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the appellant's own act, have given the proper length of notice of motion for security, he was entitled to apply for security without notice.

THE COURT refused the application. COTTON, L.J., said that the
respondent might have applied for leave to give short notice of motion.
Moreover, both sides had already incurred the costs of the appeal.-
COUNSEL, Ince, Q.C., and Nalder; Woodroffe. SOLICITORS, A. Hunt;
Robinson, Preston, & Stow.

Re VAN DUZER'S TRADE-MARK; Re LEAF'S TRADE-MARK-
C. A. No. 2, 28th January.
TRADE-MARK-REGISTRATION-"FANCY WORD NOT IN COMMON USE"-
PRIMARY AND SECONDARY MEANING OF WORD-PATENTS, DESIGNS, AND
TRADE-MARKS ACT, 1883, s. 64-Costs.

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In these two cases, which were heard together, the question arose, what is a "fancy word not in common use," which is capable of being registered as a trade-mark. Section 64, sub-section 1, of the Patents, Designs, and Trade-Marks Act, 1883, permits the registration of (inter alia) a distinctive device, brand, heading, label, ticket, or fancy word or words not in common use." In Re Van Duzer's Trade- Mark application was made for an order directing the registration of the words "Melrose Favourite Hair Restorer " as a trade-mark for a preparation for the hair. The Comptroller refused to register the mark, on the ground that "Melrose," being the name of a place, was, or might be, descriptive of locality, and could not therefore be "a fancy word not in common use" within the meaning of section 64. Bacon, V.C. (34 W. R. 730), directed the registration to proceed, on the ground that "Melrose "on the label was not a geographical description, but a purely fanciful word, as much as "Eureka or Opoponax" when applied to the particular commodity. In Re Leaf's Trade-Mark application was made for the registra of the words "Electric Velveteen as a trade-mark for cotton goods. The Comptroller had refused to register it on similar grounds. Bacon, V.C. (30 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 673), directed the registration to be made. THE COURT OF APPEAL (COTTON, LINDLEY, and LOPES, L JJ) reversed both decisions. On behalf of the Comptroller it was argued that a "fancy word" did not mean, as the Vice-Chancellor thought, a common word, the application of which to the particular commodity was novel and fanciful, but a word which had no meaning in the English language, and had been coined for the purpose, or is a word which was not, and could not be, in common use. On behalf of the respondents it was contended that by user they had acquired a right and property in the word as applied to the particular commodity, and the primary sense had become merged in the fancy sense. A fancy word was either a word ab initio coined for the occasion; or a word might become a fancy word by usage in an unusual, abnormal sense, and recognition of such usage. COTTON, L.J., said that the court had to construe a particular clause in the Act, though, of course, with the assistance of other clauses. The object of the Act was to benefit traders by making it unnecessary to go into evidence in a proceeding to protect a trade-mark, if the mark was registered, and also to furnish the public with the knowledge of what marks were entitled to protection. It was a further aim of the Act to cut down the loose forms by which traders had tried to protect themselves, and to oblige them to keep their marks within the prescribed limits. The question was whether the words were within the definition "A distinctive device, brand, heading, label, ticket, or fancy word or words not in common use." In both cases there was evidence that the word had been used for a consider able time, and that traders had recognized it as indicating the maker of the goods for which it was used; so that, but for the Act, the users of the words might have made out a case for protection. There was evidence that the words had come to be considered as fancy words in the trade, but the real question was whether the words had lost their primary meaning. Cases had been cited in which, before the Act, the court had protected traders from having goods passed off as theirs by others, and it was said that in those cases certain words were recognized as fancy words. But it was not necessary in those cases that the words should be fancy words in order to obtain protection. The principle was, that, if the word had come to denote the goods of a particular person, the court would restrain the use of it by another person so as to deceive, but not on the ground that it was a fancy word. The cases before the Trade-Marks Acts were no guides now. As to the "Melrose" case, it could not be said that no geographical term could be a fancy word as applied to a particular article, but it would be wrong to allow the registration of "Melrose" in the present case. A fancy word must be one which was obviously not intended to be descriptive to have reference to a place or to the character of the article to which it was applied. As to the word "electric," could it be said to be a fancy word when applied to velveteen? It was a word of description. It was not necessary that a "fancy" word should be a word not in the dictionaries, but the fanciful use of a word descriptive in itself did not make it a "fancy word." It was not enough to use the word inappropriately. It was quite possible there might be differences of opinion as to the meaning of the word applied as it was, but that did not affect the principle. LINDLEY, L.J., said that the court must take care not to make the Act too burdensome to those who were not registered. The term " fancy word" had been introduced into the Act of 1883 on account of Ex parte Stephens (3 Ch. D. 659), where it was found impossible under the former Act to register the fancy word "Aeilyton.' LOPES, L.J., said that the question whether a word was a fancy word" could not be decided by evidence; the word must speak for itself. The question was then raised whether the respondents ought to be ordered to pay the costs of the Comptroller. Bacon, V.C., had made no order as to costs. On behalf of the respondents it was urged that in a number of previous cases similar words had been registered without objection, and that the respondents had been misled by the previous course

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adopted by the Comptroller. On behalf of the Comptroller it was urged
that the rule was, that even a successful applicant for registration paid the
costs of opposition by the Comptroller.
THE COURT said that, as the cases were test cases, they would not
order the costs of the Comptroller in either court to be paid by the
respondents, but this decision must not be taken as a precedent, or as
altering the ordinary practice.-COUNSEL, Sir R. E. Webster, A.G., Sir H.
Davey, Q.C., and Ingle Joyce; Aston, Q.C., and Sebastian. SOLICITORS,
Solicitor to the Board of Trade; Watney, Tilleard, & Freeman; C. A.
Bannister.

DYOTT v. NEVILL-C. A. No. 2, 9th February. MORTGAGE-FORECLOSURE-R. S. C., 1883, XV., 1, 2. This was an action by a mortgagee for foreclosure, and the question be made in chambers on summons. was raised whether, under rule 1 of order 15, a foreclosure order could of summons has been indorsed for an account, under ord. 3, r. 8, or when Rule 1 provides that, "When a writ the indorsement on a writ of summons involves taking an account, if the defendant either fails to appear, or does not after appearance, by affidavit or otherwise, satisfy the court or a judge that there is some preliminary question to be tried, an order for the proper accounts, Division in similar cases, shall be forthwith made." And rule 2 says with all necessary inquiries and directions now usual in the Chancery that the application for such an order "shall be made by summons.' make foreclosure orders on summons under this rule, as in Smith v. Davies It will be remembered that it was formerly the practice of Chitty, J., to (28 Ch. D. 651, 29 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 115), until, in Blake v. Harvey (29 Ch. D. 827, 831), Cotton, L.J., expressed a doubt whether rule 1 of however, whether the rule gives jurisdiction to make such an order has order 15 authorized the making of a foreclosure order. The question, not yet been actually decided by the Court of Appeal. In the present case North, J., in chambers, made a foreclosure order under this rule. The J., refused to do. On the appeal being opened it appeared that in defendant afterwards moved in court to discharge the order, which North, chambers the point of jurisdiction was not raised, the case being dealt with only on the merits. Under these circumstances

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THE COURT OF APPEAL (COTTON, LINDLEY, and LOPES, L.JJ.) held that the defendant had waived the objection to the jurisdiction. The court would have had jurisdiction to make the order in another way, and the objection to the form of procedure ought to have been taken as soon as done, the objection could not be raised now.-COUNSEL, Cookson, Q.C., and possible, before the merits were entered upon. This not having been Dundas Gardiner: Cozens- Hardy, Q.C., and Ingle Joyce. SOLICITORS, Swan & Co.; Peake, Bird, & Co.

Re NATHAN, NEWMAN, & CO.-C. A. No. 2, 9th February. PRACTICE-SERVICE OUT OF JURISDICTION-COMPANY-WINDING UP-NOTICE OF APPOINTMENT TO SETTLE LIST OF CONTRIBUTORIES CONTRIBUTORY RESIDING OUT OF JURISDICTION - GENERAL ORDER UNDER COMPANIES ACT (NOVEMBER, 1862), R. 30-R. S. C., 1883, XI., 1.

In this case an important question arose as to the service of a notice of appointment to settle the list of contributories of a company in liquidation upon persons alleged to be contributories who are residing out of the jurisdiction of the court. In the present case the liquidator had served such a notice by post upon some persons residing in Scotland and Ireland, stating that he proposed to include them in the list, and, having received no reply from them, he included their names in the list. North, J., in chambers, however, held that the service of the notice was invalid, and that he had no power to give leave to make such a service, and he therefore excluded the names of the persons so served from the list. He thought that he was bound by the decision of the Court of Appeal in Re Anglo-African Steamship Co. (32 Ch. D. 348, 30 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 449), in which it was held that there was no jurisdiction to allow the service on persons residing out of the jurisdiction of the court of an order for a call on the contributories of a company in liquidation. Rule 30 of the General Order of November, 1862, under the Companies Act provides that, "Upon the list of contributories being left at the chambers of the judge, the official liquidator shall obtain an appointment from the judge to settle the same, and shall give notice in writing of such appointment to every person included in such list."

THE COURT OF APPEAL (COTTON, LINDLEY, and LOPES, L.JJ.) reversed the decision. COTTON, L.J., said that Re Anglo-African Steamship Co. was a very different case. There it was sought to serve on persons residing in a foreign country an order for a call, with the view of founding proceedings against them to compel payment of the call. In the present case the notice was not to be the foundation of any proceedings against the persons served with it, but the liquidator was only performing the duty imposed on him by the rules of settling the list of contributories. A foreigner might be on the list, and all that had been done was to give notice to the persons in question that it was proposed to place them on the list. That was a very different thing from the service of an originating summons or a notice which was intended to be the foundation of proceedings substituted for an action. In his lordship's opinion the notice had been properly served, and, no cause having been shewn to the contrary, the judge ought to have settled the persons in question on the list. LINDLEY, L.J., said that there was a very wide distinction between the present case and a proceeding to enforce the payment of calls; there would be no infringement of the jurisdiction of a foreign country. If such a notice could not be served abroad, his lordship did not see how, in many cases, a company could be wound up at all. LOPES, L.J., concurred.-COUNSEL, Buckley, Q.C., and Levett. SOLICITORS M. Abrahams Son, & Co.

Re PHILLIPS-Chitty, J., 5th February. INFANT-INFANT MARRYING WITHOUT A SETTLEMENT AND UNDER SEVENTEEN -INFANTS' SETTLEMENT ACT, 1855 (18 & 19 VICT. c. 43), ss. 1, 4. This was a petition under the Infants' Settlement Act, 1855. It appeared that the petition was presented by a husband and wife for settlement of the wife's property, the wife being at the date of marriage in March, 1886, under seventeen years of age, but having attained that age in October of the same year. The question arose whether the court could make a binding settlement, having regard to section 4 of the Act, which provides that nothing in the Act contained shall apply to any male infant under the age of twenty years or female infant under the age of seventeen years CHITTY, J., said that in Re Sampson and Wall (32 W. R. 617, 25 Ch. D. 482) it was held that section 1 of the Act was wide enough to include a settlement made upon the occasion of marriage, whether post-nuptial or antenuptial. In the present case some ten months had elapsed since marriage, but, nevertheless, having regard to what was decided in the Court of Appeal and his own view of section 1, he held that such an interval presented no objection to his making an order. With regard to section 4, he thought that the right way of reading this section was to read the proviso which it contained as limiting the incapacity of the infant to the age of seventeen, or, to use the words of Lord Selborne, L.C., in the case cited, the infant's incapacity to make a settlement ceases after the age has been attained, and that then a settlement, if really and truly a settlement upon the occasion of the marriage and caused by the marriage and sanctioned by the court, might be made. To exclude from the benefit of the Act an infant marrying a few days before seventeen and applying a few days after attaining seventeen would be a strauge result. Moreover, the Act did not intend to give protection only to persons who married after seventeen and to deny it to those who married before seventeen, when such latter class of persons might apparently require a somewhat greater degree of protection than the former. He therefore made an order under the Act for a settlement.-COUNSEL, Dunning. SOLICITORS, Talbot & Tasker.

TOWGOOD v. PIRIE & SONS-Chitty, J., 4th February.

PATENTS, &c., ACT, 1883, s. 64-FANCY WORD-Jubilee.

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This was a motion in an action between paper manufacturers which raised the question as to the admissibility to registration of the mark "Jubilee" under the Patents Act, 1883, ss. 64 and 74, on the ground that it was a fancy word or distinctive. The question was argued solely on the former point. The plaintiffs had registered "The Jubilee Note as a mark for their paper, and moved for an interim injunction restraining the defendants from selling paper as "The Jubilee Accession Note," and the defendants moved for an order to strike the plaintiffs' mark off the register. The defendants relied on the decisions of the Appeal Court in Re Van Duzer and Re Leaf, Sons, & Co. (Court of Appeal, 28th January, 1887) as enunciating that the registrability of a word as a fancy word depended on its being obviously meaningless in its application to the article in connection with which it was sought to be used-that was to say (per Cotton, L.J.). "obviously not descriptive"; or (per Lopes, L.J.) "obviously and notoriously inappropriate as neither to be deceptive nor descriptive, nor calculated to suggest deception or description.' The plaintiffs submitted that the word "jubilee was sufficient, within those definitions, as being both meaningless in itself and in its proposed application.

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CHITTY, J. (who, during the course of the argument, had asked the question, to whom was the inappropriateness, &c., of an English word to be obvicus, to the learned or the unlearned ?) said that the word "jubilee" was not obviously meaningless as regarded paper or notepaper, because it might possibly signify that the paper was used in the Jubilee Year (1887) of her Majesty's reign. Moreover, the word “jubilee" was used by many English writers, including Dryden, Sir Walter Scott, and others. It was, therefore, a common English word. He therefore held that the word "jubilee" could not be registered as a trade-mark for paper.-COUNSEL, Aston, Q.C., and Sebastian; Romer, Q C., and Carpmael. SOLICITORS, Wansey, Bowen, & Co.; Wilson, Bristows, & Carpmael.

Re LEA, LEA v. COOKE-North, J., 7th February.
WILL-CHARITABLE LEGACY-SCHEME.

The question in this case was whether a charitable legacy should be paid to the person named as the legatee, or whether the court ought to direct a scheme for the application of the legacy. The testator bequeathed "to General William Booth the sum of £4,000 for the spread of the Gospel." General Booth was the "Superintendent-General" of a body called the Salvation Army. There was evidence that the property of the body was, in accordance with a deed poll executed by General Booth in 1878, confided solely to him as General-Superintendent. At that time the body was called the "Christian Mission," but its name was afterwards changed.

NORTH, J., held that the legacy must be paid to General Booth. His lordship said that it was not disputed that a bequest for the spread of the Gospel was a good charitable bequest; but the question was whether the legacy ought to be made the subject of a scheme, or to be paid to the legatee named without any scheme, the mode of application being left to him. The legatee, described by the testator as General William Booth, was well known as the present head of the organized body called the Salvation Army. There was full evidence of the nature and objects of

that body, including a deed poll enrolled in Chancery, declaring their doctrines and constitution. It appeared from the recitals in that deed that the earliest efforts of the Salvation Army, formerly known as the "Christian Mission," were addressed to bringing under the Gospel those who were not in the habit of attending any place of worship; and his lordship thought that the great object of that body might fairly be described as being the diffusion of religion and the spread of the Gospel. By their deed of constitution their founder, Mr. Booth, was made for his life General-Superintendent of the body, and he had consequently become well known as Ĝeneral Booth, and it became his duty, under that deed, to determine and express the discipline and laws and superintend the operations of the society, and to govern the same to and for the objects and purposes for which it was first originated, and he was empowered to expend on behalf of the body all money contributed for the general purposes thereof, or any of its special objects or operations, and required to publish annual balance-sheets, duly audited, of all receipts and payments. These duties he still continued to perform, and under his superintendence the body had made very rapid progress, and its operations were daily extending. The accounts were regularly published, and it appeared from them that very numerous sums of large aggregate amount came to the hands of General Booth, and were applied in a very large number of payments, generally of small amounts. The testator was, at any rate, to some extent aware of the operations of the body in question, and had on several occasions contributed to its funds. He described the legatee by reference to his official character. In the case of every other legacy in favour of a charity he provided for payment to the intended recipients. His lordship had no doubt that if he had been asked whether he wished that the bequest should be intrusted to the General for him to apply it, he would have answered in the affirmative. Under these circumstances his lordship did not think it necessary to direct any scheme as to the application of the legacy. Powerscourt v. Powerscourt (1 Moll. 616), Welch v. Cohen (16 Ves. 206), Hird v. The Earl of Suffolk (2 My. & Keen. 59), and Walsh v. Gladstone (1 Phil. 290) were ample authority for that view. His lordship did not think that the establishment of any permanent trust is what the testator contemplated. He thought the control of the court quite sufficiently maintained by giving leave to apply as was done in those cases.-COUNSEL, Rigby, Q.C., and Renshaw, Q.C.; Ingle Joyce; Everitt, Q.C., and Vaughan Hawkins; Cozens-Hardy, Q.C., and Geare; Theobald; Blackmore. SOLICITORS, Crowders & Vizard; Hare & Co.

Re CROOKES-North, J., 8th February. INFANT-CUSTODY-INJUNCTION TO RESTRAIN REMOVAL OUT OF JURISDICTION -INFANTS' CUSTODY ACT, 1873 (36 & 37 VICT. c. 12).

This was a petition by a mother, under the Infants' Custody Act of 1873, asking that her husband might be ordered to deliver into her custody an infant child of the marriage, a girl aged three and a half. The father had employment in Spain; the mother, with the child, had been residing in England with her own father, who had been maintaining stated that the father, who was temporarily in England, had come to the them. The petition was supported by an affidavit of the mother, which house of her father and carried away the child by violence. The father of its having been served upon him. Under these circumstances, did not appear on the hearing of the petition, and there was no affidavit

NORTH, J., said that he could not make an order on the petition. It must stand over to enable an affidavit of service to be produced, and he the child out of the jurisdiction.-COUNSEL, Cozens-Hardy, Q.C., and L. would meanwhile make an order restraining the father from removing Field. SOLICITORS, Field, Roscoe, & Co.

Re HOBSON AND HOWES-North, J., 9th February. MORTGAGEE-POWER OF SALE-EQUITABLE MORTGAGE-CONVEYANCE LEGAL ESTATE-CONVEYANCING ACT, 1881, s. 21.

OF

This was a summons under the Vendor and Purchaser Act, 1874, the question being whether an equitable mortgagee by deed of freehold land, selling the mortgaged property under the power conferred by the Conveyancing Act, 1881, can convey the legal estate to the purchaser. We believe that there has been a difference of opinion among conveyancers on this point. Section 19 of the Act gives to a mortgagee, when the mortgage is made by deed, a power, when the mortgage-money has become due, to sell the mortgaged property, the power being given "to the like extent as if it had been in terms conferred by the mortgage-deed, but not further." Section 20 imposes certain restrictions on the exercise of the power, and section 21 provides that "a mortgagee exercising the power of sale conferred by this Act shall have power by deed to convey the property sold, for such estate and interest therein as is the subject of the mortgage, freed from all estates, &c., to which the mortgage has priority, but subject to all estates, &c., which have priority to the mortgage, except that, in the case of copyhold or customary land, the legal right to admittance shall not pass by a deed under this section, unless the deed is sufficient otherwise by law, or is sufficient by custom, in that behalf.” NORTH, J., held that the mortgagee could only convey the estate which he himself had.-COUNSEL, J. B. Porter; Ingpen. SOLICITORS, O. G. Harman; R. Parker.

FRENCH. HOPE-Kekewich, J., 3rd February.
MORTGAGE-SETTING ASIDE-FRAUD-DEPOSIT OF TITLE Deeds.

In this case the question arose whether a mortgagor, who had been induced by fraud to enter into a mortgage, could have it set aside against

a person who took the mortgage and title deeds bond fide on deposit to secure a loan to the mortgagee. The plaintiff, who was an illiterate person, mortgaged his property to a solicitor for £200, and signed a receipt for the money, believing that he was only giving the solicitor instructions to raise a loan. The plaintiff never received the money. The mortgagee shortly afterwards deposited the mortgage and title deeds with the defendants, S. & Co., who received them bona fide, and without notice, to secure the repayment of £100 lent by them to him. The action was brought against the mortgagee and S. & Co. to have the mortgage set aside and the deeds delivered to the plaintiff. The mortgagee did not appear. KEKEWICH, J., held that, although the plaintiff might be entitled to have the mortgage set aside as against his solicitor, yet, inasmuch as he intended to authorize his solicitor to raise money upon the security of the property, his equity must be postponed to that of S. & Co.: Parker v. Clarke (9 W. R. 877, 30 Beav. 54) must be taken to be overruled by Bicker ton v. Walker (34 W. R. 141, 31 Ch. D. 151).—COUNSEL, Stern, Barber, Q.C., and W. C. Druce. SOLICITORS, F. J. Day; Storey & Cowland.

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purchase, and the price and terms and conditions thereof, and no commission is paid by the client to an auctioneer, or estate or other agent. In cases of sales under the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, or any other private or public Act under which the vendor's charges are paid by the purchaser, the scale shall not apply." Paragraph 4 of the introductory part of the order provides that "the remuneration prescribed by schedule I. to this order is not to include (inter alia) auctioneer's or valuer's charges." In the present case the Commissioners of Sewers for the City of London, acting under the powers conferred on them by their special Act (which contained no provision that the charges of a vendor should be paid by the commissioners, and with which the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act was not incorporated), in August, 1884, served on S., the occupier of two leasehold houses, a notice to treat for the purchase of his interest. In reply to this notice S., on the 5th of May, 1885, sent to the commissioners a claim for £17,834 for the value of his interest in the property. The claim was made upon a printed form furnished to him by the commissioners, and it was signed by his solicitors on his behalf. At the foot of it was the following (printed) note:-"Name and address of surveyor or agent appointed to treat for sale of property," opposite to

Re WICKHAM, MARONY v. TAYLOR Kekewich, J., 2nd and 3rd which was written by the solicitors, "Mr. Farmer, of Messrs Debenham,

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CONTEMPT-UNPAID COSTS-STAYING PRO

CEEDINGS.

In this case the question arose whether the defendant could take a preliminary objection to the hearing of an action on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to pay the costs of a motion in the action which he had been ordered to pay. The plaintiff had moved for a receiver, and his motion had been dismissed with costs. These costs were never paid, but no order had been applied for to stay the further proceedings in the action until their payment. This was the hearing of the action, and the defendant took the preliminary objection that the costs of the motion had not been paid. The plaintiff urged that proceedings could only be stayed upon a special application made for that purpose. KEKEWICH, J., following Bacon, V.C, in Re Neal, Weston v. Neal (24 W. R. 319, 31 Ch. D. 437) allowed the objection, and ordered the trial to be postponed until the plaintiff had paid the costs.-COUNSEL, Oswald, Pochin, C. E. E. Jenkins. SOLICITORS, Geo. Johnson; Shaen & Roscoe.

SMYTHE v. SMYTHE-Q.B.Div., 31st January and 3rd February. PRACTICE-COMPROMISE OF DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS-EX PARTE MOTION TO ENFORCE IN QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION.

the order.

This was a motion to set aside an order of Huddleston, B., ex parte, making a compromise of certain divorce proceedings a rule of court. The agreement of compromise contained a provision that it might be made a rule of court. A deed embodying this agreement was drawn up, the principal provision being as to payment of the wife's costs. This deed, after some dispute, was settled by one of the conveyancing counsel to the Chancery Divison, before whom both parties appeared. The respondent in the suit refused to execute, but eventually did so after the order of Huddleston, B. Costs were duly taxed, but no order for payment made. After a writ of fi. fa. had been issued upon the order of Huddleston, B., the respondent paid the costs under protest and appealed against THE COURT (Lord COLERIDGE, C.J., Sir J. HANNEN, P., AND GROVE, J.) upheld the order. Lord COLERIDGE, C.J., said that he had no doubt that the court had power to make such a compromise a rule of court on motion ex parte when the case had been pending in any other division but the Divorce Division; and he agreed with Sir James Hannen's view that the court would enforce compromises of cases in that division also. Sir JAMES HANNEN said that the old practice had been altered by Sir C. Cresswell, who refused to permit, as a matter of course, the compromise of divorce suits, thus leaving parties to take proceeding in other courts when the Divorce Court refused to take action. Since the Judicature Acts all the judges were judges of one court, and the power exercised by Huddleston, B., in enforcing this compromise was analogous to that constantly exercised by the vacation judge in matters pending in the Divorce Division. The provisions in the compromise sought to be made a rule of court were, in effect, merely for the repayment of the petitioner's costs and did not concern such matters as the custody of children, in which, the learned judge said, he should have refused to enforce it. GROVE, J., doubted whether a compromise of an action ought to be enforced on ex parte motion before any judge except the one who had heard the matter in open court, but agreed that in this case the order that had been made was a just one.-COUNSEL, Crump, Q.C., A. T. Laurance; Horne Payne, Q.C., A. T. Reddel. SOLICITORS, Mackinson, Taylor, & Arnold; Waples Canwarden.

CASES AFFECTING SOLICITORS.

Re HARRIS, POWELL, & GOODALE-North, J., 8th February. SOLICITOR-COSTS-TAXATION-NEGOTIATION FEE"-"FEE FOR DEDUCING TITLE "SOLICITORS' REMUNERATION ORDER (AUGUST, 1882), SCHEDULE I., PART I., R. 11.

The question in this case was whether the solicitors of a vendor were entitled to a "negotiation fee" and a fee "for deducing title," as provided by Part I. of Schedule I. of the Remuneration Order. Rule 11 in that schedule provides that, "the scale for negotiating shall apply to cases where the solicitor of a vendor or purchaser arranges the sale or

Tewson, & Farmer." On the 5th of April, 1886, a contract in writing was interest for £15,000. The contract provided (inter alia) that "the comentered into between S. and the commissioners for the purchase of his missioners are to pay the vendor's solicitors' preliminary costs, and also the costs of title and conveyance, such costs, in case of difference, to be taxed in the ordinary way, and they will also pay the fee of the vendor's surveyor, such fee to be settled and determined by the engineer and surveyor to the commissioners." On the 5th of April, 1886, the commissioners' solicitor wrote to the vendor's solicitors: "If the title consists of anything more than the lease, please let me have abstract; otherwise, I shall not require one." At this time the commissioners had acquired the reversion of the property subject to the lease. On the 6th of April the vendor's solicitors replied: "The title consists of the lease only; will you require a copy in lieu of abstract?" At this time the vendor's solicitors did not know that the commissioners were the owners of the reversion. The commissioners' solicitor did not reply, except by sending a draft assignment of the lease for perusal. No copy or extract of the lease was supplied by the vendor's solicitors. The purchase was completed on the 12th of May, 1886, and the commissioners paid the fee of the vendor's surveyor, which was settled by their engineer at £90. In fixing that amount, the engineer acted on "Bryde's Scale in Compensation Cases.” The vendor's solicitors sent in their bill of charges to the commissioners, amounting to £160. It consisted of two items only-viz., £77 10s., which was the negotiation fee prescribed by schedule I. for a purchase-money of £15,000; and £82 10s., which was the fee for deducing title provided by that schedule for the same amount of purchase-money. The commissioners obtained an order to tax the bill, their petition on which the order was obtained alleging that the solicitors "were employed by S. in the negotiation of a contract, dated the 5th of April, 1886, between S. and the commissioners, for the sale to the commissioners of certain leasehold property, and the carrying out of such sale." The taxing master was of opinion that, under the circumstances, the solicitors were not entitled to charge either of the scale fees, but they must be remunerated under schedule II. to the order, and he taxed their costs at £19 9s. 7d. The solicitors carried in objections to the taxation, in which they said, with regard to the "negotiation fee": "The purchasers having given notice to treat, the vendor's solicitors did in fact prepare the claim, and send it in to the purchasers, and they did in fact close with the purchasers' offer of £15,000, so as to satisfy the rule that the scale for negotiating shall apply to cases where the solicitor of the vendor arranges the sale and the price and terms and conditions thereof, and, moreover, no commission was paid by the client to an auctioneer, or estate or other agent. fee was not, in fact, a commission, and was wholly in the discretion of the The purchaser contracted to pay the fee of the vendor's surveyor. Such purchasers, and it is immaterial to the claim of the vendor's solicitors that it was, in fact, settled on ' Bryde's Scale in Compensation Cases,' as the vendor's solicitors had no voice in the matter. The purchasers' contract to pay the vendor's solicitors preliminary costs was, in fact, a contract to pay the negotiation fee." To this objection the taxing master replied, "The solicitors are not entitled to the scale charge for negotiating, as they and The comtheir clients employed surveyors, who made full charges. missioners agreed to pay the costs of the vendor's solicitors, and also the fee of the vendor's surveyor, but their paying the vendor's costs and charges does not alter the proper legal amount of such costs as payable by the client." As to the fee for deducing title, the solicitors said, "The vendor's solicitors deduced such title as they had, and answered the only requisition capable of being made upon it. If they had forestalled the purchasers' solicitors' question by delivering a copy or abstract of the lease, no question could have been raised, and they have done, in substance, the whole of the work in respect of which a charge is allowed by the schedule." The taxing master replied, "The solicitors are not entitled to the scale charge for deducing title, &c., as no title was shewn to the purchaser (see Re Lacey, 25 Ch. D. 311)." The solicitors took out a summons to review the taxation. No evidence had been adduced before the taxing master except the claim, the agreement for purchase, the bill nothing to show precisely what work had been done by the vendor's of costs, the order to tax, and the answers to objections; and there was surveyor, but, on the hearing of the summons, it was contended that he had only advised as to the value of the property, and that the terms and conditions of the sale had been, in fact, arranged by the solicitors.

NORTH, J., affirmed the decision of the taxing master. He said that the matter stood in the same position as if there had been no bargain that the purchasers should pay the vendor's costs and charges, and the

The

question had arisen between the vendor and his own solicitors. question turned entirely on rule 11. The vendor's surveyor had done some work, the details of which did not appear, but it appeared from the objections to the taxation that the amount of his fee, or commission, or remuneration was ascertained by the engineer of the commissioners, and was settled by him according to Bryde's Scale. It came to this, that a person was employed by the vendor to treat for the sale of the property, and that he was paid for his services a commission, which the taxing master described as "full charges." A fee, arrived at by an ad valorem charge, was paid to a person who came within the description of an "estate or other agent "in rule 11, and who was described as surveyor or agent" in the vendor's claim. The scale for negotiating applied only to a case where no such charge or commission was paid by the client as was paid in the present case. The solicitors were, therefore, not entitled to the scale fee, but must obtain their remuneration in the ordinary way. And, as to the fee for deducing title, his lordship was clearly of opinion that no title had been deduced, and the scale did not apply.-COUNSEL, Byrne; J. Henderson. SOLICITORS, Harris, Powell, & Goodale; E. A. Baylis

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Re CORSELLIS, LAWTON v. ELWES-C. A. No. 2, 3rd February. SOLICITOR-COSTS-TAXATION-SOLICITOR-TRUSTEE-PROFIT COSTS.

This was an appeal by the defendant from the disallowance by Kay, J. (30 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 567), of certain costs to the defendant Elwes, a trustee, who was a solicitor, on the ground that he had placed himself in a position in which his interest conflicted with his duty, and was therefore unable to charge the estate of which he was a trustee with the costs of professional work done by himself or his firm. N. C. Corsellis by his will, dated the 26th of October, 1876, appointed Lawton; S. Turner (a solicitor) and Firman his executors and trustees. His real estate, which comprised the manor of Wivenhoe in Essex, was devised in strict settlement, and the trustees were empowered to employ receivers, bailiffs, accountants, and agents in the affairs of the estate. And the testator appointed Turner, his heirs and assigns, steward of the manor, and provided that he might, by himself or his firm, act as solicitor for the estate, and charge for business done relating to it. There was no general power for every solicitor-trustee to charge for business done by him. The testator died in September, 1878, and Turner died in February, 1880. The defendant Elwes, a solicitor, who had been in partnership with Turner, was appointed a trustee in his place. The appeal related to four classes of charges. (1) In August, 1881, an application was made to the court by the plaintiff, an infant, who was beneficially interested in the real estate under the testator's will, by his next friend, for maintenance out of the estate. To that application the defendant Elwes and his co-trustee Firman (Lawton having died in May, 1881) were respondents. The defendant Elwes's firm, through their London agents, Messrs. Elwes & Sharpe, acted as folicitors for the respondents to this application, and in respect of this the defendant Elwes's firm made profit charges amounting to £16 9s. 2d. (2) Firman died in September, 1881, and after his death the defendant Elwes, having then become the sole trustee of the estate, was made defendant in this action for the execution of the trusts of the real estate and for the appointment of a receiver and manager. A receiver and manager of the estate was appointed, and the defendant's firm, by their London agents, acted as his solicitors, and received £15 6s. 1d. as their share of the profit costs allowed to the receiver on taxation. (3) The defendant appointed his partner, G. B. Turner, to act as steward of the manor. Fees paid to him as steward by the copyhold tenants of the manor had been carried by him to the credit of his firm, and the defendant claimed to be entitled to a share of those fees. (4) The defendant's firm made profit charges in respect of certain leases and agreements for leases of parts of the estate which the defendant, as trustee, had granted. The plaintiff applied for a review of the taxing master's certificate by disallowing all these profit costs and charges. Kay, J., disallowed them all.

THE COURT OF APPEAL (COTTON, LINDLEY, and LOPES, L JJ.) allowed the appeal as regarded the costs of the application for maintenance and the steward's fees. THE COURT expressed their approval of the rule which Lad been laid down as to the duty of trustees not to make a profit out of their trust, and to avoid placing themselves in a position in which their interest would conflict with their duty. But to this general rule an exception had been established in Cradock v. Piper (1 Mac. & G. 664) viz., that a solicitor-trustee, acting for himself and his co-trustees in legal proceedings, was entitled to profit costs, if the costs had not been increased by his so acting. That exception had been always acted upon in the taxing master's office, and was an established rule of the court, and it ought not to be frittered away. Their lordships were of opinion that the proceedings for maintenance were within the rule laid down in Cradock v. Piper, and the costs of these proceedings must be allowed. As to the costs of the receiver, the decision of Kay, J., must be affirmed. The solicitor-trustee in acting for the receiver, who had to account to the estate for those charges, had placed himself in a position in which his interest and his duty were in conflict. The decision must also be affirmed with regard to the charges for the leases. The trustees employed the solicitor to do the work, though it was agreed that the lessees should pay for it. The steward's fees stood in a different position; they were not professional charges, but were fixed by statute or by custom. They must, therefore, be allowed. All the three judges, though they felt themselves bound by Cradock v. Piper, said that they should have decided that case differently.-COUNSEL, Giffard, Q.C., and Bardswell; Graham Hastings, Q.C., and Swinfen Eady. SOLICITORS, Elwes & Sharpe; A. W. Digby.

LAW SOCIETIES.

SOLICITORS' BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION. The usual monthly meeting of the Board of Directors of this association was held at the Law Institution, Chancery-lane, London, on Wednesday, the 9th inst., Mr. Sidney Smith in the chair. The other directors present were Messrs. W. Beriah Brook, Samuel Harris (Leicester), Edwin Hedger, R. Pennington, H. Roscoe, W. Melmoth Walters, Frederick T. Woolbert, and J. T. Scott (secretary). A sum of £270 was distributed in grants of relief. Six new members were admitted to the association, and other general business was transacted.

WOLVERHAMPTON LAW ASSOCIATION.

The fortieth annual general meeting of this association was held on the 17th ult., Mr. W. A. Green, president, in the chair.

The secretary read the annual report of the committee, and the hon. treasurer read the financial statement for the past year.

It was proposed by the chairman, seconded by Mr. C. L. Adams, and resolved unanimously:-" That the report of the committee, and the financial statement for the past year, which have been read, be received, adopted, and entered on the minutes."

It was proposed by Mr. Stirk, seconded by Mr. Thorney croft, and resolved unanimously:-"That Mr. Henry Stanley be president for the year

1887."

It was proposed by Mr. Waterhouse, seconded by Mr. Robert Willcock, and resolved unanimously:-"That Mr. F. T. Langley be vice-president for the year 1887."

It is proposed by Mr. A. B. Smith, seconded by Mr. A. Whitehouse, and resolved unanimously::-"That Mr. E. B. Thorneycroft be re-elected honorary treasurer for the year 1887."

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It was proposed by Mr. Owen, seconded by Mr. Greensill, and resolved unanimously:- That Mr. E. T. Cresswell be elected honorary secretary for the year 1887."

It was proposed by Mr. A. B. Smith, seconded by Mr. S. W. Page, and resolved unanimously:-"That Messrs. Adams, Green, C. B. Smith, and Stirk be elected members of the committee.

It was proposed by Mr. G. W. Walker, seconded by Mr. Greensill:— "That the best thanks of the association be given to the president, vicepresident, committee, and hon. treasurer, and secretary for their services during the past year." The thanks of the meeting were also voted to the chairman for his conduct in the chair.

The annual dinner of the society was held on the same day, and was attended by 24 members. The county court judge, the stipendiary, and the official receiver were present as invited guests.

The following are extracts from the report of the committee:Professional matters.-The question of proceedings against solicitors practising in the neighbourhood who had not taken out their certificates has further engaged the attention of the committee, and as a result the Incorporated Law Society, at the suggestion of the committee, prosecuted three solicitors for practising without certificates, and in each case a conviction was obtained, and the defaulters were fined, and have paid, £5 and costs. The attention of the committee has also been called to other cases of solicitors practising without certificates. In one case their representations induced the solicitor in default to take out his certificate, and in another case the Incorporated Law Society have decided to take proceedings. The committee have, in the interests of the members, protested against the employment of a solicitor not practising in the town in a Post Office prosecution, and they trust that as a result of their protest local solicitors will in future be employed. They have also caused a circular to be sent to the clerks of the magistrates in the district calling their attention to the irregularity of constabulary officers conducting prosecutions. A circular has also been sent to members of the association asking for their assistance in suppressing this practice, and the committee would venture to urge that this matter be not lost sight of by the members.

The Incorporated Law Society.-With reference to the paragraphs in last year's report as to the desirability of more solicitors becoming members of the Incorporated Law Society, the president and secretary made a canvass of the members of the association, and the result of that canvass, and of the steps taken by the association, has been that fifteen members of the association has joined the Incorporated Law Society. The committee consider while this is a satisfactory result it is not all that could be desired, and they trust that every member of the association who does not also belong to the Incorporated Law Society will join that body at

once.

The new County Court Rules.-The question of the inconvenience caused by the new County Court Rules has engaged a large amount of attention during the year. The committee have also in connection with this subject considered the proposed Bill to consolidate the County Court Acts, which was introduced into the House of Lords by the then Lord Chancellor, in June last. The attention of the committee was called to the complaints which were being made by the Chamber of Commerce relative to the inconvenience caused to the commercial community by the new rules, and the secretary was instructed to place himself in communication with that body, with a view to united action. After some meetings had taken place between a sub-committee of the Chamber of Commerce and your secretary, the committee of this association appointed a sub-committee to confer with the sub-committee of the Chamber of Commerce upon the matter, and to suggest to the latter sub-committee the direction in which

amendments should be sought, with a view of assisting the local Chamber of Commerce in bringing the matter before the next meeting of the Associated Chambers of Commerce, and by that means enlisting the assistance of that body in improving county court practice. The result of the conference between the two sub-committees was that a united plan of action was agreed upon, and your committee venture to hope that the assistance they were able to render to the Chamber of Commerce will be of service to that body in their endeavour to use their influence to obtain an alteration of the present anomalies in county court practice; anomalies which cause much inconvenience and great loss, both of money and time, to the constituents of both associations. As a result of the above-mentioned conference it has been suggested that the Chamber of Commerce and this association might usefully work together in many things. The suggestion has been well received by the Council of the Chamber of Commerce, and it is believed that that body have under consideration such an amendment of their rules as will make the president of this association an ex-officio member of their council. The committee trust that much benefit may result to both bodies by this inter-communication.

LEGAL NEWS.

APPOINTMENTS.

Mr. GEORGE EDWARD HILLMAN, solicitor, of Lewes and Eastbourne, has been appointed Deputy-Coroner for the Eastern Division of the county of Sussex. Mr. Hillman was admitted a solicitor in 1880.

Mr. HENRY KINNEIR, solicitor (of the firm of Kinneir & Tombs), of Swindon and Cricklade, has been appointed Registrar of the Swindon County Court (Circuit No. 52). Mr. Kinneir is clerk to the Swindon School Board, and to the county magistrates at Cricklade. He was admitted a solicitor in 1854. His partner, Mr. Henry Coggan Tombs, is official receiver in bankruptcy for the Swindon District.

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CARLYLE SLATE AND SLAB Co., LIMITED.-Stirling, J., has fixed Feb 16, at 12,
at his chambers, for the appointment of an official liquidator
INDESTRUCTIBLE ENAMEL CO., LIMITED. By an order inade by Chitty, J., dated
Jan 22, it was ordered that the company be wound up. Smith & Eldridge, Great
James st, Bedford row, solors for petners

LONDON AND LANCASHIRE PAPER MILLS Co, LIMITED.-Petn for winding up, presented Jan 29, directed to be heard before North, J., on Saturday, Feb 12. Lumley & Lumley, Old Jewry chbrs, solors for petner

NORTHERN LONDON ESTATES CO., LIMITED.-Petn for winding u2, presented Feb 3, directed to be heard before Chitty, J., Feb 12. Pearpoint & Lock, Pall Mall, solors for petner RIVER THAMES STEAM BOAT Co.. LIMITED.-By an order made by Chitty, J., on Jan. 28. it was ordered that voluntary winding up of company be continued. Ashurst & Co, 6, Old Jewry, solors for petners SHORT HORN DAIRY CO, LIMITED-Stirling, J., has fixed Feb. 15, at 11, at his chambers, for appointment of official liquidator

UNITED WELSH SLATE CO., LIMITED.-Petn for winding up, presented Feb. 3, directed to be heard before Stirling, J., on Feb. 12. Snell & Co, George st, Mansion House, petners in person

UNLIMITED IN CHANCERY.

CROYDON AND NORWOOD TRAMWAYS Co.-Petn for winding up, presented Feb. 1, directed to be heard before North, J., on Saturday, Feb. 12. Dean, Walbrook, solor for petner COUNTY PALATINE OF LANCASTER. UNLIMITED IN CHANCERY.

BOLTON EXCHANGE ROOMS.-The Vice-Chancellor has fixed Tuesday, Feb. 15, at 11.30, at 2, Clarence st, Manchester, for appointment of official liquidator FRIENDLY SOCIETIES DISSOLVED.

Mr. JOHN DOUGLAS SANDFORD, barrister, has been appointed a Magistrate for the County of Middlesex. Mr. Sandford is the fourth son of the Rev. John Sandford, archdeacon of Coventry, and was born in 1832. He was formerly a scholar of Trinity College, Oxford, where he graduated first class in Classics in 1855. He was called to the bar at the Inner Temple NORTH OF ENGLAND FRIENDLY BURIAL SOCIETY, Royal Exchange, Middlesin Easter Term, 1870. He was for several years Chief Judge of Mysore.

Mr. JOHN STOK ELL DODDS, Attorney-General of Tasmania, has been appointed Puisne Judge of the Supreme Court of that colony, in succession to the late Mr. Justice Giblin.

Mr. RICHARD ERNEST LANGHORNE, Solicitor, of Wakefield, has been elected President of the Wakefield Incorporated Law Society for the ensuing year. Mr. Langhorne was admitted a solicitor in 1867.

Mr. LEWIS LLOYD JOHN, Solicitor, of Llangollen, has been appointed Clerk to the Llangollen School Board in succession to Mr. Philip Henry Minshall, resigned. Mr. John was admitted a solicitor in 1882.

Mr. WILLIAM ALFRED PLUNKETT, solicitor (of the firm of Plunkett & Leader), of 60, St. Paul's-churchyard, and of Greenhithe, has been elected Chairman of the Gas and Water Committee of the Court of Common Council. Mr. Plunkett was admitted a solicitor in 1863. He is a mon councilman for the ward of Farringdon Within.

com

Mr. WILLIAM BOUSFIELD, barrister, has been appointed a Magistrate for the County of Middlesex. Mr. Bousfield is the eldest son of Mr. William Bousfield, of Streatham, and was born in 1812. He was educated at Merton College, Oxford, where he graduated second class in Law and Modern History in 1866. He was called to the bar at the Middle Temple in Michaelmas Term, 1868, and he practises in the Chancery Division. He is a member of the School Board for London, representing the Chelsea Division.

Mr. W. P. ST. LEONARDS CHUBB, solicitor, of 29, Lincoln's-inn-fields, London, has been appointed a Commissioner to administer Oaths in the Supreme Court of Judicature.

Mr. W. Scort Fox, solicitor, of 13, St. Mary's-square, Paddington, has been appointed a Commissioner to administer Oaths in the Supreme Court of Judicature.

PARTNERSHIPS DISSOLVED.

ROBERT HESILRIGE BUCK BY and ROBERT EDWARD MARSHALL, solicitors (Buckby & Marshall), Leicester, Hinckley, and Nuneaton. Dec. 20. ROBERT BENDLE MOORE, FRANCIS STYAN MOORE, and EDWIN ERNEST MARSHALL, Solicitors (R. B. Moore & Co. and Moore, Son, & Marshall), Birkenhead and Liverpool, so far as regards the said Edwin Ernest Marshall. Jan. 31.

RICHARD BURGASS WOOSNAM and JAMES GOULD COKER, solicitors (Woosnam & Coker), Newton Abbot, so far as regards the said James Gould Coker. The said business will in future be carried on by the said Richard Burgass Woosnam at Newton Abbot aforesaid. Dec. 24. [Gazette, Feb. 4.]

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borough, York. Jan. 28

JOINT STOCK COMPANIES. LIMITED IN CHANCERY.

London Gazette.- TUESDAY, Feb. 8.

AUTOMATIC RETORT CO, LIMITED.-Petn for winding up, presented Feb 4, directed to be heard before Chitty, J., on Feb 19. Micklem & Co, Gresham st, etners in

person

DANIEL HAYWOOD & SONS, LIMITED.-Stirling, J.. has, by an order, dated Dec 7, appointed John Young, 41, Coleman st, to be official liquidator. Creditors are required, on or before Mar 7, to send their names and addresses, and particulars of debts or claims, to the above. Tuesday, Mar 15, at 2, is appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon debts and claims DAVENPORTS, LIMITED.-Petn for winding up, presented Feb 7, directed to be heard before Kay, J., on Saturday, Feb 19. Cooper & Co, Bedford row, agents for Cooners, Newcastle under Lyme, solors for petners

DEVONSHIRE COPPER CO, LIMITED. By an order made by Kay, J., dated Jan 29, it was ordered that the company be wound up. Rooks & Co, King st, Cheapside. solors for petner

HASTINGS AND ST. LEONARDS PASSENGER STEAMSHIP CO, LIMITED.-Creditors are required, on or before March 7, to send their names and addresses and particulars of their debts or claims to Thomas Stephen Evans, 6, Bucklersbury. Tuesday, March 22, at 12, is appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon the debts and claims

HERMANN LOOG LIMITED.-North, J., has fixed Thursday, Feb 17, at one, at his chambers, for the appointment of an official liquidator

INTERNATIONAL ELECTRIC CO, LIMITED.-Creditors are required. on or before April 20, to send their names and addresses and particulers of their debts or claims to Ernest Cooper, 14, George st, Mansion House. Wednesday, May 11, at one, is appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon the debts and claims NOTTINGHAM GENERAL OMNIBUS CO, LIMITED.-By an order made by Stirling, J., dated Jan 29, it was ordered that the voluntary winding up of the company be continued. Lee & Co, St Paul's churchyard, agents for Brights, Nottingham, solors for petner

NOTTINGHAM MALLEABLE IRON CO., LIMITED-Stirling, J., has, by an order, dated Jan 28, appointed Thomas Leman, 1, Greyhound st, Long row, Nottingham, to be official liquidator

PROTECTOR CARRIAGE AND HORSE INSURANCE CO., LIMITED.-Petn for winding up, presented Feb 4, directed to be heard before Chitty, J., on Saturday, Feb 19. Warriner & Kinch, Dashwood House, Broad st, agents for Hodgson, Burnley, solor for petner ROYAL EXCHANGE SHIPPING CO., LIMITED.-Chitty, J., has fixed Friday, Feb 18, at 12, at his chambers, for the appointment of an official liquidator SOUTH WALES (SIEMENS PATENT) GLASS MANUFACTURING CO., LIMITED.-Stirling, J., has, by an order, dated Jan 22, appointed William Alfred Baker, Newport, Mon., to be official liquidator. Creditors are required, on or before March 10, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to the above. Monday, March 21, at 12, appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon the debts and claims

WEST LONDON COMMERCIAL BANK, LIMITED.-Petn for winding up, presented Feb 8, directed to be heard before Chitty, J, on Feb 19. Chapple & Co, Carter lane, solors for petner

WEST LONDON COMMERCIAL BANK, LIMITED.-Petn for winding up, presented Feb 8, directed to be heard before Chitty, J, on Feb 19. Munns & Longden, Old Jewry, solors for petner

UNLIMITED IN CHANCERY. BANK OF EGYPT.-Petn for winding up, presented Feb 8, directed to be heard before Kay, J, on Feb 19. Bircham & Co. Old Broad st, solors for petners COUNTY PALATINE OF LANCASTER. UNLIMITED IN CHANCERY.

BOUNDARY PERMANENT BENEFIT BUILDING SOCIETY.-Petn for winding up, presented Feb 5, directed to be heard at St George's Hall, Liverpool, on M ́nday, Feb 21. Goffey & Co, Liverpool, solors for petners

FRIENDLY SOCIETIES. SUSPENDED FOR THREE MONTHS. LOYAL DUKE OF EDINBURGH LODGE ORDER OF DRUI S' FRIENDLY SOCCIETY, Forge Inn, New Whittington, Chesterfield, Derby. Feb 4

LOYAL ORANGE INSTITUTION DEFENCE LODGE, Platt Bridge Inn, Hindley, Wigan, Lancaster. Feb 5

PERMANENT FRIENDLY BENEFIT SOCIETY, Provident Baptist Chapel, Glemsford, Suffolk. Feb 5

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