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F V01 XXXI-. 31. THE SOLICITORS’ JOURNAL. g 603

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WE 1ii~:ci:s:rLr mentioned that the Council of the Incorporated LEW sf-wlety had prepared a Bill to remedy the hardships which were likely to be occasioned by the decision in Ea: parts Stanford Re Barber (34 W. R. 507, 17 Q. B. D. 259). It appears from the report of the council that the Bill was submitted to the Lord Chancellor, but that he does not think it desirable to deal with the question by legislation. The council, however, intend to Pmmote the Bill next session.

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THE srrsivrioiw of our readers should be directed to a correspondgnce which will he found in the appendix to the report of the C“Ym§Bter-General, the general result of which is to shew that the

ommissioners of Inland Revenue have decided that the stamp on 8 power pf attorney for the receipt of money from the Paymaster391191111 in any case not falling under the precise words of divisions ( gm! (4) under the head “ Letter or Power of Attorney ” in the 2; adulepo the Stamp Act of mo is ten shillings. It has been “I9 P"<=~‘-we of the Paymaster-General’s department to regard for mtP‘11‘l3°8§ fl periodical payment “ out of dividends ” as a paytoen °f dividend or interest” within (3) of the head referred a »thl11_d_ therefore to require a five-shilling stamp only. The Z orities at Somerset House, however, have decided that such a gegizliilgllfl not the payment of :1 dividend, and that if it is a shining staP;£inent in excess of £10 per annum, it requires a ton_ L

of 1021- w- H. Siiirn’s statement on Monday evening in the House Tmn;Lmi_s may probably be taken as settling the fate of the Laud mm I 111*?!) at all events, of the registration part of it-this

' nHe 9815 1-“ There is one other measure which will come

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down in the course of a few days from the House of Lords—namely, the Land Transfer Bill. This is a Bill of very considerable importance, and one which has been accepted by the other side with favour in the House of Lords; and if it should be the pleasure_of the House to accept it in the same spirit, I hope it may be possible to pass it into law; but I cannot insist against any considerable or protracted opposition.” It is to be hoped that the Lord Chancellor will not listen to the suggestions which have been thrown out that the real property clauses should be severed from the rest of the Bill and carried this session. These clauses need not_less careful and prolonged consideration than those relating to registration,_ and although, after they have received full criticism and discussion, it will undoubtedly be desirable that the Bill should be split into two, it would seem to be very unwise to press forward this session enactments which may have to be amended next session. The suggestion made by the Council of the Incorporated Law Society that the Bill should be referred to a committee nominated by the Lord Chancellor, and composed of conveyancing counsel and solicitors, appears to afford the best means of arriving at a satisfactory result.

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Ir is UNDEBSTOOD that the proposed scheme for a rearrangement of the civil business at assizes has been withdrawn The judges and the Government found that the proposals would meet with most determined opposition not only from the bar, who acted with unusual promptness and unanimity, but also from the local authorities in the counties which it was proposed to deprive of civil assizes; and, as will be seen elsewhere, the Lord Chief Justice added his authority against the scheme, and also against the mode proposed for carrying it out. He seems to express an opinion that the scheme cannot legally be authorized by Order in Council—a view which, considering the wide terms of section 23 of the Judicature Act, 1875, we confess somewhat surprises us. But we think that few persons off the bench will doubt that the scheme ought not to be carried out in this way. As Lord COLERIDGE points out, there is all the difference in the world between a Bill which can be discussed in detail and amended in committee, and with regard to particular parts of which even the strongest Government must give way, and an Order in Council which must be accepted or rejected en bloc, and can usually be carried by the aid of a docile majority. The odd thing is that a majority of the judges, who are commonly supposed to be persons of common sense and experience of the world, should have supposed that a scheme vitally affecting the interests of powerful professional classes and of the inhabitants of thirty-four counties was a proper subject for legislation by Order in Council.

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THE Fiizsr Orrrmiisns BILL has now been passed by the House
of Commons and introduced in the Upper House. The preamble
of the Bill recites that “it would be conducive to the public good
if first offenders were, in certain cases, permitted to be at large on
probation of good conduct, without suffering imprisonment, so long
as they properly conduct themselves and shew an earnest desire to
reform.” The Bill leaves the whole matter to the discretion of
the judges by proposing that the court may, upon conviction of
any first offender, direct that he shall be released on entering into
a recognizance “to appear and receive judgment when called
upon,” and, in the meantime, to observe a number of specified
conditions, or suck of t/rem as may, in fire opinion of tile court, be
suitable. These conditions are (1) that the offender notify his
residence during a period named by the court to such authprity as
the court may direct; (2) that he report himself on_ce in each
month to such authority; (3) that he be of good behayiour during
such period; (4) '“ that the offender will, if required, appear
before the court or some specified future court to answer privately
as to his conduct ”; and (5) that the oifender_will pay the co_sts
of the prosecution. It is also expressly provided that the period
named for supervision is not to exceed twelve_nionths. The Bill
is not a model of good drafting, but we think it is sound in pun-
ciple. It turns into statute law the common law practice of discharg-
ing offenders in the less serious cases upon the terms of entering
into a recognizance to come up for judgment when_calle<_l upon, and
all the other provisions of the Bill are so purely discretionary that,

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if wisely administered, they can do little harm. It should lie expressly provided, however, that the pewer_ oi the cou_rt to call up a first oflender for judgment should be limited in point of time, and the twelve months during which the conditions are to be observed would be a very good limit to fix._ Both at common law and by the Bill the power to “ call up for judgment " appears to be unlimited in point of time. It is seldom or never exercised, but none the less should it be limited. Otherwise the convicted person has the possibility of being “ called up” hanging over him for life.

We onsnuve that, with the view of increasing the efficiency of the Preliminary Examination, certain alterations have been made, including the substitution of passages for translation at sight instead of passages from books named five months previously; the addition of algebra up to simple equations and the first four books of Euclid, and a more stringent regard to spelling _and English composition. It appears that the judges to whom the altered regulations were, under the Act of Parliament (40 & -ll Vict. c. 25, s. 6), submitted for approval, objected to the addition of algebra and Euclid being treated as essential, and insisted on the candidates having the option of taking up these subjects in lieu of one of the two languages prescribed. The change in the direction of setting passages for translation from unseen authors in the language paper is a step in the right direction, as it is a. wellknown fact that many candidates have, by means of cramming, passed without having even an elementary knowledge of the languages taken up. With regard to the algebra and Euclid we venture to think that it would have been much better to make these subjects essential. The examination has always been a very elementary one, but this alteration will lower rather than increase its standard. The Council have during the past year abolished the old classification of the subjects for the Final Examination into essential and non-essential subjects, considering that candidates should be examined in all branches of the law usually transacted by solicitors. We have already given full particulars of this alteration. The principal feature will be that no one subject will be more essential than another, and that a candidate will have to obtain a fixed minimum of marks, but it does not matter in which oi the subjects he obtains the necessary marks.

_ A FULL INQUIRY having been promised in Miss C.iss's case, there is little to be said except that the vote of censure in which the series of_/iascos in that case culminated will be useful as atfirming the doctrine that a Home Secretary is responsible to the House of Commons for the administration of justicc, and especially responsible for the investigation of complaints of misconduct on the part of tho metropolitan police. Mr. Msrriisws’ action in the matter certainly shewed an inadequate appreciation of his duties in this respect and an unlawyer-like readiness in the first instance to pronounce judgment on apparently inadequate materials. As regards the conduct and remarks of the magistrate, all the Home Secretary could do would be to draw the attention of the Lord Chancellor to the matter, and it is not clear what course, beyond censure, could be taken in case the Lord Chancellor came to_ the conclusion that the magistrate had been guilty of serious misconduct. There _does not appear to be any explicit power to dismiss a metropolitan police magistrate given by 2 & 3 Vict. c. 71_, but possibly the general power in the Crown to discharge any justice of the peace by writ under the Great Seal (Burn’s J ustice, 30th ed., 3rd_ vol. by Cave, p. 123), might cover the case. As regards the policeman, there was, of course, power on the part of the Home fiecretary to direct the Commissioners of Police to inquire into his conduct.

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of forty shillings, and “it shall be lawful for any constable belonging to the Metropolitan Police Force to take into custody, without warrant, any person who shall commit any such ofience within view of any such constable.” It is absolutely necessary, for this section to operate, that the offence should be committed within view of the constable ésee Eimmons v. Millingsn, 2 C. B. 524; Justice v. Gosling, 12 .B. 39), and if it be not so committed the constable is liable to an action for false imprisonment. It may be doubted whether so large powers of arrest without warrant have been wisely conferred upon the metropolitan police indiscriminately.

A FURTHER BATCH of amendments stood in the paper when the Land Transfer Bill was reported to the House oi Lords on Thursday last. They were nearly all in the name of the Lord Chancellor. Lord Hi:iisci=ii:i.r. made one more attempt to throw the duty of registering on the purchaser and not on the vendor, and Lord MONIEAGLE moved for the extension of the real property clauses to Ireland. We append a summary of the more substantial of the Lord Chancellor’s amendments, a considerable number being only verbal improvements and corrections. _ _

U/ause 4.—To add a power for the board, on first registration of a leasehold, to dispense with production of the actual lease or a copy thereof (required by section ll of the Act of 1875), and to accept secondary evidence of its provisions in proper. cases.

Clause 5.—To direct that the assignce (by operation of law _or otherwise) of a person registered as tenant for life shall be registered as such—the registration not to impair the tenant for lifcs powers. _ _

Clause 30.—A corresponding alteration of the provision I-‘I l»° bankruptcy of tenant for life.

Claim 36.—The rules are to contain directions _as to when ofllce fees may be remitted, and as to the notices in respect of deaths to be given to the Commissioners of Inland Revenue.

Clause 37, sub-clause l.—Remodelled so as (1) to include ii casus omissus—namely, where real estate is vested in_ a pom“ which, if he had died intestate, would not pass to his heirs-— namely, where such person took by descent, and the land would, therefore, go to the heirs of his ancestor, the purchaser. It should be observed that the beneficial enjoyment is not altered, only it 16 provided that in this case, too, the executor of the person last seised shall administer; and (2) to meet an argument (raised 016; a colonial Act) that where a man died without heirs (ih°“3 leaving a will) the Act did not apply. The s_iib-clause niilw runs :—-“ Any real estate which would, but for this Act, 0!! i 8 death of any person intestate pass to his heirs, or,_if he bfitlge entitled by descent, to the heirs of his ancestors, if 8117- hf; Sub-clauses 2 and 3 are transplanted into clause 41, f1‘°l11 Y 1°. we also note the puzzling, and, at best, unnecessary, words 11¢" passu wth his personal estate” are to be excluded. _ the

Clause 47.—A curious little addition is_ made, shewipged extreme care needed to be taken when institutions are “abohsljihi;_a For it appears that the borrowing powers of at least two Yor_ B the towns require deposits of memorandums of 0l1"8°' 38,) local Yorkshire registry. The local registry being (P}‘°5P°° ‘wit abolished by this Act, those towns would have been in thebi: W distressing situation for a local body of bemg }1I1flP1° t° T3", had not the present proviso been added, subBtlt11ll"18 the registry for the local registry for this purpose.

Clause 53, authorizing the employment of oflloers on behfllég applicants and other persons dealing with _the oflice, bflfit this elucidated. It will be remembered that it was thong W‘ clause opened the door to the admission oi s number of pghthé not solicitors, to the privilege of transacting basins? géersn registry. The amendment now confines the provision {dad by to examiners of title, surveyors, and other persons B5 Pm" the rules.

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employed to transact them. For instance: °u

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July 9, I887. Tl-IE SOLICITORS’ JOURNAL;

605

(as it has done in former years) cost between £5,000 and £6,000 a year to maintain, 100 applications per annum would cost about £55 each. Even if this be so reduced as to bring the oflicial disbursements down to £5 each, this, added to the lowest of Mr. Baresnii.s’s instances—£2 12s. 8d.—makcs a total to the nation and the landowner together (in computing which, by-the-bye, our correspondent omits to substract the otlice fee of 7s. 6d.) of £7 18s. 8d, as compared with £6, the total present costs for the same transaction. We need hardly point out, however, that in these calculations the most important item—namely, the average cost to the ofiice of conducting dealings, which our correspondent conjecturally places at £5—is one which it is impossible to determine with certainty. The scale of fees issued by the present registry, which formed the basis of Mr. Biiici;r>.ii.r:’s statistics, was intended, and doubtless was carefully calculated, to make the oflice self-supporting. The Queensland registry has 48,000 titles in it-the returns, largely from auniform tarifi of fees of 10s. for a mortgage and £1 for ii transfer, exceed the expenses in all cases, independently of value, many times; the gross expenses, however, only amount to £4,230 ls. 4d. —rather less than 2s. per title per annum.

THE APPLICATION OF THE MAXIM VOLENTI NON
FIT IN/URIA TO THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE.

THE law of negligence is one of the most interesting and, as it seems to us, the most obscure and uncertain branches of the law. We made a little while ago some short observations on the recent decision in Tliomaa v. Quarter-maine, as briefly reported in the daily papers. The full report of the case has since been published (33 ‘V. R. 555, 18 Q. B. D. 685). The judges in the Court of Appeal delivered separate judgments, each of which will be found to be full of interest, but perhaps more particularly that of Bowen, L.J., which is a masterpiece of powerful and subtle reasoning. The judgment of the Master of the Rolls will, we are disposed to think, be found, upon careful consideration of the matter, to be in truth, to a great extent, a corollary from views expressed by him more full and elaborately in the well-known case of Heaven v. Pemier (ll Q. B. D. 503).

The general interest of the case does not depend so much on the particular point decided with regard to the construction of the Employers’ Liability Act as on the discussion of general principles with regard to the law of negligence. The facts shortly were these : The plaintiff was employed ata brewery ; upon the premises there was a vat full of scalding fluid, round which there was a rim about sixteen inches high. The plaintiff was attempting to pull a board from under another vat, and, the board coming away more suddenly than he expected, he fell into the first-mentioned vat. The county court judge found that there was a defect in the condition of the works at the defendants’ brewery by reason of there being no suflicient fence to the cooling vat; that the condition of the vat was known to both the plaintiff and the defendant;_and that the plaintiff had not been guilty of contributory neghgence. It was held by the majority of the court (Bowen and F17, L-U that the plaintifi could not maintain an action under the Employers’ Liability Act, Lord Esher, M.R., dissenting. It WM a question in the case whether that Act had placed the servant in the same position as, or in a better position than, anyone of the public invited on to the premises, but we rather understand the Master of the Rolls’ judgment really to involve the proposition that, apart from the fact of his being a servant, the plaintiff would have had a cause of action at common law, and herein appears to us mainly to lie the interest of the conflict of views.

The view of the majority seems to be briefly this: Withouta duty there can be no negligence, or, in other words, neglect of duty; the existence of the duty, and, consequently, of the negligence, depends on the circumstances with regard to the particular P911011 towards whom the duty is alleged; there can be no duty ‘1Il_thc person who occupies premises to have such premises, or mlwhlflefy, or other matters thereon in a particular condition, nor any breach of duty in not so having them, towards a free agent wh°| by the licence of the occupier, voluntarily comes upon such premises with as complete knowledge of the state of things that

mm? find any danger resulting therefrom as the occupier of the Premises has himself.

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The view which lhc Master of the Rolls takes comes, if we rightly understand it, to this: There is a general duty with regard to premises, machinery, or anything of which a person may have the management and control, to take ordinary care that the person or property of others lawfully coming upon, or into proximity to, such premises, machinery, or other matters shall not sufi'er damage by reason of the state thereof, and that knowledge by the party injured of such state is only an element in determining whether thcre has been contributory negligence. He says: “The duty, however, is that you are bound not to do anything negligently so to hurt a person near you, and the whole duty arises from the knowledge of that proximity. Whether the negligence is your personal act or arises from using your property in a particular way, the rule equally applies, and you must so use your personal powers or property as not to injure any other person if, by the exercise of reasonable care, you can avoid doing so.” This practically reduces the whole question in these cases to two elements—viz., negligence and contributory negligence. _

It appears to us that the subject is one involving m_ueh dificulty, both practical and theoretical, in either point of view. A great deal of the theoretical difficulty arises from the fact that, owing to certain natural human tendencies, which are, perhaps, _inevitable, in many cases the findings of juries on the question whether there has been negligence or contributory negligence are untrustworthy. If juries could be trusted to take_ a really fair and dispassionate view, in many cases this nice question as to the existence of any, and, if so, what, duty would be rendered unnecessary by t e fact that the existence of negligence would be immediately negatived. The truth is that in these cases the questions whether there was a duty and whether _there was negligence or a breach of duty may often be really interchangeable. If the question whether there was a duty_ is framed so as to state exactly what the duty suggested is, it becomes obvious that practically this is so. The question, whether there was a duty under the circumstances of the particular case to do or not to_ do a particular thing, comes to much the same thing as the question, whether it was negligent under all _the circumstances of the particular case to do or not to do a particular thing. .Tudges_ha_ve really distinguished bct\veen the two_ questions because juries cannot be altogether trusted, but there is always a difficulty about the distinction. The l-\[ast_er of the ltolls is pre-eminent_ among j udgcs for his belief in j urics and the jurysystem, and no judge is more careful so to frame his general propositions_of law as to give the fullest operation to the functions of the juryman, and we cannot help thinking that there is some relation between his belief in juries and his way of looking at these questions of negligence. It will be obvious to anyone who carefully reads his judgments in Heaven v. Pender and the case we are now discussing, how great is their tendency to put the question in these cases iinrestrictedly into the hands of the jury. Qiven the general definition of the duty which he propounds, it simply becpmes a question for the jury whether the degree of care he describes as ordinary care has been used by_the defendant, and whether, if not, there was con

e. mgiiitjrlgrlddihdiidliiaulty in relation to the law of tort_ which is particularly exemplified in the law of negligence is that it must to a great extent be founded on moral duty, lbut that the ideas of legal duty and m0I'1il dut)’; _l1°'°E‘tl1@Bi are not and cannot be coincident. The limits at mqi: duty are, in the nature of things, shifting and llllfiiflifllna 1 tlst 9! necessary tendency of the ideas of moral duty to e 1;}. a skate ct flux, and over enlarging their borders. Amm°l'9 t 1?} _t“€ a any given time it is ha;-dly_ possible to assign exact imi s '08: moral duty. In everyday life it i_s c_0i1Bt9J1i'1Y bemg 1'°°°8mZ_u that moral and legal duty are not G01I1(Eld§l1l7-' All lxlllfifili 1118-11 W1 pay a dobt barred by the _Statute of LlI11lt&tl0DBb h_ umlgne man will take many precautions for the benefit o is wor mcq or servants which clearly he could not be compelled by (;D1!;10!1 aw to take. No one will deny that it is a moral duty to Z tumtapcé The function of law m this respect is to determine _to whatex Us moral and legal duty ought to be coinoidcnt—i.e-, 111 ht’; elfgffcé and to what extent, the force of the G0l:lIlIIIlU.I1ll2{, oug diatincflon the performance of moral duty. There is an 0 vious _ between justice and benevolence. The law has to say_What 18 just as between man and man. A jurymlm Will b‘;1"Pt "1 ml"? of these cases to make the precepts of benevolence t 6 m°“5‘“'e °

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justice, as against others. The vice, as we venture to think the Master of the Rolls’ view of the subject of negligence is th the result of it would be, if logically carried out in practice, failure to distinguish sufliciently between the moral duty of humane or scrupulous man to use precautions to prevent lI1]111'y the person or property of others, and the legal duty that ought be enforced against all men. His judgment in the case

Heaven v. Pender, if followed, would, as we conceive, have been perfectly new departure in the law of negligence. We imagi that it will be found that in the previous cases on t subject the principle has always been recognized that there mu be special circumstances on which the duty to take care towar the particular person may he founded. Something beyond t

of ' and introduced so nearly at the same moment ; the Prussian Registry 7 at of Title was established in 1872, and was very soon adopted by the

a other German States. _
The most interesting portion of the report at the present juncture is
a at the end, where a few notes are collected as to the processes

to employed to get land on to the register in the first instanceefirst to registration—which appears, by-the-bye, to have been effected with °f guaranteed title in all oases. The proof of title admitted was

a various.

ne 1. Sale by judicial auction. Apparently any vendor could sell by he judicial auction on producin a. certificate of possession given by a

st local authority, coupled with a certain amount of public advertisement

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mere fact that the defendant knew, or ought to have know

e bably from the existing deed pegistrsrs, after search of some kind. n 3. Evidence of possession, either

if he reflected, that in the absence of some precaution a person (my For twenty-five yea;-5 simply, or

coming into proximity to the machinery, or whatever it might be (b.) For ten years at least, _pl'A6 a legal commencement of such

that caused the damage, might be injured. Thus, for instance, ossession. _ _

to persons using an adjoining highway, or in the lawful exercise of (cg For ten years by the applicant and his predecessor together. e 4. Evi ence of title in the ordinary sense.

a right of way over private land, there is a duty on the part of th occupier of premises so to use them as not to endanger the safet

of such persons. To persons invited on to premises or license there is a duty not to lay a trap for them, not to allow them,

ignorance or with incomplete ‘knowledge, to expose themselves risks the nature of which the occupier of the premises eith knew or ought to have known. It would be impossible to cxhau

by one or two formula: the whole of the law on this subject, bu we think it will be found that in all the cases some s ecial circum o

P stances existed beyond what would be necessary to satisfy the pr position laid down by the Master of the Rolls in Heaven v. Pmde

At any rate, we cannot think that there is any authority for th proposition that a person is responsible as for negligence in respec

of anything on his premises constituting a danger which is as we known or as obvious to the person whom he has invited on to h premises as it is to himself.

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But, although we cannot help thinking that, upon the authoritie

and thc general principles which have always been supposed t

govern the law of negligence, the decision of tho majority wa correct, we think everyone will be ainfull conscious, afte

. . P 5' . " perusing the judgments of the Court of Appeal in the cases w

have mentioned above, that there are great logical and practice i

difficulties in connection with this branch of the law, whether be regarded from the oint of view ado ted b the ma'orit o

P P Y 1 S’ that adopted by the Master of the Rolls, and we can conceive that

to some minds, it may appear that _after all the broader view o the_ latter, by which these questions are really made almos entirely questions of fact, is the sounder and more logical.

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y The other more notable points _of the system mentioned in the S report are these. We give them without comment:— _ Transfers consist of two parts—an act of transfer, _and its subsen quent registration. The act of transfer consists in a verbal or ° written conveyance by the registered proprietor and an acceptance 1‘ by the transferee. Where the parties can attend at the registry t (nearly every market town has its registry) the process is verbal; t where the written form is used it must be properly verified Mid . authenticated. _ _ Devoluticns do not require registration until the new owner desires I to transfer or charge the land; then he must be registered. Notwfl é of prifor unregistered rights does not affect the title of a regwtefcd t

rans eree. _ _ ll; Adverse possession gives no title as against the registered pro_ prietor. is Notes of temporary matters, such as intended sales and mortgagef; lfs pendens, &c., corresponding to our “ caution ” and "I10$1°9 system, can also be entered on the register. _ _ i Easements and other rights to which property is subject must be S registered in order to afect third parties. _ A list curiousl similar to section 18 of the Land Transfer Act) 15 Y r also given of certain rights which shall not be affected by registration, 6 they are all either notorious or trivial matters. l A very distinctive feature of the system is the land debenhirei t which we are informed is used for large sums mostly. thenae” r mortgage or registered charge being still kept on foot and largpll’ , used for small sums. Mortgages are given constantly for less In E £‘Thiahiirifiedpftgistfdlibhagpgeakz tdclilecfilidsparoel ; each parcelhss B separate sheet in the register, but means appear to exist fpr collecting the parcels when splyeral are the owership o;onpe%ropnet01'The register is o y accessi e to persons in res - _ _ It appears that the oral instructions of applicants are readily l9<=°l"3d by the registrars, who thereupon, in ordinary casemake the necessary alterations in the re 'sters while the parties wait. gl t f

oflicials specially charged with their supervision t N The report concludes with some of the specimen form! 05 19S“,fus

' appended to the original statute, with translations of the vN'l°

entries. , “D” Mr. Scott refers the legal expert to Herr Bahlmanl1B_ch he

Preussische Grundbuch-recht” (Berlin, 1881), 700 pilgflii W1

- has himself utilized for the purposes of this report.

r

Tpust estates can be registered pn production of the cert-ifiofl 9 ° y - . . ' ’

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CORRESPONDENCE. COSTS UNDER THE LAND TRANSFER BILL[To the Editor of the Solicitors’ Journal-l RF»

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much expedition in the transfer of land as one heed wish for been registered were not, in the eye of the law, paid up; whoever took

it would be found to eifect, in time, both simplicity of title and as take £2,875 in fully paid-up shares. Tho shares in respect of which A. had w

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ould be liable to pay tho full amount of them. It was argued s between the company and A.. they must be deemed to be

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A. had never intended to deal with these particular shares which were

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question was whether A., a former director oi‘ the company, could be made °h. a contributory in respect of unpaid shares, he having agreed to take fully P"

the company raised a presumption against A., but they were only
mfifacie evidence. The notion that a director of a company was con-

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13§3. it was resolved “That the board further vote A., seventy-five fully he: paid-up shares, subject to confirmation of the shareholders at the next sec genera meeting, for the additional assistance he has rendered the com- 8

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tion 25 applied only to shares “issued and held." That turned upon
tion 23 of the Act of 1862, and the question was whether A. ever was
‘member" of the company, or had agreed to become a member, in
ect of these shares. His original agreement was not to take shares

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Blllres." A. was present at this meeting and assented to the resolution me

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N0 proper share register was kept by the comphny, but his name was sw

entered in the shareholders’ ledger as the holder of 500 of the 575 shares.

He afterwards transferred to other persons 260 of the 500 shares, and he THE LONDON AND YORKSHIRE BANK (LIM.) 11. T. E. PRl'TI'.—

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Ef ‘placed on the list of contributories in respect of the 315 which remained
U hlsvhhmfii and thfat, no contract for the issue of the shares as fully paid
P B Hg een registered in compliance with section 25 of the Companies

Act. 1367, the shares must be treated as having had nothing paid in hm

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In this case the question arose whether an agreement could be gathered
m the condition of a bond, or whether the sole remedy against breach

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a sum of £1,000 by the defendant, a bank manager, to the plaintiffs,
employers, and the condition was that the defendant should not,
ring the space of twelve calendar months next after quitting the
intitfs’ employ, take a banking appointment within five miles of the

executed the transfers the numbers of the shares were not filfed in and plaintiffs’ bank. The defendant having quittcd the plaintifis’ employ,

$3; he believled that lie was transferring some other shares which had hh I previous y allotted to him - that the numbers were wrongly filled in hh

d accepted a post at a neighbouring bank, the plaintiffs moved for
inlc)'iln iniunction. The defendant submitted that the plaintiffs could

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tiflcates he did so only with the intention of taking the shares when they

CHITTY, J.. said that when the circumstances under which the bond
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Ellgllld he duly allotted to him as, in fact, fully paid up in compliance w s executed, and also the intention of the parties were regarded the all h section 25: and that _his name was entered in the company’; hooks as fair way of looking at the matter was to take the agreement as existing ' n

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the condition of the bond, and to extract it out of the bond. Authority

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him from the comp“ - " . . .
. y, then, in accordance both with principle and the
decided cases, the set-ofl‘ of that debt against the amount payable by him

Tu 1h T°BPP0t of the shares might have been considered payment of the

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8 Phh°iPhB to a case in which the debt from the company was created 3-Z 3:19 fileihlie 1'i;0l\1tl0lJ which voted the shares to him as fully paid up. It plying wi-thh 9 tqct, up allotment of shares as fully paid up, without comno contract sic ion 2.3 of the Companies Act, 1867. In the present case registered fir the issue of the 545 shares as fully paid up was ever Compmie‘; A t hi". however, argued_ that, under section 23 of the had agreed tech; 36?, A- must be considered a contributory, because he ‘be register of h0°lI1l<:fl member o_f the company, and his name was on whet that wit; are olders. _In his lordship's opiiiiou it must be shewn 5 member.“ th is assent, his name had been entered on the register as the comp“ t 8 °°mPhh7» or that he h_ad entered into a contract with

Y 0 ecomea member, of which the liquidator was entitled

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order vesting in the trustees to be appointed the right to call for a

rarisfer of ii. sum of Consuls of which the trust property consisted. The

testator did not by his will appoint any trustee. The stock stood in the

ame of his executor. The executor had died, and no representation had

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been taken out to him.

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received the testators personal estate, and aving pa 1

cgacies, became a trustee of the fund. His lordship a so held that till

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