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unfair to purchasers and prejudicial to vendors. He, therefore, refused the motion. On the appeal it was argued that the sale was not one which was authorized by section 95 of the Companies Act, 1862.

THE COURT OF APPEAL (COTTON, LINDIEY, and BowEN, L.JJ.) affirmed the decision. They were of opinion that the sale was authorized by section 95, and that Chitty, J., had exercised his discretion upon sufficient evidence. The Court of Appeal ought not therefore to interfere.-COUNSEL, Rigby, Q.C., Romer, Q.C., and F. B. Palmer; Sir H. Davey, Q.C., Latham, Q.C., and T. H. Wright; Sir H. James, Q.C., Maclean, Q.C., and Vernon R. Smith. SOLICITORS, Hollams, Son, & Coward; Freshfields & Williams; Linklaters & Co.

Re SMITH, LORD . HAYWARD-Kay, J., 24th May. WILL-CONSTRUCTION-GIFT TO Children of a DECEASED PERSON-WHETHER GRANDCHILDREN ENTITLED IN DEFAULT OF CHILDRen.

The testator made separate gifts of shares in his residuary estate in favour of the children of two of his deceased brothers and a deceased sister, who should be living at his (testator's) death, each gift being similarly worded. The sister had left one only child surviving her, and he had died before the date of the will, leaving two children, who survived the testator. And it appeared that the testator was aware of these facts. There were living at the testator's death children of both the deceased brothers. The question was now raised by summons whether, under the gift in favour of the children of the sister, her grandchildren were entitled to take.

KAY, J., held that they were entitled. His lordship said that the law seemed to be this :-If a testator gave a legacy to the children of a person whom he mentioned as being dead, and at the date of the will there were not children, but only grandchildren, then they were held to be entitled on the principle of “ut res magis valeat." But where a testator gave his property in a mass to the children of deceased persons, some of whom had left children who survived, and others only grandchildren, the court held it too difficult to construe "children" in two different senses. Or, again, in a case where the testator on the face of his will shewed an intention of using the term in its normal sense, by mentioning grandchildren as well as children. In the present case the testator had divided his residue into shares, in each case using the word "children" as the class to take. It was, therefore, possible that, in one case, he meant children to take, and that in another, where he knew there were no children, he meant grandchildren. His lordship felt himself, therefore, entitled to take the more liberal view, especially as there would other wise be an intestacy as to the share.-COUNSEL, Tremlett; Byrne; Dauney. SOLICITORS, Prior, Church, & Adams, for Philcox, Burwash; Byrne & Lucas, for M. S. Stephen & Son, Chatham; Kingsford, Dorman, & Co., for W. H. Dawes, Rye,

WIGRAM v. FRYER-North, J., 26th May. EASEMENT-OBSTRUCTION BY LESSEE OF PUBLIC BODY-INJUNCTION OR COMPENSATION-METROPOLITAN STREETS IMPROVEMENTS ACTS, 1877 AND 1882 -LANDS CLAUSES CONSOLIDATION ACT, 1845, s. 68.

A question arose in this case as to the effect of the Metropolitan Streets Improvements Acts of 1877 and 1882. The action was brought to restrain the defendant from obstructing the plaintiffs' ancient lights by some new buildings which he was erecting. The Act of 1877 empowered the Metropolitan Board of Works to make certain new streets. It incorporated the provisions of the Lands Clauses Acts, and empowered the Metropolitan Board to take the lands delineated in certain deposited plans and to purchase the easements they should require to extinguish. Section 33 contained a recital that it was expedient to provide accommodation for such of the labouring classes as would be displaced by the intended improvements. It provided that the board should for that purpose acquire or appropriate the lands coloured blue on certain deposited plans, which included the land on which the defendant was building, and that the board should sell or lease the same on building lease for the purpose of providing such accommodation, with power to contract with the purchaser or lessee as to the design of the dwellings to be erected. It was provided by the Act of 1882 that, in the exercise of the powers conferred by the Act of 1877, one portion of the land should be cleared and artizans' dwellings constructed on it; and that, when those dwellings had been constructed, the buildings on a second portion of the land, which included the defendant's land, should be removed and a second set of artizans' dwellings constructed thereon. Section 3 of the Act of 1882 repealed some of the provisions of section 33 of the Act of 1877. The defendant was a sub-lessee of a person who had taken a lease of part of the second portion of land from the board, the lease obliging the lessee to erect artizans' dwellings on the demised land according to certain plans and elevations. The principal question was whether the plaintiffs' remedy was by way of injunction, or whether they were only entitled to compensation under section 68 of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act as for lands "injuriously affected."

NORTH, J., held that the principles of Clark v. The London School Board (9 Ch. 120) and The Duke of Bedford v. Dawson (20 Ey. 353) applied, and that it made no difference that the buildings were being erected by a lessee of the board instead of by the board themselves. The plaintiffs' remedy was by compensation under section 68. His lordship was also of opinion that the board had, by implication under the Act of 1882, powers similar to those which were conferred on them by section 33 of the Act of 1877.-COUNSEL, Cozens-Hardy, QC., and Byrne; Giffard, Q.C., and Creed. SOLICITOUS, Bowman & Crawley Boevey; Benbow, Saltwell, & Tryon.

MURRAY v. STEPHENSON-Q. B. Div., 27th May. TIME FOR SERVICE OF SPECIALLY-INDORSED WRIT-R. S. C., 1883, ORD. 64, R. 11.

In this case the writ of summons, which was specially indorsed, was served on the defendant at 11 o'clock at night on Saturday, April 30, 1887. On the 9th of May, the defendant not having entered an appearance, the plaintiff signed judgment in default under ord. 13, r. 3, and execution was issued thereon. The defendant then applied at chambers to have the judgment and execution set aside, on the ground that the writ, having been served after 2 o'clock on Saturday, was, by ord. 64, r. 11, to be deemed to have been served on the following Monday, and, therefore, judgment could not properly be signed in default of appearance till the 10th of May. Huddleston. B., ordered the judgment and execution to be set aside. The plaintiff appealed, and it was argued on his behalf that ord. 64, r. 11, applied only to pleadings, summonses, and other like documents, and not to writs, and that a specially-indorsed writ, although the indorsement was to be deemed to be a statement of claim, was still a writ and not a pleading: Veale v. Automatic Boiler Feeder (Limited) (ante, p. 364, 35 W. R. 454, 18 Q. B. D. 631). On the part of the defendant it was admitted that ord. 64, r. 11, did not apply to ordinary writs, but it was said that there was a distinction between an ordinary writ and a specially-indorsed writ, and that the latter was a pleading: Robertson v. Howard (26 W. R. 683, 3 C. P. D. 280). And by section 100 of the Judicature Act, 1873, "pleading" was to include any summons and also the statements in writing of the claim or demand of any plaintiff.

THE COURT (MATHEW and A. L. SMITH, JJ.) allowed the appeal. They said that by the old well-established practice a writ might be served at any time. Under the Common Law Procedure Act special indorse ments on writs were first used, and under the Judicature Acts the use of them was extended. Ord. 64, r. 11, provided for the service within limited hours of certain documents, but writs were excluded. It was said for the defendant that in the case of a specially-indorsed writ its character as a writ was absorbed in its character as a pleading. But two strange consequences would follow from such a doctrine. First, there would be no need for a defendant who had been served with a specially-indorsed writ to take any step for ten days; and, secondly, no specially-indorsed writ could be served during the Long Vacation. As to section 100 of the Judicature Act, that did not refer to writs of summons. Therefore a specially-indorsed writ, like an ordinary writ, might be served at any hour.-COUNSEL, Bray; Raven. SOLICITORS, Elliott & Ash; Gasquet & Metcalfe.

BANKRUPTCY CASES.

Ex parte LOVERING & CO., Re AYSHFORD-Cave, J., 3rd
May.

RE-HEARING-DEED OF ASSIGNMENT-MONEY PAID AT REQUEST OF CREDI
TORS-BANKRUPTCY-APPLICATION TO TRUSTEE FOR REPAYMENT-CON-
SENT OF CREDITORS-COSTS-BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1883, s. 4, SUB-SECTION
1 (A)

This was an application by Lovering & Co., accountants, asking the court to re-hear a motion made by them on November 22 last, for an order directing the official receiver, as trustee in the bankruptcy, to repay to them the sum of £48 68. 8d. which they had paid for the benefit of the creditors. In June, 1886, the debtor executed an assignment of his estate for the benefit of his creditors, and Lovering & Co. were instructed, by the trustees of such assignment, to prepare a statement of the debtor's affairs. A private meeting of the creditors was held on July 7, 1886, at which the landlord of the debtor's premises, to whom £48 6s. 8d. was due for rent, was present, and he intimated to the meeting that unless his claim for rent was paid he should distrain. Lovering was present at estate if the landlord realized the goods under the distress, he, at the rethe meeting, and in order to save the loss which would be caused to the understood that he was to be recouped out of the first moneys coming in quest of the creditors, advanced the amount of the rent due, it being on account of the estate, the meeting having agreed to accept a composition of 5s. in the pound, secured. The debtor, however, failed to find the against him. Application was subsequently made by Lovering & Co. to necessary security, and on July 8, 1886, a receiving order was made the official receiver, as trustee in the bankruptcy, for repayment of the £18 63. Sd., but the official receiver declined to do so without an order of the court, and on November 22, 1886, application was made to the court for this purpose, but there being no evidence before it that the payment was made at the request of the creditors the application was refused. Application was now made to re-hear and decide the case, and, in the meantime, in addition to the evidence required, a request for repayment to the applicant, signed by a majority in number and value of the creditors had been filed. On behalf of the applicant, it was urged that the case came within the principle laid down in Ex parte Mutton (14 Eq. 178), the question being whether the payment had benefited the estate, and, if so, the estate could not take that benefit without recouping the money. On the other hand the official receiver, while submitting that the payment in question was a mere voluntary one, repayment of which could not be enforced, was desirous of doing what was right under the circumstances. CAVE, J., said that, with reference to the question of re-hearing, it was impossible to found such an application on the materials previously presented to the court. The court ought not, except in a case of clear mistake, to be asked to re-hear on the same materials as were put before it on the former occasion. On the other hand, if different materials were

found an application to re-hear might be made to the court by way of indulgence. In the present case there were materials which ought to have been brought to the notice of the court, and the application to re-hear would therefore be granted. Then, as to the general right of anyone to recover in similar cases to the present, he certainly did not intend to lay down a rule and establish a precedent that anyone who made a payment with his eyes open after an act of bankruptcy could come down on the trustee and ask for repayment on the ground that the estate had reaped a benefit. The case of Ex parte Mutton (14 Eq. 178) went to the very extreme limit. There was no rule of law which entitled a man who made a voluntary payment to recover that payment from the person who might be benefited by it; and he should be slow to introduce a different rule into bankruptcy. It was no part of the duty of a judge to be generous with the money of the creditors. In the present case the circumstances were favourable to the applicant. He was not a volunteer altogether, because he was requested to make the payment by some of the principal creditors. The payment had undoubtedly benefited the estate, and the official receiver admitted that under similar circumstances he himself would have made it. There was also the very important fact which was not before the court in November, and which had great weight both with regard to granting the leave to re-hear and to the present decision-viz, that after they were in a position to judge if the payment was beneficial or not the majority of creditors in number and value had said that it was beneficial, and had expressed their willingness that repayment should be made. If there was any doubt as to how far the payment had been beneficial he should have ordered repayment to the extent of the benefit to the estate, but here the whole payment was beneficial. If it had not been made the landlord would have distrained, and there would have been the expenses of the distress to pay. It was not reasonable that the court should require that every creditor should consent, and where payment was made at the request of the creditors, and a majority desired afterwards that repayment should be made, he did not think the court would go too far if it made an order. The estate, however, should not be put to expense. It was right under the circumstances that the applicant should get his money back; but it would not be right that the creditors, especially those who did not specifically consent, should be put to further expense. Therefore, although the order would be made to repay the £48 68. 8d., the official receiver must retain his costs of the hearing out of that amount and hand over the balance to the applicant.-COUNSEL, Herbert Reed. SOLICITORS, Rooks & Co; W. W. Aldridge.

CASES AFFECTING SOLICITORS. BOSWELL v. COAKS-North, J., 26th May. COSTS-TAXATION - SEVERANCE OF DEFENDANTS-DISCRETION OF TAXING MASTER" REFRESHERS"-R. S. C., 1883, LXV., 29, 48. This action was brought to set aside a sale of an estate pur autre vie which formed part of the estate of a testator whose estate was being administered by the court. The sale was made, under an order of the court in the administration action, to Coaks and Bunyon, two of the defendants in the present action, who bought as trustees for themselves and four other persons, who were also defendants to this action. The ground for setting aside the sale was that Coaks occupied a fiduciary position, as the solicitor to some of the parties to the administration action, and that he had not made a full disclosure to the court of facts which were within his knowledge relating to the value of the life interest. All the six defendants appeared separately in the action, and were represented at the trial by separate solicitors and separate counsel. The action was tried by Fry, J., and the trial occupied four whole days (February 26 and 27, and March 5 and 6) and part of a fifth day (March 12). On March 12 Fry, J., stopped the defendants' counsel and dismissed the action, with costs, without hearing any evidence on their behalf (23 Ch. D. 302). The time occupied on the fifth day was about three hours, the delivery of judgment being concluded at the mid-day adjournment of the court. When Fry, J., returned into court after the adjournment, he said that he thought he had not sufficiently considered one point in the case, and that he wished to hear further argument on this point, and evidence in relation to it. This further hearing took place on March 19, and occupied the whole of that day, and in the result Fry, J., adhered to his former judgment. The Court of Appeal reversed the decision of Fry, J. (27 Ch. D. 424), but the House of Lords restored the judgment of Fry, J. (11 App. Cas. 232). The House of Lords directed that the plaintiffs should pay the defendants' costs in all three courts, and that, in taxing the costs in the High Court and the Court of Appeal, the taxing master should consider "whether any of the defendants who appeared separately had any sufficient reason for severing in their defences, and if, and in so far as, it should appear that they had not, the taxing master was to allow only one set of costs, or only as many sets of costs as he should think right." In taxing the costs of the defendant Bunyon under the order the taxing master had allowed him separate costs. His case was treated as a test case. The plaintiffs objected to the allowance of more than one set of costs between the six defendants, on the grounds "(1) that there was no conflicting interest between any of the defendants, and nothing to prevent one solicitor consistently acting for all; (2) that the defendants employed one solicitor in the sale which was sought to be set aside; (3) that the defendants employed one solicitor to conduct their appeal to the House of Lords, and put in a joint case, although appellants can appear there separately if there is any difference in their cases; (4) that the defendants severed their defences without sufficient reason, and that it was not equitable that the plaintiffs should be called on to pay the

extra costs occasioned by such severance." To these objections the taxing master replied: "I am much impressed by what is stated in these objections on the above point. But this action was very serious, both in respect of property and character, to these defendants. They employed each of them his own solicitor, and I suppose they were entitled so to do. I therefore allow to each defendant a separate bill of costs." NORTH, J., affirmed the decision of the taxing master on this point. He was of opinion that, under the order of the House of Lords, as well as under the Rules of Court, the taxing master had a discretion in the matter. He had exercised his discretion, and his decision was final.

Another question arose as to the number of refreshers to be allowed for the defendants' counsel. The taxing master allowed refreshers for the second, third, and fourth days of the first hearing, and for the day of the second hearing, but declined to allow a refresher for the last day of the first hearing, because less than five hours were occupied on that day. The defendants objected "that, this being a witness case, and having lasted four and a half days in the first instance, and another day on the rehearing, five refreshers to counsel ought to be allowed, and that such counsel were entitled to a fee on the case being re-opened after ouce being disposed of, either by name of refresher, or, at least, as a fee to hear judgment." The taxing master replied:---"The last daily refresher was disallowed because the attendance in court last previous to payment of the refresher had lasted less than five hours. The wording of ord. 65, r. 48, which is declaratory of the former practice, shews clearly that a refresher ought not to have been paid."

NORTH, J., was of opinion that, under the circumstances of the present case, rule 48 did not prevent the allowance of refreshers for a fifth day, and that they ought to be allowed.-COUNSEL, Cookson, Q.C., and A. G. Langley; Cozens-Hardy, Q.C., and E. Beaumont; Phipson Beale; ChadwyckHealey; Butcher; Haldane. SOLICITORS, Whites, Renard, & Co.; Hudson, Matthews, & Co.; Smythe & Brettle; S. W. Johnson & Son; Blake & Haseltine; Aldridge, Thorn, & Morris.

Re J. RAWSON, A SOLICITOR, &c.—Q. B. Div., 27th May. This was a rule calling on a solicitor to shew cause why he should not answer certain matters contained in affidavits. The matter was referred by the court to Master Hodgson, who now made a report to the court. The case arose out of the recent election for South Islington, when Mr. Raymond Llewellyn was a candidate for the borough in the Conservative interest. After about a fortnight's canvass Mr. Llewellyn unfortunately caught a chill after a meeting and died from the effects of it. Failing him, Sir Albert Rollit came forward as a candidate on the same side and was returned to Parliament. During this contest the solicitor in question acted as Mr. Llewellyn's election agent, and after his death was continued in the same employ by Sir Albert Rollit. After Mr. Llewellyn's death his widow employed Mr. Rawson to act as her solicitor in taking out letters of administration, and he did work therein to the extent of some £20. Being dissatisfied with him, she employed other solicitors and they demanded of the respondent an account as against the This account formed the basis of the present estate of the deceased. application. The affidavits which the solicitor was called upon to answer disclosed the following charges-(1) that the respondent had charged as his agent's fee 100 guineas, whereas it was alleged that by agreement with the deceased he was only entitled to fifty guineas; (2) that the respondent had charged the estate of the deceased with various payments out of It was alleged that some of these paypocket to election messengers. ments had not been made at all and that others were overcharged.* (3 That the respondent had charged thirty-three guineas for administration expenses, whereas he could only furnish items up to £20 19s. 9d. Lastly it was asserted that the charge of fifty guineas for general not otherwise charged was wilfully exorbitant expenses Counsel the knowledge of the respondent. for the solicitor, in shewing cause, said the court would not convict the respondent of wilful fraud when the master had not so found. These charges were inaccurate, negligent, and careless, but not dishonest, and the respondent believed and acted on what his clerk Reed had told him. A mere excessive charge in a solicitor as against a client was not a ground for punishing a solicitor by deprivation or suspension (Meux v. Lloyd, 2 C. B. N. S. 409). He quite accepted the rule of law as regards the duties of solicitors and the powers of the court as laid down by Cockburn, C.J., in Re Francis Blake (3 E. & E. 34) and Ex parte Edwards (7 Q. B. D. 155). Counsel in support of the rule reminded the court that Mr. Rawson had received £160 from Mr. Llewellyn when alive for the election expenses and a further sum of £200 from his widow's brother (Mr. F. Osborne) to cover all the claims, and it was not until she discovered a bill of £78 from a tradesman, supposed to have been paid, for the election expenses that she knew that all was not properly settled. And beyond that sum the respondent had sent in a claim for some £90 against the estate of the deceased. When asked for accounts by Messrs. Baxter, Rose, & Norton, Mrs. Llewellyn's solicitors, the respondent had put them off from time to time, and then put in this claim. When the inquiry took place before the master, Reed had sat there, but had not been called; while it was shewn that the respondent kept his banking account in Reed's name, and kept his name upon the door, though he was not an admitted solicitor.

to

FIELD, J., in delivering judgment, said the case was one of consider. able complication, but the facts had been so clearly laid before the court that they could pronounce a judgment on them. As to several payments to people who were not forthcoming, amounting to £61, that he thought a very serious matter, and they had not been asked to send the case back to the master to have it amended in that particular. The respondent's counsel said he was not a criminal, and he (the learned judge) did not say

there was one in this case. As to the practice of people practising as solicitors, occupying a position of trust towards the public, with the name of uncertificated and irresponsible persons over the doors, that he thought very reprehensible, and it might possibly form the subject of another inquiry. The master had found that the solicitor knew, when he claimed 100 guineas as his election fee, that he was not entitled to more than fifty guineas, and that the charge was excessive and unfounded. The charges, perhaps, taken singly, would not justify the court in acting penally; but each charge must be considered as coupled with the others. And the charge for £50 incidental expenses turned out to be absolutely unfounded. Had the respondent, then, been guilty of misconduct? He had no doubt whatever in his mind that he had. It was clear the respondent had not got a balance of the money now; that was gone, and yet every opportuuity was given him of acting rightly in making up his account, in explaining his conduct afterwards, or having his case amended if he could. He therefore thought the respondent had been guilty of dishonourable conduct amounting to fraudulent intention to hold the money, and he had very serious doubts whether he ought to be allowed to remain on the rolls. Looking, however, at all the facts of the case, the judgment pronounced by Cockburn, C.J., and acting as leniently as he could, he felt that the honour of the profession, which he held very dear, could not be upheld without a long sentence of suspension-namely, three years. STEPHEN, J., concurred, and said the difficulty the court had was to rightly adjust their sentence. In the conduct of its officers that which was morally a crime deserved to be treated as a crime. In this case he entertained some doubt as to how near to crime the respondent had come, and of that doubt the respondent should have the benefit. The respondent had no doubt applied the money (£360) to his own purposes, and then endeavoured to charge Mrs. Llewellyn unjustly. If fraud had been brought home to the respondent, he would doubtless have been wholly unfit to carry on his profession. Reed had sworn falsely that he did not know any vouchers had been asked for, and that none had been asked for, and when the respondent would not call Reed before the master that looked very like as if he made himself an accessory after the fact; but it was just the difference between Rawson's conduct and Reed's conduct which prevented the former from being struck off the rolls. As to the overcharges made by the respondent, he thought them ungentlemanly, and such as no man in an honourable profession would make, but they hardly formed the ground for striking a man off the rolls. The rule would be made absolute with costs, that John Rawson, of King's-cross-road, be suspended for three years.-COUNSEL, Chambers; Houghton.-Times.

SOLICITOR STRUCK OFF THE ROLLS.

27th May-HENRY SAUNDERS (Wolverhampton).

LORD COLERIDGE ON THE LAWS REGULATING THE ENJOYMENT OF PROPERTY.

On the 25th ult. Lord Coleridge delivered an address to the members of the Glasgow Juridicial Society on "Thoughts on the Value of Clear Views as to the Laws Regulating the Enjoyment of Property." Sheriff Berry, Hon. President of the Juridicial Society, presided. Lord Coleridge said that in the present day there was nothing that was more confusing and more mischievous than erroneous ideas of property itself, and in regard to the laws and rules by which the practical enjoyment of property was regulated in these islands. But the distinction between principle and application, or detail, was surely so obvious that one would think no one could possibly dispute it. The right of property-the right to possess peaceably what one had acquired-underlay all society. Without some such right no society could exist. But the right of property had never existed, even in its most absolute form, without some restrictions. In the earliest historical times the English State claimed the right to prescribe the conditions on which its citizens were to hold and deal with their property. They would hear men talk as if a rule, once laid down, was laid down for ever-as if the rules of enjoyment of property became part of the thing enjoyed. If anyone presumed to question the existence of the rule, or the existence of that which was the subject of the rule, or desired to propose any alteration of it, one had to do so, as in the old Greek Republic, with a halter round his neck. At present this was too much the fact; and in times past awfully and disgracefully the fact. In Blackstone's time there were 160 telonies punishable with death. The vast majority of these statutable crimes were made crimes in defence of property, and the statutes enacted were statutes to protect the enjoyment of property. All these horrors were effaced by slow degrees, and in the face of determined opposition. Men of the highest character opposed the changes on the ground that, to attack property. and to attack property successfully, was to subvert life itself. This feeling was not dead. The confusion of thought, which was supposed to justify the feeling, was as prevalent as ever, though particular examples of it might exist no longer. It had been shewn that the great and beneficent institution of property rested upon its general advantage. The enjoyment of property must also rest on one and the same foundation-namely, the general advantage. In this respect, the laws of property resembled all other laws. The defence of any other law was that it contributed to the general advantage. In a free country he could not conceive the laws standing upon any other ground. There were estates in these islands of more than a million acres, and it was plainly conceivable that they might grow much larger; and it was further quite possible that the growth of a vast emporium of commerce might be checked by one great landowner. No man,

however, would deny that a state of law under which a country existed, not for its people, but for a mere handful of them, ought to be instantly and absolutely set aside. He denied that fifty, or a hundred, or a thousand gentlemen, it might be, had the right to come to an agreement to shut up the coal mines of England, or to stop the manufactures of Great Britain, and to paralyze her commerce. Such an idea seemed to him unspeakably absurd, and was not even the idea held on such matters in olden times, as the old statutes laid it down that, while property itself should be acknowledged, the laws of its enjoyment should be regulated according to what was thought to be the general advantage. Then, again, as regarded perpetuities, or what were sometimes called munificent bequests, they sometimes heard people talk about them as if to interfere with them was an act of immorality and sacrilege; but as yet no answer had been given to Bishop Butler's statement-"that no man could give what he had not received, and that as no man himself could have & perpetuity, so he could not give it to himself." It was often said they might, no doubt, alter the laws of property on a proper cause being shewn for its alteration; and it would, indeed, be difficult, in the face of railways, gas, water, harbour, dock, and other Bills, which passed every year through Parliament, to deny that private property might not be rightly interfered with for the public good, even when the public was represented largely, if not entirely, by a small band of speculators. But then it was said they must give proper compensation. What, he asked, were they to understand as proper compensation? If a foreign army landed on our shores, and the general in command, in name of the Sovereign, ordered the destruction of a house which, if left standing, might be an important position for the invading army, or it might be that a large tract of culti vated country was to be laid entirely waste-had the owners a claim-a legal right-to compensation! It had been decided for centuries in England, in accordance with good sense, against the owner. Certainly he had no right, Salus populi suprema lex. Lord Coleridge then dealt with the subject of sufficiency of compensation in private cases, and went on to trace the transferences of property from corporations to great proprietors, and the circumstances under which further changes may take place. He remarked that the country belonged to its inhabitants, and that the moment a fragment of the people set up rights inherent in themselves, and not founded on the public good, plainly absurdities followed. They had heard a great deal lately of the enormous importance of maintaining the Eighth Commandment. Until recently there were no legal obstacles to the appropriation of a wife's property. Money coming to her after marriage did not fall within the scope of the Eighth Commandment. Great difficulty was experienced in getting this commandment applied to wives' property; but, after many struggles, the power of stealing was forbidden up to £200. Subsequently an attempt was made, and in the end successfully, to extend the prohibition to all the wife's property. Many questions of this sort arose under the laws of distress, the justice of which, to the ordinary and uninstructed mind, seemed to require explanation. To seize on a man's goods, who owed nothing to any man, to pay the debt of another did at first sight seem to be a breach of the Eighth Commandment. Again, a great nobleman who owned half the land in a country might hunger for the possession of the other half. Under certain conditions this hunger was laudable enough; but if it was a craving which prevented the satisfying of the need of the poor man, who hungered for a few acres, the possession of which was a necessity to his existence, he could only characterize the rich man's hunger as something between petty larceny and highway robbery. It was certainly a breach of the Decalogue. His whole opinion of the subject was that the laws of property were like all other laws-made by the State for the State, and were the expression, from time to time, of the judgment of that cultivated intelligence which, in a free country, controls and leads the opinion of the State upon the various subjects of its laws. But any changes in the laws relating to land ought to be made without unnecessary disturbance, and, it might be, with compensation to those who might suffer by the changes, doing no violence to the great principle that right must not be compassed by wrong or evil might come of it. It was often said that to change the laws of property involved, as a rule, interference with free contract. He was not 80 foolish as to deny that to interfere with freedom of contract was mischievous and demoralizing. But, unless the parties contracting were not only nominally but really free, there was no freedom of contract. There could be no freedom of contract between a slave and his owner, nor could there be freedom of contract with a child. Under the truck system it was possible to deliver every man and woman over to a degrading, hopeless, life-long slavery, from which there was practically no escape and practically no redress, by so arranging the payment of wages that a debt was created which could never be paid off; and the service was so hampered that it could not be relinquished except at a loss so serious that at times it might be absolutely ruinous. In conclusion, Lord Coleridge said he had endeavoured to place a few thoughts before them as they really wereundisturbed by passion, and free from prejudice. In these days of fierce dispute it was something to ascertain the limits within which they were to It was something to be assured that the contests were contend. matters which would leave the great foundations on which society is built as secure as ever and entirely unassailed.

LAW SOCIETIES.

LAW ASSOCIATION.

on

The annual general court of the association was held at the Law Institution, Chancery-lane, London, on Thursday week, John Boodle,

Esq., vice-president, in the chair. The report of the directors was as follows:

1. The directors have the pleasure of submitting a report of their proceedings and the accounts for the past twelve months.

2. The directors have considered thirty-one members' cases, and have distributed amongst them the aggregate sum of £1,256 138. 4d.

3. They have also considered numerous applications of the nonmembers' classes, and have distributed the sum of £250 placed at their disposal amongst twenty-three cases, and recommend to the general court that a sum of £300 be placed at their disposal for distribution amongst the cases of non-members for the ensuing year.

4. The directors have the pleasure to report that they have received towards the funds of the association & second donation of £100 from Mr. James Hopgood, and a donation of £21 from Mr. Frederick Leigh Hutchins, and of £52 10s. from Mr. Barclay Farquharson Watson.

5. The several investments now belonging to the association are as follows-viz. :

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6. The dividends received during the past year from these investments amounted to £1,238 10s. 2d., and with £329 14s., the amount received for the like period in respect of annual subscriptions, and £100, £21, and £52 108. donations, make the total income of the association derivable from these several sources £1,741 14s. 2d. for the year.

7. The directors have to report with deep regret the deaths, during the past year, of the following members of the association:-Mr. Richard Hervé Giraud, Mr. Joseph Needham, Mr. Henry Syme Redpath, Mr. Alfred Benjamin Carpenter (your late secretary), Mr. Henry Nicholson, Mr. Robert Few (who was one of your trustees and directors), Mr. Charles Few, Mr. Newenham Chas. Wright, Mr. Jno. Chas. Burgoyne, Mr. Edward Brydges Hardisty, Mr. Thos. Allen Hickley, Sir Richard Nicholson, and Mr. Edw. Weyman Wadeson.

8. The directors are sorry to state that very few new members have joined the association during the past year, and feel that it only needs a little active personal effort on the part of individual members in explaining the objects of the association, and in inviting professional friends to become subscribers, to obtain a large addition to the list of members to this metropolitan association, and thus enable the directors to make larger grants to the numerous applicants for assistance.

9. By the regulations of the association, the president, vice-president, treasurers, directors, and auditors for the ensuing year, are to be elected at the present meeting.

10. In conclusion, the directors cannot but feel that the proceedings of past years are well calculated to impress on the minds of the supporters of the association a strong feeling in favour of its continued usefulness, and the only reward they desire for their exertions in this charitable work, is the approbation of the members at large, and their general activity and zeal in promoting the interests of this truly benevolent metropolitan association.

LAW STUDENTS' JOURNAL.
LAW STUDENTS SOCIETIES.

UNITED LAW STUDENTS' SOCIETY.-April 25.-The subject for discussion was whether "The complete emancipation of women, by their being admitted to the franchise, to all professions, to all legal rights, liabilities, and duties, upon an equal footing with men, is desirable?" The motion was opened by Mr. White. Mr. Knight followed, contrà. Mr. Shirley, M.P., proposed, as an amendment, "That the emancipation of women, by their being admitted to the franchise and to some of the professions and trades of the country, is desirable." He was followed by Dr. Bateman Napier. Mr. White replied, and, upon the amended motion being put to the House, it was rejected by two votes. The original motion was then put, and negatived by one vote.

The society will in future, until further notice, meet in the Lecture Hall of the Inner Temple, No. 3, King's Bench-walk, Temple. The hour of meeting remains the same, but it is not obligatory there, as in the Law Institution, to close debates at 10 p.m., and smoking is also permitted.

May 9.-The question was whether it was advisable or not that marriage with a deceased wife's sister should be made legal. Mr. Spence opened the motion in the affirmative. Mr. Kains-Jackson opposed the motion. The following gentlemen also spoke-viz., Messrs. Eiloart, Goodall, Common, Yates, Lewis, and Ball. Upon being put, the motion was carried by a majority of eight votes.

LAW STUDENTS' DEBATING SOCIETY.-April 26-Chairman, Mr. R. L. Devonshire.-Mr. J. D. Crawford opened the debate: "That it is desirable to amend the law by allowing prisoners to give evidence on their trial, as proposed by Lord Bramwell's Bill," and was supported by Messrs. J. K. B. Cama, W. E. Elmslie, Woolcombe, W. M. Woodhouse, and J. C. Wheeler. Messrs. W. H. Pitman, E. Todd, Macintosh, and Richmond, opposed the motion. After Mr. Crawford had replied, the motion was put to the society, and carried by a large majority.

sion was: "That this society disapproves of the Irish Crimes Bill." Mr. Charles Russell opened the debate, and was supported by Messrs. P. T. Rhys, T. B. Napier, and C. Ellis, and opposed by Messrs. J. Lithiby, J. Douglas, J. D. Crawford, Lloyd Jones, and C. A. Mackintosh. The chairman then put the motion to the society, but it was lost by a large majority.

May 10-Chairman, Mr. W. E. Elmslie. -The subject for discussion was "That the case of The Bernina (12 P. D. 58), overruling Thorogood v. Bryan (8 C. B. 115), was wrongly decided." Mr. W. Van Sommer opened the debate, and was supported by Messrs. A. C. Macintosh and Howtin, and opposed by Messrs. T. Douglas, H. A. Brady, and Bernard Hill. The question was negatived.

BIRMINGHAM LAW STUDENTS' SOCIETY.-May 3-Chairman, Mr. C. T. Saunders.-Mr. S. M. Slater, B.A., opened the debate in the affirmative by moving "That the passing of a Leasehold Enfranchisement Bill would be beneficial to the community at large." Messrs. H. J. Jelf and W. H. Copnall followed on the same side. Mr. G. A. Nutt, B.A., argued for the negative, and was supported by Messrs. J. F. Addison and Percy Short. On putting the question to the meeting, the affirmative secured a small majority.

LIVERPOOL LAW STUDENTS' ASSOCIATION.-April 25-Chairman, Mr. Bright, Vice-President of the Incorporated Law Society of Liverpool.A joint debate with the Birmingham Law Students' Society had been arranged, and after the private business of the meeting Mr. Slater (Birmingham) opened the affirmative side of the following question:-"Is it desirable that the Bill to amend the Law of Evidence, introduced into the House of Lords this session by Lord Bramwell, should become law?" Mr. Inglis (Liverpool) argued in favour of the negative, and in the discussion which followed Messrs. Raybould, Short, and Nutt (Birmingham), and Messrs. Thornely, Lewis, Todd, Rathbone, and Smith, took part. Mr. Slater having replied, the question was put to the meeting, and carried in the affirmative by a large majority. There were thirty-six members present.

LEGAL NEWS.

OBITUARY.

South Sir

SIR CHARLES COOPER, Knt., formerly Chief Justice of Australia, died at Bath on the 24th ult. in his ninety-second year. C. Cooper was the son of Mr. Thomas Cooper, of Henley-on-Thames, and was born in 1795. He was called to the bar at the Inner Temple in Hilary Term, 1827, and he formerly practised on the Oxford Circuit. In 1839 he was appointed judge of the Supreme Court of South Australia, and in 1856 he became chief justice of the colony, and he retired on a pension in 1861. He received the honour of knighthood in 1857. Sir C. Cooper was married in 1853 to the daughter of Mr. Charles Newenham.

Mr. THOMAS NORMAN WIGHTWICK, solicitor (of the firm of Kingsford, Wightwick, & Kingsford), of Canterbury, died on the 28th ult. Mr. Wightwick was born in 1820. He was admitted a solicitor about the year 1843, and he practised for over forty years at Canterbury. He had a large practice, and he was formerly solicitor to the Kent and Canterbury Hospital, and clerk to the magistrates and the Commissioners of Taxes for the Home and Wingham Divisions of Kent. He was formerly in partnership with Mr. Montague Kingsford, who is clerk to the East Kent Commissioners of Sewers, with Mr. Cecil Edward Kingsford, and with his only son, Mr. William Norman Wightwick, who was admitted a solicitor in 1872, and is now clerk to the Com. missioners of Taxes. Mr. Wightwick retired from practice three or four years ago.

APPOINTMENTS.

Magistrate for the borough of Cardiff. Mr. Lewis was called to the bar Mr. THOMAS WILLIAM LEWIS, barrister, has been appointed Stipendiary at the Middle Temple in June, 1879, and he has practised on the South Wales and Chester Circuit and at the Glamorganshire Sessions.

Clerk to the magistrates for that borough. Mr. Deane is an LL.B. of the Mr. EDGAR ERNEST DEANE, Solicitor, of Batley, has been appointed University of London. He was admitted a solicitor in 1882. Mr. Deane has also been appointed Official Receiver in Bankruptcy for the district of Dewsbury. Both offices were held by his brother, the late Mr. John

Arthur Deane.

missioner to administer Oaths in the Supreme Court of Judicature. Mr. JAMES FOWLER, solicitor, of Stockton, has been appointed a ComMr. ALFRED DOUBLE, solicitor, of 27, Jewin-crescent, has been appointed a Commissioner to administer Oaths in the Supreme Court of Judicature. Supreme Court of the Colony of New South Wales. Mr. MATTHEW STEPHEN, barrister, has been appointed a Judge of the

appointed a Commissioner to administer Oaths in the Supreme Court of Mr. ALEXANDER WILSON, Solicitor, of 4, Cook-street, Liverpool, has been

New South Wales.

PARTNERSHIPS DISSOLVED.

BENJAMIN BURDEKIN, JOHN WILLIAM PYE-SMITH, REGINALD BENSON, and BENJAMIN THOMAS BURDEKIN, solicitors, Sheffield. April 30. So far as concerns the said John William Pye-Smith. [Gazette, May 27.]

EDWIN HENRY ARMSTRONG NEWMAN and ANTHONY GODFREY WILSON, solicitors (Newman & Wilson), 90, Cannon-street, London._ March 23. The business will in future be carried on by the said Edwin H. A. Newman and T. F. W. Crawhall Wilson, under the style or firm of Newman & [Gazette, May 31.]

May 3-Chairman, Mr. J. Cornelius Wheeler.-The subject for discus-Wilson.

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