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inconsistent alternative defences of fact, and that the defence was embarrassing, but he gave the defendant leave to amend.

THE COURT OF APPEAL (LINDLEY and BowEN, L.JJ.) reversed the decision. LINDLEY, L.J., said that North, J., had construed rule 4 too strictly, and as meaning that a defendant could never plead inconsistent alternative defences. The rule only meant that the defendant must state clearly the facts on which he intended to rely. He might intend to rely on different sets of facts as leading to different conclusions. An executor would very probably not know any of the facts, but he could not safely simply put the plaintiff to proof of his case, for he might then be prevented from relying on some defence at the trial because he had not pleaded it. An executor could hardly plead in any other way than this defendant had done-viz., by raising all the defences which were likely to arise, and then at the trial he would rely on the defence which he could prove. Nothing was more common in an action of debt in the Queen's Bench Division than for a defendant to plead "never indebted," "payment," and "set off." BOWEN, L.J., concurred. The order of North, J., was discharged, and it was ordered that the defendant should, within fourteen days after discovery of documents by the plaintiffs, either amend his defence, or give particulars of those defences which the plaintiffs asked to have struck out. The costs of this application in both courts to be costs in the action.-COUNSEL, Aspland, Q C., and Upjohn; CozensHardy, Q.C., and B. Byre. SOLICITORS, Morgan, Son, & Upjohn; Croncy, Spencer, & Edwards.

Re HOBSON AND HOWES-C. A. No. 2, 13th May. MORTGAGEE-POWER OF SALE EQUITABLE MORTGAGE CONVEYANCE OF LEGAL ESTATE-CONVEYANCING ACT, 1881, s. 21. This was an appeal from the decision of North, J. (ante, p. 254) the question being whether an equitable mortgagee by deed of freehold land, selling the mortgaged property under the power conferred by the Conveyancing Act, 1881, can convey the legal estate to the purchaser. Section 19 of the Act gives to a mortgagee, when the mortgage is made by deed, a power, when the mortgage-money has become due, to sell the mortgaged property, the power being given "to the like extent as if it had been in terms conferred by the mortgage deed, but not further." Section 20 imposes certain restrictions on the exercise of the power, and section 21 provides that "a mortgagee exercising the power of sale conferred by this Act shall have power by deed to convey the property sold, for such estate and interest therein as is the subject of the mortgage, freed from all estates, &c., to which the mortgage has priority, but subject to all estates, &c., which have priority to the mortgage, except that, in the case of copyhold or customary land, the legal right to admittance sball not pass by a deed under this section, unless the deed is sufficient otherwise by law, or is sufficient by custom, in that behalf." The corresponding section (section 15) of Lord Cranworth's Act (23 & 24 Vict. c. 145) empowered the person exercising the sale, by deed to convey or assign to and vest in the purchaser the property sold, for all the estate and interest therein which the person who created the charge had power to dispose of, except that in the case of copy hold hereditaments the beneficial interests only shall be conveyed to and vested in the purchaser by such deed." North, J., held that the mortgagee could only convey the estate which he himself had.

THE COURT OF APPEAL (COTTON, LINDLEY, and BOWEN, L.JJ.) affirmed the decision. COTTON, L.J., said that section 21 gave the mortgagee power to convey that which was sold, and section 19 gave no power to sell the legal estate when the mortgagee had only an equitable estate. The language of section 21 differed from that of section 15 of the Act of 1860, and the difference was no doubt intentional. LINDLEY and BowEN, L.JJ., concurred.-COUNSEL, J. B. Porter; Ingpen. SOLICITORS, 0. G. Harman, R. Parker.

Re BUCKNALL'S GOLD ESTATE (LIM.)-Kay, J., 14th May. PRACTICE-COMPANY-RECTIFICATION OF REGISTER--MOTION.

This was a motion by a shareholder that his name might be removed KAY, J., said that the application must go into the general list and be

from the list of shareholders of the company.

heard as an action, and that the same course must be followed in future with respect to similar applications.-COUNSEL, Butcher. SOLICITORS, Harper & Battcock.

WEBSTER v. SOUTHEY-Kay, J., 3rd, 4th, and 16th May. MORTMAIN-LEASE-WORKHOUSE-CHARITABLE USE-CHURCHWARDENS AND OVERSEERS OF THE POOR-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-9 GEO. 1, c. 7, s. 4 -9 GEO. 2, c 36, s. 1-7 & 8 VICT. c. 101, s. 73.

By a deed of the 10th of March, 1747, Sir T. Webster granted a lease of one acre of land for 150 years from the 25th of March then next, at a rent of one shilling a year, if demanded, to several persons, including the Vicar of East Griustead, as a site for a workhouse for that parish. The land was not to be let or sold, but might be given up to the lessor, if not wanted, on his paying for the building. This deed was not enrolled under the Mortmain Act. The workhouse was built, but no rent was paid after 1776, and in 1862 the lessees sold the site and conveyed it, in fee simple, to the defendants. The plaintiff, who was admitted to be the successor in title of the lessor and entitled to the reversion, brought this action claiming one year's rent-viz., a shilling. The question was whether the lease was valid, so as to avoid the operation of the Statute of Limitations.

KAY, J., said that he had no doubt whatever that the lease was for charitable uses, and it failed to comply with the Mortmain Act in that

it was not enrolled, it did not take effect in possession, and there was a reservation in favour of the grantor. It was not saved by the provisions of 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101, s. 73, which only cured the want of enrolment. The Poor Law Act, 1722, s. 4, did not affect the Mortmain Act, except that it avoided the necessity of guardians of the poor obtaining a licence to hold land in mortmain. The grant to them must be in the form prescribed by the Mortmain Act. The lease was, therefore, void, ab initio, and the action must be dismissed, with costs.-COUNSEL, Sir H. Davey, Q.C.; Elton, Q.C., and Jemmett; Rigby, Q.C., Renshaw, Q.C., and F. Thompson. SOLICITORS, Hasties & Crawford; R. C. Adams Beck.

BIRMINGHAM AND DISTRICT LAND CO. v. LONDON AND NORTH-WESTERN RAILWAY CO.-Chi, J., 14th May.

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R. S. C., 1883, XVI., 48, 50-PRACTICE-THIRD PARTY NOTICE. In this case an application was made by the defendants under R. S. C., 1883, XVI., 48, for leave to issue a third party notice. A similar applica tion had already been refused on the ground that the party sought to be joined was not a party against whom any right of indemnity was made out. Chitty, J.'s refusal was affirmed by the Appeal Court (35 W. R. 173, 34 Ch. D. 261). The defendants now alleged the execution, on the 1st of March, 1887, of a conveyance which altered the circumstances, and, accordingly, again applied for an order.

CHITTY, J., said that it was not necessary to decide whether the conveyance gave the right of indemnity alleged. The application was, in his judgment, made too late, and therefore failed. Such applications should, as a general rule, be made before the time limited for delivery of defence, and at the latest before the close of the pleadings.—Counsel, Romer, Q.C., and Woodroffe; Ince, Q.C., and 0. L. Clare. SOLICITORS, Robinson, Preston, & Stow; C. N. Mason.

Re H. T. RICHARDSON (DECEASED), SHULDHAM v. THE ROYAL NATIONAL LIFEBOAT INSTITUTION-Chitty, J., 17th May.

CHARITY-CONDITIONAL BEQUEST-ABSOLUTE TRANSFER.

In this case the question arose as to whether the Royal National Lifeboat Institution was absolutely entitled to a transfer of a legacy of £10,000, bequeathed to it on condition of constructing and maintaining two lifeboats according to directions contained in the testator's will, and coupled with a gift over on non-compliance. Attorney-General v. Christ's Hospital (1 Russ. & M. 626) and Re Conington's Will (8 W. R. 444) were referred to, and it was admitted, on behalf of the institution, that as it accepted the gift it had also accepted an obligation in the nature of a CHITTY, J., said that there were cases in which such conditions had been held to be trusts. He was of opinion that that was so in the present He made an order as asked.-COUNSEL, Romer, Q.C., and L. Field; Vaughan Hawkins. SOLICITORS, Peacock & Goddard, for Capron & Sparkes, Guildford; Clayton, Sons, & Fargus.

trust.

case.

Re J. H. BIEGEL'S TRADE-MARK-Chitty, J., 6th May. TRADE-MARK-RECTIFICATION OF REGISTER-SIMILARITY OF MARKCOLOUR-PATENTS, &c., Acr, 1883, s. 67.

This was a motion by Messrs. Younger & Co., brewers, of Edinburgh, to strike out from the register of trade-marks a mark registered by J. H. Biegel, of Amsterdam, a shipper of Pilsen beer, on the ground that such mark so closely resembled the applicants' mark as to be calculated to deceive. The applicants had used their mark for ale and stout for twenty years, and registered it in March, 1886, in class 43 for fermented liquors. The respondent had also registered in class 43 in September, 1886, for bottled beer, the mark complained of. Both marks consisted of fanciul arrangements of triangles, but such arrangements differed, the applicants' triangles being two placed on a third, and the respondent's being three triangles interlaced, and in the centre of the applicants' mark was a blank space, but the space in the centre of the respondent's mark contained a stag's head. It was submitted by the respondent that there was no resemblance between the two marks as actually used, and that the right time for interference by the court was when a case of imitation was made out against the respondent of colouring, &c., his mark so as to resemble the applicants' mark. The applicants, however, relied on Re Worthington's Trade-Mark (28 W. R. 749, 14 Ch. D. 8).

CHITTY, J., said that, in respect of the triangular arrangements, he held that there was such a resemblance as was calculated to deceive when the nature of the marks was considered and the way they were used, by being affixed to bottles, and especially because neither the applicants' nor the respondent's mark was registered so as to be confined to any particular colours. Under the provisions of the Patents, &c., Act of 1883, the respondent was not bound to use his mark in any particular colour, but he could retain the outline of his mark, and could colour it in any way he thought fit, provided that he did not entirely obliterate it. When the marks in the present case were compared with those in issue in Re Worthington's Trade- Mark, the resemblance between the two cases was very striking; and the present case, therefore, fell within the principle enunciated in the case cited, that when the use the mark might be put to, by being coloured, was considered, it would be calculated to deceive. He, therefore, should make an order, with costs, as asked, for rectification of the register by expunging therefrom so much of the respondent's mark as consisted of a triangular arrangement.-COUNSEL, Romer, Q.C., and J. Cutler; Maclean, Q.C., and Whinney. SOLICITORS, Mackenna & Co.; Linklater & Co.

Re JACOB'S SETTLEMENT TRUSTS-North, J., 14th May. TRUSTEE ACT, 1850, s. 25-DEATH OF SURVIVING TRUSTEE WITHOUT PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE-APPOINTMENT OF SOLE BENEFICIARY AS TRUstee. This was a petition under the Trustee Act. A sum of stock stood in the names of the two trustees of a settlement. Both the trustees were dead, and there was no personal representative of the survivor. The petitioner had, under the trusts of the settlement, become absolutely beneficially entitled to the fund. Section 25 of the Trustee Act, 1850, provides that "when any stock shall be standing in the sole name of a deceased person, and his or her personal representative shall be out of the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, or cannot be found, it shall be lawful for he Court of Chancery to make an order vesting the right to transfer such .tock, or to receive the dividends or income thereof, in any person or persons whom the said court may appoint," NORTH, J., following Re Dixon's Trusts (21 W. R. 220), held that he could not, under that section, vest the right to transfer the stock in any one but a trustee of the settlement. He accordingly appointed the petitioner to be sole trustee, and vested the right to transfer in him.COUNSEL, J. F. Waggett. SOLICITORS, Guscotte, Wadham, & Day.

SMYTH v. ADAMS-North, J., 14th May.

R. S. C., 1883, XXVII., 11-MOTION FOR JUDGMENT IN DEFAULT OF PLEADING-DELIVERY OF DEFENCE AFTER SERVICE OF NOTICE OF MOTION. In this case, the defendant not having delivered a statement of defence within the time limited for the purpose, the plaintiff set down the action upon motion for judgment. After this had been done, but before the motion came on for hearing, the defendant delivered a defence and counter-claim, and on the hearing of the motion (as a short cause) the defendant appeared by counsel. The plaintiff's counsel admitted, on the authority of Gill v. Woodfin (32 W. R. 393, 25 Ch. D. 707) that, though the statement of defence had been delivered after the proper time, it could not be treated as a nullity, and that the plaintiff was not entitled to judgment for default of pleading, but he asked that the notice of motion might be amended, and that judgment might be given for the plaintiff on admissions in the defence.

August, 1885, the defendant obtained from the justices a renewal of the licence. A petition was presented by some of the neighbours complaining of the breach, and on the 23rd of August, 1885, proceedings were ordered to be taken to restrain the defendant.

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KEKEWICH, J., said there was in this case no question of fact except this, whether there had been acquiescence on the plaintiff's part such as would prevent him from claiming an injunction. It was common ground that there was a restrictive covenant which had been broken, and that the defendant took the property with actual notice of the covenant. The principles guiding the court in cases where acquiescence is set up were laid down in the old authority of the Duke of Leeds v. Amherst (2 Ph. 123). "Acquiescence is not the term which ought to be used. If a party, having inconsistent with that right, and makes no objection while the act is in a right, stands by and sees another dealing with the property in a manner progress, he cannot afterwards complain. That is the proper sense of the be set up is not acquiescence, but release or abandonment of the party's word acquiescence. The defence, therefore, which is really intended to right This was indorsed in the cases of Hogg v. Scott (18 Eq. 444), and De Bussche v. Alt (8 Ch. D.286). The Vice-Chancellor in the former case said: "The omission to take any proceedings at law or in equity for a time does not in itself appear to me an encouragement to the defendant amounting to an equitable bar in this court." There was also a passage to the same effect in the second of the above cited cases. Sayers v. Collyer (28 Ch. D. 103) was clearly distinguishable. The defendant knew of the first breach of the covenant and had herself endeavoured to prevent it, but with the Duke. The delay from August, 1884, to October, 1885, when then bought up the property without again communicating in any way notice had been given complaining of the defendant's acts, was not such Duke had never, according to the requirements of Lord Cottenham's as to prevent the plaintiff from now insisting on an injunction, since the definition, stood by so as to assent to what was done.--COUNSEL, Barber, Stewards, & May; T. Cray for Dix & Warlow, Newcastle-upon-Tyne. Q.C., and Fate Lee; Seward Brice and A. A. Baker. SOLICITORS, Bell,

BANKRUPTCY CASES.

Ex parte THE OFFICIAL RECEIVER, Re GOULD-C. A. No. 1, 6th May.

NORTH, J., having looked at the defence, said that he could not treat it as sufficient admission of the plaintiff's case, especially as there was a counter-claim. The plaintiff must proceed in the ordinary way, but the BANKRUPTCY-ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATE OF DECEASED INSolvent-Jurisdefendant must pay the costs of the motion in any event.-COUNSEL, TO AVOID VOLUNTARY SETTLEMENT - BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1883, Marcy; F. W. Heather. SOLICITORS, Blyth; W. & W. Rees Davies & Co.

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By a purchase agreement, dated the 17th of February, 1881, under which the plaintiff company purchased their business from the defendant, the defendant covenanted that he would not, so long as the company should, carry on within 100 miles of London the business of a dairy farmer or assist as principal or servant in any such business. The defendant, who was formerly the managing director of the defendant company, had lately become chairman of a rival company-namely, the Home Counties Dairy Supply Association (Lim.). The plaintiff company had recently been ordered to be wound up under the direction of the court, and a liquidator had been appointed. The plaintiff company now moved to restrain the defendant from holding the office of chairman, director, or any other office in or under the Home Counties Dairy Supply Association (Lim.). The motion was resisted by the defendant upon the ground (among others) that, under the circumstances, the company had ceased to carry on its business, and consequently that the covenant was not now operative. STIRLING, J, said that the question was one of fact whether the company were now carrying on their business. The business was being carried on by an officer of the court with a view to its sale as a going concern. That was not a carrying on of the business by the company. There had, therefore, been no breach of the covenant, and the motion must be refused.-COUNSEL, Hastings, Q.C., and Daniel Jones; Buckley, Q.C., and Dunham. SOLICITORS, Allen & Edwards; Crowdy, Son, & Tarry. THE DUKE OF NORTHUMBERLAND v. BOWMAN-Kekewich, J., 6th May. COVENANT-BEERHOUSE-ACQUIESCENCE.

This was an action to restrain the breach of a covenant that the houses erected on a certain piece of land "should not be used or occupied, either in whole or in part, as public-houses or beershops, nor as shops for the sale, whether by wholesale or retail, of wine, ale, or spirituous liquors, except with the permission in writing of the plaintiff, his heirs, or assigns." The breach was not denied; the sole question being whether there had been acquiescence on the plaintiff's part. In 1875 the lot upon which the house held by the defendant was built was sold to her predecessor in title. In 1882 a butcher, under some agreement, got possession of the premises, and on the 23rd of August, 1884, obtained an off licence. The defendant was at this time carrying on business as an hotel-keeper in the neighbourhood, and complained to the duke's agent about the grant of the licence. On the 25th of August, 1884, the agent wrote to the clerk to the justices, complaining of the grant of the license, but took no further step at that time. On the 10th of September, 1881, the defendant, without informing the duke's agent about her intention, purchased the house and the off licence, and took a conveyance which disclosed the covenant.

In

DICTION ss. 47, 125.

This was an appeal from a decision of Cave, J. (35 W. R. 458), the question being whether section 47 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, which makes void under certain circumstances, as againt the trustee in a bankruptcy, voluntary settlements executed by the bankrupt, applies in the administration of the estate of a deceased insolvent under section 125 of the Act. A debtor died insolvent, and an action to administer his estate was commenced in the Chancery Division. On the application of a creditor, an order was made transferring the proceedings to the Court of Bankruptcy, and that court made an order for the administration of the estate. The official receiver applied to the court for an order declaring void as against him a post-nuptial settlement which the debtor had executed. Cave, J., dismissed the application, on the ground that section 47 did not apply to an administration under section 125.

THE COURT OF APPEAL (Lord ESHER, M.R., and FRY and LOPES, L.JJ.), affirmed the decision. Lord ESHER, M.R., said that he agreed with every reason given by Cave, J., for his conclusion. What was the estate with which section 125 was dealing? Was it merely the estate of the deceased debtor, or did it include also property of other persons? In a bankruptcy that which passed to the trustee was the "property of the bankrupt.' The law of bankruptcy, under certain circumstances, dealt with the property of other persons as well as that of the bankrupt, but the power to do so was conferred in plain terms. It had been pointed out to the Legislature by the decisions upon section 10 of the Judicature Act, 1875, that, if at any time they intended in such statutes as these that the estates of other persons should be dealt with, besides the estate which was the main subject of the legislation, they should say so in plain terms, otherwise the legal effect would be that their legislation would not extend beyond the estate which was being administered. In the bankruptcy part of this Act the Legislature, when they wished to deal with the property of third persons, had said so distinctly; but when they came to deal with the estates of deceased debtors they deliberately left out the words necessary for that purpose, and in every clause of section 125 confined the subject-matter carefully to the estate of the deceased debtor. Under subsection 6 of section 125, the provisions of Part III. of the Act, relating to the administration of the property of a bankrupt, were to apply to an administration order under section 125, "So far as the same are applicable.' Section 47 would apply, not to the property of the deceased debtor, but to the property of the trustees of the settlement-i.e., to the property of third persons. Therefore the provisions of section 47 were not applicable. FRY and LOPES, L JJ., concurred.

The counsel for the official receiver asked for leave to appeal to the House of Lords, but the court refused the application.—COUNSEL, Bigham, Q.C., Muir Mackenzie, and A. G. Macintyre; Winslow, Q.C., and Yate Lee. SOLICITORS, Smiles, Binyon, & Ollard; Roopers & Whately.

CASES AFFECTING SOLICITORS.

Re T. C. & J. F. KELLOCK (SOLICITORS)—Stirling, J., 17th May.
SOLICITOR-TAXATION-WITHDRAWAL OF BILL OF COSTS REFUSED.
This was a petition, on behalf of the trustees for sale of the Bulford

Estate, praying a reference to the taxing master to tax a bill of costs. The Bulford Estate was subject to a mortgage for £18,500 and interest. Messrs. Pickett & Mytton, the solicitors to the trustees for sale of the Bulford Estate, inquired of Messrs. Kellock, the solicitors of the mortgagees, whether, upon a contemplated sale, their clients would allow the above sum to remain, and allow the purchasers to inspect the title-deeds of the estate. Messrs. Kellock, after communicating with their clients, assented to the money remaining, and offered facilities for the inspection required. The Bulford Estate was subsequently sold, as proposed, and the title-deeds duly inspected, and Messrs. Kellock, before and after the sale, rendered other services for which they were entitled to be paid. Messrs. Pickett & Mytton undertook to pay these charges. The evidence was that, when the purchase was about to be completed, the purchasers required that the law charges due to the mortgagees should be paid by the vendors, the trustees for sale; whereupon, on the 17th of March, 1887, Messrs. Pickett & Mytton sent Messrs. Kellock this telegram:-"Please send us any costs you have against us in Bulford's Estate." Correspondence ensued to the following effect: Kellocks to Pickett & Mytton.-17th March, 1887.-Letter. "Having received your telegram this evening we presume you wish to have our costs at once. They are not draited yet, so we write to know if you require details, or whether you will be satisfied with a general statement and lump sum. If the latter is acceptable we are prepared to name a figure. Having regard to the amount of mortgage, the work done, and our client's accession to your proposal to allow the money to remain on the security to facilitate a sale of the estate, we consider that we are entitled to at least 100 guineas. Let us have your views by return." "Pickett & Mytton to Kellocks.-Telegram.

"Acting for trustees we must have details. Please send same as soon as possible."

"Kellocks to Pickett & Mytton.-22nd March, 1887. "We now send you our costs, which, considering the importance of the matter, there ought not to be any demur about paying. If further details are required we must furnish them, but as you are aware of all that has passed, we do not expect you will have occasion to ask for them."

"Pickett & Mytton to Kellocks.-March 23rd, 1887. "We have received your letter and the bill of costs which accompanies it. We feel that [our views] as to what you are entitled to charge vary so hopelessly from yours, that discussion upon the subject would be fruitless. We will, therefore, carry your costs in for taxation in the usual way."

"Kellocks to Pickett & Mytton.-24th March, 1887.

"If it is your intention to carry our costs in for taxation without any attempt on your part to settle the amount, we must, of course, instruct some solicitor in London to attend on our behalf to produce the papers, and explain the nature of the case. We must admit we did not anticipate the course you have indicated."

"Morse, Hewitt, & Farman (on behalf of Kellocks) to Pickett & Mytton. -29th March, 1887.

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"We are instructed by Messrs. Kellock herein. On their behalf we must intimate that, unless your firm is personally liable to pay the costs (upon which point we are not instructed), we contend that no bill has been delivered to the persons liable to pay, and give you notice that a proper bill shall be prepared and sent in. Our clients think you are not dealing fairly with them in the matter, and, considering the large amount of work done by them, their charges are, in our view, very reasonable. We understand, further, you decline to specify your objections to any part of the rough bill, which was completed in a great hurry in order to help you as much as possible, and in compliance with your telegram of the 17th and 18th inst.' The bill of costs above mentioned was headed "The Trustees of Mr. and Mrs. H. H. Lee's Settlement," [the mortgagees] Account of costs and expenses of Messrs. Kellock in connection with the mortgage for £18,500 upon, and the sale of, the Bulford Estate." It was objected, on the part of the respondents, Messrs. Kellock :-(1) that the delivery to the solicitors of the mortgagors, instead of to the mortgagors themselves, was improper, and that, therefore, the bill could be withdrawn; (2) that no bill had been delivered to the mortgagees, and that the petitioners, who were only third parties, could only tax a bill or copy of a bill so delivered; (3) that the alleged bill of costs was not intended as a bill of costs; (4) that the application should have been by summons and not by petition.

STIRLING, J., held (1) that Messrs. Pickett & Mytton were acting, under the circumstances, in the scope of their employment in requiring a bill of costs to be sent, and a bill delivered to them could not be withdrawn ; (2) that this objection failed-first, because Messrs. Pickett & Mytton had become persons liable to pay the bill under their undertaking, and, secondly, that delivery of the bill to the mortgagees was not necessary; (3) that the bill delivered was a bill of costs, and as to further details they could be given on the taxation; (4) that it was true that, under R. S. C., 1883, LV. 2 (15), the special application, which was here necessary, ought to have been by summons and not by petition; but, acting under ord. 70, r. 1, his lordship allowed the petitioners the same costs as of a summons adjourned into court.-COUNSEL, Harris Lea; Graham Hastings, Q.C., and Eustace Smith. SOLICITORS, Pickett & Mytton; Morse, Hewitt, & Farman. FORD v. THE INCORPORATED LAW SOCIETY-Stirling, J., 13th May.

LAW SOCIETY CLUB-MOTION TO RESTRAIN INCORPORATED LAW SOCIETY FROM ALLOWING PERSONS, NOT MEMBERS OF THE SOCIETY, TO BECOME MEMBERS OF THE CLUB.

This was a motion by the plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others the members of the society of attorneys, solicitors, proctors, and others,

not being barristers, practising in the courts of law and equity of the United Kingdom (commonly known as "The Incorporated Law Society "'), except eight of such members who were defendants, for an interim injunction to restrain the defendants (being the society and such eight members who were eight out of the thirty-nine members of the council) from confirming a resolution passed at a meeting of the society on the 28th of January, 1887, or, in the alternative, from permitting the Law Society Club, or the committee thereof, to elect as a member, honorary or otherwise, of the club any person not being a member of the society. The material facts were as follows:-By the charter of the Incorporated Law Society in 1845, the capital, possessions, and income of the society applicable for its general purposes, were directed to be applied in "promoting professional improvement and facilitating the acquisition of legal knowledge," and the society was (among other things) empowered to make bye-laws, fixing the conditions and the manner upon and in which persons being eligible for membership, but not residing in England, should be admitted to the rooms of the society and to alter such bye-laws. And the council might, by their bye-laws, appropriate such part of the society's buildings as they should think fit as clubrooms, subject to such regulations as the council should approve. During the whole time of the society's existence there had been a club in connection with it, which had occupied part of its premises. Down to 1884 this club consisted exclusively of members of the defendant society. In 1884 the club was dissolved, and a new one, which is the present Law Society Club, was formed. Resolutions were passed at that time by the defendant society that the council should take possession of the premises to be vacated by the old club, and permit them to be used by the members of the new club; and regulations were made providing that the new club should be contined to members of the society, and that no alteration should be made in such last mentioned rule except in pursuance of a resolution passed by and confirmed at the general meeting of the society. Since then the club had consisted entirely of members of the society, and they had been permitted to use certain rooms on the society's premises. On January 28 last a resolution was passed that "the committee" of the Law Society's Club "shall have power, subject to the approbation of a majority of the members voting at a general meeting specially called for the purpose, to elect as honorary members any person not being a member of the Incorporated Law Society, bnt that the number of such honorary members shall not at any time exceed twenty." This was the resolution against which the present motion was directed. By the writ in the action the plaintiff claimed a declaration that the proposed permission to the club to elect members who were not members of the society was ultrà vires.

STIRLING, J., said that the plaintiff did not by his notice of motion seek to prevent the Law Society Club from using the rooms of the society in pursuance of the resolution in that behalf, which, inasmuch as it would have been equivalent to an order for ejectment, the court would not have done on an interlocutory application, but the relief which he asked was confined to the resolution of January 28. Interference by the court with the enjoyment of the rooms by the club being out of the question, could it be said that the admission of a certain number of additional members as proposed was such an infringement of the constitution of the society as to call for the interference of the court? His lordship though tit was not. If the existing members of the club were promoting professional improvement and facilitating the acquisition of legal knowledge," which it must be assumed that they were doing, his lordship did not see why a few additional members could not contribute to the same object. Nor was it possible to say that they could not do so because the new members were not members of, or eligible for membership of, the Law cociety, for it was not suggested that legal knowledge was confined to persons who satisfied that condition. The motion was refused.-COUNSEL, Gazdar; Hastings, Q.C., and Joyce. SOLICITORS, Coldicott & Son; E. W. Williamson.

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Re W. M. PYBUS (A SOLICITOR)-Chitty, J., 16th May. SOLICITOR AND CLIENT-COSTS THE SOLICITORS' REMUNERATION ACT, 1881, GENERAL ORDER, SCHED. I., PART I.-PROCURATION FEE-TAXATION AFTER TWELVE MONTHS UNDER SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES-ATTORNEYS AND SOLICITORS ACT, 1843, s. 37.

On the 9th of July, 1885, Mr. W. M. Pybus, a solicitor, who had been employed by his client to raise certain moneys for him upon mortgages, sent to his client a cheque for the balance of the mortgage-money, and also an account shewing how such balance was arrived at, and also his bill of costs, the amount of which he had deducted. The client complained of the amount of the bill, and some correspondence ensued with reference thereto. Mr. Pybus offered to deduct £1 12s. 8d., and sent his client a cheque for that amount, which the client, however, refused to accept in settlement, although he retained and cashed the cheque. The client instructed Mr. Pybus to have the bill taxed, but he took no steps for doing so, though still acting as his solicitor in other matters. On the 23rd of July, 1886, the client instructed another solicitor to get the bill taxed, who on the 31st of July, 1886, issued a summons for taxation. The main objections to the bill were that the solicitor, though acting only for the mortgagor, had charged his client procuration fees according to the scale allowed to the mortgagee's solicitor, though he had himself paid such fees to the mortgagee's solicitors, and that he had charged such the scale charge was made for deducing title, perusing and completing fees as scale charges. A further objection was taken to one item in which mortgage, although no abstract was in fact delivered.

CHITTY, J., directed the bill to be taxed, as he thought that charging a scale charge, which in fact did not exist, was overcharge within the rule established by the cases, and he also thought that

the fact that the solicitor had not taken steps to have the bill taxed when directed to do so was a special circumstance which would take the case out of the rule, although the bill had been delivered over twelve months.— COUNSEL, R. F. Norton; F. H. Colt. SOLICITORS, Pattison, Wigg, & Co.; Nash, Field, & Withers.

LEGAL NEWS.

OBITUARY.

Sir WILLIAM YOUNG, late Chief Justice of Nova Scotia, died about a week ago at the age of eighty-eight. Sir W. Young was the son of Mr. John Young, of Falkirk, and was born in 1799. He was educated at the University of Glasgow. He was called to the bar in Nova Scotia in 1826, and he became a Queen's Counsel for that colony in 1843. He was for many years a member of the Nova Scotian Parliament, of which body he was Speaker from 1843 till 1854. He was Attorney-General of Nova Scotia from 1854 till 1859, and he became Chief Justice in 1860, and judge of the Court of Admiralty in 1864. He received the honour of knighthood in 1869, and he retired from the bench in 1881. Sir W. Young was married to the daughter of Mr. Michael Tobin, of Halifax.

Mr. JOHN ARTHUR DEANE, solicitor, Town Clerk of Batley, died at Bournemouth on the 8th inst., after a somewhat long illness. Mr. Deane was admitted a solicitor in 1871, having served his articles with his father, whom he succeeded as Town Clerk of Batley. He was also clerk to the borough magistrates, and after the passing of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, he was appointed official receiver in bankruptcy for the Dewsbury District. Mr. Deane was a perpetual commissioner for the West Riding of Yorkshire. He was, at the time of his death, associated in partnership with his younger brother, Mr. Edgar Ernest Deane.

Sir JOHN PETER DE GEX, Q.C., died suddenly at his residence, 20, Hydepark-square, on the 14th inst., at the age of seventy-eight. Sir J. De Gex was the eldest son of Mr. John De Gex, and was born in 1809. He was formerly fellow of Jesus College, Cambridge, where he graduated as a wrangler in 1831. He was called to the bar at Lincoln's-inn in Hilary Term, 1835, and he practised for many years in the Court of Chancery and in the Court of Bankruptcy. He will be remembered as one of the old school of authorized reporters, his name extending through a long series of equity reports. In 1865 he received a silk gown from Lord Westbury, and after his promotion he appeared chiefly in bankruptcy appeals, but he relinquished his practice a few years ago. bencher of Lincoln's-inn, of which society he was treasurer in 1882, and in that capacity he received the honour of Knighthood on the opening by the Queen of the Royal Courts of Justice. Sir J. De Gex was an honorary fellow of Jesus College, Cambridge. He was married to the eldest daughter of Sir John Henry Briggs.

APPOINTMENTS.

He was a

Mr. PETER DE LANDE LONG, Solicitor (of the firm of Monckton, Long, & Gardiner), of 17, Lincoln's-inn-fields, has been appointed Solicitor to the Foundling Hospital. Mr. Long was admitted a solicitor in 1858. Mr. ARTHUR WILLIAM PEARCE, solicitor, of Southampton, has been appointed a Commissioner to administer Oaths in the Supreme Court of Judicature.

Mr. JAMES HENRY KEMM, solicitor (of the firm of Robins, Cameron, & Kemm), of Gresham House, Old Broad-street, has been appointed a Commissioner to administer Oaths in the Supreme Court of Judicature.

Mr. FRANK HOLYOAKE, Solicitor, of Droitwich and Bromsgrove, has been appointed Clerk to the Stoke Prior School Board. Mr. Holyoake was admitted a solicitor in 1878.

Mr. JOSIAH SADLER EMPSON, Solicitor, of North Walsham, has been appointed Clerk to the Preston United District School Board. Mr. Empson is clerk to the North Walsham Local Board, and clerk to the county magistrates and the Commissioners of Taxes at that place. He was admitted a solicitor in 1869.

Mr. EDMUND TALBOT PALMER, solicitor, of Portsmouth, Portsea, Southsea, and Gosport, has been appointed Clerk to the Alverstoke Local Board. Mr. Palmer was admitted a solicitor in 1879.

Mr. TURNER COLLIN, solicitor, of Saffron Walden, has been appointed Clerk to the Commissioners of Taxes for the Walden Division of Essex and for the Linton Division of Cambridgeshire on the resignation of his father, Mr. Joseph Thomas Collin. Mr. T. Collin 18 an M.A. of Trinity College, Cambridge. He was admitted a solicitor in 1877. He is a registrar of the Saffron County Court, and clerk to the magistrates for the Walden

Division and to the Linton Board of Guardians.

Mr. ARTHUR COOK COOLE, solicitor, of Horsham and Crawley, has been appointed Clerk to the Horsham Board of Guardians, Assessment Committee, School Attendance Committee, and Rural Sanitary Authority. Mr.

Coole was admitted a solicitor in 1872.

Mr. WILLIAM HENRY HYNDMAN JONES, barrister, has been appointed a Member of the Executive Council of the Island of Granada. Mr. Jones was called to the bar at Lincoln's-inn in July, 1878. He has been for some time Stipendary Magistrate for the Island of Lucia.

PARTNERSHIP DISSOLVED.

WILLIAM EDWOOD SHIRLEY and HENRY EDWARD DONNER, Scarborough, solicitors. May 12. [Gazette, May 17].

GENERAL.

It is stated that the Archbishop of York has submitted to Mr. Arthur Charles, Q.C., a case on the pew question at St. Mary's Church, Beverley, and that Mr. Charles has furnished a written opinion, in which he says: -"The churchwardens have no legal right to maintain that they are parish officers only. There is abundant authority that they are the officers of the ordinary, authority from a very early period until the present time, especially with regard to the ordering of seats in church." On the second point Mr. Charles says:-"In the event of a different direction being given by the vestry and the ordinary as to the arrangement of seats, I think the churchwardens must obey the direction of the ordinary. If they were to disobey it they would be guilty of an ecclesiastical offence. It is to be noticed that there seems to be no direct authority that the bishop, acting himself and not through the medium of his court, has the power to issue general orders to the churchwardens; but it appears to follow from the various cases above referred to that he may do so." Mr. Charles adds on a third point:-"Churchwardens ought all to act together, but I think the majority can act in opposition to the minority in doing an act in itself lawful."

At the Liverpool Assizes on the 13th inst. a case of Snow v. Etty came before the court. Mr. French, for the plaintiff, said the action was brought by Mr. Thomas Snow, a chancery barrister, of Liverpool, for libel, against Mr. Thomas Etty, a solicitor practising in the same town. The libel was contained in the statement that Mr. Snow or his clerk had altered a brief after the hearing of a case before the Vice-Chancellor. Mr. Snow was bound to meet the charge as a man of honour and a barrister, and though unwilling, as a professional man, to go into court in a case of this kind, he had no alternative but to bring the action. He (Mr. French) was glad to say that, upon referring to the registrar of the Court of Chancery, and upon his producing the official bill of costs, Mr. Etty found he was absolutely mistaken in the charge he made, and he now unreservedly withdrew it, expressing regret for having made it under a misapprehension. Mr. Addison was prepared to go further and say that Mr. Etty never intended at any time to make any imputation against Mr. Snow, and upon that Mr. Snow would not, under the circumstances, have taken money from Mr. Etty in such a He was content to take judgment for the plaintiff with costs. Mr. Addison said Mr. Etty would desire not merely to apologize if what he said had been misconceived, but to say that he never intended to cast the smallest reflection on the personal conduct of Mr. Snow, or to suggest anything more than an excess of zeal on the part of Mr. Snow's clerk. Mr. Justice Wills said the imputation was a most serious one. What was suggested was that Mr. Snow had received a brief marked ten guineas, and that in his chambers it was altered to fifteen guineas. Such an imputation could not be allowed to pass. He was glad that the result was not one of compromise, because the circumstances would not warrant Mr. Snow accepting any result which did not carry costs. He trusted the result of the case would satisfy everyone who read or heard of it that Mr. Snow's character had been completely set right by his action.

case.

66

On the 18th inst., at Nottingham, Anthony Bush was summoned for having falsely and wiliully pretended to be a solicitor in Nottingham on the 31st of March and the 1st of April, 1887, not being qualified to do so. Mr. Williams (Hunt & Williams) appeared to prosecute on behalf of the Incorporated Law Society, and Mr. J. F. Ward was for the defendant, on whose behalf he pleaded guilty. Mr. Williams remarked that the defendant was charged with, a breach of section 12 of the Solicitors Act, the penalty for an offence under that section being £8. The defendant was an accountant, and, in connection with his work, had dealings with medical men in Nottingham, being employed in collecting their debts. On the 31st of March defendant wrote the following letter to a gentleman whose name he need not mention : 43, Portland-road, Nottingham.-Dr. F. Howitt v. Yourself.-Sir,-I am under the necessity of informing you that, unless the above account be attended to at once, I shall be compelled to take legel proceedings against you without further notice.-Yours respectfully, A. BUSH." That was clearly a lawyer's letter, and was written in a straightforward way. Such letters had from time to time been held to be lawyer's letters. The practice of sending such letters had become very prevalent in Nottingham, but defendant had promised to hand over the circulars in question to Mr. Ward for the purpose of having them destroyed. Under those circumstances he asked the magistrates not to inflict the maximum penalty. On behalf of the defendant Mr. Ward said his client felt compelled after some consideration to plead guilty to a technical breach of the Act. In doing so he wished to say that Bush was not guilty of any wilful fraud or misrepresentation whatever, and he was sure he might safely say that, so far as the words of the statute were "wilfully and falsely pretend," no offence had been committed. the defendant must have known that he had no right to send out such a circular as he had done, and he would be fined £5. Mr. Ward asked that the fine might be reduced, but Alderman Barber said that the sending out and trouble, and the fine they had imposed was quite as low as they of such circulars often put people to a great deal of unnecessary expense could go.

Alderman Barber said that

WARNING TO INTENDING HOUSE PURCHASERS AND LESSEES.-Before purchasing or renting a house have the Sanitary arrangements thoroughly examined by an expert, from The Sanitary Engineering & Ventilation Co., 115, Victoria-st., Westminster (Estab. 1875), who also undertake the Ventilation of Offices, &c.—[ADVT.] FURNISH ON NORMAN & STACEY'S SYSTEM; No Deposit; 1. 2, or 3 years credit; 60 wholesale firms. Offices, 79, Queen Victoria-st., E.C. Branches at 121, Pall Mall, S. W., & 9, Liverpool-st., E.C. Goods delivered free.-[ADVT ] STAMMERERS and STUTTERERS should read a little book by Mr. R. BEASLEY, after suffering nearly 40 years, cured himself by a method entirely his own.Baron's Court House, West Kensington, London, price 13 stamps. The Author, [ADVT.]

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BENJAMIN EVANS & CO. LIMITED.-Stirling, J., has fixed Monday, May 23 at 12, at his chambers, for the appointment of an official liquidator CAMBRIAN CHEMICAL CO, LIMITED.-Petn for winding up, presented May 11, directed to be heard before Kay, J., on Saturday, May 21. Gedge & Co, Old Palace yard, Westminster, solors for petners

NORTH ATLANTIC STEAMSHIP CO, LIMITED.-By an order made by Chitty, J., dated May 4, it was ordered that the voluntary winding up of the company be continued. Abrahams & Co, Old Jewry, solors for petners PROTECTOR CARRIAGE AND HORSE INSURANCE CO, LIMITED.-Chitty, J., has, by an order dated March 12, appointed Charles Fletcher Richardson, 4, Tokenhouse bldgs, to be official liquidator

WYCLIFFE STEAMSHIP CO, LIMITED.-Creditors are require1, on or before June 10, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to Frederick Bertram Smart, 22, Queen st. Cheapside. Friday, June 24, at 12, is appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon the debts and claims FRIENDLY SOCIETIES DISSOLVED.

CHURCH OF ENGLAND CLUB, Bell Inn, High st, Dudley, Worcester. May 10
ECONOMIC £10 BURIAL SOCIETY, 8. Union st, Canterbury, Kent. May 10
UNION PRIDE LODGE, United Odd Fellows, Bolton Unity, Brown Cow Inn,
Rochdale, Lancaster. May 5

London Gazette.-TUESDAY, May 17. JOINT STOCK COMPANIES.

LIMITED IN CHANCERY.

DAKOTA STOCK AND GRAZING CO, LIMITED.-Petn for the continuance of the voluntary winding up, presented April 29, directed by Chitty, J., to stand over until Saturday, May 21. Brandon, Essex st, Strand, solors for petners E. L. PARR & CO, LIMITED.-Petn to continue the voluntary winding up, presented May 14. directed to be heard before Kay, J., at the Royal Courts, on Thursday, May 26. Wooler, John st, Bedford row, agent for Morgan & Scott, Cardiff, solors for petner

FRIENDLY SOCIETIES DISSOLVED.

ALSTONEFIELD FRIENDLY BENEFIT SOCIETY, George Inn, Alstonefield, Stafford. May 11

BEDINGFELD FRIENDLY SOCIETY, Bedingfeld Rectory, Suffolk. May 12 INDEPENDENT MOUNTAINEERS' FRIENDLY SOCIETY, Horse Shoe Inn, The Bank, Ingleton, York. May 11

KIDDERMINSTER BOAT OWNERS' AND GENERAL DEALERS' SOCIETY, LIMITED, 22M, Lorne st, Kidderminster, Worcester. May 13

MUTUAL RELIEF SOCIETY, Waggon and Horses Inn, 69, Little London, Willenhall, Stafford. May 13

BIRT, MARY, Wickham Market, Suffolk. June 21. Welton, Woodbridge, Suffolk BIDDEN, JOHN EDWARD. Loats rd, Clapham pk, Gent. June 15. Roopers & Whately, Lincoln's inn fields

BOOTH, JOHN BAINBRIDGE, Catterick, York, Esq. June 11. Wray, Leyburn, Yorks

BURKE, HARRIET, Avenue rd. June 4. Guscotte & Co, Essex st

BURROWS, FREDERIC THOMAS, New ct, Lincoln's inn. June 11. Russel, Coleman st

CARTHEW, JAMES HENRY, Blythe lane, Hammersmith, Licensed Victualler.
June 14. Sawbridge & Son, Aldermanbury
CHICK. WILLIAM, South Petherton, Somerset, Farmer. May 31. Batten,
Yeovil

CRESSWELL, WILLIAM, Southsea, Esq. June 11. Davidson & Co, Spring gdns
DUGMORE, HENRY JOHN DENNIS, King's Lynn, Esq. June 20. Meredith & Co,
New sq

EVISON, SAMUEL, Liverpool, Draper. June 24. Price, John st, Bedford row FITZGIBBON, VICTOR BEARE, Woodchurch rd, West Hampstead. June 4. Guscotte & Co, Essex st, Strand

FORDHAM, HARRIET GURNEY, Melbourn Bury, Cambridge. June 14. Ware &
Co, Gt Winchester st

FOSTER, JOSEPH, Heeley, York, Manager. May 28. Vickers & Co, Sheffield
FREEBOUT, ANN JANE, Deptford. June 11. Lockyer Deptford

GARWOOD, THOMAS, Bury St Edmunds, Hotel Keeper. June 1. Gross & Son,
Bury St Edmunds

GLEDHILL, RICHARD, Paddock, York. Aug 1. Bottomley, Huddersfield

HART, BARNETT, Bow. July 11. Clark, Walbrook

HAWKER, JAMES WILLIAM, Poland st, Printer. June 24. Dod & Co, Berners st HYDE, SAMUEL WILLIAM, Pall Mall, Gent. June 24. Duffield & Bruty, Tokenhouse yd

JOHNSON, ANN, Kensington. June 21. Kinsey & Co, Bloomsbury pl

JOHNSON, GEORGE HENRY, Kensington, Esq. June 21. Kinsey & Co, Bloomsbury pl

JOHNSON. THOMAS, Adlington, Lancaster, Gent. June 18. Flegg & Son, Hill's place KENWORTHY, CHARLES JAMES FOX, Ealing. May 31. A. W. Kenworthy, Ironmonger lane

LAZENBY. WILLIAM HENRY, Kingston upon Hull, Cooper. May 31. Johnson,
Hull

LOCKE, HENRY. King's Hill, Somerset, Shoemaker. June 4. Benson & Car-
penter, Bristol
McBAIN, HEPHZIBAH, Islington. July 30. Ashley & Co, Frederick's place
MITCHELL, THOMAS GIBBINS, Leamington, Esq. June 20. Mitchell, Leamington
MERSON, FRANCIS, Bickham, Somerset. May 21. Ponsford & Co, Bardon
MURDOCH, HARRIET, ROTHERHITHE. June 14. Ashbridge, Whitechapel rd
POPPLEWELL. ROBERT JAMES, Holloway, Traveller. June 1. Wild & Co, Iron-
monger lane

SEYMOUR, MARY, Tonbridge. June 4. Guscotte & Co, Essex st, Strand SHEPPARD, EDWARD REVETT, Bramber, Sussex, Gent. June 2. Riley, Moorgate st

SMITH, FARRER, Sunderland, Cabinet Maker. June 1. Walker, Sunderland
SOLOMON, ROSE, Maida Vale. June 17. Harvey-Samuel, Whittington avenue,
Leadenhall st
TEMPLEMAN, SIMEON, York, Gent. July 11. Cobb, York

TOOLEY, STEPHEN, Aylesbury, Jeweller. May 21. J & T Parrott, Aylesbury
TUTILL, GEORGE, Upton, Essex, Regalia Manufacturer. June 7.

Salters' Hall ct

Parkes,

WAITE, JOHN DEANE, Manby, Lincoln, Clerk. June 1. Allisons & Allisons, Louth

WALL, EMMA, Moseley, Worcester. June 6. Lane & Clutterbuck, Birmingham
WATSON, MAY, Bath. June 8. Tucker, Bath

WHITE, FREDERICK GEORGE, and WILLIAM DUNSFORD WHITE, Upper Thames st,
Wharfingers. June 28. Clarke & Co, Old Broad st
WINGFIELD, JOHN, Sheffield, Gent. May 31. Gould & Coombe, Sheffield

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BANKRUPTCY NOTICES.

London Gazette.-FRIDAY, May 13. RECEIVING ORDERS.

ALLCOCK, CHARLES. Bewdley, Worcester, without employment. Kidderminster. Pet May 7. Ord May 7

ARMSTRONG, HENRY, Lowestoft, Smack Owner. Gt Yarmouth. Pet May 9. Ord May 9

ARMSTRONG, RALPH. Rochdale, Lancs, Licensed Victualler. Oldham. Pet May 10. Ord May 10

BARBER, GEORGE, Liverpool, Tailor. Liverpool. Pet May 10. Ord May 10 BARRINGTON, CALEB, Manchester, China Dealer. Manchester. Pet May 10. Ord May 10

BROADGATE, JOSEPH PALFREMAN, Brigg, Lines, Auctioneer. Gt Grimsby. Pet May 11. Ord May 11

BROWN, ARCHIBALD DOUGLAS, Bristol, Cabinet Manufacturer. Bristol. Pet May 9. Ord May 9

COLE, ROBERT DAVID, Gurnard, I W, Builder. Newport and Ryde. Pet April 23. Ord May 4

CROYDEN, RATCLIFF HENRY, Weymouth, Auctioneer. Dorchester. Pet May 10. Ord May 10

DENNIE, WILLIAM HENRY, Sheffield, Tobacco Manufacturer. Sheffield. Pet May 9. Pet May 9

DOWSETT, EDWARD JOHN, Gt Dunmow, Essex, Picture Frame Maker. Chelmsford. Pet May 10. Ord May 10

FULCHER, GEORGE, Cricketfield rd. Lower Clapton, Potato Salesman. High Court. Pet May 9. Ord May 9

FIELD, JAMES THOMAS, Hastings, Eating house Keeper. Hastings. Pet May 5. Ord May 7

GARRATT, CHARLES, Ridgmount, Bedford, Butcher. Bedford. Pet May 9. Ord May 9

GOODWIN, WILLIAM SLATER, Shottle, Derby, Farmer. Derby. Pet May 9. Ord May 9

GROVE, WILLIAM, Hereford, Nurseryman. Hereford. Pet May 11. Ord May 11 HOLLIS, JOHN, Birmingham, Wheelwright. Birmingham. Pet May 6. Ord May 6

KELSEY, WILLIAM, Bisley, Gloucester, L.R.C.P. and L.R.C.S. Gloucester. Pet May 11. Ord May 11

LEWIS, MORGAN LLEWELLYN, Cardiff, Grocer. Cardiff. Pet May 6. Ord May 6

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