income was charitable, and it was managed by a public body, and no private person had any interest in it, and no profit was in contemplation, and its object was the benefit of a large class of her Majesty's subjects, all those circumstances pointed to it being a public school. The fact that colleges and halls were also exempted in the section shewed that it did not refer merely to charity schools.-COUNSEL, Sir E. Clarke, S.G., and A. V. Dicey; Sir Charles Russell, Q.C., and Pollard. SOLICITORS, The Solicitor for Inland Revenue; The City Solicitor.

LYON v. MORRIS; MUTUAL LOAN FUND ASSOCIATION, CLAIMANTS-C. A. No. 1, 17th May. PRACTICE-INTERPLEADER-APPEAL BY LEAVE FROM SUMMARY DECISIONR. S. C., 1883, LVII., 8, 11-COMMON LAW PROCEDURE ACT, 1860 (23❘ & 24 VICT. c. 126), s. 17-1 & 2 WILL. 4, c. 58, ss. 2, 4.

This was an appeal from a divisional court (Day and Wills, JJ.), and raised an important question as to the right to appeal from the summary decision of a judge in an interpleader issue. Certain goods, having been seized in execution, were claimed under a bill of sale. The only question being as to the validity of the bill of sale, Huddleston, B., in chambers, by consent of the parties under R. S. C., 1883, ord. 57, r. 8, decided the matter in a summary manner, holding the bill of sale valid, but he gave the execution creditor leave to appeal against his decision. The Divisional Court held that section 17 of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1860, being still in force, there was no right of appeal, and no power in the judge to give leave to appeal, but after hearing the case on its merits, they expressed a strong opinion against the validity of the bill of sale. The execution creditor appealed from this decision, and it was now argued that section 17 applied only to the procedure given by section 14 of the Common Law Procedure Act, and had no reference to the consensual summary jurisdiction of a judge in interpleader cases. On the other hand it was contended that the consensual jurisdiction was given by 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 58, which, by section 2, expressly forbade any appeal in such cases. The appellant, however, contended that the force of section 2 was limited by section 4, which gave a right of appeal from all decisions of a single judge.

THE COURT (FRY and LOPES, L.JJ.) dismissed the appeal. FRY, L.J., said the question was by no means free from difficulty, and ord. 57, r. 11, was not easy to construe satisfactorily. It began, however, " Except where otherwise provided by statute," and, therefore, although it contemplated the possibility of a judge giving leave to appeal from a summary decision, it did not intend to conflict with any existing statutes. The statute which gave a judge power to decide interpleader matters summarily by the consent of both parties was the 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 58, and that Act, by section 2, expressly enacted that such decision should be final and conclusive. It could not be said that that section took away the right of appeal, because no such right then existed at common law. Section 4 of the Act did not give any right of appeal in interpleader cases, it only gave the same right of appeal against orders under the statute as already existed at common law. It was true that 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 58 had been repealed by the Statute Law Revision Act, 1883, but it was clear, from the preamble to that Act, that it was only repealed because its subject-matter had been already dealt with by the Rules of the Supreme Court. Order 57, therefore, which replaced the statute, was not intended in any way to alter its subject-matter. But at the time the rules were drawn up the Common Law Procedure Act of 1860 was in existence, of which section 17 alone still remained in force. To say that that section only referred to the jurisdiction given by section 14 of that Act was to put too narrow a construction upon it. It referred to all summary decisions in interpleader issues, whether the jurisdiction was given by the Act of 1860 or by consent under the Act of 1831. The Legislature, by leaving section 17 alone intact, had shewn that they considered it applied to the whole summary jurisdiction. The section, therefore, was expressly excluded by rule 11 of order 57, and the judge had no power to give leave to appeal. LOPES, L.J., concurred.-COUNSEL, A. T. Lawrence, Cluer; Sidney Woolf. SOLICITORS, R. Frederick Hill & Co.; W. Beard.

THE COLONIAL BANK v. HEPWORTH-Chitty, J., 25th May. COMPANY-SHARE CERTIFICATES-NEGOTIABILITY-ESTOppel.

In this case it appeared that the defendant had employed P. W. Thomas & Co. as stockbrokers to purchase a number of shares of the New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Co., and paid them for the same. Thomas & Co. deposited with the plaintiffs the share certificates, and, afterwards being pressed by the defendant, obtained the certificates from the plaintiffs, and caused the defendant's name to be registered on the books of the company as owners of the shares, and the plaintiffs received back new certificates with the defendant's name thereon as registered holder. The certificates in use by the company bore on the face of them the name of the persons in whose name the particular shares were registered in the books of the company. On the back of each certificate was a blank form of transfer, and a blank power of attorney to execute a surrender and cancellation of the certificate, and to do all things requisite to transfer the shares represented thereby in the books of the company. The plaintiffs contended, amongst other things, that the certificates were negotiable by estoppel, and that the plaintiffs, as actual holders thereof, were entitled to be registered in place of the defendant, and the plaintiffs relied on Goodwin v. Robarts (24 W. R. 987, 1 App. Cas. 476). CHITTY, J., said that the case did not fall within Goodwin v. Robarts. In that case the instrument in question was simply scrip purporting, on the face of it, that the bearer would be entitled to receive the definitive bond from the foreign Government in exchange for the scrip. The scrip virtually represented that the paper would pass from hand to hand by delivery only. Each prior holder was deemed to have concurred

in that representation. In the present case there was no such representation. Estoppels could not be manufactured arbitrarily. No estoppel could be raised inconsistent with the terms of the document itself, and the only estoppel which could be rightly inferred in the case before him was that, where the transfers were duly signed by the registered holder of the shares, each prior holder conferred upon the bond fide holder for value of the certificates for the time being an authority to fill in the name of the transferee, and was estopped from denying such authority, and to that extent, and that extent only, was estopped from denying the title of such holder for the time being. By delivery an inchoate legal title passed, but a title by unregistered transfer was not equivalent to what was termed the legal estate in the shares. Such inchoate title of the plaintiffs had been defeated by the defendant's registration.-COUNSEL, Rigby, Q.C., Sir Arthur Watson, QC., and Butcher; Romer, Q.C., Finlay, Q.C., and Grosvenor Woods. SOLICITORS, Druces & Attlee; Dod & Longstaffe.

-1

Re TOOGOOD'S TRUSTS—Chitty, J., 21st May. R. S. C., 1883, XLVI., 12, 13-STOP ORDER-FUND EXCEEDING £1,000.

In this case an application was made by petition for a stop order of a fund exceeding £1,000, paid into court under the Trustee Relief Act, 1847. CHITTY, J., in making the order prayed for, without prejudice to the title of certain parties mentioned, said that, under R. S. C., XLVI., 12, 13, a petition, and not a summons, was the proper mode of applying for a stop order when the fund in court exceeded £1,000 and there had been no prior application in respect of the fund.-COUNSEL, Archibald Brown. SOLICITORS, G. P. Rogers, for Powell & Browett, Birmingham.

Re ORIENTAL BANK CORPORATION-Chitty, J., 20th May. PRACTICE-WINDING UP-ORDER IN CHAMBERS-SALE OF ASSETS BY PRIVATE CONTRACT-Alleged Undervalue.

In this case a motion was made by the New Oriental Bank Corporation to discharge or vary an order in chambers sanctioning a contract to sell the outstanding assets of the liquidating corporation to the Assets Realization Co. By the sale objected to an offer had been accepted by the liquidator on the part of the Assets Co. to pay to the creditors (who had not compromised) a sum sufficient to make up the final dividend to 19s. 9d. in the pound. The applicants offered at the bar to give 20s. in the pound, and to take as their remuneration a moiety of any remaining surplus and pay the other moiety to the shareholders.

CHITTY, J., after stating that the sale as sanctioned was the best thing in the then existing circumstances, said that he had inquired in chambers and had also asked counsel, but had found no precedent for setting aside a sale by private contract which had been sanctioned in chambers, when the ground of recalling the order was simply that a better offer was proposed. He agreed with Malins, V.C., who said, in Re Bartlett, Newman ▼. Hook (29 W. R. 279, 16 Ch. D. 561)), that to open biddings for such a reason (as was the practice in sales by public auction before 30 & 31 Vict. c. 48) was a most pernicious practice, unfair to purchasers and most prejudicial to vendors. The motion was dismissed, with costs.— COUNSEL, Romer, Q.C., and F. B. Palmer; Latham, Q.C., and T. H. Wright; Maclean, Q.C., and Vernon R. Smith. SOLICITORS, Hollams, Son, & Coward; Freshfields & Williams; Linklaters.

DICKSON v. MURRAY-Stirling, J., 19th May. FRAUD-VOIDABLE TRANSACTION-RIGHT TO FOLLOW MONEYS INTRUSTED TO

A SOLICITOR TO INVEST.

This was an adjourned summons for determining a question which arose in a creditor's administration action with regard to the right to follow trust moneys. The testator, who was a solicitor, had been intrusted by a Mr. Young with £11,500 to invest. He pretended to have invested the money upon four mortgage securities, and had delivered to Mr. Young what purported to be the mortgage deeds and the title deeds of the several properties. After the death of the testator it was discovered that three of the alleged mortgage securities were entirely fictitious. With regard to the fourth, there was a prior mortgage subsisting on the property comprised in it, and there had also been a prior assignment of the equity of redemption, but the property was in Middlesex, and neither the mortgage nor the assignment had been registered. Mr. Young, having registered his mortgage, acquired priority, and had commenced foreclosure proceedings, which had been compromised. There was, at the testator's death, money at his bank which could be earmarked as forming part of Mr. Young's £11,500. The question to be now determined was whether he was entitled to follow that money.

STIRLING, J., said that, according to the rule laid down in Clough v. London and North-Western Railway Co. (7 Ex. 26), a person defrauded had, subject to the rights of innocent third parties, a right to avoid the contract so long as he had done nothing to show an election to abide by it. With regard to the first three pretended mortgages, Mr. Young had done nothing to alter his position or affirm the transactions. As to them, therefore, he was entitled to follow his money into the testator's bank. The fourth mortgage, however, stood on a different footing. If Mr. Young had intended to repudiate that, he should have done so promptly. He had not done so, but had, on the contrary, taken steps to enforce it. That seemed to his lordship an election to affirm the transaction, and was inconsistent with an intention to disaffirm it. With regard to this, therefore, he was not now in a position to exercise the right of repudiation.COUNSEL, Pearson, Q.C., and J. Henderson; Hastings, Q.C., and Methold; Borthwick. SOLICITORS, Henderson & Buckle; Johnson & Masters, for J. B. Coaks, Norwich.

ROB v. ROB-Stirling, J., 20th May.

R. S. C., 1883, L., 1 (A.)-SPEEDY TRIAL OF ACTION. In this action the plaintiff claimed an injunction to restrain the defendant from entering upon certain lands at Skipton, in Yorkshire, and if necessary specific performance by him of an alleged agreement for a tenancy thereof contained in correspondence, and he now moved for an interim injunction in the terms of the writ. The only question in dispute was whether the correspondence constituted a complete contract or whether it was merely negotiation, and it was admitted that if there was a contract it was for a tenancy from year to year. No pleadings had yet

been delivered.

STIRLING, J., said that this was a case in which he was disposed to apply ord. 50, r. 1 (a.), and direct a speedy trial of the action. Counsel stated that such an order would be satisfactory to all parties, and his lordship accordingly directed that the trial should take place at the next York Assizes, and in the meanwhile granted the injunction.- COUNSEL, Methold; Warrington. SOLICITORS, Jackson, Morse, & Simpson, for Jackson & Jackson, Middlesborough; Bell, Brodrick, & Co., for Richardson, Thirsk.

COURTNEY v. COLE-Q. B. Div., 19th May. COMPULSORY PILOTAGE- TRADING TO NORTH OF EUROPE

SHIPPING ACT, 1854, s. 379.

MERCHANT

In this case the appellant, who was the master of the ship Cardiganshire, had been convicted by justices of unlawfully piloting his ship within the London district without having a pilotage certificate. The ship was one of a line of steamers which sail regularly from London to Japan, China, and the Straits Settlements, and back to London, and thence to Amsterdam and Hamburg and back to London. In April, 1886, she arrived in London with a cargo from the East, and, having discharged part of the cargo, she left London for Amsterdam with the rest of the cargo. When she was off Gravesend the informant, who was a duly licensed pilot, offered to take charge of the ship for the purpose of piloting her to the seaward limits of the London district. The appellant refused the offer, and continued to pilot the ship himself. The vessel proceeded to Amsterdam and Hamburg, and, after discharging her cargo, took in a fresh part cargo for the East, with which she returned to London, and then, after making her cargo complete, she proceeded on her next voyage to China and Japan. The question was whether, under the above circumstances, the ship was exempt from compulsory pilotage under section 379 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854. That section, in its 3rd sub-section, exempts all ships not carrying passengers and trading to Boulogne or to any place in Europe north of Boulogne. On behalf of the appellant it was argued that the ship was not less a ship trading to the north of Europe because she afterwards went to China and Japan. On behalf of the respondent it was argued that trading meant constantly trading, and here the vessel was a foreign-going ship, London being only her calling port; and reliance was laid on The Agricola, 2 W. Rob. Adm. 10, and The Sea Queen

B. & L. 359.

THE COURT (Lord COLERIDGE, C.J., and A. L. SMITH, J.) after taking time to consider their judgment, allowed the appeal. Lord COLERIDGE, C.J., said that it was obvious that the case was directly within the words of the exemption given by sub-section 3. It had, however, been argued that compulsory pilotage had been imposed by the Legislature solely for the benefit of ships themselves and the protection of human life, and that the section ought to be construed with reference to that principle. But he thought it was impossible to say, looking at all the exemptions, that they were designed solely with that purpose, and without any idea of favouring particular trades. For instance, the effect of sub-section 4 was that ships from Guernsey, Jersey, &c., laden with stone were exempt, but if laden with fruit they were not exempt. It was clear that there must have been an intention to favour the stone trade between those islands and England. | It was not necessary to decide whether the Legislature intended to favour trading between London and the north of Europe. It may have been so; but it was enough to say that this vessel was a ship trading between London and Amsterdam, a place in Europe north of Boulogne, and doing that habitually, though his lordship thought that it was not necessary that she should be habitually so trading. The case came within sub-section 3, and the vessel was exempt. A. L. SMITH, J., said that the question was whether the ship was trading to a port north of Boulogne within the meaning of sub-section 3. Dr. Lushington had decided that coasting in sub-section 1 meant continually coasting. But that decision did not govern sub-section 3, which meant what it said-viz., that a vessel, when it is trading to a port north of Boulogne, is exempt. - COUNSEL, Gainsford Bruce, Q.C., and James Fox; Bucknill, Q.C., and Aspinall. SOLICITORS, Parker, Garrett, & Parker; Sandilands, Humphry, & Co.

BANKRUPTCY CASES.

66

Ex parte THE OFFICIAL RECEIVER, Re REED, BOWEN, & CO.-
C. A. No. 1, 20th May.
APPEAL-LOCUS STANDI-OFFICIAL RECEIVER-APPLICATION FOR ADJUDICA-
TION OF BANKRUPTCY-BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1883, ss. 20, 104, 105, 109-
BANKRUPTCY RULES, 1886, R. 191.

The question in this case was whether the official receiver was entitled to appeal against the refusal of an application made by him, under section 20 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, for an adjudication of bankruptcy against a debtor against whom a receiving order has been made. In the present case a receiving order was made against the debtor, and the creditors accepted a scheme of arrangement. The registrar refused to approve the scheme, and his decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal

(17 Q. B. D. 244). The creditors resolved to accept a second scheme, which the registrar again refused to approve, his decision being again affirmed by the Court of Appeal on the 25th of March, 1887. The court refused to allow another meeting of the creditors to be summoned for the purpose of proposing a fresh scheme. On the 29th of April the official receiver applied to the registrar for an adjudication of bankruptcy against the debtors. At the request of the debtors and some of the creditors the registrar adjourned the hearing of the application to the 1st of July. The official receiver appealed, and on the hearing of the appeal the respondents objected that the official receiver had no locus standi, that he of section 104. 'person aggrieved" by the registrar's order within the meaning

was not a

66

THE COURT OF APPEAL (Lord ESHER, M.R., and FRY and LOPES, L.JJ.) held (FRY, L.J., dissenting) that in such a case the official receiver was entitled to appeal. Lord ESHER, M.R., said the order which the registrar was asked to make was one which, if the facts alleged were made out, he was bound judicially to make, unless he was entitled for "sufficient reason" to adjourn the hearing. Section 20 provided that "the court shall" (not may) adjudge the debtor bankrupt if certain circumstances were proved. If no "sufficient reason" to the contrary were proved, the registrar would do a legal wrong in his judicial office if, on those circumstances being proved, he did not adjudge the debtors forthwith bankrupt. The official receiver had alleged that the scheme had not been approved within fourteen days, and had asked the registrar forthwith to adjudge the debtors bankrupt. If he proved that that was so, and that there was no sufficient reason for adjourning the hearing, the registrar was bound forthwith to adjudicate the debtors bankrupt. Under rule 191 the official receiver was a party who was bound to ask the court for a judicial decision on a matter of fact which might be in contest. It was his duty to produce evidence and to argue on the effect of that evidence. That placed him in exactly the same position as a litigant, and the question was whether he was entitled to appeal as a "person aggrieved" by the refusal of his application. In Ex parte Sidebotham (14 Ch. D. 458) James, L.J., said (p. 465): "A person aggrieved' must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something, or wrongfully refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to something." That might not be an exhaustive definition, but, at any rate, it would include a person like the official receiver in this case, who had been wrongfully refused a decision for which he had a right to ask. And in the same case Bramwell, L.J., said, "Certainly the general rule is that an appeal must be by the party who has endeavoured to maintain the contrary of that which has taken place." That also included the present case. FRY, L.J., regretted that he differed from the Master of the Rolls. The official receiver was not a litigant, but was acting as an officer of the court whose duty it was to bring facts to the knowledge of the court, and, when he had done so, he had discharged the whole of the duty cast on him as a public servant; he was functus officio, and had no further duty to perform, and, whether his application succeeded or failed, he had no further concern in the matter. He was not in any sense a "person aggrieved" by the refusal of his appliction, for the decision was not any more a decision against him than against any other member of the public. He suffered no legal grievance if the registrar had given a wrong deci sion. He was deprived of nothing and he was refused nothing by that decision, and, therefore, he could not appeal. In his lordship's opinion this view was consistent with the definition given by James, L J., in Ex parte Sidebotham. And Bramwell, L.J., only mentioned a condition sine qua non to an appeal; he did not say that everyone who had "maintained the contrary" had a right to appeal. LOPES, L.J., agreed with the Master of the Rolls.

The appeal was then heard on its merits, and in the result T COURT reversed the decision of the registrar, and made an immediate adjudication against the debtors.-COUNSEL, Sir R. Webster, A.G., Sir E. Clarke, S.G., and Muir Mackenzie; Finlay, Q.C., and Sidney Woolf; Herbert Reed; Wilkinson. SOLICITORS, Solicitor to the Board of Trade; Foss & Ledsam; G. S. § H. Brandon; Cuddon & Co.

Ex parte TODD, Re ASHCROFT-C. A. No. 1, 20th May. BANKRUPTCY-AVOIDANCE OF VOLUNTARY SETTLEMENTS-RETROSPECTIVE EFFECT OF ACT-"TRANSFER OF PROPERTY "-BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1883, ss. 47, 168-BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1869, s. 91.

Section 47 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, provides, by sub-section 1, that any voluntary settlement (not being a settlement made on or for the wife or children of the settlor of property which has accrued to him after marriage in right of his wife) "Shall, if the settlor becomes bankrupt within two years after the date of the settlement, be void as against the trustee in the bankruptcy, and shall, if the settlor becomes bankrupt at any subsequent time within ten years after the date of the settlement, be void against the trustee in the bankruptcy, unless the parties claiming the settlement able to pay all his debts without the aid of the property under the settlement can prove that the settlor was at the time of making comprised in the settlement, and that the interest of the settlor in such property had passed to the trustee of such settlement on the execution thereof." And, by sub-section 3, "Settlement' shall, for the purposes of this section, include any conveyance or transfer of property." Section 91 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, was identical with sub-section 1, except that it was confined to traders, and that it did not contain the words which are above placed in italics. Section 169 of the Act of 1883 repeals the Act of 1869 in toto, but provides that the repeal shall not affect (inter alia) “any liability or disqualification incurred under the repealed Act." In the present case a trader in April, 1877, executed a voluntary deed, to which his wife was a party, by which, after a recital that he was absolutely

LAW STUDENTS' JOURNAL.

INCORPORATED LAW SOCIETY.

PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION.

The following candidates (whose names are in alphabetical order) were successful at the preliminary examination held on the 4th and 5th days of May, 1887.

FIRST CLASS.

[In order of merit.]

Frank Augustus Padmore, who served his clerkship with Mr. Thomas Southall, of Worcester; and Messrs. Church, Rendell, & Co., of London. Alfred Bassett Starbuck Welch, who served his clerkship with Mr. Robert Hall, of Lancaster.

Christopher John Parker, who served his clerkship with Mr. Richard Stephens Jackson, of London.

William George, who served his clerkship with Mr. Randal Casson, of the firm of Messrs. Breese, Jones, & Casson, of Portmadoc.

Frederick George Neave, who served his clerkship with Mr. Arthur Augustus Padley, of Market Rasen.

William Irons, who served his clerkship with Mr. Dossey Wightman, of Sheffield; and Messrs. Jaques & Co., of London.

Dixon Henry Davies, who served his clerkship with Mr. Fred. Horatio Barr, of the firm of Messrs. Nelson, Barr, and Nelson, of Leeds and

London.

John Henry Hutchings, who served his clerkship with Mr. William Smith, of Dartmouth.

Frank Heron Wilson, who served his clerkship with Messrs. Griffith & Lamb, of Cardiff; and Torr, Janeways, & Gribble, of London.

SECOND CLASS.

[In alphabetical order.]

Godfrey Hale Boyce, who served his clerkship with Mr. Matthias Boyce, of London.

Thomas Hart, who served his clerkship with Mr. Francis Summers, of Hull; and Mr. John Thomas Cotton, of London.

Francis Robert Nott, who served his clerkship with Mr. Frederick Sortaine Hancock, of Devizes; and Henry Archibald Dowse, of London. THIRD CLASS.

William Luscombe Munday, who served his clerkship with Messrs. Gush, Phillips, Walters, & Williams, of London.

The Council of the Incorporated Law Society have accordingly given class certificates and awarded the following prizes of books:

To Mr. Padmore-prize of the Honourable Society of Clement's-innvalue 10 guineas; and the Daniel Reardon prize-value about 25 guineas.

To Mr. Welch-prize of the Honourable Society of Clifford's-inn-value 10 guineas.

To Mr. Parker-prize of the Honourable Society of New-inn-value 5 guineas.

To Mr. George-prize of the Incorporated Law Society-value 5 guineas.

To Mr. Neave-prize of the Incorporated Law Society-value 5 guineas.

To Mr. Irons-prize of the Incorporated Law Society-value 5 guineas. To Mr. Davies-prize of the Incorporated Law Society-value 5 guineas.

To Mr. Hutchings-prize of the Incorporated Law Society-value 5 guineas.

To Mr. Wilson-prize of the Incorporated Law Society-value 5 guineas.

The council have given class certificates to the candidates in the second and third classes.

The number of candidates who attended the examination was 37.

LEGAL NEWS.

OBITUARY.

Mr. GEORGE ALDEN STEVENS, solicitor (of the firm of Miller, Stevens, & Son), of Norwich, died on the 14th inst. Mr. Stevens was born in 1831. He was admitted a solicitor in 1870, and he had ever since practised at Norwich. He had an extensive practice in the city and neighbourhood, and he was at the time of his death associated in partnership with Mr. Henry Blake Miller, the town clerk of Norwich, and with his son, Mr. William George Stevens. He was buried on the 19th inst. Mr. Stevens was for many years a member of the Norwich Town Council, and he was an alderman at the time of his death. The town council have passed a vote of condolence with his family, and the mayor and many members of the corporation were present at the funeral.

Mr. THEODORE BRYETT, solicitor (of the firm of Bryett & Hare), of Totnes, died on the 19th inst., at the age of seventy-seven. Mr. Bryett was born in 1810. He was admitted a solicitor in 1840, and he had since conducted a large practice at Norwich. He had been for thirty-five years registrar of the Totnes County Court (Circuit No. 58), and he was district registrar under the Judicature Acts. Mr. Bryett was in partnership with Mr. Frederick Trelawney Hare, who is clerk to the Totnes Burial Board and clerk to the county magistrates.

APPOINTMENTS.

Mr. JOHN ROGERS JENNINGS, Solicitor, of 7, Great Winchester-street, received the honour of knighthood on the 14th inst. at the opening by the solicitor in 1845. He is a member of the Court of Assistants of the Queen of the People's Palace, Mile End. Sir J. Jennings was admitted a Drapers' Co., and is master of the company for the current year.

Mr. WILLIAM BRANDFORD GRIFFITH, barrister, C.M.G., has been created a Knight Comnder of the Order of St. Michael and St. George. Sir W. Griffith was called to the bar at the Middle Temple in June, 1881. He has been for several years Governor of the Gold Coast Colony, and he was created a Companion of the Order of St. Michael and St. George in 1879.

cuting Counsel to the Mint at the Central Criminal Court. Mr. Wilkinson Mr. ROBERT WILKINSON, barrister, has been appointed Junior Prosemember of the South-Eastern Circuit. was called to the bar at Lincoln's-inn in Easter Term, 1864. He is a

for the Island of Cyprus. Mr. Justice Smith was called to the bar at the Mr. ARTHUR SNICE SMITH, barrister, has been appointed a Puisne Judge Middle Temple in January, 1881. He has been for some time acting as

Solicitor-General of British Guiana.

Mr. RICHARD EDMUND HILARY FISHER, solicitor, of 1, New-court, Careystreet, and of Harrow, has been appointed Clerk to the Harrow Local

Board. Mr. Fisher was admitted a solicitor in 1880.