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WILLIAMS, WILLIAM GEORGE, Bridge End sq, Haverfordwest, Grocer. Pembroke Dock. Pet Nov 6. Ord Nov_9 WILSON, JOHN, Calverley, Yorks, Physician. Bradford. Pet Nov 9. Ord Nov 9
BRUNNER, LEOPOID, Birmingham, Watchmaker. Birmingham. Pet Nov 12. Ord Nov 12
CRLLRM, PHILIP SISSON, Milton st, Frilling Manufacturer. High Court. Pet Nov 11. Ord Nov ll
Cnicx, CHARLES, and GEORGE THOMAS PAPR. Till grove, Melbourne grove, East Dulwich, Builders. High Court. Pct Nov 12. Ord Nov 12
CLARK, ALFRED, Bishop's Stortford, Hertfordshire, Corn Merchant Hertford. Pet Nov 12. Ord Nov 12
WATSON, Ronsar Dtmaznrr, Rainham, Kent, Farmer. Nov 25 at 11.30. Oil’ Rec,
W1iITE.' IIOMAS, and LUKE WHITE, Rawmarsh, Yorks, Painters. Nov 24 at 12.
Of! Rec. Figtree lane. Sliefiield
\Vestgate st, Ipswich
The following Amended Notice is substituted for that published in tho
London Gazette of Nov 5.
GRAVETT. Esrrrim. Burgess Hill, Sussex, Wine Merchant. Nov 25 at 11. Court
house, Church st, Brighton
The following amended noticeis substituted for that published in the
London Gazette of Nov. 12.
VABNBY, Anrnsn, Ramsgate, Baker. Nov 19 at 11.30. Guildhall, Canterbury
DAvIss, THOMAS EDWARD, Pantycymmer, nr Bridgend, Draper. Cardiff. Pet
EDWAB3; WILLIAM, Kidderminster, Miller. Kidderminster. Pet Nova. Ord
Or Nov 12
Jomzs. (\);Ii.2I.IAaI WALL. Dorrington, Salop, Farmer. Shrewsbury. Pet Nov 6.
KING, EDWARD, Chaxhill, Gloucester, Farmer. Gloucester. Pet Oct 28. Ord
Enston v. The London Joint Stock Mills’ state, In re ............. . . 65
Lssr \\'i-:i:x, in a case before Mr. Justice Nonrn, some lengthy correspondence was put in evidence, and in the copies furnished to the judge two or more letters were given on the same sheet of pflper. The learned judge desired it to be known that it was very inconvenient to have copies of different letters on the same sheet of paper: the better course was to have, in the copies furnished to thcjudge, every letter copied as a separate document. This, we believe, has been the ordinary course, and we may add that it is very desirable that the copies furnished to the judge and counsel should exactly correspond in paging.
Os TUESDAY LAST Lord Justice COTTON stated that in future the costs of an appeal will include the costs of shorthand notes of the Judgment of the court below, without the necessity of any special apphcation for the purpose. If the unsuccessful party on the appeal desired for any reason that these costs should be disallowed, he must apply to the court. The practice hitherto has been for the_ successful party on an appeal to ask for these costs, and, we believe, they have been uniformly allowed, at any rate where the notes have been actually used on the appeal (Coll!/er v. Iaaacs, 30 \\. R. 70, l9 Ch. D. 342). In future the onus will be on the unsuccessful party to shew that they ought to be disallowed; and We presume that one ground which will be open to him will he that a report of the judgment below appeared sometime before the hearing of the appeal, and has been used on the appeal gflseg) Landon and iS'outli- Western Railway Co. v. Gomm, 20 Ch. D.
th'l'irii ocrsrroir has been often asked this week, What can be Le meaning of the announcement, which appeared in Tuesday’s ondlm Gafzette, that “anyone reprinting without due authority matter which has appeared in any Government publication I‘6_11ders himself_ liable to the same penalties as those which he niliht. "Elder like circumstances, have incurred had the copyTL8 t been in private_hands”? Has someone been reprinting a ° ea? 81_1d popular edition of a fascinating Blue-Book? Or has zffllée wicked and unconscicntious person pirated the Anthrax tl; °3°T the gtabies Order _which recently adomed the columns of whi h ‘$3338-U I8 the notice intended _to apply to the Gazeite, men: i blllilg _ Published by authority, " is presumably a “ Governis th pa h cation P The explanation, we have'reason to believe, iimcw ft ere have been some rather glaring instances of late of gm y_o Works published by the Government, but it is not the ntion of the Stationery Ofiice to interfere with the privilege
hitherto allowed to newspapers of publishing matters of pub’liGc interest cxtracted from Parliamentary papers or the official azetle. L
Ir ivii.L HAVE BEEN observed that Mr. A1>Aiis’s cross-examination of Lord COLERIDGI-I was twice interrupted by Mr. Justice DENMAN, and that on the latter occasion the learned judge intimated that the cross-examination amounted to persecution, and that the jury appear to have agreed with him. The power of the judge at u trial to interfere with a cross-examination when improperly conducted is derived from R. S. C., I883, XXXVL, 38, which provides that “the judge may in all cases disallow any questions put in cross-examination of any party or other witness which may appear to him to be vexatious, and not relevant to any matter proper to be inquired into in the cause or matter.” This was a newly-introduced provision amongst the consolidating Rules of 1883, and it gave rise to much controversy upon its first appearing, some going s0 far as to maintain that the Rule Committee of Judges had no power to make it, nor do we know that thc power given to the judge by the rule had been ever exercised bcforc it was put in force in the case of Mr. A1.>A.us. However, this may be, there can be no doubt of the propriety of its exercise by Mr. Justice DESMAX, for a cross-examination more irrelevant than that by Mr. ADAMS has seldom occurred in a court of justice. Nor can we agree with the learned judge that plaintitfs in person are entitled to any greater latitude in cross-examination than plaintiifs represented by counsel.
WE nsronr elsewhere u case of Re Allen, which decides a new point under the Remuneration Order. When may a lessor’s solicitor elect, under clause 6 of the order, that his remuneration shall be “ according to the present system as altered by schedule II. ?" According to the clause, the election must be made “before undertaking any business ”; and it is clear that under these words the election cannot be made after the draft lease has been prepared and submitted. But, supposing the lessor’s solicitor enters into correspondence with the lessee’s solicitorwith reference to matters preliminary to the granting of the lease—for instance, in the case of a renewed lease, as to the lessee’s title to claim renewal—can the lessor’s solicitor be said to have already “ undertaken the business,” so as to be debarred from electing? In the recent case the taxing muster thought that the lcssor’s solicitor was not debarred by the preliminary correspondence from electing. But it is obvious that this official, in deciding thus overlooked the shocking consequences that might follow from adopting this construction. Mr. Justice Ksr did not overlook them. He pointed out that, “ if a solicitor were to be at liberty to carry on any business until he could see whether it was to his benefit to charge according to scale or according to the previously existing system, the client would bs at a disadvantage, as the scale charge would be adopted only in cases wherc it was larger than that under the previously existing system. This result could not have been intmr/ed." And the general rule he laid down was that, “ after a S0ll(1tor had accepted any employment, and had done anything therein for which he could make a charge supposing the scale did not apply, it was too late for him to elect to charge according to the system existing before the General Order came into operation." We do not know enough of the circumstances of the particular case to be able to aflirm that Mr. Justice K.u"s decision was wrong. There is support for his construction of the word “ business ” in the cases of Re Fi'eld(33 W. R. 504, 533, 29 Ch. D. 608) and Re Enwiwmel andSinimonds (34 W. R. 613, .33 Oh. D. 40). But one would suppose that it ought always to be a question of fact in each case whether the solicitor has really undertaken the business, and we emphatically protest against the general rule Mr. Justice Kn’ thought proper to lay down. Let us test the effect of it in practice. The client, to whom notice is to be “communicated” in writing, is, of course, the lessor. Suppose (as constantly occurs) the owner of a. house calls on his solicitor to_ say that he has had a proposal for a lease of the house; h_e is not disposed to accept that proposal, but the result of the interview is the suggestion by the solicitor of certain terms on which the 0WI1@1'15 Willing to grant ulease. Itis, of course, uncertain whether the other side will agree to the terms, or Whether the lessor s 80l1P1t°1' “"111
have anything further to do in the matter, yet, as he_has accepted employment and done work for the lessor “for which he could make a charge supposing the scale did not apply” (namely, the interview), he is debarred from afterwards electing when it turns out that a lease is to be prepared. His only mode of electing is, as soon ashis client mentions anything about the lease. to say, “ My dear sir, pray stop; there is a little preliminary matter; excuse me a moment while I write out a contingent election under the Solicitors’ Remuneration Act.” If he waits until the client has explained and discussed the terms, he will have “ undertaken the business,” and will be “carrying on the business until he can see whether it is to his benefit to charge according to scale or according to the previously existing system ”—a very heinous offence indeed, which could not possibly have been intended by a rule which expressly gives him the right to elect between those two systems. The meaning of the framers of the rule was, of course, that the election must be made by the solicitor absolutely blindfold!
Hniis rs A suosnsrioiv for some enterprising law stationerWhy cannot a special paper be manufactured for drafts intended to be kept as completed drafts, and for copies of probates and other documents likely to require frequent reference? We have repeatedly had occasion to remark the torn and ragged condition into which these documents come in the lapse of years, due to want of toughness in the paper. The paper used is too often thick without being tough, the result of which is that a great deal of room is required for the drafts and copies which accumulate in a solicitor’s ofllce. The paper we want should be thin, but perfectly opaque, and as untearable as possible. There are large-sized envelopes supplied by some law stationers which meet the requirements as to thinness and toughness, but they are too transparent. The paper should, we think, be white or cream coloured, and should have a smooth surface, as far as possible resembling parchment, so as to repel dust and smearing by fingers. There should also be provided an extra-thick quality to serve as the outer sheet, and on one side of this there should be ared line about an inch from the edge, which would provide a space at the top of the back, when folded, within which there could be written a short description of the nature of the instrument, so as to facilitate search among a bundle of papers.
The Inland Revenue has issiicd a. circular letter to commissioners of income tax and su f tax '
rveyors 0 es, stntiiig that the Board of Inland Revenue have received authority from the Lords Commissioners of the treasury to make allowances for the current financial year in respect to the assessments under Schedule A of the income-tax in cases where temporary abatcments have been made from existing rents on account of the agricultural depression, on the understanding that nothing but the actual reduction ui money payment will be recognized as ground for the remission. The tenant may be relieved from payment of tax on the amount remitted both under Schedules A and B on producing to the surveyor a certificate from his landlord or the landlord's agent of the amount given back. For any relief beyond that on the rent remitted the tenant must appeal in the usual way. When thelandlord pays the tax under Schedule A instead of by deduction he may secure a corresponding reduction to that granted to the tenant.
On Thursday, at the Central Criminal Court, George Bernard Harvey Drew, solicitor, pleaded guilty to embezzling large sums of money (mmp. 66). He was sentenced to ten years‘ penal servitude. '
AN EXTRAORDINARY APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF CONCEALMENT.
Tris case of Blackburn v. Vigor: (17 Q. B. D. 553) raised a very interesting and important point of marine insurance law. As our readers are, of course, aware, concealment of a material fact known to the assured vitiates a policy of marine insurance; and it seems likewise clear that concealment by an agent who effects the policy has the same effect; but the case to which we refer carries the doctrine of concealment to a much greater length.
The facts were these: the plaintiff, who himself was perfectly innocent of any concealment, employed an insurance broker to efiect a policy of re-insurance on a certain ship which was overdue. Whilst the broker was acting on behalf of the plaintifi he received information of a material fact tending to shew that the ship was lost. The broker did not communicate this information to the plaintifi, but did not obtain an insurance for him. Afterwards the plaintifi, through another broker (the first broker's authority having been terminated) effected a policy of insurance, lost or not lost, which was underwritten by the defendant. The ship had, in fact, been lost some time before the plaintiff tried to insure, but neither the plaintiff nor the broker who effected the insurance knew of, or concealed from the defendant, any fact tending to shew that the ship had been lost. It was held in the Court of Appeal, by Lindley and Lopes, L.JJ., Lord Esher, M.R., dissenting, that the plaintiff could not recover on the policy. We hope this case will go to the House of Lords, because it is not satisfactory that there should be a division of opinion on a point of so much importance. A great part of the judgments is taken up with the discussion of previous decisions, but we hardly think that they are so conclusive either way that the question could be considered as concluded by authority in the Court of Appeal, and still less in the House of Lords; and therefore the case may be regarded, as it seems to us, as one which must ultimately turn on general principles.
We think that the substance of the opposing views may be put very shortly as follows: one view is that the assured can only be affected by the non-communication to the underwriter, by himself or his agent employed to effect the insurance in question, of a material fact known to himself or such agent. In the case in question it will be observed that there could not possibly have been a communication of the material fact in respect of the insurance sued upon, because the fact was known neither to the principal nor to the agent who efiected the insurance. The opposite view appears to be this: that the assured is to be treated as if he knew every fact that ought to have been communicated to him in the course of business by a servant or agent employed by him, and that, it having been the duty of the first agent employed by the plaintilf to communicate the material fact to him, he could not be in a better position by reason of the breach of such duty on the part of the person employed by him than he would have been in if it had been fulfilled.
This appears to us, to use a somewhat colloquial expression, rather a_strong order. The rule that affects a man with the unauthorized acts or fraud of his agent who effects the contract in such a case bears somewhat hardly on the principal; but it seems, 911 the “'h°19» just, 88 springing out of the principles that, of two innocent persons, the one who has employed the knave must suffer, and that you cannot approbate and reprobate-i.e., claim to takeadvantage of your agent’s action without also being affected by it as if it was your own; otherwise the employer of an u“a°r“Pu1°“5_98e_11tW°\1l<1 have a great advantage. But in the Present “B9, it will be observed, there is no question of any breach of duty or fraud by the agent effecting the contract, both he and the Pnncllml being quite innocent of any concealment in factThere was no real breach of any duty towards the underwriter by the
e ma erial fact so that he mi ht t- to insure on that basis,
and that the Plaintiff i8 to be affegted 1?; the information that 116 Pught tovhave had made known to him as if he, in fact, had such ilfiformation. It is to be observed that the word “ought,” as used er?’ .°1,ea"1Y °B_11I10t mean that there was any default on the Pfiillltlif s _part in not obtaining the information, the only default %_ eged bemg that of the first agent in not communicating it to im. Moreover, we do not feel quite sure that in any legal sense