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is conceived, should be abolished, except in special cases. During the Long Vacation there is only one master sitting, and the consequence is that no long bill can be taxed, as his time is fully occupied in dealing with short taxations. To remedy this it has been suggested that three of the masters should be in attendance daily during the vacation. There seems to be no sufficient reason to increase the number of common law masters if a proper system were adopted, and if the masters were in regular attendance from ten till four, and on Saturdays from ten till two. To prevent the delays which at present arise it is suggested that three masters should be assigned to each division— A to F, G to N, and O to Z-and that they should attend in the same division in every sitting through the year. If the suggestions above made were carried into effect they would do much

The Solicitors' Journal and Reporter. towards facilitating the taxation of costs and disposing of the

LONDON, JUNE 4, 1887.

CURRENT TOPICS.

A SPECIAL RULE OF COURT has been made authorizing the closing of the Court of Appeal, High Court, and the offices of the Supreme Court on the 21st inst.

WE PRINT elsewhere new Rules of the Supreme Court for further carrying out the arrangements of the Chancery Chambers at Liverpool and Manchester. Rule 1 provides that originating summonses may be sealed and issued in the district registries of Liverpool and Manchester respectively, and appearances thereon entered in the same respective registries. Rule 2 enables petitions presented in those registries respectively, and requiring answer, to be answered in the name of one of the district registrars.

arrears which now exist in some of the offices.

THE AGITATION for repression of "indecent law reports" has resulted in the introduction of a Bill "to amend the law as to reports of proceedings in courts of law," which, we observe, is backed by five members of the bar. The Bill proposes that, "in any proceedings, civil or criminal, in any superior court, it shall be lawful for the court at any time by order to direct that the details of matters of an obscene or indecent nature in such proceedings, or in any specified part or parts thereof, shall not be pubvertisement, or other printed document"; and it provides penalties lished in any newspaper, book, pamphlet, news-sheet, placard, adment for not exceeding one month, or fine not exceeding £50, or on summary conviction for breach of such order of either imprisonboth imprisonment and fine. It will be observed that proceedings before magistrates, which are the proceedings most frequently giving rise to the publication in country newspapers of "matters of an obscene or indecent nature,' are left untouched by these anxious guardians of public morals. Their attention has apparently been exclusively fixed on sensational divorce cases, in which more or less exalted personages are concerned. It will also be noticed that, while it is considered essential to prohibit the publication by "printed document" of "matters of an obscene or indecent nature," it is apparently left open to anyone to publish a lithographed copy of the details." Clause 2 subjects to the heavy penalties imposed (1) the reporter who prepares; (2) the printer who prints; (3) the sub-editor who "procures to be prepared"; (4) the proprietor who "procures to be printed" any prohibited report; (5) the publisher who publishes; (6) every newsvendor who sells; (7) every newsvendor who exposes for sale any newspaper, published after the order, containing any report of the prohibited details. Apparently the only persons who escape penalties are the chief editor and the purchasers, who are perhaps not the persons least to blame. It is provided that No person shall be liable to any punishment under this Act if he proves to the satisfaction of the court of summary jurisdiction that, without any negligence on the part of himself or of those intrusted with the management of his business, the alleged offence was committed in ignorance of the order of court forbidding such publication." As it would plainly be negligence not to look at the newspapers or search for prohibitory orders, it would seem to be necessary, if this singular Bill becomes law, for every newspaper boy in the streets, and every stationer who exposes newspapers for sale, to examine the law reports in each newspaper, and if he finds any indecent details therein, to search forthwith at the Central Office or Divorce Registry in order to ascertain whether any prohibitory order has been made. Probably, however, the effect of these penalties on cautious newspaper editors and proprietors would be such that the publication of reports of divorce cases and other cases involving indecent details would altogether cease. Have the promoters of this Bill considered the extreme comfort and satisfaction which this result will afford to guilty parties? The heaviest penalty for their offences will be removed, for their crimes, instead of being known all over England, will be revealed only to a few score people in court. A divorce case will, in fact, become quite a comfortably private little affair.

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THE DELAY in getting costs taxed in the Chancery and Queen's Bench Divisions, but more especially in the Chancery Division, has for some years past engaged the serious consideration of solicitors and suitors. In 1878-79 the Incorporated Law Society gave the subject much attention, and reported fully to the Lord Chancellor upon it, the result of which was that one of the then members of the council (Mr. F. G. DAVIDSON) was appointed a taxing master. We understand that the council have again given the subject attention, and have prepared a report, which they have brought to the notice of the proper authorities. There are some matters conducing to delay which seem to be capable of easy remedy. For instance, with regard to objections, the present cumbrous and dilatory practice could be effectually remedied by adjourning the objections to a judge in chambers directly they are brought in, instead of waiting, as at present, for the master to write out his reasons for the disallowances. If this suggestion were adopted, the judge could forthwith give the master directions, and in nine cases out of ten objections could be thus promptly disposed of. Should the parties be disposed to carry the matter further, they could do so in the ordinary course by means of a summons to review. Under the present system it is not an uncommon thing for a summons to proceed upon objections to take several months. Again, one of the taxing masters of the Chancery Division should take daily, without formal appointments, all taxations in small matters, and, in giving appointments to proceed, the morning should be devoted to matters not taking much time, and the afternoon to long appointments. Queries should be disposed of at any time during which the master or his clerk are not engaged with parties actually before them. Having regard to the number of bills which at the commencement of each Long Vacation remain undisposed of, it may be suggested that each master, before closing his office, should report to the Lord Chancellor that all bills in his office have been taxed, or should append to his report a schedule of the bills which remain untaxed, giving the reason why each has not been dealt with. In the Queen's Bench Division there is no delay in getting short bills taxed, either during the sittings or in the Long Vacation. The delay which exists in getting long bills taxed arises from the inconvenient system of allotting a taxation to the particular master to whom the action has been referred, and who has exclu- THE RAILWAY AND CANAL Traffic Bill has been sent down from sively to deal with all applications in that action. This system, it the House of Lords to the House of Commons with only two

material alterations in regard to traffic, both in the interest of the traders. In the first place, the clause which enabled the commissioners, in deciding a question of undue preference, to take into consideration whether any difference of charge complained of was necessary for the purpose of securing traffic, has been amended by requiring the difference to be necessary for securing the traffic in the interests of the public, and by a proviso that the commissioners may direct that "no higher charge shall be made to any person in respect of merchandize carried over a less distance than is made to another person for similar services in respect of the same description and quantity of merchandize carried over a greater distance on the same line of railway." This, though it leaves everything to the discretion of the commissioners, is a great concession to the traders, the proviso steering between the equal mileage rates system and the system of preferential rates at large. In the second place, the controversy between the companies and the traders as to the charge for stations is met by a provision that, in the new rates, when settled, "in the determination of terminal charges regard shall be had only to the expenditure reasonably necessary to provide the accommodation in respect of which such charges are made, irrespective of the outlay which may have been actually incurred by the railway company in providing that accommodation." This is not very clearly expressed, but we take it to mean that no charges are to be made to meet the interest upon the capital used to build the stations, but that charges may be made for keeping the stations and station appliances in proper working order. We expect to see this amendment further amended in the interest of the traders, and it is material to point out that until the new rates come into effect-which may not be for some two or three years-the traders will have to pay for the whole expenses of the stations. Such we take to be the effect of the interpretation clause, which defines "terminal charges" as including charges in respect of stations, sidings, wharves, depôts, warehouses, cranes, and other similar matters, and of any services rendered thereat," inasmuch as the Act is to be read as one with the Traffic Acts of 1854 and 1873. But the question, whether or not the railway companies, pending the settlement of the rates to be revised, are to become entitled to charge for stations, ought to have been more directly faced.

66

"THE GREAT and beneficent institution of property," Lord COLERIDGE told the Glasgow Juridical Society last week, "rests upon its general advantage," and he added that "the enjoyment of property must rest on the same foundation." Perhaps we may be permitted to respectfully hint that this is as trite as it is true. The learned speaker seemed to suppose that the distinction between the right of property and the mode of enjoyment of property was forgotten, which, considering that he was addressing an assembly of lawyers, does not seem to have been particularly complimentary to his hearers. But there is another distinction which we do not find noticed by the learned Chief Justice in his address, and which is more apt to be forgotten. The mode of enjoyment of property must be protected until the Legislature has altered it, however much such enjoyment may seem to be opposed to the general advantage. There is no point in which the English law has been more careful than this. The doctrine, so much laboured by Lord COLERIDGE, of the right of the Legislature to interpose and regulate the mode of enjoyment of property, we should suppose needed no demonstration, but at the present day we should have thought that the principle that no one is justified in violating property or rights for the time being established by law in favour of another, however much such violation may appear to be for the general good of the whole community, might have been very usefully dwelt upon. Instead of this we find the Lord Chief Justice telling his hearers that the "country belonged to its inhabitants, and the moment a fragment of the people set up rights inherent in themselves, and not founded on the public good, plainly absurdities followed"; that " There were estates | in these islands of more than a million acres, and it was plainly conceivable that they might grow much larger," and that "A state of law under which a country existed, not for its people, but for a mere handful of them, ought to be instantly and absolutely set aside." Did it not occur to the learned speaker that people who are stupid enough to confuse the right of property with the mode

of enjoyment of property would be very likely also to mistake an exhortation no doubt meant to stimulate legislation for a direct approval of the lawless disregard of private rights which seems to be every day becoming more prevalent?

IT HAS FOR SOME TIME been looked upon as settled law that there can be no public right of fishing in non-tidal waters, even where the river in question is to some extent navigable (Pearce v. Scotcher, 9 Q. B. D. 162). In that case Mr. Justice GROVE is reported to have said that the case was determined by authority, and, after referring to the "rule" laid down in Hale De Jure Maris, and the Irish case of The Banne (Davis, 55), to have semarked that the cases cited against the claim made on behalf of the public were uniform and consistent with that rule. Under these circumstances, at first sight, it is somewhat surprising to read a Bill recently brought in by Mr. BROADHURST, which recites that "doubts" have arisen as to the right of the public to fish in such rivers and streams in England as are public highways, and were not "in defence" in the reign of Henry II., and which proposes to enact that they "shall have the right to fish in all rivers or streams which are public highways, or over or upon which the public have free right of passage." The only rights "saved" by the Bill are those in existence in the reign of Henry II., and which have since been continued. As the Bill purports to be a declaratory one, it is natural to inquire what grounds the promoters have for suggesting that the law is doubtful, and why they refer to the reign of Henry II. The answer to the inquiry is given in an opinion of a learned gentleman, which has been printed, in which, after going very elaborately into the early English law on the subject, he forms the following conclusions:-(1) every river that is in fact navigable for ships or boats is a "public river" and a highway; (2) an exclusive right of fishery is a royal franchise; (3) the grant of any franchise of fishery is void by Magna Charta, c. 16, unless the franchise was in existence in the reign of Henry II. He cites a considerable number of extracts from hundred rolls and other ancient authorities to shew that it was unlawful for a private person to take possession of fisheries (even in fresh water) which had been public before. He does not say that the decision in Pearce v. Scotcher is not law, but points out that it is not consistent with our earlier law, and that the question has never been decided by an English Court of Appeal. The Bill, it would appear, ought to one, not to declare, but to amend, the law.

CONTINGENT LIABILITIES IN BANKRUPTCY. THE case of Morgan v. Hardy (ante, p. 346, 18 Q. B. D. 646), recently decided in the Court of Appeal, raised a somewhat important question of bankruptcy law. We apprehend that the principle of the decision will apply to the existing Bankruptcy Act, though the case arose under the repealed Act of 1869, the provisions of the two Acts, in pari materia, being very similar.

The facts of the case were these. The assignee of a term of years covenanted to indemnify the lessees against damages for breach of a covenant to yield up the demised premises in repair at the end of the term. Eight years before the term expired, the assignee filed a petition for liquidation by arrangement under the Bankruptcy Act, and obtained an order of discharge. The lessees tendered no proof in the liquidation in respect of the assignee's possible liability at the end of the term upon his covenant to indemnify; but after the term expired they claimed indemnity from him in an action in respect of damages recovered against them by the lessor for breach of the covenant to yield up the premises in repair.

It was held by the majority of the court (Bowen and Fry, L.JJ.) that the claim of the lessees was barred under section 49 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, by the order of discharge, because the effect of section 31 was to make the assignee's future and contingent liability on his covenant for indemnity a debt provable in the liquidation, unless the lessees obtained an order of the court declaring it to be a liability incapable of being fairly estimated. The Master of the Rolls unfortunately dissented, holding that the lessees' claim was not barred by the order of discharge, because

the assignee's liability was at the date of the liquidation proceedings incapable of being estimated at all, and the provisions of THE AMENDMENTS TO THE LAND TRANSFER BILL. section 31 did not apply to such a liability.

We cannot help thinking that the view taken by the majority of the court was sounder and more in accordance with the expediency of the case than that taken by the Master of the Rolls. One reason, and a very strong one for so deciding, seems to be derivable from the well-known history of the law of bankruptcy and the general scope of the legislation in regard to this subject. This point is so fully developed in the judgment of Bowen, L.J., and the cases referred to by him, that it would be useless to dwell upon it at length. One of the well-known objects of a law of bankruptcy is to give a bankrupt a fresh start in life. Under the older enactments a bankrupt was left subject oftentimes to liabilities which could not be proved in bankruptcy owing to their contingent nature; and we have always supposed it to be almost truism that the general scope of the subsequent legislation was to free a bankrupt in the most absolute manner possible from all

liabilities.

a

II.

application for a qualified title could be made. The process was to 4. Registration generally.-Under the Act of 1875 no direct New clause 22 enables the application for a qualified title t› be apply for an absolute title, and then to accept a qualified one. made direct.

flats or portions of houses held as separate freeholds, may be By (new) clause 23 undivided shares in any lind or charge, and compulsion clauses, especially as there is no such note to this registered. Such interests would then appear to come under the clause as there is to the following one (24) that such registration shall not be compulsory. If it be compulsory, the convenience of the provision may be questioned.

By (new) clause 24 (1) (f.) power is given to register rights of way, water, light, and other rights attached to or in favour of land, otherwise such rights could only be noted as against land (Act of 1875, s. 18).

The argument that appears to have weighed principally with the Master of the Rolls seems to have been that it could not be that tions is now made obligatory (clause 28 (1)), and power is given to the The production of the certificate of title on all registered transacthe Legislature intended what, as a matter of business, would be board to compel its production by any person having it in his custody an absurd and idle formality to be gone through; that, when the (clause 28 (2) (3) and Act of 1875, s. 110). This is probably intended liability was obviously incapable of being estimated, it would be to effect the raising of the certificate of title into a more trustworthy useless to go through the ceremony of asking the trustee to put substitute for title deeds than it is now. an estimate upon it; and that the Legislature could only mean where the certificate was in the hands of a third party, coupled The frequency of cases the provisions to apply when the machinery given by them was, in with the want of any power to compel its production under the the nature of things, applicable. We are not convinced by this argu-old Acts, has unavoidably caused a practice to arise in the present ment, forcible as it may at first sight appear. We think it may be registry of registering transfers without production of the certificate shewn that it is not idle to apply the machinery given by the statute of title, therefore (of course) without any note or indorsement of to the case of any liability however incapable of being estimated. the dealing being made on it. Thus the certificate is no evidence The broad object of the legislation is admitted to be to free the at all of the state of the title subsequent to the date of its first bankrupt as completely as is reasonably possible from all liabilities. issue. Under the Torrens' system its production is always insisted It is, however, recognized by the Legislature that, in the case of on; every dealing is indorsed upon it, and, in consequence, some liabilities, it may be so absolutely impossible from their where parties do not suspect actual fraud, a great deal of business nature to estimate them, that they cannot be provable, and is done on faith of the certificate alone, supplemented at most by therefore, ex necessitate rei, the bankrupt must remain liable. But a search for cautions, which can be effected by telegraph. It is how and when is this capability or incapability of being estimated probably the intention of this amendment to obtain the like results

to be ascertained? It must either be ascertained at the time of the bankruptcy or afterwards in the action brought to enforce the liability. We should say that on every ground it is more convenient that it should be ascertained at the period of the bankruptcy -the period to which the possibility or impossibility of estimating the liability has relation-than perhaps after a long interval at the time when the action is brought. The circumstances with relation to which its capacity for being estimated are to be judged are those existing at the time of the bankruptcy. Again, there is this great advantage in having the question determined at the time of the bankruptcy, that this enables the bankrupt to know how he stands. If it be determined that the liability can be proved, he starts again a free man; if not, he knows, at any rate, of the possible liability, and is not left with an uncertainty hanging over his head.

The fallacy, if we may respectfully say so, of the Master of the Rolls' view appears to us to be that he assumes too much the exist

ence of an obvious absolute line of demarcation between liabilities

that are capable, and those that are incapable, of being estimated. We doubt whether it would be found in practice that the incapacity of a liability for being estimated would be so certain and obvious à priori; and therefore great uncertainty might arise; the bankrupt would not know whether he was free or not, and it might be a difficult question afterwards, in an action brought on the liability, to say whether it came on one side of the line or the other. Surely it is obviously much better that the question should be determined at once upon the bankruptcy.

The following gentlemen have been proposed as candidates for election as members of the Bar Committee at the ensuing annual election, which will be held in the week ending the 11th of June-viz., Sir Henry James, Q.C., M.P., Mr. W. F. Robinson, Q.C., Mr. Montague Cookson, Q.C., Mr. J. Rigby, Q.C., Mr. F. A. Bosanquet, Q C., Mr. F. Lockwood, Q.C., M.P., Mr. A. M. Channell, Q.C., Mr. W. R. Kennedy, Q.C., Mr. F. W. Maclean, Q.C., M.P., Mr. E. Cutler, Q.C., and Messrs. Bargrave Deane, J. W. Dunning, F. Evans, W. Graham, W. A. Meek, S. Hall, W. E. Harrison, H. Smith, A. Underhill, R. S. Wright, and Alfred Young. Only sixteen

candidates can be elected.

here.

follows:-She may be registered as proprietor; if her husband is
The case of a married woman is provided for by new clause 32 as
entitled to the rents and profits he may be registered as joint
proprietor, and in such cases, and only in such cases, she shall be
separately examined before making any disposition; on her death
the usual registry rules will apply; the husband, however, having
power to be registered as proprietor according to his interest.
is given (new clause 35 (3)).
Power to appeal to the court on a refusal of the board to register

visions

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5. Law of real property (Part IV.).-The alterations made are option of taking their curtesy, dower, freebench, &c., estates as follows:-Husbands and wives surviving are to have the under the old law if married before the passing of the Act. The purposes of appropriation in specie for satisfaction of legacies by somewhat arbitrary powers of valuing land given to executors for the (old) clause 31 (1) are now subjected to the "prescribed prostanding grievance of purchasers for many years-is at last to be and an appeal to the court. Succession duty-the dealt with in a summary manner, and the ingenious device of the celebrated Chancellor of the Exchequer, by which every purchaser has been made to do the work of an Exciseman gratis, is considerably diminished in force. By new clause 44 (1) succession duty is made an "incumbrance." This renders it liable to extinction if not declared on the register on first registration with absolute title. (2) On the death of a registered owner the board are to place a caution on the register for six months, and inform the Commissioners of Inland Revenue of it. (3) The caution can be renewed on application of the commissioners; but (4) only for two have been diligent in their endeavours to exact payment. The old years, unless they satisfy the board or, on appeal, the court, that they clause 33 (2) relating to conversion of a base fee into a fee simple has been struck out; these cases are not very common, and the case of base fees which had been sold presented much difficulty.

heir-at-law-namely, the effect of the word "heirs" in future A curious little point which arose out of the abolition of the documents-is met by new clause 62, which provides (broadly) that, where it is used as a word of limitation, it shall have its

present meaning; when used as conferring a beneficial interest on a person or class of persons, it shall have its present meaning in documents executed before the Act, but shall mean "next of kin " in future documents; and, when used in any other way, shall mean "personal representatives."

6. Solicitors will be interested in observing the bearing of the amendments on the employment of agents by landowners. New clause 53 (4) alludes to "officers employed on behalf of the applicants for registration or other persons dealing with the Land Transfer Office," who are to be "remunerated by such fees by the parties as may be prescribed." The words of the clause have raised an apprehension that an opening is thus given for the employment of agents other than solicitors to transact legal business for applicants. It may be, however, that the clause only contemplates the employment, at fixed rates, of some such persons as the licensed surveyors who have so greatly facilitated the details of registration under the Torrens' Acts; or even the accrediting of solicitors themselves to act for and as officers of the Land Transfer Office in receiving and forwarding applications-a system which, if it could be carried out, would be likely enough to prove a considerable benefit to the Land Transfer Office and the landowners also.

The old clause 45 empowered her Majesty by Order in Council to make district registries of the High Court, and any other offices created by Act of Parliament, to be auxiliary to the board. The corresponding new clause (56) adds clerks of the peace, clerks of Land Tax Commissioners, clerks to justices, or registrars of This addition makes it appear county courts, to the list. likely that an attempt will be made to utilize the local knowledge possessed by these personages, who, moreover, are mostly solicitors. The provision will also enable a very large number of local receiving officers, so to speak, to be created: the beneficial results of such a step, if such a step be contemplated, would probably be considerable.

This concludes the observations we think it advisable to make on the amendments at this stage of the Bill. We have not adverted to matters of minute interest, or to verbal difficulties except when thrown in our way from other causes, our object being to discover and set forth, as far as possible, the general intentions of the framers of the amendments, leaving questions of exact detail, and even of construction also, to a later period, when the final form of the measure becomes more accurately known.

those of Mr. Sanders. Nor are we at all convinced by Professor
Gray's reasoning, that conditions at the common law annexed
to legal estates are within the Rule against Perpetuities (ss. 299-
303, pp. 213-216). The information which follows the last cited
passage, shewing that the American courts are much of our opinion, is
learned author that his explanation of the origin of Lord Coke's
highly interesting. On the other hand, we cheerfully concede to the
doctrine, that, on the dissolution of a corporation, there occurs a
reverter to the donor, and not an escheat to the lord, is at least
exceedingly ingenious and plausible (s. 48, p. 35). But even upon
those points in which we differ from Professor Gray we have derived
much advantage from his careful and clear treatment, which never
fails to illustrate any subject with which he deals. In conclusion, as
the conciseness of a new Act of Parliament for the more prolix
a warning to any among ourselves who may be too eager to substitute
security of settled authorities, we would call attention to the frightful
list of cases given at pp. 442-444, which are due to the recent
labours of the American statute-mongers. "Since the passage of the
Revised Statutes," says Professor Gray, "there have been over one
hundred and seventy reported case son questions of remoteness.
This enormous amount of litigation is, perhaps, as striking an illus-
tration as could be found of the dangers attending radical legisla-
tion."

MAGISTERIAL FORMULIST.

A GENERAL FORMULIST FOR USE IN JUSTICES' CLERKS' OFFICES,
INCLUDING THE CONSOLIDATED FORMS, 1886, THE FORMS FOR
INDICTABLE OFFENCES, AND SPECIAL FORMS FOR THE GENERAL
PRACTICE OF SUCH OFFICES. By TEMPLE CHEVALLIER MARTIN,
Chief Clerk of the Lambeth Police Court. Knight & Co.

The scope of this book is given in the title. It does not pretend to be an absolutely complete collection of forms for use in magisterial practice, but it contains all the forms in most ordinary use. The forms given are, generally speaking, as far as practicable complete and ready for use, and provide for cases requiring two or more justices, a petty sessional court, or other special description of jurisdiction. The portions expressing alternative offences or portions requiring to be altered are printed in italics, so as to call the attention of the clerk to them at once. The forms are not usually unnecessarily multiplied, but we confess we do not see any reason for inserting a form of ordinary landlord's notice to quit under the Small Tenements Act, or heading such notice with the Royal Arms. The Rules under the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879, and the Employers and Workmen Act, 1875, are prefixed to the forms.

REVIEWS.

PERPETUITIES.

THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES. By JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY,
Royall Professor of Law in Harvard University. Boston: Little,
Brown, & Co.

The learning and industry of Professor Gray are known to the lawyers of this country through his book on Restraints upon Alienation, which was reviewed by us some time ago. The present work is of larger extent, but deals with a closely kindred subject. The policy of the American law so nearly resembles, upon these points, the policy of the English, that even the later development of the former throws light upon the latter. Until the Declaration of Independence, the one law was practically identical with the other; but the doctrine of perpetuities is of such recent invention that many of its most important principles remained at that date in a crude or embryonic condition. Professor Gray is as much at home when citing English authorities as when appealing to those of his own country; and there are few English lawyers who might not gather some breadth of view, and some important details of information, from the present work. The learned author is a man with the courage of his convictions, and he speaks his mind with a refreshing freedom from that creeping obscurity which seems always afraid to let the reader know what the writer really means. We shall not deny that we have found in his pages some propositions from which we dissent. We do not agree with his opinion that "the Statute Quia Emptores put an end to qualified fees" (s. 36, p. 25). The fact, stated by the learned author, that "Mr. Sanders was the first author to distinctly recognize, or at any rate to distinctly state" this proposition, is enough by itself to cast some suspicion upon its correctness; for it 18 not very probable that so important an operation of the statute remained for about five centuries hidden from the eyes of all men, to be revealed only then to

CORRESPONDENCE.

CITY LAW SOCIETY AND LIBRARY.

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.]

Sir, Mr. Low's revival of an idea many times broached seems to me to be worth consideration. I have myself been more than once invited during the last fifteen years to take an active part in forming a City society, but I have held aloof, as the proposals hitherto have been rather antagonistic to the Incorporated Law Society, which, I think, is approaching the matter at the wrong end.

But I have always been of opinion that the Law Society proper should be divided into two parts-namely, the tribunalistic and the useful-and if a sort of City annexe to the latter could be formed I purse and person. would willingly co-operate in

We City men certainly want a local library and a law club too, within hail of the Bank of England. I mean for lunch only, as few of us wish to stop in the City after office work. I should have joined the Chancery-lane Club years ago but for its distance, a question I seriously considered when the District Line opened and brought us by train to St. Stephen's and other West-end clubs in less time and with less fatigue than one could walk to Chancery-lane. Whilst I agree that a handy law library and club are desirable, because he cannot conveniently I see no reason why any City man, get to Chancery-lane, should needlessly attack the parent institution. FRANCIS K. MUNTON. There is room enough for all.

95a, Queen Victoria-street, May 31.

THE NEW CHANCERY JUDGE.

To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal. Sir,-It seems to me that there is no power to appoint a new chancery judge, or to amalgamate the offices of the chancery taxing masters and registrars with the offices of the chief clerks of the chancery judges, without a special Act of Parliament for the purpose. It is to be hoped that the Government will not jeopardize a

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RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT, MAY, 1887. 1. Originating summonses may be sealed and issued in the district registries of Liverpool and Manchester respectively, and appearances thereon shall be entered in the same respective registries; and the provisions of the Rules of the Supreme Court, and in particular of Order LV., Rules 20 and 23, shall be applied accordingly.

2. Petitions presented in the district registries of Liverpool and Manchester respectively, and requiring answer, shall be answered in the name of one of the district registrars of the same respective registries; and the Rules of the Supreme Court, and in particular Order LXII., Rule 18, shall, as regards such petitions, be construed as if the district registrars of Liverpool and Manchester respectively were mentioned in place of the registrars of the Chancery Division. 3. These rules may be cited as the Rules of the Supreme Court May, 1887, and shall come into operation on the sixth day of June, 1887.

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It is stated that at the adjourned inquest at Ipswich on Thursday (see ante, p. 449), being the fourth occasion on which the jury had met, they having on previous occasions refused to act unless the coroner withdrew his decision excluding from the proceedings the representatives of the press, the coroner read a communication which he had received from the Lord Chancellor, upholding his view as to the exercise of the coroner's discretion in allowing publicity.

It is stated that a case, which has arisen out of the recent earthquake at Diano Marino, will shortly be decided before an Italian court. Two adjoining houses at Diano Marino belonging to two different families were destroyed by the earthquake, and the inhabitants were all killed. When the ruins were removed, the sum of 200,000 francs was found among the débris. It was impossible to ascertain to which house the money belonged, and no member of either family survived to speak to the ownership of the money.

CASES OF THE WEEK.

KNIGHT v. COALES-C. A. No. 1., 27th May. PRACTICE-COMPULSORY REFERENCE-MATTER OF MERE ACCOUNT-REFERENCE OF OTHER ISSUES-COMMON LAW PROCEDURE ACT, 1854, s. 3.JUDICATURE ACT, 1873, s. 57.

In an action to recover £53 arrears of rent of a furnished house, let by the plaintiff to the defendant, and £38 for dilapidations and breakages, the defendant, as to the rent, pleaded that the plaintiff agreed to accept a new tenant in place of the defendant at an increased rent, and to take the arrears of rent out of the increased profit rental, and denied that there were any dilapidations. The judge at chambers, on the application of the plaintiff, referred the whole cause to the official referee for trial, under section 57 of the Judicature Act, 1873, on the ground that part of it was a matter of mere account within section 3 of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, and this order was affirmed by the Divisional Court. The defendant appealed, and the question was argued whether the court has jurisdiction, where part only is a matter of mere account, to refer the whole matter under section 3 of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854. Clow v. Harper (26 W. R. 364, 3 Ex. U. 198), Ward v. Pilley (28 W. R. 937, 5 Q. B. D. 427), and Martin v. Fyfe (49 L. T. N. S. 107) were cited. THE COURT, after taking time to consider, affirmed the order. Lord ESHER, M.R., said that it was unnecessary to consider whether the whole matter could be compulsorily referred under section 3, as it was clear that, where some of the issues were matters of account, the court could. under section 57 of the Judicature Act, 1873, send all the issues in the cause to the official referee for trial. FRY and LOPES, L.JJ.. said that, if the matter consisted in part of matter of mere account, the court had jurisdiction, under section 3 of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, to If Cockburn, C.J., in Clow v. Harper, meant to say that in such a case refer either the part that was matter of mere account or the whole matter. there was no jurisdiction to refer the whole matter, they could not agree with him. Their construction of the section was consistent with all the cases. The discretion to refer the whole matter, however, should be exercised with extreme caution, as the matter of account should not be subordinate to the other issues, but should be a substantial issue in itself. -COUNSEL, Lumley Smith, Q.C., and C. A. Reeve; Channell, Q C., aud T. W. Chitty. SOLICITORS, R. Wells; Harvey & Capron.

GUARDIANS OF CROYDON UNION v. GUARDIANS OF
REIGATE UNION-C. A. No. 1, 25th May.

POOR LAW-SETTLEMENT-CHILD UNDER SIXTEEN-WIDOWED MOTHER-
DIVIDED PARISHES ACT, 1876 (39 & 40 VICT. c. 61), s. 35.
Special case stated under 12 & 13 Vict. c. 45, s. 11, on appeal against an
order adjudging the pauper, a child under the age of sixteen, to be
legally settled at Penge, in the Croydon Union. The pauper was the
daughter of Richard Scully and his wife, Emma Scully. Emma Scully
was born in the parish of Reigate, in the Reigate Union, which was her
maiden settlement, and she never acquired any subsequent settlement in
her own right. Richard Scully, whilst resident with her, acquired a
settlement in Penge, in the Croydon Union, and soon afterwards left for
Gibraltar, where he was joined by his wife, who resided there ever since.
Richard Scully died at Gibraltar. The Divisional Court (A. L. Smith and
Grantham, JJ.), following the decisions in Maidstone Union v. Holborn
Union (17 Q. B. D. 817) and Kingsbridge Union v. East Stonehouse (18
Q. B. D. 528), quashed the order, holding that the pauper child took the
settlement of its widowed mother in the Reigate Union.

THE COURT OF APPEAL (Lord ESHER, M.R., and FRY, L.J.) affirmed this decision. They said that in section 35 of the Divided Parishes Act, 1876, the word "wife" did not include a widow. Hence a widow did not take her deceased husband's settlement. As to a child under sixteen, the section said that it was to take the settlement of its father or of its widowed mother, as the case might be. That meant that, if its father were alive, it was to take his settlement; if the father were dead and its mother alive, it was to take its widowed mother's settlement. The widowed mother did not retain her deceased husband's settlement, but reverted to her original settlement. Hence in this case the child took its widowed mother's maiden settlement in the Reigate Union.-COUNSEL, Charles, Q.C., and Burleigh Muir; Bosanquet, Q.C., and Mead. SOLICITORS, Morrisons, for G. C. Morrison, Reigate; West, King, Adams, & Co.

Re THE ORIENTAL BANK CORPORATION-C. A. No. 2, 27th

COMPANY-WINDING UP-SALE

May.

OF ASSETS-SETTING ASIDE CONTRACT SANCTIONED IN CHAMBERS-COMPANIES ACT, 1862, s. 95. This was an appeal from the decision of Chitty, J. (ante, p. 493). The Oriental Bank Corporation was being wound up and the liquidator entered into a conditional agreement for the sale of all the outstanding assets to a company called the Assets Realization Co. at such a price as would give the creditors of the corporation a dividend of 19s. 9d. in the pound. Chitty, J., in chambers, sanctioned this agreement. Another company called the New Oriental Bank Corporation, which had been formed to carry on the business of the old corporation, moved to discharge or vary the order, offering themselves to pay the creditors of the old corporation a dividend of 20s. in the pound, and to pay a moiety of y surplus of the assets to the shareholders in the old corporation. Chitty, J., said that he could find no precedent for setting aside a sale by private contract which had been sanctioned in chambers, merely because a better offer had since been made. Such a practice would be most pernicious

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