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Feb-5.1881. [HE SOLICITORS’ JOURNAL. 233


whether it would do harm to grant or to refuse the in‘unction. ' this case the had taken upon himself to din that whigfwthuii defendant sai was an infringement of his patent, and in respect of which he had w_arned the plaintiffs customer that he intended to take proceedings against the plaintiff. It seemed to him, therefore, that he should be doing more harm to the defendant by granting the injunction than to thoiplaintiflr‘ by refusing it. The balance of convenience therefore, was in avour of his making no order on the motion, and for that reason 0111!. Ind Without _e!p_ressing any opinion u on the question whether there had been any infrmgement of the defen<i)ant’s patent. He refused the injunction.—Conxsi:i., Inre, Q.C., and Pliipson Beale ; Sir R. Webster, A.6., Rmslmw, Q._C., and_6'm_-pmnel. Sonicirons, Field, Roscoe, g Co., for Barlow, Smith, 4- Pmamt, Birmingham; Wilson, Briszowi, g 0¢ipm(wz_

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In this case the question arose as to whether a married woman could act as guardian ad htem of an infant. It appeared that the registrar had refused to draw up an order made under such circumstances. It was submitted, however, that any disability to be guardian ml {item or next friend which existed under the old practice arose from a married woman's incapacity to be sued, which incapacity was, however, removed by the Married Women s Property Act, 1882, s. 1, sub-section 2, which enacts that a married woman shall be “ capable of suing and being sued either in contract or tort or otherwise in all respects as if she were a fame sole."

_ Cuii-rr, J ., said that it was true that the old practice was based on the incompetence of a married woman to sue and be sued and be answerable in costs, but the Act of 1882 had not made a married woman for all purposes a fem: .\-ole. _ Section 1, sub-section 2, had only made a married woman capable of suing and being sued in matters relating to herself personally, but did not remove her personal incapacity to be a next friend or guardian _ad lilem. R. S. C., 1883, XVL, 16, expressly incorporated the old practice, and shewed that the framers of the rules had the Act of 1882 iii view._ There were many reasons why it might not be for the advantage _of infants to he represented in legal proceedings by a married woman which his lordship would not discuss, as he decided the present question on the ground that hcr personal incapacity had not been removed. To grant the application would be a dangerous innovation, as I1 tnamed woman would not be responsible for the costs of an improper ‘M1011. or liable to pay those of an improper defence, or, at the most, she would_on1y be hable the extent of her separate estate, which would necessitate an inquiry into her separate estate, with all its attendant inconvenience. He should, therefore, make an order that the married woman be removed from her position as guardian ad lilem, and that the matter be referred to chambers to appoint a new guardian.—Cov.\-ssi., :“#;"I:;:iQ.C-, and Budcock. s0LICI'l'O!tS, Wailers, Darrell, Q 0'0; Orowdmi

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In this case an application was made to the court, under section 39 of the Cvnyeyancmg Act, l_881, for_ the purpose of obtaining an order binding {he interests of certain marned women who were tenants in common for ife of real property under the will of a deceased testator, which contained fldeclaration that gifts to married women should be for their separate use without power of anticipation. It was stated that the property consisted of houses, and that no valid leases could be granted by reason of t e restraint on anticipation imposed on the tenants for life, and it was asked that the property be partitioned and re-settled. Ci-ii-rri', ., said that section 39 did not inform the court as to what Were the circumstances under which it should make an order overriding a restraint on anticipation, save and except that it must appear that such 811 Order must be for the benefit of the married woman. Therefore, if it was simply that leave to convey should befliiven without any special :*:*5°11 belng assigned, the court could not m e an order. Each case, ei-efore, required to be examined by itself. It appeared to him, although the question was not before him, that a married woman restrained from anticipation could make a will passing the property, because the restraint °!l anticipation could not operate after death. He should, in the present c?-5°. make an order _as being for the benefit of the property, on the ground 0 the diflic_ulty_ which otherwise existed in dealing with the property, “lisithe de51lflb}l1ty of 8; partition. Moreover, a re-settlement would he :lb_e under which the life interests of the married women would be made undlfict IQ B like restraint on anticipation as existed in the instrument danger which they took the property. The scheme proposed being a pru0 9 one, he should accede to the2pplication.—Coi"usai., Spencer Butler ,- - . Barnes. Sonicirons, Currey, ollzmd, Q Cui-reg.

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be used on the hearing of the motion (an affidavit to prove the service on
the defendant of the order which he had disobeyed) was not served with
the notice of motion. On Saturday, the 8th of January, a copy of the
afhdavit was served on the defendant's solicitor. On the hearing of the
motion thedefendant did not appear. Rule 4 of order 52 provides that
“ every notice of motion . . . for attachment . . . shall state in
general terms the ground of the application; and when any such motion
is founded on evidence by afildavit, a copy of any affidavit intended to be
used shall be served with the notice of motion.” In Whitham v. Wkitlmm
(29 Souoirons’ JOURNAL, 707) and in Sshirgei v. Sela‘:-gas (30 s0LICITORS'
JOURNAL, 403) Pearson, J., held that this rule does not apply to an
affidavit which is merely to give formal roof of the service of an order.
Non-ri-i, J., deolinedto follow those dliecisions. He was unwilling to
order the attachment of a defendant who, in reliance on the irregularity,
might have abstained from 8pp6Bl'lI1g.—O0UNSEL, Vernon R. Smitli.
Souciroizs, Dangerfield 4- Blythe. '

January. .
The question in this case was whether the interest of a pawnbroker in
goods pledged with him, before his title has become absolute by the
e iration of the time fixed for the redemption of the pledge, is of such a

.nature that it can be seized by the sheriff under a fi. fa. subject to the

right of the pledgor to redeem. There appeared to be no express authority
on the point. The goods had been seized under an execution to enforce a.
' bt ' d 'n an action in the Chancery Division._ Another

Judgment o aine i
creditor obtained a judgment, and the appointment of a receiver of tho
h D'v' ‘on The

pawnbroker's business, in an action in the Queen's Benc i isi .
appointment of the receiver was made subsequent to the seizure of the
goods. The question was whether the title of the receiver was ousted by
the prior title under the seizure.

Noarn, J., held that the pawiibroker’s interest in the goods could be
seized under the execution, and that the execution was entitled to priority.
—COL'NSBL, illrwaakie ,- H. Tmiial Atkinson; fll ‘Clymont. SOLICITORS,
Taylor, Hon1'e, Q C0. ; Pildwr §~ Vcrtua; Bel/‘rage Q 00.

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Act, 1880. Section provi , _
able cause to believe that a company is not carrying on biismess or in
' t letter in uiring

operation, he shall send to tho company by pus a q whether it is carrying on business or in operation "; (2) if the registrar does not, within one month, receive any answer, ho shall, within fourteen days after the expiration of the month, send to the company u registered letter referring to the first letter, and stating that no answer has been received thereto, and “ that, if an answer is not received to the second letter within one month from the datc thereof, a notice will be published in the Gazette with a view to striking the name of the company off the register”; (3) “if the registrar either receives an answer from the company that it is not carrying on business or in operation, or does not, within one month after sending the second letter, receive any answer thereto," he may publish in the Go:/tie and send to the company “a notice that at the expiration of three months from the date of that notice the name of the company will, imless cause is shown to the contrary, be struck ofl? the register, and the company will be dissolved"; (4) “ At the expiration of the time mentioned in the notice the registrar may, unless cause to the contrary is previously s_hewn by such company. strike the name of such company off the register, and shall publish notice thereof in the Gasette, and, on the publication i_n the Gazelle of such lust-mentioned notice, the company whose name is so struck off shall be dissolved; provided that the liability (if any) of _every director, managing oflicer, and member of the company shall continue, and may be enforced as if the company had not been dissolved”; (5) “If any company or member thereof feclslaggrieved by the name of_such company having been struck ofi the register in pursuance o_f this section, the company or member may apiply to the superior court in w_hich the company is liable to be woun up, and such courf,_ if satisfied that the company was, at the time of the striking off, carrymg on bllflmefle Or In operation, and that it is just so to do, may order the name of the comgiiny to be restored io the register, and thereupon the company shall be eemed to have continued in existence as if the name thereof had never been struck off." In the _present case_ the company hid. 1\1 March, 1879, passed an extraordmary resolution to wind up voluntarily. There being no obligation under the Companies Acts _to register an extraordinary resolution, the registrar had no notice of the winding up. After the commencement of the winding up the ofiice of the company was removed from the registered olhw. but no notice of the change of ofiice was sent to the registrar, 8B_1‘°q\111'?d bl’ section 40 of the Companies Act, 1_862. The liquidation continued till t%ie year 1886, the liquidator not having been able to realize the B889?-l 11 1881 he commenced an action against the prmcipal debtor to the conipallgi but the action was not set down for trial till August, 1880i] Tlaeslgvffie ants then agreed to pay what was due from _thein, butat _ety;, 0:! we lat that the company had been dissolved by a notice in the M‘ .¢ .

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of June, 1886, and its name struck ofi the register, and they to pay the debt unless the name was restored to the register. 0n_ inquiry it was found that the registrar had taken the proper proceedings under section 7, because no returns had been made to him by the company, as required by section 26 of the Companies Act, 1862, since October, 1878. The registrar had sent the required notices to the registered ofiice of the company, but, by reason of the change of ofice, of which the regiistrar was ignorant, the liquidator had not received these notices. The quidator, who was a member of the company, now petitioned for the restoration of the company's name to the register.

Non-i-ii, J ., held that sub-section 5 of section 7 applied, though at the time of the striking off of the company's name, it was carrying on business only for the purpose of the windin§up, and he made an order for the restoration of the name in the form o. 314 given at page 66.: of Chadwyclr-Healey's Company Law.—Coimsi¢i., Lsiyli Bmianl ; Ingle Joya. Soi.iL-irons, J. TV¢'.vlr0H ; W. Jilurton.

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In this case the question arose whether a tenant for life of settled land, who had sold the land, under the power conferred on him by the Settled Land Act, i882, had exercised the option given to him by sub-section 1 of section 22 of the Act, as to the payment of the purchase-money either to the trustees of the settlement or into court. The suit was for tho administration of the estate of the testator by whose will the land was settled. The will contained no power of sale, and no trustees were appointed by it who were trustees of the settlement for the purposes of the Act. With a view to a sale under the Act, trustees for those purposes were appointed by the court. The tcnant for life entered into a contr t

ac for the sale of the land, and, there being some questions raised in the suit as to certain charges on the property, the purchaser refused to c l t h‘ ' '

omp e e l81PllI‘0l1&S6, unless the purchase-money was paid into court in the suit. he tenant for life consented to an application made by the purchaser for an order for the payment of the money into court in the suit, and the order was made and the money paid into court under it. The purchase having been completed, the tenant for life presented a petition in the suit and in the matter of the Act, asking tha the money might be paid out to the trustees, the object being that they might then invest it according to his direction. Section 21 of the Act provides that “capital money arising under this Act shall when re ' ed b

. . . ceiv e invested or otherwise applied wholly in one, or partly in one and partly in another or th f ' ' '

o ere, o the following modes—-namely" (inter aha) “ (ir.) In payment to any person becoming absolutely entitled or empowered to give an absolute discharge.” By section 22, “ (1) Capital money arising under this Act shall, in order to its being invested or applied as aforesaid, be paid either to the trustees of the settlement or into court, at the option of the tenant for life, and shall be invested or applied by thetrusteea, or under the direction of the court, as the case may be, accordingly ’; “ (2) The mvestment or other application by the trustees shall be made according to the direction of the tenant for life, and, in default thereof, according to the discretion of the trustees, but, in the last-mentioned case, subject to any consent required or direction given by the settlement with respect to the investment or other application by the trustees of trust money of the settlement, and any investment shall be in the names or under the control f th " "

o e trustees ; (3) The investment or oiiher application under the direction of the court shall be made on the a ' ti

pp ics. on of the tenant for life or of the trustees.” It was argued that, notwithstanding the payment into court, the tenant for life was still entitled to the option given to him by sub-section l of section 22 of having the money paid to the trustees, and that the trustees were persons _“becomin_g absolutely entitled" within the meaning of subsection (ix.) of section 21.

N onru, J ., held that the trustees did not come within that description and that the tenant for life had exercised the option given to him by sectiod 22 (1) when he consented to the order for the payment of the money into court, instead of insisting on its being paid to the trustees. The money must, therefore, remain in court, and be invested or applied under the direction of the court, as provided by sub-section (3) of section 22 ._. Coi‘.\'szL, Gnoksrm, Q,.C., and R./uhleiyln Napicr H¢'_q_qi1;.y, Q,_C_, and ,§:,,,.'e,1 Q,.C ; Oozem-Hardy, Q,.C., and T. L. W11/ ; Inglu Joyce; Dauney:'ir0u.~i, Gregory, R011/'(‘ll;flld, §~ Co., Tucker Q Lake; Lidiard Q On Ularks, Woodcock, Q R3/land. "

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thscapa may-require, a scheme for the execution of the in vement, showing the proposed expenditure thereon. “ (2) Whego the capital money to be expended is in the hands of trustees, then, after a scheme is approved by them, the trustees may apply that money in or towards “payment for the whole or part of any work or operation compris in the improvement on inter aha) “ (iii) Au order of the court directing or authorizing the trustees to so a. ply a spccifiedj portion of the capital money." North, J . (in | chnmbersl was of opinion that the zipprovul by the trustees of the scheme l ought to have been obtained before the work was executed, and on this , ground he dismissed the summons. The tenant for life moved in court to , discharge the order made in chambers, and that an order might be made in the terms oi the summons. it was urged that if, before expending money in a permanent improvement, the tenant for life was bound, if lie desired to be repaid out o capital money, to obtain the approval of the trustees, the immediate execution of a work which was urgently required -e._1]., the construction of a sea or river wall to prevent the flooding of land—-would be discouraged, to the possible serious injurz of an estate.

Non-rii, J., lsoweeer, adhered to the view which he ad already erpressed. He thought that the intention of section 26 was, that the opinion of the trustees or the court (as the case might be) should be taken in the first instance as to whether the proposed works were of such a nature that the cost of them ought to be defrayed out of cg-pital money, and that it was only after obtaining the approval of the s eme by the trustees or the court that the tenant for life could expand the money with a certainty of being, repaid. It was very important that tlilpuprovisiona of the Act should c complied with. Before the money been expended 5° trustees might be able to exercise their 'udgment fairly, but after the tenant for life had spent the money it might seem an invidious thing for them to refuse to approve what he had done, and thus prevent his obtaining the repayment of the money. The Act did not intend that either the trustees or the court should be placed in such a position. His lordship, therefore, declined to allow the payment of the money out of the capital money in the hands of the trustees.

Another question arose thus. Counsel appeared for the trustees, and proposed to address the court in support of the motion. _

Noimi, J ., said that he could not ear the trustees’ counsel m support of an application in the interest of the tenant for life. The trustees were intended to be a check on the tenant for life in the interest of the other persons who were entitled under the settlement, and tney ought, at leasito maintain a neutral position.—Coi".\'ssi., 1’. T. I’roctu'; J. T. DaddSULXCITOR, E. P. Cobb.

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In this case a question arose how repayment from the PaymasterGeneral of money paid into court as security for cost: should be obtamqd on behalf of a litigant residing in Germany. Mr. Schmidt,_a resident in Germany, had been ordered F-0 P87, and had paid, £200 coflfi "9 security for costs in respect of an application by him for registratioucf a tradc-mark. Upon the hearing of that application, together with another matter, Mr. Schmidt obtained an order for payment of his C0?“It thus became necessary to obtain repayment of the £200. Mr. Schmidt: being in Germany, could not attend in person at the oflice of the Pl!‘ master-General, and could not, according to the law of Germany, °°mPlY there with the formalities required by the Payme-star-General in Hmd '° the execution of a power of attorney, but would have to go to d °' Belgium for that purpose.

STIRLING, J ., directed that Mr. Schmidt should give a power of _I\W}1'l¢Y in the ordinary form to some person in this country, and upon 11" 55'1"" ture thereto being verified, the ower should be entered in the order, Hid the sum in court paid out to Efr. Schmidt's nominee.—Cocxs3!» 3' F‘ Norton. Sonioiroiis, Ellis, Jfimday, g- Iiartmm.

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In this case a question arose whether a gift of a legacy in dischlfge °! a covenant contained in a marriage settlement, and under which $119 limitation in default of appointment was to children at twenty-four, IN void for remoteness. By his [marriage settlement, dated the 28th of 38Pl16mbBl‘. 1367, Joseph Warden covenanted that his execvlimfi W°“1d' within twelve months after his death, ay to the trustees £2.000be held upon trust for the wife for life, and] after her death for the chilclrtll as she should appoint, arid, in default of appointment, for the children Wl1° should attain twenty-four, equally, and, if there should be but 0119 "ch child, then for such one child. Joseph Warden died on the 9th of l\i"¥'

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The plaintifi, who was married on November 23, 1870, became entitied, in June, 1876, to certain real estate as co-heiress of an intestate. Her rights in such real estate were consequently regulated by the Married Womsn’s Property Act, 1870, which, by its 8th section, enacts, in eiiect, that the rents and profits of descended property “shall belong to the married woman forher separate use, and t at her receipts alone s all be a good discharge for the same.” The plaintiff had purported to settle the property upon certain trusts with the concurrence of her husband, but not by deed acknowledged. The question now arose, as to this real estate. Whether or not, being a deed unacknowledged, the settlement had assed any estate beyond one for the life of the plaintiff and the possible life interest of the husband as tenant by curtesy.

STIRLING, J . , in giving judgment on January 29, said that the question wss, What was the intention of the Legislature in enacting this section of this public Act? Was it intended that the separate use shoul extendtorents and profits ivhenever they might arise; or that it should be limited to the rents and profits which might be personally enjoyed by the married woman? At the time of the passing of the Act the consequence of marriage upon the real estate of the wife was this, the husband acquired a freehold interest during their joint lives, and on the birth of a child capable of inheriting under the existing limitations in favour of the wife, that estate became, by the curtesy of England, enlarged to an estate for life, but, subject to this, the freehold remained in the wife and she could pass it by deed acknowledged. Now, the words of the section of the Act contained no words of limitation. Again the word “receipts " pointed to the meaning of the words “ rents and profits ” for which they were to be given, being the rents and profits which she would be capable of giving receipts for, that is the rents and profits during her life, and did not point to the corpus of the property. Further, this must be considered, if “ rents and profits" meant “rents and profits for all time,” it must have been intended to give her an increased power of disposition, and yet there was not a word in the Act to enable a married woman to deal with the legal estate otherwise than in the ordinary way, that was by a deed acknowledged. If then, the Legislature had intended to confer upon ii married woman the unfettered power of disposing of real estate descending upon her, they had conferred it upon her by very indirect means, and that intention might have been effected much more readily by such s provision as the one inserted in the Married Women's Property Act, 1882. Finally, it was obvious that the whole Act dealt with the property of married women, not in a comprehensive, but in a limited and tentative way; thus as to personal property coming to a married woman under a deed or will, the preceding section only attached the separate use to it if the amount did not exceed £200. He accordingly came to the conclusion that the better view was to hold that the object of the Legislature was simply to remove and put aside that interest of the husband which interfered with the personal enjoyment of the rents and profits by the wife, and not to give her an enlarged dominion over her property. He held, therefore, that the separate use crested by the Married Women’s Property Act, 1870, extended only to rents and profits which might come to a married woman so as to be Personally enjoyed by her, and that it followed from this that the contention of the plaintiif was right.—Coi'xsni., Briinee ; Willis Band. Somerroas, Iiuyhes g» Gleridow.

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In this case the question was raised, whether the voluntary replacement by a trustee in insolvent circumstances of trust money which he has llllfiflpprcpriated can be treated in his bankruptcy as a fraudulent preference uuder section 48 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883. In Ex purl: Siwbbim (l7 Ch. D. 58) and in the recent case, Er parln Taylor gmte, p. 96), it was held by the Court of Appeal that such a payment coul not be treated as afrandulent preference, on the ground that the relation of debtor and creditor did not exist between a trustee and his co-trustee, cr between a trustee and his mlui que trust, in regard to money due from the trustee by reason of a breach of trust, and that section 48 applies only to the Preference of a creditor. In the present case Cave, J., had refused to set aside a payment of this nature which had been made by a trustee to 111$ 00-trustees shortly before his bankruptcy, on the ground that he was bound by these decisions of the Court of Appeal. On behalf of the allllellant it was urged that those decisions applied to the case of a trustee W110 had committed a fraudulent breach of trust in respect of which he was liable to criminal proceedings, the knowledge of which fact might well have produced an influence on his mind inducing him to replace the ""53 I_110l\cy, whereas in the present case the bankrupt, though he had cofflljmttcd a breach of trust, had done nothing to expose himself to Clflmlnal proceedings. Moreover, the claim of a mtui qua trust against 111! trustee in respect of misapplied trust money could be enforced lg Proceedings in a court of equity, and constituted an equitable debt whi could be made the subject of proof in bankruptcy, and section 48 was Intended to prevent a preference of any person who, but for the prefer?“°°» Would have been entitled to prove in the bankruptcy.

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alfii-med the decision. HANNBN, P., said that the point was disposed of
by express authority. He must confess that he was surprised at the
decision that in such a case the relation of debtor and creditor did not
exist within the meaning of section 48. But the point had been solemnly
decided by the Court of Appeal in Bx part: Taylor, and the court was
bound by that decision. BOWEN’, L.J., concurred for the same reason,
without expressing any opinion of his own. Fav, L.J., also thou ht that
the court was bound by the previous decisions. As at present advised, he
should not have come to the same conclusion as the Court of Appeal did
in E2 parts Taylor. Beyond saying that, he would not express any
opinion. Leave was given to gppea to the House of LOl'dI.—-COUNSEL,
Tmdal Atlnnson, Q.C., and Si nay Woolf; He;-but Reed. SoLici'r0iis,
Hogan Q Hughes; llloosop 4- Rolfe.

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In this case a question arose as to a solicitor’s right of audience in
court. Section 151 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, provides that “nothing
in this Act, or in any transfer of jurisdiction eifectod thereby, shall take
away or affect any right of audience that any person may have had at the
commencement of this Act, and all solicitors or other persons who had the
right of audience before the Chief Judge in Bankru tcy shall have the
like right of audience in bankruptcy matters in the fiigh Court." This
was an’ appeal from a decision of Cave, J ., in a bankruptcy matter, and
the appellant’s solicitor claimed to be entitled to audience on his behalf.

Ti-in Coos.-r (Harman, P., and BOWEN and Far, LJJ.) held that the
right of audience given by section 151 is strictly limited to tho High
Court.—C0imsni., 0oo;m~- Willis, Q.O., and Kowlqaki. Soumroas, A. G’.
Dillon ; Charla Rogers, Sons, Q Russell.

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The question in this case was whether a client, who has obtained the common order to tax his sol.icitor’s bill of costs, can dispute his retainer of the solicitor in regard to some of the items in the bill. In the present case the clients were trustees of a marriage settlement, theficobtained the common order to tax two bills of costs which their so ' itor had delivered to them. A part of one of the bills was headed, ‘f As to the Willesden Security," and under this heading a number of items were charged. On the taxation, the trustees made afidavits to_the effect that they had never retained him in relation to the matters included under that head, and that he had acted contrary to their express instructions. On this ground the taxing master disallowed nearly the whole of the items under that heading. The solicitor objected to the taxation, o_n the ground that “ the master had not jurisdiction to enwrinto the question of retainer as regards the Willesden secnnty." The taxing i_nasra_r_repl1ed, “ A client to whom a bill of costs has been delivered by his solicitor, and who obtains a common order to tax it, cannot object to the whole bill, but can object to part, it having been incurred without, op contrary to,_his directions." This was a summons by the solicitor to renew the taxation, and it was urged on his behalf that the master no jurisdiction imder the common order to go into thequestlon of retainer, and that the solicitor was entitled to have that question tried by a jury. R: Imlcrwwk (32 \V. R. 51.1, 25 Ch. D. 279, 28 Soirciroas’ JOURNAL, Si) and R: Thur;/ood (19 Bcav. 541) were cited.

N onri-i, J ., held that the case was governed by Rn Bracep _(8 Bsav. 266), in which it was held by Lord Lmsdale. M-11,, thatmaiwty. the client, in prosecuting the common order for taxation, may object, an the ground of want of retainer, to any of the items U16 13,105?‘ 911°" as to which he has admitted the retainer by his pehtwlh 011 the authority of this case North, J ., dismissed the summons.——UcvHBII-i R. G. Glenn; Herbrrt Rad. Souciroas, F. S. Herbert Q 0a.; ll’. Furl:

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gm, Hastings House, Lavender-hill, 5-W

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The PRESIDENT said : Although not strictly in order, it may be agreeable to the meeting that I should say a few words with reg_ard_to tho preliminary examination The question of the P~ exammation was referred the Executive Committee of the coimcil in ovember, l88§, and again in lllzirch, 1886, and the subject has been before commlllw 1°? *1TY long time. It has received very anxious consideration, and I am happy say the committee have come to a conclusion on the subject, and the cou_ncil have confirmed the report._ The result has been that existmg regulations as to the preliminary examination no longer exist. _The_y are ~6d, and a new regulation has been devised. That regulation, in acco ce_ with our statutes, is now before tho judges. It was sent to th_em o_n the l ith of this month, and it will come into full force and efiect, if within twentyeight days after it has been so sent to the judges no expression of dlflléllt is received from them. I must ask the meeting not to p_ress_ me with any questions as to the character of the alteration in the_exaini_nation, because it would be inconvenient that any discussion should anse whilst the _is before the judges. But I may say much, that the alteration in the regulation as to the examination is not in the direction of lowering the standard.


Mr. F. K. Muxros, in accordance with notice, asked as follows: “ What steps have been taken by the council in relation to the resolution passed at the last annual meeting as to the questions with the hliddlesex ? ”

The Piiizsmizsr 2 The council have that subject under consideration, and have come to the determination that that question shall be raised and determined by the courts of the country. It is an important question with respect to taking the oath before an ordinary‘ London commissioner, instead of compelling the deponent to go to the Mid esex Registry ; and the council had thought it a subject which ought to be determine by the superior court, and steps will be taken accordingly.

Mr. Muxrox said that he would orthwith proceed in the matter of a personal memorial which ho had kept by him for the same purpose.

The PRESIDENT: It is the desire of the council that you should assist them in the matter, therefore I may ask you to communicate with us, and we will do what is necessary.

Cormrr Couars.

Mr. MUNTOI moved, in accordance with notice :—-“ That the Special Committees’ County Court Report be remitted back to such committee for reconsideration, with the aid of the council's observations thereon, and especially in conjunction with the oflicial rules and regulations promulgated since the report was drawn u —the committee to have power (with the concurrence cf the council) to adll to their number.” He said that in 1883 a committee was appointed by the society to consider the question, and, as was well known, they made a report to the council thereon. The council took such report under their consideration, and sent it out to the members with some o servations of their own upon it. A resolution was carried at a general meeting that a conference should take place between the council on the one hand and him (Mr. Munton) on the other, as repreeentin at the time the County Court Committee. Two meetings took place, and there was considerable difference of opinion on some of the points. In the meantime a large number of new rules and regulations had been issued by the authorities, which, to some extent, dealt with the question. Since that time the late Lord Chancellor had brought in a Bill to consolidate the county courts’ statutes; and it had been publicly announced that the present Lord Chancellor would, during tho comin session, bring in ii Bill to consolidate the county courts‘ Acts, and he (Dir. Munton) had reason to believe that the charact/er of that Bill would be something after the style of the Public Health Act, 1875, which in effect admitted of a number of new clauses being inserted in the Bill, and he thought a very excellent opportunity would be found during the next session for any representation being made to the Lord Chancellor which will not only deal with the question of more rules but will resultin satisfactory enactments also. That was one reason why llclpropoged the motion.

Mr. Wzsxizs seconded the motion, which was agreed to.

Ti-is CLUB.—HONORARY Maiiiisiis.

Mr. Saiwai. Dar moved, in accordance with ' " ' be added to the existing rules of the Law Sociilzligiliilelhb Eiihtdidouoiing notwithstanding anyihing to the contrary in these rules shall havmml eel subject to the a pro tion of a majority of the members, votin t 8 power’ meeting specjallir called for the purpose, to elect, as honomryg 1:6 nirbgeneral person not being a member of the Incorporated Law Society 1. "IDY

Mr. MACARTHUR objected to the motion being pg-0¢;Beded'with . contrary to the rules of the society. H6 quoted from the ml wings being the necessary notices with regard to the motion had not be es . °w that motion had for its object the alteration of the exisiin 1, Ian given.’ as ti?“ that the club should be confincd to members of the 9% Eve. amwhich mid

Mr. Dar urged that he was quite in order, and that Litiil d b on a revious occasion He had propoged 3mum. a Ben 5° ruled

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same ob'ection had been raised, but it had been overruled. The whole thing was at tliat time discussed.

Mi-. C. Foim said that his recollection was that the point of order objected to was not the same.

Mr. \V. M. Wsnrnns said the issue was very simple. It was quite clear that a bye-law could not be altered without giving certain notice. But it was absurd to say that the minute details required for the management of the club were bye-laws of the society. What the meeting had to do was simply to comply with the provision that any rules of the club might be altered by the society.

The Piiasinairr: It seems to me that the motion is in order, and we shall

rocecd. P Mr. Mseiisrriiuiz : Then I hand in a written protest, that there may be no

, mistake about it.

Mr. Dav said that all the West End clubs had the same rule. This was the Jubilee year, and many roininent people would visit London, and it would be very convenient to have the opportunity of making some of them honora members of the club.

llli-. Tyasnisoros seconded the motion. He thought it would be s great convenience that it should be passed. It was only asking the society to do what it had done upon ii former occasion. One of the objects in view was to admit as honorary members the secretarsy and the assistant secretary. It was obviously very convenient that they ould be members of the club. Of course they required refreshment, and it was much better for the society that they should be able to get that refreshment conveniently and close at hand instead cf having to go out of the building when they would not be accessible to gentlemen who wanted to see them, and in other respects it was very advantageous. Therefore he hoped the meeting would feel no difficulty in agreeing to what was a vcry convenient and universal practice of clubs, that 0 admitting honorary members.

Mr. FORD said he offered a strong opposition to this most monstrous proposal. He called attention to the rather mysterious language inwhich_it was framed. It was to be by the vote of a general meeting. He was quite sure many persons were under the im ression that it was to be a general meeting of the society, but it was nothing of the kind. It was to be merely a meeting of the club. He thought he was right in saying that Day was not a member of the curious institution called a club, and it might be that he hoped to be rnwardcd by made an honorary member.

Mr. Dar rose to order. He had a ready said that he had spoken merely as the mouthpiece of Mr. Humphreys. Therefore it was not fair that he (Mr. Day) should be subjected to these remarks.

lilr. Foiin thought ho was right in saying that Mr. Humphreys was one of the aid oflicers of the society. He was a solicitor, very largely employed by them, and it was on that account he had thought it desirab e that_the proposition should be brought forward by another member. The club might

ring in fifty or sixty outsiders, because it was financially embarrassed, kee it going. If the motion was defeated it would be found that_witl1l!1 twelve months the club would find it necessary to give the society notice that they did not require their rooms any longer. He regretted that he had wit drawn the action which he commenced against the society. _

Mr. Paaxsn, as a member of the club, supported the motion. He did iioi intend to answer Mr. Ford's remarks, because he did not think this a fitting time or occasion to have made them. There were several reasons why the motion should be passed. The society had this year, in return for the repeated hospitality tendered to them in the rovinces, invited the country societies to meet in London. Every one would agree that it would be nine to be regretted that any portion of the building should be closed to tl!° members on their meotmg at the society’s premises in the summer. It W85 evident from the resolution bei brought forward that there wasadoubt upon the point, and ii doubt iiihich would reflect very seriousl ' I1p0Il the hospitality of the society. He remembered in connection with tlie o d club, that during the dynamite scare, the oliicers of the guards on duty at the law Courts were made honorary members, and they appreciated the advanlflvery highly. He had looked at the rules at the time, and had thought that there was now power under them to do this. Who could object to the secretary and assistant secretary being inade honorary members ? Did they not all agree that to those two gentlemen, for their high ability, th9lI 59'" MHBB °°“l'WB)’» and unwearying patience to the members lfldlViClll3l-b' a“.d collectively, their warmest thanks were due, and when an occasion of this kind presented itself, and they could extend to them some recoglliiilml 05 their valuable services, they should warmly accept it

Mr. G. B. Gascuiir suggested that the words “ of the club" should follow “geffeffll meeting!’ and that the number of honorary members should_l>6 restricted. At t e suggpstion of the president he moved the followlllg

amendment: “ That sue honorary members shall at no time exceed 553' "1 number."

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to der the chairman would have been bound to stop him. _The question

or was not that of the existence of the club or the appropriation of the students‘ fees for improper purposes. It was an unworthy suggestion, but

still it was madei

Mr. hlacanrauaz And persisted in.

Mr. WALTBRRI Yes. The insinuation is made, and persisted in.

Mr. Macanruuii: It is not an insinuation; it is a direct charge. Use proper language.

Mr. WALTERS said the statement he repelled, and the taste which persisted in insisting upon it he would leave to the meeting. With reglard to Mr. Ford, what he (Mr. Ford) had said about the action brought by im against the society was not quite right. I-Ie had regretted that he did not go on with the action. He (Mr. Walters) thought Mr. Ford rather forgot that he had asked leave to withdraw that action, if the council would not press for psyment of oosts—

Mr. Fonn: I rise to order. I dispute in tolo the accuracy of that statement. I say it is not correct.

Mr. Waixrlss did not know that his memory was worse than Mr. Ford's, and he had no doubt that if the correspondence were referred to it would be found that he (Mr. Walters) had spoken correctly. Mr. Ford complained that the club question was constantly coming up. That was due to him and Mr. Macarthur. \Vas it also quite consistent with dignity and fairness that Mr. Ford should constantly impute motives to everyone? When, for instance, lilr. Day had brought forward the motion, Mr. Ford had accused him of unworthy motives, in that he might be itchforked into the position of an honorary member. This was hardly good form. He should remember that these remarks got into the papers, and the members brought themselves down to the level of a parliament of Home Rulers. Mr. Day had than explained that Mr. Humphieys really was the originator of the resolution ; then .\lr. Ford said that Mr. Humphreys occupied the position of a paid oifioer of the society. In this honourable profession did he mean to say that the members of it, by taking fees for doing business, surrendered their independence? Surely that was unworthy, and if Mr. Ford had thought so badly of his professional brethren, he ought not to have said it in public. Then Mr. Ford had said that the club wanted the motion carried to Igct them out of their financial diflioulties. That was an unworthy motive. id not Mr. Ford know that no club could exist upon the sale of its food and drink? Did he not know that the club was dependent, like other clubs, on the fees and subscriptions of members without which it could not go on? Lethim argue the questions fairly, and not throw broadcast these insults against persons, individually and collectively.

Mr. Foan hoped the amendment would not be accepted. It followed. from the remarks made by Mr. Roscoe, that there was n serious and grave difference of o inion between tho members of the club upon the subject. He (Mr. Ford) has in his ssession letters from Mr. Saunders, when he was p{esident, which wouldmcloarly prove that the statements made by Mr.

'slters as regarded the withdrawal of the action of Ford v. The Incorporated Lalo Society were wholly incorrect.

Sir Ti-ioius Psixir said the motion seemed to him to be a mistake, both as regarded the substance of it and the way in which it had been brought forward. Some years s-go it had been expressly stated that the club should be composed only of members of the society. There were good reasons for that, and he was not disposed to join in any motion which would be inconsistent with the determination which had been then come to. Moreover, it FPP<¥-‘red to him that any resolution of the kind should come in the first mstance from the club, and be confirmed by the society.

Mr. Dav accepted the amendment, and thought the number of honorary members might even be reduced to twenty.

Mr. E|.Laa'ro.\' trusted that members who were doubtful upon the motion would not vote for it merely to shew that they did not agree with the sentiInents of the members who had spoken against it. .

llir. Mnsroiv said he was not a member of the club, but he had been conIefflllgnwith some of the members, and they thought it was desirable that the amen ent should be altered by adding the words—“elected as honorary member for a period not exceeding two years. "

Ml‘. Giuzooiir concurred in the alteration.

_ Mr. PBNNINGTON could not u rec with the alteration. It would put them in a very diflicult position with regard to the secretary and the assistant Secretary, whom he believed every member. if tho club was to exist at all, would wish to be honorary members of it. As a member of the committee Of the club, he knew there was no danger that it would be swamped with honorary members.

Mr. Gascoiir observed that there was nothing to prevent re-election.

Mr. Psrmmorox assented to the alteration.

T116 Papsinssr put the motion as follows :—“ That the following be added 15° the existing rules of the Law Society Club: ‘The committee, notwithm'“dmB lnything to the contrary in these rules, shall have power, subject to um ‘Probation of a m.a'ority of the members voting at a general meeting of the c ub specially called for the purpose, to elect as honorary member any Person not being a member of the Incorporated Law Society, but the number °i Bush honorary members shall not at any time exceed twenty, and such itfiggigkall, be for a period not exceeding two years, but with power of

Q6 I;OtlOIl was carried--69 voting for it, and 33 against it. b _

- KILLIIOK ' ' resolution; but heswiggsélmtéhlpltaclit ought to be put again as a su stantive

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view to the assimilation of the practice in England generally with that which
prevails in the North of England with regard to the employment and remu-
neration of auctioneers. That it be suggested to the council that a com-
mittee of the society be appointed, which shall include members familiar with
the practice in the North of England, to consider and report on the subject
with a view to carrying the above resolution into effect." He also moved-
“That s committee be appointed to consider and report to the council on tho
measures necessary to be taken with the object of assimilating the practice
in England generally to that which prevails in the North of England with
respect to the employment and remuneration of auctioneers. That the com-
mittee (of whom ten shall be a quorum) shall consist of members of the
society to be named at the meeting, with power to add to their number.
That it be an instruction to such committee to especially invite the co-opcra-
tion of members familiar with the practice in the North of England." He
said the purport of the resolution passed at York was that the same method
of practice in relation to sales by auction should prevail all over England.
He need not remind them that there was one custom in the North and
another in the South. In the North a very broad distinction was drawn
between auctioneers and survc ors and valuers, and that the auctioneer was
merely employed to get on to the rostrum and sell. The solicitor did a great
deal of the work which was ordinarily done by the auctioneer in the South of
England—thnt was to say, the auctioneer's duties were really divisible into
two, the act of selling and the act of hri 'ng the property prominently before
the notice of the public. The first tiniexthle matter had come under prominent
notice was after the sing of the general order which gave solicitors a foo
for conducting a salewb public auction He thought it was within the
knowledge of everyone that that order was promulgated according to the
custom of the North of England, and he thong t that fact by itself almost n
suflicicnt reason for their endeavouring to assimilate their practice to that of
tho North of England The mutter was one which had been the subject of
' di ' l d ' 'o on other occasions By one decision Vice-Chancellor

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the solicitor to the auctioneer. at did not seem to have been o owe

and in unothcr case work was done by the auctioneer which was held to have
been work which could not have been done by the solicitor, and therefore
the solicitor was not alloweda conducting fcc; and another case was reported
in the Soi.ici'roas‘ J OUBNAL. He took it that it was desirable for all 0 them
that these difficulties should be smoothed away, and he took it that a com-
mittee which could recommend one consistent course of conduct all over
England would ave the way for the removal of these difliculties. Upon the
resolution ed at York he had drawn the motion which was intended to

embody thaltaizipression of opinion. Ho had been givento understand that the
resolution at York had been approved by the council, vs-ithout wflhich
h e ect.

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