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advantage of facilitating recourse would induce every transferee of papers to register, and when once the register became known, searches would be almost as plentiful as at Somerset House.

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Snvansi. QUESTIONS were raised in the discussion on the legality of Father Kai.I.i;ii’s imprisonment, but the real ground upon which the Court of Appeal in Dublin based its decision does not seem to have received much notice in the English accounts of the trial. It appeared very clearly that the committal was no_t in any way for contempt of court, and so the general jurisdiction with regard to contempt did not require to be considered. But by the Irish Bankruptcy Act of 1857 (20 8: 21 Vict. c. 60) power is given to the court to enforce answers to lawful questions by imprisonment, and it was under this statutory power that Judge Born proceeded. By section 385 it is enacted, inter alia, that if any person shall refuse to answer any lawful question put by the court, it shall be lawful for the court to commit such person to prison until he shall be willing to make full answers as required. Section 386 provides that the question need not be specified or set forth in the warrant, but it is suflicient to refer therein to the deposition remaining on the file of the proceedings, provided that the question in respect of which the warrant is made out is specified in the deposition so remaining on the file. From these sections it is clear that, in any case where the legality of the warrant is called in question, the actual deposition becomes of the greatest importance. This it is which shews the question out of which the trouble has arisen; and from the general tenor of this it will be possible to shew \\ hether the question is so irrelevant to the proceedings as not to be a lawful one. Hence it becomes of importance, too, that the deposition should be an exact record of the witness's answers. But in Father KnLLan’s case it appeared, as the Master of the Itolls remarked, that the deposition was neither taken by a sworn olficer nor certified by the judge to be correct, nor—and this was the most important of a.ll—-completed by the witness’s signature, which was essential to give validity to the document. Every facility ought to be given to enable the witness to explain or correct what he had said, and until he had deliberately signed the deposition, or refused to do so—in which case, of course, different considerations applied--it was impossible to make out a warrant under the statutory power of the Bankruptcy Act.


In THE ABOVE cssa the court seems to have passed over the chief arguments put forward by counsel, and to have decided upon a point which had received little consideration at the bar. It will hardly be so in the case of Mr. BELL-COX, who also has just been discharged from his imprisonment. The formal judgment of the court has not yet been given, but it is unlikely that any stronger reasons will be found for it than those advanced by his counsel. It seems to be clearly established that the writ dc contumace capiendo is only designed to enforce obedience to an order, and not to punish the delinquent for past acts of disobedience. So it was laid down by Lord DENMAN, C..T., in The Queen v. Th0r0_q00zl (12 Ad. & E1. 196). So soon then as it becomes, for any reason, unnecessary or impossible to enforce obedience, the object of the writ fails, and the imprisonment ought to come an end. This is illustrated by the cases of Hudson v. Tooth (2 P. D. 125) and Dean v. Green (8 P. D. 79). In Mr. Too'rn’s case possession of the church was obtained during his imprisonment by a clergyman authorized by the bishop, and Divine service was performed in a lawful manner. With this arrangement it was assumed he would not interfere, and hence, as no further disobedience was apprehended his release was ordered. In Mr. GaEniv’s case, while he was still iii prison, his living became vacant under the Public Worship Regulation Act, the inhibition having remained in force more than three years. In these circumstances it was held that the inhibition had come to an end, being swallowed up in the larger punishment of deprivation. Hence, as there was no longer any question of obedience to it, the imprisonment ought to come to an end equally The case of Mr. BELT.-COX is very similar to this, He wag imprisoned for disobeying an order suspending him for six monthg from officiating in his church. The six months have now elapsed the order is, therefore, at an end, and on the authority of the abovd cases it is clear that the imprisonment must end also.


Tun runes to be read at the forthcoming meeting of the Incorporated Law Society promise to be of unusual interest. The President will contribute an important paper on the extension of the functions of the society, and the Land Transfer Bill will be dealt with by Mr. JOHN Human, whose paper on that subject at the Liverpool Meeting in 1885 will be remembered as a very able contribution to the literature of the subject. Mr. Aniinm: SAUNDERS is also to discuss the question of land transfer. Mr. F. K. Mouton will contribute some practical suggestions as to the sittings of the Law Courts; and Mr. F. E. Sawrna, of Brighton, an accomplished antiquarian scholar, will propose the preparation by the society of a history of attorneys and solicitors. Mr. F. D. Lowxnns, of Liverpool, will deal with the question whether a successful litigant ought to be recouped by his opponent all his reasonable professional expenditure in obtaining or defending his rights. Among other papers of interest we observe one by Mr. BERNARD Wsxs, of Sheffield, on Newboulrl v. Smith (34 W. R. 690, 33 Ch. D. 127), with regard to which we may perhaps deviate so far from our usual practice as to say that the article on the subject which appeared in our columns (ante, p. 2'28) should not be overlooked, representing as it did professional opinions of great weight.

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Iiv the debate in the House of Lords on the second reading of the
Land Transfer Bill, Lord Selborne called attention to the question
of registered charges for future advances, and pointed out that
clause 20 (clause 27 in the Amended Bill) was intended to over-
rule their lordships’ decision in Hopkinson v. Rolt (9 H. L. C.
524). The matter is one which, as is well known, chiefly affects
bankers, and it is noteworthy that it has been quite recently dis-
cussed in the Scotch case of Union Bank qf Scotland v. National
.B¢mlcq'Scotlaml(l2 App. Cas. 53). The result was to uphold
emphatically the rule in Hop/cinson v. Rolf, and Lord Halsbury,
C., commented upon the obtaining of further advances from the
National Bank after notice of a second mortgage to the Union
Bank in the following terms : “ It seems to me that such a pro-
ceediug is contrary to good faith, and the decision of your lord-
ship’s House in Hop/einaon v. Roll establishes the principle, and
establishes it upon the broadest grounds of natural justice.”
Nevertheless, it is now proposed to upset the principle so far as
regards registered charges, and this is to be done, as Lord
Selborne informs us, for the convenience of bankers.
The clause in question (in its amended form) is as follows :—

“Where a registered charge oi a specified sum is expressed to be created on any land for the purpose of securing (whether with or without present advances) future advances to an amount not exceeding that sum, the registered proprietor of the charge shall be entitled in priority to any subsequent charge or transfer to the payment of any sum due to him in respect of advances up to the full amount of the specified sum, notwithstanding that some of such future advances have been advanced after the date and with notice of the subsequent charge or transfer.”

The apparent discrepancy between this provision and the reasons which have hitherto decided the law seem to make it worth while to attempt a brief examination of the subject. The rule in Hoplcinson v. Roll was not established without considerable discussion. In the judgment appealed against Lord Chelmsford had stated the matter as follows :—“ A prior mortgage for present and future advances; a subsequent mortgage of the same description; each mortgagee has notice of the other’s deeds; advances are made by the prior mortgagee after the date of the subsequent mortgage with full knowledge of it; is the prior mortgagee entitled to priority for these advances over the antecedent advances made by the subsequent mortgagee?” In answering this question the great diificulty was to get over the old case of Gordan v. Graham (2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 598, pl. 16). There Lord Cowper, C., is reported to have said:—“The second mortgagee shall not redeem the first mortgage without paying as well the mone lent after as that lent before the econd mortgage was made; fldr it was the folly of the second mortgagee with notice to take such security.” But this decision had been much doubted. First mortgngees were advised not to act upon it for fear the court should impute fraud to them rather than folly to the second mortgagee, and it was shaken by the remarks of Lord St. Leonards in Blunden v. Desart (2 Dr. & W. 405) and Show v. Neale (6 H. L. C. 581). In the case in question Lord Cranworth, indeed, chose to be guided by it; but, after a minute examination of the records, Lord Campbell, 0-» decided that it must have been wrongly reported, and both he and Lord Chelmsford held that it must in any case be overruled. They were much influenced by the reason urged in Fisher on Mortgages (lst ed. 363; 4th ed. 570), that it is contrary to the 88l18r_81 principles of equity that a mortgagee should, by taking a security for advances which may never be made, put a pressure "P°!1 the mortgagor by taking away his power of raising money from other persons ; the first mortgagee being never bound by such B clause to make further advances at the mortgagor’8 pleasureAnd it was pointed out that the hardship upon the banker at once Vanished upon considering that the security of the first mortgage could not be impaired without notice of the second. It is imporhint to remark that the law as thus established applies when each Pflfty has notice of the other’s security, and, indeed, requires that H115 Bhvuld be the case. Registration, however, is merely a safer “id m9_Ie general way of giving notice, and the mere fact that a °.h*"8° 15 {Bgistered does not seem to introduce any new considerahon to weigh against those upon which the present rule is founded.

But» I-B_ We have already remarked, it has quite recently received we‘ P89-111 the highest judicial confirmation, and was made to Ovcrride the technical difiiculties of Scotch law which had deter


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mined the judgment of the Scotch judges. In the case above referred to a good deal depended upon the peculiar nature of the mortgages in question, which were by way of absolute disposition, accompanied by a back bond—i.e., a condition of re-conveyance upon payment of the sum (in this case) at any time due from the disponor to the disponee. At first sight this seems exactly like an English mortgage, but there is a distinction. The Scotch law recognizes heritable securities which are properly charges l1pOI1 the land, and which do not divest the owner of his title. But the security in question is one of recent introduction, devised in order to evade the law, and it is apparently treated very much as an English mortgage was before equity interfered. Hence a majority of the judges held that the first bank, having the absolute property in the land, had a right to retain it as security for all sums at any time owing by the mortgagor, and that the second bank could only take the same personal right which the mortgagor had—viz., the right to a re-conveyance upon payment of all moneys owing by the mortgagor at the time of demand. This was the opinion of eight judges, and it is to be noticed that they distinctly refused to be guided by Hopkinson v. Rolt, on the ground of the fundamental difference between securities of this kind and the ordinary English mortgage. But there was an important minority. It was held by five udges that the security, whatever it might be in form, was in reality a charge only, and that the mortgagor retained a valuable interest in the land, which could be charged in favour of a second mortgagee, and that after notice of such second charge the first mortgagee would make any further advances at his own risk. They held the principle of Hopi.-inaovn v. Roll to be as applicable to Scotch law as to English, and in addition to the considerations which we have already noticed, a new and very striking one was adduced by Lord Shand, which seems so apposite as to merit quotation (p. 83) :—

“Suppose that after a certain amount had been advanced by the National Bank [the first mortgagee], a creditor cf Mrs. McArthur [the mortgagor] had by diligence attached her reversionary right in the property or its proceeds; could that bank possibly, in disregard of the diligence, have gone on voluntarily to make advances to Mrs. McArtl1ur, or on her account, which would afiect, and even sweep away, the reversion, and so defeat the diligence; and could it really be said that they had such a right in order that they might earn banker's profits under their agreement with Mrs. l\IcArthur? . . . . It seems to me too clear for argument that a creditor's diligence could not be so defeated.”

When this case came before the House -of Lords it was, as we have already stated, decided against the bank which was the first mortgagee, on the principle of Hopkinson v. Roll, and in two of the judgments that principle was stated to be founded upon natural justice. We seeiu to have here an instance of judge-made and judge-confirmed law which has been the subject of _no ordinary consideration. When such law is overruled by the Legislature it is usually on the ground that the judges have felt themselves bound to follow time-honoured precedents with which they did not themselves agree. But in this case special pains had been already taken to overrule the time-honoured precedent, and a modern rule had been settled with general approval. _Possi_bly the convenience of bankers may be entitled to great consideration, but we may at least expect eminent legislators to consider also the principles of law which they have themselves, in their judicial capacity, so recently approved.

On the point of registration it may be well to refer 150 the 01159 of Brazlford Banking Co. v. Briggs (12 App. Cas. 29). There the first charge was, in fact, registered, _for it was created by the articles of association of a company registered under the Companies Act, 1862. It was to be “ a first and permanent lien and charge, available at law and in equity, upon every share for all debts due from the holder thereof.” Yet, when the share Was Elven as security to a bank, with notice of the transaction to the company. it was held that the principle of Hopkipson v. Roll applied, and that, in-spite of the articles of association, the company had 110 claim in priority to the bank for debts contracted after such

notice. _ _ h t

In the interest of legal consistency it seems proper $0 urge t " the clause of the Land Transfer Bill in question should not become law without full consideration.

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THE Land Transfer Bill, as presented in amended form to the Committee of the House of Lords on the 17th _inst_.,_is a very different and much more complete document than it originally was. It has been partly re-arranged, many minor gaps and omissions have been filled up, even mere verbal improvements have n0t_ been considered unworthy of insertion, and some solid alterations in its substantive provisions have also been made. By these means the Bill has been considerably lengthened; it now consists of sixtynine clauses, instead of fifty-seven, and covers thirty-four pages, instead of twenty-six.

As an instance of re-arrangement, we notice that the old clause 6, vesting land in personal representatives on death, which had been placed in “Part II., Compulsory Registration,” in the original Bill, now appears, considerably filled out with needful detail, under its proper title in “ Part IV., Amendments of Law of Real Property ” (new clause 38). Some of the excisions for the purpose of these re-arrangements are a little alarming at first sight, until the omitted portions are seen to re-appear elsewhere, or to be otherwise provided for—for instance, the (old) clause 9 (3), requiring the applicants for confirmation of boundaries to pay the reasonable costs of objectors—a.n obviously proper rule, though one likely to diminish the numbers of such applications -—is struck out in the amendments. Its place is really supplied, however, by (old) clause 29 (9).

We do not propose to lay before our readers an exact summary of the amendments. We would do something less, and, we hope, something more, than that. The amendments are so numerous, and, in many instances, so minute, that it would be impossible to mention them all, or nearly all, short of a reprint of the Bill, and, unless some commentary were added, nothing would be gained when it was done ; while to add a discussion to such a work would occupy more space than we can devote to the subject. We propose to review the points (which are not many) in which the three leading novel features of the Bill with regard to land transfer proper—namely, compulsion, confir-motions, and insurance-—are modified by the amendments; then to note its further effects on registration generally and on the law of real property, and finally to offer observations on portions of it which seem to afiect solicitors in particular.

(l) UompuZsion.—~A correspondent had already pointed out to us, that the language of the first paragraph of clause 2 of the original Bill, providing that after a certain date “land transfer ” was to be compulsory, and that thenceforth it should be the duty pf “every person” before selling, &c., to be registered, seem to imply a more permanent kind of compulsion than we, in our notice (ante, p,_3_75 ), had deduced from the words of the Bill. In our original view we had relied principally on the opening words of sub-clauses (rr.) and (6.), “until a proprietor,” &c., coupled with the fact that section 49 of the Act of 1875 (allowing the legal estate to pass by unregistered deed) remained unrepealed —provisions which are hardly consistent with a vcry strict interprctatpon of the early part of clause 2. Now, however, the intention of the Legislature is to be made plainer; (new) clause 9 provides that :—

i1Nothing in section forty-nine or any other part of the principal Act s a l enable any legal estate or interest _in any registered land or charge to be conferred otherwise than by a registered disposition."

Beyond declaring the mind of the Legislature, however, this addition does not much alter the case, for the following reasons: Under the provisions of the principal Act referred to, an unregistered purchaser got the legal estate, obtained power to protect himself by cautions, &c., and, on the other hand, was liable to be ousted by a subsequent registered disposition; under the present P1V15}°!} he W111 only get an equitable estate, but this, while it lasts, is just as good as a legal estate. He will still have power to PT°tt hlmselt by °‘*‘1tl°l1, and as to being ousted by destruction °f 1115 estate» 1115 elmllcefi Of that are no more and no less than if clause 9 had not been inserted, because though he has no le al estate, no one else can have one either eiccpt b bein re isterged —inher wordsby ex”'°flY the Hallie means is sufgcedgbefore

under the old rule of section 49 of the Act of 1875 to oust
1 ,


even the owner of the legal estate. Among the disabilities in clause 2 (rr.), attending neglect to register, “taking any benefit from the land" was originally included. The precise efiect which these words would have had was not very clear; they have now been removed. In other respects the list of penalties remains unaltered; we discussed their effect, ante, p. 375 (11.). A proviso is now added to the clause, exonerating the grantor from the duty of registering previously to sales (rr.) under the Lands Clauses Acts, (6.) in execution of judgments and processes, (c.) by mortgagees alone—and in other cases where the grantor is not a party to the conveyance. In cases (a.) and (b.) the board is directed to register the new proprietor in manner to be prescribed by rules, and subject to an appeal to the court by persons aggrieved (new clause 7).

Under the heading “Compulsory Registration ” there are also included provisions as to the classes of persons entitled to apply for first registration, also as to the registration of settled land, and for new registrations on defeasances. On these we observe that the amended clause 5 provides that tenants for life shall be registered as proprietors, with an appropriate addition-not the trustees, as before provided— the trustees of the settlement being also entered under an appropriate heading. The present registry practice in these cases seems a good one, and will possibly be continued under this enactment——it is, to register the tenant for life as proprietor simply, and to place “a restriction” on all dealings, requiring that the purchase-money be paid to the trustees (naming them). The same clause provides that the trustees shall cause the new proprietor to be registered when the tenant for life dies; it does not appear from what source the necessary funds are to be provided in cases where (as often happens) “the trustees” have no property vested in them. The new clause 5 (6) also enables land already settled to be registered without the express appointment of trustees of the settlement, which would probably have been necessary as the Bill originally stood.

2. C’onfirmat1lon.—The alterations and improvements in these sections are very numerous, but only one or two of thein make any inroad upon the general policy of the Bill. An application for confirmation can be carried on (under new clause 13 ((5)) by any successor in title of the original applicant, not only (as in $118 old clause 10 (6)) in cases of death. Unborn persons are (new clause 15 (2)) added to the list of incapacitated persons on whose behalf petitions against confirmations may be presented; and married women are removed from it. Power is also given to!‘-l}6 board to confirm titles, subject. to qualifications, which doubtless be useful (now clause 16). Confirmation of boundaries by consent of neighbours is extended to all cases, instead of being confined (as by old clause 14 (2)) to the case where the a¢l]0i11-1118 neighbour was also registered.

Under new clause 19, however, a really most important alteration is introduced. It will be remembered that section 21 of the Land Transfer Act of 1875 runs as follows :—“ A title_to any lfllld adverse to, or in derogation of the title of, the registered PT?‘ prietor, shall not be acquired by any length of possession.’ T1115 rule has been the subject of much criticism, and has been _shewn i0 be both inexpedient and iinjust——inexpedient, because it ifltelfergs with the very convenient practice of informally a<l]i15t111E b°“nh' aries; unjust, as helping the “dormient” at the expense Of '5 S “vigilant” owner. To remedy these defects, the new clause )1 enables the board, subject to an appeal to the court, to rectiiY 131° registered description of the property in all cases where h° registered owner has lost possession, and would not, under t e ordinary law, be entitled to recover it. _

3. Insm'ance.—Thcre are several points of interest iii 00111193‘ tion with the insurance system, on nearly all of which the M11911 ments have some bearing. The occasions of payment Of {"!“"‘“l€h fees remain the same as before—namely, on regist!‘I1l51°n wl B absolute or qualified (but not possessory) title, or on confirma_t€°ia of title, and on every subsequent dealing for value, save that llue now provided (schedule 1 (B) end) that, where a transfer for 2 or occurs within three months of first registration with abB_0l11 The qualified title, or confirmation, no insurance fee shall be P3d'b we amendments (new clause 20 (1)) appear to require that, ine claiming compensation out of the fund, the claimarit must mm attacked “ the person liable to pay the same ”—that is, the ed (if any) owing to whose forgery or fraud the error v°111P‘“”

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May‘28, 1887. THE SOLICITORS’ JOURNAL.‘ 491


of was made. This is the rule under the Torrens’ system, but its expediency is more than doubtful, and, if the new provision stood alone, it would probably not be altogether satisfactory to claimants, as it would involve them in the risks of a preliminary action, against a very unsatisfactory defendant usually, before approaching the fund. But schedule 1 (L) gives the board power to “award compensation out of the insurance fund in the first instance, and to determine whether a right to compensation from the insurance fund has arisen.” This power, if we interpret it rightly, will enable applications to be made direct to the board, who, it would appear, must have large powers of admitting claims. It would seem desirable, however, that, on so important a point, the language of the enactment should be made a little clearer.

On another point which was slightly ambiguous in the original Bill, the amendments introduce a satisfactory clearness. Under the old clause 16 and schedule 1 (A.), which provided that persons “deprived of registered land ” by registry errors might apply for its restoration in specie, it was not quite clear whether, if an erroroccurred on afirst registration, the true owner would have come within the definition “deprived of registered land ” ; and if he did not, it seemed as if in those cases he would be forced to content himself with money compensation out of the fund. The new clause 21 (1) and schedule 1 (A.) (2) have been framed so as to give to such persons, in common with persons deprived of land by mistakes in subsequent registered dealings, the same right to apply for restoration as was undoubtedly given to registered proprietors.

The Lord Chancellor (schedule 1 (J ), with the approval of the Treasury, may from time to time apply the insurance fund to any matters of which notice may be entered on the register under section 18 of the Land Transfer Act—for instance, rights of way, rights of common, easements, rights to mines and minerals, succession duty, land tax, and short leases incapable of registration, &c.—or which may be entered in subsidiary registers under the present enactment.

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FROM the earliest period in legal history until a comparatively recent date the duty of inquiring into the fitness and capacity of solicitors 'e§tQd With the judges. In them was also vested the power of admitting solicitors and removing from the roll such of them as were deemed to be unfit to practise.

A8 Bfirly as the year 1292 Edward I., with the sanction of Parlian}9"ti issued a commission, which was addressed to the Chief Justice 1*} the Court of_ Common Pleas, John de Mettingham, authorizing

"11. 111 C0_D]lll10lIl0l1 with the other judges, to look out for, provide, and ?PDQint from every county a certain number of attorneys to gmfltlse in the courts, and a certain number of pupils to study the tgl1211;Ol1 law and secure its continuance. The commission suggested W; ‘J0 ""50mey_s might suffice for the purpose in view, but power t,JeirB’F{1!1t9d t0_ increase or diminish the number, as the justices in um (zlfldom might see fit; and it was declared that the persons to be b § W811, and _those only, should attend the courts and conduct the

llfipess of the king’s subjects therein. the _ 9 (Elly persons spoken of as constituting the legal profession are and J81? dfies to whom the commission was addressed and the attorneys true uuatents who were the subjecls of it. N 0 bar is mentioned. It is and co filtlhere were serjeants m those days, but they were very few, speak 31 ed themselves to one tribimal. In the time of which we it seem fimduty of advocate was performed by the attorneys, and termedfl 1 . for some centuries after the profession had what may be howeve9831 Offgln that attorneys were also the advocates. When, ,uncti°;'. We arrived at a comparative state of civilization, these existent; were severed, and what we now call the bar came into menfioneh thverl’ shortly after the issuing of the commission 1°03, ted _ th e attorneys and apprentices chosen by the justices were be seenlllth c Inns of_Chancery. From what we have stated it will intmsted HI:-:13 too the jigdfes, tlie_ Crown, and the Legislatiirp was superior eoump wer 0 etermiuing who were fit to practise m the Pagvuznjlilt l10t weary our readers with an account of the Acts of Rules of Cl about _seventy in number, which were passed, and the admission sf“-1'ttWl1lCl1 were made for regulating the examination and the judges tbst°"1°Y5; Blidice it to say that down to the year 1836 As in as remselves exercised these powers. egards exammation, the judges do not appear to have


uired much of the applicants for admission, and the want of any proper test of legal knowledge was, no doubt, one of the principal reasons which influenced the public against allowing to the profession its proper rank and influence. The Law Society was instituted in 1825. In 1833 it established a course of lectures for law students, and in 1836 it induced the judges to order that all persons seeking to become solicitors should, before admission, pass an examination in legal knowledge. In 1843 the Solicitors Act (6 & 7 Vict. c. 73) was passed, under which the Law Society was appointed the registrar of attorneys and solicitors, and since that time—i.n fact, since 1836—they have conducted the examinations, until 1877 nominally under the supervision of the judges. In 1877 the power of making rules for, and conducting the examinations, previously vested in the judges, was transferred to the Incorporated Law Society, which has since that date performed the duty in a very satisfactory manner, and great praise is due to those members of the council (all of them busy men) who, without fee or reward, act as examiners.

At present there are two oflices where practically the same functions are performcd—viz., the Law Society and the Petty Bag Oifice. For instance, all articles of clerkship have to be enrolled at the Petty Bag Oflice, and they have afterwards to be registered at the Law Society. If an articled clerk requires an order for any purpose, he must take out a summons at the Petty Bag Oflice, and a copy of this summons, together with a copy of the affidavit on which the application is based, must be left at the Law Society. A roll of solicitors is kept at the Petty Bag Oflice, and another at the Law Society. The latter shows who are entitled to practise, but the former does not, and is, therefore, of no practical utility.

We would suggest that the Petty Bag Ofiice, which only exists for the purposes mentioned and other minor matters of a kindred character, should be abolished, and that the powers now vested in that ofiice should be transferred to the Law Society, due provision being, of course, made for the protection of vested interests, but, as to this, it is believed that there would be no practical ditficulty. Under the Judicature Oflicers Act, 1879 (42 & 43 Vict. c. 78), s. 14, the Petty Bag Olfice will be abolished on the next vacancy, but there seems to be no sufiicient reason why this contingency should be waited for.

Another uggestion which has been made, and deserves consideration, is that all solicitors should be compelled by statute to be members of the Law Society. At resent only about 5,000 out of the 13,000 who take out their certificates annually belong to the Law Society, and the consequence is that the society has a limited jurisdiction over its own members, but noiie over the remainder. Barristers are subject to the jurisdiction of the Inn of Courts to which they belong, each of which has the power, on sufficient cause being shewn, to suspend a barrister from practising or to disbar him altogether, as has been done on more than one occasion. In some of the colonies there are Law Societies of which all barristers and solicitors practising in the Colony are bound by statute to become 1116fi1l)8l‘8, and it is believed that the system is found to work very we .

At all events, having regard to the fact that the Law Society has complete jurisdiction as to who are fit persons to enter the profession, it seems desirable that it should not only have the power of admission, but it should also have the power of exclusion, subject, of course, to appeal. This would efl'ecta considerable saving of the funds of the society, and of the time of the judges before whom these cases come, and of the masters to whom they are often referred.

The adoption of our suggestions would have the effect of concentrating in one body all the functions necessary to be exercised with regard to the training, examination, admission, and punishment of solicitors, and would add greatly to the conven1ence_both of the solicitors and the public. We see no practical difliculty D1 the way of carrying our suggestions into _efi'ect, and _we _ventnre _to hope that steps will be taken for obtaining the legislative sanction necessary

for the purpose.


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It is stated that the costs of the Campbell divorce trial amount to more than £20,000.

On Wednesday Mr. Justice Stirling stated that he had directed a summons for the confirmation of a scheme for the reconstruction of the Briton Medical Life Assurance Association to be at the head of the paper for the consideration of the court on the 8th of June, and that he intended to commence takmg causes with witnesses on Tuesday, J une 14.

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Sir,—I ask a little space in your journal to call attention to the provisions of this Bil , which has passed the House of Commons entirely without discussion.

It enacts, in language taken verbatim from the Thellusson riot, that “ no person shall, after the lst cf January, 1888, settle or dispose of any property in such manner that the income thereof shall _be wholly or partially accumulated for any longer period than the mmority or respective minorities _only of any_person or persons who, under the uses or trusts of the instrument directing such accumulations, would for the time being, if of full age, be entitled to receive the income so directed to be accumulated."

Without denying that cases may and do occur (see Havelock v. Havelock, 17 Ch. D. 807) in which accumulations to an unreasonable extent are directed, an inquiry among members of the profession well able to form an opinion has shewn that such cases are very uncommon ; it therefore becomes desirable to consider whether the Bill as prepared does not interfere with dispositions of roperty which are not injurious and which ought not to be prohibited.

There is a not uncommon desire among testators in all classes of society that the vesting of legacies with the interest thereon should he postponed for some few years after the legatee attains his majority, say until he attains twenty-five. The object of this desire is not so much to increase the magnitude of the legacy by means of accumulations as to postpone the enjoyment of it until the legatee attains yzilirs of discretion—an object which, in many cases, is most desira e.

The operation of the Bill on a gift to a person eontingently on his attaining twenty-five, accompanied either with an express or implied direction to accumulate the income for the benefit of the legatee, would appear to be that the gift of the capital would stand, but the direction for accumulation would be wholly void, inasmuch as there is no person who would for the time being, if of full age, be entitled to receive the income.

Again, the Bill would render invalid a direction for accumulation fior a fixed} period however short, say, for four or five years—a

irectionw ich was contained in the will of the late Mr. Atkinson Morley, and without which it is not probable that his large fortune would have sufiiced to build and maintain the magnificent Convalescent Hospital at Wimbledon which bears his name.

I venture to think that in the two instances I have named the existing law ought not to be interfered with. At any rate, it is to be hoped that the Bill will not pass the House of Lords without full C0l'!8l(l&X‘8l’l0l1. C()NvEYA};CE1g_

P.S.—It is, I think, open to question whether the Bill applies to wills executed before the lst of January, 1888 —it would be well to make this point more clear.

[The Bill was, we _believe, suggested by the remarks. of the late Mr. Justice Pearson in Re Alford, Dammit v. Hennell (3% W. R. 773). -—En. S. J.]


A CITY OF LONDON LA\V SOCIETY. [T0 the Editor of the Solicitors’ Journ-al.]

_Sir,—The dista_iice_of the Incorporated Law Society’s hall from the City makes that institution almost valueless as a library to solicitors practising in the vicinity of the Mansion House and further East, and Ihave long felt that a library could, with great advantage, be fipfizgd in the City, where text-books and law reports might be con

The idea is capable of expansion. A Solicitors’ Society might be formed m connection with the library, whose objects should be to strengthen the hands of the Incorporated Law Society in matters relating to. the profession (especially_that of the reduction of the annua certificate duty), to hold meetings for discussion of points of practice or etiquette, and to form a kiuzl of Solicitors’ Exchange, where b5"1°5F l11KW?I‘§. such as mortgages, might be negotiated.

The few City solicitors to whom I have mentioned the matter appear to think that such a society would meet with support, and if “HY °f Y°_111readers are of that opinion, and are prepared to cooperate_with me in setting it on foot, I shall be glad to hear from them with a view to calling a meeting and taking other proceedings.


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This action was brought by manufacturers of soap to restrain the defendants, who were also manutactiu-ere of soap, from selling their soa in such a way as to pass it off as the pilaintiffs‘ soap. The defendants did not sell their soap retail, but they sol it to retail dealers, who then sold it retail to the public. The retail dealers knew that they were not buying the plaintifls’ soap. At the trial Chitty, J ., granted an injunction restraining the defendants from selling any soap not being manufactured by the plaintiffs in the wrapper and of the form of any one of three specified exhibits which were admitted to have been issued by the defendants, or in any wrapper or in any form calculated or intended to pass off, or to enable others to pass ofl, as and for the goods of the plaintiffs. And it was ordered that an account should be taken of the profits made by the defendants in selling soap made by them in any wrapper such as that contained in the three specified exhibits, and in the form of those exhibits, and that the defendants should pay to the plaintitfs the amount found due to them on the taking of the account. The defendants appealed, and it was argued on their behalf that, even if the injunction was properly granted, the account of profits directed was too extensive. It was contended that the defendants were accountable for profits only in cases in which the ultimate urchaser of the soap believed that he was buying the plaintiffs’ soap, and that, therefore, the plaintiffs were bound to shew in each case that the ultimate purchaser had been deceived, or that at any rate the defendants were entitled to shew, in any case in which they could do so, that the ultimate purchaser had not been deceived.

Tun Couar or APPEAL held that the injunction had been properly granted, and also that the account of profits directed was in the proper form. COTTON’, L. J ., was of opinion that the defendants had intentionally got up their soap in such a way as would lead incautious purchasers _to believe it to be the plaintiffs’ soap. As to the other point the complaint against the defendants was that they had dressed up their soap in such s way as to enable the middlemen to sell it as the plaintiifs’. l‘he whole gist of the com laint was that the defendants had sold a weapon winch was capable of gieingbused fraudently. Thaprofits which the defendants had made was made y the sales to the mid emen, and it was immaterial to the plaintiffs what the middlemen did with the soap afterwards. Whatever they did with it the sale by the defendants to them wasawrong: ful act, because it put into their hands the means of selling the defendants soap as the plaintiffs‘. Lmntsr and Bowzu, L.JJ., O0l1Cll1'l’€d.-c0V.'.\'§llL, Aston, Q.C , and Cliadwyrk Henley; Romer, Q,.C , Lockwood, Q.C., and JCutler. Cotsssn, Emmet, Son, Q Stubbs ; J. S. Salaman.

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This was an appeal from the decision of a divisional oourt(De11lIlll\ and Hawkins, JJ.), reported 35 W. R. 212, 18 Q. B. D. 437. The prflmlfifl occupied by the City of London School having been assessed in thp valuation list of the parish of St. Bride, at a rateable value of £1,661, 11114“ gross value of £2,000, the Corporation of the City of London appealedclaiming allowances in respect of property tax under 5 6 Vict-» °- §5' s. 61, r. 6, by which allowances are to be made, inter aha, for the dul?“ charged on any college or hall in any of the universities of Great Biitafll» in respect of the public buildings and offices belonging thei'Bfl>i_l!1_d °“ any hospital, public school, or almshouse in respect of the public hu1ldlI18'i ofiices, and premises belonging thereto. The City of London Schwl W“ founded by a private Act (4 8: 5 Will. 4, c. 35) obtained by the 2?‘; poration of London in 1834, by which it was enacted that the corp0!‘B £0 should make an annual payment of £900 towards the support 0 __ school, and should maintain for ever thereafter, upon the ground BPPWPE ated by the Act, a school for thereligious and virtuous education of 11079“ fioé the City of London School Act, 1879 (42 8: 43 Vict. c. lxin.), the corpfiffl at were empowered to appropris te certain lands on the Victoria Emban me; and to build thereon a school, and to transfer the school to thgeaw premises, and there maintain it in like manner as they wereauthori in on maintain it on the old premises. The corporation accordingly 5‘; be B the land in question the present schools, in which a large number E n in are educated. No pront is made, or sought, by the _°°!‘l§°!;B:e up carrying on the school, but there is a yearly deficiency, which is “med by the corporation. The mode of admission is according 9° B “PI: gave, by the parent and by some members of the corporation, who file, T31 Wm; unlimited as to the number of recommendations they may Bl8_!1- fgeiom of freeman and householders of the city have preference in adml and The charge for each pupil is £12 12s. up to twelve years of :53 ‘ha £15 15s. aftcr that age. The Income Tax Commissioners held e for school was entitled to exemption as a public school, and stated flB The the opinion of the Divisional Court, who upheld their d@¢":3ln'memt surveyor of taxes appealed, contending that the exempt10l1_ W5? °fi 7; and to apply to public schools, which were purely charitable mstitu Ll; ‘ad that this was shewn by their collocation in the Act with h0BP1 almshouses. ad the

Tris Couar (Lord Esi-iiia, llI.R., Far and Loi-res» L~'U') “film don; decision of the Divisional Court. They said that the)’ W°“ld 11°‘ fie Act, B"! exhaustive definition of the term public school as used b7. of its but that where a school had a public foundation, and 8m°“

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