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the Bill seem to be hard upon the present holders of mortgages upon land.
A CORRESPONDENT draws attention to the fact that vendors of lands taken for public purposes by public bodies, under Acts incorporatiug the Land Clauses Consolidation Act, appear to be included among the persons on whom the Land Transfer Bill would impose the duty of being registered as proprietors before selling them; and we would further observe that the damnatory clause 2, (a), (the eifects of which we discussed ante, p. 375), would clearly apply to any public body accepting a conveyance, without insisting on such vendor being so registered as a preliminary step. The wording of clause 2 leaves room for the contention that the vendor would in such cases be liable to pay the costs registration. Also it would seem that in case of a block occurring, owing to press of business, in the Land Transfer Oflice, the public body purchasing would be reduced to the alternative of paying purchase-money for a mere contract shom of all the attributes which usually enable people to proceed upon contracts (and which would possibly be ultrd vires also), or of deferring the execution of public works until the impediments had been cleared away.
These diificulties could probably be somewhat lessened by suitable express provisions inserted in the Bill at some future stage, but e question also suggests itself—why should not such sales and purchases be exempted from the operation of the clause altogether? The purposes of the Bill would be sufficiently met by requiring the public body to register ii, and when, it has occasion to sell to a private person. But to spend time and money in improving the facilities for selling the sites of newly-constructed public oifices, gasworks, railways, and the like, or even in setting time running to cure possible defects in title which purchasers of superfluous lands from public bodies are always willing to shut their eyes to, would appear both a useless and a wasteful proceeding. The question whether the issue of debentures is “ mortgaging land " within this same clause 2 is a further point of interest and importance suggested by the above reflections, and one to which we shall probably revert.
Ir wonm) snail that one of the questions decided by Mr. Justice STIRLING on Saturday in Re Jones was not covered by any reported case ; but the reason for this must surely have been that the question was treated as being free from doubt. Where a client obtains the common order to tax, he cannot dispute the retainer of the solicitor as to the whole of the bill of costs, because he is bound by the admission of retainer contained in the application ; hence, if he desires to dispute the retainer as to the whole bill, he must obtain a special order giving him leave to do so (Re Eld/ridge, 12 Beav. 387; Re Thurgood, 19 Beav. 541). But how does this rule apply to the case of a solicitor obtaining the common order to tax in a case where his retainer is dis uted? The client is in no wa
Lord Justice J si1ns’s well-known declaration in Sqfron Walden
Ir IS sraran that Mr. Justice Ksi"s decision last week in Tomkinson v. South-Eastern Railway 00., granting an interlocutory injunction to restrain the company from subscribing £1,000 to the Imperial Institute, is to be appealed against. We do not see how the learned judge could have refused the injunction consistently with the principles which have been laid down as to the exercise of this jurisdiction. “In order to entitle the plaintifis to an interlocutory injunction," said Lord Justice COTTON in Preston v. Luck (33 W. R. 317, 27 Ch. D., at p. 506), “ it is necessary that the court should be satisfied that there is a serious question to he tried at the hearing, and that, on the facts before it, there is a probability that the plaintifis are entitled to relief.” There can be no doubt as to the existence of the first of these requisites in the recent case; nor can anyone who considers Lord Caiswoxrifs judgment in Hawkcs v. Eastern Counties Railway C0. (5 H. L. Cas. 331)--where he says that “ a statutory corporation, created by Act of Parliament for apartieular purpose, is limited, as to all its powers, by the purposes of its incorporation as defined in its Aet_” —-doubt that there was at least a probability that the plaintifi in the recent case was entitled to relief. We are disposed, therefore, to question the wisdom of an appeal from the recent order. But the question to be decided at the hearing is one of enormous importance, well deserving to be settled by the highest Court_ of Appeal. How far is a statutory corporation justified in expending its funds on objects only indirectly conducive to the purposesdefined in its Act ? Everyone knows that the great railway companies have for years been i.n the habit of contributing to objects which M9 considered likely either to bring traflic to their lines or to benefit their servants, and the tendency of the cases has been to shew that such expenditure as a benevolent employer would bf! l1l<9lY to make (see Hampson v. Price’s Patent Candle Co., 24 W-_ R754), and expenditure in pursuance of “the generally received method of conducting a business" (Taunfon v. Royal Insurance Co., 2 Hem. & M. 135) are justifiable; but we are not BWBW that the cases have hitherto gone further than this.
P bound by the allegation of retainer in the application, and conic l“dK°5-" Fmm the hl9l'°1'l°"1 P°int °£ View the “°°“m°Y °f the sequently is not debarred from objecting to the whole bin on th description may be questioned but it is clear that, under the Ml?
ground that there has been no retainer. How, then, in such case, can the common order be improper? Mr. Justice Srmnme, in accordance with the practice in the taxing master's ofiices, held that
in such a case the common order is proper. The other point in the
case was one of fact rather than of law, but was of some general Importance. Put shortly, the question was this :—A solicitor was appomted clerk to the commissioners of a reservoir at a salary of £15 a year, the resolution appointing him stating that this modest payment was “ to be in satisfaction for his services in giving notices for payment of rates in arrear,_” &c., _b_ut was not to include aflmoney out of pocket o_r law business arismg out of the reservoir Man!’ SW11 BB preparing conyeyances or securities for money l'1‘°We 7 Pfofiefliitlng or defending actions.” Did this appointment °P°1’al'° 59 8 Tetflmer of the solicitor (who, during his tenure for over forty-four years of oflice as clerk to the commissioners, had been paid several bills of costs in addition to his remuneration as clerk) as l°ll¢lt°T W the Wlllmissioners ? Mr. Justice Srmime held that it did not. The solicitor was, he said “the oficef of the comm‘ sioners at a yearly salary, with the dxpectation no doubt on botli sides that he would be employed to transact sulih legal biisine
the commissioners might properly require but without ss as retainer.” The moral of the decision Beemglto be (pam'cu1ar1;niyj
This is a book which sup lies a want rather widely felt, and, we are glad to say, supplies it very efliciently. It contains a singularly complete collection of forms for use in proceedings in the county courts, whether under their ordinary, equitable, or special statutory jurisdictions, other than admiralty and bankruptcy. The forms commence with examples of forms in ordinary proceedings: then follow forms relating to the olficers of the courts; to solicitors; to the control exercised by the High Court over the county court ; and then we come to a most elaborate collection of forms relating to all the proceedings preliminary to, and needed in the course of, and subsequently to, an ordinary action. Next there are given forms in procee ings in actions and matters of a :g_9C1El nature; and, lastly, we have the forms relating to proce ings under the jurisdiction in equity. The forms we have examined are accurate, and we can speak in high terms of the notes and directions which are added on the different subjects. They are concise, practical, and thoughtful, and collect and state with care and iutelligenoe the material decisions on practical points. The work constitutes an admirable companion to the standard books on county court practice, and may be commended to the notice of practitioners.
The new judge required in the Chancery Division, I would most respectfully su mit, should be appointed from the equity bar. The common law judges at present number fifteen, the chancery judges only five.
There can be no doubt that economists are startled when it is proposedto increase the number of the judges ; but it mustbe apgirent that, although there are so many judges in the Queen‘s ench Division, there are so few in the C anoery Division. To get rid of the “ Divisional Courts " should be the anxious desire of every economist, the more so as these courts are not a pellate courts in the full sense of the word. Some of the judges might welibe taken from the Queen's Bench Division to form an Appeal Court No. 3, or he added to the present Ap cal Courts No. 1 and No 2.
The scheme for amalgamating the offices of chancery taxing masters and registrars with that of the chief clerks of the chancery judges I hope will be resisted. I do not believe it would work so well as the present system, by which there is a division of labour which is beneficial to the suitors, and to destroy which would, I believe, be the reverse.
If it should be determined to give a staff of chief and other clerks to Mr. Justice Kokewich, and “ economy " stands in the way, I think that might be got over by appointing only two chief clerks and dividing the alphabet by two instead of three; the principal clerks, or as they are called by classification, “ first class clerks," might be selected from the chambers of the exis'ing chief clerks, and a sulficient number of second class clerks from those chambers who are
ualified for promotion might be appointed first class clerks to Mr. ilustioe Kekewich. This might more easily be done as, by reason of the decline in the number of oi-ders directing administration accounts to be taken in chambers, many of the clerks who were appointed to take, or who usuall did take these accounts, could easily e spared, and mi ht devote their energies to the work of the chambers of Mr. J usticefiiekewich. JAMES RAWLI.\'80N.
Upper Holloway, N., May 11.
This was an appeal from a divisional court (Day and Wills, J J .). The plaintiffs had recovered judgment against the defendant Lewls for £198, ut the sheriff was unable to levy execution. They accordingly applied to Maulsty, J ., at chambers to appoint a receiver ol Lewis's salary, but the application was refused. They then applied, szpartc, to the Divisional Court, who granted the up lication, and appointed a receiver of the whflle of Lewis's weekl salar . It appeared that Lewis was ii managing clerk to a firm of soliciltors aia salary of £4 per week. It was now urged on ll]! behalf that the order for a receiver ought notto have been made in 1118 absence, and that this was not a proper case for making such an order. _ Tiiii Couar (FRY and Lor-as, L.JJ.) allowed the appeal. Far, L-J-| ""1 that orders of this kind affecting a person's maintenance and livelihood ought not to be made i.n the absence of the defendant. The court had 11° doubt jurisdiction to make an order for a receiver upon an exparle appllcation, but that jurisdiction ought to be exercised with the groflwlt caution, and only in cases of emergency. The cider was borrowed from the Chancery practice, and it was there almost unknown to make such I11 order on an ex partv application. The mere fact that Lewis had refused to assist the shenff in levying execution on his goods by declining to 09¢)‘ the door to him was no ground for making such an order agslust him Ill his absence. It was the duty of the court under ord. 50, r. l5a,toseeit such an order would be just or convenient. In this case it would fulfll neither 0; those requisites since it gave e uitable execution against the wlwlftf Lewis's means of maintenance. It would, therefore, make it 1mP°°“'bd° for him to continue in his employment, and would thus defeat its own 9&5 by destroying the very fund it was intended to receive. 1m=rs,_L-J » he wished entirely to indorse the remarks of Lindley, L.-I-7 "1 L""“.' " Harris (as w. R. 112, 18 Q. B. 1). 127), where he ma, " II 111'“ =PP"°?' tions for a receiver ought not to be granted even after judgment stile?’ in cases of emergency, and it is desirable that this rule shouldvbe boll" mind, and not be lightly departed from.”—Oov:\'sizL, Lrww Mm” ' J. B. Banlm. Bomcirons, Maddium ; Jllluon it Trotter.
‘May 14, I887. THE SOLICITORS’
JOURNAL. g 461
ssion of the mills with the view of selling them as a going concern.
Trrr: Couar or Arrnar. (COTTON, Lrxnuzr, and Bowen, L.JJ.) atfirmed the
The Iguestion in this case was whether the full pay of an oificer in the Royal avy on active service could be attached for the payment of his wife's costs of s divorce suit. Section 141 of the Act 44 dz 45 Vict. c. 58 expressly makes void any assignment of the deferred pay oi any oiilcer in the army, but section 5 of the Act 28 and 29 Vict. c. 73, applies only to assignments of the pay of a “ 0fl6or'd|'naf¢ oflicer, selman, or marine in the navy," and not to assignments of pay made by commissioned ofllcers. In the present case the husband was a surgeon in the navy on active service, his rank being that of a lieutenant. The wife sought to attach his pay for
Imperial Institute; provided that any shareholder who declines to boa party to any such donation shall have his proportion returned to him with his next dividend warrant." This resolution was carried by a large majority. The plaintiff was not present at the meeting, but after reading a report of the proceedings, he wrote to the secretary of the company, on the llth of March, protesting against the company’s funds being applied as was proposed, and threatening legal proceedings. The secretary replied, pointing out that the directors were accustomed to act in obedience to the orders of their shareholders, and. not otherwise, and that, having regard to the amount of the dplaintiffs holding, his proportion of the subscription would be about 13 . After further correspondence the plaintifi commenced this action, and now moved for an injunction to restrain the company from subscribing the £1,000 in the manner proposed. In opposition to the motion, the general manager of the company made an aflidavit stating that, in recommending the proprietors to contribute to the funds of the Institute, the directors desired to further its establishment in the belief that a great number of visitors would be thereby drawn from the districts served by their railway, and their traific largely increased; and that, inasmuch as the previous exhibitions at South Konsington had, by the issue of through tickets from their system of railways, increased the
traflic revenue of the company by many thousand pounds, the directors believed that the establishment of the Institute at South Kensington
would lead to a similar result. Further, that railway companies in general had been accustomed to contribute to the funds oi objects likely to en
courage trafllc upon their lines,such as race-meetings and regattas, and also
to hospitals and other public institutions which might benefit their ser
vants. It was contended, on behalf of the defendant company, that the
proposed subscription, being conducive to the prosperity of the railway,
was not ulmi vires, on the authority of the cases of Tnunlan v. Royal Insurance Co. (I2 W. R. 549, 2 H. & M. 135), where it was hold to be
within the power of insurance companies to pay in their discretion risks
which they were not legally liable to pay: liumpson v. Pm-e's Patent Candle Co. (24 W’. R. 754), where a payment by the directors of extra wages to
the company's workmen was allowed; and Hutton v. West Cork Irnilwog 0o. (31 W. R. 542, 827, 23 Oh. D. 654), where a similar gratuity would
have been allowed if the company had still been a going concern.
Kn, J., said that he had no doubt that it was the duty of the court to
ll" Pliment of_ her costs in the suit, which he llfld 1189" °1'¢lel'°d Y0 pay grant the injunction. It was well settled that, if a proposed act were
and had not paid. Butt, J., held that the pay could not be BtY'B¢l19d- outside the powers of a company, any shareholder might ask the court
Tun Oounr or Avvizar. (Conox, LINDLRY, and Bowen, L JJ.) aififmed to stop it, and the court had no discretion in the matter. In this case, so
P .7 811 1 8 conn that lt was protected by the general law. The pay W88 intended $0 keep Burlington House, or at the Grosvenor Gallery, or Madame Tussaud's, or the otlicer in a position to discharge his duties properly. It had been held any other exhibition in London. The only ground suggested for allowing l'hal_'m °m°el"5 ll“lf'Pa.Y could 1109 be “89l8ll'3d- Alld if lmlf-DBL Wlllvll the proposed payment was that the tratlic would be thereby increased ; but was intended to keep the oflicer in a proper-position to discharge his duties, this 1-egult wuuld follow from any exhibition which people wished to see, when he should be called on to do so, could not be assigned, it ioll0W9d and, as he understood the law, to apply the funds of a railway company Hi“ lull P51, Which was given to the ofllcer to enable him to discllafgfl towards such an exhibition would clearly be improper. The proposed lils Present duties, could not be assigned. And if the pay could not be payment was, therefore, in his opinion ullwi vireo. The resolution pro"'l8ll@d, it Would be equally wrong to attach it by any order of ills C0llrt- vided that any shareholder who objected to the donation should have his L"‘lll-"1 L-J-. was astonished that the question should have been raised. proportion returned to him ; but a shareholder had a right to say that he U l"ll'PlY could not be assigned it would be 8 startling thing ll fllll fly did not want his money spent in this way at all, and that he objected to
rm-sons, Irmglols g» Blden ; Bramall Q Wlnta. she _ _ _ had long been considered by managers to be payable at their discretion,
that risks, for which insurance companies were not legally liable,
CHARLES v. JONES-Kay, J., 7th May. and were paid in order to impress the p_ublic with an idea of their liberM ality. He had always considered that this case had carried the doctrine 0nrosos—Powxn or S.sr.r—Is-rsassr on Svnrncs Pnocssns or SALl— of V
A m°ll8B8¢e ll! possession sold the mortgaged property in 1884 under a gab company from doing what others had always done. The other cases power of sale contained in the mortgage. In an action brought against only held that directors who, acting as good masters often did, gave extra
lm l°I an account, he admitted that £600, and that only, was due from wages to workmen with whom they were satisfied in order to encourage hlm in respect oi’ rents and profits and surplus proceeds of sale, and he them in diligent and faithful service, were not acting beyond their powers. flllfieguently paid this amount into court. The chief clerk, by his certifl- None of these cases touched the present one, and he should be the last "it, Olmd that, in addition to this, there was due from him a further judge on the bench to extend their meaning. It was important to keep W111 Of £591 8s. lld. The question was whether he ought to pay interest incorporated companies within the limits of their powers, and the court on these two sums from the date of the completion of the sale and had always done so. To argue from the cases cited that any expenditure Whether he ought to have his costs of the inquiries I which would indirectly conduce to the prosperity of a company was inlrd
K", J , said that he could not under the Ircumstanc iv h vim was an extravagant proposition. No kind of objection could be made
com 1° ‘>888 raised the question whether it was ullrri vires of a railway sums of stock which the plaintiff alleged had been transferred out of his pan t
Y 0 subscribe moneys of the com an b wa of donation or n °:ll°l'WlBe for the urposes of the Im rial Fnstitirtey Atameetin of the a
ame by means of a forged transfer. One of the witnesses who_ had ttested the execution of the transfer being dangerously ill, the plaintiif
p Oprletois of the defendant railway ggmpany held -on the 5th ofglliarch moved, er pm-te, that his examination might be taken do bone em.
KAY, J., in granting the application, observed that he was surprised to
ve such depositions in evidence at the trial of this action " &c
1 RB they may be ed vised, to subscribe the sum of £l7,000 to the I Ii’: his opinion these words ought not to be inserted, f0! at iil\° Vial the
witness might be capable of being examined, and it would ' then be necessary for the plalntifl to shew that he was incapable of being examined before leave would be given to use the evidence. In other respects the form of order given in Seton on Decrees was correct. Bis_1ordship_, in reply to a question whether the order should direct a special examiner, said that the matter would go to the examiner in rotation.—Coi:Nsni,, Whitaker. Soniciroas, Stephens Q Stephens, for Henry Hand, Macclesfield.
This was a motion for foreclosure absolute. It iippPM'»'(l that a receiver had been appointed iii the action, and that the plaintiff had written to the defendants, statingthat the receiver had received up to datea sum of some £500, and had expended some £100, and that the plaintiff was willing to take such amount. and any further amount which should be received by the receiver, in reduction of a sum of £5,000 found due to the plaintifi by the chief clerk's certificate. and was willing also to allow a deduction to the defendants of a sum of £500 if the residue of the £5,000 should be paid at or before the date fixed for foreclosure absolute. It was stated that the mortgaged property was deficient, and that no answer had been received to the plaintifi's letter, and that the plaintiff had served on the defendants notice of the present motion. It was stated that the plaintiff had adopted the above-mentioned course asa means of obviating the difficulties arising from the decision in Jenner-Furl V. Needharn (31 Ch. D. 500).
Oiirrrv, J ., said that although there was nothing to shew that the defendants had accepted the plaintiffs offer, yet he should make an order as asked, and the defendants might, if they thought fit, move to discharge the order. He would make the order more readily because the defendants had had notice of the motion.—Soi.iciroas, Harvey, Oliver, 4 C-apron, for E. 0. New-ey, Birmingham.
This was a summons by the plaintifis, under rule 27 of order 19, to strike out some of the defences raised by the defendant in his statement of defence, on the ground that they tended “ to prejudice, embarrass, or delay the fair trial of the action." The action was brought by the administrators of a wife against the executor of her husband, claiming to recover from the husband's estate certain sums of money which they alleged that he had received on trust for the separate use of the wife. By his statement of defence the defendant denied that the husband had ever received the moneys in question, and said that, if he had received them, he had not received them upon any trust. The defendant also alleged inthe alternative that, if the moneys had been received, they had been repaid to the wife, or that she had made a gift of them to her husband. The defendant also pleaded accord and satisfaction, set off, and the Statute of Limitations and delay. The plaintiffs asked that the defences of repayment, gift, accord and satisfaction, and sei. off might be struck out as embarrassing and inconsistent.
Nauru, J .,‘ held that the defendant was not entitled to plead inconsistent alternative defences of fact, and that the defence was em narrassiug ; but he gave the defendant leave to amend.—Couxsai., Cusem-Ilardy, Q.O., and B. Eyre; U;y'oIm. Sonicirons, Crouch, Spencer, 4- Edwards ; Morgan, Son, Q Upyohn.
‘ nominally and personally a party ; and the court could not make a per.
sonal order for costs against the liquidators where, as here, they were only sued in the name of the company. The order for costs must therefore be in the ordinary form against the company 0lLly.—C01‘N8BL, Warmington, Q.O., and G. F. Hart; Barber, Q.O., and Townsmd. SOLICITORS, .l[. Abraham-s, Son, Q U0. ; Hurford Q Taylor.
The question in this case was whether it was the duty of a bankrupt, part of whose property consisted of a contingent reversionary interest, to submit to a medical examination to enable the trustee in the bankruptcy to insure his life, and then sell the reversionary interest with the policy. The bankrupt was entitled to a contingent revcrsionary interest in the event of his surviving his mother, who was aged sixty-nine. The trustee had an opportunity of selling this interest for £800 if the bankrupt's life could be insured, and the trustee called upon the bankrupt to submit for this purpose to a medical examination. The bankrupt refused. Before the bankruptcy he had tried to raise money upon the reversionary interest for the purpose of carrying on his business, and at that time he submitted to a medical examination for the purpose of insuring his life, and his life was accepted, but the insurance was not can-i_ed out. The bankrupt applied for an order of discharge, and the oflicial receiver reported that, to the extent of refusing to submit to a medical examination, the bankrupt had failedto aid to the utmost of his power in the realization of his property as required by sub-section 3 of section 24 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883. Mr. Registrar Gifiard, on the authority of Ez purl: Bullock (16 Q. B. D. 698), in which Cave, J., held that a bankrupt could not be ordered to submit to a medical examination for the purpose of insuring his life, declined to take this refusal into account, but suspended the bankrupt’s discharge for six months on another ground. The Board of Trade and the trustee appealed. It was contended that the bankrupt had not comfilied with sub-section 2 of section 24, which requires that adebtor sha “generally do all such acts and things i_n relation to his property and the distribution of the proceeds amongst his creditors as may be reasonably required by the oiiicial receiver, special manager, or trustee, or may be prescribed by general rules, or be directed by the court."
THE COURT or APPEAL (Lord Esuiin, M.R., and Far and Lorss, L -l~l_-l aflirined the decision, Fur, L.J., dissenting. Lord Esaim, M-R» “"1 that the question was not whether the conduct of the bankruptwasreasqw able, but whether it was brou ht within the Bankruptcy Act, 1883 bection 28 said that “the court shall take info consideration a report of llw oflicial receiver as to the baiikrupt's conduct and affairs, and_ may grail!or refuse, or suspend the order of discharge." In his lordship's oplalolli " ccndnct" there referred to, if it did not come within the cases specified in section 28, must be something mentioned in section 2-i. The ‘l“e”"°“' therefore, was whether the refusal to be medically examined was a refusal to do an act within the meaning of section 24. The object of the i1_1edl_68l examination was to enable a policy to be efiected on the banln'\1P“ Me’ so as to give a greater value to his contingent reversionary interest. Til; policy never would be the hankrupt’s property. It would be sold Wilt the reversionary interest to the purchaser. The act which the _bII1h'"P was reqluired to do would relate to the creation of property which neg‘; would e part of the banki-upt's property. The act which he will ftql" to do had no relation to his property or the distribution of it. but "5 Q‘ qnired for the purpose of adding a new value to his pl'0P91'tYg SF ' section 4 of section 24 made a wilful failure to perform the dillflflfl 1"]; posed by that section upon the debtor a contempt of court, and it wou E be extremely dangerous to bring within that section any case which 1:31 not clearly within it. In his lordship’s opinion Ez parts Bullock was1"8 ,1; decided. Fur, L.J., differed from the rest of the court and from Er [We Bullock. He founded his judgment upon the aparticnlar facts of theh 011;: The bankrupt before the bankruptcy propos to raise inoney on t shad vsrsionsry interest, and submitted himself for exammatlon. H6 “V stated that he had contracted no disease since then, and withoallgge reason he refused to submit to a. medical BX8mi!1atl0I1- _ will l e BC, within sub-section 2 of section 24? The act required of him washailme “ in relation to his property." The property depended 11P°“ mu nu’ and would realize a far larger surn if the contingency Idllbe which it depended could be got rid of. The act was one which fiiillmml reasonably required, for a reasonable man would feel under an 0 516% to do it. And under sub-section 3 the bankrupt was bound f/0 lid 9° Bu so most of his power in the realization of his property, which must :11?! only that it might produce the greatest amount of money, and ill!" °°h bub be done in the present case by,a policy being effected. No doubt t ehupt’ rupt could be committed to prison for contempt, but this boll med having taken so unreasonable a course, would be very PY_°P°l'l7 °°'mTd de. if he persisted in his refusal; whereas, on the other view, he ooilm the prive his creditors of a valuable property. Lorss, L.-l-, “Blvd '1 Master of the Rolls. _ .nt the
Leave was asked to appeal to the House of Lords. 011 lb" P°‘ le,“, °°"" reserved their ludilment, but on the eon inst. the court 8"§°,,,,. to appeal.—Coi.msiii., Sir E. Clarke, S.G., and .7. E. LI"7‘l“"" roii, Solicitor to the Beard of Trade.