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the Act of Wm. & M., and thus to affect purchasers, even without registered, proceeds to enact that purchasers are not, "by virtue notice, to the extent of the rights against them given by the old of the said Act,” to be affected by such judgments unless and law. Questions were also raised (1) whether, if a judgment was until registered, any notice thereof in any wise notwithstanding. neither docketed under the Act of Wm. & M., nor registered under The result, therefore, in cases to which the Acts 2 & 3 Vict. c. 11 the Act of Vict., a purchaser with notice would still be bound and 3 & 4 Vict. c. 82 were applicable was that, to entitle a upon the principles laid down in Davis v. Strathmore (ante, p. 25); judgment creditor to the extended remedies given by 1 & 2 and (2) whether, if a judgment was registered under the Act of Vict. c. 110, there must be both registration and notice; so that a Vict., a purchaser without notice would be bound (at least to purchaser without notice of a registered judgment, or with notice the extent of the creditor's remedy under section 11) as he would of an unregistered judgment, would not be bound by the new have been before the Act, by a duly docketed judgment (see ante, law. p. 25).

It still remained doubtful how far a purchaser with notice 28. 3 Vict. c. 11.–These questions were partially answered would be affected by a judgment registered under 1 & 2 Vict. c. by this Act, " for the better protection of purchasers against judg. 110, but not re-registered under 2 & 3 Vict. c. 11 (section 4) to ments," &c. Section 1 provided that no judgment should there which 3 & 4 Vict. c. 82 makes no reference. And section 2 of after be docketed under the Act of Wm. & M., and that the dockets the latter Act appeared to protect purchasers with notice of should be finally closed. By section, 2 judgments already docketed unregistered judgments only from the operation of 1 & 2 Vict. c. under the Act of Wm. & M. were not (after the 1st of August, 110 (Dart, 488), leaving them exposed to such remedies as, under 1841) to affect lands as against purchasers unless and until regis- the old law, a creditor would have had against a purchaser with tered in accordance with 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 19.

notice of an undocketed judgment. Nor did section 2 clearly apply Re-registration. By 2 & 3 Vict. c. 11, s. 4, it was enacted that to judgments entered up before 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110. all judgments which had, since the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, been regis 18 Vict. c. 15.—The object of this Act, as described by its title, tered thereunder, or should thereafter be registered, should, after was “the better protection of purchasers against judgments," &c. the expiration of five years from the date of "entry(? registra- Section 4 recites that the protection given by 3 & 4 Vict. c. 82, s. 2, tion) thereof, be null and void against lands as to purchasers, unless to purchasers with notice of unregistered judgments is confined to registered again in the Court of Common Pleas within five years judgments binding by virtue of 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, that the old before the execution of the instrument vesting or transferring the dockets had been closed, and that that provision ought not to be so legal or equitable title and so toties quoties at the expiration of restricted, and then enacts that no judgment "which might be every succeeding five years. The purchasers protected by this registered under" 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110 (thus including judgments section are persons who become such after the expiration of fire docketed or undocketed (?) entered up before that Act and never years from the last registration and before re-registration. It does registered under it) “shall affect any lands at law or in equity" not apply to purchasers who become such during the currency of as against purchasers, unless registered as mentioned in 1 & 2 the period of five years from any registration, and they will be Vict. c. 110, with "the proper officer of the proper court," any bound (subject to the provisions of section 5, post), though there notice notwithstanding. The terms of this section seem to protect be no subsequent re-registration (Shaw . Neale, 6 H. L. C. 581; the purchaser in respect of the operation of the old law as well as see 29 Ch. D. 531); for the object of the statute was to enable that of 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110. a purchaser to ascertain with certainty what judgments exist, not The doubt as to purchasers with notice of judgments registered to give him a chance of improving his title by the possible subse- but not re-registered is met by section 5, which enacts that the quent neglect of a judgment creditor to re-register (Beavan v. protection given by 3 & 4 Vict. c. 82, s. 2, to purchasers with Earl of Oxford, 6 De G. M. & G. 492, 499).

notice of unregistered judgments shall be deemed to extend to Purchasers without notice. By 2 & 3 Vict. c. 11, s. 5, as against section 4 of 2 & 3 Vict. c. 11, so that notice of any judgment not purchasers without notice, judgments, although duly registered," duly re-registered shall not avail against purchasers. But the are not to " bind or affect any lands," or any interest therein, protection given by 3 & 4 Vict. c. 82 is only against the opera“farther or otherwise or more extensively " than a judgment tion of the new law, and it is, perhaps, not quite clear that this would have bound such purchasers before the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, section protects the purchasers any greater extent where there where it had been duly docketed according to the law then in is no re-registration within five years, though the more general force. This enactment, therefore, left purchasers without notice terms of section 4, as to cases where there has never been any of registered judgments liable to the extent of the remedies registration at all, appear to exclude all liability under the old law under the old law (Doswell v. Reece, 11 Jur. N. S. 764). The as well as the new. old dockets were closed, the object of the Act being to complete Section 6 enacts that re-registration within five years before the a perfectly new register, so that the purchaser should have refer- execution of the instrument vesting or transferring the legal or ence to only one register (6 De G. M. & G. 534). The words are equitable title in or to a purchaser shall be deemed sufficient to large enough to extend the benefit of the enactment to all bona fide bind the purchaser, although more than five years shall have purchasers and mortgagees deriving title, whether mediately or expired since the last previous registration, and so toties quoties immediately, from the debtor, and to relieve them from any judg- upon every re-registry. This section is said to have been passed ment which they do not find entered upon the register during the in consequence of the decision in Freer v. Hesse (4 De G. M. & G. preceding five years. The plain intention of the statute was to 495). obviate the necessity for extended searches. The effect is, that a In cases where the existence of notice is material it should be purchaser may always be satisfied with a five years' search. He noted that registration is not of itself notice (Lane v. Jackson, 20 may have to look for the names of various persons who, for a con- Beav. 539. siderable time past, have been interested in the property; but in each case he may limit his search to the period of five years last past : per Wood, V.C., Benham v. Keane (9 W. R. 765, 1 J. & H., at p. 708). Though this Act required judgments "already docketed

REVIEWS. under the old law to be registered under 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, it

THE LAWYER'S COMPANION. did not appear to include judgments which had never been THE LAWYER'S COMPANION AND DIARY, AND LONDON AND PROdocketed; and therefore it was still doubtful how far a purchaser VINCIAL LAW DIRECTORY FOR 1887. Edited by J. TRUSTRAM, with notice would be affected by undocketed judgments, and also

Barrister-at-Law. FORTY-FIRST ANNUAL ISSUE. Stevens & by judgments required to be registered under 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110,

Sons; Shaw & Sons. but not, in fact, so registered.

The present issue of this valuable annual contains the new county Purchasers with notice of unregistered judgments (3 & 4 Vict. court and bankruptcy scales of costs, and the regulations under the C. 82).—This Act was passed expressly to amend 1 & 2 Vict. c.

Prosecution of Offences Acts. There is some need of re-arrangement of 110.“ Section 2, after reciting section 19 of that Act (as to regis- costs should be placed together, and the provisions as to stamp duty

the matter in this part of the book. Surely all the matter relating to tration), and that doubts had been entertained whether a purchaser on securities to bearer, and duty on property of bodies corporate and unhaving notice of "such judgments as aforesaid ” would not in incorporate should be relegated to the part relating to stamp duties, equity be affected thereby, notwithstanding they had not been instead of being sandwiched between the Prosecution of Offences Regu

lations and Conveyancing Costs. We may, perhaps, suggest that in description referred to; but, with this exception, the erection and future issues it would be convenient to have the dates of appointment use of such slaughter-houses in a rural sanitary district appears to be of Queen's Counsel added to their names in the list at page 2 of Part II. unrestricted. The editor would confer a great service on the profession if in the list Perhaps you or some of your readers can inform me whether I am of country solicitors he would adopt the suggestion often made by our correct in my conclusion, or can throw some further light upon the correspondent, Mr. John Miller, that a method should be devised of subject.

F. H. C. indicating at which of several places named a solicitor has his head November 11. quarters or an office and clerk in daily attendance. Surely none of [So far as we know, or can ascertain, our correspondent's concluthe solicitors described as practising at several places would object to sion is correct. The slaughtering of cattle for any purpose must, in give this information on application. We have checked the list of urban sanitary districts, and in the metropolis, and in places where country solicitors in several cases to ascertain whether the names of the Towns Improvements Clauses Act, 1847, is in force, be carried practitioners who have died during the last year are still inserted, out in licensed slaughter-houses only; but the requirement of a but in all the cases we have looked for we have found that most licence elsewhere appears, by 26 Geo. 3, c. 71, and its amending Acts, creditable care has been exercised.

to be limited to cases where the animals slaughtered (for these statutes apply to horses as well as cattle) are not to be used for food. The

reason of the distinction is partly a sanitary one, arising from the EQUITY INDEX.

fact that slaughter-houses are more of a nuisance in crowded than in CHITTY'S INDEX TO ALL THE REPORTED CASES DECIDED IN THE thinly-populated places, and partly a reason of police, the preamble

SEVERAL COURTS OF EQUITY IN ENGLAND, THE Privy COUNCIL, of 26 Geo. 3, c. 71, setting out that “the practice of stealing horses,
AND THE HOUSE OF LORDS, WITH A SELECTION OF IRISH CASES, cows, and other cattle hath of late years increased to an alarming
ON OR RELATING TO THE PRINCIPLES, PLEADING, AND PRACTICE degree, and bath been greatly facilitated by certain persons of low
OF EQUITY AND BANKRUPTCY; FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD. condition who keep houses or places for the purpose of slaughtering
Fourth EDITION. By HENRY EDWARD HIRST, Barrister-at-Law. horses and other cattle.”—ED. S. J.]
Vol. 3. Stevens & Sons; H. Sweet & Sons; W. Maxwell & Son.

It is fast approaching two years since the issue of the last volume of this useful book, but the delay appears, under the circumstances stated in the preface, to have been unavoidable. The arrangement of matter in the beadings we have examined varies in merit, but as

NEW ORDERS, &c. to some we can speak with much satisfaction. The heading HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE-CHANCERY DIVISION. “Executor and Administrator," for instance, which occupies 353

ORDERS OF COURT. pages, appears to us to be admirably classified, and affords an almost indispensable adjunct to the last edition of Williams.

Saturday, 13th November, 1886. “Husband and Wife" is another important heading which is, on the Whereas, Arthur Kekewich, Esq., one of her Majesty's Counsel, has whole, well classified, and will be of great service to the practitioner. been appointed a judge of the High Court of Justice, and of the

Chancery Division of the said High Court. And whereas it is ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY.

expedient that the causes now standing for trial or hearing only before

Mr. Justice Stirling should be transferred to the said Arthur Kekewich ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY FROM THE TEUTONIC CONQUEST as a judge of the Chancery Division, for the purpose of trial or hearing

TO THE PRESENT TIME. By Thomas PITT TASWELL-LANGMEAD, only. Now I, The Right Honourable Hardinge Stanley, Baron Barrister-at-Law. THIRD EDITION. By C. H. E. CARMICHAEL. Halsbury, Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain, do bereby Stevens & Haynes.

order :We believe that this journal was among the first to recognize the

(1.) That the several causes now standing for trial and hearing merits of Mr. Taswell-Langmead's work. Originally intended as a

only, before Mr. Justice Stirling (other than the causes set manual for students at the universities and the Inns of Court, its

forth in the schedule hereto) be transferred to the said Arthur conciseness and comprehensiveness speedily gained for it a bigh repu

Kekewich, as a judge of the Chancery Division, for the purtation among these classes, while its easy and interesting style

pose of trial or hearing only. rendered it hardly less adapted for the general reader. Mr. Carmi

(2.) That no cause or matter be assigned to the said Arthur chael has revised the whole book, and practically remodelled the

Kekewich, as a judge, by the same being marked with his chapters on “The Succession to the Crown” and the “Progress of the Constitution since the Revolution.”

And this order is to be drawn up by the registrar, and set up in the several offices of the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice.

Williams v. Dealtry action for judgment

Williams v. Bell action

Broad v. Harris, Robbins v. Harris action part heard SLAUGHTER-HOUSES IN RURAL SANITARY DISTRICTS.

Badeley v. Consolidated Bank action

Litchfield v. Jones adjd. sumns. [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.]

Whereas the Honourable the Vice-Chancellor Sir James Bacon has Sir,—I shall be glad if you or any of your readers can inform me resigned the office of judge of Her Majesty's High Court of Justice, whether any licence or registration is necessary for the erection or I, The Right Honourable Hardinge Stanley, Baron Halsbury, Lord use of a slaughter house (for the slaughter of cattle for sale for High Chancellor of Great Britain, do hereby order and direct that all butcher's meat) in a rural sanitary district, and whether there is any causes and matters pending before the said Vice-Chancellor Sir James law prohibiting or in any way restricting the erection and use fsuch Bacon as a judge of Her Majesty's High Court of Justice, be transa slaughter-house.

ferred to Mr. Justice Kay and marked with his name. And I do Slaughter-houses within the metropolis, as defined by Schedules further order that the chief clerks and other clerks and officers A., B., and C. to the Metropolis Management Act, 1855, are regu- attached to the chambers of the said Sir James Bacon continue to lated by the Slaughter-houses Metropolis Act, 1874 (37'& 38 Vict. perform the same duties in relation to Mr. Justice Kay as those which C. 67), and other statutes; and those within urban sanitary districts they have hitherto performed for the said Vice-Chancellor Sir James are regulated by the Public Health Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 55, Bacon. $8. 169, 170). incorporating the Towns Improvement Clauses Act, And this order is to take effect on Monday, the 15th November 1847 (10 & 11 Vict. c. 37, ss. 125–131); but I cannot find any Act instant, and is to be drawn up by the registrar and set up in the regulating or restricting the erection or use of slaughter-houses several offices of the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice. used for the above-mentioned purpose within rural sanitary districts Whereas by an order dated the 13th day of November, 1886, I did where the rural authority has not been investel with the powers of order and direct that all causes and matters pending before the Vicean urban sanitary authority under section 276 of the Public Health Chancellor Sir James Bacon, as a judge of Her Majesty's High Court Act, 1875.

of Justice, should be transferred to Mr. Justice Kay, and marked with By 25 & 26 Geo. 3, c. 71, a licence (to be obtained at quarter ses- his name:

And I did further order that the chief clerks and other sions) is required for all slaughter-houses used for the slaughter of clerks attached to the chambers of the said Sir James Bacon should animals which shall not be killed for butcher's meat; and 7 & 8 Vict. contivue to perform the same duties in relation to Mr. Justice Kay as , 87, s. 1, provides for the annual renewal of such licences; but those which they had hitherto performed for the said Vice-Chancellor these statutes do not appear to apply to cases where the animals are Sir James Bacon. Now I, The Right Honourable Hardinge Stanley, slaughtered for the purpose of food.

Baron Halsbury, Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain, do order No doubt sections 116–119 of the Public Health Act, 1875 (rela- that all causes and matters pending before the said Mr. Justice ting to unsound meat, &c.) apply to slaughter-houses of the Kay, as a judge of Her Majesty's High Court of Justice, be trans


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ferred to Mr. Justice Stirling, and marked with his name. And I do as against the plaintiffs. The action was commenced in February, 1884, further order that the chief clerks and other clerks and officers against the company, the bank, and the trustee in bankruptcy of T. & Co., attached to the chambers of the said Mr. Justice Kay, continue to asking that the bank might be ordered to deliver up the certificate ; that perform the same duties in relation to Mr. Justice Stirling as those the company might be restrained from permitting any transfer; and that

Shortly afterwards which they have hitherto performed for the said Mr. Justice Kay. the bank might be restrained from selling the stock. And I do further order that so much of the order dated the 19th day from selling, but in October, 1885, the bank abandoned their claim and

the plaintiffs obtained an interlocutory injunction restraining the bank of May, 1886, as directs that no cause or matter should be assigned to delivered up the certificate' to the plaintiffs. The stock had meanwhile the said Mr. Justice Stirling, by the same being marked with his name,

fallen in value, and the plaintiffs claimed damages from the bank for its be discharged.

unlawful detention. North, J., held (W. N., 1886, 50), that the loss And this order is to take effect on Monday, the 15th November was caused by the plaintiffs' own fault in not asking for a sale of the instant, and is to be drawn up by the registrar and set up in the stock when they applied for the injunction, and that they were not entitled several offices of the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice. to any damages. The Cou'RT OF APPEAL (Cotton, Bowen, and Fry,

ICALSBURY, C. L.JJ.), reversed the decision, and gave the plaintiffs £900 damages.

COTTON, L.J., said that the injunction was granted only in consequence

of the unfounded claim made by the bank. The plaintiffs simply wished COUNTY COURTS.

to stop the bank, as persons dealing wrongfully with the shares, from

It was true that the plaintiffs might have suggested the I, the Right Honourable Hardinge Stanley, Baron Halsbury, Lord sale of the shares and payment of the proceeds into court, but so might High Chancellor of Great Britain, do, under the powers vested in me

also the bank. In considering the question of damages, the court took into by the County Court Rules, 1886, hereby order that the offices of the account the fact that the plaintiffs were desirous to sell, but were precounty courts may be closed on the twenty-fourth, the twenty-seventh, vented from selling the shares, and also the market value of the shares. and twenty-eighth days of December, 1886.

BOWEN and Fry, L.JJ., concurred.—Counsel, Sir Horace Darey, Q.C.; Given under my hand this first day of November, 1886.

Warmington, Q.C., and Decimus Sturges ; R. T. Reid, Q.C., and H. HALSBURY, C. Burton Buckley. Solicitors, Young, Jones, f. Co.; Druces of Attlee ;

Lawrance, Baker, & Co.; Freshfields f Williams.

HELMORE . SMITH-C. A. No. 2, 17th November,

R. S. O., 1883, LVIII., 16, 17-APPEAL_STAY OF Proceedings-APPLICA


BY WHOM ORDER APPEALED FROM WAS MADE, BILL OP SALE—INTEREST UPON INTEREST-CHARGE OF INSURANCE PRE In this case a question arose as to the mode of making an application MIUMS, RENT, RATES, AND Taxes.

for a stay of the proceedings under an order, pending an appeal, in the In this case the question arose as to the validity of a bill of sale. The been made. Rule 16 of order 58 provides that

case of the resignation of the judge by whom the order appealed from had

an appeal shall not document purported to have been given as security for an advance of operate as a stay of execution or of proceedings under the decision £500, and interest thereon at the rate of 60 per cent. The defendant appealed from, except so far as the court appealed from, or any judge agreed "that he would duly pay to the claimant the principal sum afore

thereof, or the Court of Appeal, may order." And by rule 17: “Where. said, together with the interest then due, by twelve equal monthly pay. ments of £41 138. 4d. on the 21st day of August now next, and below, or to the Court of Appeal, or to a judge of the court below or of

ever under these rules an application may be made either to the court £41 13s. 4d. on the 21st day of each and every succeeding month until the whole of the said sum and interest shall be fully paid, and in default the court or judge below.” In the present case the application was

the Court of Appeal, it shall be made in the first instance to of payment of any instalment, then that he, the mortgagor, will pay interest thereon, at the rate aforesaid, from the date when such instalments which had been made by Bacon, v.c., on the sth of November.

for a stay, pending an appeal, of the proceedings under an order shall become due until full payment thereof." The mortgagor further On the 10th of November "Bacon, V.C., resigned his office. agreed to pay the rent, rates, and taxes of any premises whereon the assigned chattels might be, and also to keep the premises insured against of Appeal. On the opening of the application the preliminary, objection

11th of November notice was served of the present application to the Court fire in the sum of £1,000, and that in default it should be lawful for the mortgagee to keep on foot the insurance, and to charge the costs, with in

was raised, that no application for a stay of proceedings had been made terest at the rate of 20 per cent. per annum to tho mortgagor, and that and HANNEN, P.) overruled the objection. Corron, L.J., said that, under

to the court below in accordance with rule 17. The COURT (COTTON, L J., the same should be considered as included in the security. The bill of sale the peculiar circumstances of the case, the objection ought not to be further gave the mortgagee a power to pay all rent, rates, and taxes, &c, which might become due and payable in respect of the premises, and ferred, would know no more of the case than the Court of Appeal did. -7

allowed. Kay, J., to whom the business of Bacon, V.C., had been transprovided that all such payments made by the mortgagee, with interest at Counsel, Marten, Q.C., and G. Henderson ; Millar, Q.C., and Oswald. the rate of 20 per cent., should be a charge upon the assigned chattels, SOLICITORS, Richard Furber; Joel Emanuel, & Co. which should not be redeemed until full payment of all such moneys and interest. The Queen's Bench Division (34 W. R. 460) held that this bill of sale was bad. On appeal the court reversed that decision. Fry, L.J., in reading the considered judgment of himself, Lord Esher, M.R., and BOWEN, L.J., said that the word “instalment” referred only to the Re HASTINGS, HIALLET 1. HASTINGS---Kay, J., 10th November. twelfth part of the principal sum and not to any interest. The stipulation for interest to be paid up till the actual time of payment was

SEPARATE ESTATE-STATUTE or LIMITATIONS. necessary to give the lender his right to 60 per cent. between the day This case raised the question whether the Statute of Limitations is or fixed for payment and the actual time of payment; for otherwise, after is not capable of being a defence to an action against a married woman by default, a jury would have been justiied in giving only 4 or 5 per cent. a creditor on a simple contract debt seeking to obtain execution against The words in the form given in the schedule to the Act of 1882 with her separate estate. On April 1, 1865, Mr. Heane married Lady Hastings, regard to the payment by equal instalments was to be read to mean that who was entitled to separate estate. In 1875 he paid to her the sum of the grantor would pay the principal sum by equal payments on the stipu- £100. She died in 1881, und Mr. Heane carried in a claim against the lated days together with the interest due at the respective times of pay- separate estate of Lady Hastings in respect of the £100 on the footing of ment of the instalments of the principal. With regard to the pro- its having been advanced as a loan. The chief clerk disallowed the claim visions as to payment of insurance premiums, rent, rates, taxes, &c., and the point now came before the court upon an adjoured summons seekhis lordship said that the court was of opinion that the case was practically ing to vary the chief clerk's certificate. It was denied on the part of the governed by Ex parte Stanford (34 W. Ř 507) and that it was competent estate that the payment was a loan, but if it were then the statute of to a lender to have such provisions inserted for the maintenance of the Limitations was relied upon on the ground that this was, if anything, a security granted by a bill of sale.-Counsel, Cooper Willis, Q.C., and simple contract debt, there having been no payment or acknowlegement Ringwood; Lionel Hart. SOLICITORS, Joseph Davis; Edward Lee.

in respect of the debt by Lady Hastings. There was separate estate

available for execution. KAY, J., said he would not enter into the ques. WILLIAMS v. THE PEEL RIVER LAND AND MINERAL CO. tion of whether the payment was a loan or not, but would assume against C. A. No. 2, 12th November.

the estate, for the purpose of his decision, that it was a loan. It had not ACTION TO RECOVER STOCK-INJUNCTION TO RESTRAIN SALE-SUBSEQUENT

been proved that Lady Hastings, during her life, had made any payment FALL IN PRICE-DAMAGES.

or given any acknowledgment by which the debt would be taken out of

the Statute of Limitations; and if the debt was regarded as one upon The question in this case was as to the plaintiffs' right to damages in simple contract, six year: having elapsed since it was entered into the consequence of a fall in the value of certain stock during the exist Statute of Limitations would apply in an ordinary case. ence of an injunction which they had obtained to restrain some of here, then, to exclude the operation of the equitable analogy to the

What was there, the defendants from selling it. In September, 1882, the plaintiffs sent to Statute of Limitations ? This was but an action upon the debt of a married T. & Co., brokers, a certificate for £15,000 stock in the defendant company, with instructions to sell the same as opportunity should offer. nolien or charge upon the separate estate, and the doctrine that a married

woman seeking to obtain execution against her separate estate ; there was T. & Co. sold £1,000 of the stock, and duly accounted for the proceeds, woman's contract of debt operated as an appointment of her separate and in October a new certificate for the remaining £14,000 stock was estate had been settled not to effect a lien or charge upon her property, issued in the plaintiffs' names to T. & Co. This certificate was not but merely to admit of execution being had against it. Upon principle, negotiable, but in May, 1883, it was deposited by T. & Co. with a bank to then, the monstrous result that a creditor could get execution upon & secure certain advances to them, and the bank claimed to hold the certificate simple contract debt of a married woman any number of years after it was


contracted, without any payment or acknowledgment having been made in taking, and the plaintiffs were directors of the company. A petition by the meantime by her, did not obtain. Upon principle, he was of opinion the company was presented in opposition to the abandonment bill. The that the Statute of Limitations applied to the present case. Secondly, Select Committee of the House of Commons reported in favour of the upon authority, the claim was supported upon the case of Norton v. abandonment, and also stated in their report that they were of opinion Turvill (2 P. Wms. 144); but, in his opinion, the explanations of that case that the defendant had been vexatiously subjected to expense in the proby later authorities did not warrant its application to prevent the bar of motion of the abandonment bill by the opposition of Hanley and Fisher the Statute of Limitations in the present case.-Counsel, Fischer, Q.C., (the present plaintiffs) directors of the company, petitioners against the bill, and J. G. W00.1; Hastings, Q.C., and P. Beale; Colt. SOLICITORS, Flower and that Mallett (the defendant) was entitled to recover from Hanley and f Nussey; Stephens f. Couldwell; Torr.

Fisher the proportion of his costs in relation to the abandonment bill. By

28 & 29 Vict. c. 27, it is provided (section 2) that the Committee on Private HOLT & CO. v. BEAGLE AND OTHERS-Kay, J., 11th November. Bills may award costs against petitioners vexatiously opposing, and (secMORTGAGE-FORECLOSURE-PUBLIC-HOUSE - RECEIPT OF RENTS AND PRO

tion 3) provision is made for the taxation of such costs, and that th CEEDS OF BUSINESS BETWEEN DATE OF CERTIFICATE AND DAY FIXED FOR

certificate of the taxing master of the House shall be exclusive evidence REDEMPTION.

of the amount of the demand, and of the title of the party therein named

to recover; and (section 5) that the person entitled to the taxed costs may This was a motion for foreclosure absolute of a mortgage of the lease, sue for the same, and in such actions the plaintiff, on filing a declaration fixtures, fittings, and goodwill of the business of a public-house. The ques- of indebtedness, together with the certificate, shall be at liberty to sign tion was what order should be made, having regard to the fact that the judgment and issue execution, and that the validity of such certificate receiver and manager appointed in the action, and continued by the judg. shall not be called in question in any court. The taxing master had ment, had received moneys between the date of the chief clerk's certificate issued his certificate awarding the defendant some £227 costs as against the and the day fixed for redemption, and to the decision in Jenner- Fust v. plaintiffs. It was contended by the plaintiffs that, as the company were Needham (34 W. R. 709, 32 Ch. D. 582), that the receipt of moneys by the the petitioners against the abandonment bill, the report of the Select Comreceiver between the chief clerk's certificate and the day for redemption mittee in denominating the plaintiffs petitioners, and directing them to operated to open the foreclosure and to render it necessary to fix a new pay costs, was null and void, and all proceedings founded on it usedate for redemption. The defendants had not appeared throughout the action, lessly vexatious. The plaintiffs moved for an injunction to restrain the but had been served with notice of the present application. It was con defendant from taking any further proceedings on the certificate or on tended, on behalf of the plaintiffs, that, as the subject matter of the mort the report of the Select Committee. CHITTY, J., said that the House of gage was the business of a public-house, of which the receipts varied in Commons had decided, whether rightly or wrongly, that the plaintiffs amount and were taken de die in diem, it would be very inconvenient if pre- were petitioners. The court was unable to control that decision. Morecisel y the same order should be made as was made in the case of Jenner-Fust v. over, the Act of Parliament said that the certificate of the taxing master Needham. KAY, J., directed that the receiver should forthwith pass his final was to be conclusive evidence, and not to be questioned in any court. The account and be discharged. The balance (if any) on the receiver's account plaintiffs were proceeding in the very teeth of the Act of Parliament. should be paid into court, with liberty for any of the parties to apply as Further, the Appeal Court had held, in North London Railway Co. v. Great to such balance and as to the costs of the present application.-COUNSEL, Northern Railway Co. (31 W. R. 490, 11 Q. B. D. 30) and London and Ratcliffe. SOLICITORS, T. W. Ratcliffe f Son.

Blackwall Railway Co. v. Cross (34 W. R. 201, 31 Ch. D. 354), that there

was no jurisdiction under the Judicature Act, 1873, s. 25, sub-section 8, Ex parte THE MAYOR AND CORPORATION OF LONDON, Re ZION to grant injunctions restraining proceedings which were being taken in COLLEGE–Kay, J., 11th November.

non-judicial tribunals-such as, for instance, arbitration proceedings

merely because such proceedings must be vexatious and futile. The INTERIM INVESTMENT OF PURCHASE-MONEY-Costs—LANDS CLAUSES Con- present application fell within the principle of those cases. He should, SOLIDATION Act, 1845, ss. 1, 80—Zion COLLEGE Act, 1884.

for all these reasons, refuse the motion, with costs. When the defendant This was a motion to discharge an order made in chambers, and the had signed judgment for the taxed costs, then would have been the right object of the application was to enable the matter to be taken to the time for the plaintiffs to have brought forward their claim as to the certiCourt of Appeal. The question was whether the court could order the ficate’s invalidity.--Counsel, Romer, Q.C., and Henry Kisch; H. B. Buckley. President and Fellows of Zion College to pay the costs of the interim SOLICITORS, Whitfield; Torr $ Co. investment of the purchase-money paid by them to the Corporation for certain land on the Thames Embankment. The facts, so far as material,

TAPSCOTT 1. TAPSCOTT—Chitty, J., 13th November. were as follows:- In the reign of King Charles I., the Rev. Thomas PAYMENT OUT OF Court-BENEFICIARY ABROAD-POWER OF ATTORNEYWhite bequeathed a sum of money for the purpose of founding a college

Proor. and library for the benefit of the clergy of the City of London, and an almshouse for ten poor men and ten poor women. Zion College was

In this case, being a petition for payment out of court, it appeared that accordingly incorporated by charters of King Charles I. and King Charles one of the persons entitled to a share in the fund, who resided in Western II., and various powers, including powers to acquire and manage land, Australia, had executed a power of attorney, sealed with the seal of a were given to the President and Fellows. These powers were extended notary public in Western Australia. An affidavit was made by one of the by an Act of Parliament passed in 1875. By a further Act, the Zion petitioners, who was a brother of the giver of the power, proving the College Act, 1884, the President and Fellows were authorized to purchase signature. CHITTY, J., said that the court would take judicial notice of from the Corporation of London land on the Thames Embankment, for the the seal of the notary public, and that the affidavit was sufficient proof of purpose of providing a site for a new college and library. By section 4 of signature of the power of attorney.-COUNSEL, Hadley. the last-mentioned Act it was provided that “all purchase-money to be paid by the President and Fellows of Zion College for the said piece of Re GREAT WESTERN STEAMSHIP CO. (LIM.)- North, J., 13th land should be paid into the Bank of England in the same manner and to

November. the same account as if the same were paid in under the Lands Clauses Company–Reduction of Capital-Shares UNEQUALLY PAID UP-UNPAID Consolidation Act, 1845, and other Acts amending the same, and should

CALLS. be dealt with accordingly,” but the Lands Clauses Act was not otherwise incorporated with it. The purchase-money was paid into the bank under This was a petition for the confirmation by the court of special resolusection 4, and an application made for the interim investment of it. KAY, tions which had been passed for the reduction of the capital of the comJ., said that he was very glad to have an opportanity of stating the rea- pany. The nominal capital was £1,000,000, in 20,000 shares of £50. The sons by which he had been guided in making the order in chambers. The articles of association gave the directors power to issue any of the shares as object of the Lands Clauses Act, 1844, was to enable certain provisions preference shares. Only 6,044 shares had been issued—1,359 of them as usually inserted in railway, land, and other similar Acts, to be introduced preference shares—and the remaining 4,685 as ordinary shares. All the in future Acts in a simple and short manner. It was not, however, so far preference shares, and 4 360 of the ordinary shares, had been paid up in as he was aware, usualto introduce such clauses into all Acts relating to full. On the remaining 325 ordinary shares only £38 per share had been private charities. Zion College was not an undertaking or work of a public called up, and that sum had been paid on all of these shares except 37, nature within section 1 of the Lands Clauses Act, and that Act could not, on which only £30 per share had been paid, a call of £8 per share not therefore, be held to be in corporated with the Zion College Act, 1884, having been paid on them. A considerable amount of capital had been unless the latter Act contained express words to that effect. That was lost, and the resolutions provided that the nominal capital of the company not so. It was then agued that section 4 of the Zion College Act, 1884, should be reduced to £264,000, in 8,000 preference shares of £15, and incorporated the Lands Clauses Act sufficiently to make section 80 apply 12,000 ordinary shares of £12, paid "up capital which had been lost to the present case. Section 80, however, although it gave the court being cancelled to the extent of £35 on each of the 1,359 preference purchase-money. It could not, therefore, be said to be incorporated by proposed to state in the minute which was to be registered, that on 325 section 4 of the Zion College Act, 1884. For these reasons he could not of the ordinary shares (specified by their numbers) nothing was to be hold that the court had the jurisdiction contended for by the Corporation. deemed to have been paid up, all of the other issued shares being deemed - COUNSEL, Baker; Rawlins. Rawlins, & Co. SOLICITORS, The City Solicitor; Clarke, to have been fully paid up. An order had been made in chambers dis

pensing with the advertisement of the presentation of the petition, as the

proposed reduction would not affect the rights of creditors. In the first HANLEY AND ANOTHER 4. MALLETT-Chitty, J., 12th November. instance, North, J., felt some difficulty in confirming the resolutions, INJUNCTION TO RESTRAIN PROCEEDINGS ON AWARD of Costs UndER REPORT $12 shares, on which nothing was to be deemed to have been paid, it might not

OF SELECT Committee of House of COMMONS-JURISDICTION—28 & 29 be possible in the event of a winding up to recover from the holders of the VICT. C. 27, ss. 2, 3, 5—JUDICATURE Act, 1873, s. 25, SUB-SECTION 8.

In this case it appeared that the defendant was the promoter of a bill reduction. Evidence, however was adduced that the holders of the 37 for the dissolution of the company and the abandonment of its under- ! shares were persons of no means, from whom it would be practically im

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possible to recover any part of the £8 call, and this being so, North, J., and void. It was also urged that the unwillingness of the ecclesiastical said that he would confirm the resolutions, as no harm could be done to courts to set aside a marriage was founded upon religious considerations, the creditors. But the order would be without prejudice to any claim which were inapplicable to a civil marriage, especially if it had not been against the holders of the 37 shares.-COUnsel, Cosens-Hardy, Q.O., and consummated ; and they referred to Turner v. Meyers (1 Hagg. Cons. Christopher James. SOLICITORS, Saunders, Hawksford, Bennett, f Co. 414), Harford v. Morris (2 Hagg. Cons. 423), Portsmouth v. Portsmouth (1

Hagg. Ecc. 355), Wilkinson v. Wilkinson (4 Notes of Cases, 297), Field's GUILBERT-MARTIN KERR & JUBB-Kekewich, J., 16th

Marriage Bill (2 H. L. Cas. 48), Harrod v. Harrod (1 K. & J. 4,2 W. R. 612), November.

and Hancock v. Peaty (15 W. R. 719, L. R. 1 P. & D. 335). Butt, J., in giving

judgment, observed that the validity of a contractof marriage must be tested PATENT-BENEFICIAL USER-Prior PUBLICATION.

and determined in precisely the same manner as that of any other con. The plaintiff, a French subject, took out a patent, No. 4,960, on the 17th tract, and would not be binding if the consent of either party had been of October, 1883, for an improvement in water gauge glasses for steam obtained by fraud or duress. No doubt public policy required that mar. boilers; the improvement being the addition, at the back of the tube, of a riages should not be lightly set aside, and great care and circumspection white enamel band with a pink stripe down it. By this means the must be exercised in a case like the present; but these considerations height of the water in the tube could be more easily seen. It appeared could not alter the grounds npon which a marriage contract could be that in or about the year 1877 the superintendent of the engines of avoided. It was not necessary, in order to avoid a contract entered into Messrs. Crossley & Co., at Halifax, being dissatisfied with the ordinary through fear, that the fear should be so great as would compel a person clear glass tubes, ordered from a glass tube manufacturer at Birmingham of ordinary courage and resolution to yield to it; but if through fear, a number of gauges with different coloured stripes at the back, and whether reasonably entertained or not, a party to a contract is in a state amongst others some with a white enamel band with a red stripe down the of mental incompetence to resist pressure improperly brought to bear, centre. A number of these coloured tubes, together with some clear glass there is no more consent than there would be in the case of a person of ones, were sent to him through a firm of Kerr & Jubb, who usually stronger intellect and courage yielding to a more serious danger. In the supplied gauge tubes. Crossley & Sons and their superintendent had a present case the petitioner's pecuniary liability on the bills, and the patent, No. 4,111, dated the 1st of December, 1874, for coloured glass tubes. threats of the holders of them, had reduced her to such a state of bodily No separate invoice was made for the different colours. Messrs. Crossley and mental prostration as to render her unable to resist constraint and had some of the red striped tubes fixed to their boilers, where several re pressure exercised by other parties for their own ends. The contents of mained for about two years; but as they did not prove satisfactory to many of her letters were inexplicable, except on the ground that her their engine superintendent, he gave orders for the discontinuance of their mind was enfeebled by disease. Then there was clear evidence that, use, and no more were put on the boilers. The plaintiff had begun to being ignorant of the nature and effect of bankruptcy proceedings, she sell on a large scale glasses manufactured by him, whereupon Kerr & Jubb was induced to believe that her marriage to the respondent would relieve had begun to sell similar glasses manufactured at Birmingham to their her from liability or facilitate a settlement of the actions. After going order. This was an action to restrain them from doing so. KEKEWICH, J., through the evidence of what took place at the registrar's office, he in giving judgment, said it seemed unnecessary to decide upon the utility of pointed out that none of the material allegations had been contradicted the invention, the question was simply whether there had been anticipa by the respondent, and that there appeared to be no evidence of coltion. There was no doubt D. Martin did not know of any anticipation lusion. He was satisfied that the plaintiff would never have married the when he took out his patent. [After stating the above facts his lordship respondent of her own free will, that she was incapable of offering recontinued :-) The glasses eent to Crossley were used as long as they could sistance to threats and coercion, and that she had never given such a conbe in a most public manner on their engines, and were used by them in sent as the law required in crder to render a marriage valid. He theretheir business and not as an experiment. No doubt they were not satis fore pronounced a decree declaring the marriage to be null and void, fied with the glasses, but still that did not make the user any less a dismissed the counter-claim, and ordered the respondent to pay the costs beneficial one while it lasted. He came to the conclusion accordingly of the suit.—Counsel, Sir R. Webster, A.G., Dr. Tristram, Q.C., Pollard, that there had been anticipation and prior publication, and, therefore, and Statham, Sir E. Clarke, S.G., Inderwick, Q.O., Searle, and Innes. the judgment would be for the defendant with costs.--COUNSEL, Aston, SOLICITORS, T'idy Tidy; T. D. Dutton, Q.O., Gazdar, and Pollard ; Moulton, Q.O., and R. W. Wallace. SoliciTORS, Gresham & Davies ; Burn f Berridge for R. M. & J. M. Kerr, Halifax.

BANKRUPTCY CASES. SCOTT (otherwise SEBRIGHT) v. SEBRIGHT-Prob. Div., 16th November.


12th November. NULLITY OF MARRIAGE-CONTRACT—CONSENT-FRAUD-DURESS. Judgment was given in this suit, which had been tried before Butt, J.,


-Locus STANDI TO APPEAL-CREDITOR-Costs-BANKRUPTCY Act, 1883, without a jury. The petitioner sued for a declaration that the marriage solemnized between berself and the respondent at the Registrar's Office

ss. 28, 104. for the parish of St. George's, Hanover-square, on the 30th of January, This was an appeal by some creditors of a bankrupt against an order 1886, was null and void, on the ground that her consent to the marriage suspending the bankrupt's discharge for twelve months, on the ground had been obtained by means of fraud and duress, and she alleged that the that the sentence was too lenient. The bankrupt had acted as a shipmarriage had never been consummated. The respondent, by his answer, broker to the appellants, and they opposed his application for a discharge denied the allegations in the petition, and in a counter-claim he alleged on the ground that he had been guilty of a fraudulent breach of trust that the marriage was valid, and he prayed for a decree for restitution of towards them in not paying over moneys which he had received for conjugal rights. The petitioner and the respondent had been acquainted them, and using those moneys for his own purposes, and in furnishing with one another for several years, and in March, 1885, the petitioner, them with misleading accounts. The official receiver had reported that who had recently, on coming of age, become entitled to a sum of £26,000 the bankrupt had been guilty of two offences under section 28 of the under the will of her father, was induced by the respon lent to Bankruptcy Act, 1883, in continuing to trade after knowing himself to be sign a bill of exchange for £500 for his accommodation, the transaction insolvent, and in omitting to keep proper books in his business. The not being known to her mother or to any of her friends. An engagement registrar held that the bankrupt had committed a breach of trust, but of marriage had previously been entered into by them, but had been that there had been no fraud, and he suspended the order of discharge broken off. The respondent afterwards induced her to put her name to for twelve months. The COURT OF APPEAL (Lord Esher, M. R., and other bills, and at the end of the year 1885 she had, in this manner, LINDLEY and Lopes, L.JJ.) reversed the decision, and held that the order incurred liabilities to an amount exceeding £3,000, and was threatened of discharge ought to have been entirely refused. On behalf of the with bankruptcy and other legal proceedings by the holders of the bills. bankrupt it was urged that a creditor had no locus standi to appeal from There was medical and other evidence to the effect that the anxiety and such an order ; that he was not a “person aggrieved” by it within the distress caused by the liabilities thus incurred bad reduced the petitioner meaning of section 104; that there could not be an appeal for the purpose to a condition of bodily and mental prostration, and she was afterwards of increasing a quasi-criminal sentence; and that, the registrar having told by the respondent that the only way for her to escape from her legal exercised his discretion under section 28, the Court of Appeal would not liability upon the bills was to marry him. On the 30th of January he readily interfere. Lord Esher, M.R., said that it could not be denied requested her to meet him at the corner of Mount-street, when she that the registrar had a discretion in dealing with such an application, accompanied him to the registrar's office. She stuted that she did not and if the Court of Appeal had taken the same view of the facts, and the know where she was going, and that, after they had entered the appeal had been only from the mildness of the registrar's decision, it office, a friend of the respondent stood before the door in would have been very difficult (though not impossible) or this court to such a manner as to prevent her from leaving the room, and differ from his decision. the respondent threatened to shoot her if she evinced any unwillingness induce this court to differ. But, if the court was of opinion that the

But it would require a very strong case to to marry him. She admitted that all the formalities necessary to the registrar's conclusion on the facts as to the bankrupt's conduct, validity of the marriage were complied with, but she alleged that, when erroneous,

it could

take into


the the respondent attempted to place the ring on her finger, she threw it on of the registrar's discretion as to the amount of the sentence, for the floor, and that he afterwards dragged her by the arm to the table and the discretion would then have been exercised on an erroneous state compelled her to sign the marriage register. registrar was examined as a witness, and stated that he heard no threats any attention to the amount of the sentence, which the registrar had

The superintendent of facts. Under such circumstances the Court of Appeal would not pay uttered, but that the respondent appeared excited and annoyed, and thought a proper one. threw down the ring. The respondent was not examined, except for the rupt, as a broker, to collect freight for his employers, and when he had

In the present case it was the duty of the bank; purpose of denying that he had ever had sexual intercourse with the peti- collected it it was his duty to pay over what he had received to his prin: tioner, and no other witnesses were called on his behalf. The counselcipals, subject to any deduction which he might be entitled to make. He for the petitioner argued that there was abundant evidence of both fraud was not bound to hand over the very cheques or cash which he had and duress, either of which would be sufficient to render a marriago null I received, nor to pay them over from day to day. But he was bound




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