Page images


the appellant's own act, have given the proper length of notice of motion adopted by the Comptroller. On behalf of the Comptroller it was urged for security, he was entitled to apply for security without notice.

that the rule was, that even a successful applicant for registration paid the THE Court refused the application. COTTON, L.J., said that the costs of opposition by the Comptroller. respondent might have applied for leave to give short notice of motion. The Court said that, as the cases were test cases, they would not Moreover, both sides had already incurred the costs of the appeal.- order the costs of the Comptroller in either court to be paid by the Counsel, Ince, Q.C., and Nalder ; Woodroffe. SOLICITORS, A. Hunt ; respondents, but this decision must not be taken as a precedent, or as Robinson, Preston, & Stow.

altering the ordinary practice.- COUNSEL, Sir R. E. Webster, A. G., Sir H.

Davey, Q.C., and Ingle Joyce ; Aston, Q.C., and Sebastian. SOLICITORS, Re VAN DUZER'S TRADE-MARK; Re LEAF'S TRADE-MARK Solicitor to the Board of Trade; Watney, Tilleard, $ Freeman; C. A. C. A. No. 2, 28th January.


DYOTT v. NEVILL-0. A. No. 2, 9th February.
TRADE-MARKS Act, 1883, s. 64-Costs.

MORTGAGE-FORECLOSURE-R. S. C., 1883, XV., 1, 2. In these two cases, which were heard together, the question arose,

This was an action by a mortgagee for foreclosure, and the question what is a "fancy word not in common use,” which is capable of being be made in chambers on summons.

was raised whether, under rule 1 of order 15, a foreclosure order could registered as a trade-mark. Section 64, sub-section 1, of the Patents, of summons has been indorsed for an account, under ord. 3, r. 8, or when

Rule 1 provides that, “ When a writ Designs, and Trade-Marks Act, 1883, permits the registration of (inter the indorsement on a writ of summons involves taking an account, alia)

a distinctive device, brand, heading, label, ticket, or fancy word if the defendant either fails to appear, or does not after appearance, or words not in common use. was made for an order directing the registration of the words. Melrose by affidavit or otherwise, satisfy the court or a judge that there is Favourite Hair Restorer” as a trade-mark for a preparation for the hair.

some preliminary question to be tried, an order for the proper accounts, The Comptrollor refused to register the mark, on the ground that Division in similar cases, shall be forth with made."

with all necessary inquiries and directions now usual in the Chancery

And rule 2 says “Melrose," being the name of a plače, was, or might be, descriptive of locality, and could not therefore be “a fancy word not in

that the application for such an order "shall be made by summons.” use" within the meaning of section 64. Bacon, V.C. (34 W. R. 730), make foreclosure orders on summons under this fule, as in Smith v. Davies

It will be remembered that it was formerly the practice of Chitty, J., to directed the registration to proceed, on the ground that “Melrose” on the (28 Ch. D. 651, 29 Solicitors' Journal, 115), until, in Blake T. Harrey, label was not a geographical description, but a purely fanciful word, as much as “ Eureka" or "Opoponax" when applied to the particular com

(29 Ch. D. 827, 831), Cotton, L.J., expressed å doubt whether rule 1 of modity. In Re Leaf's Trade- Mark application was made for the registra: however, whether the rule gives jurisdiction to make such an order has

order 15 authorized the making of a foreclosure order. The question, of the words "Electric Velveteen". as a trade-mark for cotton goods. not yet been actually decided by the Court of Appeal. In the present case The Comptroller bad refused to register it on similar grounds. Bacon, North, J., in chambers, made a foreclosure order under this rule. The V.C. (30 ŠOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 673), directed the registration to be made. The Court of APPEAL (COTTON, LINDLEY, and Lopes, L.JJ) reversed both J., refused to do. On the appeal being opened it appeared that in

defendant afterwards moved in court to discharge the order, which North, decisions. On behalf of the Comptroller it was argued that a "fancy chambers the point of jurisdiction was not raised, the case being dealt word” did not mean, as the Vice Chancellor thought, & common word, with only on the merits. Under these circumstances the application of which to the particular commodity was novel and fanciful, but a word which had no meaning in the English language, and had

THE COURT OF APPEAL (COTTON, LINDLEY, and LOPES, L.JJ.) held that been coined for the purpose, or is a word which was not, and could not

the defendant had waived the objection to the jurisdiction. The court be, in common use. On behalf of the respondents it was contended that

would have had jurisdiction to make the order in another way, and the by user they had acquired a right and property in the word as applied to objection to the form of procedure ought to have been taken as soon as the particular commodity, and the primary sense had become merged in possible, before the merits were entered upon. This not having been the fancy sense.

A fancy word was either a word ab initio coined for the done, the objection could not be raised now.- Counsel, Cookson, Q.8., and occasion; or a word might become a fancy word by usage in an unusual,

Dundas Gardiner : Cozens-Hardy, Q.C., and Ingle Joyce. SOLICITORS, abnormal sense, and recognition of such usage. Cotton, L.J., said that

Swan & Co. ; Peake, Bird, f Co. the court had to construe a particular clause in the Act, though, of Re NATHAN, NEWMAN, & Co.-C. A. No. 2, 9th February. course, with the assistance of other clauses. The object of the Act was to benefit traders by making it unnecessary to go into evidence in a pro

PRACTICE-SERVICE OUT OF JURISDICTION-COMPANY-WINDING UP-NOTICE ceeding to protect a trade-mark, if the mark was registered, and also to

OF APPOINTMENT TO SETTLE LIST OF CONTRIBUTORIES CONTRIBUTORY furnish the public with the knowledge of what marks were entitled to

RESIDING OUT OF JURISDICTION GENERAL ORDER UNDER COMPANIES protection. It was a further aim of the Act to cut down the loose forms

ACT (NOVEMBER, 1862), rt. 30–R. S. C., 1883, XI., 1. by which traders had tried to protect themselves, and to oblige them to In this case an important question arose as to the service of a notice of keep their marks within the prescribed limits. The question was whether appointment to settle the list of contributories of a company in liquida. the words were within the definition “A distinctive device, brand, tion upon persons alleged to be contributories who are residing out of the heading, label, ticket, or fancy word or words not in common use." In jurisdiction of the court. In the present case the liquidator had served both cases there was evidence that the word had been used for a consider- such a notice by post upon some persons residing in Scotland and Ireland, able time, and that traders had recognized it as indicating the maker of stating that he proposed to include them in the list, and, having received the goods for which it was used; so that, but for the Act, the users of the no reply from them, he included their names in the list. North, J., in words might have made out a case for protection. There was evidence that chambers, however, held that the service of the notice was invalid, and the words had come to be considered as fancy words in the trade, but the real that he had no power to give leave to make such a service, and he there. question was whether the words had lost their primary meaning. Cases fore excluded the names of the persons so served from the list. He had been cited in which, before the Act, the court had protected traders thought that he was bound by the decision of the Court of Appeal in Re from having goods passed off as theirs by others, and it was said that in Anglo-African Steamship Co. (32 Ch. D. 348, 30 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 449), those cases certain words were recognized as fancy words. But it was not in which it was held that there was no jurisdiction to allow the service on necessary in those cases that the words should be fancy words in order to persons residing out of the jurisdiction of the court of an order for a call obtain protection. The principle was, that, if the word had come to on the contributories of a company in liquidation. Rule 30 of the General denote the goods of a particular person, the court would restrain the use Order of November, 1862, under the Companies Act provides that, Upon of it by another person so as to deceive, but not on the ground that it was the list of contributories being left at the chambers of the judge, the a fancy word. The cases before the Trade-Marks Acts were no guides official liquidator shall obtain an appointment from the judge to settle the

As to the " Melrose" case, it could not be said that no geographical same, and shall give notice in writing of such appointment to every term could be a fancy word as applied to a particular article, but it would person included in such list.” be wrong to allow the registration of “Melrose” in the present case. The COURT OF APPEAL (COTTON, LINDLEY, and LOPES, L.JJ.) reversed A fancy word must be one which was obviously not intended to be the decision. Cotton, L.J., said that Re Anglo-African Steamship Co. descriptive-to have reference to a place or to the character of the article was a very different case. There it was sought to serve on persons reto which it was applied. As to the word "electric,” could it be said to siding in a foreign country an order for a call, with the view of founding be a fancy word when applied to velveteen? It was a word of description proceedings against them to compel payment of the call. In the present It was not necessary that a "fancy” word should be a word not in the dic case the notice was not to be the foundation of any proceedings against tionaries, but the fanciful use of a word descriptive in itself did not make the persons served with it, but the liquidator was only performing the it a "fancy word.” It was not enough to use the word inappropriately. duty imposed on him by the rules of settling the list of contributories. It was quite possible there might be differences of opinion as to the A foreigner might be on the list, and all that had been done was to meaning of the word applied as it was, but that did not affect the princi- give notice to the persons in question that it was proposed to place them ple. LINDLEY, L.J., said that the court must take care not to make the

on the list.

That was a very different thing from the service of an Act too burdensome to those who were not registered. The term “ fancy originating summons or a notice which was intended to be the foundaword” had been introduced into the Act of 1883 on account of Ex parte tion of proceedings substituted for an action. In his lordship’s opinion Stephens (3 Ch. D. 659), where it was found impossible urder the former the notice had been properly served, and, no cause having been shewn to Act to register the fancy word " Aeilyton.”. Lores, L.J., said that the the contrary, the judge ought to have settled the persons in question on question whether a word was a "fancy word” could not be decided by the list. Lindley, L.J., said that there was a very wide distinction beevidence; the word must speak for itself.

tween the present case and a proceeding to enforce the payment of calls ; The question was then raised whether the respondents ought to be there would be no infringement of the jurisdiction of a foreign country. ordered to pay the costs of the Comptroller. Bacon, V.C., had made If such a notice could not be served abroad, his lordship did not see how, no order as to costs.

On behalf of the respondents it was urged in many cases, a company could be wound up at all. *Lopes, L.J., conthat in a number of previous cases similar words had been registered without curred. -COUảsel, Buckley, Q.C., and Lerett. SOLICITORS 1. Abrahams objection, and that the respondents had been misled by the previous course

Son, & Co.


that body, including a deed poll enrolled in Chancery, declaring their Re PHILLIPS-Chitty, J., 5th February.

doctrines and constitution. It appeared from the recitals in that deed

that the earliest efforts of the Salvation Army, formerly known as the INFANT-INFANT MARRYING WITHOUT A SETTLEMENT AND UNDER SEVENTEEN -INFANTS' SETTLEMENT ACT, 1855 (18 & 19 VICT. C. 43), ss. 1, 4.

“ Christian Mission,” were addressed to bringing under the Gospel those

who were not in the habit of attending any place of worship, and his This was a petition under the Infants' Settlement Act, 1855. It lordship thought that the great object of that body might fairly be appeared that the petition was presented by a husband and wife for described as being the diffusion of religion and the spread of the Gospel. settlement of the wife's property, the wife being at the date of marriage By their deed of constitution their founder, Mr. Booth, was made for his in March, 1886, under seventeen years of age, but having attained that life General-Superintendent of the body, and he had consequently become age in October of the same year. The question arose whether the court well known as General Booth, and it became his duty, under that deed, to could make a binding settlement, having regard to section 4 of the Act, determine and express the discipline and laws and superintend the operawhich provides that nothing in the Act contained shall apply to any male tions of the society, and to govern the same to and for the objects and infant under the age of twenty years or female infant under the age of purposes for which it was first originated, and he was empowered to exseventeen years

pend on behalf of the body all money contributed for the general purCHITTY, J., said that in Re Sampson and IV all (32 W. R. 617, 25 Ch. D. 482) | poses thereof, or any of its special objects or operations, and required to it was held that section 1 of the Act was wide enough to include a settle- publish annual balance-sheets, duly audited, of all receipts and payments. ment made upon the occasion of marriage, whether post-nuptial or ante These duties he still continued to perform, and under his superintendence nuptial. In the present case some ten months had elapsed since mar the body had made very rapid progress, and its operations were daily riage, but, nevertheless, having regard to what was decided in the Court extending. The accounts were regularly published, and it appeared from of Appeal and his own view of section 1, he held that such an interval pre them that very numerous sums of large aggregate amount came to the sented no objection to his making an order. With regard to section 4, he hands of General Booth, and were applied in a very large number of thought that the right way of reading this section was to read the proviso payments, generally of small amounts. The testator was, at any rate, to which it contained as limiting the incapacity of the infant to the age of some extent aware of the operations of the body in question, and had on seventeen, or, to use the words of Lord Selborne, L.C., in the case cited, the several occasions contributed to its funds. He described the legatee by infant's incapacity to make a settlement ceases after the age has been reference to his official character. In the case of every other legacy in attained, and that then a settlement, if really and truly a settlement favour of a charity he provided for payment to the intended recipients. upon the occasion of the marriage and caused by the marriage and sanc His lordship had no doubt that if he had been asked whether he wished tioned by the court, might be made. To exclude from the benefit of the that the bequest should be intrusted to the General for him to apply it, Act an infant marrying a few days before seventeen and applying a he would have answered in the affirmative. Under these circumstances few days after attaining seventeen would be a strange result. Moreover, his lordship did not think it necessary to direct any scheme as to the the Act did not intend to give protection only to persons who married application of the legacy. Powerscourt v. Powerscourt (1 Moll. 616), Welch after seventeen and to deny it to those who married before seventeen, v. Cohen (16 Ves. 206), Hird v. The Earl of Suffolk (2 My. & Keen. 59), when such latter class of persons might apparently require a somewhat and Walsh v. Gladstone (1 Phil. 290) were ample authority for that view. greater degree of protection than the former. He therefore made an His lordship did not think that the establishment of any permanent trust order under the Act for a settlement.-Counsel, Dunning. SOLICITORS, is whet the testator contemplated. He thought the control of the court Talbot f Tasker.

quite sufficiently maintained by giving leave to apply as was done in those

cases.--Counsel, Rigby, Q.C., and Renshaw, Q.O. ; Ingle Joyce ; Everitt, TOWGOOD v. PIRIE & SONS—Chitty, J., 4th February. Q.C., and Vaughan Hawkins ; Cozens - Hardy, Q.O., and Geare ; Theobald ;

Blackmore. SOLICITORS, Crowders f Vizard ; Hare f Co.
PATENTS, &c., Act, 1883, s. 64-FANCY WORD-JUBILEE.
This was a motion in an action between paper manufacturers which

Re CROOKES—North, J., 8th February. raised the question as to the admissibility to registration of the mark * Jubilee” under the Patents Act, 1883, ss. 64 and 74, on the ground Infant-Custody—INJUNCTION TO restrain Removal OUT OF JURISDICTION that it was a fancy word or distinctive. The question was argued solely

-INFANTS' CUSTODY Act, 1873 (36 & 37 Vict. c. 12). on the former point. The plaintiffs had registered “The Jubilee Notes as a mark for their paper, and moved for an interim injunction restraining 1873, asking that her husband might be ordered to deliver into her

This was a petition by a mother, under the Infants’ Custody Act of the defendants moved for an order to strike the plaintiffs" mark off the custody, an infant child of the marriage, a girl aged three and a half. register. The defendants relied on the decisions of the Appeal Court in

The father had employment in Spain; the mother, with the child, had Re Van Duzer and Re Leaf, Sons, f Co. (Court of Appeal, 28th January,

been residing in England with her own father, who had been maintaining 1887) as enunciating that the registrability of a word as a fancy word stated that the father, who was temporarily in England, had come to the

The petition was supported by an affidavit of the mother, which depended on its being obviously meaningless in its application to the article in connection with which it was sought to be used-that was to

house of her father and carried away the child by violence. The father say (per Cotton, L.J.); “obviously not descriptive”; or (per Lopes, L.J.) of its having been served upon him. Under these circumstances:

did not appear on the hearing of the petition, and there was no affidavit “obviously and notoriously inappropriate as neither to be deceptive nor descriptive, nor calculated to suggest deception or description.”

North, J., said that he could not make an order on the petition. It

The plaintiffs submitted that the word “jubilee” was sufficient, within those

must stand over to enable an affidavit of service to be produced, and he definitions, as being both meaningless in itself and in its proposed the child cont of the jurisdiction. ---Counsel, Cozens-Hardy, Q.C., and L.

would meanwhile make an order restraining the father from removing application.

CHITTY, J. (who, during the course of the argument, had asked the Field. SOLICITORS, Field, Roscoe, $ Co.
question, to whom was the inappropriateness, &c., of an English word
to be obvious, to the learned or the unlearned ?) said that the word

Re HOBSON AND HOWES-North, J., 9th February. "jubilee" was not obviously meaningless as regarded paper or notepaper, because it might possibly signify that the paper was used in the MORTGAGBE-Power_OF SALE-EQUITABLE MORTGAGE--Conveyance of Jubilee Year (1887) of her Majesty's reign. Moreover, the word “jubilee"

LEGAL ESTATE-CONVEYANCING Act, 1881, s. 21. was used by many English writers, including Dryden, Sir Walter Scott,

This was a summons under the Vendor and Purchaser Act, 1874, the held that the word jubilee” could not be registered as a trade-mark for selling the mortgaged property under the power conferred by the Conveye

He therefore i question being whether an equitable mortgagee by deed of freehold land, paper.—Counsel, Aston, Q.C., and Sebastian ; Romer, Q C., and Carpmael. ancing Act, 1889, can convey the legal estate to the purchaser. We SOLICITORS, Wansey, Bowen, & Co.; Wilson, Bristows, $ Carpmael.

believe that there has been a difference of opinion among conveyancers on

this point. Section 19 of the Act gives to a mortgagee, when the morto Re LEA, LEA v. COOKE-North, J., 7th February.

gage is made by deed, a power, when the mortgage-money has become WILL-CHARITABLE LEGACY-SCHEME,

due, to sell the mortgaged property, the power being given to the like

extent as if it had been in terms conferred by the mortgage-deed, but not The question in this case was whether a charitable legacy should be further.” Section 20 imposes certain restrictions on the exercise of the direct a scheme for the application of the legacy. The testator bequeathed sale conferred by this Act shall have power by deed to convey the property paid to the person named as the legatee, or whether the court ought to power, and section 21 provides that “ a mortgagee exercising the power of Gospel.” General Booth was the “Superintendent-General" of a body freed from all estates, &c., to which the mortgage has priority, but that: called the Salvation Army. There was evidence that the property of the ject to all estates, &c., which have priority to the mortgage, except three body was, in accordance with a deed poll executed by General Booth in 1878, confided solely to him as General-Superintendent. At that time

shall not pass by a deed under this section, unless the deed is sufficient the body was called the “ Christian Mission," but its name was afterwards otherwise by law, or is sufficient by custom, in that behalf.” changed. North, J., held that the legacy must be paid to General Booth. His

NORTH, J., held that the mortgagee could only convey the estate which

he himself had.-COUNSEL, J. B. Porter; Ingpen. lordship said that it was not dispnted that a bequest for the spread of the

man; R. Parker. Gospel was a good charitable bequest; but the question was whether the legacy ought to be made the subject of a scheme, or to be paid to the legatee named without any scheme, the mode of application being left to

FRENCH ». HOPE-Kekewich, J., 3rd February. him. The legatee, described by the testator as General William Booth,

MORTGAGE_SETTING Aside-Fraud-Deposit of Title Deeds. Salvation Army. There was full evidence of the nature and objects be) induced by fraud to enter into a mortgage, could have it set aside against

In this case the question arose whether a mortgagor, who had been


[ocr errors]

a person who took the mortgage and title deeds bona fide on deposit to prchase, and tbe price and terms and conditions thereof, and no comsecure a loan to the mortgagee. The plaintiff, who was an illiterate mission is paid by the client to an auctioneer, or estate or other agent. person, mortgaged his property to a solicitor for £200, and signed a

In cases of sales under the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, or receipt for the money, believing that he was only giving the solicitor any other private or public Act under which the vendor's charges are paid instructions to raise a loan. The plaintiff never received the money. The by the purchaser, the scale shall not apply.” Paragraph 4 of the intromortgagee shortly afterwards deposited the mortgage and title deeds with ductory part of the order provides that "the remuneration prescribed by the defendants, S. & Co., who received them bona fide, and without notice, schedule I. to this order is not to include (inter alia) auctioneer's or to secure the repayment of £100 lent by them to him. The action was valuer's charges.” In the present case the Commissioners of Sewers for brought against the mortgagee and S. & Co. to have the mortgage set the City of London, acting under the powers conferred on them by their aside and the deeds delivered to the plaintiff. The mortgagee did not special Act (which contained no provision that the charges of a vendor appear.

should be paid by the commissioners, and with which the Lands Clauses KEKEWICH, J., held that, although the plaintiff might be entitled to Consolidation Act was not incorporated), in August, 1884, served on S., have the mortgage set aside as against his solicitor, yet, inasmuch as he the occupier of two leasehold houses, a notice to treat for the purchase of intended to authorize his solicitor to raise money upon the security of the his interest. In reply to this notice S., on the 5th of May, 1885, sent to property, his equity must be postponed to that of S. & Co.: Parker v. the commissioners a claim for £17,834 for the value of his interest in the Clarke (9 W. R. 877, 30 Beav. 54) must be taken to be overruled by Bicker - property. The claim was made upon a printed form furnished to him by ton v. Walker (34 W. R. 141, 31 Ch. D. 151). —COUNSEL, Stern, Barber, Q.C., the commissioners, and it was signed by his solicitors on his behalf. At and W. C. Druce. SOLICITORS, F. J. Day; Storey f Cowland.

the foot of it was the following (printed) note:-“Name and address of

surveyor or agent appointed to treat for sale of property," opposite to Re WICKIAM, MARONY v. TAYLOR – Kekewich, J., 2nd and 3rd which was written by the solicitors, “Mr. Farmer, of Messrs Debenham, February.

Tewson, & Farmer.' On the 5th of April, 1886, a contract in writing was PRACTICE-ACTION — TRIAL — CONTEMPT – UNPAID Costs — STAYING PRO- entered into between S, and the commissioners for the purchase of his

interest for £15,000. The contract provided (inter alia) that “the comCEEDINGS.

missioners are to pay the vendor's solicitors' preliminary costs, and also the In this case the question arose whether the defendant could take a prelim- costs of title and conveyance, such costs, in case of difference, to be inary objection to the hearing of an action on the ground that the plaintiff taxed in the ordinary way, and they will also pay the fee of the vendor's had failed to pay the costs of a motion in the action which he had been surveyor, such fee to be settled and determined by the engineer and surveyor ordered to pay. The plaintiff had moved for a receiver, and his motion to the commissioners.” On the 5th of April, 1886, the commissioners' had been dismissed with costs. These costs were never paid, but no order solicitor wrote to the vendor's solicitors : "If the title consists of any. had been applied for to stay the further proceedings in the action until their thing more than the lease, please let me have abstract; otherwise, I shall payment. This was the hearing of the action, and the defendant took not require one.” At this time the commissioners had acquired the the preliminary objection that the costs of the motion had not been paid. reversion of the property subject to the lease. On the 6th of April the The plaintiff urged that proceedings could only be stayed upon a special vendor's solicitors replied: “The title consists of the lease only; will you application made for that purpose.

require a copy in lieu of abstract ?" At this time the vendor's solicitors KEKEWICA, J., following Bacon, V.C, in Re Neal, Weston v. Neal (34 W.R. did not know that the commissioners were the owners of the reversion. 319, 31 Ch. D. 437) allowed the cbjection, and ordered the trial to be The commissioners' solicitor did not reply, except by sending, a draft postponed until the plaintiff had paid the costs.-COUNSEL, Oswald, Pochin, assignment of the lease for perusal. No copy or extract of the lease was C. E. E. Jenkins. SOLICITORS, Geo. Johnson ; Shaen & Roscoe.

supplied by the vendor's solicitors. The purchase was completed on the

12th of May, 1886, and the commissioners paid the fee of the vendor's SMYTHE v. SMYTHE-Q.B.Div., 31st January and 3rd February.

surveyor, which was settled by their engineer at £90. In fixing that PRACTICE-COMPROMISE OF DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS—Ex Parte MOTION TO

amount, the engineer acted on “Bryde's Scale in Compensation Cases."

The vendor's solicitors sent in their bill of charges to the commissioners, ENFORCE IN QUEEN's Bench Division.

amounting to £160. It consisted of two items only-viz., £77 10s., which This was a motion to set aside an order of Huddleston, B., ex parte,

was the negotiation fee prescribed by schedule I. for a purchase-money making a compromise of certain divorce proceedings a rule of court. The of £15,000, and £82 108., which was the fee for deducing title provided agreement of compromise contained a provision that it might be made a rule by that schedule for the same amount of purchase-money. The comof court. 4 deed embodying this agreement was drawn up, the principal missioners obtained an order to tax the bill, their petition on which the provision being as to payment of the wife's costs. This deed, after some

order was obtained alleging that the solicitors “were employed by S. in dispute, was settled by one of the conveyancing counsel to the Chancery the negotiation of a contract, dated the 5th of April, 1886, between S. and Divison, before whom both parties appeared. The respondent in the

the commissioners, for the sale to the commissioners of certain leasehold suit refused to execute, but eventually did so after the order of Hud- property, and the carrying out of such sale.” The taxing master was of dleston, B. Costs were duly taxed, but no order for payment made. opinion that, under the circumstances, the solicitors were not entitled to After a writ of fi. fa. had been issued upon the order of Huddleston, charge either of the scale fees, but they must be remunerated under By the respondent paid the costs under protest and appealed against schedule II. to the order, and he taxed their costs at £19 98. 7d. The

solicitors carried in objections to the taxation, in which they said, with The Court (Lord COLERIDGE, C.J., Sir J. HANNEN, P., AND GROVE, J.) regard to the “negotiation fee”: “The purchasers having given notice upheld the order. Lord COLERIDGE, C.J., said that he had no doubt that

to treat, the vendor's solicitors did in fact prepare the claim, and the court had power to make such a compromise a rule of court on motion send it in to the purchasers, and they did in fact close with the purex parte when the case had been pending in any other division but the

chasers' offer of £15,000, so as to satisfy the rule that the scale for negotiDivorce Division ; and he agreed with Sir James Hannen's view that the ating shall apply to cases where the solicitor of the vendor arranges the sale court would enforce compromises of cases in that division also. Sir

and the price and terms and conditions thereof, and, moreover, no comJAMES Hannen said that the old practice had been altered by Sir Cmission was paid by the client to an auctioneer, or estate or other agent. Cresswell, who refused to permit, as a matter of course, the compromise The purchaser contracted to pay the fee of the vendor's surveyor. Such of divorce suits, thus leaving parties to take proceeding in other courts

fee was not, in fact, a commission, and was wholly in the discretion of the When the Divorce Court refused to take action. Since the Judicature purchasers, and it is immaterial to the claim of the vendor's solicitors that it Huddleston, B., in enforcing this compromise was analogous to that dor's solicitors had no voice in the matter. The purchasers' contract to pay constantly exercised by the vacation judge in matters pending in the

the vendor's solicitors preliminary costs was, in fact, a contract to pay Divorce Division. The provisions in the compromise sought to be made a rule of court were, in effect, merely for the repayment of the petitioner's solicitors are not entitled to the scale charge for negotiating, as they and costs and did not concern such matters as the custody of children, in their clients employed surveyors, who made full charges. The comwhich, the learned judge said, he should have refused to enforce it.

missioners agreed to pay the costs of the vendor's solicitors, and also the

fee of the vendor's surveyor, but their paying the vendor's costs and forced on ex parte motion before any judge except the one who had heara charges does not alter the proper legal amount of such costs as payable the matter in open court, but agreed that in this case the order that had by the client.” As to the fee for deducing title, the solicitors said, "The been made was a just one.—Counsel, Crump, Q.C., A. T. Laurance za Elorne vendor's solicitors deduced such title as they had, and answered the only Prune, Q.C., 4.°T. Reddel. Solicitors, Hackinson, Taylor, ago Arnold; requisition capable of being made upon it. If they had forestalled the

purchasers' solicitors' question by delivering a copy or abstract of the lease, no question could have been raised, and they have done, in substance, the whole of the work in respect of which a charge is allowed

by the schedule.” The taxing master replied, “The solicitors are not CASES AFFECTING SOLICITORS.

entitled to the scale charge for deducing title, &c., as no title was shewn

to the purchaser (see Re Lacey, 25 Ch. D. 311).” The solicitors took out a Pe HARRIS, POWELL, & GOODALE-North, J., 8th February.

summons to review the taxation. No evidence had been adduced before SOLICITOR-Costs– TAXATION "NEGOTIATION Fee”-“Fee for Denuc- of costs, the order to tax, and the answers to objections and there was

the taxing master except the claim, the agreement for purchase, the bill ING TITLE"-SOLICITORS' Remuneration Order (August, 1882), Sche- nothing to show precisely what work had been done by the vendor's DULE I., Part I., R. 11.

The question in this case was whether the solicitors of a vendor were had only advised as to the value of the property, and that the terms and entitled to a “negotiation fee" and a fee " for deducing title," as pro- conditions of the sale had been, in fact, arranged by the solicitors. that schedule provides that, “the scale for negotiating shall apply to the matter stood in the same position as if there had been no bargain cases where the solicitor of’a vendor or purchaser arranges the sale or that the purchasers should pay the vendor's costs and charges, and the

question had arisen between the vendor and his own solicitors. The question turned entirely on rule 11. The vendor's surveyor had done

LAW SOCIETIES. some work, the details of which did not appear, but it appeared from the objections to the taxation that the amount of his fee, or commission, or

SOLICITORS' BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION. remuneration was ascertained by the engineer of the commissioners, and

The usual monthly meeting of the Board of Directors of this association was settled by him according to Bryde's Scale. It came to this, that a

was held at the Law Institution, Chancery-lane, London, on Wednesday, person was employed by the vendor to treat for the sale of the property, and that he was paid for his services a commission, which the taxing the 9th inst., Mr. Sidney Smith in the chair. The other directors present

were Messrs. W. Beriah Brook, Samuel Harris (Leicester), Edwin Hedger, master described as “full charges." A fee, arrived at by an ad valorem

R. Pennington, H. Roscoe, W. Melmoth Walters, Frcderick T. Wool charge, was paid to a person who came within the description of an

bert, and J. T. Scott (secretary). A sum of £270 was distributed in “estate or other agent " in rule 11, and who was described as surveyor or agent” in the vendor's claim. The scale for negotiating applied only grants of relief. Six new members were admitted to the association, and to a case where no such charge or commission was paid by the client as

other general business was transacted. was paid in the present case. The solicitors were, therefore, not entitled to the scale fee, but must obtain their remuneration in the ordinary way.

WOLVERHAMPTON LAW ASSOCIATION. And, as to the fee for deducing title, his lordship was clearly of opinion

The fortieth annual general meeting of this association was held on that'no title had been deduced, and the scale did not apply: --- COUNSEL, the 17th ult., Mr. W. A. Green, presideut, in the chair. Byrne ; J. Henderson. Solicitors, Harris, Powell, f Goodale ; E. A.

The secretary read the annual report of the committee, and the hon. Baylis

treasurer read the financial statement for the past year.

It was proposed by the chairman, seconded by Mr. C. L. Adams, and Re CORSELLIS, LAWTON v. ELWES-C. A. No. 2, 3rd February.

resolved unanimously :-—“That the report of the committee, and the fin. SOLICITOR-Costs_TAXATION-SOLICITOR-TRUSTEE-Profit Costs.

ancial statement for the past year, which have been read, be received,

adopted, and entered on the minutes." This was an appeal by the defendant from the disallowance by Kay, J. It was proposed by Mr. Stirk, seconded by Mr. Thorney croft, and re(30 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 567), of certain costs to the defendant Elwes, a solved unanimously :-—"That Mr. Henry Stanley be president for the year trustee, who was a solicitor, on the ground that he had placed himself in 1887." a position in which his interest conflicted with his duty, and was therefore It was proposed by Mr. Waterhouse, seconded by Mr. Robert Willcock, unable to charge the estate of which he was a trustee with the costs of and resolved unanimously :-" That Mr. F. T. Langley be vice-president professional work done by himself or his firm. N. 0. Corsellis by his for the year 1887." will, dated the 26th of October, 1876, appointed Lawton ; S. Turner (a It is proposed by Mr. A. B. Smith, seconded by Mr. A. Whitehouse, solicitor) and Firman his executors and trustees. His real estate, which and resolved unanimously :-" That Mr. E. B. Thorneycroft be re-elected comprised the manor of Wivenhoe in Essex, was devised in strict settle. honorary treasurer for the year 1887." ment, and the trustees were empowered to employ receivers, bailiffs, It was proposed by Mr. Owen, seconded by Mr. Greensill, and resolved accountants, and agents in the affairs of the estate. And the unanimously :-" That Mr. E. T. Cresswell be elected honorary secretary testator appointed Turner, his heirs and assigns, steward of the for the year 1887.". manor, and provided that he might, by himself or his firm, act as It was proposed by Mr. A. B. Smith, seconded by Mr. S. W. Page, and solicitor for the estate, and charge for business done relating to it. resolved unanimously :-" That Messrs. Adams, Green, C. B. Smith, and There was no general power for every solicitor-trustee to charge for Stirk be elected members of the committee. business done by him. The testator died in September, 1878, and Turner It was proposed by Mr. G. W. Walker, seconded by Mr. Greensill :died in February, 1880. The defendant Elwes, a solicitor, who had been in “That the best thanks of the association be given to the president, vicepartnership with Turner, was appointed a trustee in his place. The president, committee, and hon. treasurer, and secretary for their services appeal related to four classes of charges. (1) In August, 1881, an applica. during the past year.” The thanks of the meeting were also voted to the tion was made to the court by the plaintiff, an infant, who was beneficially chairman for his conduct in the chair. interested in the real estate under the testator's will, by his next friend, The annual dinner of the society was held on the same day, and was atfor maintenance out of the estate. To that application the defendant tended by 24 members. The county court judge, the stipendiary, and the Elwes and his co-trustee Firman (Lawton having died in May, 1881) were official receiver were present as invited guests. respondents. The defendant Elwes's firm, through their London agents, Messrs. Elwes & Sharpe, acted as solicitors for the respondents to this application, and in respect of this the defendant Elwes's firm made profit

The following are extracts from the report of the committee :charges amounting to £16 9s. 2d. (2) Firman died in September, 1881, practising in the neighbourhood who had not taken out their certificates

Professional matters. - The question of proceedings against solicitors and after his death the defendant Elwes, having then become the sole trustee of the estate, was made defendant in this action for the execution

has further engaged the attention of the committee, and as a result the of the trusts of the real estate and for the appointment of a receiver and

Incorporated Law Society, at the suggestion of the committee, prosecuted manager. A receiver and manager of the estate was appointed, and the

three solicitors for practising without certificates, and in each case a condefendant's firm, by their Lonàon agents, acted as his solicitors, and

viction was obtained, and the defaulters were fined, and have paid, 65 received £15 6s. 1d. as their share of the profit costs allowed to the

and costs. Tbe attention of the committee has also been called to other receiver on taxation. (3) The defendant appointed his partner, G. B.

cases of solicitors practising without certificates. In one case their repre: Turner, to act as steward of the manor. Fees paid to him as steward by in another case the Incorporated Law Society have decided to take pro

sentations induced the solicitor in default to take out his certificate, and the copyhold tenants of the manor had been carried by him to the credit ceedings. The committee have, in the interests of the members, protested fees. (4) The defendant's firm made profit ci arges in respect of certain Post Office prosecution, and they trust that as a result of their protest leases and agreements for leases of parts of the estate which the defendant, as local solicitors will in' future be employed. They have also caused: trustee, had granted. The plaintiff applied for a review of the taxing circular to be sent to the clerks of the magistrates in the district calling master's certificate by disallowing all these profit costs and charges. Kay, I their attention to the irregularity of constabulary officers conducting J., disallowed them all. The Court of APPEAL (Cotton, Lindley, and LOPES, L.JJ.) allowed asking for their assistance in suppressing this practice, and

prosecutions. A circular has also been sent to members of the association the appeal as regarded the costs of the application for maintenance and mittee would venture to urge that this matter be not lost sight of by the the steward's fees. The Court expressed their approval of the rule which members. Ład been laid down as to the duty of trustees not to make a profit out of their trust, and to avoid placing themselves in a position in which their year's report as to the desirability of more solicitors becoming members

The Incorporated Law Society.-- With reference to the paragraphs in last interest would conflict with their duty. But to this general rule an exception had been established in Cradock v. Piper (1 Mac. & G. 664) — canvass of the members of the association, and the result of that canvassa

of the Incorporated Law Society, the president and secretary made a viz., that a solicitor-trustee, acting for himself and his co-trustees' in and of the steps taken by the association, has been that fifteen members legal proceedings, was entitled to profit costs, if the costs had not of the association has joined the Incorporated Law Society. The coma been increased by his so acting. acted upon in the taxing master's office, and was an established rule desired, and they trust that every member of the association who does not

That exception had been always mittee consider while this is a satisfactory result it is not all that could be of the court, and it ought not to be frittered away. Their lordships also belong to the Incorporated Law Society will join that body at were of opinion that the proceedings for maintenance were within must be allowed. As to the costs of the receiver, the decision of Kay, 3., by the new County Court Rules has engaged a large amount of attention

The new County Court Rules.- The question of the inconvenience caused must be affirmed. The solicitor-trustee in acting for the receiver, who had during the year. The committee have also in connection with this subject to account to the estate for those charges, had placed himself in 'a position considered the proposed Bill to consolidate the County Court Acts, which in which his interest and his duty were in conflict. The decision must also be afirmed with regard to the charges for the leases. The trustees

was introduced into the House of Lords by the then Lord Chancellor, in employed the solicitor to do the work, though it was agreed that the which were being made by the Chamber of Commerce relative to the ind they were not professional charges, but were fixed bye statute sitio by the secretary was instructed to place himself in communication with that custom. They must, therefore, be allowed. All the three judges, thoug/ body, with a view to united action. After some meetings had taken have decided that case differently. --Counsel, Giffard, Q.c., and Bardswell; Becretary, the committee of this association appointed a sub-committee te Graham 11 astings, Q.C., and Sivirfen Eady. "SOLICITórs, Elwes of Sharpe; confer with the sub-committee of the Chamber of Commerce upon hili A. W. Digby.

matter, and to suggest to the latter sub-committee the direction in which



amendments should be sought, with a view of assisting the local

Mr. Justice Mr. Justice Mr. Justice Chamber of Commerce in bringing the matter before the next meeting of


STIRLING. KEKEWICH. the Associated Chambers of Commerce, and by that means enlisting the

Monday, February 14 Mr. Carrington Mr. Beal

Mr. Jackson Tuesday

15 assistance of that body in improving county court practice. The result Wednesday


Carrington Beal

Jackson of the conference between the two sub-committees was that a united Thursday


Koe plan of action was agreed upon, and your committee venture to hope that Friday,

18 Carrington Beal

Jackson Saturday

19 the assistance they were able to render to the Chamber of Commerce will


be of service to that body in their endeavour to use their influence to
obtain an alteration of the present anomalies in county court practice;
anomalies which cause much inconvenience and great loss, both of money
and time, to the constituents of both associations. As a result of the

WINDING UP NOTICES. above-mentioned conference it has been suggested that the Chamber of

London Gazette.-FRIDAY, Feb. 4. Commerce and this association might usefully work together in many

JOINT STOCK COMPANIES. things. The suggestion has been well received by the Council of the

LIMITED IN CHANCERY. Chamber of Commerce, and it is believed that that body have under con CARLYLE SLATE AND SLAB Co., LIMITED.-Stirling, J., has fixed Feb 16, at 12, sideration such an amendment of their rules as will make the president at his chambers, for the appointment of an official liquidator of this association an ex-officio member of their council. The committee INDESTRUCTIBLE ENAMEL CO., LIMITED.- By an order made by Chitty, J., dated trust that much benefit may result to both bodies by this inter-com

Jan 22, it was ordered that the company bě wound up. Smith & Eldridge, Great

James st, Bedford row, solors for petners munication

LONDON AND LANCASHIRE PAPER MILLS CO, LIMITED.-Petn for winding up, presented Jan 29, directed to be heard before North, J., on Saturday, Feb 12.

Lumley & Lumley, Old Jewry chbrs, solors for petner

NORTHERN LONDON ESTATES Co., LIMITED.-Petn for winding un, presented Feb LEGAL NEWS.

3, directed to be heard before Chitty, J., Feb 12. Pearpoint & Lock, Pall Mall,

solors for petner APPOINTMENTS.

RIVER THAMES STEAM BOAT Co., LIMITED.-By an order made by Chitty, J., on Mr. George EDWARD HILLMAN, solicitor, of Lewes and Eastbourne, has

Jan. 28. it wns ordered that voluntary winding up of company be continued.

Ashurst & Co, 6, Old Jewry, solors for petners been appointed Deputy-Coroner for the Eastern Division of the county SHORT HORN DAIRY CO., LIMITED. --Stirling, J., has fixed Feb. 15, at 11, at his of Sussex. Mr. Hillman was admitted a solicitor in 1880.

ebambers, for appointment of official liquidator Mr. Henry KINNEIR, solicitor (of the firm of Kinneir & Tombs), of

UNITED WELSH SLATE CO., LIMITED.-Petn for winding up, presented Feb. 3, Swindon and Cricklade, has been appointed Registrar of the Swindon

directed to be heard before Stirling, J., on Feb. 12. Snell & Co, George st,

Mansion House, petners in person County Court (Circuit No. 52). Mr. Kinneir is clerk to the Swindon

UNLIMITED IN CHANCERY. School Board, and to the county magistrates at Cricklade. He was

CROYDON AND NORWOOD TRAMWAYS Co.-Petn for winding up, presented Feb. 1, admitted a solicitor in 1854. His partner, Mr. Henry Coggan Tombs, is

directed to be heard before North, J., on Saturday, Feb. 12. Dean, Walbrook,

solor for petner official receiver in bankruptcy for the Swindon District.

COUNTY PALATINE OF LANCASTER. Mr. John DougLAS SANDFORD, barrister, has been appointed à Magistrate

UNLIMITED IN CHANCERY. for the County of Middlesex. Þr. Sandford is the fourth son of the Rer. BOLTON EXCHANGE ROOMS. -The Vice-Chancellor has fixe 1 Tuesday, Feb. 15, at John Sandford, archdeacon of Coventry, and was born in 1832. He was

11.30, at 2, Clarence st, Manchester, for appointment of official liquidator formerly a scholar of Trinity College, Oxford, where he graduated first

FRIENDLY SOCIETIES DISSOLVED. class in Classics in 1855.

He was called to the bar at the Inner Temple NOBIM. ENGLAND FRIENDLY BURIAL SOCIETY, Royal Exchange, Middlesin Easter Term, 1870. He was for several years Chief Judge of Mysore.

JOINT STOCK COMPANIES. Mr. JOHN STOKELL Dodds, Attorney-General of Tasmania, has been

LIMITED IN CHANCERY. appointed Puisne Judge of the Supreme Court of that colony, in succession

London Gazette.- TUESDAY, Feb. 8. to the late Mr. Justice Giblin.

AUTOMATIC RETORT CO, LIMITED.-Petn for winding up, presented Feb 4, directed Mr. RICHARD ERNEST LANGHORNE, solicitor, of Wakefield, has been

to be heard before Chitty, J., on Feb 19. Micklem & Co, Gresham st, etners in

person elected President of the Wakefield Incorporated Law Society for the DANIEL HAYWOOD & Sons, LIMITED.-Stirling, J.. has, by an order, dated Dec 7, ensuing year. Mr. Langhorne was admitted a solicitor in 1867.

appointed John Young. 41, Coleman st, to be official liquidator. Creditors are

required, on or before Mar 7, to send their names and addresses, and parMr. Lewis LLOYD John, solicitor, of Llangollen, has been appointed ticulars of debts or claims, to the above. Tuesday, Mar 15, at 2, is appointel Clerk to the Llangollen School Board in succession to Mr. Philip Henry for hearing and adjudicating upon debts and claims Minshall, resigned. Mr. John was admitted a solicitor in 1882.

DAVENPORT3, LIMITED.-Petn for winding up, presented Feb 7, directed to be Mr. William ALFRED PLUNKETT, solicitor (of the firm of Plunkett &

heard before Kay, J., on Saturday, Feb 19. Cooper & Co, Bedford row, agents

for Coopers, Newcastle under Lyme, solors for petners Leader), of 60, St. Paul's-churchyard, and of Greenhithe, has been elected DEVONSHIRE COPPER CO, LIMITED.-By an order made by Kay, J., dated Jan 29, Chairman of the Gas and Water Committee of the Court of Common it was ordered that the company be wound up. Rooks & Oo, King st, CheapCouncil. Mr. Plunkett was admitted a solicitor in 1863. He is a com

side. solors for petner

HASTINGS AND ST. LEONARDS PASSENGER STEAMSHIP CO, LIMITED.-Creditors mon councilman for the ward of Farringdon Within.

are required, on or before March 7, to send their names and addresses and parMr. William BousField, barrister, has been appointed a Magistrate ticulars of their debts or claims to Thomas Stephen Evans, 6, Bucklersbury. for the County of Middlesex. Mr. Bousfield is the eldest son of Mr. Tuesday, March 22, at 12, is appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon the William Bousfield, of Streatham, and was born in 1842. He was educated

debts and claims

HERMANN LOOG. LIMITED.-North, J., has fixed Thursday, Feb 17, at one, at his at Merton College, Oxford, where he graduated second class in Law and chambers, for the appointment of an official liquidator Modern History in 1866. He was called to the bar at the Middle Temple INTERNATIONAL ELECTRIC CO, LIMITED.-Creditors are required. on or before in Michaelmas Term, 1868, and be practises in the Chancery Division. He

April 20, to send their names and addresses and particulers of their debts or

claims to Ernest Cooper, 14, George st, Mansion House. Wednesday, is a member of the School Board for London, representing the Chelsea Division.

May 11, at one, is appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon the debts and

claims Mr. W. P. ST. LEONARDS CHUBB, solicitor, of 29, Lincoln's-inn-fields,

NOTTINGHAM GENERAL OMNIBUS CO, LIMITED.-By an order made by Stirling, London, has been appointed a Commissioner to administer Oaths in the

J., dated Jan 29, it was ordered that the voluntary winding up of the company Supreme Court of Judicature.

be continued. Lee & Co, St Paul's churchyard, agents for Brights, NottingMr. W. Scott Fox, solicitor, of 13, St. Mary's-square, Paddington, NOTTINGHAM MALLEABLE IRON Co., LIMITED.-Stirling, J., bas, by an order, has been appointed a Commissioner to administer Oaths in the Supreme

dated Jan 28. appointed Thomas Leman, 1, Greyhound st, Long row, NottiogCourt of Judicature.

ham, to be official liquidator PROTECTOR CARRIAGE AND HORSE INSURANCE Co., LIMITED.-Petn for winding

up, presented Feb 4, directed to be heard before Chitty, J., on Saturday, Feb PARTNERSHIPS DISSOLVED.

19. Warriner & Kinch, Dashwood House, Broad st, agents for Hodgson, ROBERT HESILRIGE BUCKBY and

Burnley, solor for petner

ROYAL EXCHANGE SHIPPING CO., LIMITED.-Chitty, J., has fixed Friday, Feb 18, tors (Buckby & Marshall), Leicester, Hinckley, and Nuneaton. Dec. 20.

Robert BendLe Moore, FRANCIS STYAN Moore, and EDWIN ERNEST SOUTH WALES (SIEMENS PATENT) GLASS MANUFACTURING CO., LIMITED. Stirling, MARSHALL, solicitors (R. B. Moore & Co. and Moore, Son, & Marshall),

J., has, by an order, dated Jan 22, appointed William Alfred Baker, Newport, Birkenhead and Liverpool, so far as regards the said Edwin Ernest

Mon., to be official liquidator. Creditors are required, on or before March 10, Marshall.

to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, Jan. 31.

to the above Monday, March 21, at 12, appointed for hearing and adju dicating RICHARD BURGASS Woosnam and James Gould COKER, solicitors (Woos,

upon the debts and claims nam & Coker), Newton Abbot, so far as regards the said James Gould

WEST LONDON COMMERCIAL BANK, LIMITED.-Petn for winding up, presented

Feb 8, directed to be heard before Chitty, J, on Feb 19. Chapple & Co, Carter Coker. The said business will in future be carried on by the said Richard lane, solors for petner Burgass Woosnam at Newton Abbot aforesaid. Dec. 24.

WEST LONDON COMMERCIAL BANK, LIMITED.-Petn for winding up, presented

Feb 8, directed to be heard before Chitty, J, on Feb 19. Munns & Longden, [Gazette, Feb. 4.] Old Jewry, solors for petner

BANK OF EGYPT.-Petn for winding up, presented Feb 8, directed to be heard
before Kay, J, on Feb 19. Bircham & Co, Old Broad st, solors for petners




sented Feb 5, directed to be heard at St George's Hall, Liverpool, on Monday, ROTA OF REGISTRARS IN ATTENDANCE ON

Feb 21. Goffey & Co, Liverpool, solors for petners

No. 1,
No. 2.


Mon., Feb. 14 Mr. Godfrey Mr. Leach Mr. Pemberton Mr. Ward

Godfrey Clowes


Forge Inn, New Whittington, Chesterfiela, Derby. Feb 4

Pemberton Ward LOYAL ORANGE INSTITUTION DEFENCE LODGE, Platt Bridge Inn, Hindley, Wigan,

Lancaster. Feb 5
Pemberton Ward

PERMANENT FRIENDLY BENEFIT SOCIETY, Provident Baptist Chapel, Glemsford,
Pemberton Godfrey


Suffolk. Feb 5

Tuesday......15 Wednesday 16 Thursday .. 17 Friday Saturday... 19

..... 18

« PreviousContinue »