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allowed to exercise the double powers of tenant for life and trustees
for the purposes of the Act in cases of infancy. But these con-
siderations do not seem to a ply so strongly to the case of
guardians. His lordship thought he had power to dispense with
the appointment of trustees under the concluding words of section
60, which says that the powers of a tenant for li e may be exercised
on behalf of the infant by the trustees of the settlement, and if
there are none, then by such person and in such manner as the
court, on the application of the guardian or of a next friend of the
infant, “ either generally or in a particular instance orders.” But
it is submitted that those words only mean what they say—namely,
that the court may either give the guardians a general power to exer-

cise the powers of a tenant for life on behalf of an infant, under which
they could sell the whole estate, or (as in the case now under con-
sideration) power to sell a portion of the estate in a particular case.
Section 60 occurs in that portion of the Settled Land Act which
deals with “limited owners generally” (Part XIII.) When in-
formation respecting the trustees of the settlement is sought, re-
course must be had to another part of the Act—namely, Part X.,
which is headed “ Trustees ” ; and it seems that all section 60
does is to say who is to exercise the powers of the tenant for life,
leaving questions of the appointment and duties of trustees to
another part of the Act. It is improbable that the recent case will go
further, but it is extremely probable that a similar application will
come before the Court of Appeal, when an interesting discussion
may be expected.


Tun SALVATION Aiuir gained a triumph in the recent case of
Allen, Appellant v. Munro, Respondent (W. N., 1887, p. 116).
The Municipal Corporation Acts of 1835 and 1882 (Act of 1835, s.
90; Act of 1882, s. 23) provide that town councils “may from
time to time make such bye-laws as to them shall seem meet for
the good rule and government" of a borough, “ and for the
prevention and suppression of nuisances not already punishable in
a summary manner by virtue of any Act in force throughout the
borough.’ ’ Under the Act of 1885 the town council of Ryde had
made a bye-law imposing a penalty upon any person “ who should
sound or play upon any musical or noisy instrument, or who
should sing, recite, or preach, in any street, without having
gr-evioiisly obtained a licence from the mayor.” A member of the

alvatiou Army having been convicted for a breach of this bye-
law, tho court (Msrnnw and CAVE, JJ.) has quashed the conslic-
tion, on the ground that the bye-law was unreasonable and ultrd
vires, and, further, on the ground that it gave an absolute discretion
to the mayor to grant or withhold the licence. The decision seems
to be correct. It had already been held in Johnson v. Mayor of
O’:-oyrlzm (16 Q. B. D. 708) that a bye-law under section 23 of the Act
of 1882, that no person (not being a member of her Majesty’s Army
acting in discharge of his duty) should sound music in a street on
Sunday, was unreasonable and ullrd virer, and the reason of that
judgment—that ithe playing of music, though it may be, is not
necessarily, a nuisance —4s applicable to this case also. If munici-
pal authorities wish to put down the Salvation Army music, they
must either obtain the consent of the Legislature to a special
enactment framed to meet the case, or themselves frame a bye-law
mllklng the playing of music to an excessive degree punishable:
see Reg. v. Powell, cited 111 Johnson v. Mayor of Croydon (uhi
sup-). for an instance of such a bye.-law being upheld.

Tar. MARRIED Woiisx’s Pnorniirr Acr, 1882 purports to place married women in a position of complete freedom so far as their property is concerned. It may frequentlv ha pen, however, that this freedom will not be found to exist in fiict and it has been

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Th’ "_P"', a _e aw will make due allowance for such cases.
us, in considering the question of undue influence them ma 1,
circumstances to be regarded in favour of a married ’woman ii
would be tyuite immaterial in the case of a man. It a dv mt
have been aid down therefore that although the court vsilililldrs Q
assume that she was otherwise than a free agent yet it wohld
require less evidence to shew influence on the part of her husband
than on that of any other person. In the case in uestion th .f
stated that she had been induced to make a (transfer fell":
spares by a threat to [prosecute her husband for a felon O Tin

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i husband, and was not exerted by him directly. But where there

is such a threat, and where the person threatened knows that there
is a moral certainty of conviction, it has been already settled that
the law will grant relief in other cases, as in that of father and
son: Williams v. Bailey (1 E. & I. App. 200). Unless, then, we
, can conclude from r. Justice Knirsivicifs judgment that in the
case of husband and wife the law would go further, and would
dispense with the necessity for a moral certainty of conviction,
the above remarks do not seem applicable to the case. The
judgment, however, is not quite clear, though the decision would
apparently have been in the wife’s favour could she have proved
that there was merely a promise to let her husband go if the
shares were transferred, but, if not, then to prosecute him. As
s matter of fact, it appeared that she had been specially told by
her solicitor that her husband was not liable to a criminal charge,
and that in spite of this she made a voluntary ofier to execute the
. transfer. As her husband's creditor thus got a chance of having
his debt paid, he naturally accepted it. It still remains, then, to
be decided whether the law will extend special consideration to
a married woman, not only in case of undue influence by her
husband directly, but also where the undue influence is founded
upon her affection for him.


Sis H. Ssi.\viu\'-Isiisrsoiv’s Bii.i. to amend the Lodgers’ Goods Protection Act, 1871, is a measure of considerable practical importance, and, judging from a petition to the House of Commons which we printed last week, there appear to be substantial grounds for its proposals. It is stated in that petition to be a common practice for unscrupulous tenants to live on the rents lwhich they receive from their lodgers, and not to pay their own rent for the houses which they sub-let to such lodgers, leaving the landlord to obtain his money by action as best he can, his remedy ~ by distress being barred by the fact that the lodgers‘ rents are regularly collected weekly by the tenant, coupled with the adoption by them of the well-known procedure of the Act of 1871. ,To remedy this, the Bill provides that “nothing in the said ’ Act [of 1871] shall prevent” the superior landlord from pro, ceeding with a distress upon the goods of a ledger for arrears of rent “due to such superior landlord b his immediate tenant," to the extent of the rent due by the lodger to such immediate tenant, after the lodger has received notice of the superior landlord’s claim. There are provisoes that the lodger “ shall 11y” to the superior landlord the rent due to the imiuediate landlord, 3 and “ shall pay " future rent in like manner, until the claim of the . superior landlord as stated in the notice shall be discharged. A l, further clause protects the lodger from a double distress by the severe provision that an immediate landlord distraining upon 11 ledger after notice “shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. , and upon conviction thereof shall be liable to a fine not exceeding" double the amount of the rent distrained for, or, in default of payment, to not more than one month’s imprisonment. The lodge!‘ ; is also enabled to apply to a magistrate for an order for restoration to him of the goods distrained. The Bill is rather clumsily worded, but we think its proposals are just. For the mesne landlord, taking everything from his sub-tenants and paying nothing to his superior landlord, no advocacy is neededThe question is, \Vill the ledger, who is not in fault Bl all, be put in any worse position than he was? Legally. it seems not; all that he will have to undergo will be that his goods may be distrained upon by A. instead of by B- I11 fact, his position will be slightly battered, for under the presfifll law he may be distrained upon by both, by A. for the head rent until he has made the declaration under the A01, and by B. for hli own rent. The Bill displaces B. altogether for a time. Add to this that the landlord cannot give the notice until he hns,assumil18 l the mesne 1andlord’s insolvency, lost one whole quarter's or halfyear’s rent-—for no superior landlord reserves a weekly rent-while the mesne landlord may have fraudulently pocketed a corresponding amouut of weekly payments and absconded. We lfhlllk it will be found that the landlord comes before Parliament with 8 fairly just claim which will relieve a substantial grievance B114 damage nobody but a fraudulent scouudrel. It is greatly $0 be desired, however, that the Bill should be more clearly @XP'"e5S°‘l' T11¢_=_1'i§h'fi=1 of the superior landlord, for instance, should be 1 positive y, and not negatively, conferred.

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laughter from the noble and learned lord terming the company his
“clients ”), was negatived without a division, Lord Sumner of

the Railway and Canal Traific Bill (which motion excited some

Preston observing that the company could not hope to be repre- est
sented better in the House than they already were by Lord of

Bii.iii\vnLL. There is no doubt that modem practice is against R
allowing cou_nsel to be heard on public Bills, although from the '


acbinery jbr re_qi'straIz'on.—-A Land Transfer Board is to be ablished, consisting of a Registrar-General, a Chief Examiner Titles, and an Assistant-Registrar. The present Oflice of Land egistig will no doubt be merged in the new board, and the exist

mcedents Ven b L d B . . ing sta transferred to it. The principal oflice of the boanl is to

p _ gi y or_ nouoimii in moving that counsel be be
heard agamst the Australian Colonies Bill in 1850—which motion En
was defeated by a majority of eight—the general rule (see May’s ab]
Bari. Pr., 9th ed., p. 55614) _that “_a public Bill, being of national 1

interest, should be debat in Parliament upon the grounds of pub- sf,
hc expediency” has been pot unfrequently relaxed, so as to admit at
counsel to appear for parties “ whose interests, as distinct from m

the general interests of the country, have been directly afiected ” by of;
a Bill. Thus, in l8|O, certain barlev growers were heard against am
a Bill to prohibit distillation from grdin, and in 1833 counsel were sis
allowed to appear against the Municipal Corporations Bill. Many 10,,

other mstances of a relaxation of the rule are stated by Lord

Bnouoasir and in May's Practice, but we can find no instance of a a has

railway company being heard, though there is a precedent pointing of

slightly agamst such a. th1ng—that of the General Turnpike Bill, wh

in London, but there are to be branch oflices at such places in gland as may be specified by Orders in Council. It seems probe that the district registries of the High Court will be ected as branch oflices. The rincipal ofilce in London, and ch of the branch offices, will have a Land Transfer District tached to it. The idea. is apparently to establish radually so ny branch oifices that in each district there shall be a local cc and a local register. It is to be presumed that upon the blishment of a land transfer district including the whole tpict of any "oi the existing local registries of deeds, such a regist wi e closed.

Oampiilsaxzy reyistratiari of title.—After an Order in Council
been issued declaring that the registration of the transfer
land in any land transfer district is to be compulsory, o. some-
at novel species of compulsion is to come into force. It is

on which were heard, not the receivers but the payers of the on] . -
, » y to apply on change of ownership but if the owner of any
M16l the owners °f h°“eswagmsr and cart“-H freehold land conveys the fee simple, hr the owner of any lease-
hold land assigns his whole interest without registration after
N registration has been declared to be compulsory, the conveyance

An Aer which was passed nearly twenty-eight years ago was, as 01

assignment is to operate only as a contract, and not to transfer

to one of its two principal provisions, brought into operation the legal estate, or confer any right in respect of the land, except
for the first time before Mr. J ustice CH_ITT)' on Wednesday 1351; the Tliqlll of enforcing the contract ; and, as we understand, the costs

The 22 & 23 Yict. c. 63, entitled “ An Act to afford facilities for 0f

the conveyance or assignment will not be allowed on taxation.

the more certain ascertainment of the law administered in one And a person succeeding under a will or intestacy to the fee
part of her Majesty’s dominions when pleaded in the mum; of simlplc or whole interest, or a life estate, in freehold or leasehold

another part thereof,” appears to have practical operation mainly 111

is to be incapable of taking an benefit from, or exercising or

in the solution of variations between the laws of England and Creating any legal rights in, the land: until after registration.

those of Scotland. There have been several instances in which

Mode of ré_qz'sIration.—-'I'his remains on the basis provided by

the courts in England have remitted questions governed by Scotch the Land Transfer Act, 1875--that is to say, registration may
law to be settled in the Court of Session, notably Lord v. Calvin be either with an absolute or a qualified or possessory title; but several
(8 W. R. 201) and Toplmm v. Duke of Portland (1 D. J. S. 578, important novelties are introduced. The first is that leasehold land
680); but the case of Ea: _parta Spro appears to be the only mayberegisteredwithapossessorytitleonly. Thesecondisaprovisicn
occasion on which an English court has settled a question of enabling any person registered with a possessory or qualified title

English law for the benefit of the Court of Session. One similar t°

apply to the board for the confirmation of his title as an

flpplication is recorded, but in that eage_Rg Brodie and Johnson absolute title after the expiration of five years from the date of

(39 _Beav. 129)—the Master of the Rolls declined to give an 511

ch application. The application is to be accompanied with an

opinion, on the ground that he had no jurisdiction, the law of both all-ldavit in a prescribed form as to the title, and by the deposit of a

tountries being the same on the point in question. B11
O - . PT
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m for expenses. Notice in a prescribed form, and containing
escribed particulars, will then be advertised in such manner as
e board may direct, and will be served on every registered

incumbrancer or cautioner. Within the five years any person

sirous of showing cause against the confirmation of a title may
tition the board, and on receipt of the petition the board are
inquire into the matters alleged, and are not to make the _cntry
plied for until they are satisfied that the cause shewn against it
not sufiicient. The taxed costs incurred by the petitioner are to
borne by the applicant for confirmation imless the board deems

b 10- The amendments are, it is true, extremely important, the petition to have been presented without reasonable ground.
"U119 new scheme is built up on the ruins of Lord Cairns’ When the five years have expired without any sufiicient cause

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Iltmllted ‘ixtent'"l5l1al7 it 11098 not arise until change of ownership. board are thereupon to make an entry in the register confirming

B so aims at diminishinv the cost of registration which consti- t tug‘-ltillo obstacle to suchbcompulsion. It appears, to proceed, to t an _H1I1_extent, on the scheme for registration without ofiicial t vidllllllflbloll of title propounded by Sir H. Davey; but it pro- t

he title of the applicant. The efiiect of this put-ry will be to make
he title confirmed as absolute as it the proprietor had been regis-
ered with an absolute title on the day on which the first applica-
ion to confirm his title was made, but, if by reason of such

hhfsanfvel nieans of rapid conversion of possessory or qualified confirmation any person is deprived of any interest in the land,

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he registered proprietor is to be liable to pay compensation for the
ame. An appeal is given to the High Court against any decision

Wigs $0 establish a land insurance fund l of the board with regard to the confirmation of a title.

regiiiaglfi Bill floss much more than provide for the compulsory

The third novelty is a provision on similar lines relating to

of 1011 of title, it contemplates two most drastic alterations ascertaining the boundaries of registered land. The registered
- real pr°Pe'l7Y 19-W, both of which have been rccentl fully proprietor may apply to the board in alike manner to that above
dmlisxedin this1l1l18l- y I described for an entry after five years, on the register that the

_T1Ine will not allow us this week to do more than state as‘ description of the land therein contained shall be conclusive as to the
M7 " w°“‘"1,Wl1flt we iindentand to be the proposals of thisl boundaries; and the subsequent proceedings fill T988149 °b.l*‘~‘°¢i°"'

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and confirmation will, we presume, be generally similar. It may no doubt, however, be assumed that special provision will be made for the contents of the aflidavit accompanying the application and for the petition showing cause against the entry. After the entry_ has been made, the description of the boundaries entered in the register is to be conclusive, but the proprietor is to be_ liable to pay compensation to any person thereby deprived of any interest m_the land.

The fourth novelty is the establishment of an insurance fund for providing compensation for loss sustained by any person in respect of registered land arising from forgery, fraud, or error. The plan of a guarantee fund adopted in the Australasian Colonies was described in our columns a year ago (30 Soucrrons’ JOURNAL, 316), and it was stated that, the contribution being one halfpenny in the pound on the value of the property registered, the various funds amounted in 1881 to about £200,000, while the total payments for compensation had only amounted to £2,504. It is understood that Lord I-Ialsbury’s proposals include an elaborate scheme for the application of the insurance fund and for the regulation of the insurance fees by which it is to be provided. It is believed that the fees intended to be charged are, generally speaking, a farthing or a halfpenny in the pound, according to the circumstances. The High Court is enabled to either order compensation to be paid out of the insurance fund to any person deprived of any registered land by forgery, fraud, or error, or to order that the landibe restored to him and that the person losing the land shall receive compensation out of the fund.

It is presumed that provision will be made for subsidiary registers in which there may be registered public rights affecting registered land, incumbrances, restrictive covenants, &c.

As the system of compulsory registration of title involves the ultimate disuse of deeds of conveyance and mortgage, it will, of course, be necessary to provide that every registered charge on registered land, and every registered transfer of registered land, or of a registered charge on land, shall have effect as a conveyance by deed, so as to make the implied powers and provisions in the Conveyancing Acts apply. Priority will, no doubt, also be expressly given to a registered charge for value created on registered land over any charge not previously registered. A special provision is, we believe, proposed with a view to the dithculty which was so widely felt under the similar provision in the Yorkshire Registries Act, in connection with mortgages to bankers to secure current accounts.

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Succession to real estate on intestae-_y.—It is proposed that, on

the death of a person intestate as to real estate, his real estate shall be administered by his personal representatives in the same manner as if it were personal estate. The husband, however, is only to take a life interest in his wife’s realty, and the wife is to take a life interest in her husband's realty. It follows, of course, that all general or customary modes of descent, tenancy by curtesy, dower, and free-bench are to be swept away. _ As_ to estates lail.—lt is proposed that the estate of any tenant 111 tail of full age, and _able, without the consent of any other person, to bar the entail, shall be enlarged into a fee simple absolute, in like manner as if he had executed a disentailing deed. Estates tail are not to be created in future, the expressions which at_ present create such estates operating after the passing of the Bill to create an estate in fee simple absolute.


In the House of Commons on the 24th ult. Mr. Addison asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether his attention had been called the great waste of ]\ldlCl8l time, the undue protraction of the assizes in populous places, and the heavy expenses thrown upon the country by a practice introduced of recent years, whereby the judges of assize tried prisoners committed by the magistrates to take their trial at quarter_ or adyourned sessions of the peace; whether he was aware that the aanicient form of the Commission of Assize for the county of Lancaster W88 a few years agp to enable this change to be effected, and that grand ]l1l‘lBB in Lancashire had made presentments against the new "7 stem; I-md whether her Majesty’s Government were prepared, by logis. lfltwn '>r otherwise, to procure that prisoners committed to take their trial at quarter or adyourned sessions of the peace should (unless otherwise specially ordered) be tried there and not elsewhere. Mr. Matthews said t at the whole of that subject, including not only the times and 15¢“ of holding the assizes, but also the times for holding quarter sessiiins had been for some time under the consideration of a committee of the jiidges giltxadtiqc request of_ the Chancellor. Their report was expected soon

would receive the immediate attention of the Government. i


APPLICABILITY OF THE LANDS CLAUSES ACT. (Re Mills‘ Estate, 35 Vi’. R. 65, 34 Ch. D. 24.)

THE disagreement expressed in this case by the Lords Justices in one branch of the Court of Appeal with the strong remarks made by the Master of the Rolls in Re Wood’s Estate (34 W. R. 375, 31 Ch. D. 607) respecting Lord Westbury’s decision in Re (J'he1"ru's Settled Estates (10 W. R. 305, 4 D. F. & J. 332), seemstojustify giving some consideration to that case.

Re Cherry’s Settled Estates, with which, as far subject is concerned, Re Mills‘ Estate is identical. construction of 9 & 10 Vict. c. 34 in connection with 3 & 4 Vict. e. 87, the general question being whether the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, l8~15 (8 & 9 Vict. c. 18), was incorporated with the Act of 9 & 10 Vict., and the particular point was whether the Commissioners of Woods, &c., who were the commissioners for executing the Act, were liable to pay the costs of an order for payment of money out of court to a party absolutely entitled, the Commissioners’ Acts (3 & 4 Vict. and 9 & 10 Vict.) not providing for payment of those costs, though they provided for payment of some expenses. To make the case clear it is necessary to state shortly the enactments of those Acts affecting the subject.

9 & 10 Vict. c. 34, an Act enabling the Commissioners of Woods to construct n. new street from Spitalfields to Shoreditch, by section 18 enacted “ that, for the pui-plose of laying down and constructing the said intended new street, t e said commissioners for executing this Act shall have such and the same powers, authorities, privileges, and exemptions as in and by 3 & 4 Vict. c. B7 are given to the Commissioners of her Majesty’s Woods [&c.] for the purpose of or with reference to the laying down and constructing the several new streets and improvements therein specified, so far as the same shall be applicable to the said intended new street, and also that all powers authorizing incapacitated persons to convey in the said Act contained shall extend to all the lands and hereditaments to be taken under this Act; and that all and singular the enactments, exemptions from stamp duties, and provisions in the said last-mentioned Act contained shall extend and be construed in all respects as if the said last-mentioned Act had been passed for the purpose of authorizing the laying down and construction of the new street by this Act authorized to be laid down and constructed, and for the purchase and taking of hereditaments, and for the leasing, selling, managing. and disposing of the hereditaments to be taken and the buildings to be erected thereon, and as if the hereditaments comprised in the schedule to this Act had been comprised in the schedule to the said last-mentioned Act, and as if the moneys authorized to be raised by this Act had been authorized to be raised by the said last-mentioned Act, and as if the said street hereby authorized to be made had been by the said Act authorized to be made, except that,” &c. T1118 exception, in effect, provides for payment of moneys into the Court of Chancery, instead of into the Court of Exchequer.

3 & 4 Vict. c. 87, in section 49, provides that where, by R880“ of disability, &c., of persons entitled to property taken under the Act, the purchase-money is paid into court to _l1@ applied in the purchase of other property to be settled to the like uses, the court may order the expenses of purchases from time to time made to be paid by the commissioners. But there is 110 provision such as is made by section 80 of the Lands Clauses Act for payment of the costs of obtaining an order for payment out of court to persons absolutely entitled.

Re Clzerr;/'.s Settled Estates came, in the first instance. b9i°!'° Kindersley, V.C. (10 W. R. 54), who, ii on an application for p"_Y' ment out to a person absolutely entitled), decided that the comm!!sioners were liable to pay the costs of the application, he l10ldlflg that tho provision for payment of such costs in the Lands Clauses Act was incorporated with the Act 9 & 10 Vict. c. T519 decision was reversed by Lord Westbury, C., who, in his Judgment: after quoting section 18 of 9 & 10 Vict. c. 34, is reported to hB'9 said, “ Nothing could define more correctly that the Act i5.t0 befefil as written on the Act of 3 & 4 Vict.” He further explained. 1" R

Westminster Estate of the Parish of St. Fepulchre (12 W. R. 499. 4 DJ. & S. 232), the ground of his decision in Re Chen-_i4’s Settled EstatesHe said, “ The language of the Act 9 & 10 Vict. c. 34, which W8! 1" question in Re (ilierrg/’s Settled Estates, was such as to render transactions under it as though they had been transactions under the ante‘ cedent Act of 3 & -1 Vict., and to pass over the Lands Clauses Act altogether; and it followed that the provisions of that general Ml? could not affect such transactions." _

The Master of the Rolls, in Re Wood’s Estate, after q110¢ll1_S the above passage from the St. SepulC]LTe'8 case, said:—“That is. he read the new Act into the old Act, instead of readinii the °1d Act into the new Act. That was the ground of his decision. - - But I will say candidly that that explanation of Re ( 716"’ fly’ Sfme Estates is far too refined for my comprehension. I think that if We had to decide that case now we should decide it directly Onntmry to

as the present arose upon the

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the wayiuwliich Lord Westbury decided it, and when I read his judgment in the St. Sepu7chre’s case I cannot help thinking that, if he hadthen had to decide Re Ch*rry's Settled Estates again, he would have decided it in exactly the contrary way,” and he made some further remarks in the same direction. But in Re Mills’ Estate, before the Court of Appeal, consistinfilof Cotton, Bowen, and Fry, L.JJ., the court not on y refused to ow the question decided by Lord Westbury in Re Iflierrg/’s -“ettled Estates to be argued, but each of the Lords Justices expressed an opinion that the decision in that case was perfectly right.

In this division of judicial opinion we presume to offer some observations respecting Re C'he'rry’a Settled Estates. It appears to us that Lord Westbury did not take suflicient account of the fact that, whatever was the language of section 18 of 9 & 10 Vict. with reference to the Act of 3 & 4 Vict., the making of the new street authorized by 9 & 10 Vict. was an undertaking falling within the terms of section 1 of the Lands Clauses Act, which enacts that that Act “ shall apply to every undertaking authorized by any Act which shall heresfterbe passed, and which shall authorize the purchase or taking_of lands for such undertaking,” o_r of this other fact, that, 2;f)t<%i(gtiviiilg thig f:]:llest_§fi'pcttto tl1iiW0l‘&lSA1Ig. itlhei llgth S80lillal1f0f Ft)h&

., as e sai as -inen one c a en passe or e pgirptss of lgutilgopizingl the l;.y,ingddovli;'n and gonstruction of the new s ree yi '4 c ant orize , an ot er wor sof similar import, the prxioius vgorgp, “th; engctmerfis," &c., in 3 & 4 Vict. c. 87, “ shall ex n an cons rue in a respects,” are in their very nature necessarily(prospective, and became operative from the passing of 9 & 10 Vict., an not from the passing of 3 & 4 Vict., so that the extended operation of the enactments in 3 & 4 Vict. took effect only from the passing aiaf ttlhe laterAA€t. ahpfie fai<(:if;sAwp think go onelwilll deny, and if we “re e new c in e 0 c ," we o vious y o so yvfrtue of the_new Act. Our own opinion distinctly is that the enactment in question, section 18, was not intended to have, and had not, any retrospective effect, but was the mode adopted by the draftsman for incorporating the provisions of the earlier with the later Act, and, as the result shewed, we think rather a clumsy one; for while in the earlier Act there was, as might be expected, a limit of time~—viz., seven years—foi' effecting purchases imder it (section 2T) there was no hmit of time expressed in the later Act, passed six years afterwards; and the question naturally arose, from the mode in which section 18 of 9 8: 10 Vict. was framed, whether the limit of time contained in the earlier Act, seven years from the passing of that Act, which left onliy one year after the passing of 9 & 10 Vict., applied to purchases un er that Act, and 13 & 1-l Vict. c. 109 contains a

eclaratory enactment (section 6) that the time by the Act of the 9 & 10 Vict. limited for purchases should be deemed to be seven years from the passing of that Act. It seems likely that if the section in 13 & 14 Vict. c. 109 that we have mentioned had been brought to Lord Westbury's notice (which it probably was not) his lordship would not have formed the opinion that the effect ("language ”) of 9 & 10 Vict. was “ such as to render transactions under it as though “*9? hid been transactions imder the antecedent Act of 3 & 4 Vict." From what we have said it will be seen that we think the views by the Master of the Rolls as to the unsoundness of the

scision in Re Clierrgfs Settled Estates were justified. d W? have confined ourselves in f5lJC:COII11.l16D.tS on Lord Westlun-y’s celzlfilfln to the question whether tlie applicability of the Lands 10 pses Act was prevented by the terms in which section 18 of 9 8: f ict. referred to the Act of 3 & 4 Vict. We think it is apparent {mm thqdecisron in Re Wood’s Estatv that this is the only question 8371' Consideration. That case was the same in all respects as Re dig"!/B fseitled Estates, except that Re Wood’s Eatutv arose upon a th crent incorporating Act—na.mely, X8 & 19 Vict. c. 95—and that the1°°1'P°Tflt10n of 3 & 4 Vict. c. 87 was in different terms from

ose of 9 & 10 Vict. c. 34, section 9 of the later Act enacting that

ilfllgllg other sections) sections 28 to 57 of 3 & 4 Vict. c. 87 “ shall

. eemcd to be herein repeated,” &c., the difference between the ‘g1f"°“;118i&nces of the two cases being simply that between the mode cl gr: erence to the Act of 3 & -l Vict. eniployed in 9 & 10 Vict. ma tiillld the mode of reference employed in 18 & 19 Vict. c. 95, meat (z Court of_ Ap al held in Ru Wovd’s Estate that the enactof th °L2u& 4 Vict. (section 49) did not exclude the application (3& iv ds Clauses A_ct, the court considering that the old Act co“ 1°11-)1Was_ read into the new (18 & 19 Vict.), instead of the

@118 as eld in Re Cherry/’a Settled Estates.

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CORRESPONDENCE. 'lHE LIIDDLESEX REGISTRY. [To the Editor of the Solicitors’ JournaI.]

Sir,—This is the age of reforms, and is it not time, in the interest of their clients, if not of themselves, that solicitors should endeavour to reform that venerable institution the Middlesex Registry? The late case of illuntmz v. Lord Truro (35 \V. R. 138, 17 Q. B. D. 783) has drawn attention to the overcharges which have been made in the past for registration of memorials, and we now know what we may be legally required to pay, and that the amount can no longer be determined by the mere will of the registrar or his deputy. It is an open secret that the plaintiff in that case was backed by the moral support and influence of the Incorporated Law Society, and that, having minimized and settled the lawful scale of fees on registration, it is intended to raise by manrlamus the vexed question whether the registry can compel London witnesses to attend at Great Jamesstreet personally to depose to the execution instead of by aflidavit before a commissioner.

Might not the question of what are the legal fees payable on searches now also usefully receive some attention, and, if possible, a judicial determination ?

No doubt it would be more satisfactory if the registry, as a whole, were reformed or abolished by Act of Parliament, and that the public who deal with land in Middlesex were thereby freed from the tax so much in excess of the necessity of the case which may, even under the wers of the Statute of Anne, be inflicted on them for the benefit of ‘$2 sole surviving registrar and her Majesty’s Treasury; but, though in the present Parliamentary deadlock there is no hope of this, may it not, nevertheless, be possible to obtain some he p from the coiu'ts in settling what amounts may be legally charged for searches, and what assistance we are entitled to receive in return for our money P _

The registry created by the Act of Anne is a public registry set_up for the protection of purchasers, mortgagoes, and ot ers_ having dealings with land in Middlesex, and it was never surely nitendc to become a machine for turning out profits for individual registrars, or roviding ii. fund in aid of the taxpayers of the kingdom at large ; and if, after payment of the reasonable expenses, there is a surplus (and there is no doubt there is a handsome one), that surplus, if the fees which make it cannot be reduced, should surelybe applied so as to make the machine more perfect for the use of t ose for whom it was intended.

The Act contains no express provision for the payment of the expenses of the registry, or the disposition of any surplus funds arising from fees, and the rosult has apparently been that successive registrars have looked upon it very much as 8 p}'lVi}t9 P1‘°P‘"tY to be developed according to ordinary commercial principles.

The Act appointed four registrars, who were four oficiiils of the respective courts of Chancery, Queen‘s Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer, and subsequently (see 25 Geo. 2, c. 4, 4 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 30, and 5 8: 6 Vict. c. 10:2 three of the registrars_were to be appointed respectively by the Lor Chancellor and the _Cliief Justices of the Queen’s Bench and Common Pleas, the remaining registrar being the Queen’s Remembrancer. Later on this last-mentioned oflicer ceased to be a registrar (see 22 & 2,} \_ict. c. 31),_but his share of the fees (presumably one-fourth) was still paid to llllll,-)?Hd accounted for by him to the Consolidated Fund._ By section ..o of the Judicature Act, 1SS1, the powers of the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas (and amongst them I presume the powerof appointing one registrar) were transferred to the Lord Chief Justice of ngland. It wou d seem, therefore, that three registrars may still beappointed, one by the Lord Chancellor, and two by the Lord Chief Justice. The Lord Chief J usfice, however, does not appear to have BX9l'¢1!8d his powers, and there is at present one registrar only. _

The share of fees taken by the Queen s Rs-ineiiibrsincor will be found iii the finance accounts of the United l(ing;doin for the yiig ending the 31st of March, 1886, stated as £-3,35% °dd~ NW" t was apparently a fourth share, and_the_total net fees, afte:-1 payipfigt of expenses, would therefore be £10,028 Odd» find the 5 “'9; t ,9 present registrar £11,646, a very handsome return from wot is practically a sinecure appointment. Mr. Meynell, Bfoljmel‘ 1:931? $51 in his evidence before the Land Transfer Conimission_ in tl-1, plaintively states that for a short time after his appomtnlisnth 2 attended rcgilarly at the registry, but found. Find W53 M; he was rather more in the way than useful. ""3 that they 9 r in his absence. _

If a general registry of title be_hcreafter established and ill; registry in Middlesex be abolished, with due compensation fortviis ee interests, what a pleasing prospect this for the taxplyegs 3 fifglé all gpowing out of a registry set up snnply Pllt3°§ dlegex pure asers, mortgagces, and others eahng with 8-" "1 ~ and created out of the fees which they have paid

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Now, while, as I have slicwn, those who deal with land in Middlesex provide so handsome an income to the oflicials of the registry, we all know how little the comfort and convenience of those who have to frequent it has been studied.

The Act of Anne (section 2) gave power to the Lord Chancellor and the Chief Justices of the Queen’s Bench and Common Pleas and the Cbie! Baron of the Exchequer, or any three of them, to make rules for the government of the oflim of the registry. The powers of the Chief ustice of the Common Pleas and the Chief Baron of the Exchequer have been transferred to the Lord Chief Justice (see section 25 of Judicature Act, lSSl), and the power, therefore, to make rules is apparently now vested in him and the Lord Chancellor. This power appears never to have been exercised.

The Act requires the oflicials to keep an alphabetical calendar of parishes, extra-parochial places, and townships within the county, with a reference to the number of every memorial. No such calendar is kept. Instead of this there is kept an index of grantors' names arranged alphabetically by the first letter only of the name, and this the oflicials call the “Parliamentary Index." The huge bulk of this index, without any sub-divisions of parishes, &c., renders a search therein amatter of very great labour and expenditure of time. Side by side with this so-called “Parliamentary Index ” is kept what is called the “Lexicographic Index." which is an index of the names of grantors arranged lcxicographically, and a search in this latterindex takes much less labour and time, but the oflicials say it is private property, and claim the right to charge such fee for a search therein as they please, and even, if they like, to refuse to produce it at all.

The Act says that for every search there shall be paid a fee of “ one shilhng, and no more."

Practically, then. what the officials do is this: they keep what they Call the " Parliamentary Index ” in a form other than that the Act requires, andm so cumbrous a shape that a search therein is a matter of such great labour and expense as to make it almost prohibitory, alpd for a search in this they _charge the statutory shilling, and, at t 9 same $11116; they keep side by side with this a much better, though any thing but perfect, index (the “ Lexicographio Index ") which they claim as their private property and for a search whereiri they charge 2s. Gd. Will this hold good if challenged in a court of law? can hardly think so. What would be said if a similar P1698<1mg were to take place at the Central Ofl-ice or at the Probflte Registry, 0!‘ my other public registry ? y

With the ample funds at their command, there is no reason why
the oflicials should not make and keep very much more erfect in-
dices or registers even than the “ Lexicographic Index ” agd divided
inlo divisions of parishes and otherwise so as to lessen the labour and
time expended in searching, and that without an hi her fee than
one shilling being charged. and 1 ooiiioiia that itilithgdut of uio
registrar to see that this is done. y

I maintain that no rivate in ' '
in the ofl-ice of the Middlesex Regiigtei;oiiiid%lili€lalf:h1dheer0l:Jlidliiid{iept
or registers now kept in the oflied (includin the “Lhiiico his
Mex") 9-1'0 public indices or registers and ghat the publifiraliiivld
:.?.i%;i:.i":. m *1 or of the on of

There is a uestion no d u
The oflicials gO1lt61ld (thoulghbiidts dfwgylst tllidtAillt 1;‘ ems by E Bengali
one name on one day, and that a separate fee must iildns id sfadiice lh
separate name searched. I maintain that for one searcliafee a e ac
is entitled to make a full search no matter in how P Non
long as it is in one matter or trdnsaction I admit l,Il!1?lny' names, so
and it is one amongst many other matters whi h ls is nifilldolenr,
thought W0I11(1 have been made clear b rul G onl: we h have
authorizes to be made, and which on ht mybe esé sued as tde Act
the office in order that all persons bgvin bllfillllna lzlin "Poem up In
what may be demanded of them and reqgired b :55“) n€;I'G111 may know

Surely. Sir, it is time that either " - I
H131; cow or by appeal th the Lolid i§‘i'.L‘E£{io§ “Z? ilf fiiméif-1‘°i
Justice to exercise their powers inider the A t ti?‘ t la
to remedy the state of things I have ende vc 1 S3? ‘Pg were done
"Qt, the Incorporated Law Society help 1lGulIl“illll€l38l) 0 Pomt out. Cun-

bpnng_g"“d°'“’ M°"°h 24- Gno. P. J ACKSON.

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The plaintiff had obtained judgment against the defendant for £1,227, and applied, under ord. 42, r. 32, for an order for the attendance of the manager of the defendant's business for the purpose of being examined as to what moneys were owing to the defendant, so that they might be attached to answer the judgment. Ord. 42, r. 32, provides that “ w iere a judgment or order is for the recovery or payment of money, the party entitled to enforce it may apply to the court or a judge for an order that the debtor liable under such judgment or order, or in the case of a coiporation that any ofiicei thereof, be orally examined as to whether or what debts are owing to the debtor . . . ; and the court or judge may make an order for the attendance and the examination of such debtor or of any other person, and for the production of any books or documents." Field, J ., at chambers, refused the application on the ground that there was no jurisdiction to make the order. The Divisional Court afllrmed this decision, on the ground that the case was not one in which the power should be exercised; Denman, J., however, being of opinion that the judge's view of the rule was right, Hawkins, J., being of a contrary opinion. The plaintiff appealed.

Ti-in Coinir (Lord Esiina, ll1.R., and Bowrm, L.J.), having taken time to consider its judgment, refused the application. They said that if the rule had stopped at the end of tlie first clause there would be no doubt that the judgment debtor alone, if an individual, or an cfllcer of a corporation, if the judgment debtor were a corporation, could be ordered to be examined under the rule. Upon the last clause they had come to the conclusion that the words “ any other person" did not include such ii person as it was pro osed to examine here. The words did not mean, where the judgment debtor was an individual, any other person besides the judgment debtor himself; they referred, where a corporation was a judgment debtor, to any one of its ofl-lcers.—OoussIi., Cock, Q.C., and W. S. Goddard. SOLICXTOR, E. Hart Smith.

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In this case, the plaintiff havin obtained judgment in the Court of Appeal, the defendant ap lied and obtained from a master a stay of execution, pending an appsalito the House of Lords, which was aflirined by the judge at chambers. On appeal to the Divisional Court that court held that there was no authority in the master to grant the stay of exccution, and accordingly dissolved it. The defendant new applied to the Court of Appeal by way of original motion.

Tun Couiir (Lord Esiisn, M.R., Bowsx and FRY, L.JJ.) having taken time to consider the point, said that they had come to the conclusion, as a matter of practice, that where there was an lppebl from the Court of Appeal to the House of Lords under any circumstancefli whether the Court of Appeal had dismissed or allowed the appeal from $118 court below, if there was any proposition to stay execution the application should be made solely to the Court of Appeal, and not either to tne niaswl or to the court below. The application was then heard on the merits and disinissed.—Coussiii., Henri Collins, Q,.C., and Ilindmarsh ; Lmn/cry 5v"'7/I, %.C.,d and Percy G3/e. SOLICITORS, F. D. Simpson 5' Ca. ; 9- 5- Q’ H


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This was an original motion by some of the defendants, asking that 11116 plaintiff might be ordered to give security for the costs of an 893851 °! which he bad given notice. The appeal was in the paper of the BY l°‘ hearing. The order appealed from was made on the 24th of Febr11flfYOn the l'Ith of March the plaintiff served notice of appeal. On the 18tl1 of March the defendants’ solicitors wrote to the Plfll1‘l.hfi'B London limb asking whether the plaintiff was willing to give security for the cost! Oi the appeal without an application to the court for the purpose. Tl" London agent said that he must consult the country solicitor. The defendant's solicitors replied that the) would wait till the 2lt of llllwll before giving notice of application to the court. On the 21st of l\iH_1‘¢l1 the defendants‘ solicitors, not having received any reply fronithe plaintiff’! London agent, served notice of motion in the Court of APP°a'1 for security. t was objected, on behalf of the plalnliifi, that the 8119531 being already in the paper, and the costs having been already 111011" v it would be contrary to the settled rule to order security $0 be 8i'°“- An objection was also made to the evidence of the plaintiffs inabil_iW lP” the costs of the appeal if he should be unsuccessful. That evidence W05 that he had failed to pay some costs which he had been ordered 15° PW in an action between himself and another person. .

Tun Cover (Corrox and Li.\'m.i=.\', L.JJ.) overruled both 0b-769' tions, and ordered the plaintiff to give security. Co-no!’ L-J-* Bald that as a general rule it was too late to ask for security for the cost! "5 an appeal after the appeal had come into the paper for hearing. 3'19 in the present case there was no unreasonable delay in the defendnfl" "“lfi“81 " they did, to see whether the plaintifi would give aw!-F1W without an application to the court. As to the other point, ii" n°.n|'

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,PaYm811t of prior costs was not, of itself, a ground for requirllll

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