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STIMSON'S LIST of PROPERTIES for

SALE for the present month contains 2,000 investments and can be had free. Particulars inserted without charge. It is the recognized medium for selling or purchasing property by private contract.-Mr. STIMSON, Auctioneer, Surveyor, and Valuer, 2, New Kent-road, S.E.

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LL.B. AND LAW EXAMS.

A LONDON LL.B. (1st in Honours) pre

pares for all Law Exams.-London LL.B. a speciality-by Correspondence and privately. - For particulars of these and Correspondence Classes for all London University Exams. address Prof. CLIVE,

MR. B. A. REEVES, LAND AGENT and 54. Nelson-square, London. 8.E.

SURVEYOR, LONSDALE CHAMBERS, 27, CHANCERY LANE, is prepared to conduct Sales of Freehold and Leasehold Properties by Auction on moderate terms. The Management of Property and Collection of Rents undertaken.

RE

ESIDENTIAL CHAMBERS to be LET, in Lincoln's-inn-fields; fitted with every convenience, bath room (hot and cold water); key and use of square; splendid situation; moderate rent.Apply to Attendant on the premises. 3 and 4, Lincoln's-inn-fields; or at Collector's Office in the Hall of 63, Chancery-lane.

FFICES to be LET.- Some splendid

OFFICES, to be ding om

Courts, the Patent Office, and the Chancery-lane Safe Deposit; lighted by electric light, and with every convenience; moderate rent; well suited for a solicitor, law stationer, or patent agent.-Apply at the Collector's Office in the Hall of 63 and 64, Chancery-lane.

AW

STATIONERS. PRINTERS, and

Chancery-lane, in a fine building close to the Law Courts and the Chancery-lane Safe Deposit; lighted y electric light, and fitted with every convenience; moderate rent. Apply at once at the Collector's Office in the Hall of 63 and 64, Chancery-lane.

GROUND FLOOR-Fine large Premises

to Let in Lincoln's-inn-fields; well suited to Solicitors, Barristers, Law Stationers and others desiring to be near the Law Courts; splendid situation; moderate rent.-Apply to Attendant, 3 and 4, Lincoln's inn-fields; or at the Collector's Office, in the Hall of 63 and 64, Chancery-lane.

MR.

LEONARD

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Solicitor, First Division and Honours in Common Law and Equity, 1887; First Division and Honours in Jurisprudence and Roman Law, 1885, University of London; Sir Henry James Gold Medallist, 1886. &c., prepares Pupils at his chambers in Leeds and by correspondence for the Solicitors' Intermediate and Final, Bar, LL.B., and other Law Examinations. Terms moderate.-Apply, Brough, East Yorkshire.

R.

MR

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UTTLEY, Solicitor, successfully PROVIDENT LIFE OFFICE

PREPARES CANDIDATES, either Privately or by Correspondence, for SOLICITORS' and BAR PRELIMINARY, INTERMEDIATE, and FINAL, and LL.B. Examinations. Pupils have obtained Honours. Terms from £1 1s. per month.-Address, 17, Brazennose-street, Albert-square, Manchester.

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PRELIMINARY LAW EXAMINATION. Bonuses declared

REVISED
Preparation under a Graduate in
Honours of long experience. For the last five years
not one failure. For prospectus address H. SER-
GEANT, 8. High-street, Camden Town, not far from
Gower-street, King's-cross, and Euston Stations.

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£2,4 5,955 £319.215 £8,000,000 £2,629,814

CONDITIONS OF ASSURANCE. - Foreign Residence and Travel.-All Policies already issued and to be issued after having been Five Years in Force-the Life Assured not being engaged in any Military, Naval, or Seafaring Service, and of the a re of Thirty years and upwards-shall be relieved from all conditions as to Foreign Residence and Travel.

HALF-CREDIT SYSTEM.-Merchants, Traders, and others requiring the full use of their Capital, and desiring a Life Policy at the cheapest present outlay. are invited to examine the terms of the Half-Credit System of this Office.

Prospectuses and further information to be obtained at the Head Office, or of any of the Agents. CHARLES STEVENS,

Actuary and Secretary.

A LONDON SOLICITOR of position and THE MORTGAGE INSURANCE COR

GROUND-RENTS. Freehold or Leasehold, of a Town Practice of a deceased solicitor or one

by Trustees; a high price will be paid for suitable properties; to employ a fund of £17.500.-ROBERTS & BARNARD, 53 and 54, Chancerylane, W.C.

CITY.-Long Leasehold Investment for

Sa.e. to pay 7 per cent.; £300 per annum net; thoroughly secured and arising from premises let on full repairing lease to a well-known firm; would suit Trustees.-Apply to ROBERTS & BARNARD, 53 and 54, Chancery-lane, W.C.

Leasehold Investment, nearly equal to Freehold, producing in one collection £111 10s. per annum.

MR.

R. WALTER KNIGHT is instructed to SELL by AUCTION, at the MASONS' HALL, Masons'-avenue. Coleman-street. E.C.. on TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 22nd, 1887, at ONE o'clock, a leasehold Improved Rental arising out of the East Dulwich Hotel, situate at the corner of Lordship-lane, and Goose-green, Dulwich. Held on lease for ninetyfour years at the ground-rent of £8 10s., and let for 70 years at £120 per annum.

May be viewed by leave of the tenants. Cards and particulars of the Auctioneer, 104, Great Russellstreet, Bloomsbury.

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FARMER, & BRIDGEWATER'S LIST of ESTATES and HOUSES to be SOLD or LET, including Landed Estates, Town and Country Residences, Hunting and Shooting Quarters, Farms, Ground Rents, Rent Charges, House Property and Investments generally, is published on the first day of each month, and may be obtained, free of charge, at their offices, 80, Cheapside, E C., or will be sent by post in return for three stamps.Particulars for insertion should be received not later than our days previous to the end of the preceding month.

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AMOUNT OF CAPITAL SUBSCRIBED, £686,000
Offices of the Corporation-
Winchester House, Old Broad-street. E.C.
Rt. Hon. E. PLEYDELL BOUVERIE, Chairman.
Sir SYDNEY H. WATERLOW, Bart., Deputy-Chairman.
Policies are now being issued by this Corporation
insuring Mortgages of Freehold and Leasehold
Property, holders of Mortgage Debentures and
Debenture Stock, against loss of principal and in-
terest.

These Policies will be of especial advantage to Trustees who may be held responsible for losses consequent upon their Investments.

also be enabled to obtain Advances at the lowest Mortgagors insuring with the Corporation will possible rate of interest.

The Corporation also grants Policies to Leaseholders insuring the return of the Amount invested at the expiration of their leases or at any fixed periods.

For particulars and conditions of Insurance apply
to the Secretary.
By order,
JAS. C. PRINSEP, Secretary.

January 6, 1887.

No. 960. HENRY SLATER, Manager, 27, Basinghone THE NEW ZEALAND LAND MORT

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NSTITUTION for BOYS of the UPPER
CLASSES only in any Misfortune or Distress.-
Two Guineas on admission and Five Guineas per
quarter for education, maintenance, and clothing.-
Apply to the CHAPLAIN, St. Michael's, Woodside,
Croydon. Latin, French, Mathematics.

INTEMPERANCE.-Ladies suffering from

the effects of Intemperance or from the use of Drugs are provided for with security and every comfort. First Department for ladies; Second Department for the friends of tradesmen.-Apply to the SECRETARY, St. Raphael's, Woodside, Croydon.

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furnished Rooms for Meetings, Arbitrations &c. ACCIDENTS AT HOME AND ABROAD,

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HIS GRACE THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE, K.G.

The Object of this College is to enable Students at the earliest practicable age, and at a moderate cost, to take the University Degree in Arts, Law, or Medicine.

Students are admitted at 16, and a Degree may be taken at 19.

The College Charges for Lodging and Board (with
an Extra Term in the Long Vacation), including all
necessary expenses of tuition for the B.A. Degree,
are £84 per annum.

For further information apply to the WARDEN,
Cavendish College, Cambridge.

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64, CORNHILL, LONDON. Income £246,000. COMPENSATION PAID FOR 118,000 ACCIDENTS. £2,350,000.

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Knight, Re, Knight v. Burgess... Lloyd v. Gordon

Marrett, Re, Chalmers v. Wingfield

In the Weekly Reporter.

Crosley, In re. Munns v. Burn Crossman v. Reg..

Gaulard & Gibbs' Patent, In re Gowan v. Wright..

..

"Johann Sverdrup," The Knott, In re. Bax v. Palmer Nathan Newman & Co, In re Nottebohn v. Richter

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.... 300

295

286

Hotckin's Settled Estates, Re Hughes, In the Goods of

.... 284

286

285

Olley v. Fisher

300
301

286

Pommery v. Apthorpe

307

Reg. v. Croydon and Norwood

286

Pearce, Re, McLean v. Smith Phipps v. Jackson

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Van Duzer's Trade-Mark, In re, In re Leaf, Son, & Co.'s TradeMark

294

AN INGENIOUS ATTEMPT was made last week, in Phipps v. Jackson, to induce Mr. Justice STIRLING to undertake the enforcement of a stipulation in an agricultural agreement to maintain on Webber, Ex parte, In re Webber.. 308 the demised farm a sufficient stock of sheep, horses, and cattle.

If the attempt had succeeded, the court might before long have had added to its other manifold duties that of superintending the

The Solicitors' Journal and Reporter. execution of agricultural agreements throughout the country. As

LONDON, FEBRUARY 26, 1887.

CURRENT TOPICS.

AT HIS PRESENT RATE of progress in hearing causes, Mr. Justice KEKEWICH Will require a new transfer in the course of two or three weeks. We understand that more than half of the cases transferred to him on the 22nd of January will, at the end of this week, be exhausted.

IT IS UNDERSTOOD that the Attorney-General intends to organize a system of contributions from members of the bar towards the establishment of the proposed Imperial Institute of the United Kingdom, the Colonies, and India, and that the Incorporated Law Society propose to adopt a similar plan as regards solicitors.

THERE IS an anticipation that, among the honours to be conferred upon the completion of the fiftieth year of her Majesty's reign, some will be bestowed upon the higher officials of the Supreme Court; and it may not perhaps be unreasonable to look for a repetition of the precedent set on the opening of the Royal Courts with regard to the official heads of the governing bodies connected with either branch of the profession.

THE SUGGESTIONS we ventured to throw out a few weeks ago with regard to the London-provincial meeting of the Incorporated Law Society have been practically adopted. The council have issued a circular to all the London members of the society informing them that the meeting usually held in the provinces in October will this year be held in London, in the week commencing the 6th of June; and in order to make some return for the hospitality received in the provinces, it is proposed to give a dinner, a ball, and some other entertainment, either theatrical or musical, to be fixed on afterwards. The invitation will be extended to all the country members of the society, and, having regard to the time of the year and the occasion, it is likely to be very well attended. Το meet the expenses a guarantee fund is proposed to be formed by the members of the council and the London members of the society. All members who guarantee up to, but not exceeding, ten guineas are to be members of a grand committee for carrying the objects in view into effect, and those who guarantee not less than five guineas will be entitled to take part in the entertainment. Subscriptions of a less amount than five guineas will also be received. Sufficient guarantees ought to flow in soon, though it is doubtful whether the maximum has not been put at too low a figure. soon as the guarantees have been received, it is proposed to appoint a sub-committee, to whom the duties connected with the organiza. tion of the entertainment will be intrusted. This committee should be small and well chosen, because upon it will, in a great measure, depend the failure or success of the undertaking. While on this subject we desire to throw out a suggestion, which is that the club should admit as extraordinary members for the week commencing the 6th of June all country members present at the meeting. This may be ultrà vires, but we do not suppose that

As

the late Master of the Rolls said in Musgrave v. Horner (23 W. R. 125, a case which seems to have been lost sight of in Phipps v. Jackson), "the court would be inundated by suits to compel farmers to farm in accordance with their covenants, followed by motions to commit them for not doing so"; and as there are probably few judges or chief clerks who know turnips from mangold wurzel, it is obvious that this extension of jurisdiction would have involved the addition of an Agricultural Department to the offices of the Supreme Court, and ruddy-faced assessors, clad in leather gaiters, would have had to sit by the learned judges on the hearing of these applications. The rule that the court will not enforce specific performance of covenants in a farming lease has never been doubted since Rayner v. Stone (2 Eden, 128), where Lord NORTHINGTON asked, "How can a Master judge of repairs in husbandry?" It has always been considered that these contracts are of such a nature that the court cannot enforce their performance. But, although the court will not grant a mandatory injunction to compel a tenant to cultivate and manage his farm in accordance with his agreements, it has often granted injunctions to restrain acts of farm tenants inconsistent with their express or implied obligations; and there is no small difficulty in laying down any clear rule as to the limits within which the granting of these injunctions will be confined. In Johnson v. Golswaine (3 Anstr. 749) the Court of Exchequer, sitting in equity, attempted to limit the intervention by injunction to cases of threatened injury in the nature of irreparable waste, and refused to restrain mere breaches of contract, such as carrying off straw and manure contrary to the tenant's agreement; but about the same time, in Geast v. Belfast (Ibid., 749, note (a.)), an injunction was granted to restrain a tenant from carrying off manure in breach of an affirmative covenant to spend upon the premises all the hay and manure arising from them (see also Fleming v. Snook, 5 Beav. 250, where the doctrine of irreparable injury was disregarded). And in Onslow v. Anon (16 Ves.173) a tenant from year to year was restrained from taking away crops and manure contrary to the implied affirmative stipulation to farm. according to the custom of the country. The line of division between these cases and the case before Mr. Justice STIRLING-where the tenant, having agreed to maintain on the farm a sufficient stock, threatened to sell off all his stock-is, it must be admitted, somewhat fine. The learned judge, in refusing the injunction, appears to have limited the remedy by injunction to cases where there is either "an express negative covenant" or "a covenant which necessarily carries with it a negative." He thought that the covenant to keep a sufficient stock on the farm did not fall within either class, and that the application was in reality that the court should superintend the execution of this particular stipulation during the rest of the tenancy. It is greatly to be desired that an opportunity should be given to the Court of Appeal of laying down clearly and precisely the limits of the intervention of the court by injunction in the case of agricultural agreements.

THE RECENT IRISH CASE of Reg. v. Barrett (18 L. R. Ir. 430) is of considerable interest as a decision by the Court for the Consideration of Crown Cases Reserved that a threat to "boycott" is an indictable offence. The prosecution had been instituted under the Whiteboys Act, 1831 (1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 44); section 3 of which imposes a sentence of transportation or imprisonment on any person who "shall knowingly print, write, post, publish, circulate, send, or deliver, or cause to be printed, written, posted, published,

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Goldstrom v. Tullerman (34 W. R. 507, 17 Q. B. D. 259) in the court below, as deciding that a provision that moneys paid for insurance by the grantor of a bill of sale should remain a charge during a fixed period at twenty per cent. interest, invalidated a bill of sale, but did not refer in this connection to the reversal of that decision on appeal (reported 18 Q. B. D. 1).

RAILWAY AND CANAL TRAFFIC ACT. THE case of Dickson v. Great Northern Railway Co. (35 W. R. 202, 18 Q. B. D. 176) raised a number of interesting and important points with regard to the liability of railway companies as carriers of animals and the construction of the provisions of the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1854. The decision arrived at seems to us to be based on most convincing arguments so far as the particular case was concerned, but each of the judges of appeal, in delivering judgment, appears to have enunciated a proposition about which we must confess to feeling some little difficulty.

circulated, sent, or delivered, any notice, letter, or message exciting, or tending to excite, any riot, tumultuous or unlawful meeting, or assembly, or unlawful confederation or conspiracy, or threatening violence, damage, or injury, upon any condition or in any event or otherwise, to the person or property, real or personal, of any person whatever, or demanding any matter or thing whatsoever, or directing or requiring any person to do, or not to do, any act, or to quit the service or employment of any person, or to set or give out any land." The indictment was for knowingly and unlawfully printing a certain notice, described in the first count as REASONABLENESS OF A CONDITION UNDER THE exciting, or tending to excite, an unlawful confederacy amongst the traders of Loughrea to refuse to supply goods of all kinds to certain persons then being caretakers of lands, with intent to injure the said persons"; in the second count as "threatening injury and damage to the traders of Loughrea, and their property, if they should supply goods to certain persons then being caretakers"; and in the third count as "directing and requiring the traders of Loughrea not to supply goods to certain persons being caretakers." The notice set out in the indictment was a copy of a resolution passed by the local branch of the Irish National League condemning the action of the traders of Loughrea in supplying goods to emergency men, and stating that the league would take such steps as we may deem advisable to boycott any trader who supplies them with such goods." At the trial it was proved that several copies of this notice had been printed and circulated by the prisoner's directions. The prosecution put in a copy of the Dublin Gazette containing a proclamation of the district of Loughrea, but gave no other evidence of its disturbed state, and the prisoner was convicted, subject to a case reserved by Mr. Justice ANDREWS. There was some difference of opinion among the judges, but four of them upheld the conviction. The only judges who thought that the conviction ought to be quashed were the Lord Chief Baron and Mr. Justice O'BRIEN. The former thought that the meaning of the word "boycott" ought to have been explained by evidence, so as to satisfy the jury that the notice amounted to a threat of force or violence. He further held that all the three counts were bad, apart from the consideration that they could not have been sustained without further evidence of "the existence of Whiteboy disturbance" in the district. Mr. Justice O'BRIEN also held that all the counts were bad, since an "unlawful combination or confederacy," as contemplated by the statute, could not include "the casual identity in conduct of a number of traders of different kinds upon uncertain and contingent occasions which in fact may never arise at all." In the earlier case of Reg. v. Coady (10 L. R. Ir. 205), a prosecution for boycotting broke down because the court held that the jury should have been asked whether a notice by which a man was 66 declared boycotted by the competent tribunal tended, as alleged in the indictment, to excite an unlawful confederacy within section 3 of the Whiteboy Act.

IT MAY BE REMEMBERED that throughout the discussions last year and the year before of the Lunacy Bills introduced by Earl SELBORNE, and subsequently by Lord HERSCHELL, we urged the necessity for giving to every person to whom lunacy was imputed (subject, of course, to special provisions in urgent cases) an absolute right to demand a judicial investigation before he was deprived of his liberty. We pointed out the illusory character of the provisions intended to carry out this object in Lord HERSCHELL'S Bill, and when we observed the more effectual provisions which appear in clause 3 of Lord HALSBURY's Lunacy Bill we hoped that the necessity for further protest had ceased. In committee on the Bill, however, both the predecessors of the present Chancellor fell, tooth and nail, on these provisions, being apparently greatly more impressed with the necessity for dealing "promptly" and "without unnecessary delay" with alleged lunatics, than with the possibility that a sane person may be imprisoned. It seems that, in deference to these objections, the clause is to be modified, and it remains to be seen how far the alteration will be carried. If the clause should be seriously mutilated, we hope that there will be found some lawyer in the House of Commons who will attempt to restore its efficiency.

A CORRESPONDENT reminds us that, in one part of our article on The Form of Mortgage Bills of Sale (ante, p. 181), we cited

The question upon which the case turned was whether a certain condition contained in a printed ticket signed by a person delivering a dog to a railway company for carriage was just and reasonable within the meaning of the 7th section of the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1854. The condition was as follows:-"The company are not and will not be common carriers of dogs, nor will they receive dogs for conveyance except on the terms that they shall not be responsible for any amount of damages for the loss thereof, or for injury thereto, beyond the sum of £2 unless a higher value be declared at the time of delivery to the company, and a percentage of five per cent. paid upon the excess of value beyond the £2 so declared." The court held, in substance, that, though the company were not bound to be common carriers of dogs, they were bound to carry dogs on reasonable terms, and that the condition was unreasonable on the ground that the percentage of five per cent. was unreasonably large. They held that the addition of that percentage to the ordinary fare made the total fare for the carriage of the dog from London to Newcastle, on the terms of the ordinary liability of bailees for hire, outrageously large, and, therefore, practically left the sender no alternative but to accept terms which imported total absence of liability on the part of the company even for gross negligence or wilful misconduct of their servants. Inasmuch as they appear to have held this with regard to the condition as applied to the particular case-viz., that of a journey from London to Newcastle-the proposition to which we allude is, perhaps, to be regarded as only an obiter dictum. It appears to be to the effect that, when the condition is by way of general notice or condition given or used by the company indiscriminately in all cases, the reasonableness or otherwise of the condition must be judged of, not in relation to the circumstances of the particular case only, but to all possible cases to which the condition would apply. For instance, a percentage on the value of the dog which might make the fare not excessive for a long distance-as from London to Newcastle-might still conceivably make it excessive for a journey of a few miles. And it would seem that the court thought that, if such a condition were unreasonable as applied to such a journey, it would be unreasonable generally, although it was really unnecessary to decide the point. Lord Esher, M R., says: "The condition appears to be a notice to the public in general, applicable to the case of all persons for whom dogs are carried, and I think, therefore, we have to see whether it is reasonable as applied to all cases to which it is applicable." Lindley, LJ., says: "The contract in question is a printed form applicable indiscriminately to all senders of all dogs by all trains and to all places to which the company agree to carry dogs. This circumstance justifies the court in looking to the contract, not only with reference to the plaintiff, but also with reference to its reasonableness to the public generally. It is not like a special contract which is not a common form." Lopes, LJ., said: "Having regard to the fact that the terms are contained in a printed notice, and are used indiscriminately, whatever the ordinary fare may be, and whether the distance is long or short, I am of opinion that the reasonableness of the terms must be determined with reference to the public at large, and not with reference to the conveyance of this particular dog from London to Newcastle."

We cannot help feeling some doubt whether this view of the case is not at bottom inconsistent with the principle finally established by the case of Peek v. North Staffordshire Railway Co. (10 H. L. Cas. 473). The decision that the condition, to be effective, must be embodied in a signed special contract seems to us to involve the view that these notices or conditions are, after all, only effective as terms of a contract; and, that being so, it seems to us difficult to see why the reasonableness of such a condition should be considered, otherwise than with regard to the circumstances of this particular contract. It is not as if the Legislature had given to the company power to make general conditions in invitos, to affect the public, as being in the nature, as it were, of statutory byelaws; it might well be then that the condition must be reasonable, as applied to all circumstances, to be valid; but we cannot very well see, having regard to the decisions, how the section can be construed as meaning anything more than that the special contract must be reasonable, and, if so, it seems to follow that that must be judged of with regard to the bearing of the contract on the particular case in reference to which it is made. We shall look forward with interest to the further discussion of this point, which may be very important in relation to the construction of these special contracts.

Though there may be little difficulty in arriving at the conclusion that the percentage in the particular condition which we are discussing was too large, it seems to us that the effect of the considerations relied upon by the judges is to shew the great difficulties that must arise in the application of the provisions of the 7th section of the Railway and Canal Traffic Act to the exigencies of railway traffic in general. The 7th section in terms makes, with regard to certain animals, provisions which, in form, are analogous to those of the condition in the case we are discussing. It is provided, with regard to sheep for instance, that no more than £2 shall be recoverable unless the value is declared, in which case the company may charge a reasonable percentage on the excess of value so declared over £2. It would appear that this percentage may be fixed irrespectively of the distance for which the animal is carried; and, if the statute provides for the same percentage being imposed, whatever the distance, in the case of sheep, it appears impossible to say that the same is not to hold good in the case of percentages fixed by special contracts with regard to animals not expressly provided for by the 7th section. It seems extremely difficult to say with reference to what considerations the reasonable percentage is to be fixed. There is nothing to shew whether the Legislature contemplated something in the nature of a premium of insurance or a reward for extra responsibility involving extra care. case the reasonableness would seem to depend on some such basis as the calculation of the average rate of casualties in proportion to the number of carriages of animals of the sort in question. We do not know how far such a calculation would be possible, but it is manifest that many difficulties would arise. In the other case it seems equally difficult to arrive at a reasonable percentage as applicable to all distances indiscriminately.

In one

relating to land. A., the owner of a ship, entered into a charterparty with B., by which the ship was bound to make a particular voyage. A. then mortgaged his interest to C., who had notice of the contract. It was held that C. would be restrained by injunction from doing anything to interfere with the fulfilment of A.'s contract. But, as A. had, in fact, before the transfer to C., lost the power to perform the contract, C. was, in the event, not fixed with any obligation in the matter. The rule in question, however, was clearly laid down by Knight-Bruce, L.J., as follows:"Reason and justice seem to prescribe that where a man, by gift or purchase, acquires property from another, with knowledge of a previous contract, lawfully and for valuable consideration made by him with a third person, to use and employ the property for a particular purpose in a specified manner, the acquirer shall not, to the material damage of the third person, in opposition to the contract and inconsistently with it, use and employ the property in a manner not allowable to the giver or seller.”

COVENANTS RUNNING WITH THE LAND. (II.) COVENANTS IN GENERAL (continued). In our last article we shewed that there has been a strong current of judicial opinion setting against the possibility of the burden of any such covenants as those now in question running with the land -covenants, namely, touching the doing or not doing of certain things connected with it. But, in the place of the doctrine thus exploded, a more powerful engine still for effecting the same purpose has been discovered in the equitable doctrine of notice. This we shall now further examine. It rests, as we have seen, upon the view that a man who has purchased anything, knowing that his vendor has entered into a contract with regard to that thing, is bound to do nothing that would cause a breach of such contract. This, of course, is a great development of the doctrine, as compared with the manner in which it was applied by Lord Brougham in Keppel v. Bailey (1834, 2 My. & K. 517). He, as we have seen, refused to give effect to notice when the covenant in question was of an unusual nature. The extent to which the doctrine has been carried is well illustrated by the case of De Mattos v. Gibson (1858, 4 De G. & J. 282), though it is not one

This form of the doctrine of notice was applied in Catt v. Tourle (1869, 4 Ch. 654). C., a brewer, conveyed land to the trustees of a freehold land society, who covenanted with him that he should have the exclusive right of supplying beer. The trustees conveyed a plot to T., who was also a brewer, with the result that C. sought to protect himself by praying for an injunction against him. It was attempted on various grounds to shew that the covenant was not binding. Uncertainty, want of mutuality, restraint of trade, all were tried and all failed. The notice which T. had had was deemed to be conclusive, and Sir C. J. Selwyn, L.J., founded his judgment on the extension the doctrine had received in De Mattos v. Gibson.

It may be interesting to refer to the powerful effect the doctrine had in Daniel v. Stepney (1872, L. R. 7 Ex. 327, 9 Ex. 185). S. demised mines to E. for forty years, and took power of distress over any lands of E. that might have openings into the mines. Lands answering this description were sold to D. In the Exchequer they went by strict law. A rent service issues only out of the land demised, and a rent-charge must be properly imposed, and cannot shift about from one piece of land to another. Thus, in neither form, could the power be supported. But, on appeal, S. brought in the late Mr. Joshua Williams, who expounded to the court and his opponents the doctrine of notice, a doctrine which the latter at once admitted they could not withstand. Thus the power of distress was beld good as against D.

Finally, we may notice how this modern doctrine of notice has quite done away with the old requirement of privity of estate between covenantor and covenantee, if it ever existed; how, indeed, no relation of any kind other than that created by the covenant itself is necessary. Thus, in Luker v. Dennis (1877, 7 Ch. D. 227), where the purchaser of a public-house covenanted to get beer from a particular brewer, not his vendor, it was said by Fry, J., that, although there was no antecedent relation between the original covenantor and covenantee, such as lessor and lessee, vendor and purchaser, yet the covenant bound a purchaser taking with notice. He also pointed out how the equitable doctrine had been extended since the time of Lord Brougham in Keppel v. Bailey, referring to the cases of De Mattos v. Gibson and Catt v. Tourle just quoted.

Thus the doctrine of notice has practically replaced the old doctrine of covenants running with the land, and the required effect is produced in a plain and straightforward manner. Some alarm, however, has been felt at the ease with which burdens may in this way be imposed on land, and it has been suggested that it constitutes an infraction of the rule against perpetuities. The point was raised, as we have already remarked, by Lord Brougham in Keppel v. Bailey (2 My. & K., at p. 527). The objection is that a restraint imposed on land by covenant impedes its free alienation for a time which may exceed the limit allowed by the rule. Lord Brougham admitted this, but decided that, if the benefit of the covenant was vested in a person able to release it, then it was possible for a good title to be made to the land free from the covenant, and so there was really no hindrance to its alienation. In this, however, there were two fundamental errors. The rule against perpetuities did not apply to the case at all; and, even supposing it did, the use made of it was incorrect. As to the first point, it is only necessary to quote the following passage from Sanders' Uses and Trusts (vol. 1, p. 204) :—

"A perpetuity may be defined to be a future limitation, restraining the owner of the estate from aliening the fee simple of the property discharged of such future use or estate, before the event is determined or the period is arrived when such future use or estate is to arise."

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It is implied, of course, that such event or period is more remote than the law allows. Thus, the rule against perpetuities forbids future estates and interests from arising beyond the proper period; but the covenants we are discussing are present interests, and no more offend against the rule than easements perpetual rent-charges, or any other of the lesser rights which may be cut off from the totality of rights known as the ownership. Again, the rule against perpetuities may be infringed although the objectionable interest is vested in a person who is capable of releasing it. The mistake of Lord Brougham was repeated very strikingly in Gilbertson v. Richards (4 H. & N. 277, 5 H. & N. 453). The same view was taken also by Fry, J, in Birmingham Canal Co. v. Cartwright (11 Ch. D. 421). This was a case in which the owner of land had covenanted to give a right of pre-emption over it, unlimited in point of time. Mr. Justice Fry expressed himself as follows:-"I think that whereever a right or interest is presently vested in A. and his heirs, although the right may not arise until the happening of some contingency which may not take effect within the period defined by the rule against perpetuities, such right or interest is not obnoxious to that rule, and for this reason. The rule is aimed at preventing the suspension of the power of dealing with property-the alienation of land or other property. But, when there is a present right of that sort, although its exercise may depend upon a future contingency, and the right is vested in an ascertained person or persons, that person or persons, concurring with the person who is subject to the right, can make a perfectly good title to the property. The total interest in the land, so to speak, is divided between the covenantor and the covenantee, and they can together at any time alienate the land absolutely.'

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The whole matter, however, was reviewed, and the above opinion corrected in London and South-Western Railway Co. v. Gomm (1882, 30 W. R. 321, 620, 20 Ch. D. 562). There the company sold superfluous land, and the purchaser covenanted to re-convey at the same price whenever it was wanted for the railway. The matter first came before Kay, J. He quoted the two cases just referred to, but refused to be bound by them. In his opinion a present right to an interest in property which might arise at a period beyond the legal limit was void, notwithstanding that the person entitled to it might release it. This view he established on the authority of eminent writers, such as Butler, Lewis, and Jarman. But as he considered that the covenant in question did not, in fact, create an interest in the land, he held that the rule against perpetuities did not apply, and that the covenant could be enforced on the principle of Tulk v. Moxhay. In the Court of Appeal he was strongly supported as to the former part of his judgment, and the matter was fully treated by Jessel, M.R., but, as to the latter, it was held that the covenant did constitute an interest in land, and so was void within the rule.

It is thus clearly established that a covenant binding the land in equity—i.e., binding successive owners with notice is not void as infringing the rule against perpetuities, unless it is of such a nature as to create, when it takes effect, an interest in the land. But, although the doctrine that the burden of the covenants in question is binding by virtue of notice seems to be thus settled, and the objection to it, on the ground of perpetuity, to be successfully overcome, yet a learned writer on the law of real property has expressed a doubt upon the final acceptance of the doctrine. It may be interesting to quote the following from Mr. Challis (Real Property, p. 151):

"But the whole principle of Tulk v. Moxhay rests upon dubious grounds of equity, and it seems in the courts below to have been carried to some absurd lengths. It has never been considered by the House of Lords; and it is not improbably destined, like the doctrine of the consolidation of mortgages, to have its wings clipped whenever it shall come before that august tribunal."

We have said nothing as to the form of the covenant, whether it should be made by the covenantor merely, or whether, in order to bind assigns taking with notice, they should be expressly mentioned. For this latter requirement there seems to be no reason;

provided the intention be clear that the assigns should be bound, it is immaterial whether they are mentioned or not. Reference may be made, however, to Wolstenholme and Turner's Conveyancing Acts, p. 113, where, in the note to section 58, it is stated to be advisable for assigns always to be mentioned when they are intended to be bound. The section only deals with the devolution of the benefit of the covenant; the framers of the Act seem to have preferred not to touch the question of the burden.

TRANSFER OF BEERHOUSE CERTIFICATES. (Simonds v. Blackheath Justices, 35 W. R. 167, 17 Q. B. D. 765.) BEFORE the passing of the Wine and Beerhouse Act, 1869, a beer. house licence was obtained from the Excise without any intervention annual licensing meeting of justices as an authority for the Excise of justices, but that Act required a certificate from the general licence, thus assimilating the law as to beerhouses to that relating to public-houses under 9 Geo. 4, c. 61. But by section 8 a certificate in respect of a licence for sale for consumption off the premises was not to be refused except on some of the four grounds there specified, and by section 19 a certificate for sale for consumption on the premises was not to be refused in the case of a house with respect to which an on-licence was in force on 1st May, 1869, except on some of Amendment Act, 1870, section 19 of the Act of 1869 is made to the same grounds. By section 7 of the Wine and Beerhouse Act extend to licences by way of renewal from time to time of licences in force on 1st May, 1869, "whether such licences continue to be held by the same person, or have been or may be transferred to any other person or persons."

sessions intrusted with transfers of public-house justices' licences and The question in the above case was whether the justices at special incoming occupier of premises, were, on an application for transfer beerhouse certificates (among other cases) from an outgoing to an of a certificate for an on-licence for premises in respect of which an on-licence was in force on 1st May, 1869, restricted to refusing the transfer upon some of the grounds referred to in section 19 of the Act of 1869, or whether they had an unqualified discretion to refuse the transfer.

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In the Act of 1869 the only distinct provision-and, it is submitted, the only provision-relative to transfers is section 9, authorizing a special sessions or the next annual licensing meeting, whichever came transfer at petty sessions, which was to remain in force till the next first; and that enactment merely says: "A certificate may be transferred to a new tenant.. by the justices in petty sessions." The enactment was repealed by the Act of 1870, and the enactments in that Act on this subject are the following:-Section 4, sub-section (4), enacts, It shall be in the discretion of the justices to whom an application for a transfer is made, either to allow or refuse the application, or to adjourn the consideration thereof"; and sub-section (5), after repealing section 9 of the Act of 1869 as already mentioned, enacts the Act 9 Geo. 4, c. 61, and Acts amending the same, relating to that, "subject to the provisions of this section, all the provisions of

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the transfer, removal, and transmission of such licences [that is, justices' licences], and the grant of licences upon assignment, death, change of occupancy, or other contingency shall have effect with regard to certificates granted, or to be granted, under the principal Act [the Act of 1869] and this Act." The words "subject to the provisions of this section can only have reference to the preceding sub-section (4).

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Bowen, L.J., having taken time to consider, in their judgment In the above case the court, consisting of Lord Coleridge, C.J., and adopted the idea that before the passing of the Act of 1870 there was a fetter" on the discretion of the justices in the case of applications for a transfer, and, there being no provision previously made for the adjournment of special sessions, considered that section 4, sub-section (4), of the Act of 1870 "though perhaps inartistically expressed, really was designed only to perfect the procedure at a transfer sessions by making adjournments lawful," and accordingly held that refuse a transfer as there was upon the power to refuse a renewal at there was the same restriction upon the power of a special sessions to the annual licensing meeting.

The provisions affecting the question under consideration seem scarcely to have been adequately dealt with in the judgment, and we submit, with deference, that the conclusion come to by the court was erroneous. We are unable to find any previous statutory fetter on the transfer such as the court was referring to; section 19 of the Act of 1869, which appears to have been supposed to place this fetter upon justices

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at special sessions, uses the expression, it shall not be lawful for the tended by counsel for the justices, has no reference to special justices to refuse,' ," but it appears to us that this section, as was consessions, and that the scheme of the Act shews that the justices mentioned in this section are the justices at the annual licensing

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