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specifications describing in identical terms the same invention? The public were H161) possessed of the information contained in the plaintiff's paient, it was on the shelves of their public libi-ary—a library in the I’atent_ Olfice, the place of all others devoted to information relating to 111‘"f11tl0l1H; the place to which anyone wanting information on such subjects would resort. Why should the public be precluded from Ibo right of using the information of which they were then in possession? His lordship thought that, directly the German specifications were deposited in the library of the Patent Ofl':lce, and became unreservedly accessible to the public, there was a complete publication of the invention in this country, and it became the property of the public. In his opinion the depositing the specifications in the library of the Patent Ollioe was itself a publication of the invention contained in them, and the invention was then dedicated to, and became the property of, the public. Plimpton v. Spiller (6 Ch. D. 429) was therefore very different from the present case. There the book was not accessible to the public, and could not be_sa|d to have become part of the public stock of information. His lordship could find nothing in United Telephone Co. v. Harrison (21 Ch. 1). 731), or _0tta v. Steel (31 Oh. D. 241) opposed to the view that these specifications were deposited in the library of the Patent Oflice in such a way as to_become unreservedly accessible to the public, and to become part of their property. They were deposited in a place devoted to the subyects with which they dealt; they were placed within the reach of every member of the public who desired to consult them. His lordship was at a loss to understand how a patentee could be said to add anythingto the common stock of public knowledge when the public, at the date of his letters patent, had in their public library, accessible to everyone. a detailed description of that fcr which he was seeking a monopoly. If e. previous complete specification for the same invention was proved to have been enrolled in the Patent Ofiice, that in itself, without any proof that anyone had ever seen or heard of it, was conclusive evidence of prior publication, probably on the ground that a document describing the invention had been filed in the Patent Office, a document accessible to all,‘ and therefore the public could not be precluded from using information which they already possessed. In Hindmarch on Patents (1st ed., p. 33) it was laid down that “ if the public once becomes possessed of an invention by any means whatever, no subsequent patent for it can be granted, either to the true or first inventor himself or any other person, for the public cannot be deprived of the right to use the invention, and a patentce for the invention could not give any consideration to the public for the grant, the public possessing everything he could give.” This, in his l0rdship‘s opinion, was a correct statement of the law. He did not attach any importance to the fact that the specifications were in the German language, and he agreed with what had been said by Lindley, L.J., on that point.—Coui\"siii,, A.\ton, Q.C., and W. IE. Barn/ield; Homer, Q.C., and T. 1l[. Goodere. Soiicirons, Orowdaitv §~ Vizani, for Owston, Di'r/cinson, 4* Sirnpson, Leicester; Jalmstnn, Harrison, § Powell, for R. Q R. 0. Winder, Bolton.
This was an appeal from the dismissal by Stirling, J. (34 Ch. D. 398). of two actions brought by the plaintiff company to make the defendants liable for alleged misfeasances as promoters of the company. The company was formed by registration on the 8th of April, 1873, for the urp -.=e of purchasing the lease of the Ladywell Mine from the South Sslup Mining Co. Early in 1873 negotiations were opened between the chairman of the South Salop Co. and Mr. Paliii, with a view to the purchase of the mine by himself and other persons associated with him; and on the lst of February, 1873, an agreement was entered into between the South Salop Co., as vendors, and Palin, Brookes, l\1undey, and Waters, as purchasers, for the sale to them of the Ladywell Mine, and all the plant, machinery, and effects, for £5,000, £500 of which was to be paid down as adeposit, and the balance on or before the 1st of March, 1873. The purchasers made the purchase with the intention of re-selling the mine to a company which was to be formed. The deposit was paid immediately, and the balance of the purchase-money was paid on the 17th of March by the purchasers out of their own moneys, in the proportions in which they were interested in the purchase. On the 4th of April, 1883. an agreement was entered into between Palin, Brookes, Mundev, Waters, and a Mr. Oldrey, as vendors, and F. R. Wilson, as agent for the plaintiff company, for the sale of the inine to the company for £18,000 in cash, payable to the vendors in certain proportions. The objects of the plaintiff company, as stated in the memorandum of association, were (mm nlia) “to purchase a lease or leases ofa mine called the Ladywell Mine." The articles of association contained a clause purporting to ratify, confirm. and adopt, and make binding on‘the company, the agreement of the 4th of April, 1873. and they also provided that the first directors of the company should be Palin, Brookes, Mundey, Oldrey, and one Greame. At the first meeting of the company, on the 9th of April, 1873, the seal of the company was afllxed tothe prelimmnry agreement, and shares were allotted to Waters, Mimdey, Palm, and Brookes, who gave cheques for their fully paid-up shares, and received cheques for the purchase-moneys payable to them under the agreement. No express notice was given to the plaintiff company of the agreement of the lst of February, 1873, or of the amount of the purchase-money therein mentioned. The company, in January, 1882, passed resolutions fnr_a voluntary winding-up, and a liquidator was appointed. In August. 135-3. the lessor recovered the property. in an action against the plaintiff company, which they did not defend. Iii October, 1S8-L, the plalflilfi
ced the first of the present actions against Brookes
and Waters, and shortly afterwards they commenced the second action against the executors of Mundey, Oldrey, and Palin, who were all then dead, claiming that the defendants (in the first action), _and, as agamst the executors, that the estates of their testators, were liable in damages, on the ground that the defendants to the first action and the testators of the executors respectively were promoters of the company, and had procured the adoption of the agreement of the 4th of April, 1873, by _a breach of trust and duty and by fraud; that the agreement might be set aside; and that the purchase-money might be returned; or, in the alternative, that the estates of the several testators might be ordered to account for the profits made by them on their sale to the company, on the ground that Palm and his associates must be treated as having purchased the property on behalf of the company for £5,000, and, therefore, were chargeab e with the difference between that sum and the £18,000 for which they sold to the company ; and, further, that they stood in a fiduciary position to the company, not only when they became directors after the incorporation of the company, but at the time of the original purchase, and were, therefore, liable to the company for all profits made by them in the transaction. Stirling, J ., dismissed both actions, on the ground that the evidence failed to shew that the vendors to the company, when they bought the mine on the 1st of February, 1873, were promoters of, or stood in a fiduciary position to, the company, and that, even if they were promoters, the case was governed by Rs Cape Breton Co. (29 Oh. D. 795, 33 W. R. 788, 28 S0r.ici'ron.s' Jouarrsn, 344), because, by reason of the recovery of the property by the landlord, which the company had taken no steps to prevent, the rescission of the agreement had become impossible.
Ti-in Couiir or APPEAL (Corron, LINDLEY, and Loras, L.JJ.) afiirmed the decision. Con-o:~', L.J., said that in his opinion the case was entirely covered by Re Caps Brclon Ca. The company in that case, as in the present, had adopted the purchase, and, although there might have been grounds for setting it aside while the company was carrying on business as a going concern, yet, as rescission had become impossible, no relief could be given. It was said that the purchase was made in contemplation of the formation of the company, and made on their behalf by Palin and the others as agents of the company. But the contract between Palin and his associates and the owners of the mine was made some time before the formation of the company, and what took place between the company and Palin and his associates was no part of the original transaction. No doubt they contemplated the formation of a company, and the sale of the mine to the company when formed. But no part of the original purchase-money was paid out of the funds of the company; the whole £5,000 was paid by Palin and his associates out of their own moneys. Palin and his associates, in entering into the contract of February, 1873, acted on behalf of themselves alone, and did not, at that time, act in or occupy any fiduciary position whatever. They were, after their purchase was made, erfectly free to do with the mine whatever they liked. It was urged, however, that Palin and his ussociates were undoubtedly promoters of the company, and rnust be assumed to have been so at the time of entering into the contract of February, 1873. I t was true that they were promoters cf the company at some time or other; but it was not clear that they were promoters before the formation of the company. The omu was on the company establish that, when the original contract was entered into, Palin and his associates were so acting on behalf of the intended company that, ii’ the company should be afterwards formed, they could not either retain the mine for themselves as against the company, or sell it to the company for _more than they had given for it. The evidence did not establish that Palin and his associates were so acting in the matter of the original contract as to entitle the company afterwards to say that they were acting on behalf of the company and as their agents, so as not to be able to retain the largo profit made by them on a resale to the company. The contract was not in any_ way dependent upon the company being formed. Palin and his associates bought for themselves, and there was nothing to entitle the company to say that they bought on their behalf. Lrnnnar, and L_oi-as, L.JJ., concurred.—Coi'_\'si-ii., Seward Brice, Q,.C., and A. N. C“""'""!/I E¢'""""9. Q.C., Buckley, Q.C., and Grasvmor Woods. Soticiroas, Jackson Q‘ Co. ; J. Holmes Q Son ; Snell, Son, Q Greenip.
This was an appeal from a decision of North, J ., the question being, whether ii counter-c_laiin by the defendants ought to be struck out, on the ground that the plaintiffs would be “ doubly vexed ” by reason of there
avlng been someprevicus proceedings between the parties in relation to the same matters in the colony of British Honduras. The plaintiffs were M. and O. ; the defendants were B. and N. The plaintiffs and the defendant B. carried on busmess in tpartnership as merchants in Honduras, under the firm of G. E: Co., from _e 1st of ebruary, 1879, to the 31st of J an_uary, 1.581, when the partnership came to an end. During the same l-‘fe!'1°d» the defendants, w 0 carried on business in London, also under the E5 it-761., actzd as general agents in England for the Honduras ddendBm:B 0°C; A tepl the expiration of the Honduras partnership the tot an “owl-mt opnégce a suit in_ the bupreme Court of British Honduras ' _ _ e partnership transactions of that firm, and on the 13”‘ °f 5P"l» 1930, B decree was made for that pur osc Tho takin of the accounts in that suit was not yet completed. Thai) writ in the resgent !wi1_i0I\ WflB_iB8l\@d 011 the 15th of September last and by their Bi&b6l£6l1t of claim, delivered on the 2§th of November the plaintiffs claimed an
onged to the plaintiffs respectively,
and payment to the plaintiffs respectively accordingly; with other consequential relief. Tho defendants delivered a defence and counter-claim, and by the latter they claimed an account of all the partnership dealings between the plaiutifis and the defendant B., and of the partnership property ; inquiries and accounts; and that a receiver should be appointed and an injunction granted. In the counter-claim the defendants stated that the successor to the Chief Justice, who originally heard the suit in Honduras, was, prior to his appointment, engaged as counsel and solicitor in the suit, and was the only udge in the colony; that the clerk of courts, by whom the accounts directed by the Privy Council would have to he taken, was also formerly engaged as solicitor in the suit; and that it was impracticable to appoint in the colony a suitable person as receiver of the partnership assets, and to get in the partnership outstandings. The “plaintiffs applied to have this counter-claim struck out, and North, J ., o cred it to be struck out. He was of opinion that, primd faeie, the two actions were vexatious, and ought not to he allowed to go, and that the defendants were bound to shew that some substantial benefit would result to them from the counter- claim. This, he thought, they had not done. On the appeal it was argued for the defendants that the onus was on the party who sought to put a stop to an action to shew why it should not be allowed to go on, and that, at any rate, the counter-claim should not be struck out altogether. The defendant N., who was not a party to the Honduras suit, ofiered to undertake to be bound by the proceedings in it to the same extent as the defendant B.
Tun Conar or Arraai. (COTION and LXNDLBY, L JJ.) reversed the decision. Corros, L.J., said that the agreement between the Honduras firm and the English firm was a peculiar one, and he did not see how it was possible that the accounts should be finally taken between the two firms until the accounts of the Honduras partnership had been taken. North, J ., had not merely stayed the proceedings on the counter-claim, but he had struck it out altogether, and he had not done so in the exercise of any discretion with regard to convenience. If this action had not been commenced by the Honduras partners his lordship should undoubtedly have thought it vexatious for the defendant B. to ask _for the taking of accounts, for the taking of which he had already obtained an order in Honduras. But under the circumstances it would be wrong to strike out the counter-claim altogether, and thus prevent the de_ieuda|it B. from asking for the proper judgment at the trial of this action. Of course he would not be allowed to re-open any matter which been already decided by a competent court. Upon the defendant giving the undertaking which he had offered, the ordor of North, J ., would be charged, without prejudice to any application when the proceedings in the Court of Honduras were finally determined. Liisnnar, L.J., 581d that it did not follow that because the defendants had asked for an account of partnership dealings they would get it, or would get it in an unqualified form. If North, J ., had merely exercised a discretion this court would have been unwilling to interfere; but he had proceeded on the principle that the counter-claim was altogether w_rontg|_—that' it WM vexatious and oppressive. The claim of the p aintifis in is action was not merely to get in an asset of the Honduras firm in this country; it went much further. They sought to get in that asset, and to have it distributed among the partners in that firm. How could an asset oil firm be distributed without taking the accounts of that firm? It did not however, follow that the accounts would have to be taken over againThe accounts taken in Honduras might be adopted. But, in some shape or other, the accounts of the Honduras firm must be taken.—Cuussrt, W H. Davey, Q,.U., and Herbert Gowcll; Oozens-Hardy, Q.C., and John CutlerBOLICXTORS, Parker, Garrett, Q‘ Parker ; Raake §- Sam.
administration of an insolvent estate will be transferred to the Bankruptcy Court under the above sub-section. The usual administration judgment had been made on the 14th of October, 1886. Advertisements for creditors had been issued, and 127 claims sent in, which had not yet been adjudicated upon. A large number of the creditors lived in or near Newmarket. The present application was made by certain bankers, who claimed to be creditors for a large amount on the balance of their account, but _whose claim had not yet been proved, for a transfer of the adminisof Cambridge. The application was opposed by the defendant, who was administratrix, and who claimed a right of retainer for £1,100. It was to
trstion to the proper bankruptcy court—in this case the county court
contended on behalf of the defendant that there was no jurisdiction make such an order after an administration judgment, and that if the
transfer were made, the defendant might lose her right of retainei.
Srianixo, J., held that he had jurisdiction to make the order. That jurisdiction was discretionary, and in exercising its discretion the court would chiefl o ‘d th ‘ '
y o nsi er e questions of convenience, delay, and expens
e. As regarded convenience and delay, there was apreponderance in favour f the county court. As regarded expense, be had ascertained that it was the of the Bankruptcy Court to take up the proceedings at the point at which they were left by the High Oourt. No expense would therefore be thrown away. _Tho question of the defendant’s right of retainer would have to be considered by the judge in bankruptcy, and could not be allowed to stand in the way of a transfer. The defendant would get her
costs, charges, and ex nses under section 125 sub section 7 of the A t
pt - . - , c . The order was one wh_ch ought to be made. Having regard, however, to the fact that the claim of the applicants had not vet been proved, s
hi lordship directed the motion to stand over until their claim had been verifledin the ordinary way.—OouxsnL, Hastings, Q.C., and F H Oolt - Pear
In this case the plaintiff, the holder of a season ticket between Broadstreet and Kew, saw his portmanteau labelled at Broad-street for Kew, and entered the train, by which he travelled to Oamden Town. There he got out and proceeded by a later train to Kew. On his arrival there the portmanteau was not to be found. At the time of taking his season ticket he had signed a statement by which he bound himself to abide by and submit to all the regulations of the defendant company. One of these regulations was to this eifect:—“ [n order to prevent delay and inconvenience on the re-delivery of luggage at the end of a journey, passengers are requested to place on each article their name and address, and notice is hereby given that the company will not be responsible unless fully and properly addressed with the name and destination of the owner." An action was brought by the plaintiff to recover damages in respect of his loss, and the learned Recorder of London nonsuited him.
Ti-in COURT (HAWKINS and A. L. Ssurri, JJ.) held that the nonsuit was wrong. Hawams, J ., said that, whether the railway company were liable as common carriers or not during the transit between Camden Town and Kew after the plaintiff bad left the train, there was evidence of negligence to go to the jury which they were bound to rebut. With regard to the special contract, his lordship was of opinion that, inasmuch as theeifect of the regulation in question would be to protect the company from all liability whatever as regards passengers’ luggage when not labelled, the stipulation was not enfoi-ceab e by the company in view of the provisions of the Railway and Canal Trafllc Act, 1854, s. 7. A. L. Snrri-i, J., was of the same Opll1l0!l.—C0l.‘l\'SEL, Guiry ; Candy, Q.C. SOLICITORS, Btllfams; Pains, Son, Q Pollock.
This was an action against the defendants for having published a libel on the plaintiff in his businesss as a wine merchant. The plaintiff had been in the habit of selling champagne under his registered trade-mark of “ Dolmonico Champagne," and the defendants published a statement to the effect that they alone were entitled to the use of that name; that they would take proceedings against anyone selling Delmonico champagne, and that the plaintiffs wine was not genuine. After action brought the plaintiff died, and the plaintiff's executrix obtained an order to continue the proceedings. At the trial Lord Coleridge, C.J., directed a nonsuit, on the ground that no right of action survived to the exeoutrix. On a motion to set the nonsuit aside,
THE Coon-r (Dar and WILLS, JJ.) held that the statement of claim shewed a cause of action in the nature of a slander of title, which did survive to the executrix. Dar, J ., said that, though no doubt the executrix could have no claim against the defendants for their allegations against the personal character of the testator in his business as a wine merchant, the statement that the testator had no right to use the trademark stood on a different footing. The action was in the nature of an action for slander of title, and was therefore different from an action for libel. In the former action it was necessary to prove malice and special dam e ; and the plaintiff could do that by showing that the statement was inteiiged to injure, and had injured, the sale of the champagne sold under the registered trade-mark. WILLS, J., concurred, and said that there couldbeno doubt that trade-marks were as much property as anything else, and that the imputation on the plaintiffs right to use their registered trade-mark was a direct injury to that property.—Counssi., Jlorton Daniel and Cole; Kemp, Q.C., and Bullcn. Soucrroas, Slark q Metcalfa; J. Anderson Rose.
The question in this case was whether the Court of Bankrgptcy has the same power to enforce the provisions of a composition enter into under section 23 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, as it has to enforce the provisions of a composition entered into under section 18. Section 18 enables the creditors of a debtor ainst whom a receiving order has been made (before any adjudication 0?%Zlfl!lkI.'llpl0y) to resolve to accept a_compositi_on, which is not to be binding on the creditors unless the resolution accepting it is confirmed at a second meeting, and is approved by the court. Subsection 8 provides that “a composition accepted and approved in pursuance of this section shall be binding on all the creditors so far as relates to any debts due to them from the debtor and provable in bankruptcy. ' By subsection 10, “the provisions of a composition under this section may be enforced by the court on the application of any person interested, and any disobedience to an order of the court made on the application shall be deemedacontempt of court." Sub-section ll provides t at “if default is made in payment of any instalment due in pursuance of the composition . . . the court may, if it thinks fit, on application byvany cre_dltor, adjudge the debtor bankrupt and aunul the composition. Section 23 provides, by sub-section 1, that, “ when a debtor is ao_]udged_ bankrupt, the creditors may, if they think fit, at any time after the adj udication, by special resolution, resolve to entertain a proposal for a composition in satisfaction of the debts due to them under the bankruptcy, or for a scheme of arrangement of the bankrupt-‘s affairs ; and thereupon the same
proceedings shall be taken and the same consequences shall ensue as in
the case of a composition or scheme accepted before adjudication. " By section 2, “ if the court approves the composition or scheme, it may an order annulling the bankruptcy ” An by sub section 3, “ if def
sub- l made at the sitting of the court on the 16th ult. by Mr. J . Appleby who make said that that morning he had four or five cases put into his hands on ult is behalf of poor persons who were unable to pay a solicitor's fees, but on
made in payment of any instalment due in pursuhnce of the compdbition appearing before the registrar he had re used to hear him, and had
or scheme . . . the court may, if it-thinks fit, on application by
any stated that agents could not be permitted to conduct cases. The regis
person interested, adjudge the debtor bankrupt and annul the composi- trar said his opinion was, and he had been confirmed by the Treasury,
tion or scheme.” Rule 211 of the Bankruptcy Rules, 1886, provides at
that it was illegal and improper for persons not dul qualified to appear
th , “ where a composition or scheme is sanctioned, and default is made inany in the county courts “ for fee or reward.” He had communicated with payment thereunder, either by the debtor or the trustee (if any), no action Mr. Nicol, and he had the authority of the Treasury for refusing to hear grie ' . '
to enforce such payment shall lie, but the remedy of any person ag shall be by application to the court." In the present case the debtor
ved unqualified persons Section 10 of the County Courts Act, 1856, provided had that those who might be heard were persons duly quahfled to appear,
been adj udicatedabankrupt, and the creditors afterwards, under section 23, an_d that persons defending should be duly authorized, and the view l_Vlr. resolvedto accept a composition. The resolution was duly confirmed, and Nicol took was that a person was not duly authorized who was acting
was approved by the court, and an order was made annulling the adjudi
- in contravention of an Act of Parliament. His Honour said he would give
cation. The debtor made default in paying the composition to one ofbthe his decision on the next court day. e
creditors, and the creditor applied to the court for an order that the d
enforce a composition under section 23 And it was said that the rea
and the bankruptcy having been annulled, it might otherwise have b
- . ur that the “ consequences " referred to in sub-section 1 of section 23 me
tor 8.?“ exercise of my judicial discretion, I ought to allow paid agents, not being ' ’ , . l . . ' . r ' ’ cti
Tris Jones now said: The question for decision is whether, in the
en solicitors to appear in any case for absent parties, address the court or hon give any evidence for them In ordinary contentious business paid ma agents have not been allowed to appear but in undefendod cases and but judgment summonses they have been tacitly permitted to appear for an mm absent plaintiff or an absent defendant, and give evidence of means or £3’ discuss terms of payment, or both. I think one or two cases of miscon
duct on the part of agents have recently come to light. But quite
°n recently in an iindefended case which was being heard before the regis
' trar, Mr. Fox refused to hear Mr. Appleby, a paid agent, who came to
23° appear for the absent defendant. He founded his refusal not at all upon
grounds On Mr Appleby protesting against his exclusion the registrar ' cerns the order of the court and its due and effective administration of
Hg)“ referred the matter to me for my decision in court The question con-
t person, but otherwise only professional persons are allowed to appear,
he general words of sub section 1 On behalf of the debtor it was g d the proceeding“ of comm of ]ushc6' Runes may appear and be bend“ u
only the necessary consequences of a composition under section 18, s as the binding of all the creditors by a composition duly accepted a approved, an did not include the powers given to the court and the liab ities imposed on the debtor by section 18 in case of default. And it w said that the express repetition in section 23 of the powerto adjudi the debtor a bankrupt, while the power to enforce the provisions of t composition was not repeated, shewed that the former power only w intended to be conferred in case of default in the payment of a compo tiori under section 23
Tim Covar or Arrsar. (Lord Esiiim, M.R., and BOWEN and Far, L.-T reversed the decision of the registrar, holding that the power to enfor the payment of the composition existed under section 23 just as und section 18. They were of opinion that the making of an order to enfo the payment of_ a composition is one of the "consequences " ensui from a composition under section 18, which is, by sub-section 1 of secti 23,_ imported into a composition under that section, and that the power adjudicate the debtor a bankrupt in case of default is expressly repeated sub-section 3 for the reason suggested by the ap ellant’s counsel—viz ,
e _ . .
d who are subject to a special authority or solicitors who are oflicers 0
<1 3 ‘ill the court in w_hich they act, and certainly oflicers of ythe Supreme Court, a .
' and responsible to it The public policy of such exclusive arrangements 8 is to uphold the order of every court to secure a due learning and good
ta any objection to Mr. Appleby’s conduct or character, but on purely legal
° suitors from fraud or imposition for worthless services. This, of course.
“fa does notinean thatall unqualified agents are. as individuals, untrustworthy, 81' or that their services are worthless. But as to the general policy and
purpose of the Legislature the Solicitors Acts and the Stamp Act leave ) oubt whatever Thus, the Solicitors Acts of 1843 and 1860 provide.
J_ no ' . . _ -
e incapable to recover any fee or reward by action, but shall be punlflll 8 able as for a contempt of court. and shall also be liable to a penalty Oi
' to ' ' f the we s named are under the ban of the exclude the notion that an adjudication could notge made after the original but actmg as such In any 0 y ’ l f th rt r his adjudication had been annulled. The power’ to adjudicate was under hm S0 the county court Acts Speak “mien ly 0 B paby; 0 the
hThis was an application bya bankrupt asking the mm-1;, under mp, 131 of or other proceedmg or for an attorney in one of her MB]95ty’B supeuor
1852. It is in these words : “ It shall be lawful for the party to the ill“ 1 ’ 2 . . to
costs, ‘ provided that the Court of Appeal may in any special case in
crease or diminish the amount of such seeuritv or dispense therewith ’
April 16,1887. g THE SOLICITORS‘ JOURNAL.
though I have the power, I ought not to extend such permission top
who, as they stand there before me, are, if not under the special b n the law, st least under its marked discouragement. I can draw no d tlnction between the ordinary contentious business and uudefended
and judgment summonses. I therefore feel it my duty not to allow future aid ntsto
p age appear or address the court, or give evidence for absent arties.
P Counsel for the Incorporated Law Society. Mr. F. W. Hoi.i.airs.
meta pursuance of the resolution passed at the adjourned annual general
_ lug held on the 15th of July, 1881, to the efiect that meetings of t society should be held in J snuary and April, I am directed to inform y that a special general ‘ '
_ society on Friday, the 29th inst., at two o'clock p cisely, to coris‘d h
L _ . ) of the following regulation passed at the special geneghmtfililug of the society held on the 28th of Jannar 1887 :—' Th t the
y ll owing be added to the existing rules f th La '
in the hm of the meeting of the members of the society will be held voting at ageneifl . e approbation of a majority of the mambo:
honorary member meeting specially called for the purpose, to elect
_ _ any person not bein a member o; the Incorporated 1-:Wfi§0ClQliY, but that the number of sufih honorary members shall not at ugeeéne exceed twenty, and that such election shall be for a period not
,, Mrmg “'° S'°Bl'B- with power of re-election.’ ‘ 1 . _harles Ford will move :— in ti,’ Th“ "leellllgi whilst recognizing the good intentions of the council for idsmhll Blanks recently made to Liverpool and Newcastle-on-Tyne !h°uldl§:tl01lHl purposes, is of opinion that these and similar grants h- 1"8er in amount, and should be made without the conditions ‘them "nP°!ed by the council.’ pu1£l1i)c'1ihat‘the interests of solicitors and the public require that many would £8? appointments, from which solicitors are at present excluded, , (3) Th thrown open to theui.’ the mnsai the present practice of striking the names of solicitors off demmemmnvolves the society in much unnecessary expense, and it is instructed mto the reputation of the profession; and the council are ‘ode,’ wmflkeieekhleglslative sanction for leaving it optional to the fight 0’ appealxsuc applications by summons in Judges‘ chambers, with appSJ43]t:£(’;3:ntl§18a1lnt€rBBtE of the society require that at least one of the “Mr Helm? general meetings should he held in the evenin .’
, g e unsatisfactory manner in which the work of sheriffs‘ oflicers is performed, and to the resolutions passed thereon at such meeting, and will move :—
‘ (l) That in the opinion of this society the supervision exercised by undersheriffs over the ofllcers appointed by them is inadequate for the protection , of the interests of either creditor or debtor, and admits of grave abuses.’
‘ (2) That the duties of sheriffs‘ oificers should be intrusted to men only of proved integrity, and that no person should hold the appointment who has not been previously approved by the Hi h Court.’
revis , and should be fixed by a scale to be approved by the Lord Chancellor; and a note thereof should be handed to the execution debtor on the occasion of every levy.’
‘ (9) That the sheriffs’ fees and charges in each case should be taxed by the inspector, subject to appeal.’
‘ (10) That the levying of executions, now entrustedto the high bailiffs of county courts, should be transferred to the oifice of the inspector of tho town or district in each case.’
‘ (ll) That gentlemen now filling the oflice of under-sherifi should have the right of electing to serve the oflice of inspector in any one town or district forming part of the county for which they now act as undersheriff, and that due compensation should be made to them for being compnlsorily deprived of the emoluments now arising from their otfice for the rest of county.’
‘ (12) That a copy of these resolutions should be forwarded to the Lord
The annual general meeting of this society was held on Wednesday evening, the 30th ult., whenjthe following oflicers for the ensuing year were elected:—President, E. M. Wavell, Esq., J .P; Governors, Messrs. M. H. Rankin, J . R. Ingram, and F. Walker; Vice-Presidents, Messrs. K. \Valton (the Town Clerk), T. England, and W. Barstow, J P; _HOI-\Treasursr, Mr. J . E. Hill; Hon. Secretary, Mr. J . F. Hirst; Committee, Messrs. E M. Wavell, jun., G. Rhodes, J. R. Roberts, E. Booth, L. HLongbottom, W. H. Land, and H. A. Highley. _ _
It was decided to form a law library in connection with the society, and
an appeal for subscriptions for this object met with a favourable response from the members present.
The following are extracts from the report of the committee
pea ers, limiting length of speeches, and giving
Inmporation of the Social!/.—The memorandum of association, as ap