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the appellant's own act, have given the proper length of notice of motion i
for security, he was entitled to alpply for security without notice.
Tm»: Cocar refused the flé)plC8i.iOll. Oorroiv, L.J., said that the respondent might have applie for leave to give short notice of motion. Moreover, both sides had already incurred the costs of the appeal.Covxssn, Inca, Q.C., and NaIa'er; Woodrojo. SOLICITORS, A. Hunt ,Robinson, Preston, ¢ Stow.
In these two cases, which were heard together, the question arose, what is a “fancy word not in common use," which is capable of being registered as a trade-mark. Section 64, sub-section 1, of the Patents, Designs, and Trade-Marks Act, 1883, permits the registration of (inter alia) “adistinctive device, brand, heading, label, ticket, or fancy word or words not in common use." In Re Vim D1l:c1".9 Trad:-Ilark application was made for an order directing the registration of the words “ llielrose Favourite Hair Restorer ” as a trade-mark for a preparation for the hair. The Comptroller refused to register the mark, on the ground that “ Melrose," being the name of a place, was, or might be, descriptive of locality, and could not therefore be “ a fancy word not in common use ” within the meaning of section 64. Bacon, V.C. (34 W. R. 730), directed the registration to proceed, on the ground that “ Melrose " on the label was not a geographical description, but a purely fanciful word, as much as “ Eureka ” or “ Opoponax " when applied to the particular commodity. In Re Leafs Trade-Mark application was made for the registraof the words “Electric Velveteen” as a trade-mark for cotton goods. The Comptroller had refused to register it on similar grounds. Bacon, V.O. (30 Sonicn-one’ J ovaivsn, 673), directed the registration to be made.
Tun COURT or Ar-ri;.u. (Gorroiv, Lrxnnsr, and Loras, L JJ) reversed both decisions. On behalf of the Comptroller it was argued that a “fancy word " did not mean, as the Vice-Chancellor thought, a common word, the application of which to the particular commodity was novel and fanciiul, but a word which had no meaning in the English language, and had been coined for the purpose, or is a word which was not, and could not be, in common use. On behalf of the respondents it was contended that by user they had acquired a right and property in the word as applied to the particular commodity, and the primary sense had become merged in the fancy sense. A fancy word was either a word ab |'m'ti'o coined for the occasion; or a word might become a fancy word by usage in an unusual, abnormal sense, and recognition of such usage. Corrox, L.J., said that the court had to construe a particular clause in the Act, though, of course, with the assistance of other clauses. The object of the Act was to benefit traders by making it unnecessary to go into evidence in a proceeding to protect a trade—mark, if the mark was registered, and also to furnish the public with the knowledge of what marks were entitled to protection. It was a further aim of the Act to cut down the loose forms by which traders had tried to protect themselves, and to oblige them to keep their marks within the prescribed limits. The question was whether the words were within the definition “ A distinctive device, brand, heading, label, ticl-rel, or fancy word or words not in common use." In both cases there was evidence that the word had been used for a considerable iirne, and that traders had recognized it as indicating the maker of the goods for which it was used; so that, but for the Act, the users of the words might have made out a case for protection. There was evidence that the words had come to be considered as fancy words in the trade, but the real question was whether the words had lost their primary meaning. Cases had been cited in which, before the Act, the court had protected traders from having goods passed off as theirs by others, and it was said that in those cases certain words were recognized as fancy words. But it was not 11*3¢B§Sary in those cases that the words should be fancy words in order to obtain protection. The principle was, that, if the word had come to denote the goods of u particular person, the court would restrain the use of it by another person so as to deceive, but not on the ground that it was a fancy word. The cases before the Trade-Marks Acts were no guides now. As to the “ llelrose " case, it could not be said that no eographical term could be a fancy word as applied to a particular article, gut it would be Wrong to allow the registration of “Maltese” in the prssent case. A fancy word must be one which was obviously not intended to be descri_ptive— to have reference to a place or to the character of the article to which it was applied. As to the word “electric,” could it be said to be a fancy word when applied to velveteen? It was a word of description. I_t was not necessary that a “ fancy ” word should be a word not in the dictionaries, but the fanciful use of a word descriptive in itself did not make 138 “fancy word.” It was not enough to use the word inappropriately. It Wills quite possible there might be diifereiices of opinion as to the meaning of the word applied as it was, but that did not affect the princiP1@- LINDLEY, L.J., said that the court must take care not to make the Act top burdensome to those who were not registered. The term “ fancy ‘fold’ had been introduced into the Act of 1883 on account of Er pizrlv '3'*’)I7H'm (3_Cli. D. 659), where it was found impossible under the former Act to register the fancy word “ Aeilyton." Loi-i-zs, L.J., said that tho ‘liiestion whether a word was a “fancy word " could not be decided by evldellce; the word must speak for itself.
The quest-ion was then raised whether the respondents ought to be ordered to pay the costs of the Comptroller. Bacon, \'.C., had made :11? °_ider as to costs. On behalf of the res iondents it was urged
but iii a number of previous cases similar words hail been registered without ° .le@i5l0!l, and that the respondents had been misled by the previous course
adopted by the Comptroller. On behalf of the Comptroller it was urged that the rule was, that even a successful applicant for registration paid the costs of opposition by the Comptroller.
Tun Coricr said thut, as the cases were test cases, they would not order the costs of the Comptroller in either court to be paid by the respondents, but this decision must not be taken as a precedent, or as altering the ordinary practioe.—Conxs'n'i., Sir R. E. We-tater, A.G., Sir H. Darcy, Q,.O., and Ingle Jag/ca; Aston, Q.O., and Sebastian. Soucrroas, golidtor to the Board of Trade; Wntncy, Illlermi, 4- Frumzm; U. A.
This was an action by a mortgagee for foreclosure, and the question was raised whether, under rule 1 of order 15, a foreclosure order could be made in chambers on summons. Rule 1 provides that, “ When a writ of summons has been iudorsed. for an account, under ord. 3, r. 8, or when the iudorsemeiit on a writ of summons involves taking an account, if the defendant either fails to appear, or does not after appearance, by aflidavit or otherwise, satisfy the court or a judge that there is some preliminary question to be tried, an order for the proper accounts, with all necessary inquiries and directions now usual in the Chancery Division in similar cases, shall be forthwith made." And rule 2 says that the application for such an order “ shall be made by summons.” It will be remembered that it was formerly the practice of Ohitty, J ., to make foreclosure orders on summons under this rule, as in Smith v. Davies (28 Ch. D. 651, 29 Soucirons‘ JOURNAL, 115), until, in Blake v. Ean~e_r/ (29 Ch. D. 827, 831), Cotton. L.J., expressed a doubt whether rule 1 of order 15 authorized the making of a foreclosure order. The question, however, whether the rule gives jurisdiction to make such an order has not yet been actually decided by the Court of Appeal. In the present case North, J ., in chambers, made a foreclosure order under this rule. The defendant afterwards moved in court to discharge the order, which North, J., refused to do. On the appeal being opened it appeared that in chambers the point of jurisdiction was not raised, the case being dealt with only on the merits. Under thesecircumstsnces
Tiia Covur or APPEAL (Co'r'ru.\‘, LXNDLBY, and Loi-ias, L.JJ.) held that the defendant had waived the objection to the jurisdiction. The court would have had jurisdiction to make the order in another way, and the objection to the form of procedure ought to have been taken as soon as possible, before the merits were entered upon. This not having been done, the objection could not be raised now.-Cov:xssi., Oooison, Q. ., and Dam!/is Gardiner: 6‘azms- Hardy, Q.C., and Inyle Jayw. Soucrrous, Swan Q 6'0. ,' Peaks, Bird, if Co.
In this case an important question arose as to the service of a notice of appointment to settle the list of contributories of a company in liquidation upon persons alleged to be contributories who are residing out of the jurisdiction of the court. In the present case the liquldator had served such a notice by post upon some rsons residing in Scotland and Ireland, stating that he proposed to includ): them in the list, and, having received no reply from them, he included their names in the list. North, J., in chambers, however, held that the service of the notice was invalid, and that he had no power to give leave to make such a service, and he therefore excluded tho names of the persons so served from the list: He thought that he was bound by the decision of the Court of Appeal in Re Anglo-Afrimn Slcnms/lip 00. (32 Ch. D. 848, 30 Soucrrous’ Joriwan, 449), in which it was held that there was no jurisdiction to allow the service on persons residing out of the jurisdiction of the court of an order for a call on the contributories of a company in liquidation. Rule ll0 of the General Order of November, 1862, under the Companies Act provides that, " Upon the list of contributories being left at the chambers of the judge, the official liquidator shall obtain an appointment from the judge to settle the same, and shall give notice in writing of such appointment to every person included in such list.”
Tun Covur or APPEAL (Cori-ox, Lisnnv, and Loi-as, L.JJ.)reversed the decision. Cor-rox, L.J., said that Re Anglo-Afrmm Slrnlrisbtp Ca. was a very different case. There it was sought to serve_ on persons ‘residing in a foreign country an order for a call, with the view of founding proceedings against them to compel payment of the call. In the present case the notice was not to be the fouu ation of any proceedings against the persons served with it, but the liquidator was only performing the duty imposed on him by the rules of settling the list of coutributories. A foreigner might be on the list, and all that had been done was to give not ice to the persons in question that it was proposed to place them on the list. That was a very different thing from the service of an originating summons or a notice which was intended to be the foundation of proceedings substituted for an action. In his lordship’s opinion the notice had been properly served, and, no cause havmg been shewn to the contrary, the judge ought to have settled the persons in_ question on the list. Lixiii.r:i', L.J., said that there was a very wide distinction between the present case and a proceeding to_enforce the payment Of 011119 . there would be no infringement of the jurisdiction 0f_ a ffifelg" °°‘"m'YIf such a notice could not be served abroad, his lordship did not see how, in man y cases, a company could be wound up at all. Lor-as, g.bJ.-,h2<'>r:curred.—Ooiri\'ssi., B110/clay, Q.C., and lm-H. Soiicirous J1. W Son, if U0.
This was a petition under the Infants’ Settlement Act, 185:5. It appeared that the petition was presented by a husband and wife_ for settlement of the wife's property, the wife being at the _date of marriage in March, 1886, under seventeen years of age, but having attained that age in October of the same year. The question arose whether the court could make a binding settlement, having regard to section 4 of the Act, which provides that nothing in the Act contained shall apply to any male infant under the age of twenty years or female infant under the age of seventeen years
Ci-iri'ri', J., said that in Re Sampson and Wall (32 W. R. 61?, 25 Oh. D. 482) it was held that section 1 of the Act was wide enough to mclu_de a settlement made upon the occasion of marriage, whether post-nuptial or antenuptial. In the present case some ten months had elapse since marriage, but, nevertheless, having regard to what was decided in the Oourt of Apseal and his own view of section 1, he held that such an interval presents no objection to his making an order. With regard to section 4, he thought that the right way of reading this section was to read the proviso which it contained as limiting the incapacity of the infant to the age of seventeen, or, to use the words of Lord Selborne, L.C., in the case cite , the infant’s incapacity to make a settlement ceases after the age has been attained, and that then a settlement, if really and truly s. settlement upon the occasion of the marriage and caused by the marriage and sanctioned by the court, might be made. To exclude from the benefit of the Act an infant marrying a few days before seventeen and applying a few days after attaining seventeen would be a strange result. Moreover, the Act did not intend to give protection only to persons who married after seventeen and to deny it to those who married before seventeen, when such latter class of persons might apparently require a somewhat greater degree of protection than the former. He therefore made an order under the Act for a settlenient.—Cov;sssr., Dunriiny. SOLICITORS, Talbot Q Taskar.
This was a motion in an action between paper manufacturers which raised the question as to the admissibility to registration of the mark "Jubilee" under the Patents Act, 1883, ss. 64 and 74, on the ground that it was a fancy word or distinctive. The question was argued solely on the former point. The plaintiffs had registered “ The Jubilee Note ” as a mark for their paper, and moved for an iulcrim injunction restraining the defendants from selling paper as “ The Jubilee Accession Note," and the_ defendants moved for an order to strike the plaintiffs’ mark off the register. The defendants relied on the decisions of the Appeal Court in Rs Van Duser and Re Leaf, Sons, 4- Co. (Court of Appeal, 28th January, 1887) as enunciating that the registrability of a word as a fancy word depended on its being ‘obviously meaningless in its application to the article in connection with which it was sought to be used—that was to spy (per Cotton, L.J.), “ obviously not descriptive " ; or (per Lopes, L.J.)
obviously and notoriously inappropriate as neither to be deceptive nor descriptive, nor calculated to suggest deception or description." The plain_ti_ffs submitted that the word “jubilee ” was sufficient, within those definitions, as being both meaningless in itself and in its proposed application.
Uuirrv, J. (who, during the course of the argument, had asked the question, whom was the inappropriateness, &c., of an English word to be‘ Ob’V,10\.1B, to the learned or the imlearned P) said that the word
jubilee was‘not_obviously meaningless as regarded paper or notepaper, because it might possibly signify that the paper was used in the Jubilee Year (1887) of her Maj esty's reign. Moreover, the word “ jubilee " was used by many English writers, including Dryden, Sir Walter Scott, and others. It was, therefore, a common English word. He therefore held that the word “ jubilee " could not be registered as a trade-mark for p&p6l'.—COUN8EL, Aston, Q.U., and Sebastian ; Ranier, Q C., and 0'arpmru:l. Soricirons, Wcmssy, Bowen, §- 00. ; Wilson, Brislozcs, 4 Uarpmad.
Gospel. General Booth was the “Sn ' t d t-G '
called the Salvation Army. There waspeevrilcllleitiiie illiat i;il;e}1Zi:i)p,€:f thingy body was, in accordance with a deed poll executed by General gooth '6 1878, confided solely to him as General-Superintendent. At that uni:
,, . . . . , . 311?‘ lliggy was called the Christian Mission, ' but its name was afterwards Non-i-ii J., held that the le ac m t b ' .
lordship iiaid um it was not diipiiica ‘that if iifiigsgi 1sBr%?1ii1' f iii‘! Gospel was a good charitable bequest; but the question waslivhethgr tl e legacy ought to be made the subject of a scheme, or to be paid to Q: legatee named without any scheme, the mode of application bein left to him. The legatee, described by the testator as General Will‘ BB
was well known as the present head of the orguni'/ed bod mini] Oath’ Salvation Army. There was full evidence of the nature anti bbjfigtstlgg
that body, including a deed Ipoll enrollied} in (ganceryéadeclagig doctrines and constitution. a re rom e rec s in a e that the earliest efforts of the Sgifziition Army, formerly known as the “ Christian Mission,” were addressed to bringing undter the Gospel those who were not in the habit of attending any place o worship; and his lordship thought that the great ob'ect of that body might fairly be described as being the diffusion of reiigion and the spread of the Gospel. By their deed of constitution their founder, Mr. Booth, was made for his life General-Su erintendent of the body, and he had consequently become well known as (general Booth, and it became his duty, under that deed, to determine and express the discipline and laws and superintcud the operations of the society, and to govern the same to and for the objects and purposes for which it was first originated. and he was emplowered to expend on behalf of the body all money contributed for t e general purposes thereof, or any of its special objects or operations, and required to publish annual balance-sheets, duly audited, of all recei ts and payments. These duties he still continued to perform, and under his superintendenoe the body had made very rapid progress, and its operations were daily extending. The accounts were regularly published, and it appeared from them that very numerous sums of large aggregate amount came to the hands of General Booth, and were applied in a very large number of payments, generally of small amounts. Tlis testator was, at any rats, to some extent aware of the operations of the body in question, and had on several occasions contributed to its funds. He described the legatee by reference to his ofiicial character. In the ease of every other legacy in favour of a charity he provided for payment to the intended recipients. His lordship had no doubt that if he had been asked whether he wished that the bequest should be intrusted to the General for him to apply ii, he would have answered in the affirmative. Under these circumstances his lordship did not think it necessary to direct any scheme as to the application of the legacy. I’ow¢-rswurt v. Poum-acoiart (1 Moll. 616), Weld! v. Cohen (16 \-‘es. 206), Ilird v. T/I6 Earl of Sufolk (2 My. & Keen. 59), and YVMJ/i v. Gladstone (1 Phil. 290) were ample authority for that view. His lordship did not think that the establishment of any permanent trust is what the testator contemplated. He thought the control of the court quite sulliciently maintained by giving leave to apply as was done in those cases.—Coi'.vssi., Riyby, Q,.O., and Rmsbaw, Q,.G.; Inyk Joyw; Evm", Q.C., and Vaughan Hawkins; C024‘)!-Y-H(l)‘!l_l;, Q.C., and Heart,‘ TIWMMI Blackmore. SOLICITORS, Crowdera ¢ V izard ; H/Ire 4' U0
This was a petition by a mother, under the Infants’ Custody Act °i 1873, asking that her husband might be ordered to deliver into ht!‘ custody an infant child of the marriage, a girl aged_ three and flhflalfi The father had employment in Spain; the mother, with the cl_1ild,_1} been residing in England with her own father. who had been maintaining them. The petition was supported by an affidavit of the mother, whip] stated that the father, who was temporarily in England, had come to It‘ e house of her father and carried away the child by violence. The fat Q}; did not appear on the hearing of the petition, and there was no aflldfl" of its having been served upon him. Under these circumstances. _ It
Nos.-i-i~i, J ., said that he could not make an order on the petition. must stand over to enable an affidavit of service to be proiufifid» ind,“ would meanwhile make an order restraining the father from remvvllil the child out of the jurisdiction.—Cousssi., 0o:m.:-Hardy, Q-Q-1 ‘ma ' Field. SOLICITORS, Field, Roscoe, §- C0.
This was a summons under the Vendor and Purchaser Act, 1814. 51° question being whether an equitable mortgagee by deed of freehold land, selling the mortgaged property under the power conferred by thc Conveyancing Act, 1881, can convey the legal estate to the Pll\‘¢h5§e1'- \ e believe that there has been a difference of opinion among conve)'&“°°“ °“ this point. Section 19 of the Act gives to a mortgagee, when the I110?‘Bage is made by deed, B Power, When the mort838°'m°“°Y has b°°°.'.“° due, to sell the mortgaged property, the power being given “ to the Met extent as if it had been in terms conferred by the mortgage-deal: but “° further." Section 20 imposes certain restrictions on the exercise of I11? power, and section 21 provides that “ a mortgagee exercising the P°we'° sale conferred by this Act shall have power by deed to convey the P1'°P°fl7 sold, for such estate and interest therein as is the subject of the mfiflgalgi freed from all estates, &c., to which the mortgage has priority, but su tject to all estates, &c., which have priority to the mortgage, 93°91’) ‘ha Y in the case of copyhold or customary land, the legal right t0_B<1""mt“°€ shall not pass by a deed under this section, unless the deed is 51151019“ otherwise by law, or is suflicient by custom, in that behalf." . h
Noam, J., held that the mortgagee could only convey the estate Whlc he himself had.—Coi'.\'siiL, J. B. Porter; Ingpen. Soticiroiis, 0. G. E41’man; R. Parker.
a person who took the mortgage and title deeds Mod ji/I: on dcposit to secure a loan to the mortgagee. The plaintiff, who was an illiterate person, mortgaged his property to a solicitor for £200, and signed a receipt for the money, believing that he was only giving the solicitor instructions to raise a loan. The plaintiff never received the money. The mortgagee shortly afterwards deposited the mortgage and title deeds with the defendants, S. & Co., who received them bond fide, and without notice, tosecure the repayment of £100 lent by them to hiin. The action was brought against the mortgagee and S. & Co. to have the mortgage set aside and the deeds delivered to the plaintiff. The mortgagee did not a pear.
pKsiriiwrcir, J., held that, although the plaintiff might be entitled to have the mortgage set aside as against his solicitor, yet, inasmuch as he intended to authorize his solicitor to raise money upon the security of the property, his equity must be postponed to that of S. 8: C0,: Par/l-or v. Clark: (9 W. R. 877, 30 Beav. 54) must be taken to be overruled by ]lioIm-ton v. Walker (34 \V. R. 141, 31 Ch. D. 15l).—Cou.\'ssi., Slcrn, Barber, Q.C., and W. U. Drum SOLXQITORS, F. .1’. Day ; Storey 4» Cawlami.
In this case the question arose whether the defendant could take a preliminary objection to the hearing of an action on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to pay the costs of a motion in the action which he had been ordered to pay. The plaintifi had moved for a receiver, and his motion had been dismissed with costs. These costs were never paid, but no order had been applied for to stay the further proceedings in the action until their payment. This was the hearing of the action, and the defendant took the preliminary objection that the costs of the motion had not been paid. The plaintiff urged that proceedings could only be stayed upon a special application made for that purpose.
KBREWICH, J., following Bacon, V.C , in Re Neal, Weston v. Neal (34 W. R. 319, 31 Ch. D. 437) allowed the objection, and ordered the trial to be postponed until the plaintiff had paid the costs.—CounsnL, Oswald, Poahin,
0. E. E. Jenkins. Sonrcrrons, Geo. JoIm.wn,- Slmen 4- Roscoe.
This was a motion to set aide an order of Huddleston, B., er pom, making a compromise of certain divorce proceedings a rule of court. The sgreemsntof compromisecontained a provision that it might be made a rule of co_u_rt. A deed embodying this agreement was drawn up, the principal provision being as to payment of the wife's costs. This deed, after some dispute, was settled by one of the conveyancing counsel to the Chancery Divison, before whom both parties appeared. The respondent in the suit refused to execute, but eventually did so after the order of Huddleston, B. Costs were duly taxed, but no order for payment made. After a writ of ji. fa. had been issued upon the order of Huddleston, 5;, tbg respondent paid the costs under protest and appealed against
Tan Cocnr (Lord COLBRIDGE, C.J., Sir J. Haxnnx, P., axn Gnova, J.) upheld the order. Lord Comznrnoe, C.J., said that he had no doubt that the court had power to make such a compromise a rule of court on motion n:_part: when the case had been pending in any other division but the DlV0l’L'6 Division; and he agreed with Sir James Hannen's view that the court would enforce compromises of cases in that division also. Sir -lanes Hasxsx said that the old practice had been altered by Sir C. c'e“§"°]l1 who refused to permit, as a matter of course, the compromise of divorce suits, thus leaving parties to take proceeding in other courts when the Divorce Court refused to take action. Since the Judicature Acts all the judges were judges of one court, and the power exercised by Huddleston, B., in enforcing this compromise was analogous to that constantly exercised by the vacation judge in matters pending in the Divorce Division. The provisions in the compromise sought to be made a rule of court were, in effect, merely for the repayment of the petitions-r‘s 0083‘-B and did not concern such matters as the custody of children, in which, the learned judge said, he should have refused to enforce it. GROW, J , doubted whether a compromise of an action ought to be enforced on er part: motion before any judge except the one who had heard the matter in open court, but agreed that in this case the order that had been made was a just one.—Cousssr,, Crllmp, Q.C., .4. T. Laurame ; Horne P '1!/"B, Q-C., A. T. Reddol. Soucirons, il[ru~/uirisori, 2h_z/Ior, if Arnold ,Waplu Canwardm.
purchase, and the price and terms and conditions thereof, and no com-
the matter stood in the same position as if there had een no org
‘ that the purchasers should pay the vendor’s costs and churgflfi, Rlld the
question had arisen between the vendor and lJlSvOW!l solicitors The question turned entirely on rule 11. The vendors surveyor had done some work, the details of which did not appear, _but it appeoredfrom the objections to the taxation that the amount of his fee, or cominissloll. 01' remuneration was ascertained by the engineer of the coinmissioncrs, and was settled by him according to Bryde‘s Scale. It came to this, that a person was employed by the vendor to treat for_ the sale of the property, and that he was paid for his services a. commission, which the taxing master described as “full charges.” A fee,_ arrived at by an qr! wilvrem charge, was paid to a person who came within the_ description of an “ estate or other agent " in rule 11, and who was described as ‘surveyor or agent" in the vendor's claim. The scale for negotiating applied only to a case where no such charge or commission was paid by the client as was paid in the present case. The solicitors were, therefore, not entitled to the scale lee, but must obtain their remuneration in the ordinary ‘way. And, as to the fee for deducing title, his lordship was clearly of opinion that no title had been deduced, and the scale did not 8pply.—C0l'NSEL, Byme; J. Henderson. SOLICITORS, Harris, Powell, §- Gaodole ; E. A. Baylia.
This was an appeal by the defendant from the disallowauce by Kay, J. (30 Soniciroirs’ Jociw/it, 567), of certain costs to the defendant Elwes, a trustee, who was a solicitor, on the ground that he had placed himself in a position in which his interest conflicted with his duty, and was therefore unable to charge the estate of which he was a trustee with the costs of professional work done by himself or his firm. N. C. Corsellis by his will, dated the 26th of October, 1876, appointed Lawton; S. Turner (a solicitor) and Firman his executors and trustees. His real estate, which comprised the manor of Wivenhoe in Essex, was devised in strict settlement, and the trustees were empowered to employ receivers, bailiffs, accountants, and agents in the affairs of the estate. And the testator appointed Turner, his heirs and assigns, steward of the manor, and provided that he might, by himself or his firm, act as solicitor for the estate, and charge for business done relating to it. There was no general power for every solicitor-trustee to charge for business done by him. The iestator died in September, 1878, and Turner died in February, 18-‘10. The defendant Elwes, a solicitor, who had been in partnership with Turner, was appointed a trustee in his place. The appeal related to four classes of charges. (l) In August, 18.‘-ll, an application was made to the court by the plaintiff, an infant, who was beneficially interested in the real estate under the testator's will, by his next friend, for maintenance out of the estate. To that application the defendant Elwes and his co-trustee Firmiin (Lawton having died in May, 1881) were respondents. The defendant Elwes‘s firm, through their London agents, Messrs. _Elwcs 5: Sharpe, acted as solicitors for the respondents to this application, and in respect of this the defendant Elwes‘s firm made profit charges amounting to £16 9s. 2d. (2) Firman died in September, 1881, and after his death the defendant Elwes, having then become the sole trustee oi the estate, was made defendant in this action for the execution oi the trusts of the real estate and for the appointment of a receiver and manager. A receiver and manager of the estate was appointed, and the defe_ndant’s firm, by their London agents, acted as his solicitors, and received £15 Gs. ld. as their share o the profit costs allowed to the receiver on taxation. (3) The defendant appointed his partner, G. B. Turner, to act as steward of tho manor. Fees paid to him as steward by the copyhold tenants of the manor had been carried by him to the credit of his firm, and the defendant claimed to be entitled to a share of those fees. (4) The defendant's firm made profit charges in respect of certain leasesand agreements for leasesof parts of the estate which the defendant, as trustee, ha granted. The plaintiff applied for ii review of the taxing master's certificate by disallowing all these profit costs and charges. Kay J ., disallowed them all. ’
The fortieth annual general meeting of this association was held on the 17th ult., Mr. W. A. Green, resident, in the chair.
The secretary read the annualreport of the committee, and the hon. treasurer read the financial statement for the past year.
It was proposed by the chairman, seconded by Mr. C. L. Adams, and resolved unanimously :—“ That the report of the committee, and the iiuancial statement for the past year, whicli have been read, be received, adopted, and entered on the r_niuutes."
It was proposed by Mr. Stirk, seconded by Mr. Thorneycroft, and resolved unanimously :—“ That Mr. Henry Stanley be president for the year
n lslillwas proposed by Mr. Watcrhouse, seconded by Mr. Robert Willcoclr, and resolved unanimously :—“ That Mr. F. T. Langley be vice-president for ilie year 1887." _ _
It is proposed by Mr. A. B. Smith, seconded biyn Mr. A. “l1li€l\OllSt‘. and resolved unanimously :—“ That Mr. E. B. Tho cycroft be re-electid honorary treasurer for the year 1887." _
It was proposed by Mr. Owen, seconded by Mr. Greensill, and resolved unai1imously:—“ That Mr. E. T. Cresswcll be elected honorary secretary for the year ISST."
It was proposed by Mr. A. B. Smith, seconded by Mr. S. W. Page, and resolved unanimously :—“ That Messrs. Adams, Green, C. B. Smith, and Stirk be electcd members of the committee. _
It was proposed by Mr. G. W. Walker, seconded by Mr. Qreensill_:— “ That the best thanks of the association befiven to the president, vicepresidcnt, committee, and hon. treasurer, an secretary for their service! during the past year." The thanks of the meeting were also voted to the chairman for his conduct in the chair.
The annual dinner of the society was held on the some day, and was uttended by 24 members. The county court judge, the stipendiary, and the oihcial receiver were present as invited guests.
The following are extracts from the report of the committee :— _ _
1‘r/-fe.<.~ionaI ma!!cr.r.—The question oi proceedings against solic1i0TB practising in the neighbourhood who had not taken out their certificates has further engaged the attention of the committee, and_ as a result the Incorporated Law Society, at the suggestion of the committee, prosecuted three solicitors for practising without certificates, and in each case a_ coil; viction was obtained, and the defaultnrs were fined, and have paid, £41 and costs. The attention of the committee has also been called other cases of solicitors practising without certificates. In one case their representations induced thc solicitor in default to take out his certificate, and in another case the Incorporated Law Society have decided to take ploceediugs. The committee have, in the interests of the members, protested against the employment of a solicitor not practising in the in B Post Ofilce prosecution, and they trust that as la result of their proiefll local solicitors will in future he employed. They have also_ causal, B circular to be sent to the clerks of the magistrates in the district callflll their attention to the irregularit of constabulsry oficers coudu_Ctl_1I8 prosecutions. A circular has also Iieen sent to members of the assoclsilflfl asking for their assistance in sup ressiug this practice, and the committee would venture to urge that this matter be not lost sight of by U19 members.
The Iricorporatezl Law Soeiely.—With reference to the paragraphs in lofii year's report as to the desirability of more solicitors becoming members of the Incorporated Law Society, the president and secretary made B canvass of the members of the association, and the result of that canvmi and of the steps taken by the association, has been that fifteen member! of the association hm joined the Incorporated Law Society. The committee consider while this is a satisfactory result it is not all that could be desired, and they trust that every member of the association who does 11°‘ also belong to the Incorporated Law Society will join that bod)’ ‘l once.
T/1c new Uaunly Court Ruler.—-The question of the inconvenience 08l1§9d by the new County Court Rules has engaged a large amount of _aW“l'°n during the year. The committee have also in connection with this subJ?°l .00n8lder6d the proposed Bill to consolidate the Oonnty Oourt Acts, \i‘l"°.h was introduced into the House of Lords by the then Lord Chancellor, ill June last. The attention of the committee was called to the comtplllilflls which were being made by the Chamber of Commerce relative to 9 "Id convenience caused to the commercial community by the new l'11l§'*» 5"‘ the secretary was instructed to place himself in communication will! ill" body, with a view to united action. After some meetings llfld “kw place between a sub-committee of the Chamber of Commerce Bud Fm“ secretary, the committee of this association appointed a sub-committee iv confer with the sub-committee of the Chamber of Commerce 111"“ mo
I matter, and to suggest to the latter sub-committee the direction in Which
Feb. :2, 1827. THE SOLICITORS’ JOURNAL. =57
amendments should be sought, with a view of assisting the local
Mr. Gr-zoiios ED\\'.\Rl"I HILLMAN, solicitor, of Lewes and Eastbonrne, has been appointed Deputy-Coroner for the Eastern Division of the county of Sussex. Mr. Hillman was admitted a solicitor in 1880.
Mr. Hssiir K_i>rszia, solicitor (of the firm of Kinneir 8: Tombs), of Swindon and Cricklade, has been appointed Registrar of the Swindon County Court (Circuit No. 52). Mr. Kinneir is clerk to the Swindon School Board,_and to the county magistrates at Cricklade. He was admitted asohcitor m 1854. His partner, Mr. Henry Coggeu Tombs, is oflicial receiver in bankruptcy for the Swindon District.
Mr. Joiix DOUGLAS SAND!-‘ORD, barrister, has been appointeda Ma istrate for the County of Middlesex. Mr. Sandford is the fourth son of tie Rev. John Ssndford, archdeacon of Coventry, and was born in 1832. He was formerly a scholar of Trinity College, Oxford, where he graduated first class in Classics in 1855. He was called to the bar at the Inner Temple m Easter Term, 1870. He was for several years Chief Judge of Mysore.
Mr. Jens §ronsi.L Donns, Attorney-General of Tasmania, has been appointed Puisne Judge of the Supreme Court of that colony, in succession to the late Mr. Justice Giblin. '
Mr. Rici-ia_iiiJ Enxzsr Lsxonoiixs, solicitor, of Wakefield, has been elected President of the Wakefield Incorporated Law Society for the ensuing year. Mr. Langhorne was admitted a solicitor in 1867.
Mr. Lswis LLOYD Joiix, solicitor, of Llangollen, has been appointed Clerk to the Llangolleii School Board in succession to Mr. Philip Henry Mmwmumgmd nnimnwnanmnmssdmnrniwz
Mr. WILLIAhI ALFRED PLUNKETT, solicitor (of the flrm of Plunkett & Leader), of 60, St. Paul's-churchyard, and of Grcenhithe, has been elected Chairman of the G-as and Water Committee of the Court of Common Council. Mr. Plunkett was admitted a solicitor in 1863. He is a common councilman for the ward of Farringdon Within.
Mr. WiLLian BOIJSI-‘IELD, barrister, has been appointed a Magistrate for the County of llliddlcsex. Mr. Bousfield is the eldest son of Mr. William Bousfield, of St-reatham, and was horn in 1842. He was educated at Merton College, Oxford, where he graduated second class in Law and Modern History in 1866. He was called to the bar at the Middle Temple in Michaelmas Term, 1868, and he practises in the Chancery Division. He igfiigliltimber of the School Board for London, representing the Chelsea
Mr. W. P. Sr. LEONARDS CHUBB, solicitor, of 29, Liiicoln’s-inn-fields, L°!1d°lJ. has been appointed a. Commissioner to administer Oaths in the Sllllreme Court of Judicature.
Mr. W. Soon Fox, solicitor, of 13, St. Mary's-square, Paddington, lies been appointed ii Commissioner to administer Oaths in the Supreme bourt of Judicature.