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the Act of Wm. & M., and thus to affect purchasers, even without notice, to the extent of the rights against them given by the old law. Questions were also raised (1) whether, if a judgment was neither docketed under the Act of Wm. & l\z[., nor registered under the Act of Vict., a purchaser with notice would still be bound upon the principles laid down in Davis v. Slralhmore (ants, p. 25) ; and (2) whether, if a judgment was registered under the Act of Vict., a purchaser without notice would be bound (at least to the extent of the creditor’s remedy under section ll) as he would have been before the Act, by a duly docketed judgment (see ante, p. 25).

2 §~ 3 Vict. c. ll.-—These questions were partially answered by this Act, “ for the better protection of purchasers against judgments,” &c. Sectionl provided that no judgment should thereafter be docketed under the Act of Wm. & LL, and that the dockets should be finally closed. By section, 2 judgments already docketed under the Act of Wm. & M. were not (after the lst of August, 1841) to afiect lands as against purchasers unless and until registered in accordance with I & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 19.

Re-re_qz'stration.—By 2 & 3 Vict. c. 11, s. 4, it was enacted that all judgments which had, since thel & 2 Vict. c. 110, been registered thereunder, or should thereafter be registered, should, after the expiration of five years from the date of “ entry " (? registration) thereof, be null and void against lands as to purchasers, unless registered again in the Court of Common Pleas within five years before the execution of the instrument vesting or transferring the legal or equitable title and so toties qaotiea at the expiration of every succeeding five years. The purchasers protected by this section are persons who become such after the expiration of five years from the last registration and before re-registration. It does not apply to purchasers who become such during the currency of the period of five years from any registration, and they will be bound (subject to the provisions of section 5, post), though there be no subsequent re-registration (Shaw v. Neala, 6 H. L. C. 581; see 29 Ch. D. 531); for the object of the statute was to enable a purchaser to ascertain with certainty what judgments exist, not to give him a chance of improving his title by the possible subsequent neglect of a judgment creditor to re-register (Baavan v. Earl of Oxford, 6 De G. M. & G. 492, 499).

Purchasers without 1wh'ce.—By 2 & 3 Vict. c. ll, s. 5, as against purchasers without notice, judgments, “although duly registered,” are not to “bind or afiect any lands,” or any interest therein, “farther or otherwise or more extensively ” than a judgment would have bound such purchasers before the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, where it had been duly docketed according to the law then in force. _This enactment, therefore, left purchasers without notice of registered judgments liable to the extent of the remedies under the old law (Doswell v. Reece, ll Jur. N. S. 764). The old dockets were closed, the object of the Act being to complete a perfectly new register, so that the purchaser should have reference to only one register (6 De G. M. & G. 534). The words are large enough to extend the benefit of the enactment to all bond fide purchasers and mortgagees deriving title, whether mediately or immediately, from the debtor, and to relieve them from any judgment which they do not find entered upon the register during the preceding five years. The plain intention of the statute was to obviate the necessity for extended searches. The effect is, that a purchaser may always be satisfied with a five years’ search. He may have to look for the names of various persons who, for a considerable time past, have been interested in the property; but in each case he may limit his search to the period of five years last past: par Wood, V.C., Bmham v. Keane (9 W. R. 765, 1 J. &H., at p. 708).

Though this Act required judgments “ already docketed ” under the old law to be registered underl & 2 Vict. c. 110 it did not appear to include judgments which had never been docketed ; and therefore it was still doubtful how far a purchaser with notice would be afiected by undocketed judgments, and also by judgments required to be registered under 1 & 2 Vict. C, 110 butPnot,h1n fact, so registered. ’

arc aura with notice o unre isterezl ' P c. 82).—This Act was passjed exgressly t0]:lfJ{l'1l§lnll8 ti; 2(S'{7iicl: wi1l0. Section 2, after reciting section 19 of that Ant (as to re. is. tration), and that doubts had been entertained whether a urchfsei having notice of “such judgmentg as aforesaid» woujid not in equity be affected thereby, notwithstanding they had not bean


registered, proceeds to enact that purchasers are not, “by virtue qf the said Act,” to be afiected by such judgments_nnless _and until registered, any notice thereof in anywise notwithstanding. The result, therefore, in cases to which the Acts 2 & 3 Vict. c. 11 and 3 & 4 Vict. c. 82 were applicable was that, to entitles judgment creditor to the extended remedies given by 1 8: 2 Vict. c. 110, there must be both registration and notice; so that a purchaser without notice of a registered judgment, or with notice of an unregistered judgment, would not be bound by the new law.

It still remained doubtful how far a purchaser with notice would be afiected by a judgment registered under 1 8; 2 Vict. c. 110, but not re-registered under 2 & 3 Vict. c. ll (section 4) to which 3 & 4 Vict. c. 82 makes no reference. And section 2 of the latter Act appeared to protect purchasers with notice of unregistered judgments only from the operation of 1_& 2 Vict. c. 110 (Dart, 488), leaving them exposed to such remedies as, under the old law, a creditor would have had against a purchaser with notice of an undocketed judgment. Nor did section 2 clearly apply to judgments entered up before 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110.

18 Vict. c. l5.—The object of this Act, as described by its title, was “ the better protection of purchasers against judgments," &c. Section 4 recites that the protection given by 3 & 4 Vict. c. 82, s. 2, to purchasers with notice of unregistered judgments is confined to judgments binding by virtue of 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, that the old dockets had been closed, and that that provision ought not to be so restricted, and then enacts that no judgment “which might be registered under " 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110 (thus including judgments docketed or undocketed (?) entered up before that Act and never registered under it) “ shall affect any lands at law or in equity " as against purchasers, unless registered as mentioned in 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, with “the proper ofilcer of the proper court,” any notice notwithstanding. The terms of this section seem to protect the purchaser in respect of the operation of the old law as well as that of l & 2 Vict. c. 110.

The doubt as to purchasers with notice of judgments registered but not re-registered is met by section 5, which enacts that the protection given by 3 & 4 Vict. c. 82, s. 2, to purchasers with notice of unregistered judgments shall be deemed to extend to section 4 of 2 & 3 Vict. c. 1 1, so that notice of any judgment not duly re-registered shall not avail against purchasers. But the protection given by 3 8: 4 Vict. c. 82 is only against the operation of the new law, and it is, perhaps, not quite clear that this section protects the purchasers to any greater extent where there is no re-registration within five years, though the more general terms of section 4, as to cases where there has never been any registration at all, appear to exclude all liability under the old law as well as the new.

Section 6 enacts that re-registration within five years before the execution of the instrument vesting or transferring the legal or equitable title in or to a purchaser shall be deemed sufllcient to bind the purchaser, although more than five years shall have expired since the last previous registration, and so toties quota}: upon every re-registry. This section is said to have been passed iiiggpnsequence of the decision in Freer v. Hesse (4 De G. M. & G.

In cases where the existence of notice is material it should be

noted that registration is not of itself notice (Lane v. Jackson, 20 Bcav. 539.


THE LAwYnn’s COMPANION AXD DIARY, AND Lennon AND Paovixciiu. Law DIRECTORY roa 1887. Edited by J. TRUSTRAJL Barrister-at-Law. FOR'1‘Y—FIRST ANNUAL Issun. Stevens & Sons; Shaw & Sons.

The present issue of this valuable annual contains the new county 601111 8»1N_1b8-llkruptcy scales of costs, and the regulations under the Prosecution of O_fl‘ences Acts. There is some need of re- arrangement of the matter in this part of the book. Surely all the matter r- lating to costs shtntld be Placed wgethefv and the provisions as to stamp duty on securities to bearer, and duty on property of bodies ()9)-pqfgtegnil unincorporate should be relegated to the art relating to stamp duties,

p instead of being sandwiched between thezhrosecution of Offences Regu


lotions and Conveyancing Costs. We may, perhaps, suggest that in future issues it would be convenient to have the dates of appointment of Queen’s Counsel added to their names in the list at page 2 of Part II. The editor would confer a great service on the profession if in the list of country solicitors he would adopt the sug stion often made by our correspondent, Mr. John Miller, that a megod should be devised of indicating at which of several places named a solicitor has his head~

uarters or an ofiice and clerk in daily attendance. Surely none of tlie solicitors described as practising at several places would object to give this information on application. We have checked the list of coimtry solicitors in several cases to ascertain whether the names of practitioners who have died during the last year are still inserted, but in all the cases we have looked for we have found that most creditable care has been exercised.


Curr-rr’s INDEX T0 ALL run REPORTED CASES DECIDED IN THE SEVERAL COURTS or Eourrr nr ENGLAYD, THE PRIVY COUNCIL, AND run House or Lonos. wirii A SELECTION or Iiusn CASES, on on RELATING TO THE PRINCIPLES, PLEADIXG, AND PRACTICE or EQUITY AND Bmiraurrcyz FROM rm: EARLIEST PERIOD. FOURTH EDITION. By HENRY Eowsnn Hrizsr, Barrister-at-Law. Vol. 3. Stevens & Sons; H. Sweet & Sons ; W. Maxwell & Son.

It is fast approaching two years since the issue of the last volume of this useful book, but the delay appears, under the circumstances stated in the preface, to have been unavoidable. The arrangement of matter in the headings we have examined varies in merit, but as to some we can speak with much satisfaction. The heading “Executor and Administrator," for instance, which occupies 353 pages, appears to us to be admirably classified, and affords an almost indispensable adjunct to the last edition of Williams. “Husband and Wife " is another important heading which is, on the whole, well classified, and will be of great service to the practitioner.

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SLAUGHTER-HOUSES IN RURAL SANITARY DISTRICTS. [To the Editor of the Solicitors’ Journok]

Sir,—I shall be glad if you or any of your readers can inform me whether any licence or registration is necessary for the erection or use of a slaughter house (for the slaughter of cattle for sale for butcher-‘s meat) in a rural sanitary district, and whether there is any law prohibiting or in any way restricting the erection and use of such a slaughter-house.

Slaughter-houses within the metropolis, as defined by Schedules AB-» and C. to the Metropolis Mana ement Act, 1855, are regulated by the Slaughter-houses MetropoIis Act, 187-I (37 & 38 Vict. 0- 6:). and other statutes; and those within urban sanitary districts are regulated by the Public Health Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 55, 95- 169. 170). incorporating the Towns Improvement Clauses Act, 1347 (198: l1 Vict. c. 37, ss. 125-131); but I cannot find any Act '°8“lflt1ni or restricting the erection or use of slaughter-houses used for t e above-mentioned purpose within rural sanitary districts where the rural authority has not been investel with the powers of iltllglgli sanitary authority under section 276 of the Public Health

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_ By 2_5 & 26 Geo. 3, c. 71, a licence (to be obtained at uarter ses51°F!) I8 required for all slaughter-houses used for the dlaughter of animals 'u'hi'ch shall not be killed for butcIier’s meat; and 7 & 8 Vict. °- 37, 8- 1, provides for the annual renewal of such licences; but these statutes do not appear to apply to cases where the animals are llmlghtered for the purpose of food.

_ N0 doubt sections 116-119 of the Public Health Act, 1875 (relahas mm5°‘"1d 11-lea-ti &0-) apply to slaughter-houses of the

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description referred to; but, with this exception, the erection and use of such slaughter-houses in a rural sanitary district appears to be unrestricted.

Perhaps you or some of your readers can inform me whether I am correct in my conclusion, or can throw some further light u on the subject. F. C,

November 11.

[So far as we know, or can ascertain, our correspondent’s conclusion is correct. The slaughtering of cattle for any purpose must, in urban sanitary districts, and in the metropolis, and in places where the Towns Improvements Clauses Act, 1847, is in force, be carried out in licensed slaughter-houses only; but the requirement of a licence elsewhere appears, by 26 Geo. 3, c. 71, and its amending Acts, to be limited to cases where the animals slaughtered (for these statutes apply to horses as well as cattle) are not to be used for food. The reason of the distinction is partly a sanitary one, arising from the fact that slaughter-houses are more of a nuisance in crowded than in thinly-populated places, and partly a reason of police, the preamble of 26 Geo. 3, c. 71, setting out that “ the practice of stealing horses, cows, and other cattle hath of late years increased to an alarming degree, and hath been greatly facilitated by certain persons of low condition who keep houses or places for the purpose of slaughtering horses and other cattle."--ED. S. J.]

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Whereas, Arthur Kekewich, Es%, one of her Majesty’s Counsel, has been appointed a judge of the igh Court of Justice, and of the Chancery Division of the said High Court. And whereas it is expedient that the causes now standing for trial or hearing only before Mr. Justice Stirlin should be transferred to the said Arthur Kekewich as a judge of the Chancery Division, for the purglonse of trial or hearing onl . Now I, The Right Honourable Har ' ge Stanley, Baron Halsbury, Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain, do hereby order 1

(1.) That the several causes now standing for trial and hearing only, before Mr. Justice Stirling (other than the causes set forth in the schedule hereto) he transferred to the said Arthur Kekewich, as a judge of the Chancery Division, for the purpose of trial or hearing only.

(2.) That no cause or matter bc assigned to the said Arthur Kekewich, as a judge, by the same being marked with his name.

And this order is to be drawn up by the registrar, and set u in the several oflioes of the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice.


Williams v. Dealtry action for judgment

Williams v. Bell action

Broad v. Harris, Robbins u. Harris action part hoard
Badeley 1. Consolidated Bunk action

Litchfield iv. Jones adjd. sumns.

Whereas the Honourable the Vice-Chancellor Sir James Bacon has resigned the oflice of judge of Her Majesty’s High Court of Justice, I, The Right Honourab e Hardinge Stanley, Baron Halsbury, Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain, do hereby order and direct that all causes and matters pending before the said Vice-Chancellor Sir James Bacon as a judge of Her Majesty's High Cfmlii 9f Jllfltlcfli be trimsferred to Mr. Justice Kay and marked with his name. And I do further order that the chief clerks and other clerks and ofiicers attached to the chambers of the said Sir James Bacon continue to perform the same duties in relation to Mr. J ustioe Kay as those which they have hitherto perfonned for the said Vice-Chancellor Sir James

BaAuiiId. this order is to take effect on Monday, the 15th November instant and is to be drawn up by the registrar and set up in the severaloflices of the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice.

Whereas by an order dated the 13th day of November, 1886, I did order and direct that all causes and matters pending before the ViceChancellor Sir James Bacon, as a judge of Her Majesty’s High Court of Justice, should be transfer-redto Mr. Justice Kay, and marked with his name. And I did further order that the chief clerks and other clerks attached to the chambers of the said _Sir James Bacon should continue to perform the_same duties in relation to Mr Justice Kuylas those which they had hitherto performed for the said Vice»Chancc1 0!‘ Sir James Bacon. Now I, The Right Honourable Hardingc $011! 3)’, Baron Halsbury, Lord High Chancellor of Great Brisaigi doJ:qrfi:g‘ that all causes and matters periding before thza saiti “gmKay, as :1 judge of Her Majesty s High Court 0 Jus ce,


ferred to Mr. Justice Stirling, and marked with his name. And I do further order that the chief clerks and other clerks and ofiicers attached to the chambers of the said Mr. Justice Kay, continue to perform the same duties in relation to Mr. Justice Stirling as those which they have hitherto performed for the said Mr. Justice Kay. And I do further order that so much of the order dated the 19th day of May, 1886, as directs that no cause or matter should be assigned to the said Mr. Justice Stirling, by the same being marked with his name, be discharged.

And this order is to take effect on Monday, the 15th November instant, and is to be drawn up by the registrar and Set up in the several ofliees of the Chancery Division of the High Court of J ustico.


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In this case the question arose as to the validity of a bill of sale. The document purported to have been given as security for an advance of £500, and interest thereon at the rate of 60 per cent. The defendant agreed “ that he would duly pay to the claimant the principal sum aforesaid, together with the interest then due, by twelve equal monthly payments of £41 13s. 4d. on the 21st day of August now next, and £41 13s. 4d. on the 21st day of each and every succeeding month until the whole of the said sum and interest shall be fully paid, and in default of payment of any instalment, then that he, the mortgagor, will pay interest thereon, at the rate aforesaid, from the date when such instalments shall become due until full payment thereof.” The mortgagor further agreed to pay the rent, rates, and taxes of any premises whereon the assigned chattels might be, and also to keep the premises insured against fire in the sum of £1,000, and that in default it should be lawful for the mortgagee to keep on foot the insurance, and to charge the costs, with interest at the rate of 20 per cent. per annum to tho mortgagor, and that the same should be considered as included in the security. The bill of sale further gave the mortgagee a power to pay all rent, rates, and taxes, &:c , which might become due and payable in respect of the premises, and provided that all such payments made by the mortgagee, with interest at the rate of 20 per ccnt., should be a charge upon the assigned chattels, which should not be redeemed until full payment of all such moneys and interest. The Queen's Bench Division (3-i W. It. I60) held that this bill of sale was bad. On appeal the court reversed that decision. FRY, L.J., in reading the considered judgment of himself, Lord Esuiiii, l\, and Bo\vEN, L.J., said that the word “instalment” referred only to the twelfth part of the principal sum and not to any interest. The stipulation for interest to be paid up till the actual time of payment was necessary to give the lender his right to 60 per cent. between the day fixed for payment and the actual time of payment; for otherwise, after default, a jury would have been justifled in giving only 4 or 5 per cent. The words in the form given in the schedule to the Act of 1882 with regard to the payment by equal instalments was to be read to mean that the grantor would pay the principal sum by equal payments on the stipulated days together with the interest due at the respective times of payment of the instalments of the principal. With regard to the provisions as to payment of insurance premiums, rent, rates, taxes, &c., his lordship said that the court was of opinion that the case was practically governed by Ex parle Stanford (34 W. R 507) and that it was competent to aleuder to have such provisions inserted for the maintenance of the security granted by a bill of sa-le.—CouNsaL, Coaprr Willis, (l.C., and Rinywood; Lionel Hurt. SOI.Ici'roRs, Jaseph Daria ; Edward La-.

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The question in this case was as to the plaintiffs’ right to damages in consequence of a. fall in the value of certain stock during the exist. ence of an injunction which they had obtained to restrain some of the defendants from selling it. In September, 1882, the plaintiffs gent to T. & Co., brokers, a certificate for £15,000 stock in the defendant company, with instructions to sell the same as opportunity should offer T. Sc C0. sold £1,000 of the stock, and duly accounted for the proceeds. und in October a new certificate for the remaining £14 000 stock was issued in the plaintiffs’ names to T. & Co. This eerfifloogo was not negotiable, but in May, l883, it was deposited by T. 8: O0. with a bank to secure certain advances to them, and the bank chimed to hold tho oortifloate

as against the plaintiffs. The action was commenced in February, 1834, against the company, the bank, and the trustee iii bankruptcy of 1. S: Lo., asking that the bank might be ordered to de_liv_er up the certificate ; that the company might be restrained from permitting any transfer; and that the bank might be restrained from selling the stock. Shortly afterwards the plaintiffs obtained an interlocutory injunction restraining the bank from selling, but in October, 1885, the bank abandoned their claim and delivered up the certificate to the plaintiffs. The stock had meanwhile fallen in value, and the plaintiffs claimed. damages from the bank for its unlawful detention. Nouru, J., held (W. N., 188_6, 50), that the 1088 was caused by the plaintiffs’ own fault in not asking for a sale of_the stock when they applied for the injunction, and that they were not entitled to any damages. Tim Conn Oi-‘ A1-rEAL (Cor-roN, _Bo\\'n.\', and 1‘llY, L.JJ.), reversed the decision, and gave the plaintiffs _£900 damages. COTTON, L.J., said that the injunction was granted. only in_consequence of the unfoimded claim made by the bank. The plaintiffs simply wished to stop the bank, as persons dealing wrongfully with the shares, from selling them. It was true that the plaintiffs might have suggestcd_the sale of the shares and ayment of the proceeds into court, but so might also the bank. In considering the question of damages, the court took into account the fact that the plaintiffs were desirous to sell, but were provented from selling the shares, and also the market value of the shares. Boivi-:N and Fnv, L.JJ., concurred.—-Cov.'NsEL, Sir Horau Darcy» Q..C.; Wm-minglon, Q.C., and Dc.-inms Stu/yes ; R. T. Re-id, O,.C., and H. Burton Hm-7.-Ivy. Somcrroiis, Yozmg, Jrmzs, Q Co. ,' Druves Q Altlve ; Lawrance, Balm", Q C0. ; Fri-.~I{/iellla Q Williama.

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In this case a question arose as to the mode of making an application for a stay of the proceedings under an order, pending anappeal, in the case of the resignation of the judge by whom the order appealed from had been made. Rule 16 of order 58 provides that “an appeal shall not operate as a stay of execution or of proceedings under the decision appealed from, except so far as the court appealed from, or any judge thereof, or the Court of Appeal, may order." And by rule 17 : “ Whereever under these rules an application may be made either to the court below, or to the Court of Appeal, or to u judge of the court below or of the Court of Appeal, it shall be made in the first instance to the court or judge below." In the present case_ the application was for a stay, pending an appeal, of the proceedings under an order which had been made by Bacon, V.C., on the 8th of November. On the l0th of November Bacon, \'.C., resigned his office. On the llth of November notice was served of the present application to tho Court of Appeal. On the opening of the application the opreliminary objection was raised, that no application for a stay of proce ings had been made to the court below in accordance with rule 17. TEE Covnr (Cor-roN, L J ., and HANNBN, P.) overruled the objection. Corron, L.J., said that, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, tho objection ought not to be allowed. Kay, J ., to whom the business of Bacon, V.C., had been transferred, would know no more of the case than the Court of Appeal did.COUNEEL, illnrlm, Q C., and G. 1[tHl1e!'~I)Il,' Jlillar, Q.C., and 06100111SoLrc1'roRs, Rirluml Fwllcr; Jar! Eummu-I, 4- Co.

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This case raised the question whether the Statute of Limitations is or is not capable of being a defence to an action against a married woman by a creditor on a. simple contract debt seeking to obtain execution against her separate estate. On April l, 1865, Mr. Heane married Lady Hastings. who was entitled to separate estate. In 1875 he paid to her the sum of £400. She died in 1881, und Mr. Heane carried in a claim against the separate estate of Lady llastings in respect of the £l00 on the footing Of its having been advanced as a loan. The chief clerk disallowed the claim and the point now came before the court upon an adjourned summons seeking to vary the chief clerk’s certificate. It was denied on the part of the estate that the payment was a loan, but if it were then the Statute of Limitations was relied upon on the ground that this was, if anything, 5 simple contract debt, there having been no payment or acknowlegement in respect of the debt by Lady llastings. There was separate estate available for execution. KAv,.J., said he would not enter into the question oi whether the payment was a loan or not, but would assume against the estate, for the purpose of his decision, that it was a loan. It had not been proved that Lady Hastings, during her life, had made any paymfilll? or given any acknowledgment by which the debt would be taken out 0! the Statute of Limitations; and if the debt was regarded as one upon simple contract, six years having elapsed since it was entered into, the Statute of Limitations would apply in an ordinary case. \Vhat was there, 11°16» I-11°11. to exclude the operation of the equitable analogy to the Statute of Limitations? This was but an action upon the debt of a married woman seeking to obtain execution against her separate estate ; there was nolieii or charge upon the separate estate, and the doctrine that a married woman’s contract of debt operated as an appointment of her separate estate had been settled not to effect a lien or charge upon her property. but merely to admit of execution being had against it. Upon principle. then, the monstrous result that a creditor could get execution upon '1


simple contract debt of a married woman any number of years after it was

Nov. =0, rsss. THE SOLiCITOas’ JOURNAL. 61


contracted, without ang payment or acknowledgment having been made in the meantime by her, l not obtain. Upon principle, he was of opinion tbatthe Statute of Limitations applied to the present case. Secondly, upon authority, the claim was supported u on the case of Norton v. Tan-ill (2 P. Wms. 144) ; but, in his opinion, tlie explanations of that case by later authorities did not warrant its application to prevent the bar of the Statute of Limitations in the present 0880.—COUNSEL, Fischer, Q.C., and .7. G. Wool; Hrlsliriys, Q.C., and R Beale; Colt. Soriciroas, Flutter Q» Xuiscy ; Stephens §' C011!/114-011; T orr.

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This was a motion for foreclosure absolute of a mortgage of the lease, fixtures, fittings, and goodwill of the business of a public-house. The question was what order should be made, having regard to the fact that the receiver and manager appointed in the action, and continued by the judgment, had received moneys between the date of the chief clerk's certificate and the day fixed for redemption, and to the decision in Jenner-Fuel v. Nmllmm (34 W. R. 709, 32 Ch. D. 582), that the receipt of moneys by the receiver between the chief clerk’s certificate and the day for redemption operated to open the foreclosure and to render it necessary to fix a new date forredemption. The defendants had not appeared throughout the action, but had been served with notice of the present application. It was contended, on behalf of the plaintiffs, that, as the subject-matter of the mortgage was the business of a public-house, of which the receipts varied in amount and were taken 11¢ die in diam, it would be very inconvenient if preciselytlie sameordershould be made aswas made inthe case of Jenner-Fast v. l\’mII|am. KAY, J ., directed that the receiver should forthwith pass his final account and be discharged. The balance (if any) on the receiver's account should be paid into court, with liberty for any of the arties to apply as to such ha ance and as to the costs of the present appl)ication.—Coi-xsizi., Ralclifl. Soziciross, T. W. Itiztclifl g Sun.


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This was a motion to discharge an order made in chambers, and the object of the application was to enable the matter to be taken to the Court of Appeal. The question was whether the court could order the _l’resident and Fellows of Zion College to pay the costs of the interim investment of the purchase-money paid by them to the Corporation for certain land on the Thames Embankment. The facts, so far as material, were as follows:—In the reign of King Charles I., the Rev. Thomas White bequeathed a sum of money for the purpose of founding a college and library for the benefit of the clergy of the City of London, and an almshouse for ten poor men and ten poor women. Zion College was accordingly incorporated by charters of King Charles I. and King Charles II., and various powers, including powers to acquire and manage land, were given to the President and Fellows. These powers were extended by an Act of Parliament passed in 1875. By a further Act, the Zion College Act, 1884, the President and Fellows were authorized to purchase from the Corporation of London land on the Thames Embankment, for the purpose of providing a site for a new college and library. By section 4 of thclast-mentioned Act it was provided that “all purchase-money to be paid by the President and Fellows of Zion College for the said piece of land should be paid into the Bank of England in the same manner and to the same account as if the same were'paid in under the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, and other Acts amending the same, and should _be dealt with accordingly,” but the Lands Clauses Act was not otherwise 1l10<>_tporated with it. The purchase-money was paid into the bank under section 4, and an application made for the interim investment of it. KAY, J., said that he was very glad to have an opportunity of stating the rea9°‘? by which he had been guided in making the order in chambers. The object of the Lands Clauses Act, 1844, was to enable certain provisions usually msert/ed in railway, land, and other similar Acts, to be introduced in future Acts in a simple and short manner. It was not, however, so far EH18 was aware, usual to introduce such clauses into all Acts relating to P1'"B5t‘0l}lirities. Zion College was not an undertaking or work ofapublic nature within section 1 of the Lands Clauses Act, and that Act could not, therefore, be held to be incorporated with the Zion College Act, 1884, unless the latter Act contained express words to that eifect. That was not so. It was then agued that section 4 of the Zion College Act, 1884, incorporated the Lands Clauses Act sutficiently to make section 80 apply t“ ‘hf’ Present case. Section S0, however, although it gave the court certain powers to order the payment of costs, did not deal with the P\"‘<_i11B8e-money. It could not, therefore, be said to be incorporated by ZQCUOIX 4 of the Zion College Act, 1884. For these reasons he could not

old that the court had the jurisdiction contended for by the Corporation. _C°P'?"5Rl-i 1111/Mr," Rawlim. SOLICITORS, 1'!» Oily Solicitor ; Clarke, Rawluix, g- Cg,

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I In this_case it appeared that the defendant was the promoter of a bill °T the dlssolution of the company and the abandonment_ of its uuder- 1


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g, and the plaintiffs were directors of the company. A petition by ompany was presented in opposition to the abandonment bill. The Select Committee of the House of Commons re orted in favour of the abandonment, and also stated in their re ort that they were of opinion that the defendant had been vexatiously sugjected to expense in the promotion of the abandonment bill by the opposition of Hanley and Fisher (the present plaintiffs) directors of the company, petitioners against the bill, and that Malleti: (the defendant} was entitled to recover from Henley and Fisher the proportion of his costs in relation to the abandonment bill. By 28 8: 29 Vict. c. 27, it is provided (section 2) that the Committee on Private Bjills may award costs against petitioners vexatiously opposing, and (section 3) provision is made for the taxation of such costs, and that th certificate of the taxing master of the House shall be exclusive evidence of the amount of the demand, and of the title of the party therein named to recover; and (section 5) that the person entitled to the taxed costs may sue for the same, and in such actions the plaintiff, on filing a declaration of indebtedness, together with the certificate, shall be at liberty to sign judgment and issue execution, and that the validit of such certificate shal not be called in question in any court. The taxing master had issued his certificate awarding the defendant some £227 costs as against the plaintiffs. It was contended by the plaintiffs that, as the com any were the petitioners against the abandonment bill, the report of the Select Committee iri denominating the plaintiffs petitioners, and directing them to pay costs, was null and void, and all proceedings founded on it use

essly vexatious. The plaintiffs moved for an injunction to restrain the defendant from taking any further proceedings on the certificate or on the report of the Select Committee. Ciiir-ii", J ., said that the House of Commons had decided, whether rightly or wrongly, that the plaintiffs were petitioners. The court was unable to control that decision. Moreover, the Act of Parliament said that the certificate of the taxing master was to be conclusive evidence, and not to be questioned in any court. The plaintiffs were proceeding in the very teeth of the Act of Parliament. Further, the Appeal Court had held, in Nor!/i London Iiailway Co. v. Great Norllicm Railway C0. (31 W. R. 490. ll Q. B. D. 30) and London and B/ac/cwall Railway U0. v. Cross (34 \V. R. 201, 31 Ch. D. 354), that there was no jurisdiction under the Judicature Act, 1873, s. 25, sub-section 8, to grant injunctions restraining proceedings which were being taken in non-judicial tribuna1s—such as, for instance, arbitration proceeding[s— mere y because such proceedings must be vexatious and futile. he pre

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sent application fell within the principle of those cases. He should, for all these reasons, refuse the motion, with costs. When the defendant bad signed judgment for the taxed costs, then would have been the right time for the plaintiffs to have brought forward their claim as to the certiflcate’s invB.lidity.——Cor".\'sEi., RUlIl€!'| Q.C., and Henry Iii»-cb ,' H. L’. Bm-Ii /01/. SOLICITORS, WIii{/icZd,- Torr §- Co.

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n this case, being a petition for payment out of court, it appeared that one of the persons entitled to a share in the fund, who resided in Western Australia, had executed a power of attorney, sealed with the seal of a notary public in Western Australia. An aflfldavit was made by one of the petitioners, who was a brother of the giver of the power,_ proving the signature. cl-IITTY, J ., said that the court would take judicial notice of the seal of the notary public, and that the aflldavit was sufficient proof of signature of the power of attorney.—Covxss1., .H<u1'lc_i/.


Re GREAT WESTERN STEAMSHIP CO. (LIllI.)—North, J ., 13th November.

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This was u. petition for the confirmation by the court of special resolutions which had been passed for the reduction of the capital of the company. Thc nominal capital was £1,000,000, in 20,000 shares of £50. The articles of association gave the directors power to issue any of the shares as preference shares. Only 6,044 shares had been issuod—l,359 of them as preference shnros—and the remaining 4,685 as ordinary shares. _All the preference shares, and 4 360 of the ordinary shares, had been paid up in full. On the remaining 325 ordinary shares only £38 per share had been called up, and that sum had been paid on all of these shares except 31, on which only £30 per share had been p,aid, a call of £8 per share not having been paid on them. A considers le amount o_f capital had been lost, and the resolutions provided that the nominal capital of the cou_ip.\ny should be reduced to £264,000, in 8,000 preference shares of £1-2, and 12,000 ordinary shares of £12, paid up capital which had been lost being cancelled to the extent of £35 on each of the 1,350 preference shares, and to the extent of £38 on. each of the ordinary shares. It was proposed to state in the minute which was to be registered, that on 325 of the ordinary shares (specified by their numbers) nothing waste be deemed to have been paid up, all of the other issued shares being deemed to have been fully paid up. An order had been made in chambers dispensing with the advertisemeut of the presentation of the petition, as the proposed reduction would not affect the rights of creditors. In the first instance, Non-rii, J ., felt some dlfllfillli-YIID confirming the resolutions, because he thought that, if all the 325 ordinary shares were registered 8-8 £12 shares, on which nothing was be deemed tohave been paid. it mightnlpt be possible in the event of awinding up to recover from the holders of t‘ o 37 shares the unpaid £8 per share in respect of the call made he-topic reduction. Evidence, however was adduced that the holders of t 8' shares were persons of no means, from whom it would be practically im

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possible to recover any part of the £8 call, and this being so, Noam, J ., said that he would confirm the resolutions, as no harm could be done to the creditors. But the order would be without prejudice to any claim against the holders of the 37 shares.—-Cou.~rsai.. (Zosmw-Hardy, Q.C., and Christopher James. Soucirons, Saunders, Harsh"-sforzl, Bennett, 5- Co.

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The plaintiff. a French subject, took out a patent, No. 4,960, on the 17th of October, 1883, for an improvement in water gauge glasses for steam boilers; the improvement being the addition, at the back of the tube, of a white enamel band with a pink stripe down it. By this means the height of the water in the tube could be more easily seen. It appeared that in or about the year 1877 the superintendent of the engines of Messrs. Crossley 5: 00., at Halifax, being dissatisfied with the ordinary clear glass tubes, ordered from u glass tube manufacturer at Birmingham a number of gauges with different coloured stripes at the back, and amongst others some with a white enamel band with a red stripe down the centre. A number of these coloured tubes, together with some clear glass ones, were sent to him through a firm of Kerr &Jubb, who usually supplied gauge tubes. Crossley & Sons and their superintendent had a pptent, No. 4,111, dated the lst of December, 1874, for coloured glass tubes.

o separate invoice was made for the different colours. Messrs. Crossley had some of the red striped tubes fixed to their boilers, where several remained for about two years; but as they did not prove satisfactory to their engine superintendent, he gave orders for the discontinuance of their use, and no more were put on the boilers. The plaintiff had begun to sell on a large scale glasses manufactured by him, whereupon Kerr & J ubb had begun to sell similar glasses manufactured at Birmingham to their order. This was an action to restrain them from doing so. Kizi<iz\\'icu, J ., in giving judgment, said it seemed unnecessary to decide upon the utility of the invention, the question was simply whether there had been anticipation. There was no doubt lll. Martin did not know of any anticipation when he took out his patent. [After stating the above facts his lordship continued :—] The glasses sent to Crossley were used as long as they could be in a most public manner on their engines, and were used by them in their business and not as an ex eriment. No doubt they were not satisfied with the glasses, but still that did not make the user any less a beneficial one while it lasted. He came to the conclusion accordingly that there had been anticipation and prior publication, and, therefore the judgment would be for the defendant with costs.—Coi'xssi. Acton, Q-0-i 9"='1""1 and 1’0Il¢"'4.' Hwlton, Q.C., and R. W. Wallace. ,SOL1C1: Tons, Graham 4- Davin ; Bum Q Berridge for R. H. Q I. ll. Iferr, Halifax.

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Judgment was iveu in this suit, which had been tried before Butt J . without a jury. The petitioner sued for a declaration that the mari-'iagd solemnized between herself and the respondent at the Registrar's Ofllce for the parish of St. George's, Hanover-square, on the 30th of January 1886, was null and void, on the ground that her consent to the marriagh had been obtained bi means of fraud and duress, and she alleged that the marriage had never een consummated. The respondent, by his answer, denied the allegations in the petition, and in a counter-claim he alleged that the marriage was valid, and he prayed for a decree for restitution of conjugal rights. The petitioner and the respondent had been acquainted with one another for several years, and in March 1885 the petitioner who had recently, on coming of age, become entitled to asum of £26 000 u_ndcr the will of her father, was induced by the respondent to sign a_bi1l of exchange for £500 for his accommodation, the transaction not being known to her mother or to any of her friends. An engagement of marriage had previously been entered into by them but had bgen broken off. The respondent afterwards induced her to pht her name to other bills, and at the end of the year 1885 she had in this manner incurred liabilities to an amount exceeding £3 000 afid was threatened with bankruptcy and other legal proceedings by the holders of the bills There was medical and other cvidcncc to the cffcct that the unviet and distress caused by the liabilities thus incurred had reduced the . etigioner to a condition of bodily and mental pi-ostratiou and she was afterward told by the respondent that the only way for he; to escape from her 1 ,5 liability upon the bills was to marry him. On the 30th of Janna egh requested_her to meet him at the corner of Mount-street wheifyshfi °‘°°‘?mP°'m°d mm“ “W Tegifil-l3!’B ofllce. She stated that hhe did n t know where she was going, and that after they had ente ed 0 ofiice, a friend of the respondent , stood before th E ule such a manner as to prevent her from leavin th e oor m the respondent threatened to shoot her if she evincedgan 6 m:_1u'1' and to marry him. She admitted that all the formalities 1; ummess validity of the marriage were complied with but she all ecdmlfy to the the respondent attempted in place the ring dn her flu es; t at’ When the floor, and that he afterwards dragged her by the 1l81:lf,t'2) illthrevlz It on compelled her to sign the marriage register The su Befiihlteledand $€‘:l:r ‘gag ixamlh t filed as a Wimeifli and stated that he heard no tllfi-cliff:

" i “ “ ° mpondent iPPeated excited .1 threw down the rin . The res on -an annoyedand pin!-pose 05 denygilg ghat he had gveghlhhzgdiltidgrlzofiigd svxighpdhteopdge ouer an no o e ‘ . for thh petitioner Brlglrzlih-ll§18::stllv::;ew:1l:$;n23, 1;“ 1.)ghalf' The °°“"5e1

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and void. It was also urged that the unwillingness of the ecclesiastical courts to set aside smarrlage was founded upon relifiious considerations, which were inapplicable to a civil marriage, especia y if it had not been consummated; and they referred to Turner v. Meyer: (1 Hagg. Cons. 414), Harford v. lllorris (2 Hagg. Cons. 4'23), Portsnwuth v. P0rfs'In0l1l}l (1 Hagg.Ecc 355), Wilkinson v. Will.-imon (4 Notes of Cases, 297), Fir-Id‘: i![arri1lg¢Il|'U('Z H. L. Cas. 48), Ifarrod v. Harrod (1 K. & J. 4, 2 W._R. 612), and Ham-or/v v. I’m!_I/ (15 W. R. 719, L. R. l P. & D. 335). Burr, J.,1n giving judgment, observed that the validity of a contractof maniagemust be tested and determined in precisely the same manner as that of any other contract, and would not be bindiig if the consent of either party had been obtained by fraud or duress. odoubt public policy required that marriages should not be lightly set aside, and great care and circumspection must be exercised in a case like the present; but these considerations could not alter the grounds npon which a marriage contract could be avoided. It was not necessary, in order to avoid a contract entered into through fear, that the fear should be so great as would compel a person of ordinary courage and resolution to yield to it; but if through fear, whether reasonably entertained or not, s party to a contract is in a state of mental incompetence to resist pressure improperly brought to bear, there is no more consent than there would be in t e case of a person of stronger intellect and courage yielding to a more serious dangler. In the present case the petitioner's pecuniary liability on the bi s, and the threats of the holders of them, had reduced her to such a state of bodily and mental prostration as to render her unable to resist constraint and pressure exercised by other parties for their own ends. The contents of many of her letters were inexplicable, except on the ground that her mind was eufeebled by disease. Then there was clear evidence that, being ignorant of the nature and effect of bankruptcy proceedings, sho was induced in believe that her marriage to the respondent would relieve her from liability or facilitate a settlement of the actions. After going through the evidence of what took place at the registrar's oflice, he pointed out that none of the material allegations had been contradicted

y the respondent, and that there appeared to be no evidence of collusion. Hc was satisfied that the plaintiff would never have married the respondent of her own free will, that she was incapable of offering resistance to threats and coercion, and that she had never given such ll. consent ss the law required in order to render a marriage valid. He therefore pronouuced a decree declaring the marriage to be null and void, dismissed the counter-claim, and ordered the respondent to pay the costs of the suit.—Coi'xs:i., Sir R. Wthalfl, A.G., Dr. Tl‘fhfI'llI)l, Q.C., Ibllm-ii, and Stathum; Sir E. Clarke, B.G., Indcrwick, Q.C., Scarla, and Inna. Soucri-ons, Tidy g- Tidy; T. D. Dullon.

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This was an appeal by some creditors of a bankrupt against an order suspending the nkrupt's discharge for twelve months, on the ground that the sentence was too lenient. The bankrupt had acted as ii shipbroker to the appellants, and they opposed his application for a discharge on the ground that he had been guilty of a fraudulent breach of trust towards the-n_i in not paying over moneys which ho had received for them, and using those moneys for his own purposes, and in furnishing them with misleading accounts. The oilicial receiver had reported that the bankrupt had been guilty of two offences under section 28 of the §mk1'“P$°Y Act. 1353, in continuing to trade after knowing himself to be 1115<_>1V¢I1t. and in omitting to keep roper books in his business. The giizslglar hilallgidiigit the pan]-éruptdhgd) committed a breach of trust, but

ere on no rau , an e sus ended the order of discharge

for twelve months. Tun Couivr or A1-1'gAL (Lord Essen, M.R., and Lisniiiv and Lorna, L.JJ.) reversed the decision, and held that the order of discharge ought to have been entirely refused. On behalf of the bankrupt it was urged that a creditor had no lava-v .-tmm'¢ to appeal from such an order; that he was not a “ person aggrieved " by it within the meaning of section 104 ; that there could not be an appeal for the purpose of mcressing a quasi-criminal sentence; and that, the registrar having exercised his discretion under section 28, the Court of Appeal would not readily niterfere. Lord Essen, M.R., said that it could not be denied fl1flt_tho registrar had a discretion in dealing with such an spplicatiollv and if the Court of Appeal had taken the same view of the facts, and the alglfiglhlzld blffll °111Yd_€é0lIllttl&16hl1lilgnB88 of the registrar's decision,

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fllffer from his decision. But it vgvould requlfrc a vhry strong case to induce this court difier. But, if the court was of opinion that the iaglistrar s concluszon Tlllld the facts as to the bankrupt's conduct, °"°!1e°\15. i co not take into account the exercise

of the reg_istrar’s discretion as to the amount of the sentence, for the discretion would then have been exercised on an erroneous stfllfi of facts. Ilnder such circumstances the Court of Appeal would not E0)’ any attention to the amount of the sentence, which the registrar ad t'h°“8h$ B proper one. In the present case it was the duty of the bankl11Pt, B8 B_b§0ker, collect freight for his employers, and when he hfld °9n°°t°d ht,“ was hm duty V0 ply over what he had received to his prin°1Pa19» B‘1bJe°t t0 flnigllfduction which he might be entitled to make. H6 was_not bound to d over the very cheques or cash which he 11841

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