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exce tion conferred b
It shmlldi Perhaps, be added that in
Gi if disfin iziahed _ ' - ~ betwén a gmgand an _€1;:;r;n$g.t fgbiz;-sh: ahpiapd fd18li1!10i5l0I1 the nature of the transaction depends entirel on tli) ollllelf cilia d°11°1'; and if he has done something which a yea te hlt oh’ he on strict examination, does not amount to gpgiflfi ittyi at iv 181' certain til!‘-ll, fllth°"8l1 he may hvive at one time intehdedst 0 all y gift, the gift is imperfect; he changed his mind - he d'd 0 tna e E his intention into effect. On the other hand where lthdut carry mm is f°" "1119, and for some reason the assignment of thtansfd: perty is imperfect, we have to consider the intentions of two ergons _tl'° P9YB°11 who purports to make and the person who ace: ts the °"l811mP11l3; 8-Pd if, on consideration of all the circumstaiibes it appears that both parties intended that a perfect assi nment sho. ld be made: a court of equity will compel the assi nor tgo do an thy that is necessary to perfect the assignment. d g y mg
_Tbis distinction between a gift and an assignment for value is of Plzlmsry importance. The reader who has thoroughly grasped it will find but little difliculty in understanding the decisions uzzlin th°“8h they flppear to be at first sight. These decisions lead to tbs cardinal rule, that “ an incomplete voluntary gift creates no ri ht that can be enforced.” In other words “No person can be cfm pelled to perfect a gift which in the mode of making he has left imperfect; there is a locus penitentiw so long as it is incomplete” : Antrobua v. Smith (12 Ves. 39); Edwards v. Jones (1 Myl. &. Cr 226- See Lyle v. Peny (Dyer, 49a), where a man bailed to aunt her s. sum of money to the use and behoof of a woman and to deliver it to her on the day of marriage and countermdndedi before the marriage. ,
The real difficulty arises in determining whether that which has been done amounts to a complete transfer of the property and if it d°°s» with what motive was the transfer made? It shduld however, be remarked that where the equitable ownership is completely transferred the donee is in the ordinary position of a ceatui qua trust, and that whether the donor or e. stranger is the legal owner. Where the donor remains the legal owner he can only transfer the eiiuitable ownership by constituting himself a trustee. The question, therefore, that arises in cases of this nature is whether he has done so; and it will be found that where he has ineffectually attempted to transfer his legal ownership and has not expressly constituted himself a trustee the donee takes nothing.
There is a well-known rule of construction that, where an instrument fails to take efiect in the manner intended, it will, if possible, be construed so as to take effect in some other manner which will carry the expressed general intention of the parties into eflect : see this discussed E. N. & C. on Interpretation, p. 40, st seq. The reader who understands the principle above laid down will be prepared to learn that this rule does not apply to an instrument purporting to make a gift; however clearly the intention of the donor to make a gift, whether of the entire or the beneficial interest, may be expressed, still, if he has not transferred thc legal or the equitable ownership, as the case may be, or has not constituted himself a trustee, the gift fails.
The principles that we have stated are laid down very clearly by Turner, L.J, in his judgment in Milroy v. Lord (4 De G. F. & J., at p. 274). He says: “I take the law of this court to be well settled that, in order to render a voluntary settlement valid and effectual, the settlor must have done everything which, according to the nature of the property comprised in the settlement, was necessary to be done in order to transfer the property and render the settlement binding upon him. He may, of course, do this by
actuall transferring the property to the persons for whom he
Y intends to provide, and the provision will then be effectual, and it ' ' th 0 ert to a trustee
will be equally effectual if he transfers e pr p y
for the purposes of the settlement, or declares that he himself holds it in trust for those purposes; and if the property be personal, the trust may, as I apprehend, be declared either in writing or by parol; but, in order to render the settlement binding, one or other of these modes must, as I understand the law of this court, be resorted to, for there is no equity in this court to perfect an
imperfect gift. The cases, I think, go further to this extent, that, if the settlement is intended to be effeituated by one of the modes to which I have referred, the court will not give effect to it by applying another of those modes. If it is intended to take efiect by transfer, the court will not hold the intended transfer to operate as a declaration of trust, for then every imperfect instrument would be made effectual by being converted into a perfect trust."
“The principle is a very simple one. A man may transfer his property, without valuable consideration, in one of two ways: he may either do such acts as amount in law to a conveyance or assignment of the property, and thus completely divest himself of the legal ownership, in which case the person who by those acts acquires the property takes it beneficially or on trust, as the case may be ; or the legal owner of the property may, by one or other of the modes recognized as amounting to a valid declaration of trust, constitute himself a trustee, and, without an actual transfer of the legal title, may so deal with the property as to deprive himself of the beneficial ownership, and declare that he will hold it from that time forward on trust for some other person. It is true that he need not use the words ‘ I declare myself a trustee,’ but he must do something which is equivalent to it, and use expressions which have that meaning; for, however anxious the court may be to carry out a man's intention, it is not at liberty to construe such words otherwise than according to their proper meaning”: per Jessel, M.R., in Richards v. Delbridga (18 Eq., at p. 14).
LEGISLATION OF THE YEAR. . POLICE DISABILITIES REMOVAL.
50 Vicr. sass. 2, c. 9.-An Acr ro Remove rim DISABl'LI’l'IES or THE POLICE T0 Vorn AT PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS.
Peers and women are disqualified from voting at Parliamentary elections by the common law, but not constables. The disqualification of constables is purely statutory, and has not been for a long time in operation. It was first imposed by Sir Robert Peel in 1829, in his well-known Act establishing the Metropolitan Police, which derives from him its two familiar names (10 Geo. 4, c. 44, s. IS), and the example thus set was followed in two later Acts as to counties and boron h police (2 & 3 Vict. c. 93, s. 9, and 19 & 20 Vict. c. 20, s. 9). The preamqule to the present Act recites the inexpediency of such s. disqualification, and the operative part boldly repeals portions of the above-mentioned and other less important enactments (seven in all) having e. similar effect. It is material to bear in mind that only portions of these enactments are repealed, and that certain unrepealed portions, following a common form, prohibit the police from canvassing, and also, except iii_the case of the Metropolitan Police, from voting at municipal elections. A further section provides for the case pf a constable “ who is, or who is likely to be, on the day of any election, sent. or employed in the discharge of his duty so as to prevent him voting at the polling-booth or station at which he would otherwise by law be entitled to vote.” Such a constable may obtain a certificate from the chief constable stating the fact with particulars, and the presiding oificer at any polling station is to allow
im to vote at such station, upon the production of the certificate, which he is forthwith to cancel, and “ deal with in the same manner as the counterfoils of voting - papers are directed by law to be dealt with"—as to which detail rule 29 of schedule II. of the Ballot Act, 1872, should be consulted. This enabling provision might possibly, even in the case of the most lawalllndiiigset of citizens, tempt a man to vote early and vote often, so E e Legislature imposes the penalties of personation (as to which see
orrupt Practices Prevention Act, 1883, s. 6, sub-section 2, by which personation is felony punishable by two years’ imprisonment, with ?:l_‘d labour) upon any constable who should so far forget himself. f is a so provided that temporary absence on duty for not more than our month? shall not cause a break of the continuous “inhabitant gérgupeiicizpyn geqpipfid sip a qualification for the franchise (as to which Ford v.1Z)ame8°(15 6' Beigesppgitgpn of the People Act, 1867, and
CUSTOMS AND INLAND REVENUE AC1‘.
50 & 51 V101". c. 15.—AN Aer ro GRANT CERTAIN Dorms or Cosrons AND INLAND Rnvauon, TO ALTER ornnn Dorms, AND TO AMEND THE Laws RELATING TO INLAND REVENUE.
The present Act, in addition to imposing certain tea, tobacco, and income tax duties, contains one or two provisions of special importance. After two sections reducing to 1d. the duty on sea policies in cases where the premium does not exceed 2s. 6d. and limiting to ten days the period within which a sea policy made out of the United Kingdom may be stamped after execution without penalty, ten sections provide, with considerable elaboration, for the imposition of a new duty on the transfer of the debenture stock or funded debt of any company or corporation, and, what is more important, for the composition of the duty by the bodies concerned, thus allowing any company to place upon its whole body of shareholders the burden of the duty which in strict justice ought to fall upon transferors and transferees. It is understood that these enactments, which like all Inland Revenue Acts came into force on the 5th of July, when the Act received the Royal Assent, have caused considerable excitement and annoyance on the Stock Exchange, and not unnaturally, for section 7, incorporating by reference a portion of the Stamp Act, 1870, raises the duty in the case of debenture stock from 2s. 6d. on the nominal value of the stock transferred to “ the same ad valorem duty " as is charged by that Act “ upon a conveyance or transfer on sale of other property by relation to the amount or value of the consideration for the sale." The schedule of the Act of 1870 tit. “ conveyance” gives a long scale of duties, from which we gather for example that the duty on the transfer on £100 Debenture Stock at par will be raised from 2s. 6d. to 10s. Conveyance on mortgage, however, is excluded from the Act, and couveyanoe otherwise than on sale or mortgage is chargeable with a ten shilling duty only, whatever may be the amount transferred.
The terms of composition are fixed at sixpence for every hundred pounds of the whole " shares, stock, and funded debt " of the oompounding body (sections 7, 8, 9, 10), but composition, it is hardly necessary to state, is not compulsory. It is merely provided (section 9) that “ any company or corporation may agree with the Commissioners of Inland Revenue, 1;/"the commissioners in their dz'screti’on think
iroper, for the delivery of an account of their shares and stock. IUPOII such an account being delivered, the duty becomes chargeable upon the amount appearing from it (section 8), while by section 12 any company or corporation not delivering an account as agreed, or failing to pay the duty “ in conformity with the Act,” isliable to the very heavy penalty of ten pounds per cent. on the amount of duty payable, and a like penalty for every month after the first month during which such neglect shall continue.” By section 15, upon the account being rendered and duty being paid, transfers of any shares or stock included in the account become exempt from duty, but by section 16 the compounding bodies are enabled to recoup themselves for what they have paid by way of composition by levying additional fees “ in addition to any fee exigible upon registration of any transfer ” as to which fees, see sections 15 and 47 of the Companies Clauses Act, 1845, relating to registration of transfers and bonds respectively. and authorizing fees as prescribed in the special Act, or, if no fee be prescribei, then 2s. 6d. for each registration, but it is, perhaps, doubtful whether section 47, which applies to bonds, would, without some connecting link in the special Act, apply also to debenture stock. Section 16 is only an enabling provision, but it may perhaps be assumed that each compounding body will, in justice to its shareholders or constituents, put the section in force.
It only remains to point out that the germ of these stamp-OOIIP pounding enactments is to be found in the Metropolitan Board of Works Loans Act, 1870 (33 dz 34 Vict c. 24), ss. 3 and 4, and in the Inland Revenue Act, 1850 (43 & 44 Vict. c. 20), s. 53, which later enactment applies to municipal loans only under the Local Loans Act, 1875. The provisions of 1880 are, by section 14 of the preiellli Act, to be no longer in force as to stock issued after the 1111891118 °f the Act, and the provisions of 1870 are likewise to cease after the lst of August next, but will still have to be consulted in respect of the very numerous loans contracted before those dates—a highly _incon~ venient arrangement, which it may become next to l.IJ1%0B81l)l8 to carry out by reason of the two sets of loans becoming lended in cases where (see, c._q., section 5 of the Metropolitan Board of Works Act, 1869), the stockholders having no priorities, there has been n0 keepiéig of separate account in respect of successive parcels bill" rowe . _
Another, and the only remaining, important provision of the Act is that contained in the 18th section as to the income tax of 115"’ culturists. This section provides that “ it shall be lawful for B"? person occupying lands for the purposes of husbandry onlyto 819°‘ to be assessed to the duties of income tax chargeable under s011_#d“l° D., and in accordance with the rules of that schedule, in lieu of assessment to the duties under Schedule B.," the election _f0 b° signified by notice to the surveyor of taxes for the district within tW° months after the commencement of the year of assessment. 5° flmt
Loss of property through fraud or mistake occurs so very seldom at present that it might seem superfluous to provide for such cases. Yet insurance forms an important feature in the Bill. It would appear as if it were apprehended that the new system would giye such facilities for forgery and fraud, and that so many mistakes will be made by oflicials, that an indemnity for the sufferers must be provided. _ _
The insurance system is based on the very extraordinary principle that good titles shall be made to pay for bad ones. Sound titles are to be made to idemnify those that prove to be tainted l This, indeed, would be robbing Peter to pay Paul. The insurance scheme is specious. Itis calculated to lead the multitude, who do not take the trouble to think for themselves, to believe that this novel process would practically render every title safe. Titles are now quite sufiiciently safe; but even were additional security to be obtained, and which is doubtful, the fact remains that insurance is intended to cover the risks of a crude and arbitrary system which even the promoters view with undisguised distrust ; and that it is sought to make landowners, whose titles are good, insurers against all sorts of fraud, forgery, and blundering; andthis without the slightest resulting benefit to themselves.
If you will permit me, I may in a future letter comment on the amendments of the law of real property proposed by the Bill.
August l9. J. B.
P.S.-—I am reluctant to trespass further on your space, but I desire to call attention to the following statement in the memorandum which recedes the Bill :—
“ When ahranch office for local registration has been organised in
a district, the Act will be applied by Order in Council, and after an appointed day every purchase of legal interests in land in that district will be made by means of the register." _ It is important to know the meaning of this vague statement. Is it that it is intended that all conveyancing relating to urchases shall be done by the officials of the Land Transfer Board? Such would appear to_be the most obvious construction. If it be the correct one, then, indeed, a scheme of insurance against errors is of vital importance.
PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION DUTY ON ESTATES UNDER £300.
[To the Editor of the Solicitors’ Journal.]
S_1r_,—I.easeh_olds form part of the assets of a small estate, and, in arriving at their value, a mortgage debt is deducted. This brings the value of _ the estate below £300, and administration is sought under the provisions of section 38 of the 4-1 Vict c. 12. The department holds that the deduction of a mortgage debt is not permissible in connection with a grant under that section. It is submitted, however,_that section 7 of 31 & 32 Vict. c. l2~l lays down clearly the principle on which the value of leaseholds has to be ascertained for purposes of administration duty—i.e., “ that the mortgage debt on such leasehold may be deducted from the value of such leasehold, and the stamp duly shall be chargedble on the value . . . after deduction therefrom the 'imo_1ml of such mortgage debt.
Sub-section l of section 33 of 44 Vict. c. l2 provides that the pitatehm order to obtain the benefit of_that section, must be under
e v us of £300 without any deduction for debts or funeral expenses. The class of debt is governed by section 28, which gives the powerfo deduct debts and funeral expenses from the value of the estate. Deli: in this latter section could not mean mortgage debts, because govgage debts had already been provided for by section 7 of 31 &
ict. c. 124.
It_ is obvious that this ‘question is not likely to be contested by P511399 applymg for administration, because it affects only estates Wlppli are too poor to defend any proceedings by the department. esmtels V€]%1!:yhl18.l‘d to have to_pay duty on gross value of leasehold b s w ic maybe of consi erable worth, but subject to incum
ranccs of almost equal amount,
I shall be glad to obtain the views of your readers upon theJpoint.
in his lifetime, or his executors or administrators within five years after his death, would pay £l0,000 to the trustees, to be held by them on the trusts of the settlement. The defendant Budgett was one of the trustees, the other trustees were two of the testator's sons, who afterwards became two of his executors. The £10,000 was not paid by the testator, or by his executors within five years after his death, but was retained by them in a business which they had carried on in partnership with the testator, and was ultimately lost. It was admitted at the trial of the action that the two trustees, who were also executors, were liable to the plaintiffs, and the main question was whether the defendant Budgett, who was the only independent trustee, was liable for not having taken more active steps to compel payment of the trust money out of the testator's estate when it became due. He was brother-in-law to the other two trustees, and for this reason apparently was unwilling to proceed against them, but no dishonesty was imputed to him. The details of the case were extremely complicated, and it would be impossible to state them within any reasonable length.
North, J., said that it had been contended that Speight v. Gaunt had established this proposition, that a trustee was justified in dealing with a trust estate in the manner in which an ordinary prudent man of business would deal witli his own estate. This was too brosda statement. In Spaight v. Gaunt a trustee had, for the purpose of making a proper investment, placed trust funds in the hands of e broker. who app ied them to his own use. Two points were considered there—(l) was the trustee warranted in employing an agent, instead of carrying out the transaction himself F (2) Was he justified in handing the cash to his agent, instead of paying it himself to the persons giving the security. Each question was answered affirmatively, upon the ground that a prudent man of business advancing his own money upon such a security would, in the ordinary and regular course of business, have employed a broker and trusted him with the money. Jessel, M.R., said (22 Oh. D. 739): “ It seems to me that on general principles a trustee ought to conduct the business of the trust in the same manner that an ordinary prudent man of business would conduct his own, and that beyond that there is no liability or obligation on the trustee. Iii other words, a trustee is not bound because he is a trustee to conduct business in other than the ordinary and usual way in which similar business is couducted by mankind in transactions of their own. It never could be reasonable to make a trustee adopt further and better precautions than an ordinary prudent man of business would adopt, or to couduct the business in any other way. If it were otherwise, no one would be atrustee at all. He is not paid for it." And Lord Blackburn said (9 App. Gas. 19) : “The authorities cited by the late Master of the Rolls, I think, shew that, as a general rule, a trustee sulficiently discharges his duty if he takes, in mans ging trust affairs, all those precautions which an ordinary prudent man of business would take in managing similar affairs of his own. There is one exception to this: a trustee must not choose investments other than those which the terms of his trust permit, though they may be such as an ordinary prudent man of business would select for his own money; and it may be that, however usual it may be for I1 person who wishes to invest his own money, and instructs an agent, such as an attorney or a stockbroker, to seek an investment, to deposit the money at interest with the agent till the investment is found, that is in effect lending it on the agent's own personal security, and is I1 breach of trust." But it was quite clear that, when those learned ]l1dB55 spoke, as other judges had spoken, of conducting the business of the trust, or managing trust afiairs, as a prudent man would manage his own concerns, they were referring to cases in which the trust business was being done in accordance with the limitations of the trust. No one would contend that a trustee might safely ignore the terms of the instrument creating the trust, so long as his disposition of the trust property was B1105 as would have been a prudent disposition of his own. When thus understood, the duty of a trustee not to select investments outside the securlllefl authorised by the trust was in conformity with, and was not an exoeP' tion to, the general rule. A trustee who invested trust funds in B11 unauthorised manner would be liable for any loss arising) tl1@1'@l1'°mv however wise and safe such an investment of his own funds y B Pmllenl man would have been considered ; and a trustee who neglected to call in B sum of money, which ought to be culled in at once under the torm!_0l U15 trust, would be liable for any loss which might arise from his omitting m do so, however safe and prudent it might have been to leave the moneY outstanding if it had been his own. The defendant Budgett'8 wflducl must, therefore, be tested, not by what a prudent man would have done as to his own moneys, with which he could deal as he liked, but by wl1BH1° would have done with respect to moneys which it was his duty to }§1'°°¢°d to call in at the end of five years from the testator‘s death. In <>0I1Bld°1'lnK this question his lordship adopted the very important observations of J em], M.R., in Speighi v. Gaunt (31\V. 12.404, 22 Ch. D. 746): “ My view hasalvlyl been this, that where you have an honest trustee fairly anxious to P"f°'l” his duty and to do as he thinks best for the estate. you are not to straw the law against him to make him liable for doing that which he has 110118. and which he believes is right in the execution of his duty, without 1°“ have a plain case made against him. In other words, you are Dot 9° exercise your ingenuity, which, it appears to me, the Vice-Chancellor his done, for the purpose of finding reasons for fixing a trusts? Wm‘ liability; but you are rather to avoid all such hyper-criticism °l documents and acts, and to give the trustee the benefit of any d°_“bl °1' 9-mbifllliti which may appear in any document, so as to rellfle him from the liability with which it is sought to fix him." Ill‘ attention to the principles there laid down had in some cases led to tru_stees_receiving less than justice. Adopting these principles M ll" guide, his lordship had reluctantly come to the conclusion that he could not hold the defendant Budgett free from liability, and that he Oflglli W
have taken more active steps, and at an earlier time than he did, to get in
the trust money.
A second and rqually important question remained for consideration
whothe if the defendant Bud ett had used due dili enc
I, g 3 e in attempting to recover the trust funds, any good would have resulted therefrom; for it was clear that the court would not punish a trustee pecuniarily for his breach of trust, except so far as loss had resulted therefrom to the trust estate. In other words, if no loss had been incurred, or the loss had been replaced before action, there was nothing remaining for the trustee to make good, although no doubt the court might think fit to remove him from the trusteeship. In Ilobday v. Pelers (28 Beav. 603) a policy was assigned to trustees.
The nevcr obtained ossession of it or ave notice to the
Y P , g offlce, and the sssignor first mortgaged and afterwards surrendered the policy. The trustees were held not liable, as they had no funds out of which they could have paid the premiums, and, if they had sued the assignor, it would have been useless, as Lord Romilly, M.R., was satisfied upon the evidence that the assignor could not have paid. In Rotclifz v. Winch (17 Beav. 217) the court apparently acted on the same principle. In Uluk v. Holland (19 Beav. 262) the law was stated in terms more favour
able to the defendant Bud ett than in an other case of wh
" ich his lordshiip was aware. Lord Rbmilly, M.R., said (19 Beav. 271): “ When it is the uty of a trustee or executor to obtain payment of a sum of money, the trustee or executor is exonerated and never required to make good the loss if he has done all he can to obtain payment, but his efforts have not proved successful. Nay, more, if he has token no steps at all to obtain payment, but it appears that, if he had done so, they would have been, or there is reasonable ground for believing that they would have been, iuefioctual, then he is exonerated from all liability.” On the evidence his lordship came to the conclusion that loss had resulted from the defendant Budgett's omission to take proceedings to compel payment of the money. The defendant Budgett and the executors must pay the plaintiffs’ costs of the action, but the liability of the executors must be limited by a direction that the costs which they had to pay were not to be increased by reason of the prolongation of the trial beyond the day on which they submitted to
_ In the case of Re Adams, before Kskewich, J ., on the 24th of August, sitting as Vacation Judge, a question arose as to whether property which was the subject of a vesting order was sufiiciently described. It was also asked that the consent of the lords of the manor (the land being copyhold) to the vesting order might be recited in the order. The application was made by the persons beneficially entitled to certain copyhold property devised by the will of Samuel Adams, asking that the property should be Plftlcularly described in an order made under the Trustee Act, 1850, on the _6th of August, 1887, by Kay, J ., vesting the property in the Bllplicants. The registrar, in drawing up the order, proposed that "tho hereditaments to which s former trustee of a testator’s will had been admitted,” should be vested in the applicants. On behalf of the applicants It was submitted that they were entitled to have the parcels set out in the
vesting order or in schedules to it.
Ksirswicn, J., said that the parcels should be set out, and the consents recited, otherwise the applicants would not get a good title, and he gave
the orders, which he had read, and which he could not go behind. He was not satisfied that the gentleman had the means of paying; it would be not only idle but mischievous to send him to prison. He should make the order, not to issue for a fortnight, the debtor to pay the costs.Oooussn, E. Outler, Q.C., and W'lutewa_I/,' L3/ttolton Olmbb. Souciroas, Basal! Q Boxall ; A. B. Cliubb.
In the case of Re W. F. Low and John Nicholls 4 Co., before Kekewich, J., on the 24th of August, a question arose as to the liability of a solicitor to carry out his undertaking to repay money received by him in the event of the judge ordering a review of the taxation. This was a motion on behalf of W. F. Law, a solicitor of the Supreme Court, asking that Messrs. Nicholls & Co., solicitors, should be ordered to pay forthwith to the agents of W. F. Law the sum of £46 18s. 9d., pursuant to an undertaking dated the 24th day of J une, 1887, and costs. The undertaking was as follows :—
“ 57, Basinghall-street, E.C., “ London, 24th June, I887. “Ra W. F. Law.
“ Received of William F. Law, Esq., by payment of Messrs. Law & Worssam the sum of forty-six pounds eighteen shillings and ninepenco, being the amount certified to be due by the taxing niaster’s certificate in this matter, which we undertake to return to the said Messrs. Law & Worssum within four days after the decision of the judge overruling or varying the taxing master's certificate.
“26.6.87. “JOHN NICHOLLS & Co." By an order made on tho 27th of July, 1887, on the application of W. F. Law, Kay, J., ordered that it be referred back to the taxing master to review his certificate.
Kaxawicn, J., said that he made an exception in this case to the rule that he laid down m doing vacation business, not to deliver formal judgments. The respondent here gave an undertaking to return a sum of money to the solicitors of the applicant within four days after the decision of the judge overruling or varying the tailing master’s certificate. On the 27th of July an order was made sending back the certificate to the taxing master to review. It had been for years the settled practice and rule of the court that where one of the parties desired to appeal on a question of co=ts such as this, the money was paid to the solicitor at once on the personal undertaking of the solicitor to repay the money if the order went against him. The rule rested on the faith that such an undertaking made by an officer of the court would be observed most strictly. Nicholls got the money on the faith of the undertaking, and his lordship would strictly enforce that undertaking. He ordered Nicholls to pay the money within seven days, and pay the c0sts.—Cuuivssi., Goarge Henderson ; Bramwsll Davis. Soiiciroas, Low Q‘ Worssam ; Arnold William: Q Co.
In the case of Jonas v. Long, before Kekewich, J., o_n the 24th inst., a question arose as towhether service of a notice of motion to commit ‘on a solicitor at his private or business address was good. It was a motion to commit George Johnson, a solicitor, for contempt in assaulting a solicitor within the precincts of the court. The applicant was unable to effect personal service, either at the private or_ business address of Johnson. Johnson was not represented by a solicitor, so service could not be effected through his solicitor. Re A Solicitor (l4 Ch. 152) was cited; in that case service of the notice of motion at the residence of the party was held suflicient. _ _ _ Ksnawzoi-r, J ., said that he was unwilling to send a man to prison without another attempt to serve him. The applicant _must send_two registered letters to the two addresses, stating that he did it by the dupetion of the judge. The matter was of some importance, and the motion would stand at the head of the list next Wednesday.—Goui\'saL, Johnston Watson. Soucirous, Robinson 4- Does.
e ewich, J., on the 24th of August, a question arose as to whether an accountant, a stranger, should be appointed oflicial liquidator or a perflfm concerned in the management of the company. Chadwyck Healey’s Wmpany L8-W and Practice was cited on behalf of the accountant ; In re -L’"ldM Australian Ayency Corporation (29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 417) for the
member of the company The chief clerk had appointed an accountant,
but the summons was adjourned into court
LEGAL NEWS. OBITUARY.
Mr. J 01-[N HOLTBY, solicitor, of York and Pocklington, died 011 the 15th inst., at the age of eighty-two. Mr. Holtby was born in 1804. He was admitted a solicitor in 1840, and he had ever since p!‘uCtl8€d.&t York. He was a perpetual commissioner for the North and_ East Ridlngs of Yorkshire and for the City of lork, and _he_liad an important private ractice. He had been for many years clerk of indictments and deputy-clerk gt assize on the North-Eastern Circuit, and he was till recently c erk to the magistrates for the Pocklington Division of the East Riding. Mr. Holtby was a director of the York Gas Light _Co., and he was for fourteen years chairman of the York Board of Guardians. _He was in partnership with Mr. Robert Holtby, who is_ clerk of nrraigns on the I\orth-Eastern Circuit. Mr. Holtby was buried at the lork Cemetery on the 19th inst.
Mr. VVu.i.ian JOHN Coua-ri-for-u, barrister, _has been appointed a Oivil Service Commissioner. Mr. Oourthope is the B136" 9°11 °f -he Rev William Oourthope, and was born in 1841. He was educated at New College, Oxford, where he graduated first class in Classics in 1865. He
obtained the Newdigate prize for English verse in 1864, and the Chancel