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the work performed by the chancery taxing masters; but from the answer to that question, I am able to extract another proof of the need of the additional master ; and it is in the admission that “ there is no difiiculty in obtaining appointments for the taxation for any bill within a month of the application." _

As there are eight masters and appointments can be given in a month, it follows that there is at all times eight months’ work for another master to perform. If we deduct the legal holidays, we shall find that the legal year is a little over nine months in duration ; and, therefore, there is, beyond all shadow of doubt, work enough for another master; and, if this is so, the non-appointment of one must of necessity cause delay to suitors and their solicitors. I want everyone to understand that I mean mzavoidalzle delay, not delay for which the masters are responsible. I mean delay which could, and, I submit, ought, to be prevented by the appointment I am advocating. The following facts and figures will, I hope, convince everyone that the appointment, if made, would be a boon to suitors and a source of increased profit to the revenue :

The total fees earned by the seven Chancery Taxing

Mastcrs, from 1870-1 to 1877-S, was . . . £242,656 Ditto by eight masters, from 1878-9, when Mr. David

son was appointed, to 1884-5, was . . . . £246,156 The average fees earned by the seven masters for the

period aforesaid was per annum. . . . . £30,332 Ditto by each of the seven per annum was . . . £11,333 Ditto by the eight masters, from 1878-0 to 188-1-5,

per annum, was . . . . . . . . £35,156 Ditto by each of the eight, per annum was . . . £4,395 The numbers of orders of reference for taxation to the

eight masters for the last-mentioned period was . 36,560 Average to each of the eight per annum . . . 5,222 The number of certificates and allocaturs made for the '

like period was . . . . . . . . 32,313 The average number per ei ht masters per annum was . -l,6l6 The average number made by, or attributed to each of,

the eight masters per annum . . . . . 577 The number of cases in which no certificates or

allocaturs was made for the same seven years was . 4,2-£7 Average per annum . . , , , , _ 606

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seven masters for the period above referred to was . £30,332 And by each of the seven . . . . . . £4,333 The average amount of fees earned per year by the

eight masters from 1878-9 to 1884-5 was . . . £35,165 And by each of the eight . . . . . . £~l,:39.3

The salary of a taxing master is £1,500 a year; and the 33,131-ieg of his two clerks can never exceed £1,000 a year. The total expense of all the masters and all their clerks does not exceed £21,000 a year as may be seen in Whitaker’s Almanack. The average of the eight masters’ yearly earnings is £35,165, as sbewn above, showing an annual profit of over £14,000 l

If the information which I have given above, and which I have taken very carefully from the judicial statistics, and by which I hope they will be tested, does not prove the necessity for, and the propriety of, the appointment of an additional taxing master, it is difficult to see what possibly cnnld be considered suflicient evidence for the P"l‘P°8e- J AMES R.\\' 1

Upper Holloway, N., Feb. 1-l. lu\sON'

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This was an original motion that an appellant might be ordered to give security for the costs of an appeal. The appeal was from an interlocutory order. The notice of appeal was served on the 8th of February, and the notice of motion for security was served on the 10th of February. Both the appeal and the motion were on the paper for to-day, the motion standing first. There was evidence of the insolvency of the appellant, and also that he had repeatedly changed his solicitors, and that another person, who was s inan of means and well able to pay the costs, was real y instructing the appellant's solicitors. This allegation was not contradicted. In o position to the motion it was urged that, as the appeal was actually iii the paper, all the costs must have been already incurred, and that in such n case it was contrary to the practice to order security to be given. And He Indian, Kiligston, and S'l7l!i/N0‘-‘*1 J[i'niiI_q Cu. (22 Ch. D. B3) and Poolcy'.i Trustee v. Wlivlham (33 Ch. D. 76, 30 Souciroiis’ Jounsu, 54.8), were cited as authorities to that effect.

Tun Corn-r or .-‘li-1-air (Corrcs, Ll.\‘l)LB\’, and Lorre, LJJ.) held that security must be given. Corrorv, L.J., said that, as s. general rule, the court would not order security to be given for the costs of an appeal when the appeal was in the paper for hearing on the same day as the motion for security. It would be unreasonable to order security to be given after all the costs had been incurred if the respondent had had an opportunity of applying for security before. But in the present case the notice of motion for security had been given as soon as possible; there had been no delay, as there had been in Ru Indian, $0., 6'0. And there was this additional circumstance, that the appellant was not the person who was really prosecuting the appeal ; it was rea\ly being prosecuted by another person who was a man of substance. Taking this circumstance into consideration and also the fact that there had been no delay inapplying for security, the order ought to be made. The ordinary rule must not be used to do injustice. Lixiiisr, L.J., concurred. Lorss, L.J., added that the absence of delay distinguished the case from Poole;/‘a Triuue v. Whetham.—Coi'Nsai., illrmby; B. Eyre; Derimus Sturgzr. Bouciroiis, W. Q" J. Flower Q .\'usse1/ ,' Jaques §~ C0. ; Vincent §- Vinrenl.

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In this case there was a question as to the right of the plaintiff, a landowner, who had let land on building leases, to recover damages from the defendants on account of a diminution in the selling value of his reversion by reason of the flooding of the land through the default of the defendants. Chitty, J ., held that the damage done by the flood was not of a merely temporary nature, and that damages could properly be given in respect of the depreciation in the value of the ground-rents.

Tna Gouiir or APPEAL (Corrox, Lnviinar, and Loves, LJJ.) reveflfid the decision, holding that, it being shewn that there was no permanent injury to the houses which would affect the value of the reversion when it fell into possession, and there being no recognized trade or business 95 selling ground-rents, the plaintiff was not entitled to any damage! lfl respect of the decrease in the selling value of the reversion.—Coc.vssL. ~7¢""=; 1"“, Q.C., and A-5’/H011 Cross. SOLICITORS, Gellgv, K""1’% 4' 0°-I lVr|t.-on, owe, Q Room.

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In this case it appeared that the owner of two plots of land, on 0116 Of which some recently built houses stood and the other of which was vacant, contracted to sell the vacant plot to the defendant; but did not in such contract reserve any rights as to the passage of light to the windows Of the ad Jacent houses, and before actual conveyance to the defendant sold and conveyed to the plaintiff the other plot and houses thereon together with "ll “E1155. 560-, belonging thereto, but subject, as to one of the houses. 9° a lease thereof for an unexpired term granted by the owner previous totlllt of_the contract to sell the vacant land to the defendant. The lessee WI! J°111@<1 B8 C0-Slflllltlfi. It was contended by the laintiff that his 0011"!‘ ance operate as a conveyance of an easement of light over the defendant B land, inasmuch as, at the date of such conveyance the grant/or was ill 1" the common owner of both plots of land and that a grantor could B01‘ derogate from his own grant, and that as he, the plaintiif, had no notifie of the defendant's contract, there was nd equity. Rumll v. Warm (M ‘v- R- 27‘. 10 A_pp. Cas. 590) was referred to.

Cni-i-iv, J ,, said that inasmuch as at the date of the plaintiffs conveY3“°° the grantor had ceased to be the equitable owner of the vacant PM by having contracted to sell it to the dcfendant the grant of the easement of light could not be implied from any, unity of ownersl1lP. Ind therefore the maxim that a grantor could not derogate did not apply- The ‘*8-59. tl16I9i°Ie, in so far as it was that of the freeholder plaintiff filled? but it was otherwise with the claim of the lessee co-plaintiff, as his lease 11841 been granted during the unity of ownership and previously to the contfwi entered into with the defendant by the common owner.--Coi-asst, Ilomer. Q-C17- L 41¢/~1ml»r. and L. Raphael; Sir 111‘!/ml‘ Watson, Q-0-. find " T /‘°'"11""- s°L1¢1T°R5, H- Monzagu ; .S'¢'m11son Q Ohllinyford.



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In this case an action was commenced by members of the above society in the County Court at Liverpool_ against the committee of management, the secretary, the treasurer, and the trustees of the Royal Liver Friendly Society for an injunction to restrain the defendants from making what were alleged to be unauthorized payments, and for repayment. Amongst the alleged unauthorized payments sought to be restrained were payments of the costs of the syndicate of members appearing on the recent inquiry before the Hon. E. Lyulph Stanley. On January 31 the defendants obtained a rule niai for a writ of m-tiorari to issue to transfer the proceedings to the High Court of Justice on the ground that the payments had been authorized by the society in general meeting, and that difficult questions of law were likely to arise, and that the amount claimed was over £1,800. The plaintiffs shewed cause against the rule, and argued that the Friendly Societies Act, 1875, gave an exclusive jurisdiction to county courts in questions of disputes between a member and the society, and that the rules of the society incorporated the sections of the Act. The defendants submitted that the sections referred to-namely, section 22, sub-section (d ), and section 30, sub-section l0—merely conferred a permissive right on the county court, and did not oust the jurisdiction of the High Court.

Cl-ll'l"'|‘Y, J., said that section 30, sub-section 10, was merely permissive, and so was section 22, sub-section (rl.), and that the jurisdiction of the High _Court was not ousted. It being admitted that if the jurisdiction of the High Court was not ousted the case was a proper one for ¢‘€)'lf0)'II)‘l, the rule wouldpbe made absolute.—Coi'ssi:i., Rainer, Q,.O., mid Rullmjforrl ,Rrzlph lioville. Soticrroiis, Gregory, Rntoclrfis, Q U0. ; Brabner 4- Court, Liverpool.

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In this case the plaintiff moved for leave to issue a writ of attachment sg§iinst_ths defendant for breach of an undertaking, such undertaking beinggiven in the terms of a notice of motion for an mm-im injunction restraining hi_m from continuing the acts complained of. The plaintiff did riot, by his present notice of motion, ask for attachment or committal, and the defendant took the preliminary objection that attachment was not the right remedy and that the plaintiff could not obtain an order for committal on the present notice of motion. In support of the preliminary objection it was argued that there is a distinction between committal and attachment, the latter being the lesser remedy—attachment went to the sheriff, who could, in certain cases, accept bail, whereas committal was a more summary remedy and the party committed had to go to prison at once.

_Cuii'rr, J . , said that the former distinction between attachmentand committal was that the writ of attachment issued at the instance of the party "E81'lsved and at his risk, but notice of committal was necessary. Since the rules under the Judicature Acts this distinction had been abolished, ai_id_uot_ice was necessary in both cases. There was formerly afurther distinction between committal and attachment, the fomier being the P"-‘P61’ remedy for doing a forbidden act, the latter the proper remedy for "?8lct1_ng to do an act ordered to be done. Though for most purposes the dlfitlliction had been abolished, there were cases in which it would be lnfllntalned. The remedy by committal was sometimes more speedy and °°“'°m9'1l7_; for instance, where there was danger of the party in cont""'Pl5_1@llv111g the country. As there was this distinction between the two ;€lI1EdlGB he should give leave to amend the notice of motion by asking S01’ COl|1I1fll-l7Bl.—-COUNSEL, Romer, Q.C., and Oswulrl ; IV:-£5111! T-1,1/I0)’.

°l-10110118, Herbert F. Uzldy ; I’. III. James.


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shgtll I-his case, defendants having obtained leave for further time to put in undement of defence, suffered the time to expire, and the plaintiffs moved def 8' °"d- 27» 1'- 11, 101‘ judgment on statement of claim in default of theiuge-f The defepdsuts being served with notice of motion delivered C9 §l1°°, but did not appear at the hearing of the motion. V $113‘, J-t being referred_to Gibbiiiys v. Strom] (32 \V. R. T57) and Gill bk c vfllgin (32 W. 393), said that, although he could not read the defence, the 0;! _ not treat it as an absolute nullity. He should give judgment for for fl? fllllgfis as asked, but should direct the order not to be drawn up beforwsfi - and that the defendants be served with copy of the order on or with; 6 14th (Monday), together with notice of their being at liberty to, cow I1 Week from such service, move the court to discharge the order.‘ “Li R°'"¢". Q-O-, and D. L. Alexander. SOLici'ron., H. Jllontagu.

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The plaintiff also claimed a judgment (analogous to the personal j udgment against an individual mortgagor for the mortgage debt) against the company for the whole of ihe debenture debt due to the plaintiff and the other persons on whose behalf he sued, so as to enable them to enforce payment of their debt out of chattels of the company which were not comprised in the security. The action came on upon a motion for judgment upon admissions in the pleadings.

I\'oii-i-ii, J., inserted in the judgment a declaration that the plaintiff and the other holders of debentures of the same issue were entitled to stand as judgment credit/ors of the company for the amount of principal and interest due on the wholo of that issue of debentures. And the order extended the powers of the receiver to all chattels and other property oi the company which couldbe taken in execution under the judgment. Liberty was given to the receiver to put the judgment in force.—Coi'xssi., 6'00/lson, Q.C., and J. Brnrlforrl; Tlicobalzl; Barlow. Souciroiis, lVulf<'r Webb 4- C0. ; Sutlon §- Ommzvmeg/,

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In this case the court was asked by petition, by the trustee and executor of a will, who had in his hands a sum of money representing the interest under the will of a person of unsound mind (not so found by inquisition) to appoint a quasi-guardian of the lunatic and to give directions for the application of the fund for his maintenance. There was no fund in court, and no action had been brought for the administration of the testator’s estate.

Non-ra, J., held that under such circumstances the court had no jurisdiction to deal with the property of the lunatic. The jurisdiction of the Chancery Division to direct the application of the property of a person of unsound mind for his maintenance existed only when either money belonging to him was in court or there was some action or other proceeding, such as an administration action, which gave the court control over his property. As to this In re Taylor (2 D. F. &J. 1'25) was directly in point, and such cases as In rc T uer’.s Will Trusts (32 Ch. D. 39, 30 Scumi-oiis' JOURNAL, 384), In rs Branzl0n's Tnuta (13 Ch. D. 773), and Vane v. Vane (2 Ch. D l24) were distinguishable.~Corxsim, Climlmck; Emdan. Soucirori, H. T_:/rrvll.

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This was a claim by the holder of a bill of exchange, which he had intrusted to the company (whose head office was in Australia, but who had a branch ofice in London) for collection in Australia, to be paid full, in the winding up of the company, out of the assets of the company in England, in priority to the other creditors of the company. The bill was paid in Australia, and the proceeds were remitted with other money to the London olfioe of the company, but before the claimant was paid the company had stopped. _

Norma, J ., said that the COIfl(¥N]y were acting as the agents of the claimant in collecting the bill, an that the ordinary relationship of banker and customer did not exist between them. The applicant was justified m claiming priority.—Couxsni., Cook-mi, Q.C., an _.BuckI¢y, Q.C. ; 0. E. .I'cuki'n-v. Soiicrroiis, A. D. Smitli §- Eldridge ,' Edwin Andrew.

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This was an action (commenced by writ) by a mortgagee for foreclosure. By his writ the plaintiff claimed foreclosure of his mortgage, and also the appointment of a receiver, but he did not claim a personal judgment against the mortgagor for the mortgage debt. The defendant did not appear to the writ, and the action was set down asa short cause on motion for judgment in default of appearance. At the hearing the plflllltlfilfl counsel did not ask for the appointment of a receiver.

Noni-ii, J., said that the plaintiff ought to have proceeded by summons under rule -3a. of order 55 (30 Soiicrrous' Jouuxsn, 143), and he should only allow him the costs of a summons. He would not allow rule 5a. to be defeated by the insertion in the writ of u claim for a receiver, when the appointment of a receiver was not really required. —00CNSEL, Demdas Ga/vliner. SOLICITORS, .S'laugli!er Q Colq/raw-.

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vivors and survivor of them, while continuing to be trustees or trustee, and, until the appointment of new trustees, the personal representatives or representative for the time being of the last surviving or continuing trustee, shall, for purposes of this Act, become and be the trustees or trustee of the settlement." In the present case the court had, under section 38, appointed two trustees of a settlement. One of those trustees desired to retire, and a summons was taken out asking the court to appoint another trustee in his place. The chief clerk was of opinion that the continuing trustee could appoint a new trustee under the power given by section 31 of the Conveyancing Act, 1881, and that the application was unnecessary.

Noam, J ., would not say that the appointment could not be made under the Conveyancing Act, because he might be invalidating the title to land which depended on appointments so made in other cases. But he was of opinion that the court had power, under section 38, to make the appointment, and he thought it safer to do so.—Coi':vssr., T. Ribton. Soi.ici-ron, Bellrend.

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The question in this case was whether the proceeds of a policy of insurance, effected by a husband on his own life, under the Married Women's Property Act, 1870, for the benefit of his wife and children, belonged after his death to the widow and children us joint tenants, or whether the widow was tenant for life of the whole fund, with remainder to the children. Section 10 of tho Act provided that “ a married woman may effect apolicy of insurance upon her own life or the life of her husband for her separate use, and the same, and all benefit thereof, if expressed on the face of it so effected, shall enure accordingly, and the contract in such policy shall be valid as if made with an unmarried woman. A policy of insurance effected b any married man on his own life, and expressed upon the face of it to be for the benefit of his wife or of his wife and children, or any of them, shall ensure and be deemed a trust for the benefit of_ his wife, for her separate use, and of his chiidren, or any of them, according to the interest so expressed, and shall not, so long as any object of the trust remains, be subject to the control of the husband or to his creditors, or form part of his estate. When the sum secured by the policy becomes payable, or at any time previously a trustee thereof may be appointed by the Court of Chancery, and the receipt of such trustee shall be_a good discharge to the office." In the present case ahusband, who died in April, 1886, had effected in July, 1871, a policy for £4,000 on his own life. The policy contained a recital that he was desirous of assuring his life under the provisions of the Act for the benefit of his wife (whose Christian names and surname were stated) and of the children of their marriage, and it provided that under the provisions of the Act “his said wife and the children of their marriage, whom failing, the heirs, executors, administrators or assigns of the assured, shall be entitled to receive out of the funds of the said institution at the end of six months after the dc-cease of the assured the sum of £4,000, but which sum shall not be exigible until three months at least after proof shall have been made to the satisfaction of the directors of the said institution that the event has occurred in respect of which the said benefit becomes payable.” In July, 1886, North, J. appointed two trustees for the purpose of receiving the policy money fiom the institution, who had declined to pay it otherwise. There were seven children of the marriage. One of them died in infancy before the date of the polic another was born in 1813 and died in 1874, and a ulna, who was born ii; l_8§9, died unmarried soon after the death of her father. The four surviving children were infants. An originating summons was taken out by the mother, as plaintiff, against the trustees and the infants by their guardian ad lilem, as defendants, to determine the respective interests of the parties.

Noni-ii, J. thou ht it clear that on eithe ‘ took as j oint’tenan€s inur as ; that the child Wlli0c(gil:‘?iuill1.cil80'?1 }bgd<ii: regarded; and that the interest of the child who died after the death of the father survived, eitherto the mother and the other surviving children or to the surviving children. On the construction of the polic take alone, his lordship was of opinion that the mother and childreii wo 1: take as joint tenants. Newill v. Ncwill (7 Ch. 253) was cguclug authority for that construction, and in Re Adam's Policy (23 Ch D *2? Chitty, J., on an ca: part: application, took the same view of thelcbd) struction ofa similar policy under the Act. But he also expressed :opinion (without deciding the point) that the effect of the Act and oli n taken together was to constitute a declaration of an executed tr tp 0', lordship felt great difficulty in following this view. It was ver ‘us . um to see what the Act authorized to be done, but it was to the y '{'~'p°¥‘““‘ that one would look to find what the assured intended and p0Ki{y itself been expected, section 10 referred to the olicy for the cx I asHug t have the benefit intended was. It might be that if the oli - pmsslon of what two constructions, the one within, and the olher nogwitlii was capable of the Act, the former might be considered by the li ht of tllil the powers of true construction. But beyond that his lordship %hou ht ta ct to be the alone must be looked at, and that its construction was gnot ii]? the pohuy language of the Act. But even if the Act and the polic ictelfgby the read together as one declaration of trust, his lordshi c ldy us to be the view that the mother took a life interest in thep ho“ mtgent to mainder to the children. Either that mode of ;rd)viiesifd1ii\d' wmi Ye‘ tenancy would have been equally within the Act and if so h9r1a¢io]:?t

did not see how the Act could supply any reasonh for preferriii; are Boll]?


construction to the other. He did not see how the fact that the benefit for the wife was in the Act expressed to be “for her separate use” could aid the one construction rat er than the other. The cases which had been decided upon the construction of similar words in wills did not shew that a mere direction that the parent should take for her separate use pointed to a joint tenancy between her and her children. Inthe case of such a policy, effected bya husband, it was obvious that the children must always be in nvxe when the proceeds of the policy came into existence on the death of the assured. Another consideration was this, section 10 enab'ed a married woman to effect a policy upon the life of her husband for her separate use, and, in that case, the separate use would operate to protect the fund if she should marry again. And under the same section a man might effect a policy for the benefit of his wife alone, for her separate use, and in that case also the money would be protected from any future husband she might have. His lordship could see nothing to indicate that the separate use was not to attach to the share of the wife, whether it was a life interest or apart of the capital, just as it would to the whole capital, if she alone was the object of the trust. Section 10 provided also for the appointment of trustees of the policy money, but that did not necessarily indicate that there was to be a continuing trust. The object was merely to enable the insurance company to obtain a valid discharge for the money, and to relieve them from the obligation of seeing to the execution of the trusts. In the present case, whatever the construction of the policy was, the appointment of trustees was necessary, because the children were infants. His lordship did not think that the Married Women's Property Act of 1882 affected the case. It did, indeed, provide that a man might effect a policy for the benefit of his children only, and it was true that the Legislature had contemplated that the interests of the wife and children might possibly not be concurrent, but that was not the same thing as saying that, under a trust for the benefit of the wife and children, the interests of the wife and children were not to be concurrent. Looking at the policy and the Act of 1870 together, his lordship was of opinion that the policy operated as a settlement of the money upon the mother, and those of the children who were living at the death of the father, as joint tenants. The decision of Malina, V.C., in Re Jilc110r'.1 Policy (T Ch. D. 200) was really to the same effect, though it seemed to have been misunderstood, and the report of it was very brief and not very satisfactory.-Coi'.\'sai., G. A. 1Vnf~0n,' Amedro:. SOLICITORS, Bowman, if Craicley-Boersy.

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In this case a question arose as to the right of a company to a lien upon shares registered in the name of a trustee for a debt due to the company from the reslui qua mm. The articles of association of the Ystalyfera Gas Co. gave the company a lien on shares held by a shareholder for debts due to the company by, or on behalf of, such shareholder, whether the debts were “ those of such shareholder solely or jointly or in partnership with any other person." In January, 1885, 150 shares in this company were registered in the name of Joseph Richard Cobb. He was atrustee of them for another company called “Tho Ystalyfera C0~,' which was entirely distinct from the “Ystalyfera Gas Co." In the remark column of the register it was stated that the Ystalyfera Co. was the beneficial owner of the shares. In November, 1885, the Ystalgera C0» agreed to sell its interest in the shares to J. R. Cobb, and in the eoembfl‘ following it was ordered to be wound up. The Ystalyfera Co. was indebted to the gas company in a considerable sum, and in May, 1886, tl16_8“ company, with the object of asserting a lien on the shares in quefltlon. caused them to be registered in the name of the Ystalyfers Co. instead of the name of J . R. Cobb. This was done without his consent or knowledge. The present application was by J. R. Cobb for the rectification of the register by having the shares placed in his name. It was argued 011 behalf of the applicant that J. R. Cobb was the shareholder, 10?. bl section 30 of the Companies Act, 1862, the gas company was pwfilllded from recognizing a ceslui qua trim ; and, therefore, that it should haw 11° hen upon those shares except for a debt due from J . R. Cobb.

STIRLING, J ., said the articles of association only gave a lien up0l1 911° shares held by a shareholder fora debt due from that shareholder. Ii was plain that Mr. Cobb was the shareholder. He was registered 89 "chi and he was the person who would be liable to pay calls. The memorandum in the register that the Ystalyfera Co. were the beneficial 07119" of the shares did not make them the shareholders. There was, therefore. no lien fora debt due from thcm. The register must be rectified, “Dd the ass company must pay the costs.—C0u1\"ssi., W.»-mg/:0» and -4*"'°" Oran. Soucirons, Jllyth, IV:/kin», Q On. ,- Richard White.

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children, who were all of age, than applied to the trustees to divide the fund. The trustees declined to do so without the sanction of the court, on the ground that the class of children entitled could not be ascertained until the death of the testator's widow.

IGS-rim.i:~'o, J., held reluctantly, following Bairibi-idyc v. Cream (l6 Beav. 25) and Stanford v. Stanford (35 W. R. 191), that the class must be determined at the death or second marriage of the testator's widow which should first happen; and therefore that the testator's widow having married again the fund was now divisible.—Coui\'ssi., Robinson. (.),.C., and Tanner; Hastings, Q.C., and Tanner : Bicckley, Q.C., and E. Ford. Soticiroiis, Finis 4 Wylie,’ Mcdrtliurs ,- Mead 4- Daulwny.

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The question in this case was whether service of a petition could be directed upon respondents out of the jurisdiction. Seven of the respondents to the petition were resident in Scotland, and leave was asked to serve them with it in Edinburgh and Aberdeen. The petition was for the distribution of a fund in court and payment out to the persons entitled. Order ll of the Rules of the Supreme Court. 1883, makes no provision as to the service of a petition out of the jurisdiction.

Srinniso, J., held, following a decision of Kay, J ., in Calls v. Robins (30 Soiiciroiis Jouiimin, p. Q-)0, N., 1886, p. lll), that in the case oi a petition _simply dea_h_ng with the distribution of a fund, the court imght direct_the petition to be served upon respondents out of the jurisdiction, not with'the view of effecting a formal service. but by way of giving them information that the petition was pending.—Coi'.\'sst, Stokes, ilfaatgitpniiey, and Ingle J'v_1/ca. Soucrrons, Arnold g U0 , Simpson 4~ 00., and

ill ‘ 2 N‘.

Re HILLEARY AND TAYLOR—Stirling, J., 15th February.

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In this case it had been referred to the taxing master to tax, as between party and_party, certain bills of costs. The taxation was objected to on theptollowing point, among others. His taxing mister, having to hear an-11 race evidence to determine certain questions arising upon the taxation, informed the parties that he intended to rely upon the shorthand notes of this evidence._ The taxing master, in taxing the costs of the taxation, allowed certain costs in respect ofthe shorthand notes, those upon which costs were disputed, with thc exception of certain incidental discussions which _could not be severed from the note without great difllculty, related exclusively to evidence. It was objected that the taxing master had no power to allow anything in respect of the shorthand notes.

STIRLING, :I., said that, both by the ordinary practice of the court and under ord. 60, r. 25, of the Rules of the Supreme Court, the taxing mister had power to cause witnesses to be examined before him. Acting in pursuance of_ the order to tax, he had eventually proceeded to tax the costs of the taxation itself, and, in doing so, had allowed part of the expenses of the shorthand notes. Of course, if he had been taxing costs as between party and party, and the judge at the trial had given no direction allowing the cost of a. shorthand note relating to the proceedings at the trial, the allowance by the taxing master would have been erroneous ; but that was not the point in this case. It was most important that the discretion of_ the taxing master in cases like the present should not be fettered; while it is true that it was his duty (as it was the duty of any Judgeof fact) to take notes of the evidence; cases must arise in which that duty was superseded by that of watching the demeanour of the witnesses, it was then his duty to have a note taken for him. Under the circumstances of the present case he overruled the 0bj8Cti0l'l.—Cl)L'NS3L, P""°". Q.-C., and Normumiy; Hastinya, Q.C. SOLICITORS, R. J. Good» ; If Metcal/Xe.

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This was a motion for an injunction to restrain the defendant from “NW8 °l' Pflftiug with certain business premises, effects, and goodwill which had been assigned to him for value by the Polychromatic Simultaneous Printing Co. (Limited), by an indenture dated the 17th of N°"emb°"| 1386. The property assigned by that deed comprised, in fact, the whole of the undertaking and assets of the company. The plaintiff was a debenture-holder of the company. Each debenture contained a "h"B° by tbs company upon their undertaking of the principal money and interest thereby secured pari passu with the other debentures secured or to be secured bv that issue. The defendant had notice of these debentures when he executed the deed of the 17th of November, 1886. Shortly Bit-or the execution of that deed the company was ordered to be wound “P- B)’ the in the action the plaintiff claimed a declaration that the Bugged sale was invalid as against the debenture-holders.

D §I;i"iRLING, J., said_that the case was not precisely covered by authority. p e entiires of the kind in question constituted a floatmg security on the §1‘“11'P*111y 8 assets for the time being. They did not confer upon the

° deff any right to interfere with any dealing by the company with its ilsizts in thebrdinary course of business. But as soon as the principal or 1; diff fen ""9 BTW", <11‘ the company came to be wound up, or (as his wet 1P Fhoiight) ceased to be a going concern, the debenture-holders races entitled to have the then assets of the company realized and a ex Iva" appointed._ The deed of the 17th of November, 1886. was not

6011 d in the ordinary course of the business of the company, for it con

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veyed away the whole of the undertakin and assets of the company. It
therefore infringed the rights of the debenture-holders, and they were
entitled to have the property preserved until the trial as much as if the
company had been ordered to be wound up. The plaintiff would have
been entitled to have had a receiver and manager appointed, and/i
forliori he was entitled to the less relief which he now asked.—Cou.vssr.,
II/i.ilin_qs, QC. and Dau:w_1/; Peaoson, Q.C., and Elynod; Buckley, QC.
Soniciroiis, Um-tar if Bell; Powell Q Burl; F:'eslifii-Id 4- TVi'lIi'ams.

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The defendant, who was an auctioneer, sold by auction ahorse belonging
to the plaintiff for £40. The horse was described in the particulars of
sale as being sound. The purchaser subsequently discovered that it was
not sound, and threatened the auctioneer with an action for misrepresenta-
tion. The vendor, being unable to get the purchase-money from the
auctioneer, commenced this action for money received for his use. Tho
defendant asked for leave to intarplead. A master made an interpleader
order; but it was set aside by Field, J . The defendant appealed. It
was argued on his behalf that the right to an interplcader order was not
barred by the fact that the two claims were not co-extensive. The
claimant had made an aflidavit that he was about to bring an
»action, which would be either for breach of warranty or for mis-
representation. In either case the responsibility would really lie on
1 the vendor. Therefore it was a matter which ought to be fought out
between the vendor and the vendee. Crawsliay v. Thornton (2 My. 8: Cr. l),
Ilest v. Hayes (l H. & U. 718,11 W. R. Dig. Com. Law, 71), Attmborough v.
St. Katharine‘: Dock Co. (‘Z6 W. R. 583. 3 C. P. D. 450), and Wright v.
Frzemun (~18 L. J. Q. B. 276, 27 W. R. Dig. 101), were cited.

Tiia Couirr (Lord COLERIDGE, C.J., and Pontoon, B.) held that the
order of Field, J ., was right, and dismissed the appeal. Lord COLBHIIJUH,
C.J., said that the two claims here were diiferent in their nature. 'l‘he
claim of the vendor a ainst the auctioneer was for money received on his
behalf. The claim of the purchaser against the auctioneer, if there was
any such claim, which his lordship did not at present see, was of a
diiferent sort—viz., for damages for misrepresentation in the sale of a
horse. It was true a 'iiry might assess the damages at the same sum as
the vendor claimed. but the identity of the sums could not affect the
diiference in the nature of the claims. POLLOCK, B., said that the case did
not come within order 57, the words of which showed that the subject-
matter of the two claims must be the same. The rules had been carc-
fully drawn, and after great consideration. And rule 1 (a.) spoke of a
person under liability for any debt, money, goods, or chattels. The word
“damages” had been intentionally left out. In Atmiborougb v. Si.
If/zthm-inc‘: Dock On. there was no diiilculty on this point. There the
only diiliculty was that there might be a claim for damages for detention
over and above the demand for the goods. But the main subject-matter
of the whole contest was specific goods.—Coi:Nssi., Lumley slllfl/D, Q C.,
and Stat/mm; Yarborauyli Anderson. Soucirons, Ridsdak g Son; J. II.
Bri'dgford, for W. H’. Booconk, Halifax.

UNlON—Q B. Div., 7th February.

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This was an ea: part: application for _an order that a special case stated
on an appeal from quarter sessions might be entered at the Grown Oliice.
The case had been stated by the Recurder of Sheffield after the hearing
of an appeal brought by the Sheffield Waterworks Co. against
certain poor rates which had been made upon them by the overseers of
the poor for the townships of Shetfiild, Brightside-Bierlow, and Atter-
cliife-curn-Darnall. By the valuation list, upon which the rates appealed
against were made, the appellants were assessed at the total sum of
£10,360, rateable value. The recorder allowed the appeal with respect
to the rates laid for the townships of Sheifield and Brightside-Biarlow,
and reduced them, and dismissed the appeal with respect to the rate laid
for the township of Attercliiie-cum-Dariiall. The efioct of the recorder s
decision was that the total rateable value was reducedto £6,520. The
case set forth the contentions of the appellants and the respondents on
five points, which had been raised, and the decision of the recorder on
each of them. The Court was then asked to give its opinion_whether
the recorder was right in holding as he did on the five points. If
the court should be of opinion _that the several decisions were
right, then the order of quarter sessions was to be afllrmed. The case
then proceeded, in five paragraphs, to. deal with the five decisions,
stating in respect of each of them that, if the court shall be of opinion
that the recorder was wrong, the gross estimated rentals and the net
rate-able values of the appellants property in the three townships were to
be reduced by such and such sums. The Crown Oiiice refused to enter
the case for appeal, on the ground that the alternative form in which it
was stated was objectionable, and that the only proper waypof framing
the case was, after saying that, if the court should be of opinion that the
several decisions were right. the order of quarter sessions was tip bi
atfirmed, to end thus:—“lf_, on the contrary. the court shoulh sup
opinion that the several decisions above-mentioned were wrong, t our 9
said order is to be quashed." _It was arglwd. lfl_5"PP°rt °i shtah atpfé :3;
tion, that the case was drawn in the most convenient way, nu Bough in
not open to the objections stated by the Court of Queen s e 324 9
London and .‘Vor(li- Western Railway O0. Y. -554110" 0°l¢_ifi¢M (22 w' R" ' f
Q B 153), as the recorder had not asked questions for the P"-1'P°5e °


dealing with the court's answers, biit, on the contrary, the 005" hid 1°“

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the quarter sessions for good. Further, if tho Crown Oillce were right in their contention as to what was the only proper form, the result would be that, if the appellants were right on any of the points on which the recorder decided against them, the assessment of £6,620 would be qnashed and the assessment of £10, 360 would revive. Or, in gther wgrdsi if they won their appeal they would be in a worse position t an if t ey ost it. Tiia O0l'liT(LO’1‘d Corniiinos, C.J., and Gaova, J1.) refused‘ tlile application. It had been held that inferior courts cou d not as t is court questions simply. \Vhether this were convenient or not, it had been the practice from the time of Lord Ellenborough, and had become inveterate. That the court ought nothto entertain this case was cléiili; from thi language of Blackburn, J . in t e Sutton C014‘/ield (‘(1.901--“ s court as not in geizeral any jurisdiction to review the decision of the court of quarter sessions on any matter in which that court had jurisdiction. Nor will it take any notice of a case reserved b the sessions on the trial of an indictmen: .v. aop as~ o. u .eresanexcepion rom a tR SI (13Et9')yBtth i t' f tht general rule in cases where the court of quarter sessions on appeal makes an order either confirming or reversing the decision appca ed against, subject to the opinion of this court on some point of law reserved on a case stated by the sessions. This court will then, on a m-tioriiri bringing up dthe oglder of S€BQl0;JhS, talée cognizance of thezfifactstostéilpevilr in_ the crap, an quas or con rm e or er o sessions accor ng e view on e points of law submitted to them by the sessions.” Here the court had no jurisdiction to alter the rate; they could only either confirm it or quash iSti]—-&€O1E.\'SBL, Oyla. SOLICITOR, H. A. Jlaudv, for B. P. Bi-aoiii/mid, e e .

FAIRLAMB AND OTHERS i’. BEAUMONT—Hexham County Court, llth February.

AG1i1CL'l.'1'V.'llAL Hornixos Aer, 1883, s. -l-1 — roii. moan ruax Osiz Yiz.m’s Hzxr.

The question in this case was as to the construction of section 44 of the Agricultural Holding: (England) Act, 1883. The facts were admitted. The plaintifi took t e farm of Coalpits from the defendant as yearly tenant from the 13th of May, 1874, at the yearly rent of £230, subsequently reduced to £180 10s. By the agreement of tenancy, which was under seal, it was provided that the rent should be paid by two equal payments on the 11th of November and the l3tn of May, and the first payment was to be made on the 11th of November, 1874 By the ordinary course of dealing between the plaintiflf and defendant, the payment of the rent was al owed to be deferred until after the expiration of a half-year after it became due by the agreement under seal; therefore the plaintiff did not make his first payment of rent until after the 13th of May, 1875. This course continued down to November, 1886. On the 11th oi‘ November, 1886, the plaintiff having got a further half~year into arrear, there was due, according to the terms of the deed, three half-years’ rent—namely, that due on the lltli of November, 1885, 13th of May, 1886, and the llth of November, 1886. On the 28th of December, 1886, the defendant distrained for, and was paid, £270 5s., the amount of these three half- years’ rents. The plaintiff brought this action to recover £90 5s.—half-year‘s rent improperly distrained for—on the ground that the defendant could not make a distress for rent due more than a year before making the distress, and that ii’, under the proviso to the -l-ith section, the defendant could, by reason of the ordinary course of dealing between the plaintiff and defendant, include in his distress the rent due by the deed on the 11th of November, 1885, he could not include that due by the deed on the llth oi November, 1886, because the ordinary course of dealing between the plaintiff and defendant allowed the payment ot such rent to be deferred until after the expiration of a half-year after the llth of November, 1886, and, therefore, it must, as provided by section 14, be deemed to become due at such deferred period~namely, the 18th of May, 1887, and not at the 11th of November, 1886, and, therefore, in any case, under the circumstances, the defendant could not distrain for more than one year's rent.

Judge Horn, in giving judgment, said :—The intention of the Legislature may have been that the landlord should not recover more than 3 year's rent. But I think the effect of the section, under the circumstances of the present case, is such that there is nothing to prevent the landlord recovering a year and a halfs rent. The main provision of the -14th section does not say that the landlord cannot recover, by distress more than one year's rent; it only says he cannot make a distress fof rent which is due more than one year before the making of the dist;-¢5s_ It is admitted that there has been n custom that the rent should not be paid until a halt-year after the rent became due under the terms of the deed, and the rent which was thus due on the llth of November, 1885 does not, for the purposes of the seotion—that is to say, for the purposgg of the limitation arismg under that section—become due until the 13th of hiay, 1886; and, in the same way, the rent which became due on the 13th of Maiy, 1886, did not become due, for the purposes of the limighgion arising un er the section, until the 11th of November, 1886. Therefore there is no dispute with regard to these two half-year’s rents which the landlord was entitled to distrain for, it being rent which under th terms of the proviso, became due within twelve months before, the makiiie

of the distress. The whole point turned upon whether or not thmf, nnythmg in the section to preclude the landlord from distraining for rem; which became due under the terms of the deed on the 11th of Nov mb 1886. Mr. Strachan contends that, by the custom of the parties ti? at not having been actually paid until six months after the time, whe ml}: becomes due by the tcrms of the deed, the landlord cannot difiu .1 for it until after the time it is customary to pay it. I do not tl inli rth landlord is so precluded because of the custom that the rent is riot to bi


paid until six months after it becomes due. I think it is a matter of grace that the landlord has allowed the tenant to pay the rent at a later

riod than that at which he was legally entitled to demand it and to gistrain for it. I do not think you can imply from any such course of dealing an agreement which would have the effect of altering the terms of the deed. I think there would be nothing to preclude the landlord from distraining for the half-year’s rent which became due on the llth of November, 1886. I do not think the effect of the proviso is to take away from the landlord the common law right which he would otherwise have had to distrain for the rent which became due on the llth of November, 1886. Judgment will therefore be for the defendant.—Cocsssi., Strarliin. Soniciroii, Gibsons, llexham; Dem Q T/vmipswz, Xewclstle.

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Law Si-cniis-rs‘ DBI\A'1‘I.\'0 Socii-2-r\'.—I~‘eb. 8—Ohairman, Mr. Wilmot E. Elmslie.—-The motion for debate was, “That the case of I'ilmont_v. 11://Hry (Court of Appeal) was wrongly decided.” Mr. J. Cornelius Wheeler opened in the affirmative, being supported by Messrs. \\_. Mackenzie and Hawtin, and opposed by Messrs. C. S. Magee, W31. Woolcombe, J . Gray, and \V. Aysom. After Mr. Wheeler had replied, the chairman summed up and put the motion the society, when there voted for the aflirmative 5, and for the negative 11. The motion was thereupon declared to be lost. There were 33 members present.

Feb. 15- Chairman, Mr. Ernest '_I‘odd.—-The motion upon the paper for discussion was, “Is it desirable place further restrictions on the formation of limited companies, and oughtniiot all “firms” (real or assumed) to be compulsonly registered: Mr. F. K. Munton (of the firm of Munton & Morris) opened the debate 111 the afllrmative. Mr. John Indermaur opposed. The following gentlemen spoke in the af1irmative:—-Messrs. T. H. Richmond, Lewis Bideu, and W. Wallis; and in the negative:-—Mes:rs. T. lI._Bower and D. Stewart Smith. After Mr. Munton had replied, the chairman put the motion to the society in two parts, when the first part was carried by a majority of 12 votes, and the second part lost by a majority of 8 votes. There were thirty-five members present.

Livaai-ooi. L.\\\' Sri'niz.\"i"s‘ Assoc!/vri0N.—Feb. 7—Qlmil'mflll. Ml -7- HKenion.—The following was the subject for discussion :—“ In the year 1860 A. mortgaged a freehold house to X. The mortgage deed was in the ordinary form, and contained the usual covenant by the_mort-gagoriv repay the principal and interest. A. continued to pay the interest_r9S“' larly up to 1865. In that year he assigned his equity of redemption? his son B. No interest was ever paid or aclmowledgment given by 13- to the mortgagee, but A.. the father, continued to pay the interest up to the date of his death in 1886. In 1887 the mortgagee brings a foreclosure action against B., and B. sets up as a defence the Statutes ‘of Limlj-8151011 (3 Sr 4 Will. 4, c. 27; 7 Will. 4 8: 1 Vict. c. 28; 37 & 38 \ ict. c. 5i)~ I’ the mortgagee entitled to succeed in his action?" Mr. Bagshaw opened in the afllrmative, and Mr. Dobell in the negative. Messrs. Bromfield. Thornely, Brotlierton, \Vriglit, Lloyd, Forshaw, and Inglis supported the afilrmative, and Messrs. \Vatts and Whytt the negative. _The opener! having replied, the chairman summed up, and, on the question beilifl Pl" to the meeting, it was carried in the afiirmative by a majority of 14. T119" were 42 members present.

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Feb. l1—Chairman, Mr. \V. T. Smith, solicitor.—A discussion £001! Place on the following motion :—“ That the amalgamation of the two branfrllti of the profession is desirable.” Messrs. R. Parkinson and G. Cartwflflm “Wportcd the motion ; Messrs. J . Bell, W. Breakell, and A. W. Ladgilta opposed the motion. The chairman summed up the arg11I11@}1t° “dI at on each side and put the question to the jury, when the motion was ° bya majority of 3.

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