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VICE-CHANCELLOR BACON.

THE retirement of Vice-Chancellor Bacon removes from the bench

a judge of marked peculiarities, both of temperament and of intellect. It removes, too, the oldest of her Majesty's judges, and the last of those who have filled the office of Vice-Chancellor since its creation in 1813. Sir James Bacon was born in February, 1798, and was called to the bar at Gray's-inn on the 16th of May, 1827. He became a Queen's Counsel in 1846, and in 1868 he was appointed Commissioner in Bankruptcy for the London District. This post he held till the end of the following year when he became Chief Judge in Bankruptcy, and in June, 1870, he was appointed Vice-Chancellor, at an age when most men, who are still able to think, are thinking of retiring. merits, while they have been entertained with tales of the peculiariThe members of the profession have long appreciated the great ties and accomplishments, of the learned judge; but to the general public he was probably as little known as any man could be who had been on the bench long enough to earn a retiring pension. Neither the ill-ventilated court which he so long occupied in Lincoln's-inn, nor the melancholy place in which, on some thirty days in the year, he discharged his duties as Chief Judge in Bankruptcy, nor the more cheerful court to which he removed after the Easter Vacation of 1883, was often thronged by a large and attentive audience. His was not the court into which sensational cases naturally found their way. Plaintiffs who had been shabbily treated, but whose cases were such as could hardly admit of legal redress, were in no hurry to appeal to him for unavailing sympathy in the days when a plaintiff in chancery had the privilege of choosing his judge. Nor did it appear that a desire for "swift justice" caused any rush of litigants anxious to have their rights determined by him. Before the days when causes began to be assigned to the judges in rotation his cause list was largely filled by means of transfers from other branches of the court; and it was probably on this account that it usually contained a large number of cases requiring tedious investigations, cases of which the other judges of first instance would naturally be glad to be relieved.

To the hearing of the cases brought before him Vice-Chancellor Bacon addressed himself with an almost apathetic patience, which was perhaps recommended by considerations to which he once referred in answer to a junior counsel who expressed his regret at having detained the court so long. "Don't apologize to me. You haven't detained me. I am bound to be here, and I must be listening to this case, or the next, or to some other. I have no reason to suppose that the next case will be less uninteresting than this." Yet it was impossible for any observant person to suppose that the Vice-Chancellor did not carefully attend to what was going on before him. We have often been surprised at the readiness with which, in delivering judgment, he marshalled the facts of the case and the particulars of the evidence which had been given. And though he certainly was reticent enough (and, in this respect, has left an example which might perhaps be followed with advantage by some of those who were lately his colleagues) yet the remarks addressed by him to counsel during argument sufficiently proved that his reticence was not the result of indifference. Nor is it to be supposed that he always displayed an endurance incapable of being surprised into at least the appearance of irritation. His remarks not unfrequently exhibited rather more acerbity than was likely to be agreeable to an untrained taste. These remarks were distributed with an impartiality worthy of the judgment seat. Nemo ex hoc numero mihi non donatus abibit might seem to have been the maxim by which he dispensed his sarcasms amongst those who practised before him. Probably no counsel who, in the course of his practice, had much to do with Vice-Chancellor Bacon failed to elicit from him some remark too personal to be ignored, too true to be palatable, and too pointed to be readily forgotten. Yet, even when his observations were most caustic, there appeared to be something either in the matter or in the speaker's manner which prevented such observations from exciting protest or creating annoyance; and, in spite of the proverbial difficulty of appreciating a joke made at one's own expense, it often happened that the victim, though, perhaps, not endowed with a keen sense of the ludicrous, would join heartily in the laugh raised against him.

It is no doubt easier to illustrate by examples than adequately to analyze the Baconian method. We will take one or two examples out of many which occur to us. We remember an occasion on which a pertinacious advocate, after having completed a somewhat dreary review of one part of his case, said:-"Then, my lord, we come to the matter of the accounts, to which I desire to direct your lordship's attention." "This is not the place for it; the accounts cannot be taken here-they must be discussed in chambers." "There are only three items which I wish to mention." "Three more than it is my duty to consider now; three more than I propose to consider." "There is one item which I am particularly anxious to go into." "Go into it by all means," said the judge, but don't ask me to go into it. Go into it with my chief clerk; or, if you cannot wait till you get

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an appointment with him-for I don't wish to abridge your lawful enjoyments-go into it alone."

On another occasion a counsel, notorious for long-winded speeches, wandering away from the matter in hand, was thus addressed by the learned judge:-" Mr. X., at any other time, or in any other place, I should be most happy to converse with you on nothing to do with the case before me, and I must request you to this or on any other subject, but what you are now saying has confine yourself to the subject-matter of the case." And the learned judge, having completed with elaborate politeness this address, relieved his mind by adding, sotto voce, "jabbering idiot"!

In another case the question was whether the defendant, who lived on one side of the street, ought to be prevented from so increasing the height of his house as to diminish the amount of light coming made the following remarks:to the windows of the plaintiff, who lived on the other side of the street. In delivering judgment the Vice-Chancellor is said to have

"The plaintiff is an artist. The proposed building will undoubtedly diminish the amount of light which has for the statutory period been in the habit of finding its way into the windows of the plaintiff's studio. An attempt has been made to justify this interference with the plaintiff's property, and for this purpose certain considerations have been suggested which, by the courtesy of the counsel on the other side, have been called an argument. I am told that if the plaintiff's work is to be properly executed it is desirable that light should fall upon it from only one source; that the studio is sufficiently lighted by a skylight, with which the defendant's building cannot possibly interfere; and that the defendant is conferring a positive benefit upon the plaintiff by removing the inconvenience which would necessarily be caused by an access of light from other sources. Now I am not aware that there is any rule of law or any principle of equity which confers upon a man's opposite neighbours a right to decide upon the amount of light which is good for him, and I am of opinion that the gentlemen with whom this argument originated are

in no danger of suffering from an excess of illumination."

In another case, a plaintiff who sought to have bis name removed from the list of shareholders of a company relied upon the statement of a witness who had published a pamphlet purporting to shew that the company had been fraudulently floated, and that its business had been dishonestly conducted. The witness admitted that his information had been derived from the secretary of the company, whose acquaintance he had cultivated with the express design of eliciting from him something detrimental to his employers. After commenting on the conduct of the witness, the judge said:—

"Out of this scurrilous libel, to which the writer of it referred with manifest satisfaction as 'my pamphlet,' the plaintiff has culled and got together a number of odds and ends of incoherent tales, a set of particles and patches and fragments and scraps and rags and shreds and sticks and straws, out of which he has constructed a kind of jackdaw's nest, not without mud enough to hold it together."

But we must not multiply instances. Nor do we desire to attempt to estimate the Vice-Chancellor's abilities as a judge. No doubt he had his failings, amongst which may perhaps be justly reckoned a readiness to make up his mind too early as to the merits of a case; an excessive ingenuity in finding reasons to support the opinion which he had too hastily adopted; and a marvellous facility in ignoring what might be said against it. This was, perhaps, only what was to be expected from one who, when he had reached his threescore years and ten, was still an advocate. But we desire to express our conviction that he possessed many and great merits which are far from being common on the bench; and he must indeed have been a dull man who could practise long before Vice-Chancellor Bacon without finding anything better to imitate than his occasional asperity. We will only add that we part with great regret from a judge who combined so much of the vivacity of youth with the experience of a very mature age, and whose great originality was adorned by so many accomplishments.

CORRESPONDENCE.

SOLICITORS' ADVERTISEMENTS. [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir, The enclosed advertisement appeared in the Weekly Times of Sunday last. Surely it is time that some steps were taken to put an end to this disgraceful system of touting. C. G. SHERWOOD.

23, John-street, Bedford-row, London, W.C., Nov. 9.

The following is the advertisement enclosed:

LAW BUSINESS. -A well-established Firm of City Solicitors, being aware that bonâ fide Cases of Divorce and Probate, &c., and Claims for Damages or to Property, are often not carried out for want of Professional Aid, are willing to Give Advice by post or at interview without charge, and to take up approved cases at their own risk.-Address LEX, 64, Gresham-street, London, E.C.

NEW ORDERS, &c.

PAY OFFICE-SUPREME COURT.
REMITTANCES BY POST.

The attention of persons within the United Kingdom entitled to payment of money out of court is directed to the increased facilities, under rule 48 of the Supreme Court Funds Rules, 1886, for obtain ing payment without personal attendance:

1. Dividends or other periodical payments (without limit of amount) may be remitt d by post as they fall due upon the request of the persons entitled thereto, attested by a justice of the peace, or a commissioner to administer oaths, or a clerk in holy orders, or a notary public [Rule 48 (d)].

2. A direction for payment, not exceeding £1,000 (other than a periodical payment), specially crossed to the banking account of a person or firm whose name and address are stated in the order or other authority, or certified (as specified in the rule), will be remitted by post upon the written application of such person or firma [Rule 48 (a)]. 3. A direction for payment, not exceeding £500 (other than a periodical payment), to a person not having a banking account, or whose name and address are not ascertained as above mentioned, will be remitted by post upon a request signed by such person and attested by a justice of the peace, or a commissioner to administer oaths, or a clerk in holy orders, or a notary public [Rule 48 (b)]. 4. A direction for payment of a sum not exceeding £10 (other than a periodical payment) to a person whose address is furnished to the Paymaster in the manner specified in the rule, will be remitted by post upon the written request of such person, without attestation [Rule 48 (c)].

Requests for remittances may be sent to the Paymaster by post. Forms for the purpose may be obtained in rooms 5, 419, and 420. (Signed) W. HENRY WHITE, Paymaster. Royal Courts of Justice, October, 1886.

CASES OF THE WEEK.

above terms.

section 57 of the Judicature Act, 1873, to make an order of reference, and there was also a question as to the mode of the exercise of the judicial discretion given by that section. The plaintiff, by his writ, claimed an injunction to restrain the defendants, who were builders, and who were engaged in rebuilding a house adjoining the plaintiff's house, from taking away, or in anywise injuring, the supports of the plaintiff's house, and also from continuing to damage such house and the supports thereof, and also from continuing any other works at the house adjoining the plaintiff's house so as to cause injury and damage to the plaintiff's house and the supports thereof, and also claiming damages. In pursuance of notice, the plaintiff moved for an interlocutory injunction in the Judge. The plaintiff's counsel asked for an injunction, but told the The motion was heard by Grantham, J., as Vacation judge that the evidence was conflicting on the question whether any injury had been done to the plaintiff's house and its supports by the defendants' operations. The judge suggested that the best course would be to refer the matter to a special referee, to inquire and report to the court whether any injury had been done, and what damages (if any) the defendants ought to pay to the plaintiff. The plaintiff's counsel assented to this view, and the defendants' counsel, though he said that he was not instructed to consent to any order of reference, agreed n this view of the result of the evidence, and the judge thereupon made an order of reference to the effect above stated. The order was not expressed to be made by consent. The defendants appealed from the order, and, on the order was not technically a consent order, yet, after the course taken behalf of the plaintiff, the preliminary objection was taken that, though by the defendants' counsel at the hearing, they were not entitled to appeal. On behalf of the defendants it was contended that the judge had no jurisdiction to make the order under section 56 or section 57 of the Judicature Act of 1873, and that, not having heard the affidavits read, he could not have exercised a judicial discretion in making the order. THE COURT (COTTON, BOWEN, and FRY, L.JJ.), held that the preliminary objection must be allowed. COTTON, L.J., said that it would be impossible for business to be carried on if it could be said that, under such circumstances, the judge was not exercising a judicial discretion. It was everyday practice for a judge to ask counsel whether his affidavits answered the case made on the other side, and, if counsel replied that he could not say they did, it would be wrong for the judge to require the affidavits to be read at length. It would entirely destroy the mode in which business was conducted in the English courts (whatever might be the case in other countries) in reliance on the statements of counsel. If, under such circumstances, the court were to allow the case to be reopened, they might be doing great injustice. It might be that the defendants had obtained the advantage of escaping from an order for an

MOWATT . CASTLE STEEL AND IRON WORKS CO.-C. A. No. 2, injunction and of completing their works. The only question, then, was 3rd November.

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In this case a question arose as to the rights of the holder for value of a document which purported to be a debenture duly issued by and binding on a company, but which, in fact, was not issued so as to bind the company. The action was brought by a holder of debentures issued by the defendant company, on behalf of himself and the other holders of debentures, to realize their security. The benefit of the judgment was claimed by persons who were the holders of some documents which purported to be debentures issued by the company. They were sealed with the company's seal, signed by two of the directors, and countersigned by the secretary, and bore date the 10th of May, 1882. The claim was resisted by the plaintiff on behalf of the other debentureholders. Both Chitty, J., and the Court of Appeal came to the conclusion that these particular debentures were not in fact issued until December, 1882, after the presentation of a petition to wind up the company, on which a winding-up order was subsequently made. Chitty, J., refused to admit the claims, and his decision was affirmed on behalf of the appellants. It was argued that, as against a holder for value with notice, the company were estopped from denying that the debentures were issued at the date which they bore, and that the prior holders of valid debentures, all of which were to be paid pari passu, were equally estopped. They took their debentures subject to the rights of all subsequent holders of valid debentures, and also to the claims of all persons as to whom the company were estopped from denying that they were the holders of valid debentures. COTTON, L.J., said that, even if the company were bound by estoppel, as to which he would not express any opinion, the other holders of valid debentures could not be so bound. When it was said that all the debenture-holders were to rank pari passu, it was only meant that those who were rightly debenture-holders should so rank-not persons whom the company had wrongly admitted to be debenture-holders. The company could not by an admission by way of estoppel bind persons who had previously acquired rights against them. A man could not bind by an admission by way of estoppel those who did not claim through him by virtue of some act done by him after the admission. BOWEN, L.J., agreed. He expressed great doubt whether even the company would be bound, though it was not necessary to decide this. But there was not a shadow of a ground for saying that the other debenture-holders were bound. FRY, L.J., concurred.-COUNSEL, Farwell; Macnaghten, Q C., and W. Latham; Macaskie. SOLICITORS, J. H. Hortin; Robins, Cameron, & Kemm; Davidson & Morriss.

WHITE v. PETO-C. A. No. 2, 3rd November. PRACTICE-ORDER OF REFERENCE-JURISDICTION-EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION-JUDICATURE ACT, 1873, ss. 56, 57.

In this case a question arose as to the jurisdiction of the court, under

whether the judge, exercising a judicial discretion, had jurisdiction to make the order without consent. Both the parties being there, and the defendants' counsel not suggesting that he was taken by surprise, no objection of form could arise by reason of the notice of motion not asking for the order. The judge exercised his discretion upon the materials which both parties thought fit to bring before hia. And, in his lordship's opinion, there was power to make the order under section 57 of the Judicature Act of 1873, the matter being one which required "scientific or local investigation," if, in the opinion of the court, that investigation could not be conveniently made before a jury. And, the judge having exercised his discretion in this way, there was no ground for the interference of this court. BowEN, L.J., concurred, adding that he had observed a practice growing up of drawing up such orders in a loose and ambiguous form, not shewing whether it was intended to make the order under section 56 or section 57 of the Act. He thought the order ought to shew on its face under which section it was intended to be made. FRY, L.J., said that Schedule K to the R. S. C., 1883, contained appropriate forms of orders (Nos. 32 and 33) under sections 56 and 57, and those forms ought to be followed.-COUNSEL, Grosvenor Woods and Bramwell Davis; Millar, Q.C., and H. Courthope Munroe. SOLICITORS, Tatham, Son, & Lousada; J. J. Chapman.

Re MILLS' ESTATE-C. A. No. 2, 9th November. COSTS JURISDICTION-DISCRETION OF COURT-JUDICATURE ACT, 1873, s. 23-JUDICATURE ACT, 1875, s. 16-R. S. C., 1883, LXV., 1—R. S. C., 1875, LV., 1.

which had been paid in by the Commissioners of Works and Public In this case there was a petition for the payment out of court of money Buildings, in respect of land which they had taken under the powers conferred on them by the Acts 3 & 4 Vict. c. 87 and 9 & 10 Vict. c. 34, which contained no provision for the payment by the commissioners of the costs of a petition for the payment of money out of court. One question was, whether section 80 of the Lands Clauses Act was to be considered as incorporated in the Act 9 & 10 Vict. c. 34. In Re Cherry's Settled Estates (4 De G. F. & J. 332), Lord Westbury, C., held that there was no such incorporation, but in Re Wood's Estate (31 Ch. D. 607), Lord Esher, M.R., expressed his disapproval of that decision, though it was not then necessary to overrule it. In the present case Bacon, V.C., had ordered the commissioners to pay the costs of the petition, on the ground that rule 1 of order 65 gave the court jurisdiction to do so. THE COURT OF APPEAL (COTTON, BOWEN, and FRY, L.JJ.) reversed the decision, on the ground that there was no jurisdiction. COTTON, L J., was of opinion that the Lands Clauses Act was not incorporated in the Act 9 & 10 Vict. c. 34. That point was settled by Re Cherry's Settled Estates, and he could not agree could not, he thought, be disregarded, and in his opinion it was right. with the dictum of Lord Esher, M.R. The decision of Lord Westbury As to the other point, up to the passing of the Judicature Act it was clear that the commissioners could not have been ordered to pay these costs.

THE NEWPORT (MONMOUTH) SLIPWAY, &c., Co. v. PAYNTER-
C. A. No. 2, 10th November.
PRACTICE-PARTICULARS OF ALLEGED FRAUD-R. S. C., 1883, XIX. 6, 7.
This was an appeal from the decision of Kay, J. (ante, p. 11), the ques-
tion being whether the defendants should be ordered to give further and
better particulars of certain fraudulent and false entries which the
plaintiffs alleged to have been made in their books by the defendants.
The plaintiffs had, in September, 1883, purchased from the defendants,
P. and S., the business of engineers and ship repairers which they carried
on, and it was then agreed that the defendants should take the purchase-
money partly in cash and partly in shares of the plaintiffs; that P. and S.
respectively should be employed by the company as general manager and
manager of the engineering department for the term of two years; and
that the defendants should guarantee that the net profits of the company
for two years should be sufficient to pay a dividend of not less than seven
and a-half per cent., and that, if they did not, the defendants would make
good the deficiency, but that they were not to be liable beyond £5,000 on
the guarantee. By the present action the company claimed damages from
the defendants for fraud. Since the formation of the company the
defendants had kept their books, and by the books it appeared that a
profit had been made sufficient to pay a dividend of seven and a-half per
cent., and such a dividend had been accordingly paid. The statement of
claim alleged that the defendants had made false and fraudulent entries
in the books in order to make it appear that such a profit had been earned,
so that they might escape liability upon their guarantee, and that no
profits had been, in fact, made. The defendants took out a summons
asking for an account in writing of the particulars of the improper, wrong,
fraudulent, and false entries alleged in the statement of claim, and an
order was made that the plaintiffs should "deliver further particulars in
writing as asked" with reference to the statement of claim. The plaintiffs
then delivered particulars, which consisted merely of a list of the entries
of which they complained, but not shewing in what way the entries were
alleged to be false and fraudulent. On behalf of the defendants it was
contended that they were entitled to know what was the case which they
had to meet. Kay, J., held that the defendants were not entitled to any
further information. THE COURT OF APPEAL (COTTON and FRY, L.JJ.) held
that further particulars must be given. COTTON, L.J., said that the object and
intention of the order for particulars was that the defendants should know
what was the case made against them, and the mere statement that
certain specified entries were false was not enough. The defendants were
left entirely at sea as to the mode in which the entries were alleged to be
false. The plaintiffs were not asked to disclose the evidence by which
they intended to shew that the entries were false, but they must state the
general nature of the falsity which they intended to prove. For instance,
if they alleged an entry of the purchase of goods to be false, they must
state whether they meant that the goods were never purchased at all, or
that there was an overcharge, or that the quantity was in excess. The
plaintiffs would be at liberty to withdraw any of the entries as to which
they did not think it worth while to give them further particulars. FRY,
L.J., said that under such an order he thought reasonable particulars
would not be given unless some particulars were given of the character
of the fraud or impropriety which was alleged in the entries complained
of.-COUNSEL, Swinfen Eady; Pearson, Q.C., Seward Brice, and Woodfall.
SOLICITORS, Stocken & Jupp; Gibbs & White.

For the present purpose rule 1 of order 55 of 1875 and rule 1 of order 65 of 1883 were identical, and the question was whether the rule enabled the court to order costs to be paid by persons who, till the coming into operation of the Judicature Acts and the rules under them, would not have been liable to pay those costs. The point now argued did not seem to have been really argued in Ex parte Mercer's Co., for there the Commissioners of Sewers desired to make out that the court had power to refer the costs in question to taxation, and Jessel, M.R., commenced his judgment by saying that he thought the point was decided by the House of Lords in Garnett v. Bradley (3 App. Cas. 944). In his lordship's opinion Garnett v. Bradley did not govern Ex parte Mercer's Co. or the present case. Was, then, Ex parte Mercers' Co. right? The rule was to be considered as part of the Act, and the only question was, what was its true construction? Was it the object of the rule to give the court a jurisdiction which did not previously exist, or was it not rather to regulate the exercise of a previously existing jurisdiction? Section 23 of the Judicature Act of 1873 had an important bearing on this. It provided that "the jurisdiction by this Act transferred to the said High Court of Justice and the said Court of Appeal respectively, shall be exercised (so far as regards procedure and practice) in the manner provided by this Act, or by such rules and orders of court as may be made pursuant to this Act, and, where no special provision is contained in this Act or in any such rules or orders of court with reference thereto, it shall be exercised as nearly as may be in the same manner as the same might have been exercised by the respective courts from which such jurisdiction shall have been transferred, or by any of such courts." The object of the Judicature Acts was, not to create a new jurisdiction, but to enable the High Court to exercise the jurisdiction of all the courts whose jurisdiction was transferred to it-to enable it to administer both common law and equity. Having regard to the object thus expressed, rule 1 of order 65 was, in his opinion, intended only to regulate the way in which costs were to be dealt with in cases in which, either by statute or independently, the court had already jurisdiction to deal with costs. And it must be remembered (as was said by Lord Blackburn in Garnett v. Bradley) that to hold the contrary would be to alter the rights and liabilities of individuals under special Acts, and to throw upon them a greater burden than had been imposed on them by Parliament at the time when they had taken land under those Acts. And it would also affect the right to costs given to landowners by the Lands Clauses Act. In his lordship's opinion Garnett v. Bradley in no way decided the present point. Certain restrictions on the right of a successful party to costs had been imposed by statute in certain cases, and Garnett v. Bradley decided that rule 1 of order 55 had removed all those fetters. But that was a very different thing from saying that the rule gave the court a jurisdiction to make a suitor liable to costs which it did not previously possess. This view of the construction of the rule was supported by some previous decisions of the Court of Appeal. In Dicks v. Gates (18 Ch. D. 76) Bacon, V.C., had ordered a defendant against whom the action had been dismissed to pay the plaintiff's general costs of the action, and it was argued that there was no right of appeal, because the costs were in the discretion of the court. But the Court of Appeal held that there was no power when an action was dismissed to make the defendant pay the plaintiff's costs. Again, in Witt v. Corcoran (2 Ch. D. 69), where the respondent to a motion to commit for contempt of court had been ordered to pay the costs of the motion, the court held that an appeal lay, because there was no discretion to order the respondent to pay costs unless a contempt had been committed. And in Foster v. The Great Western Railway Co. (8 Q. B. D. 515), the Court of Appeal held that, under section 28 of the Regulation of Railways Act, 1873, the words of which were similar to those of rule 1 of order 65, the Railway Commissioners had no jurisdiction to make a railway company pay the costs of an unsuccessful applicant under the Act. Both on principle and authority, therefore, his lordship thought that the decision of INJUNCTION-MARRIED WOMAN-SEPARATE PROPERTY-HUSBAND AND WIFE the Vice-Chancellor was wrong. BowEN, L.J., agreed that, as to the incorporation of the Lands Clauses Act, the case was clearly governed by Re Cherry's Settled Estates, which he thought was rightly decided. As to the effect of rule 1 of order 65, the question was, whether it over-rode all previous laws as to costs and made quite a fresh start, placing the costs in every case in the discretion of the court? There was a distinction between the general costs of litigation, and such costs as, before the Judicature Acts, the Court of Chancery would have felt itself precluded from dealing with. With regard to the general costs of litigation his lordship confessed that he should have thought the rule was intended to place them entirely in the discretion of the court. But Foster v. The Great Western Railway Co. was a decision to the contrary, and he would never be a party to frittering away a decision which was based on principle. And in the case of the costs of privileged persons-i.e., costs which by statute or otherwise were taken out of the general category-Garnett v. Bradley did not bind the court to hold that rule 1 of order 65 had repealed all the fetters on the power of the court by which the privileges of such persons were protected. Suppose that an Act had said that a particular railway company or a particular corporation should not be liable to pay certain costs, Garnett v. Bradley did not decide that rule 1 of order 65 had destroyed that privilege. FRY, L.J., was of the same opinion. He thought that both the questions raised were entirely covered by authority. The question as to the incorporation of the Lands Clauses Act was covered by Re Cherry's Settled Estates, the decision in which was, in his judgment, not only perfectly comprehensible, but perfectly right. The question of the construction of the rule, he should have thought, if there had been no decision, a question of great difficulty, and he desired not to express any opinion as to what his conclusion would have been. But be thought the precise point was decided by Foster v. The Great Western Railway Co.COUNSEL, Sir R. Webster, A.G., and Vaughan Hawkins; H. Burton Buckley. SOLICITORS, Hare & Co.; Hollams, Son, & Coward.

DONNELLY v. DONNELLY—Chitty, J., 5th November.

-INTERFERENCE WITH WIFE-ACCESS.

In this case an ex parte motion was made by the plaintiff for an interim injunction to restrain her husband from molesting her and interfering with her business and entering her premises and removing goods therefrom. It was stated that a deed of separation had recently been executed by the parties, and a deed of assignment also had been executed by which a millinery business, stock-in-trade, and leasehold shop were assigned by the husband to his wife as her separate property, and by which the husband covenanted not to molest or interfere with her. The wife had since carried on an extensive business, and resided apart from her husband on the premises, and had obtained from the lessor a lease in her own name. The wife's statement was that the husband had, on more than one occasion, forced his way into the shop and used abusive language to her fright and disturbance, and causing serious interference to her business, and had also, against her wish, spent Saturday to Monday on the premises. It, however, did not appear that the husband had removed or taken any of the wife's property. Symons v. Hallett (32 W. R. 103, 24 Ch. D. 346) was cited as an authority for granting an injunction under such circumstances. CHITTY, J., said that the case was one which might raise important questions on the law of husband and wife, for it was difficult to say how an order could be so framed as to confine the injunction to protecting the wife in her business without interfering with the husband's right of access to his wife. It was, however, to be borne in mind that the property was settled by the husband himself, and therefore the case was not one of enforcing a settlement of property settled upon a married woman by a third person. He would, therefore, under the circumstances, grant an injunction until next motion day or further order in the terms of the deed of assignment, restraining the husband from molesting or otherwise interfering with the wife and from entering upon her premises and otherwise interfering with her busi

ness.

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ATTACHMENT-CONTEMPT OF COURT-DEFAULTING EXECUTOR - POSSESSION
OR CONTROL-PRINCIPAL AND INTEREST - DEBTORS ACT, 1869 (32 & 33 question arose whether a claim for £1,000 against the estate of the testa-
VICT. c. 62), s. 4.

This was a motion by the plaintiff for leave to issue a writ of attachment against the defendant, who was an executor, on account of his having failed to pay into court a sum of money in pursuance of an order to that effect, the order describing the money as money "in his hands." The sum of money in question was composed partly of debts which had been due from the defendant to the testator in his lifetime, being the balance on an open account between the defendant and the testator in reference to transactions in which they were jointly engaged, and partly of the interest charge able thereon. KAY, J., held that the fact that the money ordered to be paid in consisted of debts due from the defendant to the testator during his lifetime did not prevent the defendant from being "a person acting in a fiduciary capacity, and ordered to pay, by a court of equity, any sum in his possession or under his control," within the third exception to section of the Debtors Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 62). But it was incumbent on the plaintiff to shew that the defendant had the money "in his possession or under his control." The defendant could not be committed for default in paying in so much of the money in question as represented interest, for as the order did not distinguish between principal and interest, he could that could not be said to be in his possession or under his control"; and, not be committed at all. The motion therefore failed.-COUNSEL, Hastings, Q.C., and Bramwell Davies; Oswald. SOLICITORS, Charles Gregory; Tippetts & Son.

Re THE OXFORD BUILDING AND INVESTMENT SOCIETY-
Kay, J., 9th November.

LIABILITY OF DIRECTORS-PAYMENT OF DIVIDENDS OUT OF ESTIMATED
PROFITS.

Re LORD PETRE, LORD PETRE. PETRE-North, J., 2nd November.
EVIDENCE-CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE OF DEAD MAN-CORROBORATION.
This was the further consideration of an administration action, and the
tor could be admitted upon the uncorroborated evidence of the claimant.
In opposition to the claim it was not suggested that the claimant's testi-
trustworthy witness; but reliance was placed on Hill v. Wilson (8 Ch. 888)
mony was untrue-indeed, it was admitted that he was an entirely
and Re Finch (23 Ch. D. 267), as shewing that there is in the Chancery Divi-
sion a rule that such a claim will not be admitted on the uncorroborated
evidence of the claimant. On behalf of the claimant it was urged that
this supposed rule, if it ever existed, has been materially modified by the
decisions of the Court of Appeal in the more recent cases: Re Gandy
(31 Ch. D. 1) and Re Hodgson (31 Ch. D. 177). NORTH, J., admitted the
claim. He said that the rule as to the weight to be given to the testimony
of a single witness had not varied within his recollection, though it had
been applied somewhat differently by different judges. When a person
was giving evidence in his own interest one naturally sought for some
corroboration. His evidence must be received with some care and
suspicion. But, if the court came to the conclusion that the testimony
was to be believed, it would act upon it without corroboration.
remarkable instance of this was to be found in the case of Sugden v. Lord
St. Leonards (1 P. D. 151). It was true that in that case there was some
his lordship thought the statement of the claimant sufficient.-COUNSEL,
corroboration, but Cockburn, C.J., said that he would have acted on the
evidence of Miss Sugden without any corroboration. In the present case
Cozens-Hardy, QC., and Ingpen; Higgins, Q.C., and Ingle Joyce; Cookson,
Q.C., and Theobald; Maclean, Q.C., and Nalder; Everitt, Q.C., and Stokes;
Hollond King. SOLICITORS, Arnold & Co.; Few & Co.; Blount, Lynch, &
Petre.

A

Re THE BARANGAH OIL REFINERY CO.-North, J., 3rd
November.
COMPANY-WINDING UP-CONTRIBUTORY-PAYMENT OF SHARES IN CASH-
COMPANIES ACT, 1867, s. 25.

This was a summons by a creditor of the company, now in course of winding up under section 165 of the Companies Act, 1862, to obtain repayment of large sums from the directors. The case against the directors, stated generally, was that they had paid dividends out of capital instead of out of income. The articles provided that no dividends should be paid except out of the realized profits arising from the business of the company. The principal business of the company consisted in borrowing money at five per cent. and lending it at about eight and a-half per cent. to persons building, on the security of the premises about to be built, the terms of the mortgage being that the principal and interest should be paid by a number of equal instalments, extending over fourteen years. In order to arrive at what was divisible as dividends, the directors adopted calculations, on the basis of five per cent. tables, as to what was the present value of all sums due to the company; this made up one side of the balance-sheet, on the other appeared the amount of paid-up capital, and of borrowed money, and other liabilities of the company, and the dividend paid to the shareholders. Such balance-sheets showed a balance in favour of the company, and that balance was stated to be carried over to the next account, which was not, in fact, done. The divi-holders at the next general meeting, for the additional assistance he had dend was paid out of any money the directors happened to have in their hands, not out of profits in hand, and the balance on each occasion was not one of money in hand. KAY, J., held that the articles only authorized the directors to pay dividends out of money either "reduced to actual cash in hand," or at least "tangible for the purpose of division," and not out of "estimated profits," which was the precise thing intended to be prohibited by the article. The directors had committed a breach of trust outside the Statute of Limitations, and an order must be made making the various directors jointly and severally liable to the creditors for the amounts improperly paid away during their respective directorship, with interest at four per cent.-COUNSEL, Hastings, Q.C., Ashton Cross and Hamilton; Sir Horace Davey, QC., Maclean, Q.C., and Burton Buckley; Creed. SOLICITORS, Speechly, Mumford, & Langdon; Johnson, Budd, & Johnson; Philpot & Son; Collinson & Mallam, for Mallam, Oxford.

Re THE MEDICAL ATTENDANCE ASSURANCE ASSOCIATION-
North, J., 4th November.

COMPANY-WINDING UP-CONTRIBUTORY-DIRECTOR-QUALIFYING SHARES.
The question in this case was whether O., a former director of the
company, was liable to be placed on the list of contributories in the
winding up of the company in respect of the number of shares forming
the qualification of a director. O. had held five shares, and the question
was whether he was liable for twenty more, twenty-five shares being the
number provided by the articles of association as necessary to qualify a
director. The company was registered in December, 1883. Onslow was
appointed a director by the subscribers to the memorandum in May, 1884.
In March, 1885, he signed an application for twenty-five shares. Soon
afterwards it was arranged that the qualification of directors should be
reduced to five shares, and resolutions were passed at meetings of share-
holders which purported to alter the articles in that respect; but these
resolutions were invalid. Five shares were ultimately allotted to O., and
he was never treated in any way as the holder of more than five shares
till the company was ordered to be wound up. Under these circum-
stances NORTH, J., held that O. could not be placed on the list of contri-
butories in respect of more than five shares.-CoUNSEL, Cookson, Q.C.,
and H. Burton Buckley; Napier Higgins, Q.C., and E. S. Ford. SOLICITORS,
C. Harcout; A. S. D. Duncan.

The question in this case was whether certain shares, which had been allotted to A., a director of the company, as fully paid up, had been paid for in cash within the meaning of section 25 of the Companies Act, 1867. In the early part of the year 1882 A. went to India on business for the On that occasion he was paid £500, which purposes of the company. again in November, 1882, returning in the following spring, and was on that was employed by him in the expenses of his journey. He went to India occasion paid £683 for his expenses. At a meeting of the board of directors, at which A. was present, on the 19th of June, 1883, it was resolved "That 500 fully paid-up shares in the company be voted and presented to A., in recognition of his services on behalf of the undertaking company in two journeys to India, subject to The minutes of a meeting of the directors on August 28, 1883, confirmation at the next general meeting of the shareholders." contained the following entry:-"With reference to the minute of the 19th of June, 1883, it was resolved that the board further vote A. seventy-five fully-paid shares, subject to confirmation of the sharerendered the company." A general meeting of the company was held on the 24th of October, 1883, at which it was resolved "That a sum of £2,875 be voted to A., which he agreed to take in 575 fully paid-up shares." The shares thus voted were never registered in A.'s name. The be treated as having been paid for in cash. It was urged on A's behalf company being in liquidation, the question was whether the shares could that the resolutions of the board of directors were only in the nature of a recommendation to the shareholders, and that the resolution of the shareholders could only be looked at. By that resolution a debt of £2.875 from the company to A. was created, and he was entitled to set that off against the calls on the shares, and he would have had a good defence to an action for the calls by a plea of payment. NORTH, J., said that there never was a moment of time at which A. could have demanded payment of any sum of money by the company in respect of his services in going to India. If he had said that he would receive the payment in cash and not in shares the shareholders would not have voted it to him. A plea of payment could not have been supported in an action for calls. His name must be placed on the list of contributories.-COUNSEL, Cozens-Hardy, Q.C., and H. Burton Buckley; Swinfen Eady. SOLICITORS, Rooks & Co.; Milton Bradford.

CASES AFFECTING SOLICITORS.
Re SCARLETT-C.A. No. 2, 8th November.
SOLICITOR-COSTS OF LEASE-LESSOR'S COSTS CO-OWNERS-SOLICITORS'
REMUNERATION ACT, 1881-REMUNERATION ORDER OF AUGUST, 1882, K.
2, SUB-SECTIONS (B.) (C.).

This was an application by the committee of the estate of a lunatic to review the taxation of certain costs incurred by the committee with reference to the granting of two leases of parts of the estate, pursuant to an order made in the lunacy in May, 1885. The lunatic was entitled to one moiety of certain estates situate in Lancashire. The solicitors of the owner of the other moiety resided in Lancashire, and the committee's solicitors resided in London. The question was whether the scale fee prescribed by rule 2, sub-section (b.), includedt he costs of both co-owners. A great number of leases had, prior to the passing of the Solicitors' Remuneration Act, been granted of parts of the estates. The practice

was for the solicitors of the sane co-owner to see the proposed lessees and arrange with them the terms of the lease, and afterwards to forward a draft of the proposed lease to the committee's solicitors in London, who perused the draft, and, if they were satisfied with it, took the lease into the Lunacy Office for the sanction of the master. The solicitors of the sane co-owner were paid by the lessee the scale fee prescribed by rule 2, sub-section (.) of the Remuneration Order. The taxing master was of opinion that that sub-section included all the lessors' costs, except so far as they were increased by the lunacy, and he disallowed the costs of the committee's solicitors of the perusal of the lease and of the examination of the ingrossment in the Lunacy Office. On behalf of the committee it was contended that sub-section (b.) only applied to the costs of the person having the conduct of the business, and that, in the case of co-owners, the costs of the co-owner who had not the conduct fell under sub-section (c.) of order 2, and Humphreys v. Jones (31 Ch. D. 30, 30 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 6), was cited, where, in a sale under the court in a partition action, the master had only allowed the costs of the plaintiff, who was entitled to one-fourth of the property, and had the conduct of the action, and had disallowed the costs of the defendants, who were entitled to the other three-fourths, and the Court of Appeal allowed the costs of the defendants as coming under sub-section (c). The application was not opposed by the next of kin of the lunatic. THE COURT (COTTON, BOWEN, and FRY, LJJ.) were of opinion that the costs in question ought to be allowed, and referred the matter back to the master in lunacy.-COUNSEL, E. S. Ford; Cecil Russell. SOLICITORS, Robins, Burges, & Co.; Bowlings, Foyer, & Hordern.

POLICE COURTS IN BELGIUM.

A CORRESPONDENT of the Daily News says:-Being desirous of seeing
how matters are worked in Belgian criminal courts, I found my oppor-
tunity during a recent visit to the ancient city of Bruges. Unfortunately
none of the superior courts were sitting, but the judges were disposing of
what we should call "night charges," in the Court of Police Correction-
elle, and accordingly I sought admission. It struck me, first of all, that
the machinery of justice was considerably in excess of the requirements
of the case.
The matters that came before the bench were all of the very
smallest impcrtance, the most grievous offence that was tried being a
theft of pears from a fruit stall in the market. To manage this there
were three judges-viz, the president of the court and two other judges.
All three were in full legal attire, with long robes, a white band, crimped
instead of being ironed out flat like the English bands, and a high black
cap instead of a wig. In addition to these was an official, also in robes,
attached to the Government, who took notes of the cases, and another
gentleman who did nothing at all, except to put an occasional question to
the witnesses and to chat with the judges. There was, beyond these, a
clerk, whose duty apparently it was to attend to the summonses, and
there was a functionary who acted as usher. He called the cases on,
administered the oaths, and in the intervals he interpreted the nature of
the charges to me. Lastly, there were two soldiers of the Civic Guard.
Both were armed to the teeth with a rifle and fixed bayonet, and they
both wore huge bearskins and spurs. They seemed to be a kind of
mounted infantry. There was a small dock in the centre of the court
facing the dais where the judges sat; but the nature of the charges not
being sufficiently heavy, the accused sat on a form just in front of it. A
chair was placed upon the dais itself, exactly in front of the president, for
the witnesses, who thus sat with their backs to the persons against whom
they gave evidence. There was not a single policeman in the court.
In the cases to be tried there had been no arrests, and consequently no
one was in charge of the defendants. The latter, upon a plaint being
laid before the commissary of police, had been "invited" to attend the
court and answer the charge, and they had all accepted the invitation
If they had respectfully declined they would have been promptly
sent for, but they probaby knew better than to give the court
so much trouble. The first couple of criminals who seated
themselves on the form were two men-one elderly, in working clothes,
and the other a private in the artillery, who appeared in uniform. They
were charged with an assault, and the trouble seems to have arisen out of
family differences. One after another the witnesses went up to the chair
and were duly sworn. No Testament was used. The witness had
simply to hold up his or her right hand, with the index finger elevated,
and repeat the oath after the usher. What its terms were I could not
ascertain, but it was extremely short, and my impression is that the first
words were Bei Gott. Then the interrogation began by the president, and
the witness, who was a market dame, wrapped in a voluminous cloak and
bonnet, and who possessed no small share of the garrulity of her class, was
soon off upon a long history which was untimely cut short by his lordship.
Neither of the prisoners had a legal representative, and neither cross-
examined the witness. Nor were they asked to do so. The woman was
simply told to stand down, and the turn of the next came. When their
statements, which lasted altogether about five minutes, were over, the
president held a short conversation with the accused themselves, and,
having heard a brief explanation of the circumstances, discharged them
then and there. The same course was adopted with the next two, who
were sent on their way rejoicing after receiving a lecture from the bench.
Then came the pear-stealing case. Stealing pears from market stalls
would seem to be a favourite amusement among the juvenile Brugeois at
this season of the year. In this instance the culprit was a gamin of about
eight years old, and he had been caught red-handed. But in considera-
tion of his youth, and also, I believe, in accordance with a provision of the
Belgian law, the judge declined to punish him, and he too was acquitted.

Upon this I ventured to express some surprise to the usher at the number of acquittals in the face of uncontradicted evidence. He admitted that they were rather numerous, but, he added, in a triumphant tone, "Last week a boy was sentenced to three months' imprisonment for the same offence." I found this to be the case, and much indignation has been caused thereby among the Brugeois, as the lad was only fifteen. They compare his case with the leniency of Vandersmissen's sentence (which is still on appeal) and say that Belgian justice is inexplicable. Three other cases were tried, making seven in all, and every one of the prisoners was acquitted. There was no one else in the list, so the judges rose, the soldiers presented arms, and the day's work, which had lasted barely three quarters of an hour, was at an end.

THE RETIREMENT OF VICE-CHANCELLOR BACON. Ox Wednesday morning it became known that Vice-Chancellor Bacon was about to take his seat for the last time. The learned judge's court was crowded with members of the bar and officers of the Supreme Court. Shortly after 11 o'clock the Vice-Chancellor took his seat, and was followed by the Lord Chief Justice, the Master of the Rolls, the Lords Justices of Appeal, and the judges of the several divisions of the High Court.

The Attorney-General (the judges and every one in court standing), addressed the Vice-Chancellor. After some preliminary remarks he said :Your lordship is the last of a long chain of eminent judges, and with your retirement disappears a title from the judicial bench never to appear again. The office of Vice-Chancellor, established in 1813, ceases with your lordship's retirement, and it scarcely needs to remind any one who has studied the history of the English bench and of the English bar of the names of those eminent men who have filled the office before your lordship. We cannot but feel that your lordship has, for a period of no less than sixteen years, maintained the dignity of that office and fulfilled its duties in a manner which will not for many years, if indeed ever, be forgotten by those who remember what its duties are and who the ViceChancellors were. After referring to the career of the learned judge, the Attorney-General proceeded:-We of the profession feel that we owe a debt of gratitude to your lordship for the way in which you have always shewn yourself ready to meet new changes, to see how best they could be worked out, and to bring to those changes the advantage of that ripe experience and that mature judgment which had been formed in the practice of the old Court of Chancery. My lord, but one other word remains for me to say. Of your lordship's judgments, we feel that they will for ever live as models of the English language, and monuments of the great power and grasp which your lordship has had over facts-not surpassed, perhaps, by any of the judges who have hitherto filled your lordship's office; and we can all bear testimony to the unfailing industry and attention which your lordship has brought to bear even upon the longest suits, occupying many days, in your lordship's court. my wish, nor would it perhaps be fitting for me, to refer to any particular cases, but I do feel this-that on behalf of the bar I may thank your lordship most warmly and most sincerely for the unvarying courtesy and for the immense consideration that you have always shewn, not only for the convenience, but for every true interest of the bar of England. I am quite certain, my lord, that there are many who have felt that in your lordship-though they were only members of the bar while you occupied the bench-they had a true personal friend. My lord, in your retirement we wish you many years of rest, of happiness, of ease, and of prosperity. We trust that your lordship may find in that well-earned repose pleasant companions in seeking again the paths of literature, in which we know that for many, many years, when you have had leisure time, you have always found the greatest enjoyment. And, my lord, asking you again to accept these feeble expressions of mine as endeavouring to explain what I feel (and I wish that I could have put it into better words), I can, in conclusion, assure your lordship that you take into your retirement the best wishes-I think I may add the earnest prayers for your happiness, and the affection of the whole bar of England.

It is not

The Vice-Chancellor (who spoke with much emotion) said:-Mr. Attorney, my lords and gentlemen,-I feel myself a little overwhelmed by the position in which the Attorney-General's speech has placed me. I am overwhelmed to find that the Lords Justices, the judges of the other courts, and the Attorney-General representing the bar have thought it worth while to present to me the most flattering address which the Attorney-General has just pronounced. I was prepared for no such Occurrence. I had prepared myself to express to my friends of my own bar-if I may call anything my own-the very common feeling that no man can take leave of the occupation which has for a long period engrossed and occupied his thoughts and exertions without sentiments of gravity, if not of sadness. I had no notion I should have had to return my sincere and humble thanks to my learned friends the judges, who were so good as to say they desired to be present at my retirement, and to join the Attorney-General in presenting to me his expressions of regard and his good wishes for continued happiness in the future. As the Attorney-General has said, for considerably more than half a century I have been practically engaged in the profession of the law. During that period I have enjoyed the society and have endeavoured to profit by the example of many distinguished members of that same profession, almost all of whom exist no longer, but whose fame and worth can never die. I have seen many changes, all of which have been suggested and perfected by the great lawyers to whom I allude, and all of which changes have had the effect of simplifying and perfecting the administration of the law to

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