstanding a doubt expressed by Knight Bruce, V.C., in Exports lvdtfilflll (4 De G. & S. 199); but in Kendall v. Hamilton (28 W. R. 97, 4 App._Cas. 500) an attempt was made to get it overruled by a decision of the House of Lords. The case was twice argued, and all the authorities were fully discussed; and it was urged that the technical grounds upon which the judge in King v. .Hoa_re had proceeded could not be now acted upon, in view of the provision in section 25, sub-section ll, of the Judicature Act, 1873, that the rules of equity should always prevail when in conflict with the rules of the common law. This view was accepted by Lord Penzance, who also observed that K ing v. Hoare had never received the sanction of a court of appeal, and that the Judicature Acts h_ad removed the right of a joint contractor, when sued upon a joint contract, to have his co-contractor joined as a defendant. Six other law lords were, however, of a different opinion. Lord Cairns expressed himself as satisfied with the grounds upon which King v. Hours had been decided, and did not think that the Judicature Acts, _by abolishing pleas in abatement, had changed a joint right of action into a right to bring several separate actions. Lord Hathcrley thought that it would be diflicult, after so many years had elapsed, to shake the authority of K ing v. Hoare, and that the rule adopted in that case was not a mere rule of procedure. Lord S_elb0l11B remarked that the principle that an action cannot be maintained i°Y a cause which has passed in remjudicatam could not b_e affected by_ any of the changes of procedure introduced by the Judicature Acts ' and Lord Blackburn, though admitting that the defence was not “ a meritorious one," held that King v. Hours was rightly decided» and that its authority was not affected by subsequent legislation, In Cambefort v. Chapman, the question arose in connection with certain bills of exchange which had been accepted by B P3-‘met after the dissolution of the firm of which he had been a memberThe plaintiffs sold goods to a firm which consisted of W. and W9 defendant. After the dissolution of the partnership, of whwll {Wt the plaintiffs were not aware, W. accepted in the name of the firm the bills which had been drawn by the plaintiffs for the pl'l09_ °f the goods. The plaintiffs, having recovered judgment on the bill! in default of appearance, but having been unable to obtam Him!‘ faction of the judgment, sued the defendant for the price of the goods. The judgment against the firm on the bills havinB been pleaded in bar, Mr. Justice Mathew entered judgment for the defendant, on the authority of King v. Hoare and Kendall v~ Hamilton. On an application to a divisional court to enter judgment for the plaintiff or for a new trial, reliance WM Placed by the plaintiffs’ counsel 011 um/he v. Zllitcliell (2 East 251)» where it was held that an unsatisfied judgment on a bill of exchangeé given for a debt secured by the joint covenant of the defendants-11 two other persons, was no bar to an action against all the three covenantors on their joint covenant. It was also contended that the judgment against _the firm, being unsatisfied, could 110'? be pleaded in bar in an action against a partner, andml; ms goods sold and the bills of exchange had given rise to separate all


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distinct causes of action. Mr. Justice Field ex r ' '
at being compelled to decide in favour of the dgfeiidiilthlvivhbeirdd
had the benefit of the contract between the plaintiffs and the firm
but he could not escape from the authority of Kendall v, Hamill”,
where King v. Hoare met with the approval of the majority of
the law lords. The contract in the present case was one joint
contract, and not a joint and several contract ; and the maxim
Nemo debet bis oezmri pro (idem cauezi, applied as much to action;
upon the same contract as to the case of a person sued twice for
the same cause of action. He distinguished Drake v. Mitchell as
bemg 8 miss _where the_giving ofa bill of exchange could not sus-
pend an existing remedy in respect of a covenant; and he held that for
the plaintiffs to recover would be “not consistent with our legal
system.” Mr. Justice Manisty observed that in Drake v. Mitchell the
bill of exchange was a collateral security, and that the same defences
were open in an action on the bills as in an action for goods sold
and delivered. He _quoteda passage from “Byles on Bills” (14th
ed., p. 313), where it was laid down that judgment on a bill of
exchange is an extinguishment of the original debt ; and he
added, with reference to Bing v. Hoare, that he was “not at all
sure that that rule of law is not in all respects equitable and

Having regard to the authority of Kendall v. Hamilton, it “pas hardly to be expected that an attempt to set aside the authority o_ King v. Hoare would now have much chance of success. The circumstance that one of the actions was brought upon bills of fachange was the only distinguishing feature in Uambafort v. 1 flpman; but to have held that there were two separate causes of fiction would have beeii_ to determine the case upon a ground as

technical as those which have subjected the decision in King v. Hoare to so much hostile criticism.

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Gifts of cl|a_ttel.s._—-There are two principal sources whence our unwritten law is derived—viz., Roman law, and customs prevalent “.11er E118!"-lid, Which, being common to all places, have given riieto what is called common law. The civil, or Roman, law is founded on prmciples many of which are not recognized by the °Pmm°n 13"’. and Very great confusion has arisen from treating decisions on those branches of English law which are founded on the civil law as applicable to cases which depend on the common law.

_An example of the distinction between Roman and common law will be_found 1n_ Blackbum on Sales, chap. 3, where the learned z§th°f'i 1_|1 discussing the doctrine of bargain and sale, points out t at it is a principle of Roman law “that property cannot be dmf°"9d by any agreement unless there be an overt act of

elivery_of possession,” and that “ this principle is not recognized by English 1aw.” d_This_ distinction must be carefully remembered in our present iscussion; cases have often arisen where, even in judicial decisions, gifts inter vwos and donations mortis caussi have been confounded ; {uld Yet the validity of gifts inter oivos depends upon the common *‘W,_that of donations mortis causal on the Roman law. b Gifts of both classes have this in common—(1) that they must up rgade voluntarily by the donor; (2) that they must be accepted by d 9 Q1169; the difference between them consists in this-—viz., that, as pnations mortis causd are governed by Roman law, actual delivery ° hthe chattels to the donee is essential to the validity of the gift ; glllei 111 the case of a gift inter oioos, the question whether actual ti “el'.Y_1s essential has been a matter of animated controversy, T l;>11gh_ it now appears to be decided that this is not the case. ere is a further difference, not necessary to be discussed for our Prise“; Purpose, arising from the fact that a donatio mortis oausd 1lm ll! llfllillre conditional, and is not intended to be effectual “"588 _the donor dies of the illness during which it is given. I fl“’“'!l-—The question whether a gift of personal chattels gllfllrss to be perfected by delivery to the donee is one of consider'1. e ‘_hm°111§Y, 8- difficulty that has been increased by confusing a 51% "Ilor vwos with a Jonatio mortis causd. For instance, the tfictum of Lord Loughborough, in Tate v. Hilbert (2 Ves. jun. 120)

3 m°“f}Y uifiylllg ‘I give,’ without an act, does not transfer the

P'°Perty and Miller v. Miller (s P. Wms. ass), which are often



011385 as being authorities as to gifts inter oivos, really relate to donations mortis causd. In Shepherd’s Touchstone p. 227 note it is said: “By the civil law a gift of goods is not good withdut delivery. Yet in our law it is otherwise (per Coke CJ Wwu; '~ OZ’;/1°", 1 Roll Rep. 61)." Mr. Preston citing this caiie She Touch. 227 (note), adds “when there is a deed.” In Ii-one £Semlllaieve (2 B- & Ald-. at 554), Abbott C..T. considered that the dictum of Coke applies to a gift by ,deed he distinguished from a gift by parol. Jenkins Cent. 109, ca. ix. says: “A gift of anything without consideration is good- butiit is revocable before the delivery to the donee of the thing given, Donatio par-ficitur possessions accipientis." The fact of the learned author making the quotation appears to shew that he had the civil law in his mind. The learned editors (Patteson, J. and Williams, J .) of Williams’ Saunders say, in the note (it) to Wilbraham v. Snow (vol. 2, p. 47): “It may still be held that a donee, by a parol gift, acquires such a special property as to be able to maintain an action against a more wrongdoer, though tghe donor_ti}iliaTy assume the thing given.” So that they appear agree wi en ins.

There appears to be a further confusion between a gift of a personal chattel and of a chose inaction. We shall discuss gifts of the latter nature separately confining our remarks at resent to ersonal chattels. P P

Notwithstanding the dicta, “Delivery of possession is the only admissible evidence of the gift of a personal chattel ” (per Plunket, C., Patterson v. Williams, L. & Goo. Ca. Temp. Plunk., at p. 99), and “ a gift at law or in equity supposes some act to pass the property ; in donations inter oivos, if the subject is capable of delivery, delivery " (per Plumer, M.R., Hooper v. Goodwin, 1 Swans., at p. 491), Irons v. Smallpiece (2 B. & Ald. 551) is, we believe, the first case in which it was held that delivery is essential to a parol gift of personal chattels. “ By the law of England, in_0rder to transfer property by gifts, there must be either a deed or instrument of gift, or there must be an actual delivery of the thing to the donee. Here

the gift is merely verbal, and differs from ii donatio mortis causzi

only in this respect—that the latter is subject to a condition that if the donor live the thing shall be restored to him. Now it is a well-established rule at law that a donatio mortis causd does not transfer the property without an actual delivery” ( per Abbott, C.J'., who cites Bimn. v. Jllarlcham (2 Marsh. 532), a case on a ilonatio -mortis causd). In the principal case Holroyd, J ., says: “ In order to change property by a gift of this nature there must be a change of possession."

The correctness of the statement in Irons v. Smallpiecc, that a verbal gift of a chattel is incomplete till delivery, is denied by Parke, B., in Waud v. Auulland (16 M. & VV., at p. 870). See also the opinion of Maule, J. (Lunn v. Thornton, I C. B., atp. 381), which hasl been cited as opposed to the decision of Parke, B., as to delivery. It appears, however, that in the place in question Mauls, J., only differs from Parke, B., on another point not being discussed in this place.

In Shower v. Pile]: (4 Ex. 478) the plaintifi"s testator said to the defendant, who had possession of his plate: “ I will give you all the plate that is mine.” Held, in an action of trover by the executor, that this did not amount to a gift, Alderson, B., saying: “ To pass the property there must be both a gift and a delivery. Here there is hardly a gift, for the words are in the future tense ” ; Rolfe, B., saying, “ There must be a delivery to make the gift valid. Here there is a mere statement that the goods which the defendant has in her possession the owner will give her.” It should be observed that in the opinion of both the barons the words did not amount to an offer; so that their remarks as to delivery were mere obiter dicta (see post, Oliattel not in the possession of the donor).

In Bourne v. Fosbrooke (18 C. B. N. S. 515), although it is stated by Erie, C.J., that it is “ a rule of law that personal chattels cannot pass by parol gift without actual transfer of the possession," this was a mere obiter dictum, as the jury found that the goods had been delivered by the donor to the donee. _ _

In Winter v. Winter (9 W. R. 747) the current of judicial opinion began to tum. There was no evidence of formal delivery of the chattel by the donor to the donee, but there was evidence that the latter had taken possession. Tne court decided that the gift was complete, Crompton, J., saying: “ Actual delivery of a chattel is not necessary in a gift inter vivoe. . . . It is suflicient


to com lete a gift inter oivos that the conduct of the parties should shew that the ownership of the chattel has been changed.”

We now comc to Re Harcourt, Danby v. Tucker (31 W. R. 578), where it was Iaiddown by Pollock, B. (at p. 580), that “The question to be determined is not whether there has been an actual handing over of property manually, but Whether, looking at all the surrounding circumstances of the case, and looking particularly at the nature and character of the chattel which is proposed to be given, there has or has not been a clear intention expressed on the part of the donor to give, and a clear intention on the part of the recipient to receive and act upon such gift. Whenever such a case should arise again I am confident that that would be the basis of the decision of a court of common law; and, of course, the same result would follow in a court of equity.” In this case Mrs. Harcourt was absolutely entitled to pictures and plate. At her death labels in her handwriting were found placed on two of the pictures, to the effect that they belonged to her sister, Mrs. Holwell. There was no evidence as to what were the circumstances under which, or by whom, the labels were affixed. But the court held that what had been done amounted to a gift by Mrs. Harcourt to Mrs. Holwell.

In the same case it was decided that the handing over by the donor to the_donee of one of several articles intended to be comprised in a gift was snflicient delivery of the whole.

_ ln Re Ridgway (15 Q. B. D.) Cave, J., says (at p. 449), after citing Ra Harcourt, “ I am of opinion that it is going too far to say that retention of possession by the donor is conclusive proof that there is_ no immediate present gift; although, undoubtedly, iinless explained, or its effect destroyed by other circumstances, it is strong evidence against the existence of such an intention. The applicants must, however, prove circumstances from which it can fairly be inferred that the donor intended to make an immediate gift, so that the thing given then ceased to be the donor’s, and became the property of the donce." Consider Jones v, Lack (L._R. l Ch. 25), where, notwithstanding actual words of gift and dehvery of a cheque to a baby, it was held that no gift was intended. "

Reference should be made_to I<‘arin_gton v. Parker (L. R. 4 Eq. 116), where ]ewels were assigned to a trustee upon trust for such person as G., a married woman, should appoint in writing, and in default of appointment upon trust for her during her life for her separate use, and to be at her absolute disposal, and her receipt, or that of the person to whom she should direct the jewels to be delivered, _to be a good discharge. G. gave the jewels to V. without any direction in writing. It was held on the construction of the deed that G. had two powers, one to dispose of the jewels in writing, one to dispose of them as she pleased, and that the gift was valid under the second power.

The result of the authorities appears to be that a gift of personal chattels can be made without del_ivery_to the donce or any person on his behalf; but that if no delivery is made a clear intention must

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taking given by him before Chitty, J ., on the 12th of August last. This was a motion for leave to issue a wi-it of attachment against George Sanger for breach of the undertaking, whereby he undertook not to use or lpermit to be used in any entertainment of his the name of Buffalo Bi , so as to be calculated to induce the belief that Buffalo Bill was Col. W. F. Cody, commonly known as Buffalo Bill, nor to use or permit to be used in any entertainment of his the words “ Wild West" in any such manner as to induce the belief that the defendant's representation of the Wild West was the plaintiff's representation. The original programme of the defendant had the words “This great equestrian scene has never been attempted in any other establishment." Those words had been struck out, but, subsequently to the undertaking, Sanger published photographs and programmes of his entertainment at Olympia in London, and in the provinces, and in particular a programme containing the following notices : “ Grand Olympia and Scenes from the Far West," “Royal Olympia Scenes from Buffalo Bill and the Far West." “Part 3.—Scenes from the Wild West—Great trial of skill by the Indians—Great equestrian ;exercises by the female Indians—The mail on its perilous journey through the Wild Wcst—Attacked by Indians -—The arrival of Buffalo Bill and the cowboys—Great encounter-— The Indians driven ofi—Buffalo Bill and the cowboys‘ triumphant escort of the mail. Grand concluding ts.bleau.—The halt of the cowboys in the Far West—A night surprise by the Indians—Buffalo Bill to the rescueTotal defeat of the Indians—Buflalo Bill und his noble steed carried upon a dais by the cowboys.” The plaintiff was informed that the defendant had committed breaches of the undertaking in photographs and programmes. On behalf of the defendant it was contended that the motion was grounded on a letter of the 19th of August, which was vulgar and offensive, but was not written by the defendant. The defendant was entitled to use the words “ Buffalo Bill " and “ Wild West," but not so as to deceive. He had pasted a slip across the programmes, “ No connection with Buffalo Bill at the American Exhibition.”

Ksxiiwicir, J ., said that when the case came on before Chitty, J ., on the 12th of August, the defendant gave an undertaking not to use or permit to be used in any entertainment of his the name of Buffalo Bill so as to be calculated to induce the belief that Buffalo Bill was Colonel W. F. Cody (commonly known as Buffalo Bill), nor to use or permit to be used in any entertainment of his the words “ Wild West " in any such manner as to induce the belief the defendant’s representation of the Wild West was the plaintiffs representation. After that date the defendant issued aprogramme or advertisement, and his lordship understood that it was handed to persons visiting the entertainment. It differed slightly, but not substantially, from the documents used before. The following paragraphs were inserted: —- “ Grand Olympia and Scenes from the For West—Royal Olympia Scenes from Buffalo Bill and the Far West.” It would be a reasonable conclusion for anyone to come to that the plaintiff, Col. \V. F. Cody, was the person going to perform at the defendant's entertainment. But in part 3 of the programme he found “ Scenes from the \Vild West.” Thatalone would not be sufllcient to ground the charge of infringing the undertaking; but on looking at the four items under this head he found item 3, “The Mail on its Perilous Journey through the Wild West—Attacked by Indians—The Arrival of Buffalo Bill and the Cowboys--Great Encounter—The Indians driven olfBufialo Bill and the Cowboys’ Triumphant Escort of the Mail.” Thflfi was a distinct infringement of the defendant's undertaking. His lordship gave the defendant credit for not understanding the view of the court with regard to colourable imitation, and should put down his breach of the undertaking to ignorance ; and if Mr. Marten did not insist upon his strict rights he should make the order accordin to the notice of motion, the defendant to pay the costs. The writ of attachment not to issue for a week, to enable the defendant to purge his contempt.-Cov.\'ssi., Horton, Q.O., and Wood Hill ,- Latham, Q.C., and Bryan Farm-. SOLICITORS: Jonson, Cobb, g Pearson ; Lewis g Lewis.

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In the case of The Forest Iron and Steal Company (Limited) v. The B4"! Dork <mdRailwaylC'o., before Kekewich, J ., on the 31st of August, H question arose as to the right of a railway company to build a bridge overa p1'lVB_m carriage road not in accordance with the provisions of section 49 of the Railway Olauses Consolidation Act, 1845. This was a motion on behalf of the plaintiffs to restrain the railway company from interfering with their tramway by means of the bridge. For the plaintiffs it was contended that the defendants were bound to make the bridge of certain dimensions. They cited Attorney-General v. Mid Kent Railway 6'0. (L. R. 3 Ch. 100). It was argued on behalf of the defendants that section 49 of the Rallwfll’ Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, had no application; the land belonged to the company, and the plaintiffs had only an easement, which was B 51}b' ject of compensation. Section 51 of the Railway Clauses Consolidation Act gave the company power to block up or alter a road.

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motion was for an injunction to restrain the defendant, who kept a restaurant, from causing or continuing the nuisance arising from the nlodxicns and ofiensive odours from the defendant's premises until further o er.

Ksiisivica, J., granted an injunction restraining the defendant, his servants and workmen, from using, or allowing to be used, No. 14, Parkside, or anything therein, so as to allow the escape of noxious vapours to the injury of the plaintiff. The plaintiff must have his costs.—Cou.~issi., Ogle; Inypen. Somciroas, F. H. Foster Q 6'0.

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In the case of Jonas v. Long, before Kekewich, J., on the 31st of August, a question arose as to an assault committed within the precincts of the court. It was a motion to commit George Johnson, of 16, Union-court, Old Broad-street, a solicitor, for assaulting a solicitor within the precincts of the court. The motion stood over from Wednesday, August 24—-(see S_oi.ici1-one’ Joiiimnn, Saturday, August 27, 18Si)—to enable the applicant to post two registered letters to the respondent, addressed to his private and business address respectively, and containing the notice of motion and affidavits. Mr. Charles Robinson, solicitor, said that after a summons had been heard by the judge, the respondent, George Johnson, used abusive language to him in the passages of the Royal Courts, and put himself in a threatening attitude, and he had to call the police to his protection. It was contended that there were two kinds of contempt—first, assault or improper conduct in the presence of the __]ndg_e;_secondly, conduct to intimidate and obstruct the course of Justice within the precincts of the court. Reference was made to Kirby v. Webb (the Times, July 14, 1887); Republic nf Costa Rica v. Erlanger (38 L. T. N. S. 333, 46 L. J. Ch. 375), Er parts Willon (l Dowl. N. S. @001 Mr. Johnson did not appear.

Kiixiiwicii, J ., said that the applicant was entitled to the order in the absence of the respondent. The respondent, if he had got anythingto Bay, could move to discharge the order. The contempt should appear on the order. The order would recite the particular facts contained in Mr. Robmson’s aflidavit, and then it would go, the court being of opinion that that conduct was contempt of court.—Covusni., Johnston Watson. Souciroiis, Robinson Q Dm.

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Mr. MARTIN Soars, solicitor, of Neath, died on the 23rd ult. Mr. Scale was the son of Mr. Richard Scale, and was born in 1834. He was admitted a solicitorin 1861, having served his articles with ltlr. Johns, of Haverfordwest. He afterwards became managing clerk to Mr. David Randell, Of Neath, to whose practice he ultimately succeeded. Mr. Scale was in partnership with his younger brother, Mr. Gilbert Francis Scale. He was aperpetual commissioner for Glamorganshire, and he had an extensive practice, being solicitor for many of the leading families in the county. H9 was clerk to the Neath and Kenfig Local Boards, and registrar of births and deaths for the Neath District. He had also been eight times appointed under-sheriff for Glamorganshire. Mr. Scale was unmarried. He was buried at Llantwrt Cemetery on the 26th ult.

lift OHABLES Roiiii.i.r, late Clerk of the Crown in Chancery, died at his residence, 29, Wilton-crescent, on the 26th ult., in his eightieth year. Mr. Romilly was the fifth son of Sir Samuel Romilly, Q.O., M.P., and brother of the first Lord Romilly. He was born in 1808. He was to the bar at the Inner Temple in Hilary Term, 1836. He was Pflllfllpfll secretary to Lord Cottenham when Lord Chancellor, and he was Clerk of the Crown in Chanoeryfrom 1850 till 1880. Mr. Romilly was married in';1842 to Lady Georgiana Russell, eldest daughter of the sixth Duke of Bedlord, but he had been a widower since 1867. He leaves five sons._ His eldest son, Mr. John Romilly, was called to the bar at Gray's-inn In Michaelmas Term, 1865, and is now secretary to the Historical Manu5°"Pt8 Cpmmlssion. His fifth son, Mr. Alfred Romilly, was called to the bar at Lmcoln’s-inn in January, 1879.

Mr. CAYLBY SI-IADWELL, barrister, died at his residence, 25, Abercorn£13“, St. John’s Wood, on the 26th ult., in his ninetieth year. Mr. hadwell, who was almost the oldest surviving member of the bar, was the f0_l1rth son of Mr. Lancelot Shadwell, barrister, and brother of the late Vice-Chancellor Sir Lancelot Shadwell. He was born in 1798, and he was educated st Trinity College, Cambridge. He was called to the bar at Lincoln‘s-inn in Michaelmas Term, 1825, and he formerly practised in the gfigrt o(!lChancery. Mr. Shadwell was secretary to his brother while Vicence or.

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Mr. Costelloe is the only son of Mr. Martin Richard Costelloe, of Glasgow, and was born in 1854. He was educated at the University of Glasgow, and at Balliol College, Oxford, where he graduated first class in classics in 1873. He was called to the bar at Lincoln's-inn in January, 1881, and he is a member of the Northern Circuit.

Mr. J AMBS PATRICK 0’Goaiiau Manon, barrister, who has been elected M. P . for the county of Carlow in the Home Rule interest, is the son of Mr. Patrick Mahon, of Mahonborough, Clare, and was born in 1803. He was educated at Trinity College, Dublin, and he was called to the bar in Ireland in 1803. Ho was M.P. for the county of Clare in 1830 and 1831, for the borough of Ennis from 1847 till 1852, and again for Clare from 1879 till 1885. He is a magistrate and de uty-lieutenant for the county of Clare.

Sir SAIUBL Wanxaa Gairrirns, ‘$1.0. , K.C.M.G., who has been appointed Colonial Treasurer of Queensland, was born in 1845. He was called to the bar in Queensland in 1867, and he became a Queen's Counsel for the colony in 1876. He was Attorney-General of Queensland from 1874 till 1878, and Colonial Secretary from 1883 till 1886.

Mr. Gaoaoa ELLIOTT, barrister, has been appointed Lecturer in Mercantile Law to the Young Men's Christian Association. Mr. Elliott is the eldest son of Mr. George Elliott, and was born in 1861. He was called to the bar at the Inner Temple in January, 1882, and he is a member of the South-Eastern Circuit.


HIRE J ACDB and CHARLES EDWARD Tarpon, solicitors (Jacob & Taylor), Cardiff and Abergavenny. June 24. All debts due to and owing by the said late firm will be received and paid by the said Hier Jacob.

[Gmtle, Aug. 26.]

J oim JAMES DALLAS and Joan TOMLIXSON, solicitors (Dallas & Tomlin

son), 102, Fishergate, Preston. Aug. 27.

Jo HN Kiuonr and Aariwa. Gnarivn.i.n HAN'B0'1'1‘, solicitors (John Knight & 00.), 53, Moorgate-street, London. Aug. 26. All debts owing to or by the said firm will be received and paid by John Knight, who will continue to carry on the business under the style of John Knight & Co.

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The number of failures in England and Wales gazetted during the week ending Saturday, August 27, was 74. The number in the corresponding week of last year was 95, showing a decrease oi‘ 21, being a net increase in 1887, to date, of 41. The number of bills of sale published in England and Wales for_ the week ending August 27, was 252. The number in the corresponding week of last year was 244, shewing an increase of 8, beings net increase in 1887, to date, of 140. The number published in Ireland for the same week was 9. The number in the corresponding week of last year was 17, shewing a decrease of 8, being a net decrease in 1887, to date, of 162.—Fro1n ]i'emp’s Mercantile Gazelle.

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