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that year. If R. was held to have died in 1873, and then to have died a
bachelor, his next of kin living at his death, assuming that he had died
on any day in that year, would have been his mother and two of his brothers,
all of whom had since died. If R. had died on any day between the 1st
of January and the 31st of December, 1880 (both days inclusive), and had
died a bachelor, such next of kin would be the six children of one of his
deceased brothers. The fund was claimed by the representatives of the
1873 next of kin, and by the 1880 next of kin.
NORTH, J., said that the inquiries had not been answered by the chief
clerk, and there was nothing which enabled the court to say that either
set of claimants was entitled to the fund. The persons who would be
entitled if R. had died at the beginning of the period of seven years were not
the same as those who would be entitled if he had died at the end of that
period, and it was clear also that there was some moment during the
period at which the persons entitled would have been different from those
who would have been entitled either at the beginning or the end, or, at
any rate, they would have been entitled in different shares. The persons
really entitled were those who were the next of kin of R. at the time of
his death. It was settled by such cases as Re Phene's Trusts (5 Ch. 139)
and Re Lewes' Trusts (6 Ch. 356) that, though a man who had not been
heard of for seven years was to be presumed to be dead, there was no
presumption from that fact alone that he had died at one time rather than
another during the seven years, and that those who made a claim founded
on his having died at a particular time were bound to prove his death at
that time. There was no proof of the time at which R. died, and the
case must go back to the chief clerk for further inquiry.—COUNSEL, Cozens-
Hardy, Q.Č., and Bardswell; Joseph Tanner; B. Eyre. SOLICITORS, Jaques,
Layton, & Co.

Re TOOMER, HUGHES v. BENNETT-North, J., 1st August. WILL-CONSTRUCTION-PAROL EVIDENCE TO EXPLAIN AMBIGUITY-COSTS. The question in this case was whether parol evidence could be admitted to explain an ambiguity in a will. The testatrix bequeathed a legacy of £500 to "The Female Orphan As"." The fourth word in the above description was obscurely written in the original will, and it was doubtfu, whether it was "As" or "Asm" North, J., was of opinio n after looking at the original will, that the abbreviated word was "Asm.," and that it was a contraction of the word "Asylum." The legacy was claimed by two institutions, one called "The Female Orphan Asylum," whose asylum was situate at Beddington, in Surrey; the other, the Hampshire Female Orphan Asylum, whose asylum was situate at Southampton, in which town the testatrix had lived. She had in her lifetime subscribed to the latter institution.

NORTH, J., held that there was an ambiguity, and that parol evidence was admissible, and on the evidence he held that the Hampshire Female Orphan Asylum was intended by the testatrix.

The chief clerk had found that the Beddington Asylum was intended. This finding was in accordance with the direction of the judge, given after hearing an argument in chambers by counsel for the two asylums. A summons to vary the certificate was taken out on behalf of the Hampshire Asylum. North, J., had ordered the costs of the hearing in chambers to be paid out of the estate of the testatrix.

NORTH, J., said that the parties were entitled to bring the case on before him in chambers as they had done, and they were also entitled to have a second argument before him on a summons to vary the certificate, so that they might be able to appeal, if they should wish to do so. But he could not allow the costs of the second hearing out of the estate. The costs of both institutions of that hearing must be paid out of the legacy -COUNSEL, Vernon R. Smith; Cozens-Hardy, Q.C., and Warrington; C. Browne; Cookson, Q.C., and Byrne; Rowden; Southall. SOLICITORS, Lovell, Son, & Pitfield; Crossman, Crossman, & Prichard; G. Booth; F. J. & G. J. Braikenridge; S. Whitehead.

in the administration by the High Court of the assets of any person who may die insolvent, "the same rules shall prevail and be observed as to the respective rights of secured and unsecured creditors, and as to debts and liabilities provable, and as to the valuation of annuities and future and contingent liabilities respectively, as may be in force for the time being under the law of bankruptcy with respect to the estates of person adjudged bankrupt." Section 125 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, gives to creditors of deceased persons, whose estates are insolvent, power to obtain administration in bankruptcy, according to the law of bankruptcy, either by original petition in bankruptcy, or, in the case of existing proceedings for administration in another court, by application to that other court to transfer the proceedings into the Court of Bankruptcy. It was argued for the trustees of the savings bank that section 40 of the Bankruptcy Act did not repeal section 14 of the Savings Banks Act by implication, even for the purposes of bankruptcy administration, and that, if it did, the order of priority prescribed by section 40 was not imported by section 10 of the Judicature Act, 1875, into an administration by the High Court, and that the bank was entitled to the priority given by section 14 of the Savings Banks Act. On behalf of the administrator it was argued that in bankruptcy the priority of the bank was abolished by section 40 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, and that, by section 10 of the Judicature Act, section 40 of the Bankruptcy Act was introduced into the administration of the estates of deceased insolvents by the Chancery Division of the High Court, for otherwise the rights of the creditors of a deceased insolvent would depend on the mere accident whether his estate was administered in the High Court, or in the Court of Bankruptcy by virtue of section 125 of the Bankruptcy Act.

NORTH, J., held that section 14 of the Savings Banks Act, 1863, was not repealed in toto by section 40 of the Bankruptcy Act, but that it was rendered inoperative as regards administration in bankruptcy. Either the Legislature intended by section 40 to take away, as regarded bankruptcy, the priority given by the Savings Banks Act, or there was a casus omissus. He could not come to the latter conclusion. And his lordship thought that he was bound by the decision of Fry, J., in Re Maggi (20 Ch. D. 545), to hold, "that the rules of administration in the Chancery Division were not altered by section 10 of the Judicature Act so as to introduce the provisions of section 40 of the Bankruptcy Act. The argument, that it would be anomalous that a different rule should apply according as an insolvent estate was administered in the Chancery Division or in the Court of Bankruptcy under section 125 of the Bankruptcy Act, was answered by the fact that that section gave power to any creditor to apply to have the administration transferred to the Court of Bankruptcy. He was of opinion that in an administration in the Chancery Division the bank were entitled to priority.--COUNSEL, Upjohn; Vernon R. Smith. SOLICITORS, Bell, Brodrick, & Gray; Smiles, Binyon, § Ollard.

Re MARCUS, MARCUS v. MARCUS—North, J., 2nd August. WILL-CONSTUCTION-LEGACY TO CLERKS AND WORK MEN-" SIX MONTHS' FULL SALARIES"-EXEMPTION FROM LEGACY DUTY-ATTESTING WITNESS-DISQUALIFICATION- -WILLS ACT, 1837, s. 15.

A testator, who carried on business without any partner, made the following bequest:-"My office and warehouse employés, such as clerks and workmen, shall have to receive six months' full salaries." He made two codicils to his will, neither of which contained any reference to the above gift. Both the codicils were attested by a clerk who was in the testator's employment at the date of his will and up to the time of his death. The question was what employés of the testator were entitled to the benefit of the above gift. Three constructions were suggested-(1) Those who were in the employment of the testator at the date of his will; (2) those who were in his employment at the date of his death; (3) those who were in his employment at the date of the will and who so continued up to the time of his death. Another question was whether "full" salaries meant that the legacies were to be paid free of legacy duty. There was a further question: whether the clerk who had attested both the codicils was disqualified by section 15 of the Wills Act from receiving the legacy to which he would otherwise have been entitled under the above gift?

Re WILLIAMS, JONES v. WILLIAMS-North, J., 28th July. ADMINISTRATION INSOLVENT ESTATE - PRIORITY - OFFICER OF SAVINGS BANK-DEBT DUE TO BANK-26 & 27 VICT. c. 87, s. 14-JUDICATURE ACT, 1875, s. 10-BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1883, ss. 40, 125. The question in this case was whether, in the administration of the estate of an insolvent intestate, who had been the actuary of a savings bank, the bank were entitled to priority in respect of a debt due to them by the intestate. The intestate had misappropriated moneys of the bank to the amount of £30,000. He left assets of the value of about £400. Section 14 of the Savings Banks Act, 1863 (26 & 27 Vict. c. 87) provides that in case of the death, bankruptcy, or insolvency of an officer of a savings bank, having in his bands by virtue of his office moneys or effects of the bank, the bank shall be entitled to be paid out of his assets in priority to all his other creditors. Section 40 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, gives priority in the distribution of the property of a bankrupt to rates and taxes, and to wages to a certain extent, and provides that, subject to the provisions of the Act, all debts proved in the bankruptcy shall be paid pari passu. The section contains a proviso that it is not to alter the effect of section 5 of the Act 28 & 29 Vict. c. 86 (Bovill's Act), or pre-titled to take. A man who was not in the testator's employment at the judice the provisions of the Friendly Societies Act, 1875. The latter Act contains a provision similar to that of section 14 of the Savings Banks Act. The first question raised was whether, supposing that the estate of the deceased were being administered in bankruptcy, the priority given to the savings bank by the Act of 1863 was taken away by section 40 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883. The second question was whether, assuming that there would be no priority in bankruptcy, the bankruptcy rule applied to the administration of an insolvent estate in the High Court, so as to take away the priority there also. Section 10 of the Judicature Act, 1875, provides that

NORTH, J., held that the persons entitled were those employés who were in the testator's service at the date of his death. If the testator had intended those persons who were in his employment at the date of his will, nothing would have been easier than to mention them by name. There might be persons in the testator's employment at the date of his will whose salaries might, by reason of their continuance in his service, have been increased before the time of his death, and the salaries of others might have been reduced by reason of their incompetence or misconduct, or if the testator's business was not so flourishing, he might have been compelled to reduce the salaries of his clerks all round. It seemed absurd to suppose that, in the case of a man who was in receipt of a higher salary at the date of the testator's death, the amount of his legacy should be measured, not by the salary which he was then receiving, but by the salary which he had received at an antecedent time. His lordship thought that by "full salaries" the testator meant the full salaries at the time of his death, and this threw light on the question who were the persons entime of his death would not be receiving any salary at all, and there would be no standard by which the amount of his legacy could be measured. Moreover, as the testator had no partner, the persons in his employment might be left without any employment by reason of his death, and it was probable that he intended to provide them compensation for their loss of employment. The only decided cases bearing on the point were Jones v. Henley (2 Ch. Rep. 162) and Parker v. Marchant (1 Y. & C. (Ch.) 290), but in both of them the words differed from those of the present will, and it seemed that some words must have been omitted from the report of

Jones v. Henley. His lordship thought that the expression "full salaries" did not exempt the legatees from paying legacy duty. It meant that the salaries were to be calculated without any incidental deductions by reason of either the custom of trade or the illness of the legatee, but it was not intended to relieve tho legatees from the payment of any charge, such as legacy duty, which the law cast on them. On the authority of Gurney v. Gurney (3 Drew. 208) his lordship held that, as the clerk had only attested the codicils, which had no reference to the legacies, he was not disqualified.-COUNSEL, Farwell; B. 8. Ford; Bardswell. SOLICITORS, Pritchard, Englefield, & Co.

SAVILE v. COUPER-North, J., 2nd August.

NEW TRUSTEES-APPOINTMENT OF SEPARATE TRUSTEES FOR PART OF TRUST PROPERTY-CONVEYANCING ACT, 1882, s. 5.

This case raised a question as to the construction of section 5 of the Conveyancing Act of 1882, which provides that " on an appointment of new trustees a separate set of trustees may be appointed for any part of the trust property held on trusts distinct from those relating to any other part or parts of the trust property." An originating summons was taken out by the trustees of a will, as plaintiffs, against the tenants for life of a legacy of £50,000, bequeathed by the will on certain trusts distinct from the general trusts declared by the will, as defendants, asking the court to determine whether the plaintiffs were authorized to retire or be discharged from the trusts of the will so far as the same related to the £50,000, and to appoint a separate set of trustees of that legacy, or of the trusts of the will relating thereto, the plaintiffs themselves remaining trustees of the rest of the property subject to the trusts of the will. NORTH, J., was of opinion that such an appointment was not within the scope of section 5. That section contemplated the retirement of all or some of an existing set of trustees, and that there might be a difficulty in getting new trustees to act in the entire trust, and that it might be expedient to divide the trusts in order to get rid of that difficulty. But it did not contemplate the creation for the first time of a distinct trust as to part of the property when the old trustees were not retiring from the trusts as to the rest of the property. The words pointed to the power being used when new trustees were being appointed-i.e., when the old trustees, or some of them, were ceasing to be trustees altogether. The plaintiffs desired to read the section as if it had said that, on every occasion when it might be thought desirable to do so, a separate set of trustees might be appointed for any part of the trust property held on distinct trusts. But that was not what the section said. It would be easy to conceive cases in which it might be desirable to make such an appointment, but such cases were not likely to occur frequently, and his lordship did not think that they were in the contemplation of the framers of the section.-COUNSEL, Ingle Joyce; R. C. Dobbs. SOLICITORS, J. E. Fox & Co.; Murray, Hutchins, & Stirling.

KING v. CHAMBERLAYNE-North, J., 20th July. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-RESCISSION OF CONTRACT-RETURN OF DEPOSITREASONABLENESS OF NOTICE OF RESCISSION-ACTION OR SUMMONS-COSTS. This was an action by a purchaser for the return of his deposit, with interest and costs. The purchaser had given notice to rescind his contract, on the ground that the vendor had failed to shew a good title to the property. The property sold was a freehold ground-rent secured by a lease dated the 28th of January, 1876, for a term of ninety-nine years, and it formed one lot (No. 136) among others of a similar nature. The Vendor was a tenant for life, selling under the provisions of the Settled Land Act. One of the conditions of sale was, "All purchasers will buy subject to, and admit the validity of, the leases stated in the particulars.' The day fixed for the completion of the purchases was the 13th of April, 1885. From the abstract of title delivered to the purchaser, it appeared that Lot 136 had been the subject of a lease for lives dated the 18th of December, 1850. The abstract contained a note stating that this lease had been surrendered, and the lease of 1876 thereupon granted, but no surrender was abstracted. It appeared also that the lease of 1876 bad been granted by the vendor's father, who was then the tenant for life under the settlement of the property, under a leasing power contained in the settlement, which authorized the granting of leases made to take effect in possession. The purchaser required the vendor to produce evidence that the lease of 1850 was surrendered when the lease of 1876 was granted. The vendor's solicitors made inquiries, though they insisted that the conditions precluded the purchaser from requiring evidence of the surrender. In the course of the inquiries it appeared that the lease of 1850 had been granted for three lives, and that one of those lives was still in existence, but that when the lease of 1876 was granted possession of the property was at once given to the lessee, and that he had been in possession under it ever since, no claim having been since made under the lease of 1850. A long correspondence took place between the respective solicitors, and various inquiries were made, but the vendor's solicitors did not succeed in satisfying the purchaser of the surrender. At last, on the 21st of October, 1885, the vendor's solicitors wrote to the purchaser's solicitors, "We must now call upon you either to complete, or to state whether you desire to have any and what further inquiries made, or information procured. Further inquiries must be made at your expense." On the 9th of November the purchaser's solicitors wrote to the vendor's solicitors that, as the surrender of the lease of 1850 could not be shewn or procured, and it was clear that one of the lives was still in existence, the purchaser declined to complete his purchase, and required the vendor to return his deposit, with interest and costs. On the 20th of December, 1885, this action was commenced. It was argued on behalf of the vendor that, inasmuch as the lease of 1876 would not have been valid under the power if it had not been granted to take effect

in possession, and it could not have been so granted if the prior lease of 1850 was then still subsisting, the purchaser, being bound by the condition to admit the validity of the lease of 1876, was, therefore, bound to admit that the prior lease of 1850 had come to an end when the lease of 1876 was granted. It was also contended that the purchaser's notion of rescission was not a reasonable one, and that, at any rate, he ought to have proceeded by summons under the Vendor and Purchaser Act, and not by an action, and that only the costs of a summons ought to be allowed to him.

NORTH, J., held that the purchaser was entitled to rescind his contract, and ordered the vendor to return the deposit, with interest from the date of the notice of rescission, and his proper costs and expenses in relation to the contract and the investigation of the title. He said that the condition must be construed fairly. The vendor was seeking to deprive the purchaser of that to which he would otherwise be entitled. It was not suggested that the condition was fraudulent, tricky, or catching. It bound the purchaser to admit the validity of the lease of 1876, but not to admit every matter which might be a condition precedent to the validity of the lease. It did not bind him not to take the objection that the immediate reversion was outstanding. The sale was a sale of the reversion, and a title to the reversion had to be shewn. It was recessary that the prior lease which was shewn to be outstanding should be got rid of in some way. The condition did not bind the purchaser to admit that the vendor was in possession of the property at the time when the lease of 1876 was granted. That lease purported to be a lease in possession, and no doubt it was, in the belief of both lessor and lessee, that which it purported to be. Its validity would not be affected by the subsistence of an unexpired lease under which no claim was being made, especially as possession was at once delivered to the lessee. The condition did not preclude the purchaser from taking the objection. Then arose the question whether the purchaser was justified in giving the notice of rescission on the 9th of November. The vendor had given the purchaser the choice of two things completion of the purchase, or further inquiries to be made at his expense. The onus was not on the purchaser to shew that the lease of 1850 had not come to an end, it was on the vendor to get rid of that which appeared to be an existing incumbrance on the property. And, even if the onus was on the purchaser, he had done all which could be required of him. At the time when the notice of rescission was given a good title had not been shewn by the vendor, and, after the long correspondence which had taken place, the purchaser was entitled to give the notice, provided that he allowed the vendor a reasonable time within which to procure the required information. But the vendor had already said that he would do nothing more except at the purchaser's expense. Consequently, according to Nott v. Riccard (22 Beav. 307), the purchaser was justified in giving a peremptory notice of rescission. As to the question of costs, the object of the Vendor and Purchaser Act was to enable questions between vendors and purchasers to be decided expeditiously and cheaply, and, if the purchaser had deliberately adopted the more expensive mode of procedure, his lordship would not allow him the additional costs arising from his so doing. But And at that time there there was nothing vexatious in what he had done. was some doubt whether interest on the deposit could be obtained by a summons under the Vendor and Purchaser Act. Re Hargreaves and Thompson's Contract (32 Ch. D. 454, 30 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 516), in which the Court of Appeal held that this could be done by summons, had not been decided at the time when the present action was commenced. There was no ground, therefore, for depriving the purchaser of any part of his costs.-COUNSEL, Cozens-Hardy, QC., and E. Chitty; Cookson, Q.C., and Rendall. SOLICITORS, Kingsford, Dorman, & Co.; Desborough & Son.

PASHLEY v. CHAPMAN-Kekewich, J., 1st August.
COSTS-IDENTITY-ADMINISTRATION ACTION.

In this action a point arose as to what fund should bear the costs of the suit which had been brought by a residuary legatee for the purpose of establishing his own identity. By the will of J. Pashley the trustees were directed to divide the estate, after converting it into money, amongst the testator's five children, naming them, one being "Joseph Allen Pashley." J. A. Pashley had gone to Australia some twenty years ago, and had been lost sight of, having written to his relatives once or twice during the interval. The plaintiff claimed his share from the trustees, but they declined to pay him, and this suit was brought. By their defence the trustees alleged that no communication had ever been received from the plaint:ff; that proper advertisements had been issued for him, and they claimed the benefit of all statutes of limitation or rules of law if the identity were established. This was the trial of an issue directed as to whether the plaintiff was, in fact, the Joseph Allen Pashley mentioned in the will.

KEKEWICH, J., said (after hearing evidence) that he was satisfied of the identity of the plaintiff. There would be a general account, and the costs of the action would come out of the estate before division into shares. There had been no severance of the plaintiffs, and, moreover, the resistance to payment was made for the safety of the trustees and benefit of the other residuary legatees. The plaintiff was quite entitled to go to the colonies if he liked, and he had not wilfully kept out of the way, so was entitled to have the costs taken out of the general fund, and not out of his share of the residue.-COUNSEL, Murphy, Q.C., and Fossett Lock; Warmington, Q.C., and Bramwell Davis. SOLICITORS, W. B. Styer; H. A. Morse.

HARVEY v. OLLIVER-Kay, J., 19th July. The following is a more detailed statement of the facts of this case, which was shortly reported ante, p. 644.

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The last surviving trustee died on the 24th of January, 1883, and the new trustees were appointed on the 3rd of March, 1883. The writ in the action was issued on the 20th of January, 1883, and, by an order of the Appeal Court of the 26th of June, 1885, the trustees were given their costs of the action as between solicitor and client up to and including the appeal. The order under which the present question arose was made on further consideration on the 28th of June, 1886 (not on the 27th of March, 1885, as previously stated), and it was thereby "ordered that it be referred to the taxing master to tax the costs of the plaintiffs and defendants from the foot of the last taxation directed by the said order of the 26th of June, 1885 and including in the costs of the defendants (the new trustees) "any costs, charges, and expenses properly incurred by them as trustees of the will of the said John Olliver beyond their costs of this action." The new trustees duly carried in their bills of costs, and the taxing master disallowed various charges therein. Those referred to in the report as first, were items in the bill of costs of the solicitor for the original trustees and for the donee of the power of appointment for preparing transfers of four mortgages and counsel's fees thereon, searching for old deeds, counsel's fee for re-settling draft transfer, fair copies of transfers, letter to new trustees as to a difficulty in one of the mortgages, engrossing transfers, attending solicitor of the executor of the last surviving original trustee who required alteration in one of the transfers, altering the transfer, counsel's fee, and stamping transfers. The first of these items was dated the 3rd of April, 1883. This bill had been paid by the new trustees in order to obtain the transfers; and they had also paid the bill of the solicitor for the executor of the last surviving original trustee, which consisted of charges for going through accounts, perusing the appointment and transfers, and attending at the execution thereof; but this bill, the first item in which was in April, 1883, was not disallowed. The charges referred to as "secondly" consisted of items in the bill of the solicitor to the new trustees who had been retained by them on the 19th of January, 1883, with a view to the action. The taxing master disallowed all the items in this bill prior to the 3rd of March, 1883. They included attending on the new trustees to get instructions, perusing the will, checking the accounts, considering and advising on letters from the donee and her solicitors, perusing and considering draft appointment, fair copy, and advising on the same, and attendances on the new trustees. Those referred to in the report as "thirdly" were items in the same bill as those first mentioned. They included letters to the donee as to the appointment of new trustees, to others asking them to be trustees, perusing the will and accounts with a view to preparing the appointment, interviews with proposed new trustees, drawing appointment of new trustees, counsels' fees, examining into a question of a power of sale and an erroneous distribution of the trust estate and looking for documentary evidence on the point, counsel's opinion thereon, attendance on the solicitor of the executor of the last surviving original trustee, going through lists of securities. The above items were all between the dates October 13, 1882, and March 3, 1883, the date of the appointment.

The taxing master's reasons for disallowing the objections of the defendants to the taxation were as follows:

"I have considered the objections of the defendants John Olliver Vallance and Walter Sydney Livesay to my taxation. The order directs the taxation of the costs of the objectants and not the costs of the retiring trustees. I have not gone into the reason of their retirement or whether they passed their accounts, not being directed by the order to do so. The usual practice is for the retiring trustees to render their solicitor's costs and their accounts to their beneficiaries, and then transfer the trust estate to the new trustees. For the above reasons I disallow the objections 1, 3, 4, and 5."

The second objection was allowed, and the sixth was immaterial to this report. It must be borne in mind that Kay, J., decided the question of principle only; that his lordship refused to discuss the items, and that they are still subject to the taxing master's discretion.

CASES AFFECTING SOLICITORS.

Ex parte D'ARAGON, In the Matter of A FIRM OF SOLICITORSC. A. No. 1, 2nd August.

TAXATION OF UNSIGNED BILL OF COSTS.

Mr. D'Aragon had brought an action against a railway company for an injury caused by an accident, and he recovered £300 as damages. His solicitors sent in a bill of costs to the railway company amounting to £284, from which the master, on taxation, taxed off £100, reducing it to £184. They then added the £100 so taxed off to their bill of costs against their client. He sent to them for their account, and they asked him to call at their office, which he did, and they handed him an account in which the £100 was included, and also a bill of their own against him for further costs as between solicitor and client amounting to £33; and they thus reduced the sum of £300 awarded to him as damages to the amount of £153. He asked them to explain this, and they gave him the bills, but did not sign them. He thereupon applied to have them taxed, but the master declined to tax them as not being duly signed; and a judge at chambers declined to order them to be taxed as not having been "delivered" as bills of costs. A divisional court, however (Cave and Mathew, JJ.), made the order. This was an appeal by the solicitors against that decision. THE COURT held that the client was entitled to have the bills taxed. Lord ESHER, M.R., said this was the way in which the law was discredited and scandalized. An unfortunate man who is injured by a railway accident recovers large damages, and a great portion of it is to go into

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the pockets of the solicitor in addition to the costs he is entitled to as against the company. Nothing ought to be done certainly to countenance or assist such proceedings. The client sends to his solicitors for their bill, and they send for him and hand him these bills-that is, they hand them to him as their bills, and they were their bills. The master erroneously declined to tax them as not being signed; but that was not a good ground for declining to tax them. The judge seems to have been induced to believe that the bills were not delivered as bills of costs, and that the solicitors might deliver another. But in that case the master would not see the other bill off which the £100 had been taxed. The object, no doubt, of the solicitors was that if their claim was disputed they might deliver another. LINDLEY and LOPES, L.JJ., concurred.-COUNSEL, R. J. Parker ; Chambers and C. H. Lindon.-Times.

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BANKRUPTCY CASES.

Ex parte SAYER, Re MANSEL-C. A. No. 1, 22nd July. BANKRUPTCY REMOVAL OF TRUSTEE POWER OF COURT TO RESTRAIN CREDITORS FROM MEETING-BANKRUPTCY ACr, 1869, ss. 65, 72, 83 (4) — BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1883, s. 86 (1).

The question in this case was whether the Court of Bankruptcy had power, in a liquidation under the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, to restrain the creditors from holding a meeting for the purpose of removing the trustee. Sub-section 4 of section 83 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, provided that "the court may, upon cause shewn, remove any trustee. The creditors may, by special resolution at a mecting specially called for that purpose, of which seven days' notice has been given, remove the trustee and appoint another person to fill his office." (Sub-section 1 of section 86 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, is expressed in almost identical terms.) Section 65 of the Act of 1869 conferred on the London Court of Bankruptcy "all the powers, jurisdiction, and privileges possessed by any judge of her Majesty's Superior Courts of Common Law at Westminster, or by any judge of her Majesty's High Court of Chancery," and section 72 enabled the Court of Bankruptcy to decide all questions "which the court may deem it expedient or necessary to decide for the purpose of doing complete justice." (Under the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, the Court of Bankruptcy is a branch of the High Court) In the present case the debts proved in the liquidation amounted to £11,625, including a proof by a Mr. Norton for £8,498. The trustee had given notice of a motion to expunge Norton's proof. A meeting of creditors was called by certain creditors who had bought up Norton's debt, for the purpose of considering the removal of the trustee and appointing another person in his place. A day was already fixed for the hearing of the motion to expunge, and the registrar, on the application of the trustee, made an order restraining the creditors from holding the meeting, until after the motion to expunge the proof should have been heard. The creditors appealed, and it was urged that, as by section 83 (4) absolute power was given to the creditors to remove the trustee, the court had no jurisdiction to restrain them from doing so.

THE COURT OF APPEAL (Lord ESHER, M.R., and LINDLEY and LOPES, L.JJ.) affirmed the decision. Lord EsHER, M.R., said that the question was whether these was jurisdiction to restrain the holding of the meeting, not absolutely, but until the question of the validity of a debt, which was already sub judice, had been determined. In his lordship's opinion sections 65 and 72, or one of them, gave the jurisdiction. And, under the circumstances of the case, the registrar had rightly exercised the jurisdiction. The interest of the creditors who had bought up Norton's debts was that it should not be investigated, and the registrar was justified in suspecting that the object of the meeting was to get a trustee appointed who would readily admit Norton's claim. Norton's debt formed so large a part of the whole debts that the creditors who were entitled to vote in respect of that debt would be able, if they wished, to carry the resolution removing the trustee. It was perfectly right, therefore, that the question whether there was any such debt should be first decided. LINDLEY and LOPES, L.JJ., concurred.-COUNSEL, Cooper Willis, Q.C., and R. Vaughan Williams; Everitt, Q.C., and Henry Kisch. SOLICITORS, Ellis, Munday, & Bartrum; Beyfus & Beyfus.

Ex parte SAVILLE, Re SAVILLE-C. A. No. 1, 22nd July. BANKRUPTCY-RECEIVING ORDER-JUDGMENT DEBT-POWER OF COURT TO GO BEHIND JUDGMENT.

This was an appeal by a debtor from a receiving order which had been made against him on the petition of a solicitor, who had recovered judgment against him in an action in the Queen's Bench Division for the taxed amount of a bill of costs. The judgment had been obtained under R. S. C., 1883, ord. 14. The debtor had filed an affidavit in opposition to the plaintiff's summons for summary judgment, in which he stated that he was entitled to a surcharge against the solicitor exceeding the amount of the taxed costs, and that he desired to enforce this surcharge by a counter-claim. He did not, however, appeal from the order of the master to enter judgment for the plaintiff. The debtor had also raised the question of surcharge before the taxing master, but had not supported it by any evidence. He relied then mainly on a defence that he had never retained the solicitor, and that point was decided against him by the taxing master, and afterwards by North, J., upon an application to review the taxing master's certificate. The debtor asked the registrar to go behind the judgment, and proposed to prove the alleged surcharge. Evidence was adduced before the registrar as to what had taken place before the taxing master and before the master of the Queen's Bench Division, and the registrar then held that no case had been made out for going behind the judgment,

and refused to allow the debtor to adduce evidence as to the surcharge. On behalf of the appellant reliance was placed on Ex parte Lennox (16 Q. B. D. 315, 30 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 46) which, it was argued, shewed that, on an application for a receiving order founded on a judgment debt, the Court of Bankruptcy would go behind the judgment, and would, if the debtor alleged that there was no valid judgment debt and tendered evidence to shew that that was so, inquire into the validity of the debt. THE COURT OF APPEAL (Lord ESHER, M.R., and LINDLEY and LOPES, L.JJ.) affirmed the decision. Lord ESHER, M.R., said that Ex parte Lennox only shewed that the mere existence of a judgment against the debtor did not prevent the Court of Bankruptcy from going behind the judgment, if it saw sufficient reason for doing so, but it did not decide that, on the mere suggestion of the debtor that the judgment debt was invalid, the Court of Bankruptcy was bound to go behind the judgment and inquire into the validity of the debt. A judgment debt was of itself sufficient to found a bankruptcy upon. If a suggestion was made, and some plausible evidence was offered, that the judgment debt did not really exist, it might be right to go behind the judgment. But, if there were circumstances which shewed almost to a certainty that the suggestion of the invalidity of the debt was idle and frivolous, it was impossible to say that the Court of Bankruptcy was bound to enter into a lengthy and expensive inquiry. In the present case nothing had been offered to the registrar which the debtor had not had ample opportunity of going into on previous occasions, if he had chosen to do so, and the registrar was quite right in refusing to go behind the judgment. LINDLEY, L.J., concurred. LOPES, L.J., said that Ex parte Lennox was not a decision that a suggestion made by the debtor, which the surrounding circumstances shewed to be unreal and uusubstantial, was a reason for going behind a judgment. COUNSEL, R. Vaughan Williams; Cock, Q.C., and Henry Kisch. SOLICITORS, D. E. Chandler; Lewis & Lewis.

Ex parte BLUCK, Re BLUCK-Cave, J., 7th July. BANKRUPTCY-PROOF-MOTION BY BANKRUPT TO EXPUNGE-LOCUS STANDI -PROVABLE DEBT-BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1883, s. 37, SCHEDULE II., R.

25.

This was a motion on behalf of the bankrupt to expunge a proof on the ground that there was no liability at the date of the receiving order which was subject of proof. On December 18, 1886, a receiving order was made against the debtor. On December 20, 1886, verdict and judgment for the defendants was given in an action previously brought by the debtor, and on February 6, 1887, a proof for the costs in that action was tendered by the defendants against the estate. The trustee admitted the proof and by reason of the vote given by the defendants at a meeting held on May 22, 1887, a proposal of the debtor for a scheme of arrangement was rejected and he was made bankrupt. The bankrupt now moved to expunge the proof and for a declaration that the vote given at the said meeting was invalid. On behalf of the creditors it was argued that a bankrupt had no locus standi to make the application under rule 25 of the 2nd schedule to the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, which provides that "The court may also expunge or reduce a proof upon the application of a creditor if the trustee declines to interfere in the matter, or, in the case of a composition or scheme, upon the application of the debtor." It was further urged that the action had been commenced in 1884, and that the debtor, by bringing an action, had placed himself under an obligation to

pay any costs.

CAVE, J., allowed the application. His lordship said that the objection to the locus standi of the bankrupt was the most important objection. Rule 25 of the 2nd schedule allowed the court to expunge a proof upon the application of a creditor if the trustee declined to interfere, or, in the case of a composition or scheme, upon the application of the debtor. It was said that in this case there was not a composition or scheme because it was voted against. But then that was by reason of the weight of this very vote, and if the debtor could not interfere he was left without remedy in a matter in which he was greatly interested. It would be very hard that, because the chairman allowed a vote which, it might be, ought not to be allowed, and because the trustee or any creditor would not take the trouble to interfere, that the debtor should be made a bankrupt. His lordship did not think he would be going beyond what was intended by the Act if he held that rule 25 did in such a case give the debtor a locus standi to apply to expunge. Then, as to the question whether this debt was a provable debt in the bankruptcy, section 37 of the Act defined provable debts, and it was difficult to see what obligation there was before the date of the receiving order. There was litigation initiated by the plaintiff but that did not necessarily create an obligation. It could not be said that because a man brought an action he placed himself or was placed under an obligation to pay the costs of the action. The obligation was imposed when judgment was given against him. It would be carrying the court too far to say that in this case there was an obligation before the receiving order.-COUNSEL, Abrahams; Sidney Woolf; Broxholme. SOLICITORS, M. Abrahams, Son, & Co; Johnson, Harris & Dowding.

Ex parte BOARD OF TRADE, Re BRUNNER-Cave, J., 5th July. BANKRUPTCY-PUBLIC EXAMINATION-ANSWERS OF BANKRUPT SUBSEQUENT MOTION AGAINST CREDITOR-EVIDENCE-BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1883, ss. 17, 48.

This was a special case stated by the judge of the Birmingham County Court and raised the important question whether the answers of a bankrupt on his public examination are admissible in evidence in subsequent motions in the same bankruptcy as against parties other than the bankrupt himself. The notice of motion served by the trustee on a creditor asking for an order to declare that the delivery by the bankrupt of certain watches

was a fraudulent preference under section 48 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, further called upon the respondent to "take notice that in support of the said motion an affidavit of the said trustee and a transcript of a portion of the shorthand writer's notes of the public examination now on the file of proceedings in the said bankruptcy will be read and used." The county court judge was of opinion that, except by consent, the notes in question were inadmissible, but submitted the case to the High Court. On behalf of the trustee it was urged that it was only sought to use the sworn answers of the bankrupt in the same way as an affidavit, and that it was open to the respondent to have given notice that he would require the bankrupt to attend for cross-examination like any other deponent; that the public examination of the bankrupt stood on a different footing from a private examination under section 27 inasmuch as every creditor could appear and cross-examine him thereon; and, further, that even though the answers of the bankrupt in his public examination might not be admissible in every motion, still they were admissible in a motion of this kind, where the only question was as to the motive and intent of the bankrupt in making this transfer.

CAVE, J., held that the examination could not be received in evidence. His lordship said that no authority could be cited for the proposition that the evidence of a witness taken in one proceeding was evidence in some other proceeding against a person who was not a party to the former proceeding. It would be in the highest degree unfair that a statement of the bankrupt On his public examination should be evidence against every creditor who had anything to do with the bankruptcy, and even against persons who had nothing to do with it. The convenience would certainly be on the side of the trustee, whom it would place in a very enviable position, but his lordship, sitting as a judge, must not look at the convenience of the trustee, but at the convenience of all parties and the interests of justice, and it would be a grave injustice to say that such evidence was admissible. There might be a tendency on the part of a trustee to rely on expressions of the debtor at a time when he was endeavouring to make his conduct appear at the best, and was therefore unreliable. Unless some special enactment in the Act of Parliment or some definite decision of a competent court could be pointed out, evidence of this kind ought not to be received. It would be another matter if the parties consented, but in the absence of any authority, or of consent, his lordship was certainly disinclined to make a precedent.COUNSEL, Sir Edward Clarke, S.G., Muir Mackenzie. SOLICITORS, The Solicitor to the Board of Trade.

LAW SOCIETIES. LAW ASSOCIATION.

At a meeting of the directors, held at the Hall of the Incorporated Law Society on Thursday, the 4th inst.-the following being present-viz., Mr. Boodle (chairman), Messrs. Doyle, Nisbet, Lucas, Sawtell, Scadding, Sidney Smith, and Arthur Carpenter (secretary)-grants amounting to £85 were made to members' cases, and £10 to a non-member's case. Three new members were elected, and the ordinary general business was transacted.

THE ASSOCIATION FOR THE REFORM AND CODIFICATION

OF THE LAW OF NATIONS. BILLS OF LADING.

On the 27th ult. the draft Bill of Lading framed by the association was discussed.

The CHAIRMAN (Dr. Seiveking), president of the Hanseatic High Court of Appeal of Hamburg, opened the debate by intimating that he should limit, at all events, the first part of the discussion to the consideration of the negligence clause.

Mr. GRAY HILL (Liverpool) in a speech which was much applauded, proposed as a resolution: "That the following principle adopted, by the conference of the association held at Liverpool in 1882, be now confirmed and adopted as the basis of discussion, and that the principle of the common form of bill of lading should be this, that the shipowner, whether by steam or sailing ship, should be liable for the faults of his servants in all matters relating to the ordinary course of the voyage, such as the stowage and right delivery of the cargo and other matters of this kind, but on the other hand the shipowner should be exempt from liability for everything which comes under the heads of 'accidents of navigation,' even though the loss from these may be indirectly attributable to some fault or neglect of the crew."

Mr. JOHN GLOVER (London) seconded the resolution.

M. CLUNET (Paris) moved an amendment to the effect that, so far as the negligence of the crew was concerned, the shipowner should only be freed from responsibility for "the acts of gross fault and recklessness" of his servants. After much discussion, M. Clunet's amendment not being seconded, the chairman put Mr. Gray Hill's resolution to the meeting, and it was carried unanimously.

Sir TRAVERS TwIss then took the chair.

MARRIAGE LAWS.

M. LEBEL (Paris) read a paper on "The Conflict of Laws respecting Marriage." M. LACHAU read another on the same subject, by Professor Gabba, of Pisa.

M. CLUNET proposed :-"That the association expresses the wish that in consular conventions between different nations a clause should be inserted

permitting consuls to celebrate marriages between men of their own nation Ham. Mr. Casserley is the eldest son of Mr. Samuel Casserley, and was and women of the country."

M. LACHAU seconded the resolution.

A discussion ensued, and ultimately Prof. LEONE LEVI moved, and Dr. D. ORELLI CORRAGIONI seconded, the following motion, which, after further discussion, was, upon the motion of Dr. WENDT, referred for further consideration to the executive council:

"That this conference recommends that no marriage shall be celebrated between a native and a foreigner unless a duly-authorized certificate be made to the effect that there is no legal impediment to such a marriage in the country to which such foreigner belongs. That the certificate so produced shall be conclusive as to the capacity of such a foreigner to marry." FXECUTION OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS.

On the 28th ult. a paper on this subject was read by Mr. F. J. TOMKINS (Lincoln's-inn).

Upon the motion of M. CLUNET (Paris), seconded by Dr. PREDOHL (Hamburg), it was resolved, with three dissentients, "That the association expresses the desire that the question of the execution of foreign judg ments should be made the object of special conventions between the different States, and that these special conventions should be based on the principles voted by the association in its meeting at Milan in 1883."

COPYRIGHT.

born in 1841. He is an LL.B. of the University of London, and he was called to the bar at the Middle Temple in Michaelmas Term, 1873. Mr. Casserley has been for some time junior prosecuting counsel to the Post Office on the Midland Circuit.

Mr. HENRY CHARLES RICHARDS, barrister, has been appointed Junior succession to Mr. Charles Frederick Gill, who has succeeded Mr. Ernest Prosecuting Counsel to the Post Office at the Central Criminal Court, in Mr. Richards is the second son of Mr. Baggallay as senior counsel. Frederick Richards, of Hastings, and was born in 1851. He was called time junior prosecuting counsel to the Post Office on the South-Eastern to the bar at Gray's-inn in May, 1881. Mr. Richards has been for some

Circuit.

Commissioner to administer Oaths in the Supreme Court of Judícature.
Mr. THOMAS HEATH, solicitor, of Devonport, has been appointed a
East Cowes, has been appointed a Commissioner to administer Oaths in
Mr. MUNTER MACDONALD BECKINGSALE, solicitor, of Ryde, Newport, and
the Supreme Court of Judicature.

solicitor in 1856.

Mr. FREDERICK SHARPLEY, Solicitor, of Louth, has been elected Coroner for the Louth District of Lincolnshire. Mr. Sharpley had for many years acted as deputy coroner. He was admitted a solicitor in 1850. Mr. JAMES HEGER DOUGLASS, solicitor, of Market Harborough, has been On the 31st ult., Mr. CARMICHAEL (London), as secretary of the Inter-appointed Clerk to the Market Harborough Highway Board, in succession national Copyright Committee, read the report of that committee, of which to the late Mr. William Thomas Sheild. Mr. Douglass was admitted a Sir Travers Twiss was chairman. The report commenced with a reference to the Hawley Bill and the Chace Bill, both now before the United States' Congress, and cited Mr. J. W. Harper's opinion, as that of a member of an American firm honourably distinguished by their advocacy of international copyright, in favour of the Hawley Bill as the "clearer, easier, and more direct," and conforming to the American Copyright Statute. The report then shewed that the subject of international copyright was one which concerned our colonies in North America as well as our home interests, and cited the text of a question lately put by Mr. Edgar in the Dominion Parliament and the reply of the Dominion Minister of Justice to the effect that this important subject was engaging the attention of

the Dominion Government.

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Sir STEPHEN WALCOTT, K.C.M.G., died at his residence, Grange-park, Ealing, on the 25th ult., in his eighty-first year. Sir S. Walcott was the eldest son of Mr. Robert John Walcott, and was born in 1806. He was called to the bar at Lincoln's-inn in Hilary Term, 1828, and he practised for a few years in the Court of Chancery. He became an assistant poor law commissioner in 1832, and from 1835 till 1838 he was chief secretary to the Governor-General of Canada. He was secretary to the Emigration Commission from 1840 till 1860, when he became an emigration commissioner, and he had been Chief Colonial Land and Emigration Commissioner since 1877. He was created a Companion of the Order of St. Michael and St. George in 1872, and a Knight Commander of the same order in 1877. Sir S. Walcott was married in 1838 to the only daughter of Mr. John Davidson, of Quebec.

Mr. EDWARD HEELIS, solicitor, of Appleby, died at that place on the 25th ult. from rheumatic fever. Mr. Heelis was the son of the Rev. Edward Heelis, Rector of Longmarton, Westmoreland, and was born in 1835. He was admitted a solicitor in 1856, and he had practised at Appleby for about thirty years. He had a large private practice, and he was solicitor to Lord Hothfield. Mr. Heelis had been for several years registrar of the Appleby County Court (Circuit No. 3). He was at the time of his death associated in partnership with his son, Mr. Edward Alexander Heelis, who was admitted a solicitor in 1879. Mr. Heelis was buried at Longmarton on the 29th ult.

APPOINTMENTS.

Mr. SAMUEL WILLIAM CASSERLEY, barrister, has been appointed Criminal Law Pleader to the Post Office, in succession to Mr. Ernest Baggallay, who has been appointed Stipendiary Magistrate for the borough of West

Mr. JAMES LEY DOUGLASS, Solicitor, of Uppingham, has been appointed Clerk to the County Magistrates at that place, in succession to the late Mr. William Thomas Sheild. Mr. Douglass was admitted a solicitor in 1886.

Messrs. DUBOIS, REID, & WILLIAMS, of 3, Pancras-lane, have been appointed Solicitors to the Parish Clerks' Company.

Mr. ROBERT WILLIAM PARKER, solicitor (of the firm of Heath, Parker, & Brett), of 3, New London-street, and of Tottenham, has been elected Vestry Clerk of the parish of St. Olave, Hart-street, in succession to the late Mr. William Heath. Mr. Parker is solicitor to the Tottenham Local Board. He was admitted a solicitor in 1866.

Mr. THOMAS BARKER, solicitor (of the firm of Haigh, Barker, & Barker'. of Dewsbury and Horbury, has been appointed Clerk to the Horbury Local Board. Mr. Parker was admitted a solicitor in 1870.

Mr. WILLIAM BURTONSHAW, solicitor, of Doncaster and Crowle, has been appointed Clerk to the Crowle Local Board. Mr. Burtonshaw was admitted a solicitor in 1884.

Mr. ALFRED WHALEY COLE, Q.C., has been appointed to act as Puisne Judge of the High Court of Justice of Griqualand West. Mr. Cole is the fourth son of Mr. William Nicholas Cole. He was called to the bar at the Middle Temple in Hilary Term, 1850, and he is a Queen's Counsel for the Cape Colony.

Mr. CLEMENT ELPHINSTONE LLOYD, barrister-at-law, has been appointed a Revising Barrister on the North Wales and Chester Circuit, in the place of Mr. W. Langford Ffoulkes, who has resigned his appointment.

Mr. GEORGE WORTHINGTON, barrister, has been appointed Judge of Insolvency for the Colony of Victoria. Mr. Worthington is the second son of Mr. George Worthington, of Liverpool, and was born in 1825. He was called to the bar at Lincoln's-inn in Hilary Term, 1861.

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The judicial members of the House of Lords will rise for the vacation at the end of the present week.

In the course of a debate on High Sheriffs, in the House of Lords, Lord Bramwell said that, though he was in a minority among his brethren, be did not think the dignity of her Majesty's judges was augmented by the attendance of the high sheriff at the assizes.

On Tuesday five actions were in the paper for trial before Mr. Justice Hawkins with common juries. On taking his seat, however, his lordship, addressing the leaders of the bar, said he was sorry to find that, though a list of causes had been drawn up for him to try in London, yet the pressure of business compelled him to leave at once for Chelmsford. He had come up only yesterday from Derby, and thought he had had enough of circuit; but this morning Mr. Justice Grove's marshal had come and requested his presence at Chelmsford. His lordship was very sorry, but he had no alternative. If there was any case which he could dispose of at once he would take it.

On Saturday a case at the Warwick Assizes disclosed a somewhat curious official dilemma. The prisoners (two women) were committed by the magistrates at Rugby to take their trial at these assizes. Each woman had a baby about a year old, both being at the breast. The police took the prisoners and the children on the 18th of July to Warwick Gaol, when the

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