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allowed to exercise the double powers of tenant for life and trustees for the purposes of the Act in cases of infancy. But these considerations do not seem to apply so strongly to the case of guardians. His lordship thought he had power to dispense with the appointment of trustees under the concluding words of section 60, which says that the powers of a tenant for life may be exercised on behalf of the infant by the trustees of the settlement, and if there are none, then by such person and in such manner as the court, on the application of the guardian or of a next friend of the infant, "either generally or in a particular instance orders." But it is submitted that those words only mean what they say-namely, that the court may either give the guardians a general power to exercise the powers of a tenant for life on behalf of an infant, under which they could sell the whole estate, or (as in the case now under consideration) power to sell a portion of the estate in a particular case. Section 60 occurs in that portion of the Settled Land Act which deals with "limited owners generally" (Part XIII.). When information respecting the trustees of the settlement is sought, recourse must be had to another part of the Act-namely, Part X., which is headed "Trustees"; and it seems that all section 60 does is to say who is to exercise the powers of the tenant for life, leaving questions of the appointment and duties of trustees to another part of the Act. It is improbable that the recent case will go further, but it is extremely probable that a similar application will come before the Court of Appeal, when an interesting discussion may be expected.

THE SALVATION ARMY gained a triumph in the recent case of Allen, Appellant v. Munro, Respondent (W. N., 1887, p. 116). The Municipal Corporation Acts of 1835 and 1882 (Act of 1835, s. 90; Act of 1882, s. 23) provide that town councils " "may from time to time make such bye-laws as to them shall seem meet for the good rule and government" of a borough, "and for the prevention and suppression of nuisances not already punishable in a summary manner by virtue of any Act in force throughout the borough." Under the Act of 1885 the town council of Ryde had made a bye-law imposing a penalty upon any person "who should sound or play upon any musical or noisy instrument, or who should sing, recite, or preach, in any street, without having previously obtained a licence from the mayor." A member of the Salvation Army having been convicted for a breach of this byelaw, the court (MATHEW and CAVE, JJ.) has quashed the conviction, on the ground that the bye-law was unreasonable and ultrà vires, and, further, on the ground that it gave an absolute discretion to the mayor to grant or withhold the licence. The decision seems to be correct. It had already been held in Johnson v. Mayor of Croydon (16 Q. B. D. 708) that a bye-law under section 23 of the Act of 1882, that no person (not being a member of her Majesty's Army acting in discharge of his duty) should sound music in a street on Sunday, was unreasonable and ultrà vires, and the reason of that judgment that the playing of music, though it may be, is not necessarily, a nuisance -is applicable to this case also. If municipal authorities wish to put down the Salvation Army music, they must either obtain the consent of the Legislature to a special enactment framed to meet the case, or themselves frame a bye-law making the playing of music to an excessive degree punishable see Reg. v. Powell, cited in Johnson v. Mayor of Croydon (ubi sup.), for an instance of such a bye-law being upheld.

THE MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY ACT, 1882, purports to place married women in a position of complete freedom so far as their property is concerned. It may frequently happen, however, that this freedom will not be found to exist in fact, and it has been stated by Mr. Justice KEKEWICH this week, in the case of Haywood v. Whitaker, that the law will make due allowance for such cases. Thus, in considering the question of undue influence, there may be circumstances to be regarded in favour of a married woman which would be quite immaterial in the case of a man. It appears to have been laid down therefore that, although the court would not assume that she was otherwise than a free agent, yet it would require less evidence to shew influence on the part of her husband than on that of any other person. In the case in question the wife stated that she had been induced to make a transfer of bank shares by a threat to [prosecute her husband for a felony. Thus the undue influence was founded upon her affection for her

husband, and was not exerted by him directly. But where there is such a threat, and where the person threatened knows that there is a moral certainty of conviction, it has been already settled that the law will grant relief in other cases, as in that of father and son: Williams v. Bayley (1 E. & I. App. 200). Unless, then, we can conclude from Mr. Justice KEKEWICH's judgment that in the case of husband and wife the law would go further, and would dispense with the necessity for a moral certainty of conviction, the above remarks do not seem applicable to the case. The judgment, however, is not quite clear, though the decision would apparently have been in the wife's favour could she have proved that there was merely a promise to let her husband go if the shares were transferred, but, if not, then to prosecute him. As a inatter of fact, it appeared that she had been specially told by her solicitor that her husband was not liable to a criminal charge, and that in spite of this she made a voluntary offer to execute the transfer. As her husband's creditor thus got a chance of having his debt paid, he naturally accepted it. It still remains, then, to be decided whether the law will extend special consideration to a married woman, not only in case of undue influence by her husband directly, but also where the undue influence is founded upon her affection for him.

SIR H. SELWYN IBBETSON'S BILL to amend the Lodgers' Goods Protection Act, 1871, is a measure of considerable practical importance, and, judging from a petition to the House of Commons which we printed last week, there appear to be substantial grounds for its proposals. It is stated in that petition to be a common practice for unscrupulous tenants to live on the rents which they receive from their lodgers, and not to pay their own rent for the houses which they sub-let to such lodgers, leaving the landlord to obtain his money by action as best he can, his remedy by distress being barred by the fact that the lodgers' rents are regularly collected weekly by the tenant, coupled with the adoption by them of the well-known procedure of the Act of 1871. To remedy this, the Bill provides that "nothing in the said Act [of 1871] shall prevent" the superior landlord from proceeding with a distress upon the goods of a lodger for arrears of rent "due to such superior landlord by his immediate tenant," to the extent of the rent due by the lodger to such immediate tenant, after the lodger has received notice of the superior landlord's claim. There are provisoes that the lodger "shall pay to the superior landlord the rent due to the immediate landlord, and "shall pay " future rent in like manner, until the claim of the superior landlord as stated in the notice shall be discharged. A further clause protects the lodger from a double distress by the severe provision that an immediate landlord distraining upon a lodger after notice "shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be liable to a fine not exceeding " double the amount of the rent distrained for, or, in default of payment, to not more than one month's imprisonment. The lodger is also enabled to apply to a magistrate for an order for restoration to him of the goods distrained. The Bill is rather clumsily worded, but we think its proposals are just. For the mesne landlord, taking everything from his sub-tenants and paying nothing to his superior landlord, no advocacy is needed. The question is, Will the lodger, who is not in fault at all, be put in any worse position than he was? Legally, it seems not; all that he will have to undergo will be that his goods may be distrained upon by A. instead of by B. In fact, his position will be slightly bettered, for under the present law he may be distrained upon by both, by A. for the head rent until he has made the declaration under the Act, and by B. for his own rent. The Bill displaces B. altogether for a time. Add to this that the landlord cannot give the notice until he has, assuming the mesne landlord's insolvency, lost one whole quarter's or halfyear's rent-for no superior landlord reserves a weekly rentwhile the mesne landlord may have fraudulently pocketed a corresponding amount of weekly payments and absconded. We think it will be found that the landlord comes before Parliament with a fairly just claim which will relieve a substantial grievance and damage nobody but a fraudulent scoundrel. It is greatly to be desired, however, that the Bill should be more clearly expressed. The rights of the superior landlord, for instance, should be positively, and not negatively, conferred.

LORD BRAMWELL'S MOTION in the House of Lords on Monday last that the South-Eastern Railway Co. be heard by counsel against the Railway and Canal Traffic Bill (which motion excited some laughter from the noble and learned lord terming the company his "clients"), was negatived without a division, Lord STANLEY of Preston observing that the company could not hope to be represented better in the House than they already were by Lord BRAMWELL. There is no doubt that modern practice is against allowing counsel to be heard on public Bills, although from the precedents given by Lord BROUGHAM in moving that counsel be heard against the Australian Colonies Bill in 1850-which motion was defeated by a majority of eight-the general rule (see May's Parl. Pr., 9th ed., p. 551) that "a public Bill, being of national interest, should be debated in Parliament upon the grounds of public expediency" has been not unfrequently relaxed, so as to admit counsel to appear for parties "whose interests, as distinct from the general interests of the country, have been directly affected" by a Bill. Thus, in 1810, certain barley growers were heard against a Bill to prohibit distillation from grain, and in 1833 counsel were allowed to appear against the Municipal Corporations Bill. Many other instances of a relaxation of the rule are stated by Lord BROUGHAM and in May's Practice, but we can find no instance of a railway company being heard, though there is a precedent pointing slightly against such a thing-that of the General Turnpike Bill, on which were heard, not the receivers, but the payers of the tolls, "the owners of horses, wagons, and carts."

AN ACT which was passed nearly twenty-eight years ago was, as to one of its two principal provisions, brought into operation for the first time before Mr. Justice CHITTY on Wednesday last. The 22 & 23 Vict. c. 63, entitled "An Act to afford facilities for the more certain ascertainment of the law administered in one part of her Majesty's dominions when pleaded in the courts of another part thereof," appears to have practical operation mainly in the solution of variations between the laws of England and those of Scotland. There have been several instances in which the courts in England have remitted questions governed by Scotch law to be settled in the Court of Session, notably Lord v. Colvin (8 W. R. 201) and Topham v. Duke of Portland (1 D. J. S. 578, 580); but the case of Ex parte Spro appears to be the only occasion on which an English court has settled a question of English law for the benefit of the Court of Session. One similar application is recorded, but in that case-Re Brodie and Johnson (30 Beav. 129)-the Master of the Rolls declined to give an opinion, on the ground that he had no jurisdiction, the law of both countries being the same on the point in question.

THE NEW LAND TRANSFER BILL. THE measure which has been so anxiously looked for was explained by the Lord Chancellor on Thursday evening, and many of our readers may be surprised to find that after all it is, as regards registration, only an amendment of the Land Transfer Act of 1875. The amendments are, it is true, extremely important, but the new scheme is built up on the ruins of Lord Cairns' project. It supplies the compulsion which the author of the plan of 1875 came ultimately to see was essential to the success of any mode of registration of title, but supplies it only to this limited extent that it does not arise until change of ownership. It also aims at diminishing the cost of registration, which constituted the obstacle to such compulsion. It appears to proceed, to a certain extent, on the scheme for registration without official examination of title propounded by Sir H. Davey; but it provides a novel means of rapid conversion of possessory or qualified into absolute titles. It also proposes a mode of settling the muchmooted question of boundaries of registered land; and, lastly, proposes to establish a land insurance fund.

But the Bill does much more than provide for the compulsory registration of title; it contemplates two most drastic alterations of real property law, both of which have been recently fully discussed in this journal.

Time will not allow us this week to do more than state, as briefly as we can, what we understand to be the proposals of this

most important Bill, leaving for future occasions the discussion of the question of the effect of its proposals.

1. AS TO REGISTRATION OF TITLE. Machinery for registration.-A Land Transfer Board is to be established, consisting of a Registrar-General, a Chief Examiner of Titles, and an Assistant-Registrar. The present Office of Land Registry will no doubt be merged in the new board, and the existing staff transferred to it. The principal office of the board is to be in London, but there are to be branch offices at such places in England as may be specified by Orders in Council. It seems probable that the district registries of the High Court will be selected as branch offices. The principal office in London, and each of the branch offices, will have a Land Transfer District attached to it. The idea is apparently to establish gradually so many branch offices that in each district there shall be a local office and a local register. It is to be presumed that upon the establishment of a land transfer district including the whole district of any of the existing local registries of deeds, such local registry will be closed.

Compulsory registration of title.-After an Order in Council has been issued declaring that the registration of the transfer of land in any land transfer district is to be compulsory, a somewhat novel species of compulsion is to come into force. It is only to apply on change of ownership; but if the owner of any freehold land conveys the fee simple, or the owner of any leasehold land assigns his whole interest without registration after registration has been declared to be compulsory, the conveyance or assignment is to operate only as a contract, and not to transfer the legal estate, or confer any right in respect of the land, except the right of enforcing the contract; and, as we understand, the costs of the conveyance or assignment will not be allowed on taxation. And a person succeeding under a will or intestacy to the fee simple or whole interest, or a life estate, in freehold or leasehold land is to be incapable of taking any benefit from, or exercising or creating any legal rights in, the land, until after registration.

Mode of registration. This remains on the basis provided by the Land Transfer Act, 1875-that is to say, registration may be either with an absolute or a qualified or possessory title; but several important novelties are introduced. The first is that leasehold land may be registered with a possessory title only. The second is a provision enabling any person registered with a possessory or qualified title to apply to the board for the confirmation of his title as an absolute title after the expiration of five years from the date of such application. The application is to be accompanied with an affidavit in a prescribed form as to the title, and by the deposit of a sum for expenses. Notice in a prescribed form, and containing prescribed particulars, will then be advertised in such manner as the board may direct, and will be served on every registered incumbrancer or cautioner. Within the five years any person desirous of shewing cause against the confirmation of a title may petition the board, and on receipt of the petition the board are to inquire into the matters alleged, and are not to make the entry applied for until they are satisfied that the cause shewn against it is not sufficient. The taxed costs incurred by the petitioner are to be borne by the applicant for confirmation unless the board deems the petition to have been presented without reasonable ground. When the five years have expired without any sufficient cause having been shewn against confirmation of the title, the applicant may make a final application to the board for confirmation of his title, this application also being supported by affidavit; and the board are thereupon to make an entry in the register confirming the title of the applicant. The effect of this entry will be to make the title confirmed as absolute as if the proprietor had been registered with an absolute title on the day on which the first application to confirm his title was made, but, if by reason of such confirmation any person is deprived of any interest in the land, the registered proprietor is to be liable to pay compensation for the same. An appeal is given to the High Court against any decision of the board with regard to the confirmation of a title.

The third novelty is a provision on similar lines relating to ascertaining the boundaries of registered land. The registered proprietor may apply to the board in a like manner to that above described for an entry, after five years, on the register that the description of the land therein contained shall be conclusive as to the boundaries; and the subsequent proceedings as regards objections

and confirmation will, we presume, be generally similar. It may no doubt, however, be assumed that special provision will be made for the contents of the affidavit accompanying the application and for the petition shewing cause against the entry. After the entry has been made, the description of the boundaries entered in the register is to be conclusive, but the proprietor is to be liable to pay compensation to any person thereby deprived of any interest in the land. The fourth novelty is the establishment of an insurance fund for providing compensation for loss sustained by any person in respect of registered land arising from forgery, fraud, or error. The plan of a guarantee fund adopted in the Australasian Colonies was described in our columns a year ago (30 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 316), and it was stated that, the contribution being one halfpenny in the pound on the value of the property registered, the various funds amounted in 1881 to about £200,000, while the total payments for compensation had only amounted to £2,504. It is understood that Lord Halsbury's proposals include an elaborate scheme for the application of the insurance fund and for the regulation of the insurance fees by which it is to be provided. It is believed that the fees intended to be charged are, generally speaking, a farthing or a halfpenny in the pound, according to the circumstances. The High Court is enabled to either order compensation to be paid out of the insurance fund to any person deprived of any registered land by forgery, fraud, or error, or to order that the land be restored to him and that the person losing the land shall receive compensation out of the fund.

It is presumed that provision will be made for subsidiary registers in which there may be registered public rights affecting registered land, incumbrances, restrictive covenants, &c.

As the system of compulsory registration of title involves the ultimate disuse of deeds of conveyance and mortgage, it will, of course, be necessary to provide that every registered charge on registered land, and every registered transfer of registered land, or of a registered charge on land, shall have effect as a conveyance by deed, so as to make the implied powers and provisions in the Conveyancing Acts apply. Priority will, no doubt, also be expressly given to a registered charge for value created on registered land over any charge not previously registered. A special provision is, we believe, proposed with a view to the difficulty which was so widely felt under the similar provision in the Yorkshire Registries Act, in connection with mortgages to bankers

to secure current accounts.

II. ALTERATIONS IN THE LAW.

Succession to real estate on intestacy. It is proposed that, on the death of a person intestate as to real estate, his real estate shall be administered by his personal representatives in the same manner as if it were personal estate. The husband, however, is only to take a life interest in his wife's realty, and the wife is to take a life interest in her husband's realty. It follows, of course, that all general or customary modes of descent, tenancy by curtesy, dower, and free-bench are to be swept away.

As to estates tail.—It is proposed that the estate of any tenant in tail of full age, and able, without the consent of any other person, to bar the entail, shall be enlarged into a fee simple absolute, in like manner as if he had executed a disentailing deed. Estates tail are not to be created in future, the expressions which at present create such estates operating after the passing of the Bill to create an estate in fee simple absolute.

In the House of Commons on the 24th ult. Mr. Addison asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether his attention had been called to the great waste of judicial time, the undue protraction of the assizes in populous places, and the heavy expenses thrown upon the country by a practice introduced of recent years, whereby the judges of assize tried prisoners committed by the magistrates to take their trial at quarter or adjourned sessions of the peace; whether he was aware that the ancient form of the Commission of Assize for the county of Lancaster was altered a few years ago to enable this change to be effected, and that grand juries in Lancashire had made presentments against the new system; and whether her Majesty's Government were prepared, by legislation or otherwise, to procure that prisoners committed to take their trial at quarter or adjourned sessions of the peace should (unless otherwise specially ordered) be tried there and not elsewhere. Mr. Matthews said that the whole of that subject, including not only the times and places of holding the assizes, but also the times for holding quarter sessions, had been for some time under the consideration of a committee of the judges at the request of the Lord Chancellor. Their report was expected soon, and it would receive the immediate attention of the Government.

APPLICABILITY OF THE LANDS CLAUSES ACT. (Re Mills' Estate, 35 W. R. 65, 34 Ch. D. 24.)

THE disagreement expressed in this case by the Lords Justices in one branch of the Court of Appeal with the strong remarks made by the Master of the Rolls in Re Wood's Estate (34 W. R. 375, 31 Ch. D. 607) respecting Lord Westbury's decision in Re Cherry's Settled Estates (10 W. R. 305, 4 D. F. & J. 332), seems to justify giving some consideration to that case.

Re Cherry's Settled Estates, with which, as far as the present subject is concerned, Re Mills Estate is identical, arose upon the construction of 9 & 10 Vict. c. 34 in connection with 3 & 4 Vict. c. 87, the general question being whether the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845 (8 & 9 Vict. c. 18), was incorporated with the Act of 9 & 10 Vict., and the particular point was whether the Commissioners of Woods, &c., who were the commissioners for executing the Act, were liable to pay the costs of an order for payment of money out of court to a party absolutely entitled, the Commissioners' Acts (3 & 4 Vict. and 9 & 10 Vict.) not providing for payment of those costs, though they provided for payment of some expenses. To make the case clear it is necessary to state shortly the enactments of those Acts affecting the subject.

9 & 10 Vict. c. 34, an Act enabling the Commissioners of Woods to construct a new street from Spitalfields to Shoreditch, by section 18 enacted "that, for the purpose of laying down and constructing the said intended new street, the said commissioners for executing this Act shall have such and the same powers, authorities, privileges, missioners of her Majesty's Woods [&c.] for the purpose of or with and exemptions as in and by 3 & 4 Vict. c. 87 are given to the Comreference to the laying down and constructing the several new streets and improvements therein specified, so far as the same shall be applicable to the said intended new street, and also that all powers authorizing incapacitated persons to convey in the said Act contained shall extend to all the lands and hereditaments to be taken under this Act; and that all and singular the enactments, exemptions contained shall extend and be construed in all respects as if the from stamp duties, and provisions in the said last-mentioned Act said last-mentioned Act had been passed for the purpose of authorizing the laying down and construction of the new street by this Act authorized to be laid down and constructed, and for the purchase and taking of hereditaments, and for the leasing, selling, managing, and disposing of the hereditaments to be taken and the buildings to be erected thereon, and as if the hereditaments comprised in the schedule to this Act had been comprised in the schedule to the said last-mentioned Act, and as if the moneys authorized to be raised by this Act had been authorized to be raised by the said last-mentioned Act, and as if the said street hereby authorized to be made had been by the said Act authorized to be made, except that," &c. This exception, in effect, provides for payment of moneys into the Court of Chancery, instead of into the Court of Exchequer.

3 & 4 Vict. c. 87, in section 49, provides that where, by reason of disability, &c., of persons entitled to property taken under the Act, the purchase-money is paid into court to be applied in the purchase of other property to be settled to the like uses, the court may order the expenses of purchases from time to But there is no time made to be paid by the commissioners. for payment of the costs of obtaining an order for payment out of provision such as is made by section 80 of the Lands Clauses Act court to persons absolutely entitled.

Re Cherry's Settled Estates came, in the first instance, before Kindersley, V.C. (10 W. R. 54), who, upon an application for payment out to a person absolutely entitled, decided that the commissioners were liable to pay the costs of the application, he holding that the provision for payment of such costs in the Lands Clauses Act was incorporated with the Act 9 & 10 Vict. c. 34. This decision was reversed by Lord Westbury, C., who, in his judgment, after quoting section 18 of 9 & 10 Vict. c. 34, is reported to have said, "Nothing could define more correctly that the Act is to be read as written on the Act of 3 & 4 Vict." He further explained, in Re Westminster Estate of the Parish of St. Sepulchre (12 W. R. 499, 4 D. J. & S. 232), the ground of his decision in Re Cherry's Settled Estates. He said, 66 The language of the Act 9 & 10 Vict. c. 34, which was in question in Re Cherry's Settled Estates, was such as to render transactions under it as though they had been transactions under the antecedent Act of 3 & 4 Vict., and to pass over the Lands Clauses Act altogether; and it followed that the provisions of that general Act could not affect such transactions."

The Master of the Rolls, in Re Wood's Estate, after quoting the above passage from the St. Sepulchre's case, said:-"That is, he read the new Act into the old Act, instead of reading the old Act into the new Act. That was the ground of his decision. But I will say candidly that that explanation of Re Cherry's Settled Estates is far too refined for my comprehension. I think that if we had to decide that case now we should decide it directly contrary to

the way in which Lord Westbury decided it, and when I read his judgment in the St. Sepulchre's case I cannot help thinking that, if he had then had to decide Re Cherry's Settled Estates again, he would have decided it in exactly the contrary way," and he made some further remarks in the same direction. But in Re Mills' Estate, before the Court of Appeal, consisting of Cotton, Bowen, and Fry, L.JJ., the court not only refused to allow the question decided by Lord Westbury in Re Cherry's Settled Estates to be argued, but each of the Lords Justices expressed an opinion that the decision in that case was perfectly right.

In this division of judicial opinion we presume to offer some observations respecting Re Cherry's Settled Estates. It appears to us that Lord Westbury did not take sufficient account of the fact that, whatever was the language of section 18 of 9 & 10 Vict. with reference to the Act of 3 & 4 Vict., the making of the new street authorized by 9 & 10 Vict. was an undertaking falling within the terms of section 1 of the Lands Clauses Act, which enacts that that Act" shall apply to every undertaking authorized by any Act which shall hereafter be passed, and which shall authorize the purchase or taking of lands for such undertaking," or of this other fact, that, after giving the fullest effect to the words in the 18th section of 9 & 10 Vict., as if the said last-mentioned Act had been passed for the purpose of authorizing the laying down and construction of the new street by this Act authorized," and other words of similar import, the previous words, "the enactments," &c., in 3 & 4 Vict. c. 87, "shall extend and be construed in all respects," are in their very nature necessarily prospective, and became operative from the passing of 9 & 10 Vict., and not from the passing of 3 & 4 Vict, so that the extended operation of the enactments in 3 & 4 Vict. took effect only from the passing of the later Act. These facts we think no one will deny, and if we "read the new Act into the old Act," we obviously do so by virtue of the new Act. Our own opinion distinctly is that the enactment in question, section 18, was not intended to have, and had not, any retrospective effect, but was the mode adopted by the draftsman for incorporating the provisions of the earlier with the later Act, and, as the result shewed, we think rather a clumsy one; for while in the earlier Act there was, as might be expected, a limit of time-viz., seven years—for effecting purchases under it (section 27) there was no limit of time expressed in the later Act, passed six years afterwards; and the question naturally arose, from the mode in which section 18 of 9 & 10 Vict. was framed, whether the limit of time contained in the earlier Act, seven years from the passing of that Act, which left only one year after the passing of 9 & 10 Vict., applied to purchases under that Act, and 13 & 14 Vict. c. 109 contains a declaratory enactment (section 6) that the time by the Act of the 9 & 10 Vict. limited for purchases should be deemed to be seven years from the passing of that Act. It seems likely that if the section in 13 & 14 Vict. c. 109 that we have mentioned had been brought to Lord Westbury's notice (which it probably was not) his lordship would not have formed the opinion that the effect ("language") of 9 & 10 Vict. was "such as to render transactions under it as though they had been transactions under the antecedent Act of 3 & 4 Vict." From what we have said it will be seen that we think the views expressed by the Master of the Rolls as to the unsoundness of the decision in Re Cherry's Settled Estates were justified. We have confined ourselves in the comments on Lord Westbury's decision to the question whether the applicability of the Lands Clauses Act was prevented by the terms in which section 18 of 9 & 10 Vict. referred to the Act of 3 & 4 Vict. We think it is apparent from the decision in Re Wood's Estate that this is the only question for consideration. That case was the same in all respects as Re Cherry's Settled Estates, except that Re Wood's Estate arose upon a different incorporating Act-namely, 18 & 19 Vict. c. 95-and that the incorporation of 3 & 4 Vict. c. 87 was in different terms from those of 9 & 10 Vict. c. 34, section 9 of the later Act enacting that (among other sections) sections 28 to 57 of 3 & 4 Vict. c. 87 "shall be deemed to be herein repeated," &c., the difference between the circumstances of the two cases being simply that between the mode of reference to the Act of 3 & 4 Vict. employed in 9 & 10 Vict. c. 34 and the mode of reference employed in 18 & 19 Vict. c. 95, and the Court of Appeal held in Re Wood's Estate that the enactment of 3 & 4 Vict. (section 49) did not exclude the application of the Lands Clauses Act, the court considering that the old Act (3 & 4 Vict.) was read into the new (18 & 19 Vict.), instead of the converse as held in Re Cherry's Settled Estates.

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CORRESPONDENCE.

1HE MIDDLESEX REGISTRY.

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,-This is the age of reforms, and is it not time, in the interest of their clients, if not of themselves, that solicitors should endeavour to reform that venerable institution the Middlesex Registry? The late case of Munton v. Lord Truro (35 W. R. 138, 17 Q. B. D. 783) has drawn attention to the overcharges which have been made in the past for registration of memorials, and we now know what we may be legally required to pay, and that the amount can no longer be determined by the mere will of the registrar or his deputy. It is an open secret that the plaintiff in that case was backed by the moral support and influence of the Incorporated Law Society, and that, having minimized and settled the lawful scale of fees on registration, it is intended to raise by mandamus the vexed question whether the registry can compel London witnesses to attend at Great Jamesstreet personally to depose to the execution instead of by affidavit before a commissioner.

Might not the question of what are the legal fees payable on searches now also usefully receive some attention, and, if possible, a judicial determination?"

No doubt it would be more satisfactory if the registry, as a whole, were reformed or abolished by Act of Parliament, and that the public who deal with land in Middlesex were thereby freed from the tax so much in excess of the necessity of the case which may, even under the powers of the Statute of Anne, be inflicted on them for the benefit of the sole surviving registrar and her Majesty's Treasury; but, though in the present Parliamentary deadlock there is no hope of this, may it not, nevertheless, be possible to obtain some help from the courts in settling what amounts may be legally charged for searches, and what assistance we are entitled to receive in return for our money?

The registry created by the Act of Anne is a public registry set up for the protection of purchasers, mortgagees, and others having dealings with land in Middlesex, and it was never surely intended to become a machine for turning out profits for individual registrars, or providing a fund in aid of the taxpayers of the kingdom at large; and if, after payment of the reasonable expenses, there is a surplus (and there is no doubt there is a handsome one), that surplus, if the fees which make it cannot be reduced, should surely be applied so as to make the machine more perfect for the use of those for whom it was intended.

The Act contains no express provision for the payment of the expenses of the registry, or the disposition of any surplus funds arising from fees, and the result has apparently been that successive registrars have looked upon it very much as a private property to be developed according to ordinary commercial principles.

The Act appointed four registrars, who were four officials of the respective courts of Chancery, Queen's Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer, and subsequently (see 25 Geo. 2, c. 4, 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 30, and 5 & 6 Vict. c. 103) three of the registrars were to be appointed respectively by the Lord Chancellor and the Chief Justices of the Queen's Bench and Common Pleas, the remaining registrar being the Queen's Remembrancer. Later on tais last-mentioned officer ceased to be a registrar (see 22 & 23 Vict. c. 31), but his share of the fees (presumably one-fourth) was still paid to him, and accounted for by him to the Consolidated Fund. By section 25 of the Judicature Act, 1881, the powers of the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas (and amongst them I presume the power of appointing one registrar) were transferred to the Lord Chief Justice of England. It would seem, therefore, that three registrars may still be appointed, one by the Lord Chancellor, and two by the Lord Chief Justice. The Lord Chief Justice, however, does not appear to have exercised his powers, and there is at present one registrar only.

The share of fees taken by the Queen's Remembrancer will be found in the finance accounts of the United Kingdom for the year ending the 31st of March, 1886, stated as £3,882 odd. Now this was apparently a fourth share, and the total net fees, after payment of expenses, would therefore be £15,528 odd, and the share of the present registrar £11,646, a very handsome return from what is practically a sinecure appointment. Mr. Meynell, a former registrar, in his evidence before the Land Transfer Commission in 1869, plaintively states that for a short time after his appointment he attended regularly at the registry, but found, and was told, that he was rather more in the way than useful, and that they did better in his absence.

If a general registry of title be hereafter established and the registry in Middlesex be abolished, with due compensation for vested interests, what a pleasing prospect this for the taxpayers at large, all growing out of a registry set up simply to protect from fraud purchasers, mortgagees, and others dealing with land in Middlesex and created out of the fees which they have paid.

CASES OF THE WEEK.

Now, while, as I have shewn, those who deal with land in Middlesex provide so handsome an income to the officials of the registry, we all know how little the comfort and convenience of those who have to frequent it has been studied.

The Act of Anne (section 2) gave power to the Lord Chancellor and the Chief Justices of the Queen's Bench and Common Pleas and the Chief Baron of the Exchequer, or any three of them, to make rules for the government of the office of the registry. The powers of the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas and the Chief Baron of the Exchequer have been transferred to the Lord Chief Justice (see section 25 of Judicature Act, 1881), and the power, therefore, to make rules is apparently now vested in him and the Lord Chancellor. This power appears never to have been exercised.

The Act requires the officials to keep an alphabetical calendar of parishes, extra-parochial places, and townships within the county, with a reference to the number of every memorial. No such calendar is kept. Instead of this there is kept an index of grantors' names arranged alphabetically by the first letter only of the name, and this the officials call the "Parliamentary Index." The huge bulk of this index, without any sub-divisions of parishes, &c., renders a search therein a matter of very great labour and expenditure of time. Side by side with this so-called "Parliamentary Index" is kept what is called the "Lexicographic Index," which is an index of the names of grantors arranged lexicographically, and a search in this latter index takes much less labour and time, but the officials say it is private property, and claim the right to charge such fee for a search therein as they please, and even, if they like, to refuse to produce it at all.

The Act says that for every search there shall be paid a fee of "one shilling, and no more."

Practically, then, what the officials do is this: they keep what they call the "Parliamentary Index" in a form other than that the Act requires, and in so cumbrous a shape that a search therein is a matter of such great labour and expense as to make it almost prohibitory, and for a search in this they charge the statutory shilling, and, at the same time, they keep side by side with this a much better, though any thing but perfect, index (the "Lexicographic Index "), which they claim as their private property, and for a search wherein they charge 2s. 6d. Will this hold good if challenged in a court of law? I can hardly think so. What would be said if a similar proceeding were to take place at the Central Office, or at the Probate Registry, or any other public registry?

With the ample funds at their command, there is no reason why the officials should not make and keep very much more perfect indices or registers even than the "Lexicographic Index," and divided into divisions of parishes and otherwise so as to lessen the labour and time expended in searching, and that without any higher fee than one shilling being charged, and I contend that it is the duty of the registrar to see that this is done.

I maintain that no private indices or registers can he properly kept in the office of the Middlesex Registry, and that all and every the indices or registers now kept in the office (including the "Lexicographic Index") are public indices or registers and that the public have a right to make a search in all or any of them on payment of one shilling and no more.

There is a question no doubt as to what the Act means by a search. The officials contend (though not always) that it means a search in one name on one day, and that a separate fee must be paid for each separate name searched. I maintain that for one search fee a person is entitled to make a full search, no matter in how many names, so long as it is in one matter or transaction. I admit this is not clear, and it is one amongst many other matters which one would have thought would have been made clear by rules, such as the Act authorizes to be made, and which ought to be made and posted up in the office in order that all persons having business therein may know what may be demanded of them and required by them.

Surely, Sir, it is time that, either by bringing a case before the High Court or by appeal to the Lord Chancellor and Lord Chief Justice to exercise their powers under the Act, something were done to remedy the state of things I have endeavoured to point out. Cannot the Incorporated Law Society help us in this? Spring-gardens, March 24.

GEO. P. JACKSON.

The following dates for the Spring Assizes have been fixed :-Western Circuit Winchester, Saturday, April 23; Exeter, Monday, May 2; Taunton, Monday, May 9. North-Eastern Circuit-Newcastle, Wednesday, April 20; Durham, Saturday, April 23; Leeds, Friday, April 29. Northern Circuit-Carlisle, Wednesday, April 20; Manchester, Monday, April 25; and Liverpool, Saturday, May 7. South-Eastern CircuitIpswich, Tuesday, April 19; Cambridge, Tuesday, April 26; Hertford, Monday, May 2; Lewes, Saturday, May 7.

PRACTICE

IRWELL v. EDEN-C. A. No. 1, 30th March.

JUDGMENT Debtor- APPLICATION TO EXAMINE " ANY OTHER PERSON" AS TO DEBTS OWING-R. S. C., 1883, XLII, 32.

The plaintiff had obtained judgment against the defendant for £1,227, and applied, under ord. 42, r. 32, for an order for the attendance of the manager of the defendant's business for the purpose of being examined as to what moneys were owing to the defendant, so that they might be attached to answer the judgment. Ord. 42, r. 32, provides that "where a judgment or order is for the recovery or payment of money, the party entitled to enforce it may apply to the court or a judge for an order that the debtor liable under such judgment or order, or in the case of a corporation that any officer thereof, be orally examined as to whether or what debts are owing to the debtor ..; and the court or judge may make an order for the attendance and the examination of such debtor or of any other person, and for the production of any books or documents." Field, J., at chambers, refused the application on the ground that there was no jurisdiction to make the order. The Divisional Court affirmed this decision, on the ground that the case was not one in which the power should be exercised; Denman, J., however, being of opinion that the judge's view of the rule was right, Hawkins, J., being of a contrary opinion. The plaintiff appealed. THE COURT (Lord ESHER, M.R., and BowEN, L.J.), having taken time to consider its judgment, refused the application. They said that if the rule had stopped at the end of the first clause there would be no doubt that the judgment debtor alone, if an individual, or an officer of a corporation, if the judgment debtor were a corporation, could be ordered to be examined under the rule. Upon the last clause they had come to the conclusion that the words " any other person" did not include such a person as it was proposed to examine here. The words did not mean, where the judgment debtor was an individual, any other person besides the judgment debtor himself; they referred, where a corporation was a judgment debtor, to any one of its officers.-COUNSEL, Cock, Q.C., and W. S. Goddard. SOLICITOR, E. Hart Smith.

HAMILL v. LILLEY-C. A. No. 1, 30th March. PRACTICE-APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEAL TO HOUSE OF LORDS-STAY OF EXECUTION.

Appeal, the defendant applied and obtained from a master a stay of exeIn this case, the plaintiff having obtained judgment in the Court of cution, pending an appeal to the House of Lords, which was affirmed by the judge at chambers. On appeal to the Divisional Court that court held that there was no authority in the master to grant the stay of exe. cution, and accordingly dissolved it. The defendant now applied to the Court of Appeal by way of original motion.

THE COURT (Lord ESHER, M.R., BowEN and FRY, L.JJ.) having taken time to consider the point, said that they had come to the conclusion, as a matter of practice, that where there was an appeal from the Court of Appeal to the House of Lords under any circumstances, whether the Court of Appeal had dismissed or allowed the appeal from the court below, if there was any proposition to stay execution the application should be made solely to the Court of Appeal, and not either to the master or to the court below. The application was then heard on the merits and dismissed.-COUNSEL, Henn Collins, Q.C., and Hindmarsh; Lumley Smith, Q.C., and Percy Gye. SOLICITORS, F. D. Simpson & Co.; G. S. & H.

Brandon.

ELLIS v. STEWART-C. A. No. 2, 30th March. APPEAL-SECURITY FOR COSTS-COSTS OF APPEAL ALREADY INCURREDR. S. C., 1883, LVIII., 15.

plaintiff might be ordered to give security for the costs of an appeal of This was an original motion by some of the defendants, asking that the which he had given notice. The appeal was in the paper of the day for On the 17th of March the plaintiff served notice of appeal. On the 18th hearing. The order appealed from was made on the 24th of February. of March the defendants' solicitors wrote to the plaintiff's London agent, asking whether the plaintiff was willing to give security for the costs of the appeal without an application to the court for the purpose. The London agent said that he must consult the country solicitor. The defendant's solicitors replied that they would wait till the 21st of March before giving notice of application to the court, On the 21st of March the defendants' solicitors, not having received any reply from the plaintiff's security. It was objected, on behalf of the plaintiff, that the appeal London agent, served notice of motion in the Court of Appeal for being already in the paper, and the costs having been already incurred, it would be contrary to the settled rule to order security to be given. An objection was also made to the evidence of the plaintiff's inability to pay the costs of the appeal if he should be unsuccessful. That evidence was that he had failed to pay some costs which he had been ordered to pay in an action between himself and another person.

THE COURT (COTTON and LINDLEY, L.JJ.) overruled both_objections, and ordered the plaintiff to give security. COTTON, L.J., said that as a general rule it was too late to ask for security for the costs of an appeal after the appeal had come into the paper for hearing. But in the present case there was no unreasonable delay in the defendants waiting, as they did, to see whether the plaintiff would give security without an application to the court. As to the other point, the nonpayment of prior costs was not, of itself, a ground for requiring security

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