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and oppressive charges. They would also include the cost of preparing the mortgage security. The bill of sale was, therefore, not in accordance with the form. LOPES, L.J., concurred.-COUNSEL, Potter, Q.C., and Danckwerts; H. Reed. SOLICITORS, Gregory, Rowcliffes, & Co., for R. Nicholson, Liverpool; H. Davies.

HARSANT v. BLAINE, MACDONALD, & CO.-C. A. No. 1, 15th To answer this question not only the labels affixed to the boxes, but the

June.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-AGENT BONA FIDE DENYING TITLE OF PRINCIPAL-
ACTION FOR MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED-INTEREST.
The plaintiff, who resided in South Africa, was jointly interested with
a man named Lynch in 1,050 shares in the Kimberley Waterworks Co.
On leaving South Africa for England he left the shares with Lynch, who
shortly afterwards sent them, together with others, to the defendants,
who were brokers in London, as security for a draft by him on them. He,
however, directed the defendants to take the plaintiff's instructions as to
what should be done with his portion of the shares. The defendants sold
the shares. In November, 1882, the plaintiff applied to the defendants
for the shares or the proceeds of their sale, but the defendants declined
to recognize him, saying that the shares had been mortgaged to them by
Lynch and that they would render an account to him. The plaintiff,
after communicating with Lynch, brought this action for the proceeds of
the sale of the shares, which was tried before Grove, J., who gave judg-
ment for the plaintiff for the value of the shares. His decision was re-
versed in the Court of Appeal, but restored in the House of Lords, by
whom the case was remitted to the Queen's Bench Division to assess the
amount of the value of the shares. Grove, J., refused to entertain the
question, and the plaintiff appealed from his refusal and urged that he
was entitled to the present value of the shares, which had increased in
value since the sale by the defendants, and also that he was entitled to
interest on the proceeds of the sale.

opinion, the plaintiffs were not entitled to be protected in the use of the
mark. It was admitted that the cigars, if made of Havannah tobacco,
were not made at the Havannah, but at Bremen, and therefore were not
genuine Havannah cigars in the proper sense of the term. Was there,
then, a representation, or anything amounting to a representation, that
the cigars contained in these boxes were cigars made in the Havannah ?
stamp impressed on the boxes-the whole box, in fact-must be looked
and
"Habana,"
at. That stamp contained the words "La Pureza,'
"Ramon Romuedo." It was said that "Habana" merely indicated that
the cigars were made up in the particular shape and size which had come
to be known as Havannah cigars. But there were also the words "La
Pureza," which was an old Havannah brand, though it was said to be
now no longer in existence, and "Ramon Romuedo.' There was no
manufacturer of cigars at the Havannah known under that name. Why,
then, was the name used, except that it was a name which would strike
everyone as being the name of a Spaniard? Then there was also some-
thing which purported to be the signature of this "Ramon Romuedo "
written on the label, as if to denote that he was in some way connected
with the manufacture of the cigars. It was said that everybody in the
cigar trade did the same, or much the same, in reference to labels for
cigar boxes. But, in his lordship's opinion, even if that were so, it
afforded no justification to the plaintiffs, who, having made up their cigars
in boxes containing untrue representations, came to the court for protection
against infringement. The proper course for a court of law, and still
more for a court of equity, was to refuse to protect any person who
sailed under false colours. These cigar boxes, when looked at as a whole,
contained what amounted to a representation that the cigars in them were
manufactured by a person whose name appeared on the lid and label at a
particular place, the Havannah, which was not the place where they were
really manufactured. The mere fact that there were other persons in the
trade who made the same attempt to impose upon the public did not
authorize the court to interfere in a case like this, where there had been a
false representation as to the origin and manufacture of the article sought
to be protected. The action ought to have been dismissed, without costs,
but the defendants would have the costs of the appeal. Bowen, L.J.,
entirely concurred. Why should there have been this elaborate con-
catenation of pictorial lies except for the purpose of deceiving the public?
No reasonable or honest purpose could be suggested. FRY, L.J., con-
curred.-COUNSEL, Aston, Q.C., and John Culler; Warmington, Q.C., and
Sebastian. SOLICITORS, James Curtis; W. H. Roberts.

THE COURT (Lord ESHER, M.R., LINDLEY and LOPES, L.JJ.) said that they would give a decision on the principle of assessment of the damages, although they would not say that Grove, J., was wrong in refusing to do so. The action had been framed and brought as an action for money had and received, and it had been fought throughout on that footing, and the damages must be assessed accordingly. To say that the plaintiff was entitled to the present value of the shares would be to treat the action as though it were one of trover for the conversion of the shares. This could not be done without amendment, and it was now too late to amend. The defendants must therefore be treated as agents of the plaintiff, and as having sold the shares by his authority, and were therefore liable to Re ROBERTS, EVANS v. THOMAS-Kay, J., 11th June. account to him for the proceeds of such sale. At common law, before the Judicature Acts, interest on such proceeds could not be recovered from BILL OF SALE-REGISTRATION-MEMORANDUM OF SALE IN AUCTIONEER'S such agents, but since the Judicature Act the principles of equity were to prevail. In equity, in actions for account, which were of a similar nature to such actions as this, it was clearly laid down in Pearse v. Green (1 Jac & W. 586) that an agent bound to pay money to a principal, but refusing to do so, was liable for interest on that money from the time of such refusal. It was no excuse that the agent entertained a bona fide doubt as to the title of his principal to the money. Consequently, apply ing that principle to the present case, the defendants must pay to the plaintiff the proceeds of the sale by them of the shares, and interest on the amount from November, 1882, at the rate of 4 per cent.-COUNSEL, J. G. Witt; Charles, Q.C., and Bray. SOLICITORS, Saunders, Hawksford, Bennett, & Co.; Watley, Tilleard, & Freeman.

NEWMAN & CO. v. PINTO & SONS-C. A. No. 2, 14th June. TRADE-MARK-IMITATION-INJUNCTION-FRAUDULENT REPRESENTATION BY

PLAINTIFF.

BOOK-BILLS OF SALE ACT, 1878 (40 & 41 VICT. c. 31), s. 4.

In this case a stack of hay had been knocked down to R. Williams, at a sale by auction of farm produce, for £40, one of the conditions of sale being that a purchaser was to have six months' credit. No money was paid, and the ĥay was left on the vendor's farm, but an entry of the sale to Williams was made by the auctioneer's clerk in his book, specifying the lot and price and purchaser's name, so as to prevent the sale being void under section 17 of the Statute of Frauds, relating to contracts for the sale of goods for the price of £10 and upwards. Before the six months had expired, the hay was seized under a fi. fa. on a judgment against the vendor, and being claimed by Williams, the sheriff interpleaded. The execution creditor contended that the entry in the auctioneer's book ought to have been registered as a bill of sale under the Act of 1878, being an assurance within section 4, for without it the purchase could not be enforced. The claimant contended that there had been a constructive delivery of the hay to him, and that it passed to him by the sale, and not by the entry, which was merely evidence of the sale, Marsden v. Meadows (29 W. R. 816, 7 Q. B. D. 80).

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KAY, J., held that the claim failed. There was no receipt of the hay, nor of any part of it by the purchaser, so as to make the vendor bailee of it for him, and the case was clearly within the mischief intended to be prevented by the Bills of Sale Act, for the hay remained in the apparent possession of the vendor within the very words of section 4. Whatever might be the meaning of the term " "" assurance in that section, there could be no doubt that a written memorandum, which was not merely evidence of the transaction, but without which the transaction of sale and purchase was void, must be a document of title which could properly be called an assurance. The case was to be distinguished from one in which the sale would be valid and complete without the memorandum.-COUNSEL, H. Tindal Atkinson; F. Marshall; and H. Terrell. SOLICITORS, Bolton, Robbins, & Busk, for 0. Owen, Pwllheli; Rushton, for D. L. George, Criccieth; Rooke & Sons, for C. A. Jones, Carnarvon.

This was an appeal from a judgment of Kekewich, J., granting an injunction to restrain the defendants from imitating the plaintiffs' trademark and labels. The plaintiffs carried on business in London as manufacturers and importers of cigars and tobacco, and in 1883 had registered (under the Trade-Marks Registration Act, 1875) a trade-mark coutaining the words "La Pureza," with a design or picture. Each of their cigar boxes was stamped on the lid with the word "Habana," surrounded by an ellipse containing the words "La Pureza-Ramon Romuedo," and also contained an inside label with the word "Habana" at the foot of a picture. An additional label contained the signature "Ramon Romuedo," together with shields of Spain and the Havannah. The similarity of the defendants' labels to those of the plaintiffs was admitted, but the right of the plaintiffs to protection was disputed mainly on the ground that their trade-mark contained a fraudulent representation that the cigars sold by them were made at the Havannah, whereas, in fact, the cigars sold under this label were manufactured at Bremen from Mexican tobacco, and it was urged on the authority of Wood v. Lambert (32 Ch. D. 247, 30 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 200), that the plaintiffs had by their own fraud forfeited all right to protection for their trade-mark. Kekewich, J., held that the PRACTICE-JURISDICTION-ORIGINATING SUMMONS-TRUSTEES OF WILLword "Havannah " having been in common use in the trade for at least DEFENDANT CLAIMING AGAINST THE WILL-R. S. C., 1883, LV., 3 (a.), twenty-five years for cigars, wherever they came from, and this fact being (E) well known both to the trade and to customers, there had been no fraud, and Wood v. Lambert did not apply, and consequently that the plaintiffs were entitled to an injunction, an account, and the costs of the action. THE COURT OF APPEAL (COTTON, BOWEN, and FRY, L.JJ.) reversed the decision, and dismissed the action. COTTON, L.J., said that the mark had been used by the plaintiffs in connection only with boxes of cigars which they imported from Bremen; the purpose for which it was used being to protect them in the sale of cigars in boxes so marked and labelled. It must be assumed that the plaintiffs had given directions to their correspondents in Bremen as to the use of the mark, and, in his

Re BRIDGE, FRANKS v. WORTH—Kay, J., 9th June.

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This was an originating summons, under ord. 55, r. 3, by trustees of the will of Ann Bridge, asking that it might be "determined in what manner they should deal with certain freehold messuages purported to be devised by the said will, and with a certain indenture of release dated the 31st of July, 1800, which is believed to deal with the said messuages, and which is now in their possession." The defendants were H. Worth, who claimed the property under the release, and the residuary legatees under the will, some of whom were infants. The testatrix devised the property, under the belief that it was her's in fee simple, to trustees on trust for sale and to pay debts. The indenture of

summons.

1800 had been recently discovered, and under it the testatrix appeared only to have been entitled as tenant in tail of the property. If the property did not pass under the will the legacies would have to abate. The defendants did not object to having the question determined on the KAY, J., said that the court had no jurisdiction to decide on an originating summons under ord. 55, r. 3, a question of this kind between the trustees and an adverse claimant and infants, and dismissed the summons, with costs.-COUNSEL, Carson; A. a'B. Terrell; Upjohn. SOLICITORS, Cobbold & Woolley, for Cobbold, Sons, & Rouse, Ipswich; Rawlinson & Upjohn. Re WHISTLER AND RICHARDSON-Kay, J., 8th and 9th June. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-EXECUTOR - LEASEHOLDS - INQUIRY AS EXISTENCE OF DEBTS-POWER OF EXECUTOR TO SELL LEASEHOLDS 20 YEARS AFTER TESTATOR'S DEATH.

shewing that there were in existence debts of the testator.

ΤΟ

S. H. Davis bequeathed all his leaseholds to his daughter Maria upon trust to pay an annuity, and, after giving several legacies, gave the residue, subject to debts, &c., to his said daughter, and appointed her sole executrix. He died on the 28th of March, 1867. Some of the lease holds were underlet, and had recently formed the subject of ejectment proceedings by the executrix ; a compromise was effected, and the occupier agreed to buy the leaseholds. The agreement was dated the 16th of March, 1887, and by it the price was to be fixed by a valuer, which was done, but not till after the 28th of March, 1887. The purchaser insisted that after such a lapse of time the executrix could not sell as such without KAY, J., said that the requisition was unreasonable. The rule in Re Tanqueray-Willaume & Landau (30 W. R. 801, 20 Ch. D. 465) did not apply to an executor selling leaseholds bequeathed to him by the will. There was nothing to shew that the executrix had assented to the legacy, or taken possession as legatee. The law gave her the right to deal with assets in her hands, and there was no authority for saying that that power ceased after twenty years. But if that case did apply, yet this case would not fall within the rule; for as soon as the price was fixed, the contract was complete and operated from the date when it was made, which was twelve days less than twenty years from the testator's death. Summons dismissed with costs.-COUNSEL, E. Ford; J. M. Stone. SOLICITORS, Joseph Harwood; Stones, Morris, & Stone.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL v. MAYOR, &c., OF BLACKBURN-Chitty, J., 10th June.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1882, s. 15, SUB-SECTION 4; ss. 140, 141 -MISAPPLICATION OF BOROUGH FUND.

In this case the plaintiffs and relators, being ratepayers of Blackburn, complained of certain resolutions on the part of the corporation of the town for the application of moneys from the borough fund to the purposes of the local celebration of the Queen's Jubilee, and moved for an interim injunction. Since the institution of the action the corporation had rescinded the resolutions and passed others to the effect that, pursuant to section 15, sub-section 4, of the Municipal Corporations Act, 1882, the sum of £700 should be paid to the mayor by way of remuneration, and that the mayor be requested to take such steps as he might deem proper for the due celebration of the Jubilee. The plaintiffs alleged that such resolutions were an evasion of the Act, and were passed for the purpose oi misapplying the borough fund in pursuance of the intention disclosed by the original resolutions. CHITTY, J., said that to speak of an evasion of an Act of Parliament was a fallacious expression. An Act was either complied with or disobeyed; it was not evaded. The Act of 1882, s. 15, sub-section 4, said that the mayor of a corporation might receive such remuneration as the town council should think reasonable. Section 140 said that such remuneration should be paid out of the borough fund, and section 141, sub-section 2, provided that any order of the council for payment out of the borough fund might be removed into the Queen's Bench Division by writ of certiorari, and might be wholly or partly disallowed or confirmed by the court according to its judgment or discretion. It was possible that the Legislature, when granting to the Queen's Bench a discretionary power, had in its contemplation the desirability of allowing extraordinary expenditure, if such expenditure were deemed reasonable. However, be that as it might, the plaintiffs had not shewn upon the motion any case of the town council having by its resolutions said one thing when in truth it meant another, or having done anything irregular under the Act of 1882; and it was not therefore a case for an interlocutory injunction.-COUNSEL, Sir A. Watson, Q C., and Methold; Romer, Q C., and W. D. Rawlins. SOLICITORS, Bolton, Robbins, Busk, & Co., for W. E. L. Gaine, Town Clerk, Blackburn; Blachford, Riches, & Wood, for Darley & Crossley, Blackburn.

EDMONDS v. BLAINA FURNACES CO.-Chitty, J., 15th June. COMPANY-DEBENTURE-MORTGAGE OF CHATTELS-BILLS OF SALE ACT, 1882, s. 17.

In this case the question arose whether a memorandum of agreement between a company and certain mortgagees named therein, charging in favour of persons named the undertaking, property, and effects of the company, and containing a covenant on the part of the company for repayment of the sum charged, pari passu, amongst the persons named should have been registered as a bill of sale, or was exempt from such registration as being a debenture of an incorporated company within the saving clause (section 17) of the Bills of Sale Act, 1882.

CHITTY, J., said that there was no legal definition of the term debenture. But looking at the terms of the document in question, he was of opinion that it came within what was usage in legal diction styled a debenture.

It was, moreover, required to be registered under the Companies Act, 1862. It was not an essential feature in a debenture that it should bear a serial number. He had known a debenture of a company to be made in favour of a single mortgagee. He considered that the present document was within the saving clause of the Bills of Sale Act, 1882.-CoOUNSEL, Romer, .C., and C. A. James; Ingle Joyce and R. J. Parker; Vernon R. Smith. SOLICITORS, Clements; C. A. Clulow.

Re HERMANN LOOG (LIM.)-North, J., 10th June. COMPANY-WINDING UP-RESTRAINING ACTION AGAINST COMPANY-SOLICITOR-COSTS IN WINDING UP-ARRESTMENT OF ASSETS IN SCOTLANDCOMPANIES ACT, 1862, ss. 87, 122.

The above company was in liquidation in England under an order of the Chancery Division. It had some assets in Scotland, and the solicitors of the official liquidator in England appointed a solicitor in Glasgow their the terms that the English solicitor should not be personally liable for his agent in Scotland to assist in getting in the assets in that country, upon remuneration, but that he should look only to the company's assets for payment. The Scotch solicitor performed some services in getting in against the liquidator in the Court of Session for his remuneration, and assets of the company in Scotland, and he then commenced proceedings his bill of costs was taxed, and he obtained an order for the arrestment of some moneys which formed part of the assets, and which were in the hands of an auctioneer and in a bank. The liquidator moved for an injunction to restrain the Scotch solicitor from taking or continuing any proceedings in Scotland in respect of his bill of costs. An opinion was solicitor who had been employed by an English client, whether a private given by a Scotch advocate to the effect that, by the law of Scotland, a individual or an official liquidator, was entitled to found jurisdiction by arresting funds belonging to his client, and thereafter to raise an action against him in the Scotch courts for payment of his business accounts. After founding jurisdiction and raising an action in Scotland against an official liquidator resident in England, a solicitor was (the advocate said) entitled, according to the law of Scotland, to arrest in security of his debt and stop in Scotland all funds and property in that country belonging to

his client.

NORTH, J., held that the Scotch solicitor must be restrained from arresting the assets. He was no more entitled to attach the assets than an English agent employed for a similar purpose in England would have tion. The solicitor would, of course, be paid in the winding up what been entitled to bring an action against the company for his remunerawas due to him, but he could not be allowed to attach the assets.— COUNSEL, Cookson, Q.C., and Emden; Haldane. SOLICITORS, Goldberg & Langdon; Barnard & Co.

Re THE BRITON LIFE ASSOCIATION-North, J., 11th June. LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY-TRANSFER_OF BUSINESS-CONFIRMATION BY COURT-NOTICE TO POLICY-HOLDERS-LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANIES ACT, 1870 (33 & 34 VICT. c. 61), s. 14.

This was a petition by a life assurance company and its directors for the confirmation by the court of a conditional agreement which had been entered into for the sale and transfer of the life policies and annuity contracts of the company, and the goodwill of their business, to another life assurance company. Section 14 of the Life Assurance Companies Act, 1870, provides that no such company shall transfer its business to another unless such transfer is confirmed by the court. An application to the court for confirmation is to be made by petition, and "before any such application is made to the court a statement of the nature of the transfer, together with an abstract containing the material facts embodied in the agreement or deed under which such transfer is proposed to be effected, and copies of the actuarial or other reports upon which such agreement or deed is founded, shall be forwarded to each policy-holder of the transferred company, by the same being transmitted in manner provided by section 136 of the Companies Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, for the transmission to shareholders of notices not requiring to be served personally. The court shall not sanction any transfer in any case in which it appears to the court that policy-holders representing one-tenth or more of the total amount assured in any company the business of which it is proposed to transfer, dissent from such transfer." In the present case a few of the policy-holders of the company whose business was to be transferred resided in Canada, and on the hearing of the petition it appeared that the notice required by section 14 had been given to each of the English policy-holders, but that no notice had been given to the Canadian policy-holders. Under these circumstances,

NORTH, J., held that he could not confirm the transfer. He said that, his jurisdiction being purely statutory, the provisions of the statute must be strictly followed. It would not be sufficient to produce consents from the Canadian policy-holders to the registrar before the drawing-up of the confirmation order. The petition must stand over, with liberty to amend. But, if the proper notices should have been given to the Canadi en policy-holders before the hearing of the amended petition, he should hold that the requirement of section 14, that the notices to the policy-holders should be given "before any such application is made to the court," had heen complied with.-COUNSEL, Cozens-Hardy, Q.C., and Phipson Beale; F. R. Y. Radcliffe. SOLICITORS, Davidson & Morriss; Radcliffes, Cator, & Martineau.

Re SOMERSET-North, J., 13th June. APPOINTMENT OF NEW TRUSTEES-JOINT POWER TO HUSBAND AND WIFE -JUDICIAL SEPARATION-ABSENCE OF HUSBAND ABROAD—"INEXPEDIENT OR DIFFICULT"-TRUSTEE ACT, 1850, s. 32.

This was a petition by the wife and the other persons beneficially

entitled under a marriage settlement, for the appointment by the court of two new trustees of the settlement in the place of one trustee who was dead and another who desired to retire. The settlement contained a power of appointing new trustees, which was exercisable by the husband and wife during their joint lives. The wife had obtained a judicial separation on the ground of the husband's misconduct, and he had since gone to, and was still residing, in Australia. He had been adjudicated a bankrupt, and the wife had, by means of money belonging to her for her separate use, purchased from the trustee in the bankruptcy the husband's reversionary life interest in the settled property. Section 32 of the Trustee Act, 1850, provides that, "whenever it shall be expedient to appoint a new trustee or new trustees, and it shall be found inexpedient, difficult, or impracticable so to do without the assistance of the Court of Chancery, it shall be lawful for the said Court of Chancery to make an order appointing a new trustee or new trustees, either in substitution for or in addition to any existing trustee or trustees." NORTH, J., held that, under the above circumstances, section 32 applied, and that he had jurisdiction to appoint new trustees. He accordingly made the appointment.-COUNSEL, Napier Higgins, Q.C., and W. R. E. Barker; R. Marrack. SOLICITORS, Guscotte, Wadham, & Daw.

Re ARNOLD-North, J., 11th June.

R. S. C., 1883, LV., 2 (2) - PAYMENT OUT OF COURT-PETITION OR SUMMONS-COSTS-SECURITY NOT EXCEEDING £1,000 NOMINAL VALUE. This was a petition asking that a sum of £447 Bank of England Stock, which was in court, might be sold, and the proceeds of sale paid to the trustees for the purposes of the Settled Land Act, 1882, of a settlement of land made by a will. The stock represented the purchase-money of a part of the settled land which had been taken by a local board under their statutory powers. The Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, was incorporated with their special Act. The money had been invested under an order of the court. The petition asked that, in accordance with section 80 of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, the local board might pay the costs of the petition. On behalf of the board it was objected that, under the above rule, the nominal value of the stock being less than £1,000, the application ought to have been made by summons in chambers, and that they ought not to be required to pay more than the NORTH, J., said that in this particular case he thought that, if the application had been made by summons, the chief clerk would have required a written statement of the facts which would have been equivalent to a petition, and that practically the costs would have been the same. He declined, therefore, to give any special direction as to the costs. But it was important that petitions should not be presented unnecessarily, and, if in any case he could see that the costs had been substantially increased by the presentation of a petition, he should direct that only the costs of a summons should be allowed.-COUNSEL, Dunning; Swinfen Eady. SOLICI TORS, Merediths, Roberts, & Mills; Robins, Burges, & Co

costs of a summons.

Re PEREIRA-Q. B. Div., 10th June.

BARRISTER-ADMISSION TO PRACTISE-SIGNING THE ROLL. Henn Collins, Q.C., asked for an expression of the opinion of the court under the following circumstances. A gentleman named Pereira, who had been called to the bar in this country by one of the Inns of Court, but had omitted after his call to sign the roll in this court, had lately gone out to Ceylon to practise in the Supreme Court there. By an ordinance in force in that colony it is provided that any person shall be eligible to be admitted as an advocate who has been admitted as a barrister in one of the superior courts in England or Ireland. An objection having been raised to Mr. Pereira's practising in Ceylon, on the ground of his not having signed the roll, the Chief Justice there held that he was not eligible to be admitted as an advocate, inasmuch as he could not be deemed to have been admitted as a barrister in England until he had signed the roll. It was submitted that the practice of signing the roll by newly-called barristers, though it was still followed in some instances, had become unnecessary since the Promissory Oaths Act, 1868 (31 & 32 Vict. c. 72). There was no doubt that the court in Ceylon would follow any opinion expressed by this court. THE COURT (Lord COLERIDGE, C.J., and DENMAN, J.) said that they were informed by the Master that, after the passing of the Promissory Oaths Act, the question of signing the roll had been brought to the notice of Cockburn, C.J., and he considered it was no longer necessary. In that opinion their lordships concurred. The signing of the roll seemed to have been a mere authentication of the oath which was then necessary to be taken. And when the oath was abolished the signing became unnecessary. Moreover, the power of calling to the bar of England was in the hands of the Inns of Court; and when a person had been called to the bar by an Inn of Court, his admission to the bar was complete, the judges giving audience to persons who were so called. Therefore, in any view, the signing of the roll could not be considered to be a part of the admission to the bar, and this gentleman ought, undoubtedly, to be deemed to have been admitted as a barrister in this court.

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County Court dismissing a bankruptcy notice on the ground that the judgment on which such bankruptcy notice was issued had been stayed. Section 4, sub-section (1), of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, provides that a debtor commits an act of bankruptcy (g) if a creditor has obtained a final judgment against him for any amount, "and execution thereon not having been stayed," has served on him a bankruptcy notice, with the terms of which the debtor fails to comply. In the present case judgment was recovered against the debtor on January 14, 1887, for the sum of £446. A fi. fa. was issued, and the sheriff attempted to seize, but the property was claimed by a third party. The sheriff interpleaded, and by the interpleader order, upon payment of £20 into court by the claimant, the sheriff was directed to withdraw. A bankruptcy notice was subsequently issued against the debtor, but was set aside by the registrar on the ground that what had taken place operated as a stay within the meaning of section 4, sub-section 1(g). The creditor now appealed, and on his behalf it was urged that in any event the levy was for only £20, which could not act as a stay of execution for £446; and if there had been other property in the bailiwick the sheriff might have levied on that for the balance. For the debtor it was argued that the present case fell within the decision given in Ex parte Ford (18 Q. B. D. 369). Two other points were also raised on the appeal (1) That the bankruptcy notice was invalid by reason of the name of the creditor being omitted in the heading to it, which was left simply "Ex parte," and (2) that the bankruptcy notice claimed the whole amount of the debt-viz., £446-whereas in any event there had been a stay as to £20.

THE COURT (MATHEW and CAVE, JJ.), allowed the appeal with costs here and below. MATHEW, J., said that in any event the judgment had not been stayed except as to £20, and it was the duty of the sheriff, if there had been other goods in the bailiwick, to levy for the balance. The case of Ex parte Ford was distinguishable. There the whole amount of the judgment debt had been levied; the creditor was not in a position to issue another fi. fa.; and the sheriff was not in a position to proceed on other goods. The other two objections raised on behalf of the debtor on the appeal appeared very much to belong to that class of formal defects which were met by section 143 of the Bankruptcy Act. As to the first a blank had been left in the title of the bankruptcy notice and the name of the applicant omitted. But in other respects the notice was correct. It was sued out by the creditor in person, and there was a complete intimation on the face of it as to who the creditor was. The objection was a purely formal one, as was also the second which was raised, that the notice claimed the whole amount, whereas at any rate execution had been stayed as to £20. No substantial injustice had been done, and it was a defect which the court was in any case bound to correct. CAVE, J., said that care must be taken not to apply the somewhat strong language used in the case of Re Hodges (8 Ch. 204) to different circumstances in such a way as to make section 4, sub-section 1 (g), of no effect. In that case a debtor summons was taken out in the name of the secretary of a limited company, for a debt due to the company, and it was held that the summons was irregular. In the present case the proper person took the proceedings against the proper person and in the proper manner. The defect was little more than a clerical error, and to allow such an objection to succeed would be most dangerous. The clause was intended to be worked, and that would not be working it.-COUNSEL, E. Cooper Willis, Q.C.; Beddall. SOLICITORS, Gamlen, Burdett, & Woodhouse; J. Evans.

CASES AFFECTING SOLICITORS.

Re G. CASTLE-Kay, J., 8th June. PRACTICE-TAXATION OF COSTS-OBJECTIONS-REVIEW OF CERTIFICATESUMMONS-JURISDICTION-R. S. C., 1883, LXV., 27 (39, 41).

An order was made that a solicitor should deliver a bill of costs and

cash account, and that the same should be taxed without disturbing any settlement already made. The taxing master certified that there had been recovered. No objections to taxation had been carried in, but the solicitor a settlement in 1881, and that all the subsequent costs had been since that the master had misunderstood the order. took out a summons to vary or discharge the certificate, on the ground

KAY, J., said that the court had jurisdiction to make the order asked by the summons: Sparrow v. Hill (29 W. P. 490, 705, 7 Q. B. D. 362, 8 in objections where the ground for reviewing the certificate went to the Q. B. D. 429) was a distinct authority that it was not necessary to carry whole of the findings, and where there had been no actual taxation at all. ordered the client to pay all the costs of the reference.-COUNSEL, Marten, On the merits his lordship dismissed the summons without costs, and Q.C., and W. D. Rawlins; E. Beaumont. SOLICITORS, G. Castle; Saxelby §

Faulkner.

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The action was brought by Messrs. Blair & Girling, solicitors, to recover from Mr. W. J. Cordner £1 1s. 2d., being interest at the rate of 4 per cent. on a bill of costs. The plaintiffs' bill of costs had been sent in last year; an order for taxation was obtained on January 3 last, and the bill was taxed on March 30. The plaintiffs now claimed interest at 4 per cent. on the amount of the bill from one month after the time of delivery to payment. It was submitted that this charge was authorized by the Remuneration Order, clause 7. It was urged on behalf of the defendant that the taxing master's order was that the money due on the bill should be paid within twenty-one days from March 30, and that that order was complied with,

Mr. Commissioner KERR said he thought that under the General Order interest could be charged as claimed, and he must therefore find for the plaintiffs, but he would give leave to appeal; and as the matter was one of great importance to the public as well as solicitors, he would give costs on the higher scale.

SOLICITOR STRUCK OFF THE ROLLS.

10th June-ALFRED GARDINER HASTINGS.

SOLICITOR RESTORED TO THE ROLLS.

13th June-AUGUSTUS HENRY MAULE.

LAW SOCIETIES.

SOLICITORS' BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION.

ANNUAL FESTIVAL.

The twenty-seventh anniversary festival of the Solicitors' Benevolent Association was held on the 9th inst. at the Whitehall Rooms of the Hotel Metropole, Mr. E. J. BRISTOw taking the chair. Among the guests were Mr. W. J. D. Andrew, London; Mr. E. Arnold, Chichester; Mr. Geo. Wm. Barnard, London; Mr. G. Beetham Batchelor, London; Mr. John Batchelor, Greenwich; Mr. H. C. Beddoe, J.P., Hereford; Mr. Herbert

[Order of 20th April, 1887 (ante, p. 411), rescinded, on rehearing, by Bentwitch, LL.B., London; Mr. C. Stockdale Benning, Dunstable; Mr. Field and Manisty, JJ.]

COUNTY COURT PRACTICE.

MCHARDY v. LIPTROTT-Q. B. Div., 10th June. APPEAL FROM COUNTY COURT-REFUSAL OF COUNTY COURT JUDGE TO ALLOW NEW TRIAL.

The question in this case was whether there is an appeal from the refusal of a county court judge to grant a new trial. At the trial, which took place before the judge of the county court of Lancashire and a jury, a verdict was found for the defendant. The plaintiff applied to the judge for a new trial, on the ground of misdirection, which was refused. The plaintiff now moved by way of appeal from that refusal. The court called attention to the question whether an appeal lay, and referred to the case of Morris v. Lowe (34 W. R. 45). On behalf of the plaintiff it was contended that an appeal lay, and Foster v. Green (30 L. J. Ex. 263), was cited in support of that contention.

THE COURT (Lord COLERIDGE, C.J., and DEN MAN, J.) held that there was no appeal. The plaintiff might have appealed to this court in the first instance, but he chose to take his chance of obtaining a new trial from the county court judge himself, and as a general rule double appeals were objectionable. There was a difference between this case and Foster v. Green, for there the county court judge expressly reserved leave to the plaintiff to move for a new trial.-COUNSEL, G. S. Bower. SOLICITOR, H. L. Riley, Warrington.

[See Wilton v. Leeds Forge Valley Co. (32 W. R. 461). A similar decision was given by DAY and WILLS, JJ., in a case of Jacob v. Dawkes on the 13th inst.]

BLACKWELL v. GREAT EASTERN LAND AND BUILDING CO.-
Q. B. Div., 13th June.
TRANSFERRED INTERPLEADER ACTION-APPEAL-COUNTY COURT RULES,
1886, ORD. 33, R. 10.

This was an interpleader action which had been transferred to the county

court under section 17 of the Judicature Act, 1884. The defendants appealed against the county court judge's decision as to the validity of a bill of sale affecting the goods in question. Counsel for the plaintiff took the preliminary objection that, by ord. 33, r. 10, of the County Court Rules, 1886, an interpleader so transferred is to be tried in such manner and under such conditions as may be prescribed by the order directing such transfer. The order in this case simply directed the action to be tried. It had been so tried and adjudicated upon, and no further steps could be taken without leave from the court which transferred the action.

THE COURT (DAY and WILLS, JJ.) held that the ordinary right to appeal on points of law could not be affected by the terms of any order of transfer, and that the objection did not lie.-COUNSEL, Rose-Innes.

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In delivering judgment in a case on Tuesday, Mr. Justice Manisty said that the course now pursued with regard to administering interrogatories, would be ruinous to the bar, as it would drive the best business out of the courts of justice. The merchants of London were so disgusted with what they had to do, and the time they had to give up if they entered into litigation, that they would not try their cases in a court of justice. A system had grown up which was utterly destructive to the administration of justice and to the interests of the bar, and the result had been a system of arbitration. He was speaking from information when he said that merchants would rather have the decision of a court of justice than go to arbitration, but they would not subject themselves to this intolerable system of being worn to death by interlocutory applications and appeals without end. This system had done an immense deal of harm to the community at large and to the merchants themselves, who owned that they were suffering great injustice, but would rather suffer it than be subjected to such a system. He did not know whether the bar would take this into consideration, and exercise their common sense, reason, and right feeling; but if there was not a great alteration, either by compulsion, or by the bar taking it into their own hands, there would be such a wind up as regarded the whole administration of law in civil cases in the City of London and Middlesex as was never yet witnessed. He had made these observations in the hope that they would have some effect. He should do his best in chambers to prevent such a system as that which had become almost intolerable from continuing.

Wm. Frank Blandy, Reading; Mr. T. Dolling_Bolton, M.P., London; Mr. G. L. Bristow, London; Mr. W. Beriah Brook, London; Mr. H. Morten Cotten, London; Mr. W. Craven, Leeds; Mr. Grantham R. Dodd, London; Mr. John Graham, Durham; Mr. George Burrow Gregory, London; Mr. W. Harper, President Bury Law Society; Mr. W. Hodgkinson Guest, Manchester; Mr. Samuel Harris, Leicester; Mr. Edwin Hedger, London; Mr. Thos. Jas. Hooper, Biggleswade; Mr. Thomas G. Hyde, Worcester; Mr. A. W. Knott, Worcester; Mr. John Lewis, Wrexham; Mr. John Mackrell, London; Mr. H. Markby, Vice-President Incorporated Law Society; Mr. Henry O'B. O'Donoghue, President Bristol Law Society; Mr. R. Pennington, London; Mr. T. J. Pitfield, London; Mr. J. S. Purcell, London; Mr. R. T. Richardson, Barnard Castle; Mr. F. H. Rooke, London; Mr. J. Anderson Rose, London; Mr. Wm. Smail, Bedford; Major-General Annerley Smith; Mr. Sidney Smith, London; Mr. Henry Sowton, London; Mr. Edwin T. Tadman, London; Mr. James Tassell, Faversham; Mr. Arnold Trinder, London; Mr. G. Brash Wheeler, London; Mr. F. T. Woolbert, London; Mr. James Thomas Scott, secretary, &c., &c.

The CHAIRMAN, in proposing the toast of "The Queen," said the toast should be received with the utmost loyalty in an assembly of lawyers, not only because they were a constitutional body, but because they regarded the Queen as the foundation of that law and justice they were in the habit of administering, and especially because they regarded her Majesty as embodying those royal and domestic virtues and those womanly characteristics which had won for her the affection and respect of the nation. But in this special year, when they were celebrating the Jubilee of a most auspicious reign, they, as lawyers, would receive the toast with more than ordinary enthusiasm, for certainly the period covered by her Majesty's reign was one which they might regard with special satisfaction. It had been preeminently a time of legal reform. During the last fifty years the criminal laws had been humanized, the land laws had been simplified, the rights of conscience had been recognized, the representation of the people had been extended; and with regard to these great reforms it was not too much to say that, while many of them had been originated by lawyers, every one of them had had the cordial consent and co-operation of the legal profession. The toast having been honoured with the customary loyal enthusiasm, The CHAIRMAN gave the toast of "The Prince and Princess of Wales, and the other members of the Royal Family." He then proposed the toast of "The Incorporated and other Law Societies in England and Wales," observing that really, when he looked around at the audience which he had the honour of addressing, it seemed very much as if we were proposing to drink "Our Noble Selves," for he could scarcely suppose that there was any solicitor present so unmindful of the interests of his profession that he did not belong to one or other of the law societies. However, in proposing the toast, he hardly thought it necessary to remind them what great advantages solicitors had obtained from having a legallyrecognized head, not only on account of the advantage it had given to them in point of status, but also as regarded their material interests. The Incorporated Law Society, which was their recognized head, took charge of the candidate for admission to their ranks from the earliest moment. It took care that he had a certain amount of liberal education, such as became a man who was about to enter upon a learned body, and it afterwards took charge of the profession generally, taking care that no one member by any unworthy conduct brought discredit upon the whole body. And it not only did this, but, in connection with the other law societies, it took charge of and watched over all new and proposed legislation. It frequently received advice and assistance from the local law societies, and offered suggestions which were always received with respect by those to whom was intrusted the making of our laws. He might say that it was impossible almost to over-estimate the advantage which accrued to them as a general body from this connection between the central parent society and the various branches, affording as it did an opportunity for a great deal of advice and assistance from the country upon points with which the country solicitors were often much better acquainted than they were in town, and at the same time affording opportunity for concerted action in cases in which some combined effort was necessary. He did not think he need point out to them how great a step the profession had made in point of status and general position during the fifty years which had been covered by her Gracious Majesty's reign. Any of them who could carry their memory back some fifty years, or had made themselves acquainted with the literature of that period, could quite understand what a great step had been made, and he believed that, to a large extent, the improvement which had been effected in their position had been due to the efforts of the Incorporated Law Society and to the various country law societies which exercised such a beneficial interest in the localities in which they were placed. He would ask them, for instance, did they think that fifty years ago the solicitors could have held gatherings, either for festive or consultative purposes, such as had been held during the last few days under the auspices of the Incorporated Law Society? And now he should

say that the members of that society-dealing more especially with the object of their meeting here-had always been amongst the strongest and best supporters of the Solicitors' Benevolent Association. The president of the Incorporated Law Society had been prevented, quite at the last moment, from being here this evening. The vice-president had shewn his interest in it by attending, and they had with them the presidents of several local law societies in England and Wales, and he would associate with the toast the names of Mr. Henry Markby, Vice-President of the Incorporated Law Society, and Mr. H. O'Brien O'Donoghue, President of the Bristol Law Society. Mr. MARKBY, in returning thanks, said that he much regretted the compulsory absence of the president of the Incorporated Law Society. He must confess that he felt-and he hoped it was laudable to do so-a very great pride in occupying the position which he now did through the favour of his professional brethren, being as he was the vice-president of the Incorporated Law Society, and thus he not only enjoyed that honour, but he had also the honour of returning thanks for the society; but the toast might have been more worthily acknowledged by Mr. Gregory, who was present, and whose labours in and out of Parliament in the cause of his profession would never be forgotten. Or he might instance the chairman of the evening, who, had it been possible for him to respond, would have been, he was sure, most welcome to them, and whose assiduous and able labours when he was president of the Incorporated Law Society would never be forgotten by those who had the pleasure of being members of the council when he occupied that position. Speaking as a member of the Council of the Incorporated Law Society, he (Mr. Markby) was not there to express any doubt that success had not attended their efforts. And the reason was not far to seek. They had endeavoured to move in harmony with the wants and requirements of the public whilst they had tried to protect the interests of the profession to which they had the honour to belong. That profession was a laborious one. Its members had very grave interests confided to their care, and they worked under a sense of great responsibility. But following, as he believed, the traditions of the society, and accepting the mandate which they understood they had received from the members, the council did not put the interests of solicitors in the forefront, but they tried to look at questions all round and to adapt themselves to the requirements of the public. And in this they hoped, and, indeed, he might say they believed, they had not failed. With regard to the useful association on whose account they had met to night, he could say it was a most excellent association, and he might be, perhaps, permitted to refer to one instance of its usefulness in the case of a schoolfellow of his own who had begun life as a country solicitor, being a member of a wealthy family and having every advantage. But disaster had come upon him, and he had died, leaving a widow and one child totally unprovided for. He (Mr. Markby) had applied to the association, and he was happy to say help had most liberally been afforded, and the result of that assistance at a very critical period was that the daughter was enabled to continue her education, and had since, to a great extent, been the means of her succeeding in obtaining a very honourable position, and of being able to support herself and her mother.

Mr. O'B. O'DONOGHUE replied on behalf of the provincial law societies. He said that the solicitors from the country had, on the present occasion, to look at the association under very favourable circumstances. Their hearts had been cheered, their hands had been warmly shaken, and they had all experienced the very general hospitality which had been extended to them by the London solicitors. They therefore ought to have their hearts open, and they ought favourably and heartily to acknowledge the claims of this benevolent association upon their attention. Beyond looking at it from that point of view they must be aware that there had been many of their professional brethren in the provinces equally unfortunate with the gentleman of whom Mr. Markby had spoken. He (Mr. O'Donoghue) had more than one instance in his own mind where the association had stepped forward readily, liberally, and without any ostentation to give a helping hand to those who so much needed it. He had for many years felt a great interest in the association, and he would be only too glad if solicitors in the West of England more warmly entered into its proceedings. There was a time when the meetings of the association were more frequently held in the country, and he thought this was of advantage to it. In thinking of this country solicitors must also think of the present occasion when they had an opportunity of being heard, and he regretted that, owing to the enormous proportions of the hall at which the recent banquets were held, it was difficult for the provincial guests to express the great gratitude they felt, and they must express their strong sense of the noble hospitality which had been extended to them since they came to London. He was very glad to be able to make himself heard and to express the very warm feelings of friendship and gratitude which they from the country felt with regard to the magnificent hospitality, the cordial attention, and the very strong desire which had been expressed to make them all welcome and comfortable. They could not but feel that they had been drawn into closer intercourse with London by this event, and he would again venture to present to the London solicitors the warmest acknowledgments of their country brethren. The CHAIRMAN said: I now have the pleasure of proposing the toast of the evening, "The Solicitors' Benevolent Association, and may prosperity continue to attend it." In presenting this toast I am not going to appear before you in the character of a beggar, and I am not going to seek to enlist your sympathies on behalf of this most deserving charity, for I take it that the mere fact of your presence here to-night proves that you regard the charity as one with which we ought all to be in active and earnest accord. But what I propose to do is, without attempting to make a set speech, to lay before you a few facts which have been supplied to me by our excellent secretary with the view, if possible, of inducing

you to see that the future prosperity of this association depends very much upon your individual exertions. This association was founded in the year 1858, and, of course, like all charities and all similar associations, it had its day of very small beginnings. I think in the second year of its existence it expended something like £10 in charity. Now, after nearly thirty years of existence, it has something like £46,000 of funded property, and last year it distributed no less a sum than £3,868. The managers of the society have, I think very wisely, determined that they will not, at any rate at present, seek for any further accumulatfon of the capital fund, but will distribute the whole income derived from the interest of this fund and from the annual donations and subscriptions in granting relief. And they have gone further. For many years past they have not limited the exercise of their benevolence to members of the association or to members' families, but have gone outside, and have distributed their funds amongst the needy members of the profession generally, so generally, in fact, I may say that I believe there are only two counties in England and Wales which have not participated in the advantages of this excellent charity. I need hardly, I am sure, represent to you that, amongst such a numerous profession as ours, there are certain to be a number of cases in which distress and want fall upon solicitors and upon their families without any blame being attached to themselves. I have had furnished me by the secretary a long list of really heart-breaking cases which have come before the committee, and to the wants of which they have been enabled to a certain extent to contribute and alleviate. I do not know that I should do much good by reading these cases to you. You can almost imagine them for yourselves. There must always be numerous cases in which sudden death, or long illness, or change of conditions in the locality in which a solicitor may be living, or disappointments in business, or the hard times through which we in common with the rest of the community have been passing, which are sufficient to bring a certain number of our professional brethren into very low circumstances, and at the same time that it is a privilege to those of thus who have been successful, it is also our duty to help to alleviate the troubles of those who in the battle of life have been somewhat less fortunate than ourselves. The utility of our society is very much limited by the amount of its subscriptions, which I do not think are adequate to the number and to the wealth of our profession generally. And what I want to impress upon you to-night is the importance of each one of us endeavouring in his own circle and amongst his own friends to obtain an imitation of his own example in contributing to the funds of this society. I told you I did not intend to come before you as a beggar from yourselves, but I do beg of you that this influence of each of you may be exercised on behalf of the association. The toast which I have proposed I am now going to ask you to drink, and I do sincerely hope that you will not drink it merely as an expression of a sentimental charity, but that you will all feel that it pledges you to do something yourselves to promote the interests and the welfare of this association. I have great pleasure in proposing the health of "The Solicitors' Benevolent Association, and may prosperity continue to attend it," and I do hope and trust that what I have said may lead to some individual effort on the part of those who are present to extend its usefulness and to increase its income.

The health was drunk upstanding and with three hearty cheers. The secretary (Mr. J. T. ScoTT) read a list of subscriptions and donations amounting to £1,200, amongst which were the following:-The Chairman, £105; Mr. N. T. Lawrence, £50; Mr. F. L. Hutchins, £21; Mr. G. B. Batchelor, £21; the Sussex Law Society, £21; the Yorkshire Law Society, £20; the Gloucestershire and Wiltshire Law Society, £10 10s.; the Shropshire Law Society, £10 108.; the Herefordshire Law Society, £10 10s.; and the Anglesea and Carnarvonshire Law Society, £5 5s.

Mr. G. B. GREGORY proposed the health of the Chairman, observing that his presence there was amply justified by the result which had been shewn to them of his exertions on behalf of the association. He (Mr. Gregory) had had the honour of presiding at its anniversary meeting last year, and his efforts had been by no means so successful as had been the chairman's this evening. He could conceive, therefore, the energy, the devotion, the self-abnegation, the constant trouble, and the labour which the chairman had dedicated to their service upon the present occasion, for it was no ordinary thing to raise £1,200, and it required great exertions to get such a sum. He congratulated the chairman most heartily upon the meeting, and he congratulated the meeting most heartily in having such a chairman, not only one who had effected such a contribution to the funds, but one who had added so considerably to the geniality of the evening.

The toast was received with great cordiality and loud cheering.

The CHAIRMAN, in returning thanks, assured them that when the committee selected him to preside he had felt it a very great honour and pleasure. He felt it a great honour because he had been preceded in the chair by a long line of distinguished men who had presided over them with great ability, and it was a great pleasure because he was entirely at one with the excellent charity which they had met together to celebrate, and it had been a very great privilege to him to have been able in any way to contribute to its success. Mr. J. ANDERSON ROSE submitted the toast of "The Visitors." He said he would venture to change the toast into that of "Friends." The London solicitors had had great pleasure in entertaining their country brethren. They had done but little compared with what the solicitors in the country had done for them in times past, and if they could draw together in a focus the hospitality which had been extended to London solicitors for twenty years past from all parts of England and give it out again to their visitors they might think they had done well. At a time when so many attacks were made on the pocket for politics, for religion, for charity, for clubs, to build churches in all parts of London, and where

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