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The LONDON and WESTMINSTER BANK gLimitcd) are instructed by the Government of the

ape of Good Hope. in consequence of numerous applimtions from the holders of Cape of Good Hope Government Debentures who did not avail themselves of the ilonver.-ion oflered in Angust.1886. to make a further OFFER to the HOLDERS of outstanding DEBENTURES of CONVERSION into CAPE of GOOD HOPE CONSOLIDATED STOCK.

The Cape of Good Hope Consolidated Stock. bearing interest at four per cent. per annum, created for theéiurposes of this Conversion, under the Acts of the ape Legislature. No. 16 of 1881, as amended by No. 18 of 1883 and No. 16 of 1886, is inscribed in accordance with the provisions of the “Colonial Stock Act, 1877"—40 A: 41 Vict. cap. 59—i1'1 the books of the stock kept by the London and Westminster Bank (Limited), an is transferable, without charge and free of stamp duty, at that bank. either by t e stockholders personally or by their attorneys. The interest. at the rate of four per cent get annum. is payable, on behalf of the Capg of ood Hope Government. at the London and estminster Bank (Limited). Lothbmry, on the 15th April and 15th October in each year, bydivldend warrants, which, if desired, can be sentbypost to the stockholders; and the stock will be redeemable at par at the same bank on the 15th October, 1936, but the Government of the Cape of Good. Hope have the option of redempgon st par in London on or after the 15th Octo r, 1916, on giving twelve calendar months‘ notice by advertisement in the “London Gazette" and in the "Times" newspaper, or by post to the thcn stockholders at their registered addresses.

Stock certificates to bearer, oi’ the denominations of £100, £500, and £1,000 with cougons of the halfyearly dividends attached. are o tainablc in exchange lor inscribed stock at the London and Westminster Bank (Limited), Lothbnry. on payment of the prescribed fees, and such certificates can be re-inscribed as stock at the will of the owner.

The revenues of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope alone are liable in res ect of this stock and the dividends thereon, and the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom and the C(l_1l1IDIBBiOI;10l'S of her lida1esty's Treasury are not directly or indirectly liable or respoi sible for the ayment of the stock or the dividends thereon, or Tor any matter relating thei'eto.—40 8: 41 Vict. cap. 59, sec. 19.

The Conversion will close on the aolh July, 1887.

Prospectuses, giving full details of the amounls of stock offered in exchange for the various descriptions of Cape of_G9od Hope Government Debentures, and forms for listing the debentures to be lodged for conversion, can be obtained of the London and “'estminster Bank (Limited).

London and Westminster Bank (Limited), Leth

bury, London, E.C., oth May, 1887.

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Tenders may be for the whole or any part of the Stock, and must state what amount of money will be given for every £100 01 the Stock. Tenders for other than cven hundreds of Btock, or at a pi ice including ii-actions of a shilling other than sixpence, will not be accepted. Tenders are to be delivered at the Chic! Cashier-’s Oiiice, Bank of England. before Two o clock on Tuesday, 12th July, 1887. Tenders at different gr ices must be on separate forms. Tho amount of

took alpplied for must be written on the outside of the ten er.

The minimum price, below which no tender will be accepted, has been fixed at £92 for every £100 of stock.

A deposit oi £5 par cent. upon the amount of Stock tendered for must be paid at the time of the delivery oi the tender, but the deposit must not be enclosed with the tender. Where no allotment is made the amount of the deposit will be returned, and in case of partial allotment the balance of the deposit will be applied towards the first instalment.

In the event of the receipt of tenders at or above the minimum price for a arger amount than that proposed to be raised, the tendersat the lowest price accepted will be sub; ect to a pro ratfi diminution.

The dates at which the further ‘payments 011 iiocount of the Loan will be require , are as folowin

On Tuesday, the 19th July, I857, so mach of the amount tendered and accepted as. when added to 3%? deposit, will leave Eighty Pounds (sterling) to paid for each hundred pounds of Stoc x.

On Friday, the 19th August, 1887, £25 por cent. ;

On Tuesday, tho 20th September, 1887, £25 per cent. ;

On Thursday, the 20th October, 1s37, £30 per cent

Biit those who so desire mag, on and after the l9_th July, 1557, pay up in full, an will be allowed a discount at the rote of £2 per cent. per annum upon the anticipated payments. In case oi default in the paimsnt of any instalment at its goper date,bths dilposit and instalments previous paid will ehabe to forfeiture.

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The Stock will be inscribed on and alter the 20%|: October, 1887, but Scrip paid up in full may 5°" ‘ with be inscribed. as Btock.

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Paterson. Ex psrte, Be Rsthbona. 627

Roe v. Mutual Fund Loan Associ-
ation (Lim.) .................. . . 628

Walker v. The General Mutual In

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S_riiiLixo will take no more witness actions during the p
sittings than those which have already appeared in their resp
daily lists; and no more special jury actions will be taken
Queen’s Bench Division during the present sittings.

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_I_i' is smvovrrcsn that on and after Monday next the

sitting_in Court of Appeal No. l will act as a Divisional C
the High Court, and take appeals from county courts, of
there are about forty waiting to be heard. Notice will l-e
of any days on which Court of Appeal No. 1 will take
locutory appeals, and application may be made for the hes
pressing appeals in the Final List.

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WE rriinisir in another column a list of the attcndan the members _of the Council of the Incorporated Law S both at meetings of the council and at committees. We that the result, as regards the majority of the ordinary members, Will Je considered exceedingly satisfactory, and the assiduity which some of thc busiest men in the country render their tous services in the transaction of the affairs of the society d acknowledgment. It will be observed that one member council achieved the enormous number of 152 attendan

my _ last E ANNUAL nsnrisc of the Incorporated Law S for geek the _ever-recurring topic of the society's ac I118 the subject of a long debate. The objections want Y _ orm o the_ accounts, some of the me we 0511!?’ more details. If there is no insuperable objection accou ntess we do not see any—there seems to be no reason w tion 11 _s should not be modified to some extent to meet the "med; 11115. ID. order to prevent the waste of valuabl consideration. s , e 0P6 at the council will give the m

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Prim, I _ e pro ession are due to the authorities
much P“ 519!-IlBtT_V of the Probate Division for a reform which was
in thegiee ed, find the necessity for which has been frequently
were ° §°1l1!11l_1s- The fact that so-called “ office copies ” of
even Ego lliceid in court which could not with propriety be described
has givenP_ ~, not to say office copies (never having been examined)

The Solicitors’ journal and Reporter.

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Mir. Jnsrics Ciiirrr, Mr. Justice Nonrn, and Mr.

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rise to great trouble. Latter] the 'udgcs, having experijgjigeglghfrequent incorrectness of thesye S0-Cll.llk'(l office copie adopted anew and called for certified copies. Under the pla ing the Blfoh plain copies are marked “non-official,” fo oflicial copractice of the Chancery Division with regard to _ for “fie P195 Of orders. A no;-official copy of a will is of service 9 "59, as it may be examined with the original, but for the


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mingham meeting of 1984 we remarked that “if the provincial
meetings are not_to degenerate into mere legal pic-nics, some new
arrangements will have to be made as to the subjects to be
discussed. These should not be left to the chance of someone
05611113 11 pflpelfi - . . We cannot see why the suggestion we
have made before should not be adopted—viz., that certain subjects
of general interest to the profession should be fixed upon by the
council and papers invited upon them, opportunity being given for
the reading of voluntary papers on other subjects.” A resolution
was carried at the recent meeting for the appointment of a com-
mittee “ to consider and report on the arrangements of the October
Meetings, and particularly as to choice of subjects; selection of
readers and speakers, limiting length of speeches, and giving right
of reply; time of distributing prints of the papers ; previous
publication of the programme of the meeting ; admission to debates
of solicitors not yet members; and all other points likely to increase
the interest and beneficial influence of these meetings.” The effect
of the adoption of arrangements for the selection of the subjects
for discussion will, we believe, be materially to increase the value
and interest of the provincial meetings. There can never be any
difliculty in finding topics of general interest, and if they are stated
in the circular convening the meeting, members will come pre-
pared to express considered views upon them. We are not at all
clear, however, that the speakers ought to be selected beforehand,
but we very heartily desire to limit the length of the speeches.

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Tim CONCLUDING smoas of the Land Transfer Bill in the House of Lords were marked by something like a mutiny of the Conservative peers. There were fifty-five votes in favour of the omission of clause 39, relating to succession to real estate on intestacy, and the clause was carried by a majority of sixty-six, largely composed of Liberal peers. There was a still narrower majority (73 to 67) against Lord Hr:1iscn1:LI.’s amendment to clause 2, throwing the duty of registering on the purchaser and not on the vendor; and we think it may safely be said that, but for the loyalty to party to which Mr. WILLIAMS referred at the meeting of the Incorporated Law Society last week, thcre would have been in both cases considerable majorities against the Government. The amendments moved by the Lord Chancellor which we noted lust week (p. G04), were all agreed to, and, with the exception of a somewhat elaborate further amendment of clause 39, dealing with the new law of succession to lunatics’ and infants’ property, no further alteration has been made. The discussion of the Bill by the House can hardly be said to have been adequate. The silence of peers like Lord SELHORNE, Lord Honnovsn, and Lord DIACN.-LGIITEN, possessed of sufficient technical knowledge and experience to make their criticisms of value, is greatly to be deplored. Lord HERSCHELL, on whom the brunt of the discussion was thro_ivn, conducted the controversy with great ability, but the subject was necessarily unfamiliar to him. '

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Ir is A CURIOUS inirviin of modern practice that in tone cases a defendant who fails to appear to an action is in a better position than a defendant who appears and defends. In the Queen’s Bench Division, where a defendant fails to appear, j udgIn_eIit_ goes against him for the relief claimed, but in the Chancery Division it is otherwise, and the fact is worthy of note by praotiti0I1@ls- Th0 case of C/layman v. Coslam, which come before the court on the 9th inst., is an illustration of this result. The plaintiffs, in that case, were mortgngccs, and the indorsement on the writ clainjed (1) payment of principal and interest, and (2) foreo_l0sure- 'lhe statement of claim, which was served with the writ, stated the mortgage deed, setting out the covenant to pay principal and_interest, and the assignment of the premises subject to redemption.

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The defendant did not appear, and the_ amount due was verified by affidavit. The case was heard on motion for judgment, when the plaintiffs asked for the usual judgment as settled m the case of Fnrrer v. Lacy, Hartlaml, rf: U0. (34 W. R. 22, 531 Ch. D. 42) directing (l)payment, and (2) foreclosure. _ Mr. Justice Srnmnve refused, in the absence of the defendant, to give judgment for payment or to do more than make the usual foreclosure order. Had the defendant appeared and admitted the facts, it is difficult to see how he could have resisted judgment in the form asked for. It is worthy of consideration whether, in cases where a personal judgment 1s of importance, it will not be advisable to issue a writ in the Queen’s Bench Division on which judgment can be obtained for payment of principal and interest, and to follow it up by :1 summons in the Chancery Division for foreclosure. The double proceeding would be more certain in its results and would not be much more oostly than the attempt to combine two remedies in one action with the risk of being hampered by an absent defendant.


Tm: uxcannuivrr of the law relating to bills of sale received further illustration in s case of Wilt v. Banner decided on Tuesday. By section4 of the Bills of Sale Act, 1882, it is required that the personal chattels comprised in the bill of sale shall be specifically described in the schedule. The question has now arisen as to what constitutes a sufiicient description within these words? The above case referred to pictures, and these were set down as 300 oil pictures in gilt frames, 20 water-colour pictures, &c. Obviously it would be very difiicult to identify any particular picture from this description, but then it is difficult to imagine any description which would in many cases really identify a picture. Mr. Justice Wir.Ls said that the construction of the term “ specifically described” must be reasonable, but in the case before him he contented himself by saying that the description was certainly not enough, without venturing to define what would have satisfied him. lt had been said by Lord Justice Lrsnnnr, in Roberts v. Roberts (13 Q. B. D. 794), that an inventory must describe the chattels as men of business would describe them. But when this test was proposed to Mr. Justice Wrtrs he pointed out that the construction of the document lay with him, and he was nota man of business, but a judge. Counsel then ventured on the suggestion that it might be enough to describe them as an ordinary man would do. This is satisfactory as far as it goes, but it remains to be seen how an ordinary man would describe a picture by an unknown artist and representing no very definite subject. Of course, if pictures are hanging in a room and not liable in the ordinary course to be changed, they can be defined by the room. But in other cases it will apparently be necessary to describe each picture as carefully as possible. At any rate, this is ope more proof that no caution can be too great in drawing bills o sa e.

Tun JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice 1{Eli1~L\\'lL‘ll in Allczral v. Skinner has been affirmed by the Court of Appeal, but the judgment was not unanimous and it differed altogether in its reasons from that of the court below. There was no doubt that the relation between Miss Atncann, the donor of the property in question, and Miss Snrsnss, the lady superior of the sisterhood to which the property was given, was such as to call for the intervention of equity. The religion influence resulting from it was so strong that the donor could not be regarded as a free agent. But at one time, when she was on the point of joining the sisterhood and was forming the design of giving her property to it, she had the advice of her brother. Mr. Justice Knumvrcn held that this was sufiicient to re-establish her in the position of n free person and to overcome the objection of undue influence. In commenting upon his judgment at the time, we pointed out (ante, p. 227) that in certain respects it made the law more definite, inasmuch as the competent independent advice which was one means of effecting the above purpose need not be legal advice, and that, provided it were in fact ofiered to the donor, it made no difiereuce that the religious influence was so strong as to make it certain that the advice would not be taken ; though probably, as we there surmised the result might be different if the undue influence had beeii exerted with special force by the donee, or if the donor had no surlicient intelligence of tho transaction to which advice could be


addressed. But in the Court of Appeal it was pointed out by Lord Justice Corroiv that the advice given by the brother was not given at the time of the gift, but at some time previous, when a mere intention to make the gift was formed. Hence, at the time of the actual gift there was no independent advice to neutralize the undue influence, and equity might properly interfere. So far the other members of the court went with him. The only question remaining was whether Miss ALLcsnn had commenced her action in time. She left the sisterhood in 1879, and, in the next year, demanded back her will, but made no mention of the money. It was held by Lord Justice Corrorv that there had been no undue delay, as the plaintiff was not aware of her rights, and that. so far as the sisterhood was concerned, it had in fact incurred no special expense on the faith of the money which would raise an equity in its behalf. However, both Lord Justice Ln:nLEY and Lord Justice Bowen thought differently. If the plaintiff did not know her own rights it was her own fault, and in 1880 she had, by demanding back her will and not the money, really confirmed the gift after the undue influence was at an end. Ever since that time she had allowed the sisterhood to regard the money as their own, and it was too late now to claim it back. It is curious how the point as to the time of the br0ther’s advice was not noticed by Mr. Justice KEKEWICH, and yet was so conclusive with the Court of Appeal, and further, how the whole matter turned finally upon the delay of the plaintiff, and was not really affected by the undue influence which seemed to be, and indeed was, the most important feature in the case.

Tns JUDGMENT of the House of Lords in Trevor v. Whifworl/1, reversing the decision of the Court of Appeal, is of great importance to the numerous “private companies” which have been formed in recent years. One of the main objects in these companies is to keep the shares in the hands of those who were partners in the old firm which has been converted into a company, or of such persons as the directors might think desirable, and the way in which this is sometimes sought to be accomplished is by enabling the shares of the company to be purchased out of the funds of the company. There has been an impression that a mere power to purchase shares for the benefit of the company (not being a power to traffic in shares) may he validly granted by the articles, without being also contained in the memorandum; the authority cited for this proposition being the decision of the Court of Appeal in Re D7'071fi:lr1 Sillcslone Ca. (29 \V. R. 768, 17 Ch D. 76). In the recent case the articles of a private company provided that “any share may be purchased by the company from any person willing to sell it at such price, not exceeding the then marketable value thereof, as the board think reasonable”; but the memorandum did not contain any provision on the subject. The company had, under the power in the articles, purchased no fewer than 4,142 of its shares, and amongst other purchases had bought from the respondents shares of the value of £2,800, and this sum was allowed by them to remainin the hands of the company as a loan, bearing interest at 5 per cent. per annum. Four years alterwards an order was made by the Vice-Chancellor of the County Palatine of Lancaster for the voluntary winding up of the company, and objection was taken to the respondents ranking as creditors for this sum of £2,800. The Vice-Chancellor held that the respondents were not entitled to milk as creditors in respect of that sum, but his decision was reversed by the Court of Appeal (Corrox, Bownx, and Far, L.JJ.), “'h° held that, although a company could not by its articles authorize B traflic-king in its own shares, it might authorize the board to buy its shares “ whenever they thought it desirable for the purposes of the company," or “in cases where it was incidental to Um legitimate objects of the company that it should do so.” The House of Lords unanimouslv reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal, on the ground that the purchase of the shares was B11 indirect mode of reduction of the capital of the company The decision, it should be observed. does not touch the case where power to purchase its o\vn shares is given to a company bl’ its memorandum as well as by its articles. But whcrc this is not the 01189 there is no power to purchase shares out of the funds of the company. As Lord Hnnscnnrr. said :—“If certain shareholders are disposed to hamper the proceedings of the company, and arc Willing 150 sell their shares, they may be bought out, but this mull?

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July :6, 1887- g run SOLICITORS’ JOURNAL. 6,,


be done by persons, existing shareholders or others, who can be
induced to purchase the shares, and not out of the funds of the
company.” Nor does the decision affect the forfeiture, or perhaps
the surrender, of shares. The former is expressly recognized by
the Companies Act, 1862, and the latter does not involve any pay-
ment out of the funds of the company. .

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We UNDERSTAND that an influential committee has been formed to carry out the suggestions contained in our Correspondence column afew weeks since as to the formation'of a Law Library, &c., for the City of London. Mr. Hniinunr M. Low, of 12, Breadstreet, Cheapside, E.O., is the secretary pro tam.



Tin: liability for the repair of public bridges falls, as a general rule, upon the county, but it is remarkable that there should be no recognized procedure essential for the creation of this liability in the case of new bridges. The uncertainty of the law in this respect has been made very clear by the recent case of The Queen v_. _InliabiianzԤ ofitfie Counly of Southampton, and the protracted litigation which it has produced has done little to remove it. It is settled that mere user on the part of the public is not necessarily sufiicient, and that there must be, in a certain sense, an adoption by the county; this adoption, however, is not to be a formal act, but is a question to be left to the jury on all the circumstances of the case.

It might be expected that, as bridges form a part of highways, the same law would be applicable to both, and it is strange that this has pot been provided for by recent legislation. The greater inconvenience of the law relating to highways probably explains Why these have been dealt with separately. The natural procedure, °i °°‘11B9. T_Vhen_ a highway or bridge is given by a private person to the public with the intention that the future liability for repair shall fall upon them, is to require a formal dedication by the donor paid an acceptance by the public. To constitute such acceptance b ere should be, not merely a user by a portion of the public, apt a formal acceptance by some representative body on behalf of the whole public on whom the subsequent cost will fall. Under _ 9lid law, however, this latter requirement was dispensed with pa the case of_ highways, and a mere dedication by the owner

‘Put-Zht after i_t the_ consequence that the highway became repflizable by the inhabitants of the parish or district. The unsatisd':ial‘;TY _l1flture of this state of things being evident, the matter was is th with by the Highway Acts, 1835, s. 23, and _1862, s. 36. It meet?“ PT°V1d¢_id that the question _shall be submitted to a vestry the mg ‘ff the inhabitants of the parish. But with regard to bridges

ublcsse is different. So long ago as 1803 it was eyident that the End is authorities ought to have some control over their construction, yearlthwfls provided by section 5 of the County Bridges Act of that inhamat no bridge should be deemed a bridge repairable by the mufilants of the county unless it should be _erected in a subBu" "1 and commodious manner to the satisfaction of the county 77 F52‘-21 provision subsequently modified by 41 & 42 Vi_ct. c. eelitifi d ,b which enables the county authority to order that bridges But the Ay the county surveyor shall be repairable by the county. Hi h 9 cts were silent as to the other point dealt with by the angtfival’ AtS_-—viz., the necessity of formal acceptance by the public, “ti t_6 Oinission has not since been rectified. Hence the recent the83°1l;l1_in the case of the Southampton Bridge. It is true that pumice rine of the law appeared to be that some adoption by the defence?" l1e°@8§al'y, and hence they were not left in the same the mness condition as _forn-.erly with regard to highways;_but reason fneljfif Bllcli adoption was so uncertain that this gives little

The 0°!’ _ 8 omission of the Legislature. was thB€"E}11fll_1flea, indeed, seems to have been that the true test qf ywkshti’. “film? to the public. Thus, in Rea: v. lVest Rirliny 3 man b {jg (5 Burr. 2594), iiston, J., quoted the rule “that if general £1111 (ls a bridge, and _it_becomes useful to the county in Mme ii) 26Ecounty shall repair it." And in a case of the same being the t ast. 341 Lord Ellenborough, C.J., refers to this as merel . me rule, Bud speaks of adoption by the public as being

Y evidence of utility. In the Southampton Bridge case a

land com an which had ur ' '
side of thl; riter Itchin, aiid (lIll;idlelZ1U:d§ll‘1dgaBgOTlst?t:e ddlngtlfutiltall
the Cobden Bridge in order to connect their new rbads with En
existing road from Southampton on the other side of the river
There was no doubt about the dedication of the bridge, for it was
opened and dedicated to the public with much ceremony nor was
there any doubt as to user by the public. Before long the nes-
tion as to liability for repair arose, and the land company indicted
the county at the Bristol Winter Assizes in 1886. Mr Justice
Stephen appears to have directed the jury that mere user by the
public was suflicient to throw the liability on the county and the
above cases certainly support this view. The verziici; was
accordingly given against the county. Next, an application was
made to a divisional court for a new trial, on the ground of mig-
direction. This is reported in 17 Q. B. D. 424. An elaborate
judgment was delivered by Wills, J., and, in this, after admitting
that one of the conditions precedent to any liability on the part of
a county for the repair of a bridge is that it should be of public
utility, he went on to consider the further question of adoption by
the county. life referred to some other observations of Lord
Ellenborough in the udgment just referred to, where he
speaks of_ the public adopting the bridge by lying by
without objecting to it, and hence he infers that the bridge must
be so built that the public must be able to object to it; but this
will only be the case where it is built in the line of an existing
highway, for then, both during its construction and after its
erection, could be objected to as a nuisance. Hence, in addition
to the utility of the bridge, we have two other requisites ; it must
be in the line of an existing highway, and it must not have been
objected to_ as a nuisance. This is exactly the view taken by
Bayley, J., in Rea: v. St. Benedict (4 B. 8: Ald. 450). “In the
case _of bridges there is always what is to be considered as an
acquiescence by the county. The county is not liable except for
bridges made in highways ; the making of the bridge, and thereby
obstructing the road while the bridge is making, may be treated as
a nuisance, and the county may, if it think fit, stop its progress
by indictment, and the forbearing to prosecute in that way is an
acquiescence by the county in the building of the bridge.” It is
true that the restriction to bridges in ii highway was not adopted
by Mr. Justice Wills. The particular kind of acquiescence
mentioned above was, in the Southampton case, out of the ques-
tion, but he did not feel called upon to state what was to take its
place. At any rate, the acquiescence must be proved in some other
way than by the mere fact of user by the public. Such being the
common law, it remained to consider the Statute of Bridges,
22 Hen. 8, c. 5, which provides for the remedy of “ all manner of
annoyances of bridges broken in the highways to the damage of
the King’s liege people.” Of this it will be enough to say that it
was held to refer only to bridges in existing highways, and, there-
fore, was not applicable to the present case.

Accordingly there was a rule for a new trial, and this was held

b f M thew J. at the last Bristol Winter Assizes. Th_e udge

e ore a ,
directed the jui'y in accordance with the ruling of the Divisional
' ' ' ' h d all the

Court, leaving it entirely to the jury whet er, un er
circumstances, there had been such a dedication to the county as
would make it liable for repairs. This time there was a verdict in
favour of the county, but with the same result as before—an
application to the Divisional Court for a new trial on the ground
of misdirection. This has recently been argued before a full
‘ ' f C l rid e OJ. and three other judges. In

court, consisting o o e g , , _
refusing a new trial there seems to have been a feeling that nothing
' ' ' ' t' . Mr. Justice

was to be gained by protracting the litiga ion

Mathew had been very guarded in his direction to the jury, and
the Lord Chief Justice and his brethren were unable to extract
therefrom any proposition that was incorrect. They declined,
therefore, to do anything to disturb a verdict with which the judge
had not expressed himself dissatisfied. But this result will give
little help for future guidance. It is clear that no formal act of adop-
tion by the county is necessary; it is clear, too, that if the brdge_is
in the existing line of highway, the omission to prosecute as a nuis-
ancc will shew an. acquiescence suflicient to make the county liable.
But in other cases, where there is mere user by the public, this
may or may not be sufficient, according to the circumstances of the
case. Apparently it will only be suflicient when, in addition to
shewing the general utility of the bridge, _it also _shews an adop-
tion by the county. But What is to constitute this remains quite




unsettled. So far as actual use by the public goes, there could hardly be a stronger case than the present one. However, the jury decided that it was not sufficient, and the court has been content to leave the matter so.


THERE are two interesting notices of the Land Transfer Bill in the current issue of the Law Quarterly Review. While various critics of the Bill are found to select vaiious points for special attack, still it is notable (like the ballot of the Greek generals after Salamis) what a very general conscnsuc there is as to some of the points which are usually mentioned as “ minor.”

Both Mr. H. M. Humphry and Mr. C. H. Sargent agree in vigorously attacking the general form of the Bill, also section 21 of the Act of 1875 as to adverse possession; and Mr. Humphry supplements this objection with criticisms on the 19th clause of the amended Bill, which he describes as the most dilficult of interpretation that the Bill contains.” His detailed remarks on the clause are substantially in accordance with the view already expressed in these columns. The two critics also agree in considering that clause 42 (administration of realty and personalty pan" pnssu) will not be so easy to apply as it appears, considering the different beneficial interests that may arise in the two species of property (but see the amendments noticed in our last week’s issue). On the vexed subject of compulsion, however, Mr. Humphry’s view is that a scheme that is looked upon by the public as a panacea for the evils of conveyancing ought to be able to win its way by less violent means; while Mr. Sargent holds that “the Bill marks a great advance on the Act of 1875, in that it proposes to render registration compulsory.”

In his inquiry into the causes of the failure of the Act of 1875, Mr. Sargent notices an imperfection in the essence of the scheme which is not remedied by the present Bill, and which, considering the enormous amount of land affected by it, is certainly a very grave omission—that is to say, that registered proprietorship confers no power to lease. For, though sections 7 and 30 of the Act of 1875 in_ terms confer an absolute fee simple on the registered proprietor which would, at first sight, imply absolute power, not only to lease, but to settle, to devise, to charge in any way he may think proper, _eo as to_make such a person a satisfactory fount of title, even for dealings which_have to be conducted off the register, yet the better opinion now is that this is not the case, and that the “fee simple 1’ of the registered proprietor is not really a fee simple at all; that in many cases it is, in fact, no more a fee simple than the “_proprictor ” is ii proprietor in the ordinary sense of the word. For it appear in perusing the remainder of the Act, that the “ propi-ietor’s’ *‘ fee simple ” solely consists of n power to charge and a power to transfer the laud (sections 22, 29) in the prescribed manner. The prescribed manner is ii very prescribed one indeed, and does not Include (for instance) the creation of a rent-charge or the subsequent institution of a sub-mortgage, nor of the limitation of a life estate or term of years. If such things are wanted the proprietor of the land or charge must prove his title by some means external to the register. It is surely time, now that this system is tc_be enforced on everybody, that some attempt should be made to improve it by making _it, insubstance, more conformable to every-day needs, and less misleading to the unwary student by the use of familiar terms in such very unfamiliar senses. The Torrens Acts are i_nimeasuI_'ably superior to our own in these respects; they provide, for instance, not only for the creation of life_ estates and estates in remainder and terms of years by the registered proprietor, but also for their direct registration on the register-books. \Vhy, as Mr. Sargent justly suggests, the propi-ieto_r’s fee simple should not be a fee simple (at least as regards

all third parties) for all intents and purposes it is most dflflcult to seei_'_Thc Procrustman system of cutting down the modes of “_'“_";"18 and e"]°I"18 landed Property to suit the inflexible rigidity of two official formulae, i-elegating all excrescences, however vital, to the limbo of the equitable estate, is hardly the way 3 pigdpfie a‘syste_m satisfactory to landowners. The prevalence

so a a aultm the system of 1870 is doubtless largely the


cause of its extreme unpopularity, and it is to be hoped that the system of 1887 may be saved the responsibility of perpetuating such awkward expedlents. That they are not necessary to a register is proved by the Torrens provisions above mentioned.

Mr. Humphry devotes a considerable space to pointing out ii. hardship that the Bill imposes on the ordinary landowner by offering him Hobson’s choice of an “absolute” title, which he usually cannot get, or a title “with an objectionable epithet ” (p. 267). The justice of this criticism depends upon two things, not yet very clear. First, whether the absolute title will, under the new procedure, be so dilficnlt to get as to be beyond the reach of an ordinary landowner; and, secondly, will a possessory title, under the altered circumstances of universal compulsion, be considered objectionable ?

Mr. Sargent makes a suggestion as to estates tail that seems valuable, and is mainly in accord with Mr. Hunter’s paper, already noticed. It is that the protector of the settlement should be abolished, and that then estates tail should be retained.” Their abolition is probably a concession to popular sentiment merely, and would be unnecessary if the protector of the settlement were abolished. Estates tail express an idea which could otherwise be expressed, if at all, only by ii long and clumsy paraphrase, and they would be wholly innocuous if once the present difiiculty in barring them when in reversion were removed.” Quite apart from the functions of the protector, there are numerous cases in which a family estate would, if thus entailed, remain in the male line, where, if a fee simple only is permissible, it must go to females. An esteemed correspondent makes il. strong protest in another column of our issue this week against the inconvenience likely to result from the proposed abolition of estates tail.

We may remark, in conclusion, that the statement of one of the critics in the Law Quarterly, that the descent of the legal estate to executors or administrators is inseparable from the institution of a register, is not in accordance with the experience of the Torrens registries, which have been worked under the old law with perfect ease, though in some colonies real representatives have been instituted subsequently for quite other reasons.




This book constitutes a. new departure in digests. The aim Of the compilers is to enable the practitioner to discover how any case has been treated by the judges who have discussed it and how much of it remains good law. The mode in which this is carried out is by first of all presenting the cases in a tabular form, giving a brief statement of how the case has been treated, where (yvith the date) and by whom, and a reference to the column of the su sequent digest in which the case is treated in detail. Cases which stand by themselves, and Wl-ucll would not be elucidated by extracts from judgments, or such extracts would be too lengthy for the limits of the book, are noticed in the tubiilar index only, and reversed cases since 1856 also usually appeal‘ in the index only. Then follows is digest, arranged according to sub jects, with headings and sub-headings, and containing short extracts from the judgments in which the case has been dealt with. The best mode of giving an idea of the digest is to take a. particular cw? as to which the practitioner desires information. Let us take 0005* v. lfirawford (13 Sim. 91). Looking in the index, we find it has been “commented on " by Romilly, M.R., “ held overruled ” by Jessel, M.R., and “ upheld ” by the Court of Appeal ; and turning to column 1380 of the digest we find, under the head of “ trustee." sub-head “ trust for sale,” extracts from the judgments in .IIlLl_'(l0ll(lItl v. WuI_/_cer (H Bcuv. -5-5(3) : a statement that in Osborne to liowlett (13 Ch. D: 714) Goo/.7: v. (,'r,..,;;;.,-vl was held overruled, and extracts from the W58‘ ments iii Ife .l[|ITfuIL and Hullctt (15 Ch. D. 1-£3). The advantage to the lawyer of this reference book to cases is obvious. and the only question is as to the mode of execution of the work. C011‘ sidering the enormous labour involved, we think that the execution is very creditable. The cases given are extremely numerous. imdi

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