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Nov. 13. I886. _ THE $OLICITORS‘ JOURNAL 43



THE retirement of Vice-Chancellor Bacon removes from the bench a judge of marked peculiarities, both of temperament and of intellect. lt removes, too, the oldest of her Majesty’s judges, and the last of those who have filled the oflice of Vice-Chancellor since its creation in 1813. Sir James Bacon was born in February, 1798, and was called to the bar at Grays-inn on the lfith of May, 1827. He became a Queen’s Counse in 18-16, and in 1868 he was appointed Commissioner in Bankruptcy for the London District. This post he held till the end of the following year when he became Chief Judge in Bankruptcy, and in June, 1870, he was appointed Vice-Chancellor, at an age when most men, who are still able to think, are thinking of retiring.

The members of the profession have long appreciated the great merits, while they have been entertained with tales of the peculiarities and accomplishments, of the learned judge; but to the general public he was probably as little known as any man could be who had been on the bench long enough to earn a retiring pension. Neither the ill-ventilated court which he so long occupied in Lincoln’s-inn, nor the melancholy place in which, on some thirty days in the year, he discharged his duties as Chief Judge in Bankruptcy, nor the more cheerful court to which he removed after the Easter Vacation of ISS3, was often thronged by a large and attentive audience. His was not the court into which sensational cases naturally found their way. Plaintiffs who had been shabbily treated, but whose cases were such as could hardly admit of legal redress, were in no hurry to appeal to him for imavailing sympathy in the days when a plaintiff in chancery had the privilege of choosing his judge. Nor did it appear that a desire for “ swift justice ” caused any rush of litigants anxious to have their ri hts determined by him. Before the days when causes began to Ire assigned to the judges in rotation his cause list was largely filled by means of transfers from other branches of the court; and it was probably on this account that it usually contained a large number of cases requiring tedious investigations, cases of which the other judges of first instance would naturally be glad to be relieved.

To the hearin of the cases brought before him Vice-Chancellor Bacon addressediimself with an almost apathetic patience, which was perhaps recommended by considerations to which he once referred in answerto a junior counsel who expressed his regret at having detained the court so long. “ Don't apologize to me. You haven't detained me. I am bound to be here, and Imust be listening to this case, or the next, or to some other. I have no reason to suppose that the next case will be less uninteresting than this.” Yet it was impossible for any observant person to suppose that the Vice-Chancellor did not carefully attend to what was going on before him. We have often been surprised at the readiness with which, in delivering judgment, he marshalled the facts of the case and the particulars of the evidence which had been given. And though he certainly was reticent enough (and, in this respect, has left an example which might perhaps be followed with advantage by some of those who were lately his colleagues) yet the remarks addressed by him to counsel during argument sufliciently proved that his reticence was not the result of indifierence. Nor is it to be supposed that he always displayed an endurance incapable of being surprised into at least the appearance of irritation. His remarks not irnfrequently exhibited rather more acerbity than was likely to be agreeable to an untrained taste. These remarks were distributed with an impartiality we rthy of the judgment seat. Nemo er /ioc -muneromfhi non donatus abfbit might seem to have been the maxim by which he dispensed his sarcasurs amongst those who practised before him. Probably no counsel who, in the course of his practice, had much to do with Vice -Chancellor Bacon failed to elicit from him some remark too personal to be ignored, too true to be palatable, and too pointed to be readily forgotten. Yet, even when his observations were most caustic, there appeared to be something either in the matter or in the speaker’s manner which prevented such observations from exciting protest or creating armoyB1109 ; and, in spite of the proverbial difliculty of appreciating a joke made at one’s own ex ense, it often happened that the victim, though, perhaps, not endowed) with a keen sense of the ludicrous, would join heartily in the laugh raised against him.

It is no doubt easier to illustrate by examples than adequately to flnalyze the Baconian method. We will take one or two examples out of_many which occur to us. We remember an occasion on which a pertmacious advocate, after having completed a somewhat dreary review of one part of his case, said:—“Then, my lord, we come to the matter of the accoimts, to which I desire to direct your lorrlsl1ip’s attention.” “This is not the place for it; the accounts cannot be taken _here—they must be discussed in chambers.” “ There are only three items which I wish to mention.” “Three more than it is my flu’? consider now; three more than I propose to consider.” “ There is one item which I am particularly anxious to go into.” “ G0 iI1t0 it by B1-l_l11en.ns,” said the judge, “but don’t ask me to 0 into it. q0into it with my chief clerk; or, if you cannot wait til? you get

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H— ' 7?! an-appointment with him—for I don’t wish to abridge your lawful enjoyments—go into it alone."

On another occasion a counsel, notorious for long-winded speeches, wandering away from the matter in hand, was thus addressed by the learned judge:—“ Mr. X., at any other time, or in any other place, I should be most happy to converse with you on this or on any other subject, but what you are now saying has nothing to do with the case before me, and I must request you to confine yourself to the subject-matter of the case.” And the learned judge, having completed with elaborate politeness this address, relieved his mind by adding, aotto voce, “ jabber-ing idiot " !

In another casc the question was whether the defendant, who lived on one side of the street, ought to be prevented from so increasing the height of his house as to diminish the amount of light coming to the windows of the plaintiff", who lived on the other side of the street. In delivering judgment the Vice-Chancellor is said to have made the following remarks :

“ The plaintiff is an artist. The proposed building will undoubtedly diminish the amount of light which has for the statutory period been in the habit of finding its way into the windows of the plaintiffs studio. An attempt has been made to j uatify this interference with the plaintiiE’s property, and for this purpose certain considerations have been suggested which, by the courtesy of the counsel on the other side, have been called an argument. l am told that if the plaintiffs work is to be properly executed it is desirable that light should fall upon it from only one source; that the studio is sufliciently lighted byaskylight, with which the defendant’s building cannot possibly interfere; and that the defendant is conferring a positive benefit upon the plaintiff by removing the inconvenience which would necessarily be caused by an access of light from other sources. Now I am not aware that there is any rule of law or any principle of equity which confers upon a man's opposite neighbours n right to decide upon the amount of light which is good for him, and I am of opinion that the gentlemen with whom this argument originated arc in no danger of suffering from an excess of illumination."

In another case, a plaintiff who sought to have his name removed from the list of shareholders of a company relied upon the statement of a witness who had published a pamphlet purporting to shew that the company had been fraudulently floated, and that its business had been dishonestly conducted. The witness admitted that his information had been derived from the secretary of the company, whose acquaintance he had cultivated with the express design of eliciting from him something detrimental to his employers. After commenting on the conduct of the witness, the judge said :—

“Out of this scurrilous libel, to which the writer of it referred with manifest satisfaction as ‘ my pamphlet,’ the plaintiff has culled and got together a number of odds and ends of incoherent tales, a set of particles and patches and fragments and scraps and rags and shreds and sticks and straws, out of which he has constructed a kind of jackdaw's nest, not without mud enough to hold it together."

But we must not multiply instances. Nor do we desire to attempt to estimate the Vice-Chaucellor‘s abilities as a judge. No doubt he had his failings, amongst which may perhaps be justly reckoned a readiness to make up his mind too early as to the mcr-its of a case; an excessive ingenuity in finding reasons to support the opinion which he had too hastily adopted; and a marvellous facility in ignoring what might be said against it. This was, perhaps, only what was to be expected from one who, when he had reached his threescorc years and ten, was still an advocate. But we desire _t0 express our conviction that he possessed many and great _merrts which are far from being common on the bench; and he must indeed have been a dull man who could practise long before Vice-Chancellor Bacon without finding anything better to imitate than hrs occasional asperity. We will only add that we part with great regretfrom a judge who combined so much of the vrvacrty of youth with the experience of a very mature age, and whose great originality was adorned by so many accomplishments.

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Sir,-—The enclosed adyertisement appeared m the lVeekI_i/ Times of Sunday last. Surely it rs time that some steps were taken to put an end to this disgraceful system of touting. C. G. SHERWOOD.

23, John-street, Bedford-row, London, W.C., Nov. 9.

The following is the advertisement enclosed:— _

Law Bcsrxr..<.<.—A well-established Firm of City Solicitors, being aware that bonii fide Cases of Divorce and Probate, 8:c., and Claims for Damages or to Property, are often not carried out for want of Professional Aid, are willing to Give Advice by post or at interview without charge, and to take up approved cases at their own l'ltl{.—Add1'8SS Lax, 64, Gresham-street, London, E.C.

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The attention of persons within the United Kingdom entitl_ed_to payment of money out of court is directed to the increased facilities, under rule 48 of the Supreme Court Funds Rules, 1886, for obtaining payment without personal attendance :— _ _

1. Dividends or other periodical payments (without limit of nmount) may be remitt dby post as they fall clue upon the request of the persons entitled thereto, attested by a justice of the peace, or a commissioner to administer oaths, or a clerk in holy orders, or a notary public [Rule 48 (d)].

2. A direction for payment, not exceeding £1,000 (other than a periodical payment), specially crossed to the banking account of a person or firm whose name and address are stated in the order or other authority, or certified (as specified in the rule), will be remitted by posjt upon the written application of such person or firm [Rule 48 u) .

3. A direction for payment, not exceeding £500 (other than a periodical payment), to a person not having a banking account, or whose name and address are not ascertained as above mentioned, will be remitted by post upon a request signed by such person and attested by a justice of the peace, or a commissioner to administer oaths, or a clerk in holy orders, or a notary public [Rule -1S (b)].

-1. A direction for payment of a sum not exceeding £10 (other than a periodical payment) to a person whose address is furnished to the Paymuster in the manner specified in the rule, will be remitted by post upon the written request of such person, without attestation [Rule 48 (c)].

Requests for remittances may be sent to the Paymaster by post. Forms for the purpose may be obtained in rooms 5, 419, and 420.

(Signed) W. Hnxmr WHITE, Paymaster.

Royal Courts of Justice, October, 1886.

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In this case a question arose as to the rights of the holder for value of a_document which purported to be a debenture duly issued by and binding on a company, but which, in fact, was not issued so as to bind the company. The action was brought by a holder of debentures issued by the defendant company, on behalf of himself and the other holders of debentures, to realize their security. The benefit of the judgment was claimed by persons who were the holders of some documents which purported to be debentures issued by the company. They wore sealed with the company’s seal, signed by two of the directors, and countersigned by _the secretary, and bore date the 10th of May, 1882. The claim was resisted by the plaintiff on behalf of the other debentureholders. Both Chitty, J ., and the Oourt of Appeal came to the conclusion that these particular debciitures were not in fact issued until December, 1882, _aitcr the presentation of a petition to wind up the company, on which a winding-up order was subsequently made. Chitty, J., refused to admit the claims, and his decision was affirmed on behalf of the appellants. It was argued that, as against a holder for value with notice, the company wereestopped from denying that the debentures were issued at the date which they bore, and that the prior holders of valid debentures, all of which were to be paid pun‘ prlssll, were equally estopped. They took their debentures subject to the rights of all subsequent holders of valid debentures, and also to the claims of all persons as to whom the company were estopped from denying that they were the holders of valid debentures. COTTON, L.J., said that, even if the company were bound by estoppel, as to which he would not express any opinion, the other holders of valid debentures could not be so bound. W hen ‘ill? was said that all the debenture-liolders were to rank pan‘ pa-sszt, it W11?‘ 011 y mfllflt that tlwse W110 were rightly debenture-holders should so Sun —not persons whom the company had wrongly admitted to be

ebenture-holders. The company could not by an admission by way of R$t0pp€1b1ll5d. persons who had previously acquired rights against them. nolpan cou not bind_ by an admission by way of estoppel those who did

claim through him by virtue of some act done by him fllbgy the admission. Bowsu, L.J., agreed. He expressed great doubt whether EIEII tlglppgnpany wouid be bound, though it was not necessary to decide deb-enmre bar; was no a shadow of a ground for saying that the other - ers were bound. I<in', L.J., concurred.—Ooi"xssi., Farwcll ; %r;;Z:.7]|c({€;‘?l, Q 0., and W. I1fl(}lllI)l ; Jlnmsfcir. Souciroiis, J. II. Hortin ,

, nmon, Q‘ Kcmm ; Iluvulson Q Jl[0T7't88.

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section 57 of the Judicature Act, 1873, to make an order of reference, and there was also a question as to the mode of the exercise of the judicial discretion given by that section. The plamtifi, by_ his writ, claimed an injunction to restrain the defendants, who were builders, and who were engaged in rebuilding a house adjoining the plamti£E’s _h0\;lB§1 from taking away, or in anywise in'ui-ing, the supports of the plamtifi s house, and also from continuing to dlamage such house and the supports thereof, and also from continuing any other works at the house adjoining the plaintiff's house so as to cause injury a_nd_ damage to the plaintiff s house and the su ports thereof, and also claiming damages. In_ pursuance of notice, the pllsintiff moved for an interlocutory injunction in the above terms. The motion was heard by Gran_th8m_. J-. $5 Vfl°¢1t1°" Judge. The plaintiff's counsel asked for an injunction, but told the judge that the evidence was conflrcting on the question whether any injury had been done to the_plaintifi"s house and its supports by the defendants’ operations. The judge suggested _that_thc best course would be to refer the matter to a special referee, to inquire and report to the court whether any injury had been done, and wliahdlfmlgefl (If 'mYll"11e defendants ought to pay to the plaintiff. The plaintifi s counsel assented to this view, and the defendants’ counsel, though he said that he was not instructed to consent to any order_of reference, agreed n this view of the result of the evidence, and the judge thereupon made an order of reference to the effect above stated. The order was not expressed to be made by consent. The defendants appealed from the order, and, on behalf of the plaintiff, the preliminary objection was taken that, though the order was not technically a consent order, yet, after the course taken by the defendants’ counsel at the hearing, they were not entitled to appeal. ()n behalf of the defendants it was contended that the judge had no jurisdiction to make the order under section 56 or section 57 _of the Judicature Act of 1873, and that, not having heard the alfidflvllifl read, he could not have exercised a judicial discretion in making the order. THE Coriir (Oorros, Bowss, and Fur, L.JJ.),_ held that the preliminary objection must be allowed. (J_ori-ox, L.J., said_that it would be impossible for business to be carried on if it could be that, under such circumstances, the judge was not exercising a judicial discretion. I t was everyday practice for a judge to ask counsel whether his affidavits answered the case made on the other side, and, if counsel rcphed that he could not say they did, it would be wrong for the judge to require the affidavits to be read at length. It would entirely destroy the mode in which business was conducted in the English courts (whatever might be the case in other countries) in reliance on the statements of counse . If, under such circumstances, the court were to allow the case to be reopened, they might be doing great injustice. It might be that the defendants had obtained the advantage of escaping from an order for an injunction and of completing their works. The only question, then, was whether the judge, exercising a judicial discretion, bad jurisdiction to make the order without consent. Both the parties being there, and the defendants’ counsel not suggesting that he was taken by surprise, _no objection of form could arise by reason of the noticc of motion not asking for the order. The judge exercised his discretion upon the materials which both parties thought fit to bring before hii.i. And, in his loi-dship's opinion, there was power to make the order under section 57 of the Judicature Act of 1873, the matter being one which required “ scientific or local investigation,” if, in the opinion of the court, that investigation could not be conveniently made before a jury. And, the judge having exercised his discretion in this way, there was no grcuiid for the interference of this court. Bowen, L.J., concurred, adding that he had observed ii practice growing up of drawing up such orders in a loose and ambiguous form, not showing whether it was intended to make the order under section 56 or section 57 of the Act. He thought the order ought to shew on its face under which section it was intended to be made. Fur, L.J., said that Schedule K tothe R. S. (J., 1883, contained appropriate forms of orders (Nos. 32 and 33) under sections 56 and 57, and those forms ought to be followed.-—Coi'.\'siiL, G'ro.wenor' Woods and .BrrunwrIl Davis; Millar, 11.0., and H. Court/mp: Munroe. Soucirons, Tatham, Son, Q Lam-ada ,- J. J. Chapman.

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CO$TS—-JUR1BDIC'1‘ION—D!BCRBTlON or (.lOl‘RT—JUDICATURE Acr, 1873, s. 23-JUDICA'1‘UB3 Acr, 1875, s. 16—R. S. 0., 1383, LXV., 1-R. S. C., 1875, LV., 1.

I_n this case there was a petition for the payment out of court of money which had been paid in by the Commissioners of Works and Public

Buildings, in respect of land which they had taken under the

powers cpnferred on them by the Acts 3 8: 4 Vict. c. 87 and 9 8: 10 Vict.

c. 3-1, which contained no provision for the payment by the commissioners

o_f the costs of a petition for the payment of money out of court. One ques

tion was, whether section 80 of the Lands Clauses Actwas tobe considered as

incorporated in the Act 9 & 10 \'ict. c. 34. In Its 0Im'ry’s Settlsd Erich‘-"

(4 De G. 8: J . 332), Lord Wcstbury, 0., held that there was no such

incorporation, but in R0 W00(l's Estate (31 Oh. D. 607), Lord Esher, M.R.,

expressed his disapproval of that decision, though it was not then necessary

to_overrule it. In the present case Bacon, V.C., had ordered the commlflsloliers to pay the costs of the petition, on the ground that rule 1 of order 65 gave the court jurisdiction to do so. Tsz Cornr or APPEAL

(COTTON, Bowsx, and Far, L.J J .) reversed the decision, on the ground that

there was no jurisdiction. COTTON, L J ., was of opinion that the Lands

Clauses Act was not incorporated in the Act 9 & 10 Vict. c. 34. That

point was settled by Re U/I1/rr_1/'-W 15';-11/ml E.\!auȤ, and he could not agree

with the rlictmn of Lord Esher, M.R. The decision of Lord \Vestbury could not, he thought, be disregarded, and in his opinion it was ri ht.

As to the other point, up to the passing of the J udicsture Act it was clear

that the commissioners could not have been ordered to pay these costs.

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g Nov. 13, 1886. THE SOLICITORS’ JOURNAL. 45


For the present purpose rule 1 of order 55 of 1875 and rule 1 of order 65 ' I _ l

of 1883 were identical, and _the question was whether the rule enabled the
court to order costs to be paid by persons who, till the coming into opera-
tion of the Judicature Acts and the rules under them, would not have
been liabletopay those costs. The point now argued did not seem to
have been really argued in E1" plirlr 1l[e"rcer's Co., for there the Commissioners
of Sewers desired to make out that the court had power to refer the costs
in question to taxation, and lessel, M.R., commenced his judgment by
saying that he thought the point was decided by the House of Lords in
Gm-sell v. BrM'I0y (3 App. Oas. 914). In his lordship’s opinion Gnrnslt v.
Bradley did not govern Er mrte .l[m~m-'s ('0. or the present case. Was,
then, Er parts Mn-cars’ Cu. right? The rule was to be considered as part of
the Act, and the only question was, what was its true construction?
\Vas it the object of the rule to give the court a jurisdiction which did
not previously exist, or was it not rather to regulate the exercise of a
previously existing jurisdiction? Section 23 of the Judicature Act of 1873

ad an important bearing on this. It provided that “ the jurisdiction by
this Act transferred to the said High Court of Justice and the said Court
of Appeal respectively, shall be exercised (so far as regards procedure and
practice) in the manner provided by this Act, or by such rules and orders
of court as may be made pursuant to this Act, and, where no special pro-
vision is contained in this Act or in any such rules or orders of court with
reference thereto, it shall be exercised as nearly as may be in the some
manner as the same might have been exercised by the respective courts
from which such jurisdiction shall have been transferred, or by any of
such courts." The object of the Judicature Acts was, not to
create a new jurisdiction, but to enable the High Court to exercise
the jurisdiction of all the courts whose jurisdiction was transferred
to it—to enable it to administer both common law and equity. Having
regard to the object thus expressed, rule 1 of order 65 was, in his opinion,
intended only to regulate the way in which costs were to be dealt with in
cases in which, either by statute or independently, the court had already
jurisdiction to deal with costs. And it must be remembered (as was said
by Lord Blackburn in Germ-tt v. Bwnilry) that to hold the contrary would
be to alter the rights and liabilities of individuals under special Acts, and
to throw upon them a greater burden than had been imposed on them by
Parliament at the time when they had taken land under those Acts. And
it would also affect the right to costs given to landowners by the Lands
Clauses Act. In his lordship’s opinion Garnet! v. l?2'arIlr'_i/ in no way
decided the present point. Certain restrictions on the right of a success-
ful party to costs had been imposed by statute in certain cases, and
Gnrncft v. 1i’rna'1:_i/ decided that rule 1 of order 55 had removed all those
fetters. But that was a very different thing from saying that the rule
gave the court a jurisdiction to make a suitor liable to costs which it did
not previously possess. This view of the construction of the rule was
supported by some previous decisions of the Court of Appeal. In Di:/rs
v. Gale: (18 Ch. D. 76) Bacon, V.C., had ordered a defendant against
whom the action had been dismissed to pay the plainti.flE’s general costs
of the action, and it was argued that there was no right of appeal,
because the costs were in the discretion of the court. But the Court of
Appeal held that there was no power when nu action was dismissed to
make the defendant pay the plaintiffs costs. Again, in Witt v. Corcc/‘rm
(2 Ch. D. 69), where the respondent to a motion to commit for con-
tempt of court had been ordered to pay the costs of the motion, the court
held that an appeal lay, because there was no discretion to order the
respondent to pay costs unless a contempt had been committed. And in
Fosler v. Tlic Great 7Vr.iim'n Rriilway ('0. (8 Q. B. D. 515], the Court of
Appeal held that, under section 28 of the Regulation of Railways Act,
1873, the words of which were similar to those of rule 1 of order 65,
the Railway Commissioners had no jurisdiction to make a railway com-
paiiy pay the costs of an unsuccessful applicant under the Act. Both on
principle and authority, therefore, his lordship thought that the decision of
the Vice-Chancellor was wrong. Bowen, L.J., agreed that, as to the
incorporation of the Lands Clauses Act, the case was clearly governed by
Re Cherry’: Sclllni Eslam, which he thought was rightly decided. As to
the effect of rule 1 of order 65, the question was, whether it over-rode all
previous laws as to costs and made quite a fresh start, placing the costs
in every case in the discretion of the coiut? There was a distinction
between the general costs of litigation, and such costs as, before the
Judicature Acts, the Court of Chancery would have felt itself precluded
from dealing with. With regard to the general costs of litigation his
lordship confessed that he should have thought the rule was intended to
place them entirely in the discretion of the court. But Fvslrr v. T/ic
Grmt Wt-mm Railway Co. was a decision to the contrary, and he would
never_bs a party to frittering awa a decision which was based on principle.
And in the case of the costs og privileged persons—i.e., costs which by
statute or otherwise were taken out of the general category—Gurm~ll v.
Bradley did not bind the court to hold that rule l of order 65 had repealrd
all the fetters on the power of the court by which the privileges of such
persons were protected. Sup ose that an Act had said that a particular
railway company or a particuliir corporation should not be liable to pay
certain costs, Garnet! v. I}mdlc_1/ did not decide that rule 1 of order 65 had
destroyed that privilege. Fur, L.J., was of the same opinion. He
thought that both the questions raised were entirely covered by authority.
The question as to the incorporation of the Lands Clauses Act was covered
by -R0 dimly’; Settled Estates, the decision in which was, in his judgment,
not only perfectly comprehensible, but perfectly right. The question of
the constructioii of the rule, he should have thought, if there had been
110 decision, a question of great difllculty, and he desired not to express
Hy Opinion as to what his conclusion would have been. But he thought
the P760186 point was decided by Foster v. Tliv Great Weslrm Railway C0.—
Uouxsan, Sir R. Webster, A.G., and Vauglian Haw/n'n.i,' H. Burton Buckley.
SOLICITORS, Hare <§- 00.; Hui’l11ins, Son, 5- Coward.

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_ This _was an appeal from the decision of Kay, J. (ante, p. 11), the question being whether the defendants should be ordered to give further and better particulars of certain fraudulent and false entries which the plaintiffs alleged to have been made in their books by the defendants. The plaintiffs had, in September, 1883, purchased from the defendants, P. and S., the business of engineers and ship repairers which they carried on, and it was then agreed that the defendants should take the purchasemoney partly in cash and partly in shares of the plaintiffs; that P. and S. respectively should be employed by the company as general manager and manager of the engineering department for the term of two years; and that the defendants should guarantee that the net profits of the company for two years should be sufilcient to pay a dividend of not less than seven and a-half per cent., and that, if they did not, the defendants would make good the deficiency, but that they were not to be liable beyond £5,000 on the guarantee. By the present action the company claimed damages from the defendants for fraud. Since the formation of the company the defendants had kept their books, and by the books it appeared that a profit had been made sufiicient to pay a dividend of seven and a-half per cent., and such a dividend had been accordingly paid. The statement of claim alleged that the defendants had made false and fraudulent entries in the books in order to make it a pear that such a profit had been earned, so that they might escape liability upon their guarantee, and that no profits had been, in fact, made. The defendants took out a summons asking for an account in writing of the particulars of the improper, wrong, fraudulent, and false entries alleged in the statement of claim, and an order was made that the plaintiffs should “ deliver further particulars in writing as asked " with reference to the statement of claim. The plaintiffs then delivered particulars, which consisted merely of s. list of the entries of which they complained, but not showing in what way the entries were alleged to be false and fraudulent. On behalf of the defendants it was contended that they were entitled to know what was the case which they had to meet. Key, J ., held that the defendants were not entitled to any further information. Tm: Covar or APPEAL (Oorroiv and Far, L.JJ.) held thatfurtherparticulars must be given. Corroi, L.J., said that the object and intention of the order for particulars was that the defendants should know what was the case made against them, and the mere statement that certain specified entries were false was not enough. The defendants were left entirely at sea as to the mode in which the entries were alleged to be false. The plaintifis were not asked to disclose the evidence by which they intended to shew that the entries were false, but they must state the general nature of the falsity which they intended to prove. For instance, if they alleged an entry of the purchase oi goods to be false, they must state whether they meant that the goods were never purchased at all, or that there was an overcharge, or that the quantity was in excess. The plaintiffs would be at liberty to withdraw any of the entries as to which they did not think it worth while to give them further particulars. _ Fi-i.Y, L.J., said that under such an order he thought reasonable particulars would not be given unless some particulars were given of the character of the fraud or impropriety which was alleged in the entries complained of.—C0uNssL, Swirifm Early ,' 1’('zl7‘-I0", Q,.C., Scwarrl Brim, and Woodfiill. Soucirons, -S'l:/cl-en Q Jupp; Gibbs §- Wliilc.

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In this case an av prlrlv motion was made by the plaintiff for an interim injunction to restrain her husband from molesting her and interfering with her business and entering her premises and removing goods therefrom. It was stated that adeed of separation had recently been executed by the parties, and a deed of assignment also had been executed by which a millinery business, stock-in-trade, and leasehold shop were assigned by the husband to his wife as her separate property, and by which the husband covenanted not to molest or interfere with her. The wife had since carried on nu extensive business, and resided apart from her husband on the premises, and had obtained from the lessor s. lease m her own name: The wife_s statement was that the husband had, on more than one occasion, forced his way into the shop and used abusive language to her fright and disturbance, and causing serious interference to her business, and had also, aganist her wish, spent Saturday to Monday on the premises. It, however, did not appear that the husband had removed or taken any of the wife s property. Symons v. Ballet! (32 W. R. 103, 24 Ch. D._ 346) was cited as an authority for granting an injunction under such circumstances. (_Iiii'i'rY, J., said that the case was one which might raise important questions on the law of husband and wife, for it was dilficult to say how an order could so framed as to confine the injunction to protecting the wife in her business without interfering with the husband's right of access to hiswife. It was, however, to be borne in mind that the property was settled by the husband himself, and therefore the case was not one of enforcing a settlement o property settled upon a married woman by a _third_ person. He would, therefore, under the circumstances, grant an injunction until next motion day or further order in the terms of the deed of assignment, restraining the husband from molesting or otherwise iiitcrfcriiig with til; :ll'fi=b$1;i_ from entering upon her premises and otherwise interfering wit er ness.

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This was a motion by the plaintiff for leave to issue ii writ of attachment against the defendant, who was an executor, on account of his having failed to pay into court a sum of money in pursuance of an order to that effect, the order describing the money as money “in his hands." The sum of money in question was composed partly of debts which had been due from the defendant to the testntor in his lifetime, being the balance on an open account between the defendant and the testator in reference to transactions in which they were jointly engaged, and partly of the interest chargenble thereon. Kar, J ., held that the act that the money ordered to be paid in consisted of debts due from the defendant to the tcstator during his lifetime did not prevent the defendant from being “ ii person acting in a fiduciary capacity, and ordered to pay, by a court of equity, any sum in his possession or under his control,” within the third exception to section 4 of the Debtors Act, 1869 (32 dz 33 Vict. c. 62). But it was incumbent on the plaintiff to shew that the defendant had the money “ in his possession or under his control." The defendant could not be committed for default in paying in so much of the money in question as represented interest, for iliat could not be said to be “ in his possession or under his control" ; and, us the order did not distinguish between principal and interest, he could not be committed at all. The motion therefore failed.—CouNssi., Hastings, Q..C., and Bmmwell Darin ; Oswald. SOLICITORS, Charles Gregory ; l’ippetta §~ Sm.


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This was a summons by a creditor of the company, now in course of winding up under section 165 of the Companies Act, 1862, to obtain repayment of large sums from the directors. The against the directors, stat/ed generally, was that they had paid dividends out of capital instead of out of income. The articles provided that no dividends should be paid except out of the realized profits arising from the business of the company. The principal businen-1 of the company consisted in borrowing money at five pvt cent. and lending it at about eight and a-half per cent. to persons building, on the security of the premises about to be built, the terms of the mortgage being that the principal and interest should be paid by a number of equal instalments, extending over fourteen years. In order to arrive at what was divisible as dividends, the directors adopted calculations, on the basis of five per cent. tables, as to what was the present value of all sums due to the company; this made up one side of the balance-sheet, on the other appeared the amount of paid-up capital, and of borrowed money, and other liabilities of the company, and the di_vidend paid to the shareholders. Such balance-sheets shewed a balance in favour of the company, and that balance was stated to be carried over the next account, which was not, in fact, done. The dividend was paid out of any money the directors happened to have in their hands, not out of profits in hand, and the balance on each occasion was not one of money in hand. KAY, J., held that the articles only authorized the directors to pay dividends out of money either “reduced to actual cash in hand," or at least “ tangible for the purpose of division," and not out o_f _“estimated profits,” which was the precise thing intended to be prohibited by the article. _The directors had committed a breach of trust outside the St-atute_o_f Limitations, and an order must be made making the various directors ]ointl_y and severally liable to the creditors for the amounts improperly paid away during their respective directorship, with interest at four per COIIii.—C0l‘NSBL, Hastings, Q_O_, 4,1110» 0,-0, and Hmmllon; Sir Horace Dareg, QC, Maclean, Q.C., and Burton Brinkley; Urml. briiiciroiis, éprrrhly, Mumford, Q Lungdon ,' Johnson, Iludd, if Jolm-ion; I’/iilpot Q Son ; Uollinsou §' llallam, for zllallmn, Oxford.


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The question in this case was whether 0., a former director of the comtpany, was liable to be placed on the list of coutributories in the stvgn ing_up of the comdpany in respect of the number of shares forming

e qualification of a_ irector. O. had held five shares, and the question was whether _he was liable for twenty more, twenty-five i-hares being the iaprmber provided by the articles of association as necessary to qualify a

ector. The company was registered in December, 1883. Onslow was appointed a director by the subscribers to the memorandum in May, 1884. II; Marcia, l_88o, he signed an application for twenty-five shares. Boon a terwar s it was arranged that the qualification of directors should be reduced t° five 5115115, and resolutions were passed at meetings of share1101d6!5 which purported to alter the articles iii that respcct- but these resolutions were invalid. Five shares were ultimately allotted,to O and 11° W55 Dev" treated in B-Hy way as the holder of more than five shares tillthe company was ordered to be wound up. Under these circum. stances NORTH, J-, held that O. could not be placed on the list of contributories in respect of more than five shares.-Coi'.\'si=.r., Cookson Q C

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This was the further consideration of an administration action, and the question arose whether a claim for £1,000 against the estate of the testator could be admitted upon the iincorroborated evidence of _the claimant. In opposition to the claim it was not suggested that the claimant's testimony was untrue—indeed, it was admitted that he was an entirely trustworthy witness ; but reliance was placed on HiIl_ v. WtI;?0H (8 Ch. Q88) and lfr Finrh (23 Ch. D. 267), as shewiug that there is in the Chancery Division a rule that such a claim will not be admitted on the uncorroboratcd evidence of the claimant. On behalf of the claimant it was urged that this supposed rule, if it ever existed, has been materially modified by the decisions of the Court of Appeal in the more recent cases: Its Gandg (31 Ch. D. 1) and Rs Horlgson (31 Ch. D._ 177). Noiirii, J., admitted the claim. He said that the rule as to the weight to be given to the testimony of a single witness had not varied within_ his recollection, though it had been applied somewhat differently by different Judges. When a person was giving evidence in his own interest one naturally sought for some corroboration. His evidence must be received _with some care and suspicion. But, if the court came to the conclusion that the testimony was to be believed, it would act upon it without corroboration. A remarkable instance of this was to be found in the case of Sugdm v. Lord Si. Leonflrin (l P. D. 1-Bi). It was true that in that case there was some corroboration, but Cockburn, C.J., said that he would have acted on the evidence of Miss Sugden without any corroboration. In the present case his lordship thought the statement of the claimant sufIicient.—Coui~xszi., Cozom-Hardy, Q, (J., and Ingpm ; Higgins, Q.C., and Inglc Joyce; Cool.-son, Q,.C., and T/ieolmlri; Mrrrlcrzn, Q,.C., and Nalder; Ereritt, Q.O., and -S'!o1~‘e<¢ ,' Holland King. SOLICITORS, Arnold Q Co. ; Few Q C0,; Blount, Lynch, Q Petra.

Ila THE BARANGAH OIL REFINERY CO.--North, J., 3rd November.

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The question in this case was whether certain shares, which had been allotted to A., a director of the company, as fully paid up, had been paid for in cash within the meaning of section 25 of the Companies Act, 1867. In the early part of the year 1882 A. went to India on business for the purposes of the company. On that occasion he was paid £300, which was employed by him in the expenses of his journey. He wtnt to India again in November, 1882, returning in the following spring, and was on that occasion paid £683 for his expenses. At ii meeting of the board of directors, at which A. was present, on the 10th of June, 1883, it was resolved “That 500 fully paid-up shares in the company be voted and presented to A., in recognition of his services on behalf of the company in undertaking two journeys to India, subject to confirmation at the next general meeting of the shareholders." The minutes of a meeting of the directors on August 28, 1883, contained the following entry :—“ With reference to the minute of the 19th of June, 1883,_ it was resolved that the board further vote A. seventy-five fully-paid shares, subject to confirmation of the shareholders at the next general meeting, for the additional assistance he had rendered the company." A general meeting of the company was held on the 2»tth of October, 1883, at which it was resolved "That a sum of £2,875 be voted to A., which he agreed to take in 575 fully paid-iip shares." The shares thus voted were never registered in A.'s name. The company being in liquidation, the question was whether the shares could be treated as having been paid for in cash. It was urged on A ’s behalf that the resolutions of the board of directors were only in the nature of a recommendation to the shareholders, and that the resolution of the shareholders could only be looked at. By that resolution a debt of 92.875 from the company to A. was created, and he was entitled to set that off against the_ calls on the shares, and he would have had a good defence to an action for the calls_by a plea of payment. NORTH, J ., said that there never was a moment of time at which A. could have demanded payment. of any sum of money by the company in respect of his services in going to India. If he had said that he would receive the payment in cash and not in shares the shareholders would not have voted it tohim. A plea of payment could not have_been supported in an action for calls. His name must be placed on the list of co_ntributories.—Cot'ssizi., Co:/'ns-Hardy, Q.O., and H. Burton 13"¢‘7~'?"_'/ ; swm/7'n Eadg. Soucrroiis, Rooks 4 Co. ; Milton Ilrazlfurd.

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emuneration Act, been granted of parts of the estates. The practice



was for the solicitors of the sane co-owner to see the proposed lessees
and arrange with them the terms of the lease, and afterwards
to forward a draft of the proposed lease to the committee's solicitors
in London, who perused the draft, and, if they were satisfied with it

took the lease into the Lunacy Office for the sanction of the master:
The solicitors of the sane co-owner were paid by the lessee the scale fee
prescribed by rule 2, sub-section (b.) of the Remuneration Order. The
taxing master was of opinion that that sub-section included all the lessors’
costs, except so far as they were increased by the lunacy, and he dis-
allowed the costs of the committee's solicitors of the perusal of the lease
and of the examination of the ingrosament in the Lunacy Ofijice. On
behalf of the committee it was contended that sub-section (b.) only
applied to the costs of the person having the conduct of the business, and
that, in the case of co- owners, the costs of the co-owner who had not the
conduct fell under sub-section (v.) of order 2, and Humplireys v. Jones (31
Ch. D. 30, 30 S_0i.icr'rons_’ Joumun, 6), was cited, where, in a sale
under the court in a partition action, the master had only allowed the
costs of the plaintiff, who was entitled to one-fourth of the property, and
had the conduct of the action, andhad disallowed the costs of the
defendants, who were entitled to the other three-fourths, and the Court
of Appeal allowed _the costs of the defendants ascoming under sub-section
(n ). The application was not opposed by the next of kin of the lunatic.
TF3 C_Ql'R'l( §1T'i‘0a', BOWEN, and FRY, L.JJ.) were of opinion that the
costs in question ought to be allowed, and referred the matter back to
the_master in lunacy.—Cou.\'siii., E. S. Fowl; C'¢'cil Russell. SOLICITORS,
Robins, Bur;1:.i, 51- Co. ,' Bowlings, Foyer, Q Ho;-dam,

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A CORIIESPDNDENT of the Daily Mars says:—Being desirous of seeing how matters are worked in Belgian criminal courts, I found my opportunity during a recent visit to the _aiicient city of Bruges. Unfortunately none of the superior courts were sitting, but the judges were disposing of what we should_call “night charges," in the Court of Police Correctionelle, and accordingly sought admission. It struck me, first of all, that the machinery of justice was considerably in excess of the requirements of the case. The matters that came before the bench were all of the very smallest nnpcrtance, the_most grievous offence that was tried being a theft of pears from a._ fruit Stfllldn. the market. To manage this there were three judg_es—viz , the president of the court and two other judges. all three were in _full legal attire,_ with long robes, a white band, crimped instead of being ir_oned out flat like the English bands, and a high black cap instead of a wig. In addition to these was an official, also in robes, attached to the Covemment, who took notes of the cases, and another gentleman who did nothing at all, except to put an occasional question to the witnesses and to chat with the judges. There was, beyond these, a clefki whose duty_ apparently it was to attend to the summonses, and there was a iuncticnary who acted as usher. He called the cases on, administered the oaths, and in the intervals he interpreted the nature of the charges to me. Lastly, there were two soldiers of the Civic Guard. Both were armed to the teeth with a rifle and fixed bayonet, and they both wore huge bearskins and spurs. They seemed to be a kind of mounted infantry. There_was a small dock in the centre of the court facing the dais where the judges sat; but the nature of the charges not being sufficiently heavy, the accused sat on a forin just iii front of it. A chair was placed upon the dais itself, exactly in front of the president, for étlfie WltI1€8S€5,.Wll0 thus sat with their backs to the persons against whom I ey gave evidence._ There was not a single policeman in the court. n the cases to be tried there had been no arrests, and consequently no pus was in charge of _tlie defendants. The latter, upon a plaint being aid before the commissary of police, had been “invited” to attend the fimrt and answer the charge, and they had all accepted the invitation they had respectfully declined they would have been promptly 5°“ 5°13 nut they probaby knew better than to give the court 914: much trouble. The first couple of criminals who seated t emselves on the _form _wcre two men—oiie elderly, in working clothes, and the other a_private in the artillery, who appeared in uniform. They yeti} Charged with an assault, and the trouble seems to have arisen out of Biaiily differences. One after another the witnesses went up to the chair “T1 ,W°Te duly 5W_0rn. N o Testament was used. The witness had 51131)-Y t0 h01d up his or her right hand, with the index finger elevated, glgc rfpeat the oath after the usher. “~'hat its terms were I could not W03 ain, but it was extremely short, and my impression is that the first the stwere Bea Gott. l‘heu the interrogation began by the president, and ho wltneflfli Who Was ii market dame, mapped in a voluminous cloak and wfillieé and who possessed no small share of the garrulity of her class, was N,em1° upon a long history which was untimely cut short by his lordship. gamers “rho prisoners had a legal representative, and neither crossBim 111:0 Id e witness. 1\or were they asked to do so. The woman was mtg!’ t 00 stand down, and the turn of the next came. When their R8581; s, which lasted altogether about five minutes, were over, the {win fig held a_ short conversation with the accused themselves, and, than Ends:-fi'd a brief explanation of the circumstances, discharged them were Se t ere. _The sam_e_c<_>urse was adopted with the next two, who Then 1" 0"‘ the" W35’ 1'@J0}0liig after receiving a lecture from the bench. would gtme tum Peal‘-Stealiiig case. Stealing pears from market stalls this seaséilii to be a favourite amusement among the juvenile Brugeois at eight Gail 01 (jibe year. In this instance the culprit was a gamin of about flan oghigfl 0 . and he had been_ caught red-handed. But in consideraBe] .m h11l-hififld 8180, believe, in_ accordance with a provision of the A 5W» the Judge declined to punish him, and he too was acquitted.

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Upon this I ventured to express some surprise to the usher at the number of acquittals in the face of uncontradicted evidence. He admitted that they were rather numerous, but, he added, in a triumphant tone, “ Last week a boy was sentenced to three months’ imprisonment for the same offence.” I found this to be the case, and much indignation has been caused thereby among the Brugeois, as the lad was only fifteen. They compare his case with the leniency of Vandersinissen's sentence (which is still on appeal) and say that Belgian justice is inexplicable. Three other cases were tried, making seven in all, and every one of the prisoners was acquitted. There was no one else in the list, so the judges rose, the soldiers presented arms, and the day‘s work, which ‘had lasted barely three-quarters of an hour, was at an end.



Ox Wednesday morning it became known that Vice-Chancellor Bacon was about to take his seat for the last time. The learned judge's court was crowded with members of the bar and oillcers of the Supreme Court. Shortly after 11 o'clock the Vice-Chancellor took his seat, and was followed by the Lord Chief Justice, the Master of the Rolls, the Lords gustices of Appeal, and the judges of the several divisions of the High oiirt.

The Attorney-General (the judges and every one in court standing), addressed the Vice-Chancellor. After some preliminary remarks he said :—— Your lordship is the last of ii long chain of eminent judges, and with your retirement disappears a title from the judicial bench never to appear again. The office of Vice-Cliancellor, established in 1813, ceases with your lordship's retirement, and it scarcely needs to remind any one who has studied the history of the English bench and of the English bar of the names of those eminent men who have filled the otfice before your lordship. \Ve cannot but feel that your lordship has, for a period of no less than sixteen years, maintained the dignity of that office and fulfilled its duties in a manner which will not for many years, if indeed ever, be forgotten by those who remember what its duties are and who the ViceChancellors were. After referring to the career of the learned judge, the Attorney-General proceeded:—\Ve of the profession feel that we owe a debt of gratitude to your lordship for the way in which you have always shewn yourself ready to meet new changes, to see how best they could be worked out, and to bring to those changes the advantage of that ripe experience and that mature judgment which had been formed in the practice of the old Court of Chancery. My lord, but one other word remains for me to say. Of your lordship’ judgments, we feel that they will for ever live as models of the English language, and monuments of the great power and grasp which your lordship has had over facts-not surpassed, perhaps, by any of thejudges who have hitherto filled your lordship‘s oflice ; and we can all bear testimony to the unfailing industry and attention which your lordship has brought to bear even upon the longest suits, occupying many days, in your ordship’s court. It is not iny wish, nor would it perhaps be fitting for me, to refer to any particular cases, but I do feel this—that on behalf of the bar I may thank your lordship most warmly and most sincerely for thc unvaryiiig courtesy and for the immense consideration that you have always shewn, not only for the convenience, but for every true interest of the bar of England. I am quite certain, my lord, that there are many who have felt that in your lordship—though they were only members of the bar while you occupied the beiich—-they had a true personal friend. l\l y lord, in your retirement We wish you many years of rest, of happiness, of ease, and of prosperity. We trust that your lordship may find in that well-earned repose pleasant companions in seeking again the paths of literature, in which we know that for many, many years, when you have had leisure time, you have always found the greatest enjoyment. _And, my lord, asking you again to accept these feeble expressions of mine as endeavouring to explain what I feel (and I wish that I could have put it into better words), I can, in conclusion, assure your lordship that you take into your retirement the best wishes—I think I may add the earnest prayers—for your happiness, and the affection of the whole bar of England. _ _

The Vice-Chancellor (who spoke with much emotion) said :—Mr. Attorney, my lords and gentlemen,—I feel myself a little overwhelmed by the position in which the Attorney-General’s speech has placed me. I am overwhelmed to find that the Lords Justices, the judges of the other courts, and the Attorney-General representing the bar have thought it worth while to present to ine the most flattering address which the Attorney-General has just pronounced. I was prepared for _no such occurrence. I had prepared myself to express to my friends of my own bar-—if I may call anythmg my own—_the very common feeling that no man can take leave o_f the occupation which has _for a long period engrossed and occupied his thoughts and exertions without sentiments of gravity, if not of sadness. I had no notion_I should have had to return my sincere and humble thanks to my learned friendsihe judges, who were so good as to say they desired to_be present_at my retirement, and to join the Attorney-General in presentingto me his expressions of regard and his good wishes for continued happiness in the future. As the Attorney-General has said, for considerably more than half a century I have been practically engaged in the profession of the law. During that period I have enjoyed the society and have endeavoured to profit bY $115 example of many distinguished members of that same profession, almost all of whom exist no longer, but whose fame and worth can never I have seen many changes, all of which have been suggested and perfezjmd by the great law'yers_to whom I allude, and all o_f which changes 118120 to the effect of simplifying and perfecting the administration of the W

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