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of the subjects which are now not essential, because, under the system now in force, no matter what marks a candidate may obtain in the non-essential subjects, he would not be allowed to pass if he failed in equity, common law, or conveyancing.

A CAREFUL DRAFTSMAN always uses the same words to express the same meaning. Accordingly, if we find that words in an Act of Parliament are repeated without alteration in a subsequent Act dealing with the same subject-matter, the presumption is that they are intended to bear the same meaning in each Act; and this presumption is much stronger, not to say conclusive, if the words in the earlier Act have received judicial interpretation: see Ex parte Campbell (5 Ch. 703). Conversely, if the words are altered in the subsequent Act, the presumption is that they are intended to bear different meanings in the two Acts. As an example of this, let us consider what could be sold under the power of sale 290 conferred on mortgagees under Lord CRANWORTH's Act (23 & 24 Vict. c. 145, s. 11), now repealed, and by the Conveyancing Act, 1881 (44 & 45 Vict. c. 41, s. 19). The words in Lord CRAN

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LONDON, FEBRUARY 19, 1887.

CURRENT TOPICS.

LAST WEEK We called attention to two private Bills which had been introduced into the House of Lords, with a view to the formation of company trustees-viz., the National Safe Deposit Bill and the Securities Insurance and Deposit Corporation Bill. We are informed that both these Bills have now been withdrawn.

ADJOURNED SUMMONSES appear to form a very large proportion of the business of the Chancery judges if one regards their daily cause Jists this week. Mr. Justice KAY has had little else in his paper during four days, and he announces a like paper for four days next week. Mr. Justice NORTH and Mr. Justice STIRLING have also been occupied during four days with similar work, and the latter judge announces his intention of continuing adjourned summonses on three days next week.

DURING THE HEARING of an appeal in Court of Appeal No. 2 on Thursday last week some difficulty was experienced by reason of there not being copies of some material documents for the use of all the judges. Lord Justice COTTON said that each of the three judges ought to have a copy of every material document, so that he might be able to follow the points which were discussed by counsel. Sir HORACE DAVEY, who was engaged in the case, said that he understood that the taxing master would not allow the costs of three copies of a document. Lord Justice COTTON said that he had mentioned this matter before. He thought it was a waste of public time for the taxing masters to prevent suitors from supplying those copies which are necessary to enable a case to be disposed of in reasonable time.

IN OUR ISSUE of the 15th of January we called attention to the change which the Council of the Incorporated Law Society proposed to make in the division of the subjects for the final examination. The new regulation, which will come into operation in January, 1888, provides for the subjects being divided into four heads, instead of six, as at present. According to the old system, only common law, equity, and conveyancing were essential, and a candidate need not take up the other three subjects. Under the new regulation no one subject is more essential than another. There will be a fixed minimum which a candidate must obtain in order to entitle him to pass, but it will not matter in which of the subjects the candidate gets the necessary marks. Some idea, however, may be gathered as to the value to be attached to each paper from the fact that fifteen questions will be set in conveyancing and fifteen in equity. The third paper will contain fifteen questions also, eleven in common law, and four in bankruptcy. In the fourth paper, six questions will be devoted to probate, divorce, and admiralty, six to criminal law and proceedings before magistrates, and three to ecclesiastical law. This arrangement will give a greater chance of passing to candidates who possess a special knowledge of any one

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charged by deed on any hereditaments of any tenure, or on any interest therein, the person to whom such money shall for the time being be payable shall have the following powers (1) a power to sell . . the whole or any part of the property." The words in the Conveyancing Act, s. 19, are, "A mortgagee, where the mortgage is made by deed, shall have the following powers . . (1) a power to sell mortgaged property"; and, (section 21)" to convey the property sold for such estate and interest therein as is the subject of the mortgage." It was decided in Hiatt v. Hilman (19 W. R. 694) that, where leaseholds were mortgaged by demise, the power of sale given by Lord CRANWORTH'S Act enabled the mortgagee to sell and lowes (ante, p. 254) that the power of sale conferred by the the whole term. On the other hand, it was decided in Re Hobson and Howes (ante, p. 254) that the power of sale conferred by the Conveyancing Act only authorizes the mortgagee to convey the interest vested in him. Though there has been some doubt on the point among conveyancers, the more common opinion was in accordance with the decision in Hobson and Howes (see 2 Key & Elphinstone's Prec., p. 24; Wolstenholme & Turner Conv. Act, p. 28). It should, perhaps, be observed that it is easy to supplement the implied statutory power of sale by provisions enabling the mortgagee to sell and convey any interest of the mortgagor in the property which is not conveyed to him, such as the last day of a term retained by the mortgagor on a mortgage of leaseholds by demise, or the legal estate retained by the mortgagor where the mortgage is by way of charge only. There is no difficulty in giving the power to sell; any form of words that renders the meaning clear will suffice. There is, however, some little difficulty in giving a power to the assigns of the mortgagee to convey to a purchaser property which is not conveyed to the mortgagee. A power of attorney, expressed to be irrevocable, may be given under the Conveyancing Act, 1882, s. 8, to the mortgagee to convey to a purchaser. This is certainly good so long as both mortgagor and mortgagee are alive, but there is a serious doubt whether a conveyance, after the death of the mortgagor, under the power, will defeat the right of his heir, and it possibly ceases to operate on the death of the mortgagee (see 2 Key & Elph. Prec. 33; contrà, Wolstenholme & Turner Conv. Act, 70).

WE REPORT elsewhere a county court decision on what, so far as we know, is a new point under the Agricultural Holdings Act, 1883. Section 44 of that Act prohibits a distress for rent which became due more than one year before the distress; but provides that where, "according to the ordinary course of dealing between the landlord and tenant, the payment of the rent has been allowed to be deferred until the expiration of a quarter of a year or half a year after the date at which such rent legally became due, then, for the purpose of this section, the rent of such holding chall be deemed to have become due at the expiration of such quarter or half-year as aforesaid, as the case may be, and not at the date at which it legally became due." In Fairlamb v. Beaumont a distress was made, on the 28th of December, 1886, by the landlord of a holding to which the Act applies, for three half-years' rent in arrear. first of these half-years' rent was legally due on the 11th of November, 1885; but it was admitted that, according to the

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ordinary course of dealing, the payment of rent was deferred until the expiration of half a year; consequently, for the purposes of section 44, the first half-year's rent was to be deemed to have become due in May, 1885, and there was no dispute that the landlord was entitled to distrain for the first two half-years' rent. The question was whether he could distrain for the last half-year's rent, legally due on the 11th of November, 1886; it being contended for the tenant that the effect of the proviso above quoted is that, in all cases of rent deferred according to the ordinary course of dealing, the rent is to be deemed, for the purpose of a distress, to become due at the expiration of the deferred period, and not at the date at which it legally becomes due. The learned county court judge refused to construe the proviso in this way, and we think he was right in his decision, though we do not find very clearly indicated in his judgment the true reason for his construction. It appears to us that the contention of the tenant overlooked the important words of the proviso: "for the purpose of this section the rent shall be deemed to have become due," &c. What is the purpose of the section? Simply to disable the landlord, save in the cases specified, from distraining for rent legally due more than a year before the distress. For the purpose, therefore, of rent legally due more than a year before the distress, but for no other purpose, the right to distrain is to be regulated by the time of deferred payment. There are no words in the section providing that the landlord shall in no case recover by distress more than a year's rent. The proviso is introduced by way of exception to the previous restriction on the landlord's legal right of distress; and it appears to us that it would be contrary to all rules of construction to extract from it a further cutting down of the landlord's rights.

THE CASE of The Great Western Railway Co. v. MacCarthy, decided on Monday in the House of Lords, raised once again the constantly-recurring question as to the reasonableness of a condition limiting the responsibility of a railway company in respect of animals or goods delivered to them for carriage. The principles upon which the House of Lords decided the case had already been well settled, the only question being as to their application. The condition in question appears to have freed the company from all responsibility in respect of cattle delivered to them for carriage, except when the damage or loss was caused by the wilful misconduct of the company's servants It is quite clear, since Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire Railway Co. v. Brown (8 App. Cas. 733), that such a condition, or even a much more stringent one, is reasonable, if a reasonable alternative is given. If the company are willing and offer to carry for a reasonable remuneration, upon the ordinary legal liability, whatever it may be, whether that of a common carrier or of a bailee for reward, then they may carry on any terms they like to impose for a lower rate. In the case in question the House of Lords were of opinion that an alternative had been given within this principle, inasmuch as it appeared that the company did hold themselves out as willing to carry, on their ordinary legal liability, at a rate less than the maximum rate authorized by their Acts, but ten per cent. greater than the reduced or owners' risk rate. It was contended that this rate, though authorized by the statute, must be considered an unreasonable alternative, on the ground that the two rates must be reasonable inter se, or, in other words, that the alternatives offered would cease to be reasonable whenever the reduced rate was so small as to induce all senders to accept it. Their lordships held that a rate authorized by statute must be presumed to be reasonable, and, therefore, the case fell within the general principle before-mentioned. It was suggested that certain matters contained in the company's notices with regard to the carriage of cattle amounted to a qualification of their ordinary liability as carriers in cases where the higher rate was paid, and so the condition was made unreasonable, but, on the construction of the language of the notice, it was held that this was not so. The case does not seem to establish any novel principle. The main point of practical importance seems to be that the court will assume any rate within the statutory maximum

to be reasonable.

WE COMMENTED last week on the refusal of the Court of Appeal, in Lyell v. Kennedy, to admit old Scotch registers in evidence,

drawing attention to the reason for the decision-viz., that there did not appear to be any legal duty imposed on any persons to keep such registers. We assumed that the decision of the court that the registers were inadmissible because it was not proved that such legal duty existed, must have proceeded upon evidence of experts in Scotch law that there was nothing to shew any such duty; but we have since learned that the expert who was called at the trial before Mr. Justice STEPHEN admitted that he was not acquainted with this branch of Scotch law, and simply referred the judge to a book on evidence, without expressing any opinion whether the law as therein stated was correct. The decision of the Court of Appeal refusing to admit Scotch registers in evidence must, therefore, be taken to mean only that in the absence of evidence that they were kept in fulfilment of a legal duty they are not admissible. It is possible that some expert, more familiar with this branch of Scotch law, may hereafter testify that there is such a legal duty.

THERE IS A STORY afloat that in a recent legal examination the candidates were asked, amongst other things, to give the meaning of reditus nigri, and to explain the origin of the rights of property. The first of these questions seems to have lain beyond the range of reading of most of them; but some ingenious young gentlemen conjectured that it indicated an ancient fugitive slave law, or that it corresponded with the operation known in the present day as levying black mail. The second of these questions was doubtless within the range of reading of most of the candidates, but. out of their power to answer concisely. One of them, however, seems to have been equal to the occasion, stating that "the Creator devised the world to the use of man."

THE APPELLATE JURISDICTION BILL, 1887. THERE appears to be some misapprehension as to the exact scope and effect of the Bill recently presented to the House of Lords by the Lord Chancellor for the purpose of amending the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1876. The necessity for an amending Act became obvious in November last, when it was found that, as the result of section 8 of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1876, Lord Herschell and Lord Bramwell could not take part in the hearing of appeals to the House of Lords during the prorogation of Parliament. This section provides that "the House of Lords may sit and act for the purpose of hearing and determining appeals, and also for the purpose of Lords of Appeal in Ordinary taking their seats and the oaths, during any prorogation of Parliament." The latter part of the section, as if to leave no doubt about the matter, provides that "no business other than the hearing and determination of appeals and the matters connected therewith, and Lords of Appeal in Ordinary taking their seats and the oaths as aforesaid, shall be transacted by such House during such prorogation." Lord Herschell and Lord Bramwell, therefore, not being Lords of Appeal in Ordinary, and not having taken the oaths since the last dissolution, could not take the oaths during the prorogation. The amending Bill remedies the defect by providing (clause 1) that, notwithstanding anything contained in section 8 of the Act of 1876, every Lord of Appeal shall be empowered to take his seat and the oaths at any sitting of the House of Lords during prorogation.

It is suggested that this amendment does not go far enough, because no provision is made for the case of a new Lord of Appeal in Ordinary taking his seat during a dissolution, or of a Lord of Appeal who happened not to have taken his seat in the previous Parliament. Section 9, however, of the Act of 1876, which provides for the hearing of appeals during a dissolution, differs very materially from section 8, which provides for the hearing of appeals during a prorogation. The side-notes of the two sections are similar, but a careful comparison of the two clauses shews a very important difference between them. During a prorogation, under section 8, it is the House of Lords which sits for the purpose of hearing appeals and for the purpose of Lords of Appeal in Ordinary taking their seats and the oaths. During a dissolution, under section 9, the House of Lords does not sit at all, but her Majesty may authorize the Lords of Appeal, in the name of the House of Lords, to hear and determine appeals. Section 9 merely provides for the sitting of the Lords of Appeal during a dissolu

tion, and at such sitting no taking of oaths does or can take place. Section 3 of the amending Bill provides that the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council shall include such members of her Majesty's Privy Council as are for the time being holding, or have held, any of the offices described in the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1876, as "high judicial offices." This provision is supplemented by a new clause, moved by the Lord Chancellor on report, providing that the expression "high judicial office" shall be deemed, (we presume for all the purposes of section 6 of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1876), to include the office of a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary and the office of a member of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.

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With regard to clause 4 of the Bill, which deals with the position of the two retired Indian or colonial judges, it is to be noted that these retired judges will, under the amending Bill, for the first time become members of the Judicial Committee. The 30th of Justice in His Majesty's Privy Council-provided that two members of the Privy Council who have been judges in India or the colonies, and who, being appointed for that purpose, attended the sittings of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, should receive the sum of £400 a year during the time they so attended. Clause 4 of the amending Bill specifically provides that any person who attends the sittings of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in virtue of the 30th section of the Act of 1833" shall be deemed to be included as a member of the said Committee for all purposes." The clause further provides that, if there is only one such person, as is the case at present, he shall be entitled to receive £800 a year for every year during which he so attends; but if at any time there be two such persons they shall be entitled to receive £400 a year apiece. It is not easy to understand the object of this arrangement. The sum of £400 a year was originally intended as an indemnity for the expenses which might be incurred by the retired Indian or Colonial judges during their attendance at the sittings of the Judicial Committee. The arrangement appears only to be defensible on the ground that, when there is only one such judge a member of the (6 expenses are double what they would become if he had a colleague to sit with him. This seems absurd. The new Bill, so far as we have discussed it, professes to do little more than cure defects in previous legislation. Clause 2, however, goes much further than this. The Act of 1876 provided that a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary should be entitled to a writ of summons to attend, and to sit and vote in the House of Lords, during the time that he continued in his office as a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary, and no longer. Clause 2 of the Lord Chancellor's Bill will entitle a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary to sit and vote for his life. Although this section, in so far as it contemplates the creation of life peerages, is an innovation of considerable importance, the great constitutional question, which was involved in the case of Lord Wensleydale, will not be raised. In 1856 the ministry advised Her Majesty to issue letters patent to Sir James Parke, creating him Baron Wensleydale for life. In the debate which followed Lord Lyndhurst's proposal to refer this exceptional patent to the Committee of Privileges, it was common ground that the Crown had in former times introduced life-peers to sit in the House of Lords, but that no such case had occurred for upwards of 400 years. The constitutional question at issue, therefore, was, had the ancient prerogative of the Crown been lost by desuetude; or could it be exercised if the Queen thought fit to revive it? The life peerages contemplated by the Lord Chancellor's Bill will, of course, owe their creation, not to the prerogative of the Crown, but to the act of the three estates of the realm. They will, in fact, be created with the consent of the House of Lords itself.

The report of the directors of the Provident Life Office, after stating that the proposals for new assurances amounted to £494,930, and that of these 843 were accepted and policies issued for £385,580, and that the total funds of the office on the 31st of December were £2,485,955, an increase of £30,164, adds that: "In view of the great depreciation in the value of freehold and leasehold estates in all parts of the United Kingdom, the directors have felt it their duty to make a careful re-valuation of all the securities of this description held by the office; and have come to the conclusion that the sum of £60,000 should be for the present placed to a suspense account to meet any possible loss that may arise in the realization

of assets of this nature,"

COVENANTS RUNNING WITH THE LAND.

(II.) COVENANTS IN GENERAL (continued).

IN our last article we treated of covenants made for the purpose
of securing an interest in the land, such as a rent-charge. We
now proceed to the next class of covenants:—
describe more correctly as covenants concerning acts to be done, or
(2) COVENANTS CONCERNING THE USE OF LAND.-These we might
not to be done, in connection with the land. The distinction thus
taken between positive and negative covenants is of the utmost
importance, for we shall see that while in neither case does the
enforceable in equity.
burden run with the land at law, yet negative covenants are

recent case of Austerberry v. Corporation of Oldham (1885, 29
(a.) The burden.-This subject was very fully discussed in the
Ch. D. 750), and, after a full examination of the cases, the court
could never run with the land at law that the matter may be con-
was so strongly of opinion that the burden of such a covenant
sidered to be practically decided. It was not, however, necessary
for the judgment in the case; this depended also upon whether
the benefit could run, and it was settled that it could not, on the
ground that the covenant did not sufficiently concern the land to
which it was sought to be attached. After putting aside cases
relating to covenants of the first kind-viz., those relating
to an interest in the land, it was found that there were only
two cases which could be considered authorities that the burden
would run with the land. These were Cooke v. Chilcott (1876, 3
Ch. D. 694), decided by Malins, V.C., and Western v. Macdermott
(1865, 1 Eq. 499), decided by Romilly, M.R. In the first case
H. conveyed land to F., himself retaining adjacent land. F.
covenanted with H. to erect a pump and supply water to houses
on the land so retained by him. By various mesne assignments H.'s
land became vested in C. and F.'s became vested in Ch., who took
with notice of the covenant. Then C. brought an action against
Ch. for breach of it. In his judgment the Vice-Chancellor ex-
pressed the opinion that the covenant ran with the land, but, as
Ch. took with notice, he was able to decide the case on that equit-
able ground alone. Here it is to be noticed that the covenant was
positive, and the judgment could not be supported now even in
equity.. Western v. Macdermott, where the covenant was negative
or restrictive, is a better case. Here there were adjoining houses,
Nos. 9 and 10, in Brock-street, Bath. The two sites were origin-
ally conveyed by G. to W., who covenanted as to the height of the
and No. 9 to F. in fee. To these conveyances G. was a party, and
buildings to be erected. Then W. conveyed No. 10 to R. in fee
both R. and F. covenanted with G. and W. as to the height of
buildings to be erected in the gardens. G. had upon the first con-
veyance secured a rent-charge on the property for himself. Ulti-
mately No. 9 became vested in M., No. 10 in Wes., and the rent-
charge issuing out of No. 9 in T. In accordance with the
original plan the street had been regularly built, and it com-
manded a fine view to the south. In 1864 M. began to build
to be in violation of the covenant, and T., the owner of the rent-
a circular projection at the back of No. 9 of such a height as
charge, and so, practically, the representative of the original
covenantee, assented. W., the owner of No. 10, then brought an
action against him. Romilly, M.R., considered that the burden of
the covenant was one that ran with the land, and that, as the benefit
of it descended to the successive owners of the adjoining land, it
was out of T.'s power to release it. The case went to the Court
of Appeal (2 Ch. 72), but here, again, so far as our point is
concerned, the decision was unsatisfactory. Lord Chelmsford, L.C.,
found himself relieved from considering the matter at law, because
there was no doubt that the plaintiff could have an injunction in
equity, the defendant having purchased his house with notice of
the covenant.

In these cases the plaintiff had a good right in equity, and so the question at law was shelved. It was necessary to have one in which there was no claim in equity in order that the question of the legal right might be raised and authoritatively discussed. This was so in Austerberry v. Corporation of Oldham. A. was one of several owners who conveyed land to trustees for the purpose of making a road. The trustees covenanted with A. and the other owners to keep the road in repair, to let the public use it on payment of a toll, and to let A. and the others and their assigns use it free of charge. A. retained land adjacent to the road on both sides of it. The matter

The same idea was uppermost in the Chancellor's mind when he came to the question of notice. Could an assignee be bound by any kind of covenant, no matter how strange to the law? This question he answered decidedly in the negative. But, though the same result would be arrived at now, it would be in a different manner, and the doctrine of notice has been more clearly worked out.

was complicated by the fact that the Corporation of Oldham took | real property, and to impress upon their lands and tenements a over the road under statutory powers, but, so far as the present peculiar character, which should follow them into all hands, howquestion is concerned, this may be treated as an assignment of the ever remote." road to C. A. had assigned his remaining land to B. The point to be determined, therefore, was whether the burden of the covenant ran so as to bind C., and the benefit so as to belong to B. Judgments were delivered by Cotton, Lindley, and Frv, L JJ. The benefit was dealt with very fully by Cotton, L.J. With that we are not now concerned, Lindley, L.J., took up the question of the burden, and Fry, L.J., agreed with him. As we have said, the cases were carefully examined, and the former judge, after discussing Cooke v. Chilcott and Western v. Macdermott, conIcluded as follows:

"I am not aware of any other case which either shews, or appears to shew, that a burden such as this can be annexed to land by a mere covenant such as we have got here; and in the absence of authority it appears to me that we shall be perfectly warranted in saying that the burden of this covenant does not run with the land. After all, it is a mere personal covenant. If the parties had intended to charge this land for ever, into whosesoever hands it came, with the burden of repairing the road, there are ways and means known to conveyancers by which it could be done with comparative ease; all that would have been necessary would have been to create a rent-charge and charge it on the tolls, and the thing would have been done. They have not done anything of the sort, and, therefore, it seems to me to shew that they did not intend to have a covenant which should run with the land. That disposes of the part of the case which is, perhaps, the most difficult."

So, too, Fry, L.J.

66

Upon the point whether the burden of the covenant ran with the land of the covenantors, I am clearly of opinion that it did not so run; and I share the doubt which has been expressed by my learned brothers whether in any case, except that of landlord and tenant, the burden of covenants of this description does ever run with the land."

This being so, we may safely assume that a burden of this kind never runs with the land at law, and it only remains to consider how the question is treated in equity.

The most important of the early cases is Keppell v. Bailey (1834, 2 My. & K. 517) before Lord Brougham, C. There certain landowners and owners of ironworks, and, among others, the lessees of the B. Ironworks, formed a joint-stock company to construct a railway connecting a lime quarry with the several ironworks; and in the partnership deed the lessees of the B. Works covenanted for themselves and their assigns, with the other shareholders, to procure all the limestone used in the ironworks from the quarry. The lessees assigned to C., who took with notice. C. violated the covenant, and the other shareholders brought an action against him. He, on his side, objected to the covenant as tending to a perpetuity, and as being in restraint of trade. The former point we shall consider later; the latter was overruled, as the restraint was only partial. But the chief questions were whether the covenant ran with the land at law, or, failing that, whether it could be upheld on the ground of notice. We need not go into the first of these again, but the judgment is useful as containing a commentary on all the cases from the Prior's case downwards. It was also seen that, if a covenant like this was allowed to run with the land, then it would be possible to burden houses with the most inconvenient obligations; a purchaser might covenant that only a particular trade should be carried on in the house, and this would bind it in the hands of his assigns for It is true the covenant in Tatem v. Chaplin (1793, 2 H. Bl. 133) that a lessee should reside in the house was held to bind his assigns, though not named, but this was the case of a lease, and depended on the privity of estate between the lessee and the reversioner.

ever.

It is more important, however, to consider the manner in which Lord Brougham approached the question of notice. In considering the matter at law, he had been struck, as we have just remarked, by the unusual nature of the service required and the inconvenience that would follow if "incidents of a novel kind could be devised and attached to property at the fancy or caprice of any owner." As bearing on the general question, the following quotation from the judgment is important:"Great detriment would arise, and much confusion of rights, if parties were allowed to invent new modes of holding and enjoying

The first good case on the subject appears to be Whatman v. Gibson (1838, 9 Sim. 196), but this is not the leading case, and we shall have to refer to it again for another purpose. The doctrine was certainly not settled in 1844. The question then arose in the case of Bristow v. Wood (1 Collyer, 480). B. sold one plot of land to J., retaining the adjacent one, and B. and J. entered into mutual covenants as to the value of buildings to be erected, and as to the use of the land. B. then agreed to sell the plot he had retained to W., who, at the time of the agreement, had no notice of the covenant. Afterwards he discovered it, and refused to complete. Knight-Bruce, V.C., considered that the question as to whether the covenant would bind W. was of too doubtful a nature for him to be compelled to accept the title.

The first leading case is Tulk v. Moxhay (1848, 2 Ph. 774) before Lord Cottenham, C. A., who was the owner of the vacant piece of ground in Leicester-square, conveyed it to B., who covenanted for himself and his assigns to preserve it in an open state as a pleasure ground. A. was also the owner of some houses in the square. B. subsequently conveyed to C., whose deed had no covenant, but who had notice of the original one. Upon C. proceeding to violate it, A., who had retained his houses, prayed for an injunction against him. The judgment was decisive as to the equitable right being quite distinct from the question of whether the covenant ran with the land at law.

the land, this court cannot enforce it; but the question is, not "It is said that the covenant being one which does not run with whether the covenant runs with the land, but whether a party shall tract entered into by his vendor, and with notice of which he purbe permitted to use the land in a manner inconsistent with the con

chased."

This was followed in Wilson v. Hart (1866, 1 Ch. 463), where a yearly tenant under a person claiming through the original covenantor was held to be bound on the ground that he had notice. The case is interesting too for the doubt displayed by the judges, Sir G. J. Turner and Sir J. L. Knight-Bruce, L.JJ., as to whether the covenant ran with the land at law. The former denied it, because assigns were not mentioned; the latter expressly withheld his opinion and relied solely on the equity.

The second leading case, and the one which has for the present completed the doctrine, is Haywood v. Brunswick Permanent Benefit Building Society (1881, 8 Q. B. D. 403). C. J. conveyed land to E. J. in fee, reserving a rent of £11, and E. J. covenanted to pay the rent and to erect and repair buildings. By various mesne assignments the land ultimately became vested in the building society as mortgagees, and they took possession. The question arose whether they were liable on the covenant to repair. Ultimately the matter came before the Court of Appeal, consisting of Brett, Cotton, and Lindley, L.JJ. A good deal was said as to the covenant not running with the land at law, but that does not concern us. Of the utmost importance, however, is the distinction drawn as to the rule in Tulk v. Moxhay, and it was laid down that this only applied to restrictive covenants. Both in that case and in Wilson v. Hart the covenants which were sought to be enforced were of such a nature. Formerly, indeed, this was unavoidable, because the court had no mandatory injunction at its disposal, but the same holds good now because the principle will not be stretched. As was said by Cotton, L.J.:-" The covenant to repair can only be enforced by making the owner put his hand into his pocket, and there is nothing which would justify us in going that length."

This distinction was acted on in Austerberry v. Corporation of Oldham (supra), and it was because there was no equitable right on the covenant there, that the court went, as we have seen, so fully into the legal question. These two cases, with Tulk v. Moxhay, have now practically settled the question in a clear and consistent manner.

REVIEWS.

PRACTICE STATUTES AND RULES.

A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF PRACTICE STATUTES, ORDERS, AND
RULES; BEING A SELECTION OF SUCH PRACTICAL PARTS OF ALL
STATUTES, ORDERS, AND RULES AS ARE NOW IN FORCE AND
RELATE TO THE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE SUPREME
COURT, FROM 1275 to 1886. SECOND EDITION. By ALFRED
EMDEN, Esq., Barrister-at-Law, assisted by HERBERT THOMPSON,
Esq, Barrister-at-Law. Stevens & Haynes.

and a rather wider range of selection of cases adopted, it would be difficult to suggest any improvement in the execution of the authors' design of furnishing a practical guide to the Act and Rules. We are bound to say that for this purpose, as distinguished from a treatise on the law of bankruptcy, we do not know a more useful book. The notes we have consulted, in using the work in practice, we have found accurate, practical, and suggestive. They contain ample crossreferences to sections and rules, and, it need hardly be said, have the wholesome flavour of thorough familiarity with the subjectmatter. The authors are naturally cautious in expressions of opinion - perhaps here and there to excess-and this is, no doubt, one of the disadvantages of what we may call official authorship; but their book is, nevertheless, one of great value to the practitioner.

BILLS OF SALE.

THE FORM OF BILLS OF SALE GIVEN AS SECURITY FOR MONEY. By STANLEY BUCKMASTER, Barrister-at-Law. Waterlow & Sons (Limited).

A new edition within less than two years of this bulky book appears to indicate a somewhat unusual success, and, indeed, a work supplying the place of a small library of practice statutes, orders, and rules ought be welcome to practitioners. The legislation and orders up to last autumn coming within the scope of the book have been added, so far as we have observed, with care and accuracy. The Crown Office Rules, 1886, are too voluminous and too special in their application to be inserted bodily, but such of them as affect the Supreme Court Rules are given. The valuable collection of cases under distinctive headings has been largely increased; according to the preface nearly This little book appears to be accurate, and will be very useful to 2,000 cases have been added. The value of the book to the practitioner the practitioner. After a somewhat careful examination we have not may be best illustrated by taking the mode of treatment of such an Act been able to detect any misleading blunder. This is, and we intend as the Infants' Settlement Act (18 & 19 Vict. c. 43), which has recently has given a collection of precedents; time alone will shew whether it to be, very high praise. With commendable courage the author come into prominence. At pp. 324 and 325 the reader will find the he has escaped the many pitfalls in the way of the draftsman, but as Act set out, with notes containing references to other statutes and to he has, in almost every case, given the authority for the clause that rules of court bearing on the subject, to authorities on the pro- he proposes, he has done all that is in his power to insure safety. cedure, and to the cases which have been decided on the sections, The prudent draftsman, however, will always follow the suggestion arranged under short but sufficiently distinctive headings. The result is that the practitioner who has to advise upon or carry out of the author and refer to the discussion in the text rather than trust proceedings under the Act has before him, in two pages, a synopsis to the authorities given for the clauses. For example, in the note to of or references to all the law and authorities on the subject. The the covenant to insure at p. 24, the only authority cited is Goldstrom present edition, on the points with regard to which we have tested. Tallerman, an authority which is hardly sufficient to shew that the it, displays the same care and industry which we remarked in the clause is safe, while at p. 16 all the authorities are collected. The former edition. We would suggest that the double references at the only blots in this book are that the proofs have not been corrected tops of the margins to statutes should be abolished and a reference with sufficient care, and that the index is not sufficiently full; but in heavy type to the Act on the page only should be given. these are small matters considering the substantial merits of the work.

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The above title shews the large addition which has been made in this edition to the scope of Mr. Pritchard's work. The book now covers the whole subject of maritime law, and embraces not merely English courts and their decisions, but also foreign courts and their maritime jurisprudence; the decisions of these courts being usually conveniently given at the end of each heading. British courts in foreign countries and colonial courts, colonial legislation on maritime law, and colonial courts and their procedure are also now included in the work. And, with regard to subjects coming more near to the original scope of the book, the legislation relating to unseaworthy ships and the investigation of shipping casualties has involved large additions to the original matter. In the headings we have examined we have found no case omitted for which we have looked; and we have found evidence, in the references and remarks in the foot-notes to the pages, of anxions care to place before the reader a statement of or reference to everything bearing on the subject treated of in the text. American decisions illustrating points discussed in the digested cases are given in these notes, which reminds us of the remark once made to us by a learned counsel, now on the bench, that, if he was in want of an argument in a case relating to maritime law, he had recourse to the American reports, and generally found what he wanted there. The work is a monument of skilfully-directed labour and research, and should be invaluable to all who are concerned in questions of maritime law.

THE BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1883.

THE BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1883, AND RULES, 1886, &c., AND A COM-
MENTARY THEREON. By His Honour Judge CHALMERS and E.
HOUGH, Inspector in Bankruptcy, Board of Trade. SECOND
EDITION. Waterlow & Sons (Limited).

The present edition of this book is a very great improvement on the first edition. Not only have the chief decisions on the new Act been collected with care, and their effect stated with accuracy and terseness, but cases decided on the former Acts have been added. The dates of the cases are given, and if references to all the reports were also given

SUMMARY JURISDICTION ACTS.
THE SUMMARY JURISDICTION ACTS, 1848-1884. By W. CUNNING-
HAM GLEN, Barrister-at-Law. SIXTH EDITION. BY ARCHIBALD
HENRY BODKIN, Barrister-at-Law, and CECIL GEORGE DOUGLAS,
Chief Clerk, Guildhall Justice Room, London. Shaw & Sons.

Mr. Glen's well-known collection of statutes and rules has been re

arranged by the editors. The three parts into which the work is now divided—viz., (1) Acts, Rules, and Forms dealing exclusively with the procedure in relation to summary convictions and orders; (2) the Acts prescribing the duties of courts of summary jurisdiction in committing persons accused of indictable offences; and (3) an appendix containing miscellaneous statutes relating to justices and their clerks-appear to be convenient. The recent cases have been added, and notes are now appended to the Act of 1884, in one of which we find an opinion of the law officers on the meaning of section 7. The rules of 1886, however, appear without comment.

CORRESPONDENCE.

TAXATION OF COSTS IN THE CHANCERY DIVISION. [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.]

Sir, The question of Colonel Duncan, M.P., which was answered by the Attorney-General on the 7th inst., again brings prominently before Parliament, suitors, and the legal profession, the propriety of the question which Mr. G. C. T. Bartley, M.P, asked the AttorneyGeneral of the late Government early last year, and which the Attorney-General said he would take care was submitted to the then Lord Chancellor. The question was as follows:-" Whether, having regard to the additional powers and responsibility conferred on and vested in the eight chancery taxing masters by order 65 of the Rules of the Supreme Court, 1883, and the rules of December, 1885, and to the fact that the fees earned by them amounted on an average to salaries and the salaries of their clerks of between £9,000 and £10,000 £32,215 per annum, shewing an annual profit, after payment of their per annum, the Government would take under their consideration the propriety of appointing an additional taxing master, making the ninth, thus completing the number contemplated and provided for by section 5 of 5 & 6 Vict. c. 103?"

I have asserted, and, as I considered, proved, the absolute need of an additional chancery taxing master. That need is still as pressing, or, more pressing, than ever. The question of Colonel Duncan has not brought to the notice of the House of Commons the magnitude of

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