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to be given; it was only evidence of inability to pay the costs of the appeal.- COUNSEL, H. Terrell; Beaumont; Oswald. SOLICITORS, Indermaur & Brown; Chamberlayne & Beaumont; A. W. Mills.

Re AVERY'S PATENT-C. A. No. 2, 30th March. APPEAL-SECURITY FOR COSTS-SECURITY ALREADY GIVEN FOR COSTS IN COURT BELOW-ALLEGED SURPLUS-R. S. C., 1883, LVIII., 15. This was an original motion that an appellant might be ordered to give security for the costs of his appeal. He had been ordered to give security for costs in the court below, and had deposited £100 for this purpose. He now adduced evidence to shew that the £100 would be more than sufficient to answer the costs which he had been ordered to pay in the court below, and that there would be an ample surplus to cover the costs of the appeal which he was willing to undertake to allow to remain in court as security for these costs. The respondents adduced evidence to shew that there would be no surplus.

THE COURT (COTTON and LINDLEY, L. JJ.) ordered the appellant to give additional security to the amount of £20, and said that he must give the undertaking which he had offered.-COUNSEL, Yate Lee; Oswald. SOLICI TORS, Neish & Howell; E. Kimber.

Re HUME-C. A. No. 2, 28th March.

PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT OF NEW TRUSTEES-EVIDENCE OF CONSENT OF NEW TRUSTEE TO ACT-R. S. C., DECEMBER, 1885, XXXVIII., 19A. This was a petition for the appointment of a new trustee in the place of a lunatic trustee, the petition being entitled both in Chancery and in Lunacy, and the question arose how the consent of the proposed new trustee to a ct ought to be verified. The old practice was that the consent should be verified by affidavit, but rule 19a of order 38 (December, 1885, vide 30 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 143) provides that "the consent of a new trustee to act shall be sufficiently evidenced by a written consent signed by him, and verified by the signature of his solicitor." In Re Wilson (31 Ch. D. 522, 30 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 236) the Court in Lunacy held that this rule does not apply to a petition in Lunacy, and that in such a case the old practice remains.

THE COURT (COTTON, LINDLEY, and LOPES, L.JJ.) said that in Re Wilson it was assumed that the petition was entitled in Lunacy only. When, as in the present case, the petition was entitled in Chancery as well as in Lunacy, the new rule applied.-COUNSEL, Onslow; Luke. SOLICITORS, Bell, Steward, § May.

Re WICKHAM, MARONY v. TAYLOR-C. A. No. 2, 24th March. PRACTICE-STAY OF PROCEEDINGS-NON-PAYMENT OF COSTS-POSTPONEMENT OF TRIAL.

The question in this case was as to the power of the court to order the trial of an action to stand over until the plaintiff has paid costs which he has been previously ordered to pay and has failed to pay. On the 12th of June, 1885, a motion for a receiver made by the plaintiff was refused, with costs. On the 24th of January, 1887, these costs not having been paid, the defendant issued a summons asking that all further proceedings in the action as against him might be stayed until the costs should have been paid by the plaintiff. This summons was adjourned to the judge. The action was attached to North, J., but had been transferred to Kekewich, J., for trial. On the 3rd of February the action came on for trial, and the defendant took the preliminary objection that the costs in question had not been paid, and Kekewich, J. (ante, p. 255), ordered the action to stand over generally, with liberty to the plaintiff to apply to restore it to the paper on payment of the costs. And he ordered the plaintiff to pay the costs of the day. At a subsequent period on the same day the summons for a stay of proceedings was heard by North, J., in chambers, and he made an order staying further proceedings until the costs should have been paid. The plaintiff appealed from both orders.

THE COURT OF APPEAL (COTTON and LINDLEY, L.JJ.) held that when an action is in the paper for trial, there is no jurisdiction to order it to stand over because the plaintiff has not paid costs which, by a previous order, he has been directed to pay. A special application ought to be made for a stay of proceedings. Their lordships disapproved of the decision of Bacon, V.C., in Re Neal (31 Ch. D. 437, 30 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 237). But, there being a summons pending for a stay of proceedings, the right course would have been to order the trial to stand over till that summons had been disposed of. If the action had been marked in the list of actions 66 pending summons," it would not have come into the list for trial.COUNSEL, Oswald and Pochin; Chadwyck-Healey. SOLICITORS, G. Johnson; Shaen, Roscoe, & Co.

THE COURT OF APPEAL (COTTON and LINDLEY, L.JJ.) affirmed the decision. COTTON, L.J., said he should have thought the particulars sufficient, but it might be that a difficulty would arise when the case came on for trial, and the judge before whom the action would be tried having taken that view, he thought it better that further particulars should be given. It was not for the defendants to point out to the plaintiffs bow their specification ought to be framed; but there might be some particular matter in respect of which the defendants could state the nature of the deficiency in the specification. LINDLEY, L.J., thought that the defendants ought, if they could, to state in what way the specification was insufficient to enable a competent workman to construct the machine. -COUNSEL, J. C. Graham; J. G. Butcher. SOLICITORS, Goodhart & Medcalf; Renshaws.

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In this case an application was made ex parte by the official liquidator of the association for an order under section 87 of the Companies Act, 1862, restraining Bernard Boaler from further proceeding with a summons taken out by him against the association for the recovery of penalties for the association's default in keeping its register in accordance with section 25 of the Act. It appeared that on the 20th of March, and after the date of Boaler's summons, an order had been made for the winding up of the association. The summons, which was before the Lord Mayor, had been adjourned, but had been set down for final disposal on the day following the present application. The case of Re Briton Medical, &c., Association (34 W. R. 390, 25 Ch. D. 503), was cited in support of the application.

CHITTY, J., said that he should grant an interim injunction until the following Friday (April 1), but the applicant must, when the summons was called before the Lord Mayor, undertake not to oppose an adjournment.—COUNSEL, R. B. Haldane. SOLICITORS, McDiarmid & Teather.

Re THE ORIENTAL BANK CORPORATION-Chitty, J., 26th March. COSTS-SUPREME COURT FEES ORDER, 1884, SCHEDULE (69)-COURT FEESPERCENTAGE FEE ON SALES IN COURT-SALES EXCEEDING £200,000. In this case the question arose whether, in the liquidation of the corporation, which was possessed of lands of very great value, under the Supreme Court Fees Order, 1884, Schedule of fees, the court fee (69) of 2s. in the £100, payable "on the sale of any land pursuant to any order directing a sale with the approbation of the judge made in any cause or matter for the purpose of raising money to be dealt with by the court in such cause or matter," was limited by the subsequent provision, contained in the schedule, to a payment of such percentage on a sum not exceeding £200,000, and whether such sum represented a sum payable in respect of a single sale, or was made up by several sums payable in respect of several sales under several orders in the same cause or matter.

CHITTY, J., said that it appeared to him that the £200,000 limit did not depend upon the fact that the sale or sales took place by virtue of one or any number of orders. He thought that the rule was free from doubt, for nothing was said in regard to the number of orders, or as to what would be the case where there was one or more orders. He took it that the reason of the thing was, that as soon as the limit of £200,000 was ment from the suitor in regard to the proceedings which the suitor had set in motion for the purpose of obtaining a sale. Moreover, R. S. C, 1883, ord. 71, r. 2 (which was applicable to the Supreme Court Fees Order, 1884), stated that, unless repugnant to the context, the plural number should include the singular and the singular the plural. For these reasons he tuought that as to any lands sold, or to be sold, in the liquidation, so as to raise the collective value of the total sales to over £200,000, the 2s per £100 court fee was not payable.-COUNSEL, Latham, Q.C., and T. H. Wright; Romer, Q.C., and Ingle Joyce. SOLICITORS, Freshfields & Williams; The Official Solicitor.

reached, it was considered that the court had obtained a sufficient pay

BAINES v. GEARY-North, J., 26th March. COVENANT IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE-VALIDITY-DIVISIBILITY-ENFORCEMENT SO FAR AS REASONAble.

The question in this case was whether a covenant in restraint of trade was divisible in point of time, so that the court could enforce it to the extent to which it was reasonably necessary for the protection of the covenantee. The action was brought by B. and E., to restrain the defendant from committing a breach of an agreement not to supply milk to the customers of B. and his successors. B. carried on the business of a dairyman. On the 16th of February, 1885, he entered into an agreement with

CROMPTON v. THE ANGLO-AMERICAN BRUSH ELECTRIC LIGHT the defendant to employ him as milk carrier at a weekly salary. And the

CORPORATION-C. A. No. 2, 26th March.

PATENT ACTION-PARTICULARS OF OBJECTION-SUFFICIENCY. This was an appeal from an order of Kay, J., that the defendants to an action to restrain the infringement of a patent should deliver further particulars of objection to the validity of the plaintiffs' patent, the ground of objection being insufficiency of description in the specification. The particulars of objection amounted, in substance, to a statement that the direction in the specification would not enable a competent workman, without further direction and from the specification alone, to make the patented machine. It was contended on behalf of the plaintiffs that the defendants ought to state in what respect the specification was deficient. Kay, J., adopted this view, and ordered further particulars to be given.

defendant agreed faithfully to serve B., his successors and assigns, and he undertook that he would not, either during such service or after being discharged or quitting such service, serve or cause to be served, either directly or indirectly, for his own benefit or that of any other person, or interfere with, any of the customers served by or belonging at any time to B., his successors or assigns. In February, 1887, B. entered into an agreement to sell the goodwill of his business to E., the purchase to be completed on the 7th of March. The defendant continued in the employment of B. until the 5th of March, when he left in pursuance of notice previously given. He set up a dairy of his own, and sent round a circular soliciting custom from (among others) customers of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs moved for an injunction to restrain the defendant from serving with milk any of the customers of the plaintiff E., or formerly served b

the plaintiff B. It was objected, on behalf of the defendant, that the agreement not to supply the customers of the plaintiff went further than was reasonably required for the protection of B., because on its true construction it extended to persons who might become customers of B. at any time, even after the defendant had quitted his service, and that, therefore, the court would not enforce the covenant at all. NORTH, J., said that covenants in restraint of trade, not being illegal, were divisible, so that if one part of the covenant was reasonable it could be enforced, while the remainder, if it was not reasonable, would not be enforced. This had been held in many cases with regard to space. And in Nichols v. Stretton (7 Beav. 42, 10 Q B. D. 346) it had been held that such a covenant was divisible as regarded time. Assuming that the agreement in the present case would go too far if it applied to customers of B. and his successors at any time, whether during the period for which the defendant was in their employment or afterwards, it would, at any rate, be reasonable so far as it applied to persons who were customers of B. during the defendant's employment. His lordship accordingly granted an injunction limited to such customers of the plaintiffs.-COUNSEL, R. S. Norton; M'Swinney. SOLICITORS, Warmington; Marshall & Haslip.

THE PORTISHEAD WAREHOUSE CO. v. THE BRISTOL AND PORTISHEAD PIER RAILWAY CO.-North, J., 30th March. ARBITRATION-SPECIAL CASE-COSTS-JURISDICTION-COMMON LAW PROCEDURE ACT, 1854, s. 5.

A question arose between the above companies whether, under certain circumstances, the defendant company were liable to pay rent to the plaintiff company for a period of teu months, or whether, in the alternative, they were bound to pay interest. The question was referred to an arbitrator, but the costs of the award were not submitted for his decision. He made an award by which he stated a special case for the decision of the court on the question whether the defendant company were liable to pay rent or in the alternative interest, and he fixed the amount of rent or interest to be paid as the case might be if either was payable. North, J., on the hearing of the special case, held that rent was payable, and the question was then raised whether the court had jurisdiction to deal with the costs of the hearing.

NORTH, J., held that he had jurisdiction, and decided that the costs of the hearing must be paid by the unsuccessful party.-COUNSEL, Cozens Hardy, Q.C.. and Chadwyck Healey; Napier Higgins, Q.C., and E. Bray. SOLICITORS, Thos. White & Son; Hargrove & Co.

Re COPPARD, HOWLETT v. HODSON-Stirling, J., 19th March. WILL-CONSTRUCTION-GIFT TO CHILDREN OF NEPHEW AT TWENTY-FIVE OR MARRIAGE-ONLY CHILDREN BORN BEFORE DEATH OF TESTATRIX ENTITLED.

The testatrix, by her will, gave one moiety of her residuary estate upon trust for the benefit of the children or child of her nephew, to be vested interests in them, in case of sons, on their attaining the age of twentyfive years, and in the case of daughters, on their attaining that age or marrying under it. There were seven children of the testatrix's nephew, four born in her lifetime and three after her death. The question was whether and how far the gift to the children of the nephew at twenty-five or, in the case of daughters, at twenty-five or marriage, was void for remoteness.

STIRLING, J., said that the case was governed by Elliott v. Elliott (12 Sim. 276), which was an authority binding upon him. He accordingly held that only the four children who were living at the death of the testatrix could participate in the gift. His lordship further held that "vested" meant "vested in possession," and not "vested in interest," and, therefore, that one of the daughters, who had married, had become entitled to an indefeasibly vested interest in her share.-COUNSEL, Langley; Pearson, Q.C., and Ernest Hatton; Hastings, Q.C., and E. S. Ford; R. F. Norton. SOLICITORS, Clarke & Calkin, for F. T. Pearson, Shoreham; Crampton & Warne, for H. D. Warne, Brighton.

LACON v. TYRRELL-Stirling, J., 10th March. MORTGAGE-FORECLOSURE-RENT RECEIVED AFTER CERTIFICATE-AFFIDAVIT OF RECEIPTS BY MORTGAGEES-DELIVERY OF POSSESSION. This was a motion for foreclosure absolute and for possession of the mortgaged hereditaments so far as they remained unsold. The plaintiffs were mortgagees under a mortgage, made in April, 1874, of certain hereditaments in Suffolk. Part of the property had been sold by them under their power of sale, part they had entered into possession of, and part was in the occupation of the mortgagor. On the 29th of January, 1886, the plaintiffs took out an originating summons for the usual accounts and for foreclosure. The summons did not ask for possession. On the 15th of July, 1886, the chief clerk certified the balance due to the plaintiffs for principal and interest. The 15th of Jauuary, 1887, was the time fixed for redemption. The plaintiffs had received rents since the date of the certificate. The plaintiffs, on the 19th of February, the certified balance not having been paid, moved for foreclosure absolute and for possession of so much of the mortgaged premises as had not been sold. Salt v. Edgar (30 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 322), was cited on their behalf. The defendant did not appear.

February the required affidavit was filed, but the registrar, as the foreclosure had been opened by the receipt of rents after the chief clerk's certificate, declined to draw up the order because the defendant had not been served with notice of the application. Notice having been served upon the defendant accordingly, the plaintiffs, on the 10th of March, moved for foreclosure absolute in default of payment by the 19th of March, and that the defendants should be ordered to deliver up possession of such of the mortgaged premises as he was in possession of. The defendant did not appear. STIRLING, J., confirmed the order of the 19th of February.COUNSEL, W. K. Willcocks. SOLICITORS, Storey & Cowland, for Diver & Preston, Great Yarmouth.

WESTON v. LEVY—Stirling, J., 26th March.
MORTGAGE-FORECLOSURE-ORIGINATING SUMMONS-RECEIVER.

In this case a question arose whether there was jurisdiction to appoint a receiver in a foreclosure action commenced by originating summons. The plaintiffs were first mortgagees, under an indenture of mortgage dated the 27th of July, 1883, of certain leasehold hereditaments in Castletown-road, West Kensington. On the 14th of February, 1887, they took out an originating summons for foreclosure against the mortgagor and a second mortgagee. On the 24th of February an order for foreclosure was made in chambers. The mortgaged premises having been unoccupied for six months, and the mortgagor refusing to let them, although there was a tenant willing to take them, the plaintiffs now moved that a Mr. Hutchins should be appointed receiver. It was argued on behalf of the plaintiffs that although there might be no jurisdiction to appoint a order had been made upon it, yet that, even prior to the Judicature Act, receiver in proceedings commenced by originating summons before an 1873, there had been jurisdiction to appoint a receiver after such au order had been made: Brooker v. Brooker (3 Sm. & Giff. at p. 475); Re Bywater's Estate (1 Jur. N. S. 227); and now, by section 25, sub-section 8, of the Judicature Act, 1873, the court could appoint a receiver in any case in which it appeared just or convenient.

authority to act at once, the plaintiffs being answerable for his re ipts STIRLING, J., appointed the above-named gentleman receiver, with The defendant until security was given.-COUNSEL, Swinfen Eady. SOLICITORS, Hicklin, Washington, & mortgagor appeared in person.

Pasmore.

VEALE & CO. v. AUTOMATIC BOILER FEEDER, LIMITED Q. B. Div., 25th March.

FORM OF SPECIALLY-INDORSED WRIT.

The writ in this action was specially indorsed. The indorsement followed the form given in the Rules of 1883, appendix A., No. 2, commencing with "Statement of Claim." Judgment having been signed by the plaintiff in default of delivery of a defence, the defendant applied at chambers to set aside the judgment on the ground that the statement of claim was bad for not concluding with the word "delivered," in accordance with all the forms given in appendix C., section 4, it being expressly stated in ord. 3, r. 6, that special indorsements shall be to the effect of such of the forms in appendix C, section 4, as shall be applicable to the A master made an order setting aside the judgment, and this was affirmed by Huddleston, B. The plaintiff appealed. THE COURT (HAWKINS and CAVE, JJ.) allowed the appeal. They said that the word "delivered," or the words "delivered the day of were not an essential part of, or even appropriate to, a statement of claim indorsed on a writ. Such a conclusion was only applicable in the case of a statement of claim drawn as a separate document and intended to be delivered between the parties.-COUNSEL, T. W. Chitty; Macaskie. SOLICITORS, Harvey & Capron; Todd, Dennes, & Lamb.

case.

WHITELEY v. BARLEY-Q. B. Div., 25th March. DISCOVERY OF DOCUMENTS-ACTION FOR PENALTIES.

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This case raised the question as to the right of a plaintiff in an action for penalties to obtain discovery of documents. The action was brought against the surveyor to the Corporation of Ramsgate under section 193 of the Public Health Act, 1875, to recover penalties for being interested in certain contracts made with the corporation. The plaintiff obtained the usual order for discovery of documents. The defendant, in his affidavit made in pursuance of that order, specified certain documents which he refused to produce, on the ground that the action was one for penalties. The plaintiff then applied for an order that the defendant should make a further and better affidavit. Master Manley Smith held that the affidavit was sufficient; but Huddleston, B., on appeal, held that it was not, and said that the defendant ought to state in the affidavit that the production of the documents would tend to make him liable for penalties. The defendant appealed, relying on the cases of Hunnings v. Williamson (31 W. R. 924, 10 Q. B. D. 459), and Martin v. Treacher (34 W. R. 315, 16 Q. B. D. 507). On behalf of the plaintiff it was argued that the rules as to discovery in actions for penalties were the same as in other actions, and that the only test was whether the production of documents would tend to criminate the party called on to make discovery; and if it would, then, on the authority of Webb v. East (28 W. R. 336, 5 Ex. D. 108), it ought to be so stated in the affidavit.

STIRLING, J., extended the time for redemptiou to the 19th of March, 1887, and directed the plaintiffs to file and produce to the registrar an THE COURT (HAWKINS and CAVE, JJ.) allowed the appeal, pointing out affidavit shewing the amount that would be due to them on that day, the difference between an action for libel, like Webb v. East, and an action after allowing for moneys received for principal, interest, and costs. In for penalties. In the former the plaintiff was enforcing a civil remedy, default of payment on that day, the defendant was to be absolutely fore- and had a right to discovery from the defendant; and, if it so happened closed, and the plaintiffs were to have possession. On the 25th of that the production of any document would criminate the defendant, the

law, before it relieved him from the necessity of producing it, required him to take that objection on oath. But in an action for penalties the whole object was to criminate the defendant, and any demand for discovery must be for that purpose. They thought the defendant ought not to be ordered to make any further affidavit. --COUNSEL, Tindal Atkinson; H. F. Dickens. SOLICITORS, Meredith, Roberts, & Mills, for Hubbard, Ramsgate; Kingsford, Dorman, & Co.

66

DENCE.

PIKE v. ONGLEY-Q. B. Div., 16th March. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-LIABILITY OF AGENT TO THIRD PARTIES-SALE FOR AND ON ACCOUNT OF OWNER "-CUSTOM OF HOP TRADE-EviThis was an action against brokers for non-delivery of hops equal to sample sold under a written contract by the defendants "for and on account of owner," and signed by the defendants without qualification. The plaintiffs tendered evidence at the trial to shew that by the custom of the hop trade brokers who do not disclose the name of their principal at the time of the contract are looked upon as primarily liable upon the contract. The plaintiffs did not inquire of the defendants as to who the "owner" might be, but there was evidence to shew that they knew he was a foreigner. Manisty, J., before whom the case was tried, admitted the evidence, and the jury found a verdict for the plaintiffs. On an application for a new trial, on the ground of misreception of evidence,

THE COURT (DAY and WILLS, JJ.) said that though evidence of custom was admissible to render an agent liable upon a contract where no contradiction was introduced into the document, it was clear that here the agents were not primarily liable, and that evidence of a custom which would make them primarily liable upon the contract would contradict its terms. Therefore, the defendants were not liable and judgment must be entered for them.-COUNSEL, Winch; Murphy, Q.C., and Pyke. SOLICITORS, Irvine & Hodges; Philip Thornton.

THOMAS v. EXETER FLYING POST CO.-Q. B. Div., 22nd March. PRACTICE-WITHDRAWAL OF JUROR-COMPROMISE NOT CARRIED OUT-RE

HEARING.

In this case a compromise had been entered into during the trial of an action for libel, in which it was agreed that the defendants would insert an apology in their newspaper, and a juror was withdrawn. The apology was in due course inserted, but an article appeared in another part of the paper which the plantiff alleged was a repetition of the previous libel. An application was then made to the judge before whom the trial had been commenced, and he ordered the cause to come on for trial again before him on notice to the defendants. Upon the second trial the defendants did not appear, and the jury found a verdict for the plantiff, with substanial damages. The defendants then applied to the court to set aside the verdict and all proceedings after the withdrawal of a juror, on the ground that the action had been put an end to, and that the judge at Nisi Prius had no jurisdiction to try the cause. THE COURT (DAY and WILLS, JJ.) said that the withdrawal of a juror did not put an end to an action. That could only be effected by some legal proceeding. The withdrawal of a juror was in effect merely an agreement to dispense with the verdict of a jury, and the action was still alive, so that the judge had jurisdiction to retry the case if he thought the agreement had not been fairly carried out, and the justice of the case required it.-COUNSEL, Charles, Q.C., and Bullen; Pitt Lewis, Q.C., and Coleridge. SOLICITORS, Bolton, Robbins, & Co., for Dimond, Exeter; S. Hamilton, for Friend & Beal, Exeter.

Re PARKINSON: In the Matter of A PROSECUTION BY THE
TREASURY-REG. v. GERSHON-Q. B. Div., 30th March.

In this case the Treasury had directed a prosecution to be instituted against a person at Liverpool for offences under the Debtors Act-under section 12 for felony and under section 11 for a misdemeanor-and a Liverpool firm of solicitors were retained by the Treasury to conduct the prosecution at the sessions, which they did. The charge of felony was given up, the defendant pleading guilty to the charge of misdemeanor under an arrangement by which he agreed to pay £80 to the creditors and £198 to the solicitors for costs, he not being called up for judgment. The Solicitor to the Treasury, on hearing of this arrangement, called on the local solicitors, whose bill of costs as against the Treasury was taxed at a little over £100, to account to the Treasury for the amount received for costs, which they declined to do, insisting that the amount they had received had come, not from public funds, but from private sources, and that the difference between the two sums covered extra costs, especially of witnesses. This was an application on the part of the Treasury for a rule calling upon the Liverpool solicitors to account for the surplus. There had been a taxation of their bill of costs as against the Treasury, and the amount taxed was £101. It was stated that the costs of witnesses were generally defrayed by the local authorities, but the Treasury made good any deficiency. Counsel for the Treasury contended that the local solicitors acted as agents for the Solicitor to the Treasury, and received the money for him, and so were bound to account for the surplus beyond the sum of £101 taxed to the local solicitors for their own costs. Counsel for the local solicitors insisted that the money was paid to them as solicitors for the prosecution, and that all that the Treasury were entitled to was to have credit to the amount of £101, the taxed costs, and that the local solicitors were entitled to retain the difference, out of which they would have to pay the witnesses, &c. In the result,

THE COURT (DAY and WILLS, JJ.) came to the conclusion that the local solicitors must pay over the balance to the Treasury-that is, the difference between the sum received by the local solicitors for costs and the sum allowed them on taxation DAY, J., said the sort of arrangement entered into at the trial was not to be approved of, and could not be allowed to override the right of the Treasury to an account of the sum received by their local agents and to payment of the balance. WILLS, J., said the local solicitors acted as agents for the Treasury, and under definite terms embodied in a memorandum of the Treasury. Circumstances had arisen at the trial which could not have been contemplated, and an arrangement had been entered into of a kind which he was happy to know the Treasury never sanctioned, and the result of which was not satisfactory as to the ends of justice. Under this arrangement a considerable sum had been received by the local solicitors -as agents for the Treasury-and the Solicitor to the Treasury was bound to see to the application of the money as between the Treasury and its local agents, and to insist that the whole of the sum received, except the amount allowed on taxation, should be paid to the Treasury. The court had no doubt that the Treasury would do what was right under the circumstances, and would allow all that was fairly due, but the court could not allow arrangements of this kind-which they ought rather to do their utmost to discourage-to be carried out without control by the local solicitors.COUNSEL, R. S. Wright, Channell, Q.C.—Times.

CASES AFFECTING SOLICITORS.

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Re HARRIS, POWELL v. GOODALE—C. A. No. 2, 24th March. SOLICITOR-COSTS-TAXATION-"FEE FOR DEDUCING TITLE "-SOLICITORS' REMUNERATION ORDER (AUGUST, 1882), SCHEDULE I., PART I. This was an appeal from a decision of North, J. (ante, p. 255). The appeal was limited to one only of the points raised in the court belowviz., whether the solicitors were entitled to the scale fee for "deducing title." In August, 1884, the Commissioners of Sewers for the City of London served on S., the occupier of two leasehold houses, a notice to treat for the purchase of his interest, and in April, 1886, a contract was entered into between S. and the commissioners for the purchase of his interest for £15,000. The contract provided that the commissioners should pay the vendor's solicitors' preliminary costs and also the costs of title and the vendor's solicitors, "If the title consists of anything more than the conveyance. On the 5th of April, 1886, the commissioners' solicitor wrotet> lease, please let me have abstract, otherwise I shall not require one. this time the commissioners had acquired the reversion in the property expectant on the lease, though the vendor's solicitors were not aware of this. On the 6th of April the vendor's solicitors replied, "The title consists of the lease only; will you require a copy in lieu of abstract." The commissioners' solicitor did not reply to this letter, except by sending lease was supplied by the vendor's solicitors. On the completion of the a draft assignment of the lease for perusal. No copy of, or extract from, the charges, in which was included the sum of £82 10s., which was the scale purchase the vendor's solicitors sent to the commissioners their bill of fee for "deducing title" corresponding to the purchase-money of £15,000. The commissioners applied for the taxation of the bill, and the for deducing title," but that they must be remunerated under Schedule taxing master was of opinion that the solicitors were not entitled to the fee II. to the Remuneration Order. The solicitors carried in objections to the taxation, in which they said, "The vendor's solicitors deduced such title as they had, and answered the only requisition capable of being made upon it. If they had forestalled the purchasers' solicitor's question by delivering a copy or abstract of the lease, no question could have been raised, and they have done, in substance, the whole of the work in respect of which a charge is allowed by the schedule.” The taxing master replied, "The solicitors are not entitled to the scale charge for deducing title, &c., as no title was shewn to the purchaser (see Re Lacey, 25 Ch. D. 311)." The solicitors took out a summons to review the taxation. North, J., affirmed the decision of the taxing master. He was of opinion that no title had been deduced, and that the scale did not apply.

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THE COURT OF APPEAL (COTTON and LINDLEY, L JJ.) affirmed the decision on the same ground. They said that Ex parte Mayor of London (35 W. R. 211) was distinguishable, for there the solicitor of the purchasers had to ascertain that the vendors (a public body) had obtained a direction from the Lord Chancellor authorizing them to sell the property, without which they would have no power to sell.-COUNSEL, Byrne; J. Henderson. SOLICITORS, Harris, Powell, & Goodale; E. A. Baylis.

UNQUALIFIED PRACTITIONERS.

A summons issued at the instance of the Incorporated Law Society of the United Kingdom against Mr. William Clark for having given the following notice was heard before the magistrates at Derby on the 26th of March :

"6, Lower Arthur-street, Derby. "Final notice before proceedings in the county courts for the recovery of small debts as per Act of Parliament.

"I hereby give you notice that unless the sum of £0 5s. 8d., due by you to Graham & Bennett, is paid on or before Friday, the 11th day of February, 1887, I shall proceed against you under the above Act. Trusting you will think it advisable to pay the amount, and thereby avoid the expenses to which you will otherwise be liable, I am, yours respectfully, "WILLIAM CLARK. £0 5s. 8d.

66

"To Mr. Beardsley, Smalley.

"Dated this 4th day of February, 1887.

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In the Matter of A MUNICIPAL ELECTION IN THE BOROUGH OF HYTHE-Q. B. Div., 24th March. This case raised a novel question as to the withdrawal of an election petition in consequence of a reference to arbitration, the result of which had been adverse to the petitioner. There had been an election to the office of alderman of Hythe and one Bean had been declared elected. The opposing candidate, a Mr. Mallam, presented a petition against his return, contesting that he had been "returned by a majority of lawful votes," so that the question was resolved into a scrutiny, which would be very expen. sive. Under these circumstances, the mayor, who knew both the parties, wrote to them a letter suggesting that it would be desirable to avoid the expense and consequent ill-feeling of litigation, and that with that view they should meet at his house, which they accordingly did, and the result was an agreement to refer the matter to the town clerk, who, on examination of the voting papers, reported that Mr. Bean was duly elected. Upon this, the petitioner desired to withdraw his petition, as to which the Municipal Election Act, 1882, s. 95, provides that leave to withdraw may be granted by the court on special application, and the Corrupt Practices Act, 1883, provides that the affidavits shall negative any corrupt bargain or agreement. Affidavits were accordingly filed in this case, explaining how the desire to withdraw the petition had arisen-in consequence of the intervention of the mayor--and negativing any corrupt agreement. Counsel for the petitioner applied for leave to withdraw his petition, as he found it would be hopeless to proceed. [A. L. SMITH, J., inquired, How can we recognize a reference to arbitration of an election petition which involves the interests of the constituency] The court is not asked to recognize the reference to arbitration (although as the petition only involved the number of votes and did not charge bribery or corrupt or illegal practices, there would, it is conceived, be no objec. tion to it), and it is only mentioned as explaining how it came to be desired to withdraw the petition. The court can grant the leave which is applied for, and as all has been done which is required by the Act there can be no objection to it. Counsel who appeared for the alderman elected being asked whether he opposed the application, said he did not, and on the contrary he rather concurred in it, and believed that everything had been done in accordance with the Act.

THE COURT (A. L. SMITH and GRANTHAM, JJ.) upon this, said they saw no reason why the petition under these circumstances should not be withdrawn, and so they allowed it to be withdrawn accordingly. COUNSEL, Dickens; E. Pollock.-Times.

LAW SOCIETIES.

INCORPORATED LAW SOCIETY.

The following circular has been sent to all the country members of the society :

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Consequent on a resolution passed at the provincial meeting held at York in October last, a general meeting of the society will be convened in London for Tuesday and Wednesday, the 7th and 8th June next.

"As the year 1887 (being the fiftieth of Her Majesty's reign) is to be marked as a Jubilee year, it has been determined to entertain the country members, in acknowledgment of the frequent hospitalities which have been extended to the society in the provinces.

"The entertainment will comprise a dinner, a ball, and theatrical representations at one or more of the London theatres, and will take take place from the 7th to the 10th June next inclusive.

"To enable the executive committee to make the necessary arrangements, we are directed to inquire whether you will be present at the meeting, and whether the committee may have the pleasure of including you among the guests.

"In the event of your intending to be present, we shall, in due course, have the pleasure to send you a formal invitation.

"It will be of assistance to the committee to receive your reply a day or two before their meeting on the 30th inst.-We are, dear Sir, yours faithfully, "E. W. WILLIAMSON and S. P. B. BUCKNILL, Hon. Secs."

LAW UNION FIRE AND LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY. The annual meeting of proprietors was held at the offices, 126, Chancerylane, London, on the 24th ult., Mr. JAMES CUDDON, the chairman, presiding.

Mr. FRANK MCGEDY (the actuary and secretary) having read the notice convening the meeting and the minutes of the preceding general meeting, the directors' report was taken as read:

The report states that in the fire department new insurances were effected for an aggregate amount of £6,994,418, yielding in new premiums the sum of £10,618 12s. 4d.

In the life department during the same period 252 policies were effected,

insuring £236,245, the new premiums received thereon amounting to £8,085 198., of which £1,298 16s. was paid away for re-assurance.

Nine life annuities for £679 2s. 10d. were granted, the purchase-money for which was £5,742 7s. 8d. Sixteen annuities for £999 10s. 6d. became void during the year by death.

The claims under life and endowment policies amounted to £46,519 3s. 6d., which amount, although in excess of the claims for the year 1885, is below the expectation.

The total amount of losses by fire, paid and outstanding on 30th November, was £21,615 15s., being about 45 per cent. of the net premiums received in the year.

The average rate of interest realized on the assets of the company (whether productive or unproductive) was £4 11s. 2d. per cent. The balance at credit of the profit and loss account, after crediting that account with four-fifths of the surplus for the year, namely, £11,863 3s. 3d, is £42,052 12s. 5d. The directors recommend the payment of a dividend of 4s. 6d. per share (free of income tax) for the year ending 30th November, 1887. After providing for this dividend there will remain at credit of the profit and loss account the sum of £19,552 12s. 5d. Icok not only at the general result of our business, but also to consider in The CHAIRMAN said: Gentlemen, it is useful at the close of each year to detail what has contributed to that general result. In the life department the fund has been increased by about £39,000. In these bad times this certainly is not discouraging. The average amount of the new life policies continues rather to increase, the amount per new policy having been during last year about £930. At the close of the last quinquennium the average of the subsisting life policies, bonuses included, was about £830. We should have had a larger accumulation of funds last year but for the unusual number of lapses and surrenders. The payments for surrenders, you will see by the accounts, amounted to over £5,000. This, of course, also diminished the premium income. It will, however, tell favourably in the next valuation, because £5,000 cannot be paid away for surrenders without the retention of a considerable sum as profit on the policies surrendered. The lapses on policies which had not acquired a surrender value were more than usual. The annual premiums on the surrendered policies amounted to £1,340, and on the lapsed policies to £1.920. There were claims on 70 life policies in all, the average claim having been about £660, being, as you will collect from what I have said, considerably below the average of subsisting policies. Ten reversions have fallen in, resulting in a profit of about £7,000 in respect of those leversions, and sixteen annuities have lapsed, resulting in a very good profit in respect of those annuities. During the past year we have appointed forty-six rew agents. You will observe by the report that the directors recommend an increase of the dividend to the shareholders-namely, 4s. 6d. per share, instead of the former dividend of 4s. Our actuary, after a careful calculation, advised the board that this proposal is a proper and safe one to be carried out in this the third year of the current quinquennium; and that, although it offers a substantial present advantage to the proprietors, there is a reasonable prospect of something still better in the near

future.

Mr. CHARLES PEMBERTON (the deputy-chairman) seconded the motion, and congratulated the shareholders on the success of the company and the enhanced dividend.

Mr. R. J. SISSON, J. P., asked on what basis the increased dividend had been recommended? He had always thought it was due to the shareholders that the public should know pretty well how they stood with regard to the value of their shares; so that in the event of any sharegetting good value for their money. holder selling out the persons who bought would see that they were

Mr. McGEDY explained the grounds on which he had felt justified in reporting to the directors the ability of the company to pay a larger dividend, arising chiefly out of the profits on the fire business, and expressed his belief that the present amount of dividend might fairly be expected to be paid during the ensuing three years of the current quinquennium.

The CHAIRMAN added that the life profits had not been taken into account in the estimated profit.

Mr. JOHN ROOT said he saw by the balance-sheet that they had the large sum of £534,000 invested on mortgages. He wished to know whether the directors had ample security for that large sum ?

The CHAIRMAN said the interest in arrear was very small, only £3,000 or £4,000, shewing there could be very little difficulty with regard to these mortgages. They had not, of course, taken any more Irish securities. The number of securities they held on Irish property was very small, as also was the amount. He believed there was no reason to apprehend any difficulty with regard to the mortgages.

The report was then unanimously adopted.

Mr. EDMUND JAMES moved "That, in accordance with the recommendation of the directors, a dividend of 4s. 6d. per share, free of income tax, be paid to the shareholders for the financial year ending the 30th of November, 1887, in equal half-yearly payments on the 1st day of June and the 1st day of December."

Mr. JOHN ROOT seconded the motion, which was at once adopted. Mr. CHARLES CHESTON moved the election as a London director of Mr. R. T. Raikes, solicitor, of 24, Coleman-street, to fill the vacancy occasioned by the death of Mr. Wm. Crossman. They all deeply regretted the loss of Mr. Crossman. In Mr. Raikes they would have a man who would bring more than average ability and great diligence to the business of this company.

Mr. PEMBERTON (the deputy-chairman) seconded the motion, remark. ing that Mr. Raikes would ably fill the position, being a gentleman of considerable influence in his profession.

The resolution was carried unanimously.

On the motion of Mr. S. E. STEINBERG, seconded by Mr. TYмNAM, the retiring directors were severally and separately re-elected.

Mr. E. H. BURKITT proposed the re-election of Mr. Theodore Waterhouse as a shareholders' auditor for the current year.

Mr. A. CROSSMAN seconded the motion, and it was at once adopted. The CHAIRMAN announced that the directors had, in accordance with the deed, appointed Mr. James J. Darley as directors' auditor for the current year.

On the motion of Mr. H. J. FRANCIS, seconded by Mr. H. MASTER, the sum of seventy-five guineas was voted to each of the auditors for his services during the past year.

The CHAIRMAN said he would now move a vote of thanks to the actuary and secretary, the solicitors, and staff of the office. The directors, shareholders, and all concerned were very much indebted to them. He particularly wished to notice the services of Mr. Rogers, the chief clerk of the fire department, to whom they were greatly indebted for escaping many losses, and he was quite sure they all highly appreciated his valuable

services.

The resolution was carried with cordiality.

Mr. F. MCGEDY (the actuary and secretary) said he was very much obliged to them for the honour conferred upon him and the staff by this vote of thanks. It was a stimulus to them to find their services gave satisfaction and were appreciated.

Mr. MARK WATERS returned thanks on behalf of the solicitors, and said it was their desire at all times to promote the welfare of the company, not only by proper attention to its legal affairs, but by bringing it new business.

Mr. HUGH SHIELD, Q.C., proposed a vote of thanks to the chairman for his continued assiduity and effective services in the chair. It was the desire, as it was the interest, of every member of the society that he might be long spared to give them the benefit of his great services.

Mr. F. R. WARD seconded the motion, which was cordially adopted.
The CHAIRMAN having acknowledged the compliment,
The proceedings terminated.

NEW ORDERS, &c.

UNCLAIMED FUNDS IN CHANCERY.

Notice to persons requiring information respecting the accounts of unclaimed funds in the books of the Pay Office of the Supreme Court. 1. All applications should be in writing, and addressed to the Assistant Paymaster-General, Royal Courts of Justice, London, W.C.

2. The only authorized list of accounts that have not been dealt with since the 1st of September, 1871, is that published as a supplement to the London Gazette of the 8th of March, 1887, and no reliance should be placed upon any information which is not dervived from official sources.

3. Copies of this list can be personally inspected in the Eastern corridor, ground floor, at the Royal Courts of Justice, or may be purchased from Messrs. Harrison & Sons, 45, St. Martin's-lane, London, W.C., at the price of 1s. each. Application for copies to be sent abroad must enclose stamps to cover postage, in addition to the cost of the Gazette, of which the weight is 11 ozs.

4. Each application must be signed by the applicant; if made by a solicitor he must state the name of his client, and that he believes the client to be beneficially interested in the fund. (Rule 101 of Supreme Court Funds Rules, 1886.)

If the application is made by any person other than a solicitor, he must state the grounds upon which he claims to be interested in the particular matter or suit quoted in his application, bearing in mind that the mere fact of the surname of the original owner of property being the same as that of one of the parties to a suit, is not sufficient to support a claim.

5. The correct title of the matter or suit must be quoted from the authorized list, otherwise the account cannot be traced.

6. The published list is only a list of the titles cf accounts, and is not, in any sense, either a register of next of kin, or of heirs wanted, or of lapsed legacies, or of unclaimed estates.

As the Pay Office is not an office of legal inquiry, and has no knowledge of the origin or particulars of the law suits referred to, it is quite useless to furnish baptismal or other certificates in support of an alleged claim.

7. Each request for information respecting a matter or suit in the list must be stamped with a 2s. 6d. adhesive judicature stamp, as required by the order as to Supreme Court Fees, 1884, rule 107. Stamps can be obtained at rooms 6 and 419, Royal Courts of Justice; at the district registries of the High Court; and at most stamp and post offices.

8. The only information which (subject to the conditions hereinbefore mentioned) it is in the power of the Assistant Paymaster-General to furnish is

(a.) The amount of the fund in court.

(6.) The date of any order of court affecting the account (if specially required). 9. Funds in court can only be dealt with under the direction of an order of court. The Assistant Paymaster-General cannot advise applicants respecting the proper method of applying to the court for such an order.

10. No notice can be taken of applications unless the foregoing instructions are complied with.

LEGAL NEWS.

APPOINTMENTS.

Mr. EDWARD BLEAYMIRE, solicitor (of the firm of Bleaymire & Shepherd), of Penrith, has been appointed by the High Sheriff of Westmoreland (Mr. John Edward Hasell) to be Under-Sheriff of that county for the ensuing year. Mr. Bleaymire was admitted a solicitor in 1848. He is clerk to the county magistrates at Penrith.

Mr. HARRY PEARSON BROCKLESBY, solicitor (of the firm of Brocklesby, Ley, & Brocklesby), of 9, Walbrook, has been appointed a Commissioner for taking Affidavits in and for the Supreme Courts of the provinces of Quebec and Ontario, in the Dominion of Canada.

Martineau, Carslake, & Goodwin), has received the honour of Knighthood Mr. THOMAS MARTINEAU, solicitor and notary (of the firm of Ryland, on the laying by the Queen of the foundation-stone of the Birmingham New Law Courts. Sir T. Martineau is the eldest son of Mr. Robert

Martineau, of Birmingham, and was born in 1828. He was educated at Edgbaston Proprietary School, and he was admitted a solicitor in 1851, having served his articles with the late Mr. Arthur Ryland, with whom he was for many years in partnership, and on whose death he was appointed law clerk to the Guardians of the Birmingham Assay Office. he is now filling the office of mayor for the third time. Sir T. Martineau is an alderman for the borough of Birmingham, and

Mr. FRANCIS ROXBURGH, barrister, who has been appointed to act as Assistant-Judge of the Mayor's Court, is the only son of his Honour Judge Sir Francis Roxburgh, and was born in 1850. He was educated at Harrow, and he was formerly Scholar of Trinity Hall, Cambridge. He was called to the bar at the Middle Temple in Trinity Term, 1873, and he is a member of the South-Eastern Circuit.

Mr. HARRY BEVIR, solicitor, of Wootton Bassett, has been appointed by the High Sheriff of Wiltshire (Mr. Clement Walker Heneage) to be Under-Sheriff of that county for the ensuing year. Mr. Bevir is Clerk to the Cricklade Board of Guardians. He was admitted a solicitor in 1872. Mr. ALBERT IVESON, solicitor (of the firm of Oldman & Iveson), of Gainsborough, has been appointed by the High Sheriff of Lincolnshire (Sir Hickman Bacon) to be Under-Sheriff of that county for the ensuing year. Mr. Iveson was admitted a solicitor in 1860. He is coroner for the Kirton District of Lancashire and Clerk to the county magistrates and the Gainsborough Highway Board.

Mr. HARRY ALEXANDER COPE, solicitor, of Holywell, has been appointed Registrar of the Holywell County Court (Circuit No. 29) in succession to the late Mr. David Pugh. Mr. Cope was admitted a solicitor in 1873. He is clerk to the Holywell Highway Board and to the county magistrates. act as a Judge of the High Court of the North-West Provinces of India, Mr. SYED MAHMUD, barrister, of Allahabad, who has been appointed to was born in 1851. He was called to the bar at Lincoln's-inn in Easter Term, 1872.

to the High Court of the North-West Provinces of India. Mr. Strachey is Mr. ARTHUR STRACHEY. barrister, has been appointed Official Reporter the second son of Sir John Strachey, Bart., and was born in 1858. He was educated at Trinity Hall, Cambridge, and he was called to the bar at the Inner Temple in June, 1883.

appointed by the High Sheriff of Carmarthenshire (Mr. Gerwyn Jones) to Mr. DAVID LONG PRICE, Solicitor, of Talley and Lampeter, has been be Under-Sheriff of that county for the ensuing year. Mr. Price was admitted a solicitor in 1855. He is clerk to the county magistrates and Registrar of the Lampeter County Court.

Mr. WILLIAM WAKELIN, Solicitor, of Presteign, has been appointed by Sheriff of that county for the ensuing year. the High Sheriff of Radnorshire (Mr. Francis Lyndon Evelyn) to be UnderMr. Wakelin is Registrar of the Presteign County Court. He was admitted a solicitor in 1875. stone, has been appointed by the High Sheriff of Cambridgeshire and Mr. EDWARD WALTER HUNNYBUN, solicitor, of Huntingdon and ThrapHuntingdonshire (Mr. Henry Charles Geldart) to be Under-Sheriff of those counties for the ensuing year. Mr. Hunny bun was admitted a solicitor in 1871. He is clerk to the Huntingdon Board of Guardians, Authority, and Superintendent Registrar. Assessment Committee, School Attendance Committee, and Rural Sanitary mission. Lord HERSCHELL has been appointed Chairman of the Currency Com

Mr. GEORGE LEVINGE WHATELY, solicitor (of the firm of Roopers & Ottoman Railway Co., on the resignation of his partner, Mr. Maxmilian Whately), of 17, Lincoln's-inn-fields, has been appointed Solicitor to the George Rooper. Mr. Whately was admitted a solicitor in 1877.

Mr. JOHN BASELEY TOOKE HALES, solicitor (of the firm of Hansells & Norfolk by the High Sheriff, Sir Alfred Jodrell, Bart. Hales), Norwich, has been appointed Under-Sheriff for the county of Mr. Hales was admitted a solicitor in 1874. [Substituted for last week's notice.]

PARTNERSHIPS DISSOLVED. BEDFORD GLASIER, solicitors (Andrew, Wood, & Glasier), 8, Great WILLIAM JOSEPH DEWES ANDREW, WILLIAM WOOD, and WILLIAM James-street, Bedford-row. Dec. 31.

BENJAMIN MUTLOW and HENRY SIMMONS BURBIDGE, solicitors (Mutlow mons Burbidge will continue to carry on the business at the above & Burbidge), 22, Cannon-street, Birmingham. The said Henry Sim[Gazette, March 25.] Frome. March 22. WILLIAM DUNN and ROBERT PAYNE, solicitors (Dunn & Payne),

address.

THOMAS HUNT and ROBERT LUNN, solicitors, Warwick. March 25. (Mole & Stone), Derby, and sometime since at Ilkeston. March 25. RICHARD LOVELACE HOMER MOLE and FREDERICK STONE, solicitors [Gazette, March 29.]

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