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for the opinion of the court whether, under such circumstances, there was sufficient evidence, if not rebutted, to prove the publication of the German specifications in this realm prior to the date of the plaintiffs' patent so as to avoid the same. It appeared that the two German specifications had been actually open to inspection in the Patent Office Library, the one during some two and a half years and the other during some forty days previously to the date of the plaintiffs' application. Plimpton v. Malcolmson (24 W. R. Dig. 170, 3 Ch. D. 531); United Telephone Co. v. Harrison, Cor, Walker, & Co. (30 W. R. 724, 21 Ch. D. 720); Otto ▼. Steel (34 W. R. 289, 31 Ch. D. 241), were the authorities principally referred to. CHITTY, J., said that the question in issue was one of fact, and all that he had to consider was what was the fair inference to be drawn from the facts as admitted. Had the German specifications been published in this country in such a way as to become part of the common stock of public knowledge in this country? This was the question asked by the late Master of the Rolls in Plimpton v. Malcolmson. To answer it it was not necessary to shew that the knowledge had been acquired by the public in general or by the bulk of the public or by any large number of persons, but if a sufficient number, as Jessel, M.R., had said, knew it, or if the means of communication were such that a sufficient number might be presumed or assumed to know it. Had Jessel, M R., been required to re-write his statement of the law he would probably have stated the matter, not as one of presumption or assumption, but as a matter of fact and legitimate inference to be drawn from the facts proved. Of course Jessel, M. R., did not mean that an assumption was to be made without sufficient grounds. Pearson, J., in Otto v. Steel, and Fry, J., in the United Telephone Co. v. Harrison, put the question in the same way as did Jessel, M. R. Upon the facts admitted in the special case it appeared that one of the specifications had, previously to the date of plaintiffs' patent, been, for a period of two and a half years, accessible to any person who chose to go to the Patent Office. In the Patents Journal notice was given that it could be found there, and also the commissioners classified the foreign patents with the view of facilitating access. With regard to the other patent it was true that the period was forty days only. He did not, however, consider that to be too short a period, and he considered that, having regard to the facilities of access in a free public library, to the information given by the commissioners in the journal, and the length of time, the proper inference was that the public did have access to the documents. It appeared to him that the public availed themselves of the knowledge which was thus placed readily available for them, and that it was not necessary to shew that any person actually did avail himself of such knowledge. As to the circumstances that the specifications were in the German language, he considered that was immaterial, for they were in a language that must be deemed to be well understood. He, therefore, held that the specifications constituted publication. Costs were reserved. -COUNSEL, Aston, Q.C., and Bousfield; Romer, Q.C., and Goodere. SOLICITORS, Crowders & Vizard, for Owston, Dickinson, & Simpson, Leicester; Johnston, Harrison, & Powell, for R. & R. C. Winder, Bolton.

Re JONES, GReene v. gorDON—Kay, J., 3rd November. WILL-POWER OF APPOINTMENT-WILLS ACT (1 VICT. c. 26), s. 27. This was an adjourned summons. The will of J. Jones contained a provision that it should be lawful for his wife, by will or codicil, to appoint that any sum or sums of money, not exceeding altogether the sum of £20,000, should, after her decease, be raised and paid or applied to or for the benefit of such person or persons for such purposes, upon such conditions, and with such restrictions as his said wife should think fit. Mrs. Jones, the widow, by her will, devised and bequeathed all her estate and effects, real and personal, which she might die possessed of or entitled to unto her only daughter absolutely, for her sole and separate KAY, J., held that this devise contained in the will of Mrs. Jones operated as an execution of the power in the husband's will to the extent of the sum of £20,000.- COUNSEL, Ingle Joyce; Begg. SOLICITORS, Ingle, Cooper, & Holmes; Duffield & Bruty.

use.

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COLEMAN v. LLEWELLYN-North, J., 29th October. MORTGAGE-FORECLOSURE-REDEMPTION-RIGHT TO RENTS RECEIVED RECEIVER AFTER DATE OF CHIEF CLERK'S CERTIFICate. This was a foreclosure action, and the plaintiff, who was first mortgagee, now moved to make the foreclosure absolute as against the mortgagor. The second mortgagee had already been absolutely foreclosed. A receiver had been appointed, who had received rents and royalties, the greater part of which had been paid into court, but a balance remained in his hands. Part of the money had been received since the date of the chief clerk's certificate. The judgment at the trial allowed the second mortgagee and the mortgagor successive periods for redemption, and there was a provision that any person redeeming, or the plaintiff in the event of foreclosure, should be at liberty to apply in chambers for payment or transfer of any money in court or in the hands of the receiver. It was contended on behalf of the plaintiff that this clause distinguished the case from Jenner-Fust v. Nec tham (34 W. R. 409, 709; 31 Ch. D. 500, 32 Ch.D. 582; 30 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 255, 271, 418, 449), and that the mortgagee was entitled to have the foreclosure made absolute at once, without directing any fresh account, or enlarging the time for redemption, and that the plaintiff was entitled to the whole of the inoney in court and in the receiver's hands. NORTH, J., held that the above special provision in the judgment did not distinguish the case from Jenner-Fust v. Needham. And he directed a further account to be taken, and allowed the mortgagor a further period of a month, from the date of the fresh certificate, for redemption.-COUNSEL, J. G. Wood. SOLICITORS, Peacock & Goddard.

Re LODEK-North, J., 28th October. MARRIED WOMAN-MORTGAGE-MARSHALLING OF SECURITIES-RESTRAINT ON ANTICIPATION AS TO ONE FUND.

In this case a question arose as to the marshalling of securities given by a married woman, part of whose income was subject to a restraint on anticipation. A testator, by his will, gave a sum of £50,000 to trustees, on trust to pay one-third of the income thereof to his daughter, for her separate use without power of anticipation, and to apply the remainder of the income for the benefit of her, her husband C., and their children. The fund was paid into court. The husband died. An order was made in the action for the payment of one-third of the income of the fund to the daughter, the application of a specified sum for the benefit of her family, and the payment of the residue of the income to her. While she was a widow she executed a mortgage of her interest in the trust fund, and of some policies of insurance on her life, to F., and an order was made for the payment of her income to him. She afterwards married M., and after her marriage she charged her interest in the trust fund in favour of P., who obtained the appointment of a receiver. The income which was received by F. was more than sufficient to pay the interest on his mortgage and the premiums on the policies, and he did not desire to apply any part of the surplus in reduction of his principal debt. The question was how the surplus was to be applied. NORTH, J., held that, part of the income being, since the second marriage, subject to a restraint on anticipation, while the other part was not, there should be a marshalling in favour of the second mortgagee, and that the premiums and the interest on the first mortgage should, as between the wife and the second mortgagee, be paid out of that part of the income which was subject to the restraint on anticipation. — COUNSEL, Onslow; Stokes; S. Hall; Swinfen Eady. SOLICITORS, Frere, Forster, & Co.; Hicks & Arnold; Brownlow & Howe; Rooks & Co.

Re FRANCE, FRANCE v. CLARK-North, J., 29th October. ADMINISTRATION ACTION-SERVICE OF NOTICE ON THIRD PARTY-R. §. C., 1883, XVI., 40-LANDLORD-PROVISION FOR FUTURE RENT. This was the further consideration of an action by a legatee for the administration of the estate of a testator who had carried on business in partnership. The chief clerk had found by his certificate the amounts of the testator's separate debts and partnership debts. The plaintiff asked for leave to serve the testator's surviving partner with notice of the order, under rule 40 of order 16, with a view of binding him by the proceedings in the action, and asked that the payment of the partnership debts out of the assets might be meanwhile postponed. NORTH, J., refused the appli cation. He held that the surviving partner was not " a person interested in the estate," and that rule 40 did not apply. Another question arose thus. The landlord of a colliery, a lease of which had been granted to the testator and his partners, had carried in a claim for future rent. The chief clerk found that the rent had been paid up to the 1st of January, 1886. The landlord took out a summons for the admission of his claim, and he asked that a note of his claim might be made in the order on further consideration. NORTH, J., directed that the order should contain a note that, all rent and liabilities under the lease having been paid and discharged up to the 1st of January, 1886, the executors not asking to have any part of the assets appropriated, the court did not think fit to make such an appropriation.-COUNSEL, CozensHardy, Q.C., and Willis-Bund; Everitt, Q.C., and B. Eyre; Cookson, Q.C., and Seward Brice; Marcy; Ingle Joyce. SOLICITORS, Wright & Wright; G. L. P. Eyre & Co.; Torr & Co.; Few & Co.

Re GRAY, ACASON v. GREENWOOD-North, J., 28th October. WILL-CONSTRUCTION-GIFT OF FUND TO MARRIED WOMAN-RESTRAINT ON ANTICIPATION.

The question in this case was as to the construction of an appointment by will to a married woman, which purported to be subject to a restraint upon anticipation. The testator had, under a settlement, a testamentary power to appoint certain funds among his children. By his will he appointed certain specific sums, and directed that the residue "of the said money or investments" should, as to one-fourth part thereof, be held "upon trust for my daughter F. absolutely, for her sole and separate use, independently of marital control, and without power of anticipation during any coverture." The daughter was now married. It was contended, on her behalf, that, there being an absolute appointment to her, the restraint on anticipation was inconsistent with that gift, and that she was, therefore, entitled to have the capital paid over to her at once. NORTH, J., held that she was not entitled to immediate payment, but that during coverture only the income of the fund could be paid to her, founding his decision on the fact that the trustees were directed to hold (not to pay) the share appointed to her.-COUNSEL, Sladen; Vaughan Hawkins. SOLICITORS, Ingham; Wright & Pilley.

It

HUGGINS v. JEFFRIES-Q. B. Div., 28th October. PROHIBITION AFTER EXECUTION LEVIED-JURISDICTION OF MAYOR'S COURT. In this case a question arose as to whether the court would issue a prohibition after execution had been levied and the proceeds paid over. was alleged that the proceedings in the action had been taken coram nonjudice, the contract-for the breach of which the defendant was suedhaving been made, and the breach thereof having taken place, outside the jurisdiction. It appeared, however, from the evidence that an account had been stated within the jurisdiction. THE COURT (Lord COLERIDGE, C.J., MANISTY and STEPHEN, JJ) held that in such a case prohibition would not go. Lord COLERIDGE, C.J.,

said that when an account had been stated by two persons of a specific sum in terms as owed by the one to the other, there was no doubt that that account formed a good subject-matter for the consideration of a court within the jurisdiction of which it had been stated. The contention that after execution and satisfaction a prohibition might be issued appeared to be founded on a dictum of Lord Coke, but had not any decided case to support it. When the whole matter of an action is at an end the court ought not, by suffering a writ of prohibition to issue, to make a declaration upon which future proceedings against the successful party might be founded, MANISTY, J., concurred, and said that, whatever might be the case in an application made by a stranger to an action to restrain a court from exceeding its jurisdiction, a party could not get such a writ when the proceedings were finally concluded and there was nothing to prohibit. It might be that where the interests of the public or the Crown were concerned the court would take such a step, though even then it had a discretion in the matter, but the present application was not one of that character. STEPHEN, J., concurred.-COUNSEL, R. Vaughan Williams; Kemp, Q.C. and Vennell. SOLICITORS, F. Burchell; Ranger &

Burton.

HALL . COMFORT-Q. B. Div., 28th October.
BILL OF SALE-MORTGAGE BY DEMISE-ATTORNMENT-RECOVERY OF LAND
UNDER R. S. C., 1883, XIV.

point of law." THE COURT refused the application. LORD COLERIDGE, C.J., said that the magistrate might have used the expression that he should hold, as a matter of law, that the defendant's dog had not been under control, when he might well have meant so to hold only as a matter of fact. The control over the dog must be so effective as to prevent the mischief at which the statute aimed, and, in the absence of very positive evidence to the contrary, the fact that a dog had neither been muzzled nor led was sufficient to prove that it had not been uuder proper control. MANISTY, J., in concurring, said that, in his opinion, the question as to whether or not a dog would be under control must be one of fact only for the decision of the magistrate. STEPHEN, J., concurred.-COUNSEL, Candy. SOLICITORS, Pitt & Savage.

REEVE v. FOWLE-Pollock, B., at Chambers, 29th October. DEBTORS ACT, 1869 (32 & 33 VICT. c. 62)-COUNTY COURT-PROHIBITION. A point, as to which some doubt has existed in the profession, as to the validity of a committal by a county court judge for past default, and a direction that the warrant thereunder should not issue so long as monthly instalments are duly paid, was decided in this case. There is no doubt as to the desirability of the order and direction in question, which, generally speaking, is made with the consent of both the plaintiff creditor and the defendant debtor, and greatly lessens the number of imprisonments. This was an application for the recovery of land under the provisions Such orders have been made and directions given by nearly all the judges of ord. 3, r. 6, and order 14. The tenant of certain premises used for of county courts for many years past. Counsel for the applicant conwarehousing furniture mortgaged them by demise. The mortgage deed tended that Judge Stonor, the judge of the Brompton County Court, contained a clause that "for the purpose of better securing the punctual should be prohibited from proceeding further on an order of committal dated payment of the interest on the said principal sum, the mortgagor attorns the 4th of March last. He said that since it was made two instalments tenant to the mortgagee" at a yearly rent. It was also provided that the had been paid by the defendant, and though instalments were now in mortgagee might, at any time after a certain date, enter into or upon the arrear, the order should not be enforced. Counsel for the county court premises and determine the tenancy thereby created without giving to the judge contended that the order was valid. On the 4th of March, when mortgagor any notice to quit. It was argued for the defence that the the order of committal was made, the judge was satisfied by evidence attornment clause was void as being in effect an unregistered bill of sale, that the debtor had had, since the date of the judgment, the means to pay, and that section 6 of the Bills of Sale Act, 1878, included such a deed, the and had neglected to pay. This was all that is required by section 5 of mortgagee never having been in actual possession. It was also con- the Debtors Act, 1869. The county court judge should not therefore be tended that ord. 3, r. 6, did not apply to a demise such as this, which prohibited. POLLOCK, B., said:-It is admitted that the county court had been terminated by the landlord for non-payment of the rent, since judge, at the time he made the committal order, was satisfied that the relief might be obtained against the forfeiture. THE COURT (Lord debtor had had the means to pay since the date of the judgment, and COLERIDGE, C.J., MANISTY and STEPHEN, JJ.) held that order 14 was was then in contempt. The order of committal and directions were perapplicable, and the deed was not a bill of sale. Lord COLERIDGE, C.J., fectly proper. The order of committal for ten days was in respect of the said that in this case the debt was admitted, and unless the objections to defendant's past default, but the judge directed his officer (the registrar). the instrument succeeded there was no reason why judgment should not not to issue the warrant so long as £4 a month was paid; that was no part be given against the defendant. The Bills of Sale Acts did not include of the order, but was a direction that the judge gave to the officer of the such an attornment as that in this deed. Certain rights were attached by court, similar to the directions given in the High Court on committals, the law to the relation of landlord and tenant, and among them was the that the warrant should lie in the office for a time. I am well acquainted right under certain limitations to seize all property on the demised pre- with the form which is used in the Brompton County Court, where I have mises. Such property could not be brought into a schedule. If this sometimes sat as deputy-judge, and it is right. The summons for a prodeed were to be held to be a bill of sale every lease under which a right hibition against the judge must be dismissed, with costs, and, as the of distress passes to the landlord would be a bill of sale also. With registrar was served, and the judge of the county court thought it of reference to the other contention, that ord. 3, r. 6, did not refer to such a sufficient importance to be represented by counsel, certificate for counsel case as the present, his lordship added that Daubuz v. Lavington (32 W. R. will be granted.-COUNSEL, R. Wallace; Lynch; Cooper Wyld. 772) was authority to shew that where a landlord had determined a tenancy at will by a notice to quit and entry, as in the present proceedings, | PIERCE v. WILLIAMS (JONES, Claimant)-Ruthin County Court, he was entitled to put in force the provisions of the order. MANISTY 29th September and 28th October. and STEPHEN, JJ., concurred.-COUNSEL, D. Walker; Macaskie. SOLICITORS, INTERI LEADER-BILL OF SALE, STATUTORY FORM OF-BILLS OF SALE ACT, Gedge, Kirby, & Millett; Wood, Bird, & Co. 1878, AND BILLS OF SALE ACT AMENDMENT ACT, 1882. This interple ader action was to test the validity of a bill of sale given by the defendant in the original action (Robert Williams) to Jchn Jones, the claimant, whereby the scheduled goods were assigned to secure the payment of £50. The high bailiff had seized and sold a portion of the goods assigned under a judgment against Robert Williams for £21 at the suit of W. Clwyd Pierce, and the latter claimed the proceeds of the sale in satisfaction of his judgment; John Jones claimed the proceeds under a bill of sale granted by the defendant, Robert Williams, to him to secure the repayment of £50 and interest at five per cent. per annum as stated. The bill of sale was dated the 25th of May, 1886 (the date of the judgment), and was expressed to be made in consideration of £50 now paid to the said Robert Williams by the said John Jones"; the receipt was acknowledged; and it assigned unto the present claimant the scheduled goods (according to the statutory form), and also all and singular the growing crops specifically described (it being the intention of the parties that when grown and ready to gather in they shall be severed, thereby coming within the provisions of section 7 of the Bills of Sale Act, 1878)." The deed then continued in the statutory form, and the time for payment of the £50 was stated as the "26th day of May, 1886," the day following the date of its execution. Certain of the goods scheduled were not enumerated, but were classified as Flowers in glass cases, cooking utensils, set of fancy vessels, brushes, knives and forks, thirty-one farming tools, haruess and gear, tenant's fixtures in stables and house, &c., &c. Poultry, hens, ducks, chickens, ducklings." The growing crops were scheduled. For

In the Matter of AN APPLICATION FOR A RULE FOR A
MANDAMUS-Q.B.Div., 28th October.
ORDER UNDER DOGS ACT, 1871 (34 & 35 VICT. c. 56)—" UNDER CONTROL

OF ANY PERSON."

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This was an application on behalf of Sir Hector Maclean Hay, for a rule nisi in the nature of a mandamus calling upon Mr. H. Curtis Bennett, a metropolitan police magistrate, to shew why he should not state a case raising a question of law for the decision of this court. The applicant was summoned at the Wandsworth Police-court for having acted in contravention of an order made in pursuance of section 3 of the Dogs Act, 1871, in having allowed a dog belonging to him to have been in or upon a certain thoroughfare when not under the control of himself or any other person. Mr. Curtis Bennett was of opinion that, as it had been proved that the dog had neither been muzzled nor led, this was practically conclusive that it had not been under proper control at the time, and he fined the defendant 3s. and 2s. costs. He, however, expressed his willingness to state a case upon the point for the decision of this court, but when a draft case had been submitted to him he had refused to sign it, on the ground that the question raised by it was one of law. The draft case, so far as material, was as follows:- Upon the hearing of the said information a police constable of the metropolitan police, who was called on behalf of the respondent, proved that on the 26th day of September aforesaid, the appellant was seen in a public thoroughfare, to wit the Upper Richmond-road, in the district of the said Wandsworth Police-court, accompanied by a dog, which said dog was neither muzzled nor led. The appellant appeared in person and adduced no evidence in contradiction of the evidence in paragraph 4 hereof mentioned. The appellant contended that the dog might have been, and, in fact, was under his control, although it was neither muzzled nor led. I was of opinion and ruled, as a matter of law, that no dog not being either muzzled or led was, or could be, under the control of any person within the meaning of the said order, and I accordingly convicted the appellant and imposed a fine of 3s. and 2s. costs as in paragraph 1 hereof appears. The question of law arising upon this case for the opinion of the court is, whether upon the facts proved or admitted I, the said magistrate, came to a correct decision in

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the execution creditor it was contended that the bill of sale was void in toto, and the following cases were cited :-Davies v. Burton (32 W. R. 423, 11 Q. B. D. 537), Hetherington v. Groome (33 W. R. 103, 13 Q. B. D. 789), Roberts v. Roberts (32 W. R. 605), Re Williams, Ex parte Pearce (32 W. R. 187, 25 Ch. D. 656), Davies v. Rees (34 W. R. 573, 17 Q. B. D. 408), Ex parte Stanford (34 W. R. 507, 17 Q. B. D. 259). JUDGE HORATIO LLOYD, Q.C., in a written judgment, said:-After careful consideration of the points raised as to the invalidity of the bill of sale, I have come to the conclusion that I cannot declare it void on either of the grounds. I do not think that it contains any covenant so inconsistent with the Act and form that it can be impeached on that account, nor do I think that the mere fact that the time of payment is fixed at so early a date as the day following the execu

tion of the bill is of itself sufficient to avoid it. In Re Williams, Ex paret Pearce, the time was "forthwith, or when and so soon as the grantee should think fit," and power was also given to relinquish possession and resume it again so often as the grantee chooses. In the present case also there is no question of "capitalized interest" or other circumstances which existed in Davies v. Burton and other cases. Upon the whole I do not think there is sufficient reason for impeaching the bill of sale. I must, therefore give judgment foi the claimant. The case was not so clear as not to justify litigation, and therefore I do not give costs against the execution creditor, and I think the claimant should bear the cost of the hearing fee and possession money. Judgment accordingly.-For claimant, Malcolm Douglas, Barrister. For execution creditor, Solomon (Denbigh).

CASES AFFECTING SOLICITORS.

EBRARD v. GASSIER, C. A. No. 2, 29th October. SOLICITOR AND CLIENT-COSTS-TAXATION-COPIES OF CORRESPONDENCEREFRESHER FEES TO COUNSEL-RULES OF LANCASTER CHANCERY COURTDISCRETION OF REGISTRAR.

This was an appeal from the refusal of the Vice-Chancellor of the County Palatine of Lancaster (Mr. Bristowe, Q.C.) to review the taxation of the plaintiffs' costs of the action. On a prior appeal to this court on the merits of the action the plaintiffs succeeded, and the defendants were ordered to pay costs. There were two questions on the present occasion (1) the costs of copies of certain correspondence; (2) the amounts of the refresher fees which the registrar had allowed to the plaintiffs' counsel. The main question in the action was as to a commission added by the defendants to the sums due to them from the plaintiffs in the course of dealings between the parties in cotton goods. The plaintiffs were merchants in Mexico, but one of the partners in their firm resided generally in Paris. The defendants carried on business in Manchester. A large mass of correspondence between the plaintiffs inter se and between the defendants inter se had been used as evidence in the case, the defendants seeking to shew from the plaintiffs' correspondence that they were aware of the commission with which the defendants were in the habit of charging them. For the purposes of the trial the correspondence, which had been conducted in French, was translated into English, and copies of the originals and of the translations were furnished to counsel. The registrar had allowed the costs of the copies in both languages. The registrar had also allowed to the three counsel respectively employed by the plaintiffs refresher fees of twenty, fifteen, and ten guineas a day. The defendants contended that the rule of the High Court, limiting refreshers to a maximum of ten guineas a day, ought to be applied in the Palatine Court. The plaintiffs insisted that, under the rules of the Palatine Court, the quantum of refreshers is left in the discretion of the registrar, who is the taxing officer in that court. THE COURT OF APPEAL (COTTON, BOWEN, and FRY, L.JJ.) affirmed the taxation. COTTON, L.J., said that the registrar had considered that there was reasonable ground for furnishing copies of the corre spondence in both French and English. The Vice-Chancellor had taken the same view, and, though only a small number of the very numerous letters had been actually used, still this court could not see that the decision was clearly wrong, and therefore could not differ from the taxing officer and the Vice-Chancellor. There was more doubt as to the copies in French than as to those in English. If the documents had only been wanted for the purposes of the argument in court, or to shew the course of the correspondence, the English copies would have been sufficient, and if questions arose between the interpreters on the oral evidence as to the letters, then the originals would have been sufficient. The writers of the letters had, however, been examined in court through interpreters, and frequent references had been made to the French copies, and as the taxing officer and the Vice-Chancellor had thought that in this particular case it was reasonable to supply those copies, the Court of Appeal could not differ from the decision. Though the letters between the defendants were not used at the trial, yet the case was to be tried with oral evidence, and there was a conflict as to the nature of the agreement between the parties and their knowledge of what had been done. It was therefore reasonable to have the copies in readiness. With regard to the refreshers it had been urged that the rules of the Palatine Court provided that, where they did not fully and adequately provide in any particular with regard to procedure and practice, the practice of the Chancery Division of the High Court was to be followed. Therefore it was contended that the rule of the High Court as to refreshers must apply. In the Palatine Court there were two sets of rules-one, made by the Chancellor of the Duchy and the Vice-Chancellor, with the advice of one of the Lords Justices of Appeal, dealt with practice and procedure; the other, relating to costs and fees, were made by the Chancellor, with the advice of the ViceChancellor. Rule 19 of the latter set provided that, "as to all fees or allowances which are discretionary, the same are, unless otherwise provided, to be allowed at the discretion of the taxing officer." In his lordship's opinion the amount of the refreshers was in the discretion of the taxing officer, and this court ought not to interfere. BowEN, L.J., concurred, after some hesitation, and though he desired to say nothing against the ability of the taxing officers of local courts, it was very important that those officers should keep a firm hand over costs and fees, and that the courts should exercise vigilance to see that a lax practice did not grow up. The officers of the local courts necessarily had less experience in these matters than the taxing masters in London. With regard to the copies in French he had doubts, because he was afraid that the registrar had taken the correspondence wholesale, instead of considering whether the solicitor had applied his mind to the particular letters of which both French and English copies might be necessary. In general, the practice would be to allow copies only in one language. If he had

had to decide the question alone he should have formed a different judgment. FRY, L.J., said that there must be a strong case to justify copies in more than one language. The present decision would lay down no general rule. It was permissible to allow them, but only in a peculiar case. As to the refreshers, he would have been glad if the registrar, in exercising his discretion, had followed the rule of the Supreme Court, but the question was one of quantum only, and was clearly in the registrar's discretion, and it was not for the Court of Appeal on such a point to interfere with the decision of the registrar and of the Vice-Chancellor.COUNSEL, Ambrose, Q.C., and Hopkinson; O. Leigh Clare and S. Hall; W. B. Ferguson. SOLICITORS, Phelps, Sidgwick, & Biddle; Cunliffes & Davenport. Re WADSWORTH, RHODES v. SUGDEN-Kay, J., 3rd November. SOLICITOR-DISCHARGED BEFORE TRIAL-HIS CHARGING ORDER FOR COSTSLIEN OF PRESENT SOLICITOR-23 & 24 VICT. c. 127, s. 28. A solicitor employed by the plaintiff in an action and discharged before trial obtained a charging order, under 23 & 24 Vict. c. 127, for his costs, charging them upon a sum of money ultimately recovered by the plaintiff in the action, the judge holding that the services of the first solicitor had been instrumental to the successful result. This order was made subject to the lien of the second solicitors for their costs (33 W. R. 558, 29 Ch. D. 517). Upon this summons, which sought to vary the chief clerk's certificate and to deal with the funds, the discharged solicitor, who had been served, asked to have his costs paid pari passu with those of the solicitors who had acted for the plaintiff down to, and at the time of, the trial. KAY, J., held, following Cormack v. Beisly (3 De G. & J. 157), that the costs of the solicitors who acted at the time of the trial must be paid in priority to those of the applicant.-COUNSEL, Hastings, Q.C., and Renshaw; Whittaker; W. Pearson and Oswald. SOLICITORS, Jaques, Layton, & Jaques; W. Easton, for W. Durnford, Halifax; Sewell & Edwards, for J. E. & E. H. Hill, Halifax.

ELECTION CASES.

Re SHOREDITCH ELECTION-Shoreditch County Court,
13th October.

This was a sitting for taxation of the bill of Mr. Enoch Walker, the returning officer of the borough of Shoreditch at the late general election, at the instance of Mr. Germaine, one of the candidates. The bill as delivered was divided into two sections under the heads of "returning officer's charges" and "all other expenses as per vouchers," and objec tion was taken to the whole of the items in the first of these for which no Vouchers were given. For Mr. Germaine it was contended that the returning officer had, in each instance, charged the maximum allowed by the Act, while the Act says that "the charges are in no case to exceed the sums actually and necessarily paid or payable," and that the returning officer was only entitied to such sums as he had really expended, and for which he could shew vouchers. For the returning officer, it was argued that the amounts mentioned in the schedule to the Act were scale fees allowed for the remuneration of the returning officer, and he refused upon principle to produce vouchers for any of these items. very long discussion on the principal items objected to, the REGISTRAR (Mr. EARLE) stated that he would reserve judgment, at the same time intimating that he did not think the Act intended the returning officer to make a profit out of the election charges. He has since taxed a sum of £54 off Mr. Walker's bill of £175 19s. 6d. For the candidate, H. W. Chatterton. For the returning officer, Hedderwick (barrister), instructed by Mills, Lockyer, & Mills.—Times.

After a

On Monday evening the members of the Surrey Sessions Bar Mess entertained the Solicitor-General at a complimentary dinner at Willis'srooms, King-street, St. James's, in celebration of his recent appointment. The chair was occupied by Mr. Serjeant Robinson.

At the Bristol Assizes, on Saturday, before Mr. Baron Huddleston, Frederick Alfred Stock, builder, was charged with perjury. Last May one Swain, a builder at Bath, let some land to the prisoner, on which the latter was to build a house. Swain agreed to act as builder, the materials being supplied by the prisoner, who was introduced to one Book, a haulier, by Swain. Book supplied the prisoner with certain stone and did hauling for him, for which he sent in a bill to the prisoner, who promised to pay it by cheque. He, however, did not do so, and at last Book had to take proceedings against him. A specially indorsed writ was issued for the sum due, and Book made the proper affidavit to recover immediate judgment against the prisoner in accordance with the terms of R. S. C., 1883, XIV. The prisoner, in answer to this, made an affidavit, in which he positively swore that the goods supplied and the labour done by Book were not for him, but for Swain; and it was for the false statements made in this affidavit that he was now tried. The writ was issued at the district registry of the High Court at Bath, and the affidavit was sworn before a commissioner there. In the result, the jury found the prisoner guilty, and the judge sentenced him to 18 months' hard labour. In summing up the judge said: "It was no answer to the charge to say that no harm could come of the perjury. They did not even know that no harm had come. In the face of prisoner's letter to Book, promising to pay the money, was it possible to believe for a moment that prisoner thought he was not liable? Yet, in spite of that, he recklessly made the affidavit denying that he was liable for the money or any part of it. No doubt the object of prisoner was to gain time, and he might then either have got the money or have taken steps to render the execution worth nothing."

MR. JUSTICE CAVE AND MR. HIGGIN, Q.C. MR. HIGGIN, Q.C., chairman of the Salford Quarter Sessions, recently abandoned the business of the sessions, leaving thirty-one prisoners to be tried at the assizes. In doing so he spoke strongly of the arrangements made by the judges for holding assizes, allowing the sessions and assizes to clash. He further stated that it would be a breach of decorum to have courts sitting together. In charging the grand jury at the Manchester Assizes on the 29th ult. Mr. Justice Cave said:"I must take notice of certainly what in my experience is a totally unprecedented circumstance, and that is that at the sitting of the Salford Quarter Sessions, which I believe took place on Monday last, the chairman seems to have gone out of his way to make an attack upon her Majesty's judges. In all my experience, now extending over, I am sorry to say, as barrister and as judge, a great many years, I have never known such a case to take place before. I could hardly have believed it possible that such a thing could have been done, but I have had laid before me an extract from one of the local newspapers detailing the circumstances. Now the learned chairman of quarter sessions is reported to have stated that there would be a number of cases which of necessity would have to be handed over to the judge of assize to try, and it appears that there are no fewer than thirty-one of those cases, which undoubtedly ought to have been disposed of at the quarter sessions, and which have been sent here from the quarter sessions at considerably increased expense to the county, and no doubt very considerable inconvenience to the parties who are witnesses in those cases. The learned chairman is reported to have said that "if the authorities who fixed the commission day did not choose to consult the chairman of these sessions or the clerk of the peace as to when it was likely the sessions would be finished, and if the authorities fix the commission day when it is absolutely certain the sessions will not be finished, it is not the fault of the authorities of Manchester that a clashing of this kind should take place. If they would condescend to make inquiry they would receive sufficient information to prevent for the future the clashing of these two courts." Now I must say I regret extremely that the chairman should have indulged in language of that kind, which applies, and must only apply, to her Majesty's judges of assize. It is her Majesty's judges of assize who fix the time for holding the assizes. At the winter and summer assizes that is done at a meeting of all the judges, and I can assure you that a very great deal of trouble is taken and a very great deal of time spent in endeavouring to fix the date of holding the assizes so as to inflict the minimum of inconvenience on those who have to be brought there; and, so far as my experience undoubtedly extends, whenever there has been any reason to suppose that there might be a clashing between the sessions and the assizes, which is very difficult indeed to prevent in the month of July, because on some circuits-not on this-judges are compelled to begin very early indeed, the chairman of quarter sessions takes care to communicate, directly or indirectly, with the judge of assize and to call his attention-for he is necessarily ignorant of those matters-to any possible inconvenience that may be caused by the clashing of the sessions and the assizes. Now it so happens that, though I have been on the bench nearly six years, I have never yet been to Manchester at this time of the year, and consequently I was quite unaware of the day fixed for holding the Salford Quarter Sessions. All I knew of the subject was that the first day upon which the sessions could be held was the 18th of October. I was necessarily also entirely unaware of the probable number of prisoners that would be brought to trial at these sessions, and it certainly does seem to me that if the chairman of quarter sessions had really desired that this clashing should not take place, nothing would have been more simple than that he, who was aware of all these matters, should write to me, who was necessarily ignorant of them, and should give me some little warning of what might be expected to take place unless some change were made in the ordinary date of holding the assizes. Now the judges in holding the assizes adhere to certain fixed times. They do not, as is frequently the case with the recorders of cities and boroughs, for instance, fix those times to suit their own convenience, but they adhere to certain fixed times which are prescribed for them by custom, and although they undoubtedly have power to alter those times, yet, speaking for myself and I think I may speak for the rest of the judges also they would hardly think of doing that to suit their own private convenience, although fully prepared to do so to suit the convenience of the public; and had I known that there was any likelihood whatever of any great public inconvenience arising by the assizes being fixed at the time they were fixed, I certainly would have deferred them for three days, or even for a week had it been necessary; and I certainly very much regret that the learned chairman of quarter sessions, instead of addressing to the grand jury from this seat a public reprobation of her Majesty's judges, did not think fit to communicate with me directly or indirectly, and warn me of what the consequences might be of holding the assizes as early as the 28th of October. The time of holding the assizes was fixed some five or six weeks ago; but although it was fixed as far back as that there was still nothing which would prevent me from altering that date for good cause shewn to me, and had I received any intimation whatever from the chairman of quarter sessions I certainly would have had the necessary alteration. So far from this being any personal convenience to her Majesty's judges of assize to come here to-day, on the contrary, they have come at considerable inconvenience. I cannot refrain also from expressing my regret, if it is true, as I am informed it is, that the chairman did not think fit to continue sitting yesterday. Now I gather the ground on which the learned chairman puts it is that it "would be a breach of decorum and an act of indecency for the court of quarter sessions to be sitting at the same time as the assizes." I don't myself quite understand what is meant by an "act of indecency" and a "breach of decorum." I have generally understood that it is inconvenient for both courts to be sitting at once,

because witnesses and others engaged in one court may be required in the other at the same time; but what indecency or what want of decorum there could be in the learned chairman of quarter sessions sitting yesterday I cannot for the life of me conceive. I arrived in the city of Manchester at six o'clock in the evening, and the commission was not opened at all on that evening; you yourselves have just heard it opened by the clerk of assize; and I certainly do regret that while the learned chairman was so extremely anxious to avoid indecorum and indecency by sitting upon a day when he could not by any possibility have interferred with the court of assize, it did not strike him that there was something which might possibly be said on the ground of decency and decorum in favour of not holding up from this seat her Majesty's judges to public reprobation.

THE ADMINISTRATION OF LAW IN INDIA. SIR WILLIAM MUIR delivered an address on this subject on Monday at Edinburgh in which he said (we quote from the Scotsman) that Warren Hastings, in 1780, laid down the rule that in all matters regarding inheritance, marriage, caste, and other religious usages, the laws of the Koran should be administered with respect to the Mohammedans, those of the Shastas with respect to Hindoos; and where the parties were of different creeds, by the laws of the defendant. For the other classes there was no other legislative provision than that the law should be administered with justice and equity and good conscience. This rule continued to be long observed. Fifty years ago a Royal commission was appointed to promulgate a universal code, but it was only in 1862 that a penal code was enacted with a universal application. There had also been further steps in the same direction, among which he mentioned the enactment of laws of contract, twenty years ago, in which the principle of limited liability was largely recognized; the separate and independent rights in certain cases of married women, to a greater extent, indeed, than he had himself considered at the time expedient. Regulations of wills and testaments had been enacted; but in these, as in other matters, large exceptions were necessary with respect to the usages of certain classes. It would thus be seen that a large code of territorial law affecting large classes of subjects in India could be looked forward to eventually. Exceptions, however, must remain, especially in the case of the Hindoos and Mohammedans, which constituted the vast majority of the nation. In one main feature the Mohammedan and the Hindoo agreed-namely, that their law was based upon Divine sanction. The law was bound up in the religion, and consequently it was of a personal, not of a territorial nature, and followed the individual wherever he went. The Mohammedan law was intolerant of interference, and novelty or change was absolutely impossible. The Hindoo system differed in that respect. In many important points it had been materially influenced by British administration, the tendency of which had been towards the disintegration of the family and the larger recognition of the individual; so also in regard to the matters of remarriage and widowhood. It had likewise suffered modification under the action of the British law courts; in other words it was largely indebted to case-made law. Divine as the law pretended to be, it had in course of time received many modifications, and a corresponding variety of interpretation was put upon its clauses. In this way diverse schools of Hindoo law had arisen, flourishing in different centres. But as the Hindoo law was personal, and not territorial, a Hindoo passing from one province to another carried the provisions of his law along with him, and was judged according to them, so that adherents of the diverse schools might be found side by side in the same locality. To add to the complexity of the subject-matter there were the sub-divisions and castes, especially the four great castes into which society was divided. Each of these had its own usages and rights to which it clung tenaciously, and in accordance with which it was entitled to have its civil causes heard and determined. Turning next to the Mohammedan law, Sir William Muir noticed the absence of the recognition of anything like the Hindoo family unit, by which the household was maintained. Among the Hindoos the sinking of the individual in the family had no doubt tended to retard the progress of society, but it had also tended to make domestic life far sounder and healthier than the Moslem, and the same might be said of the marriage tie and the nearer approach to monogamy among the Hindoos. Scattered through the Koran, which was the great foundation of Moslem law, were the rules and instructions which Mohammed had issued from time to time for the guidance of his followers. Consequently the code was not laid down according to any systematic plan, nor did it state any general or abstract principle capable of extension to other lands or ages. And hence, when the Arabs had imposed their dominion and their creed over highly civilized nations, these rules which had suited their simple habits had to be widened to meet the new demands. The laws of inheritance, of marriage, and divorce were laid down in the Koran, and must be maintained at all hazard as matters of Divine inspiration; but, in matters not irrevocably settled, reference was had to the sayings and doings of the prophet, a vast system founded on tradition sprang up, delivered at first orally, and afterwards committed to writing. These traditions depended upon independent chains of witnesses, which found different degrees of credence with different schools. Of these four orthodox schools sprang up, besides the Shiah school which rejected the first three Caliphs and acknowleged only the fourth, Ali and his descendants, and the tradition proceeding from them. The majority of British subjects were of the orthodox schools, and their system, as a whole, was founded on principles of reason and justice. It presented certain peculiarities, such as the enactment that no more than one-third

of a property could be bequeathed by law, and the criminal code was in some respects barbarous, but it was no longer enforced, if it ever was, in its severer aspects under British rule. While endeavour was made to supply India with a territorial law of universal application, attention was not less given to special legislation for individual classes and tribes wherever the law required amelioration or amendment.

PRISONERS AS WITNESSES.

MR. JUSTICE STEPHEN contributed an article on this subject to the October number of the Nineteenth Century, in which he says:-I have gained much experience on this matter since the Criminal Law Amendment Act came into force in the autumn of last year. Since that time I have tried a great many cases in which prisoners were competent witnesses. In most of these cases, though not in all, they were called, and I have thus had the opportunity of seeing how the system works in actual practice. My experience has confirmed and strengthened the opinion upon the subject which I have held for many years and maintained on various occasions, that the examination of prisoners as witnesses, or at least their competency, is favourable in the highest degree to the administration of justice. The principal object of this paper is to shew by illustrations taken from actual experience that the value of the evidence given by prisoners is exactly like the value of the evidence given by other witnesses, and that, though their interest in the result must always be taken into account, and is in many cases so important as to destroy altogether the value of their evidence, there are also many cases in which it is of great and even decisive importance. I will begin with cases which appear to me to illustrate the doctrine that the evidence of prisoners may often be unimportant. A man was indicted under the Criminal Law Amendment Act for the seduction of a girl under sixteen. About the facts there was no dispute, but the prisoner was defended on the ground that he believed the girl to be of the age of seventeen. She admitted that she had told him she was seventeen. His counsel said that he should not call the prisoner. He would of course say, if he were called, that he believed the girl; but as this would be merely his own statement as to his own state of mind it would add nothing to the case. His evidence would thus be superfluous. The jury acquitted the prisoner, seeing no reason to doubt that the girl had made the statement, and probably regarding her appearance as such that the prisoner might naturally believe the statement made by her to be true. In this case the prisoner's evidence was sure to be given if asked for, whether it was true or false, and was therefore worthless. This case is a typical one, and suggests a general principle which may be illustrated in many ways as to the value of the evidence of prisoners and of interested witnesses. It is, that the evidence of a deeply interested witness, given on the side which his interest would incline him to give it, is of no value when the circumstances are such that he cannot be contradicted on the subject-matter of his evidence. This principle is of very general application, and reaches its height when the matter to which the prisoner testifies is a fact passing in his own mind, such as knowledge, belief, intention, or good faith. ...Though the evidence of an accused person on a point in which he is interested and cannot be contradicted ought to be regarded as worthless in the way of proving his innocence, the absence of such evidence may, under particular circumstances, go far to prove his guilt; for it is a fact, and a very strange one, that criminals will now and then shrink from denying the commission of crimes from the actual commission of which they have not shrunk. The working of the Criminal Law Amendment Act has furnished very curious illustrations of this. A girl swore that her master committed an offence upon her in his shop, and that im. mediately afterwards he suggested to a friend who came into the shop that he should do the same. The friend persuaded the girl (so she said) to go with him to his house to get some grapes, and, when he got there, committed the same offence. That the girl had gone to her master's shop, that his friend had come in and had persuaded her to go to his house to get grapes, was clearly proved; but the commission of the two offences rested upon her testimony, which was in itself open to many objections, showing, to say the least, great inaccuracy and confusion as to time and place, and being in several particulars intrinsically improbable. If the master's friend had sworn to his innocence and had said that all that had passed between him and the girl was that he took her to his house and gave her some grapes, and that the rest of her story was false, I think he would have been acquitted; but he refused to be called as a witness. The jury convicted him, I suppose, considering it incredible that a man falsely accused of such an odious crime should not deny it upon his oath when he had the opportunity. The girl's master did give evidence. He swore that the girl's story was totally false as regarded his having committed the crime. The girl, he said, had been sent to his shop (which was some distance from his house) on an errand, and had, after a short interval and some joking with his friend who came in, left it in the friend's company. The jury acquitted him, being greatly dissatisfied with the girl's evidence. This was a very singular case. It clearly shews that in the class of cases under consideration accused persons will, if the law is altered, have to swear to their innocence, unless the facts of the case are undisputed, or else be taken, and not unjustly, to have confessed their guilt. Cases sometimes occur in which the evidence of a prisoner is useless because it is out of his power to give the only evidence which would be of use to him. A man was indicted for a rape. The question was as to the identity of the prisoner, as to which the account of the prosecutrix was highly unsatisfactory, or at least very doubtful. The prisoner was a soldier. The prosecutrix saw him with other men at the barracks soon after the crime. She hesitated as to his identity, and even denied it one time, though at the trial she spoke to it

with the utmost confidence, giving reasons for her previous mistakes. On this evidence, had it stood alone, the man must have been acquitted. The woman had, however, been robbed of a purse containing three or four coins, which she specified-one being a half-sovereign, kept in a small compartment of the purse with a separate clasp. It was proved that im. mediately after the commission of the offence the prisoner was at a publichouse, in which he saw an amber mouthpiece for cigars. He bought it from the landlord after some talk, in the course of which he displayed a purse exactly corresponding to the description of her purse given by the prosecutrix, not only in its shape, colour, and material, but in the coins it contained, and the way they were distributed in it. The prisoner said nothing of the purse, and did not produce it. This caused his conviction. He was not called as a witness, and there would have been no use in calling him if he had not been able to produce a purse like the one seen by the publican but different from the one stolen from the prosecutrix. This was an instructive case in another way. If it had not been for the purse, the prisoner would probably have been acquitted on account of the weakness of the evidence of the prosecutrix, and his evidence would have been immaterial even if hers had been stronger. He was unquestionably near the place at the time of the crime, and had not more than perhaps a quarter of an hour to account for. If he had sworn that he was lounging about the streets (as he had been just before) for this quarter of an hour, and did not commit the crime, his evidence would, for reasons already given, have made no difference. It may seem to be paradoxical to say so, but it is nevertheless true that the class of accused persons who will get least advantage from having their mouths opened are those who are entirely innocent of and unconnected with the crime of which they are charged-people who have nothing to conceal and nothing to explain. The only way in which the most innocent man can prove his innocence of a crime, of which he knows nothing whatever, is by proving (as by an alibi) that it was physically impossible that he should commit the crime; this in many cases he would be able to do only by his uncorroborated assertion. "I was sitting quietly writing letters in my library at the time when you say I was committing a crime" would in many cases be all a man could say, and of such a statement he might have no corroboration whatever, and he might well have the means of leaving the room undiscovered. If, however, there is a possibility of corroboration, the fact that a man can supply, so to speak, the threads on which the corroborating facts are strung may be of the greatest importance. It must never be forgotten in connection with this subject that there are differences between people who tell the truth and people who lie, which it is not easy to specify, but which are none the less marked and real. I have known cases in which a jury has acquitted merely upon hearing an accused person tell his tale, and in which I felt perfectly confident they were right. A girl, between thirteen and sixteen, prosecuted a hawker for an offence against her under the Act of 1885. He had no counsel, and he did not much crossexamine her, but he gave his own account of the matter in a way which led the jury to stop the case and declare that they did not believe a word of the girl's story. Theoretically, the two stories were no more than an affirmation on the one side and a contradiction on the other. The girl affirmed that the man had committed the offence, and that he had, when charged by her and her mother, edmitted it; and the mother corroborated her daughter as to the last assertion. The man denied the offence, and said (and in this his wife confirmed him) that when the girl came to his house he threatened to kick her out and prosecute her. More particularly, the girl declared that on a particular day and at a particular place the man called her into the house and committed the offence. The man gave a minute description of where he was and what he was doing on the day in question, of his having met the girl and scolded or, as he called it, "chastised" her for some fault, and of her behaviour to him on the occasion. It would not be easy even by entering into minute details to give all the reasons for my opinion, but I do not think that anyone who heard this man give his evidence could have doubted its entire truth. He was a grave, elderly man, with no kind of special talent, and with a slight impediment or imperfection in his speech; but all that he said had upon it the mark of honesty and sincerity, and the details which he gave-though, having no legal advice, he was not prepared to prove them by independent evidence -were in themselves some guarantee of his truthfulness. It is little less than a monstrous denial of justice that a man so situated should be deprived of the opportunity of telling the truth in his own behalf under every sanction for his truthfulness that can be devised; and I think that nothing but the force of almost inveterate habit could blind us to the fact. It ought not however, to be forgotten that the opening of the mouths of prisoners opens a way to falsehood as well as to truth, and sometimes to falsehood which it is difficult at the moment to unmask. I have known cases in which-as it appeared to me-failures of justice have occurred because the prisoner, either from artfulness or from mere blundering, kept back till the last moment some more or less specious topic of defence, and brought it out at last when it was too late to test the matter properly. Three soldiers were tried for a rape, which no doubt was committed. The evidence against, perhaps, the most prominent of them was that he had a bugle upon which he repeatedly blew while the crime was being committed, the whole party being probably more or less in liquor. He swore positively, and with many piteous appeals, that he was not only innocent, but that it was physically impossible for him to blow upon a bugle because he had lost his front teeth, which loss he exhibited to the jury. Several persons in court, and one of the jurymen, professed to be acquainted with playing on the bugle, and one of them swore to his conviction that it was, in fact, physically impossible that the prisoner should play. The jury, upon this, acquitted all the three prisoners, thinking, no doubt, that a failure in the identification of one of the three greatly shook the evidence against the other two. I was afterwards informed that the bugle was actually taken from the man on is

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