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CAPE of GOOD HOPE CONVERSION BIRMINGHAM CORPORATION STOCK.

of the PUBLIC DEBT.

The LONDON and WESTMINSTER BANK (Limited) are instructed by the Government of the Cape of Good Hope, in consequence of numerous applications from the holders of Cape of Good Hope Government Debentures who did not avail themselves of the Conversion offered in August. 1886, to make a further OFFER to the HOLDERS of outstanding DEBENTURES of CONVERSION into

CAPE of GOOD HOPE CONSOLIDATED STOCK. The Cape of Good Hope Consolidated Stock, bearing interest at four per cent. per annum, created for the purposes of this Conversion, under the Acts of the Cape Legislature, No. 16 of 1891, as amended by No. 18 of 1883 and No. 16 of 1886, is inscribed in accordance with the provisions of the "Colonial Stock Act, 1877"-40 & 41 Vict. cap. 59-in the books of the stock kept by the London and Westminster Bank (Limited), and is transferable, without charge and free of stamp duty, at that bank, either by the stockholders personally or by their attorneys. The

RICHARD FLINT & CO. interest, at the rate of four per cent per annum.

(Late ASH & FLINT),

Stationers, Printers, Engravers, Registration Agents, 49, FLEET-STREET, LONDON, E.C. (corner of Serjeants'-inn).

Annual and other Returns Stamped and Filed.

is payable, on behalf of the Cape of Good Hope Government, at the London and Westminster Bank (Limited), Lothbury, on the 15th April and 15th October in each year, by dividend warrants, which, if desired, can be sent by post to the stockholders; and the stock will be redeemable at par at the same bank on the 15th October, 1936, but the Government of the Cape of Good Hope have the option of redemption at par in London on or after the 15th October, 1916, on giving twelve calendar months' and in the "Times" newspaper, or by post to the then stockholders at their registered addresses. Stock certificates to bearer, of the denominations of £100, £500, and £1,000 with coupons of the halfyearly dividends attached, are obtainable in exchange for inscribed stock at the London and Westminster Bank (Limited), Lothbury, on payment of the prescribed fees, and such certificates can be re-inscribed as stock at the will of the owner.

PARTRIDGE & COOPER, notice by advertisement in the "London Gazette

LAW AND GENERAL STATIONERS,

1 & 2, CHANCERY LANE LONDON E.C.

Taw Copping and Engrossing.

Deeds and Writings engrossed and copied on the Premises with punctuality and dispatch, at the lowest scale of charges. A good Discount allowed on agreed accounts

LAW PRINTING.

STATEMENTS OF CLAIM AND DEFENCE, AFFIDAVITS, and other PLEADING, Printed at 1s. per folio. DEEDS, CONVEYANCES, MORTGAGES, &c., Printed in form for Registration.

Discount allowed for cash on agreed accounts.

LITHOGRAPHY.

DRAFTS

ABSTRACTS, BRIEFS, PETITIONS, MINUTES OF EVIDENCE, Lithographed at reduced prices.

PLANS OF ESTATES, SPECIFICATIONS, BUILDING SOCIETIES' DEEDS, LEASES, &c., Lithographed with accuracy and dispatch.

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The revenues of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope alone are liable in respect of this stock and the dividends thereon, and the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom and the Commissioners of her Majesty's Treasury are not directly or indirectly liable or respor sible for the payment of the stock or the dividends thereon, or for any matter relating thereto.-40 & 41 Vict. cap. 59, sec. 19.

The Conversion will close on the 30th July, 1887. Prospectuses, giving full details of the amounts of stock offered in exchange for the various descriptions of Cape of Good Hope Government Debentures, and forms for listing the debentures to be lodged for conversion, can be obtained of the London and Westminster Bank (Limited).

London and Westminster Bank (Limited), Lothbury, London, E.C., 5th May, 1887.

Interest at £3 per cent. per annum, payable HalfYearly at the Bank of England, on 1st January and 1st July.

ISSUE OF £1,000,000 3 PER CENT. STOCK. Authorized by Acts 43 & 44 Vict.. c. 178; 44 & 45 Vi.t., c. 68; and 45 & 46 Vict., c. 61.

MINIMUM PRICE OF ISSUE £92 PER CENT. The First Dividend being Six Months' Interest will be payable 1st January, 1889.

Trustees or other persons for the time being having power to invest any moneys in nominal Debentures or nominal Debenture Stock issued under the Local Loans Act, 1875, are authorized to invest in Stock issued under these Acts.

ABRIDGED PROSPECTUS.

THE BANK OF ENGLAND give notice that by arrangements made with the Corporation of Birmingham, under the provisions of the Act 44 & 45 Vict. c. 68, and in pursuance of resolutions of the Town Council of Birmingham, they are authorized to receive tenders for £1,000,000 of BIRMINGHAM CORPORATION STOCK, bearing interest at £3 per centum per annum, payable half-yearly at the Bank of England or any of the Country Branches.

The Stock will be redeemable at par, on or after 1st day of July, 1947, at the option of the Corporation, upon one year's notice having been given by public advertisement, should the same not have been previously cancelled by purchase in the open market under the operation of the Redemption Fund constituted by the Stock Orders.

The Books of the Birmingham Corporation Stock are kept at the Bank of England, where all assignments and transfers are made; and holders of the

Stock have the option of taking out Stock Certificates to bearer, transferable by delivery, with coupons attached, at the same rate of charge as in the case of Government Stock.

Transfers and Stock Certificates to bearer are free of Stamp Duty.

Dividend Warrants are transmitted by post, when desired.

Tenders may be for the whole or any part of the Stock, and must state what amount of money will be given for every £100 of the Stock. Tenders for other than even hundreds of Stock, or at a price including fractions of a shilling other than sixpence, will not be accepted. Tenders are to be delivered at the Chief Cashier's Office, Bank of England, before Two o'clock on Tuesday, 12th July, 1887. Tenders at different Stock applied for must be written on the outside of

PARCHMENT AND LEGAL PAPERS CAPE of GOOD HOPE.-CONVERSION prices must be on separate forms. The amount of

Samples and Catalogues sent post-free.

HODGKINSON & CO.'S HAND-MADE BRIEF, FOCLSCAP, | and other PAPERS.

THE MOST SUITABLE FOR SOLICITORS, Can be obtained through all Stationers.

DINNEFORD'S MAGNESIA

The best Remedy for

ACIDITY of the STOMACH, HEARTBURN, HEADACHE GOUT and INDIGESTION,

And safest Aperient for Delicate Constitutions, Ladies Children, and Infants.

DINNEFORD'S MAGNESIA

MADE WITH BOILING WATER.

EPPS'S

GRATEFUL-COMFORTING.

СОСОА

MADE WITH BOILING MILK.

of the PUBLIC DEBT.-Notice is Hereby Given, that the above conversion will CLOSE on the 30th July, 1887.

London and Westminster Bank (Limited), Lothbury, London, E.C., 1st July, 1887.

SIX per CENT. GUARANTEED MORTGAGE
BONDS.
OMBARD INVESTMENT COMPANY.
Lo
-Capital paid up, 1,000,000 dols.; Liability of
Shareholders, 1,000,000 dols.; Surplus and Reserve,
250,000 dols.; Total, 2,250,000 dols. (£450,000).
Head Office-Boston, Mass., Mr. B. Lombard, jun.,
President.

Western Office Kansas City, Mo, Mr. J. L. Lom-
bard, Vice-President and Manager.
Sole Agent for Great Britain and Ireland-Mr. H.
Ramsden (Ramsden & Austin, Solicitors), 150,
Leadenhall-street, London, E.C.

The Company is prepared to receive money for investment in First Registered Mortgages of Freeholds in the States of the United States of America, for five years, yielding 6 per cent. interest, payable by coupons half-yearly in London, principal and interest guaranteed by the Company. For full information as to these investments apply to the London Office.

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TWO per CENT. INTEREST on CURRENT ACCOUNTS calculated on the minimum monthly balances, when not drawn below £100.

The Bank undertakes for its Customers, free of Charge, the Custody of Deeds, Writings, and other Securities and Valuables; the collection of Bills or Exchange, Dividends, and Coupons; and the purchase and sale of Stocks, Shares, and Annuities. Letters of Credit and Circular Notes issued.

The BIRKBECK ALMANACK, with full particulars, post-free, on application. FRANCIS RAVENSCROFT, Manager.

Stephens' Inks

the tender.

The minimum price, below which no tender will be accepted, has been fixed at £92 for every £100 of Stock. A deposit of £5 per cent. upon the amount of Stock tendered for must be paid at the time of the delivery of the tender, but the deposit must not be enclosed with the tender. Where no allotment is made the amount of the deposit will be returned, and in case of partial allotment the balance of the deposit will be applied towards the first instalment.

In the event of the receipt of tenders at or above the minimum price for a larger amount than that proposed to be raised, the tenders at the lowest price accepted will be subject to a pro ratâ diminution.

The dates at which the further payments on account of the Loan will be required, are as follows::

On Tuesday, the 19th July, 1837, so much of the amount tendered and accepted as, when added to the deposit, will leave Eighty Pounds (Sterling) to be paid for each hundred pounds of Stock.

On Friday, the 19th August, 1887, £25 per cent. ; On Tuesday, the 20th September, 1887, £25 per cent.;

On Thursday, the 20th October, 1837, £30 per cent. But those who so desire may, on and after the 19th July, 1897, pay up in full, and will be allowed a discount at the rate of £2 per cent. per annum upon the anticipated payments. In case of default in the payment of any instalment at its proper date, the deposit and instalments previously paid will be liable to forfeiture.

Interest will be payable 1st January and 1st July in each year; six months' interest on the full amount being payable 1st January, 1888.

Scrip Certificates to bearer will, in due course, be delivered at the Chief Cashier's Office, Bank of England, in Exchange for the Letters of Allotment.

The Stock will be inscribed on and after the 20th October, 1887, but Scrip paid up in full may forthwith be inscribed as Stock.

No tender will be received unless made upon the printed form, which may be obtained at the Chief Cashier's Office, Bank of England; of Messrs. Mullens, Marshall, & Co., Stock Brokers, 4, Lombardstreet, London, E.C.; and at the Borough Treasurer's Office, the Council House, Birmingham. BANK OF ENGLAND,

LONDON,

5th July, 1887.

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WE ARE GLAD TO SEE that a reform we have several times urged with regard to the annual provincial meetings of the Incorporated Law Society is now likely to be carried out. In writing on the Birmingham meeting of 1884 we remarked that "if the provincial meetings are not to degenerate into mere legal pic-nics, some new arrangements will have to be made as to the subjects to be discussed. These should not be left to the chance of someone offering a paper. . We cannot see why the suggestion we have made before should not be adopted-viz., that certain subjects of general interest to the profession should be fixed upon by the council and papers invited upon them, opportunity being given for

The Solicitors' Journal and Reporter. the reading of voluntary papers on other subjects." A resolution

LONDON, JULY 16, 1887.

CURRENT TOPICS.

MR. JUSTICE CHITTY, Mr. Justice NORTH, and Mr. Justice STIRLING will take no more witness actions during the present sittings than those which have already appeared in their respective daily lists; and no more special jury actions will be taken in the Queen's Bench Division during the present sittings.

IT IS ANNOUNCED that on and after Monday next the judges sitting in Court of Appeal No. 1 will act as a Divisional Court of the High Court, and take appeals from county courts, of which there are about forty waiting to be heard. Notice will be given of any days on which Court of Appeal No. 1 will take interlocutory appeals, and application may be made for the hearing of pressing appeals in the Final List.

WE PUBLISH in another column a list of the attendances of the members of the Council of the Incorporated Law Society, both at meetings of the council and at committees. We think that the result, as regards the majority of the ordinary members, will be considered exceedingly satisfactory, and the assiduity with which some of the busiest men in the country render their gratuitous services in the transaction of the affairs of the society deserves acknowledgment. It will be observed that one member of the council achieved the enormous number of 152 attendances on committees.

AT THE ANNUAL MEETING of the Incorporated Law Society last week the ever-recurring topic of the society's accounts formed the subject of a long debate. The objections raised related mainly to the form of the accounts, some of the members wanting more details. If there is no insuperable objection-and we confess we do not see any-there seems to be no reason why the accounts should not be modified to some extent to meet the objections raised; and, in order to prevent the waste of valuable time at future meetings, we hope that the council will give the matter consideration.

THE THANKS of the profession are due to the authorities of the Principal Registry of the Probate Division for a reform which was much needed, and the necessity for which has been frequently urged in these columns. The fact that so-called "office copies" of wills were produced in court which could not with propriety be described even as copies, not to say office copies (never having been examined) has given rise to great trouble. Latterly the judges, having experienced the frequent incorrectness of these so-called office copies, have rejected them and called for certified copies. Under the plan now adopted all such plain copies are marked "non-official," following the practice of the Chancery Division with regard to nonofficial copies of orders. A no-official copy of a will is of service for office use, as it may be examined with the original, but for the

was carried at the recent meeting for the appointment of a committee to consider and report on the arrangements of the October Meetings, and particularly as to choice of subjects; selection of readers and speakers, limiting length of speeches, and giving right of reply; time of distributing prints of the papers; previous publication of the programme of the meeting; admission to debates of solicitors not yet members; and all other points likely to increase the interest and beneficial influence of these meetings." The effect of the adoption of arrangements for the selection of the subjects for discussion will, we believe, be materially to increase the value and interest of the provincial meetings. There can never be any difficulty in finding topics of general interest, and if they are stated in the circular convening the meeting, members will come prepared to express considered views upon them. We are not at all clear, however, that the speakers ought to be selected beforehand, but we very heartily desire to limit the length of the speeches.

THE CONCLUDING STAGES of the Land Transfer Bill in the House of Lords were marked by something like a mutiny of the Conservative peers. There were fifty-five votes in favour of the omission of clause 39, relating to succession to real estate on intestacy, and the clause was carried by a majority of sixty-six, largely composed of Liberal peers. There was a still narrower majority (73 to 67) against Lord HERSCHELL'S amendment to clause 2, throwing the duty of registering on the purchaser and not on the vendor; and we think it may safely be said that, but for the loyalty to party to which Mr. WILLIAMS referred at the meeting of the Incorporated Law Society last week, there would have been in both cases considerable majorities against the Government. The amendments moved by the Lord Chancellor which we noted last week (p. 604), were all agreed to, and, with the exception of a somewhat elaborate further amendment of clause 39, dealing with the new law of succession to lunatics' and infants' property, no further alteration has been made. The discussion of the Bill by the House can hardly be said to have been adequate. The silence of peers like Lord SELBORNE, Lord HOBHOUSE, and Lord MACNAGHTEN, possessed of sufficient technical knowledge and experience to make their criticisms of value, is greatly to be deplored. Lord HERSCHELL, on whom the brunt of the discussion was thrown, conducted the controversy with great ability, but the subject was necessarily unfamiliar to him.

IT IS A CURIOUS FEATURE of modern practice that in some cases a defendant who fails to appear to an action is in a better position than a defendant who appears and defends. In the Queen's Bench Division, where a defendant fails to appear, judgment goes against him for the relief claimed, but in the Chancery Division it is otherwise, and the fact is worthy of note by practitioners. The case of Chapman v. Costan, which came before the court on the 9th inst., is an illustration of this result. The plaintiffs, in that case, were mortgagees, and the indorsement on the writ claimed (1) payment of principal and interest, and (2) foreclosure. The statement of claim, which was served with the writ, stated the mortgage deed, setting out the covenant to pay principal and interest, and the assignment of the premises subject to redemption.

The defendant did not appear, and the amount due was verified by affidavit. The case was heard on motion for judgment, when the plaintiffs asked for the usual judgment as settled in the case of Farrer v. Lacy, Hartland, & Co. (34 W. R. 22, 31 Ch. D. 42) directing (1) payment, and (2) foreclosure. Mr. Justice STIRLING refused, in the absence of the defendant, to give judgment for payment or to do more than make the usual foreclosure order. Had the defendant appeared and admitted the facts, it is difficult to see how he could have resisted judgment in the form asked for. It is worthy of consideration whether, in cases where a personal judgment is of importance, it will not be advisable to issue a writ in the Queen's Bench Division on which judgment can be obtained for payment of principal and interest, and to follow it up by a summons in the Chancery Division for foreclosure. The double proceeding would be more certain in its results and would not be much more costly than the attempt to combine two remedies in one action with the risk of being hampered by an absent defendant.

THE UNCERTAINTY of the law relating to bills of sale received further illustration in a case of Wit v. Banner decided on Tuesday. By section 4 of the Bills of Sale Act, 1882, it is required that the personal chattels comprised in the bill of sale shall be specifically described in the schedule. The question has now arisen as to what constitutes a sufficient description within these words? The above case referred to pictures, and these were set down as 300 oil pictures in gilt frames, 20 water-colour pictures, &c. Obviously it would be very difficult to identify any particular picture from this description, but then it is difficult to imagine any description which would in many cases really identify a picture. Mr. Justice WILLS said that the construction of the term "specifically described" must be reasonable, but in the case before him he contented himself by saying that the description was certainly not enough, without venturing to define what would have satisfied him. It had been said by Lord Justice LINDLEY, in Roberts v. Roberts (13 Q. B. D. 794), that an inventory must describe the chattels as men of business would describe them. But when this test was proposed to Mr. Justice WILLS he pointed out that the construction of the document lay with him, and he was not a man of business, but a judge. Counsel then ventured on the suggestion that it might be enough to describe them as an ordinary man would do. This is satisfactory as far as it goes, but it remains to be seen how an ordinary man would describe a picture by an unknown artist and representing no very definite subject. Of course, if pictures are hanging in a room and not liable in the ordinary course to be changed, they can be defined by the room. But in other cases it will apparently be necessary to describe each picture as carefully as possible. At any rate, this is one more proof that no caution can be too great in drawing bills

of sale.

THE JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice KEKEWICH in Allcard v. Skinner has been affirmed by the Court of Appeal, but the judgment was not unanimous and it differed altogether in its reasons from that of the court below. There was no doubt that the relation between Miss ALLCARD, the donor of the property in question, and Miss SKINNER, the lady superior of the sisterhood to which the property was given, was such as to call for the intervention of equity. The religious influence resulting from it was so strong that the donor could not be regarded as a free agent. But at one time, when she was on the point of joining the sisterhood and was forming the design of giving her property to it, she had the advice of her brother. Mr. Justice KEKEWICH held that this was sufficient to re-establish her in the position of a free person and to overcome the objection of undue influence. In commenting upon his judgment at the time, we pointed out (ante, p. 227) that in certain respects it made the law more definite, inasmuch as the competent independent advice which was one means of effecting the above purpose need not be legal advice, and that, provided it were in fact offered to the donor, it made no difference that the religious influence was so strong as to make it certain that the advice would not be taken; though probably, as we there surmised, the result might be different if the undue influence had been exerted with special force by the donee, or if the donor had no sufficient intelligence of the transaction to which advice could be

80

addressed. But in the Court of Appeal it was pointed out by Lord Justice COTTON that the advice given by the brother was not given at the time of the gift, but at some time previous, when a mere intention to make the gift was formed. Hence, at the time of the actual gift there was no independent advice to neutralize the undue influence, and equity might properly interfere. So far the other members of the court went with him. The only question remaining was whether Miss ALLCARD had commenced her action in time. She left the sisterhood in 1879, and, in the next year, demanded back her will, but made no mention of the money. It was held by Lord Justice COTTON that there had been no undue delay, as the plaintiff was not aware of her rights, and that, far as the sisterhood was concerned, it had in fact incurred no special expense on the faith of the money which would raise an equity in its behalf. However, both Lord Justice LINDLEY and Lord Justice BowEN thought differently. If the plaintiff did not know her own rights it was her own fault, and in 1880 she had, by demanding back her will and not the money, really confirmed the gift after the undue influence was at an end. Ever since that time she had allowed the sisterhood to regard the money as their own, and it was too late now to claim it back. It is curious how the point as to the time of the brother's advice was not noticed by Mr. Justice KEKEWICH, and yet was so conclusive with the Court of Appeal, and further, how the whole matter turned finally upon the delay of the plaintiff, and was not really affected by the undue influence which seemed to be, and indeed was, the most important feature in the case.

THE JUDGMENT of the House of Lords in Trevor v. Whitworth, reversing the decision of the Court of Appeal, is of great importance to the numerous "private companies "private companies" which have been formed in recent years. One of the main objects in these companies is to keep the shares in the hands of those who were partners in the old firm which has been converted into a company, or of such persons as the directors might think desirable, and the way in which this is sometimes sought to be accomplished is by enabling the shares of the company to be purchased out of the funds of the company. There has been an impression that a mere power to purchase shares for the benefit of the company (not being a power to traffic in shares) may be validly granted by the articles, without being also contained in the memorandum; the authority cited for this proposition being the decision of the Court of Appeal in Re Dronfield Silkstone Co. (29 W. R. 768, 17 Ch D. 76). In the recent case the articles of a private company provided that "any share may be purchased by the company from any person willing to sell it at such price, not exceeding the then marketable value thereof, as the board think reasonable"; but the memorandum did not contain any provision on the subject. The company had, under the power in the articles, purchased no fewer than 4,142 of its shares, and amongst other purchases had bought from the respondents shares of the value of £2,800, and this sum was allowed by them to remain in the hands of the company as a loan, bearing interest at 5 per cent. per annum. Four years afterwards an order was made by the Vice-Chancellor of the County Palatine of Lancaster for the voluntary winding up of the company, and objection was taken to the respondents ranking as creditors for this sum of £2,800. The Vice-Chancellor held that the respondents were not entitled to rank as creditors in respect of that sum, but his decision was reversed by the Court of Appeal (COTTON, BOWEN, and FRY, L.JJ.), who held that, although a company could not by its articles authorize a trafficking in its own shares, it might authorize the board to buy its shares" whenever they thought it desirable for the purposes of the company," or "in cases where it was incidental to the legitimate objects of the company that it should do so." The House of Lords unanimously reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal, on the ground that the purchase of the shares was an indirect mode of reduction of the capital of the company. The decision, it should be observed, does not touch the case where power to purchase its own shares is given to a company by its memorandum as well as by its articles. But where this is not the case there is no power to purchase shares out of the funds of the company. As Lord HERSCHELL said :-" If certain shareholders are disposed to hamper the proceedings of the company, and are willing to sell their shares, they may be bought out, but this must

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be done by persons, existing shareholders or others, who can be induced to purchase the shares, and not out of the funds of the company.' Nor does the decision affect the forfeiture, or perhaps the surrender, of shares. The former is expressly recognized by the Companies Act, 1862, and the latter does not involve any payment out of the funds of the company.

WE UNDERSTAND that an influential committee has been formed to carry out the suggestions contained in our Correspondence column a few weeks since as to the formation of a Law Library, &c., for the City of London. Mr. HERBERT M. Low, of 12, Breadstreet, Cheapside, E.C., is the secretary pro tem.

LIABILITY FOR REPAIR OF BRIDGES. THE liability for the repair of public bridges falls, as a general rule, upon the county, but it is remarkable that there should be no recognized procedure essential for the creation of this liability in the case of new bridges. The uncertainty of the law in this respect has been made very clear by the recent case of The Queen v. Inhabitants of the County of Southampton, and the protracted litigation which it has produced has done little to remove it. It is settled that mere user on the part of the public is not necessarily sufficient, and that there must be, in a certain sense, an adoption by the county; this adoption, however, is not to be a formal act, but is a question to be left to the jury on all the circumstances of the case.

It might be expected that, as bridges form a part of highways, the same law would be applicable to both, and it is strange that this has not been provided for by recent legislation. The greater inconvenience of the law relating to highways probably explains why these have been dealt with separately. The natural procedure, of course, when a highway or bridge is given by a private person to the public with the intention that the future liability for repair shall fall upon them, is to require a formal dedication by the donor and an acceptance by the public. To constitute such acceptance there should be, not merely a user by a portion of the public, but a formal acceptance by some representative body on behalf of the whole public on whom the subsequent cost will fall. Under the old law, however, this latter requirement was dispensed with in the case of highways, and a mere dedication by the owner brought after it the consequence that the highway became repairable by the inhabitants of the parish or district. The unsatisfactory nature of this state of things being evident, the matter was dealt with by the Highway Acts, 1835, s. 23, and 1862, s. 36. It is there provided that the question shall be submitted to a vestry meeting of the inhabitants of the parish. But with regard to bridges the case is different. So long ago as 1803 it was evident that the public authorities ought to have some control over their construction, and it was provided by section 5 of the County Bridges Act of that year that no bridge should be deemed a bridge repairable by the inhabitants of the county unless it should be erected in a substantial and commodious manner to the satisfaction of the county surveyor-a provision subsequently modified by 41 & 42 Vict. c. 77, s. 21, which enables the county authority to order that bridges certified by the county surveyor shall be repairable by the county. But the Acts were silent as to the other point dealt with by the Highway Acts-viz., the necessity of formal acceptance by the public, and the omission has not since been rectified. Hence the recent litigation in the case of the Southampton Bridge. It is true that the doctrine of the law appeared to be that some adoption by the public was necessary, and hence they were not left in the same defenceless condition as formerly with regard to highways; but the manner of such adoption was so uncertain that this gives little reason for the omission of the Legislature.

The original idea, indeed, seems to have been that the true test was that of utility to the public. Thus, in Rex v. West Riding of Yorkshire (5 Burr. 2594), Aston, J., quoted the rule "that if a man builds a bridge, and it becomes useful to the county in general, the county shall repair it." And in a case of the same name in 2 East. 341 Lord Ellenborough, C.J., refers to this as being the true rule, and speaks of adoption by the public as being merely evidence of utility. In the Southampton Bridge case a

land company, which had purchased a building estate on the east side of the river Itchin, and had made roads on it, constructed the Cobden Bridge in order to connect their new roads with an existing road from Southampton on the other side of the river. There was no doubt about the dedication of the bridge, for it was opened and dedicated to the public with much ceremony, nor was there any doubt as to user by the public. Before long the question as to liability for repair arose, and the land company indicted Mr. Justice the county at the Bristol Winter Assizes in 1886. Stephen appears to have directed the jury that mere user by the public was sufficient to throw the liability on the county, and the The verdict was above cases certainly support this view. accordingly given against the county. Next, an application was made to a divisional court for a new trial, on the ground of misdirection. This is reported in 17 Q. B. D. 424. An elaborate judgment was delivered by Wills, J., and, in this, after admitting that one of the conditions precedent to any liability on the part of a county for the repair of a bridge is that it should be of public utility, he went on to consider the further question of adoption by the county. He referred to some other observations of Lord Ellenborough in the judgment just referred to, where he speaks of the public adopting the bridge by lying by without objecting to it, and hence he infers that the bridge must be so built that the public must be able to object to it; but this will only be the case where it is built in the line of an existing highway, for then, both during its construction and after its erection, it could be objected to as a nuisance. Hence, in addition to the utility of the bridge, we have two other requisites; it must be in the line of an existing highway, and it must not have been objected to as a nuisance. This is exactly the view taken by Bayley, J., in Rex v. St. Benedict (4 B. & Ald. 450). "In the case of bridges there is always what is to be considered as an acquiescence by the county. The county is not liable except for bridges made in highways; the making of the bridge, and thereby obstructing the road while the bridge is making, may be treated as a nuisance, and the county may, if it think fit, stop its progress by indictment, and the forbearing to prosecute in that way acquiescence by the county in the building of the bridge." It is true that the restriction to bridges in a highway was not adopted by Mr. Justice Wills. The particular kind of acquiescence. mentioned above was, in the Southampton case, out of the question, but he did not feel called upon to state what was to take its place. At any rate, the acquiescence must be proved in some other way than by the mere fact of user by the public. Such being the common law, it remained to consider the Statute of Bridges, 22 Hen. 8, c. 5, which provides for the remedy of "all manner of annovances of bridges broken in the highways to the damage of the King's liege people." Of this it will be enough to say that it was held to refer only to bridges in existing highways, and, therefore, was not applicable to the present case.

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Accordingly, there was a rule for a new trial, and this was held before Mathew, J., at the last Bristol Winter Assizes. The judge directed the jury in accordance with the ruling of the Divisional Court, leaving it entirely to the jury whether, under all the circumstances, there had been such a dedication to the county as would make it liable for repairs. This time there was a verdict in favour of the county, but with the same result as before-an application to the Divisional Court for a new trial on the ground of misdirection. This has recently been argued before a full court, consisting of Coleridge, C.J., and three other judges. In refusing a new trial there seems to have been a feeling that nothing was to be gained by protracting the litigation. Mr. Justice Mathew had been very guarded in his direction to the jury, and the Lord Chief Justice and his brethren were unable to extract therefrom any proposition that was incorrect. They declined, therefore, to do anything to disturb a verdict with which the judge had not expressed himself dissatisfied. But this result will give little help for future guidance. It is clear that no formal act of adoption by the county is necessary; it is clear, too, that if the brdge is in the existing line of highway, the omission to prosecute as a nuisance will shew an acquiescence sufficient to make the county liable. But in other cases, where there is mere user by the public, this may or may not be sufficient, according to the circumstances of the case. Apparently it will only be sufficient when, in addition to shewing the general utility of the bridge, it also shews an adoption by the county. But what is to constitute this remains quite

unsettled. So far as actual use by the public goes, there could hardly be a stronger case than the present one. However, the jury decided that it was not sufficient, and the court has been content to leave the matter so.

THE LAW QUARTERLY REVIEW ON THE LAND
TRANSFER BILL.

THERE are two interesting notices of the Land Transfer Bill in
the current issue of the Law Quarterly Review. While various
critics of the Bill are found to select various points for special
attack, still it is notable (like the ballot of the Greek generals
after Salamis) what a very general consensus there is as to some
of the points which are usually mentioned as "minor."

cause of its extreme unpopularity, and it is to be hoped that the system of 1887 may be saved the responsibility of perpetuating such awkward expedients. That they are not necessary to a register is proved by the Torrens provisions above mentioned.

Mr. Humphry devotes a considerable space to pointing out a hardship that the Bill imposes on the ordinary landowner by offering him Hobson's choice of an "absolute" title, which he usually cannot get, or a title "with an objectionable epithet" (p. 267). The justice of this criticism depends upon two things, not yet very clear. First, whether the absolute title will, under the new procedure, be so difficult to get as to be beyond the reach of an ordinary landowner; and, secondly, will a possessory title, under the altered circumstances of universal compulsion, be considered objectionable?

Mr. Sargant makes a suggestion as to estates tail that seems valuable, and is mainly in accord with Mr. Hunter's paper, already noticed. It is that the protector of the settlement should be abolished, and that then estates tail should be retained." Their abolition is probably a concession to popular sentiment merely, and would be unnecessary if the protector of the settlement were abolished. Estates tail express an idea which could otherwise be expressed, if at all, only by a long and clumsy paraphrase, and they would be wholly innocuous if once the present difficulty in barring them when in reversion were removed." Quite apart from the functions of the protector, there are numerous cases in which a family estate would, if thus entailed, remain in the male line, where, if a fee simple only is permissible, it must go to females. An esteemed correspondent makes a strong protest in another column of our issue this week against the inconvenience likely to result from the proposed

abolition of estates tail.

We may remark, in conclusion, that the statement of one of the critics in the Law Quarterly, that the descent of the legal estate to executors or administrators is inseparable from the institution of a register, is not in accordance with the experience of the Torrens registries, which have been worked under the old law with perfect ease, though in some colonies real representatives have been instituted subsequently for quite other reasons.

REVIEWS.

DIGEST OF CASES OVERRULED, &c.

Both Mr. H. M. Humphry and Mr. C. H. Sargant agree in vigorously attacking the general form of the Bill, also section 21 of the Act of 1875 as to adverse possession; and Mr. Humphry supplements this objection with criticisms on the 19th clause of the amended Bill, which he describes as the most difficult of interpretation that the Bill contains." His detailed remarks on the clause are substantially in accordance with the view already expressed in these columns. The two critics also agree in considering that clause 42 (administration of realty and personalty pari passu) will not be so easy to apply as it appears, considering the different beneficial interests that may arise in the two species of property (but see the amendments noticed in our last week's issue). On the vexed subject of compulsion, however, Mr. Humphry's view is that a scheme that is looked upon by the public as a panacea for the evils of conveyancing ought to be able to win its way by less violent means; while Mr. Sargant holds that "the Bill marks a great advance on the Act of 1875, in that it proposes to render registration compulsory." In his inquiry into the causes of the failure of the Act of 1875, Mr. Sargant notices an imperfection in the essence of the scheme which is not remedied by the present Bill, and which, considering the enormous amount of land affected by it, is certainly a very grave omission-that is to say, that registered proprietorship confers no power to lease. For, though sections 7 and 30 of the Act of 1875 in terms confer an absolute fee simple on the registered proprietor which would, at first sight, imply absolute power, not only to lease, but to settle, to devise, to charge in any way he may think proper, so as to make such a person a satisfactory fount of title, A DIGEST OF CASES OVERRULED, NOT FOLLOWED, DISAPPROVED, even for dealings which have to be conducted off the register, yet APPROVED, DISTINGUISHED, COMMENTED ON AND SPECIALLY CONthe better opinion now is that this is not the case, and that the SIDERED IN THE ENGLISH COURTS FROM THE YEAR 1756 to 1886 "fee simple" of the registered proprietor is not really a fee simple INCLUSIVE. By CHARLES WILLIAM MITCALFE DALE, M.A., LL.B., at all; that in many cases it is, in fact, no more a fee simple than and RUDOLF CHAMBERS LEHMANN, M.A., assisted by CHARLES the "proprietor" is a proprietor in the ordinary sense of the word. H. L. NEISH, M. A., and HERBERT H. CHILD, B.A., Barristers-atFor it appear n perusing the remainder of the Act, that the Law. Stevens & Sons; H. Sweet & Sons; W. Maxwell & Son. "proprietor's' fee simple" solely consists of a power to charge This book constitutes a new departure in digests. The aim of the and a power to transfer the land (sections 22, 29) in the prescribed compilers is to enable the practitioner to discover how any case has manner. The prescribed manner is a very prescribed one indeed, been treated by the judges who have discussed it and how much of it and does not include (for instance) the creation of a rent-charge remains good law. The mode in which this is carried out is by first or the subsequent institution of a sub-mortgage, nor of the limita- of all presenting the cases in a tabular form, giving a brief statement tion of a life estate or term of years. If such things are wanted of how the case has been treated, where (with the date) and by whom, and a reference to the column of the subsequent digest in which the the proprietor of the land or charge must prove his title by some case is treated in detail. Cases which stand by themselves, and which means external to the register. It is surely time, now that this would not be elucidated by extracts from judgments, or such extracts system is to be enforced on everybody, that some attempt should would be too lengthy for the limits of the book, are noticed in the be made to improve it by making it, in substance, more conform- tabular index only, and reversed cases since 1856 also usually appear able to every-day needs, and less misleading to the unwary stulent in the index only. Then follows a digest, arranged according to subby the use of familiar terms in such very unfamiliar senses. The jects, with headings and sub-headings, and containing short extracts Torrens Acts are immeasurably superior to our own in these from the judgments in which the case has been dealt with. The respects; they provide, for instance, not only for the creation of best mode of giving an idea of the digest is to take a particular case life estates and estates in remainder and terms of years by the as to which the practitioner desires information. Let us take Cooke v. Crawford (13 Sim. 91). Looking in the index, we find it has been registered proprietor, but also for their direct registration on the "commented on by Romilly, M.R., "held overruled" by Jessel, register-books. Why, as Mr. Sargant justly suggests, the pro- M.R., and "upheld" by the Court of Appeal; and turning to column prietor's fee simple should not be a fee simple (at least as regards 1330 of the digest we find, under the head of "trustee," sub-head all third parties) for all intents and purposes it is most difficult to "trust for sale," extracts from the judgments in Macdonald v. Walker see. The Procrustaan system of cutting down the modes of (14 Beav. 556); a statement that in Osborne to Rowlett (13 Ch. D. 774) utilizing and enjoying landed property to suit the inflexible Cooke v. Cranford was held overruled, and extracts from the judgrigidity of two official formulæ, relegating all excrescences, howments in Re Morton and Hallett (15 Ch. D. 143). The advantage to the lawyer of this reference book to cases is obvious, and the ever vital, to the limbo of the equitable estate, is hardly the way only question is as to the mode of execution of the work. Conto produce a system satisfactory to landowners. The prevalence sidering the enormous labour involved, we think that the exeof so fatal a fault in the system of 1875 is doubtless largely thecution is very creditable. The cases given are extremely numerous, and,

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