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whether it would do harm to grant or to refuse the injunction. Now in be used on the hearing of the motion (an affidavit to prove the service on this case the plaintiff had taken upon himself to do that which the the defendant of the order which he had disobeyed) was not served with defendant said was an infringement of his patent, and in respect of the notice of motion. On Saturday, the 8th of January, a copy of the which he had warned the plaintiff's customer that he intended to take affidavit was served on the defendant's solicitor. On the hearing of the proceedings against the plaintiff. It seemed to him, therefore, that he motion the defendant did not appear. Rule 4 of order 52 provides that should be doing more harm to the defendant by granting the injunction "every notice of motion
shall state in than to the plaintiff by refusing it. The balance of convenience, there general terms the ground of the application; and when any such motion fore, was in favour of his making no order on the motion, and for that reason is founded on evidence by affidavit, a copy of any affidavit intended to be only, and without expressing any opinion upon the question whether used shall be served with the notice of motion.” In Whitham v. Whitham there had been any infringement of the defendant's patent. He refused(29 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 707) and Schirges v. Schirges (30 Solicitors' the injunction.- COUNSEL, Ince, Q.C., and Phipson Beale ; Sir R. Webster, JOURNAL, 403) Pearson, J., held that this rule does not apply to an A.G., Renshaw, Q.C., and Carpmael. SOLICITORS, Field, Roscoe, & Co., for affidavit which is merely to give formal proof of the service of an order. Barlow, Smith, g Pinsent, Birmingham; Wilson, Bristows, & Carpmael. NORTH, J., declined to follow those decisions. He was unwilling to
order the attachment of a defendant who, in reliance on the irregularity, Re THE DUKE OF SOMERSET, THYNNE v. ST. MAUR-Chitty, might have abstained from appearing.-Counsel, Vernon R. Smith. .., 28th January.
SOLICITORS, Dangerfield f Blythe.
Re ROLLASON, ROLLASON v. ROLLASON-North, J., 28th In this case the question arose as to whether a married woman could
January act as guardian ad litem of an infant. It appeared that the registrar had
EXECUTION-PAWXBROKER-REDEEMABLE PLEDGE. refused to draw up an order made under such circumstances. It was The question in this case was whether the interest of a pawnbroker in submitted, however, that any disability to be guardian ad litem or next goods pledged with him, before his title has become absolute by the friend which existed under the old practice arose from a married woman's expiration of the time fixed for the redemption of the pledge, is of such a incapacity to be sued, which incapacity was, however, removed by the nature that it can be seized by the sheriff under a fi. fa. subject to the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, s. 1, sub-section 2, which enacts right of the pledgor to redeem. There appeared to be no express authority that a married woman shall be " capable of suing and being sued either in on the point. The goods had been seized under an execution to enforce a contract or tort or otherwise in all respects as if she were a feme sole." judgment obtained in an action in the Chancery Division. Another
CHITTY, J., said that it was true that the old practice was based on the creditor obtained a judgment, and the appointment of a receiver of the incompetence of a married woman to sue and be sued and be answerable pawnbroker's business, in an action in the Queen's Bench Division. The in costs, but the Act of 1882 had not made a married woman for all appointment of the receiver was made subsequent to the seizure of the purposes a feme sole. Section 1, sub-section 2, had only made a married goods. The question was whether the title of the receiver was ousted by woman capable of suing and being sued in matters relating to herself the prior title under the seizure. personally, but did not remove her personal incapacity to be a next friend North, J., held that the pawnbroker's interest in the goods could be or guardian ad litem. R. 8. C., 1883, XVI., 16, expressly incorporated seized under the execution, and that the execution was entitled to priority. the old practice, and shewed that the framers of the rules had the Act of -COUNSEL, Macaskie ; H. Tindal Atkinson; M'Clymont. SOLICITORS, 1882 in view. There were many reasons why it might not be for the Taylor, Hoare, f Co.; Pilcher f Vertue ; Belfrage & Co. advantage of infants to be represented in legal proceedings by a married woman which his lordship would not discuss, as he decided the present question on the ground that her personal incapacity had not been
Re THE OUTLAY ASSURANCE ASSOCIATION-North, J., 22nd removed. To grant the application would be a dangerous innovation, as
January. a married woman would not be responsible for the costs of an improper COMPANY-RESTORATION OF NAMB To Register After Striking Orr By action, or liable to pay those of an improper defence, or, at the most, she
REGISTRAR—“CARRYING ON BUSINESS OR IN OPERATION !! - VOLUNTARY. would only be liable to the extent of her separate estate, which would WINDING UP-COMPANIES Act, 1880 (43 Vict. c. 19), s. 7. necessitate an inquiry into her separate estate, with all its attendant inconvenience.
In this case a question arose as to the restoration to the register of He should, therefore, make an order that the married joint stock companies of the name of a company, which had been struck woman be removed from her position as guardian ad litem, and that the off by the registrar under the provisions of section 7 of the Companies matter be referred to chambers to appoint a new guardian.-Counsel, Act, 1880. Section 7 provides (l) that, where the registrar " has reason. Latham, R.C., and Badcock. SOLICITORS, Walters, Deverell, & Co; Crowders able cause to believe that a company is not carrying on business or in $ Vizard.
operation, he shall send to the company by post a letter inquiring Re CURREY, GIBSON v. WAY-Chitty, J., 1st February.
whether it is carrying on business or in operation"; (2) if the registrar
does not, within one month, receive any answer, he shall, within fourteen CONVEYANCING Act, 1881, s. 39–MARRIED WOMEN-RESTRAINT ON ANTICI- days after the expiration of the month, send to the company a registered
letter referring to the first letter, and stating that no answer has been In this case an application was made to the court, under section 39 of the received thereto, and “ that, if an answer is not received to the second Conveyancing Act, 1881, for the purpose of obtaining an order binding letter within one month from the date thereof, a notice will be published life of real property under the will of a deceased testator, which contained register"; (3) "if the registrar either receives an answer from the a declaration that gifts to married women should be for their separate company that it is not carrying on business or in operation, or does not, use without power of anticipation. It was stated that the property con
within one month after sending the second letter, receive any answer sisted of houses, and that no valid leases could be granted by reason of thereto,” he may publish in the Gazette and send to the company the restraint on anticipation imposed on the tenants for life, and it was
notice that at the expiration of three months from the date of that asked that the property be partitioned and re-settled.
notice the name of the company will, unless cause is shewn to the conCHITTY, J., said that section 39 did not inform the court as to what trary, be struck off the register, and the company will be dissolved"; were the circumstances under which it should make an order overriding
* At the expiration of the time mentioned in the notice the registrar a restraint on anticipation, save and except that it must appear that such may, unless cause to the contrary is previously shewn by such company, was simply asked that leave to convey should be given without any special notice thereof in the Gasette, and, on the publication in the Gazette of reason being assigned, the court could not make an order. Each case,
such last-mentioned notice, the company whose name is so struck off therefore, required to be examined by itself. It appeared to him, although shall be dissolved ; provided that the liability (if any) of every director, the question was not before him, that a married woman restrained from managing officer, and member of the company shall continue, and may anticipation could make a will passing the property, because the restraint
be enforced as if the company had not been dissolved"; (5) “If any ca anticipation could not operate after death. He'should, in the present company or member thereof feels aggrieved by the name of such company of the difficulty which otherwise existed in dealing with the property, company or member may apply to the superior court in which the commade under which the life interests of the married women would be made company was, at the time of the striking off, carrying on business or in subject to a like restraint on anticipation mais resisted in the instrument operation, and that it is just so to do, may order the name of the com. under which they took the property. The scheme proposed being a pru
pany to be restored to the register, and thereupon the company shall be G. S. Barnes. SOLICITORS, Currey, Holland, g Currey.
never been struck off.” In the present case the company had, in
March, 1879, passed an extraordinary resolution to wind up volun. Re LYSAGHT, BLYTHE v. BAUMGARTNER-North, J., 1st
tarily. There being no obligation under the Companies Acts to February.
register an extraordinary resolution, the registrar had no notice R. 8. C., 1883, LII., 4-MOTION FOR ATTACHMENT-SERVICE OF Copy of
of the winding up.
After the commencement of the winding
up the office of the company was removed from the registered office, but AFFIDAVIT.
no notice of the change of office was sent to the registrar, as required by This was a motion by the plaintiff for leave to issue an attachment section 40 of the Companies Act, 1862. The liquidation continued till the against the defendant for his disobedience to a previous order of the year 1886, the liquidator not having been able to realize the assets. was given for Tuesday, the 11th of January. "On Friday, the 7th but the action was not set down for trial till August, 1886. The defend on January, it was served on the defendants' solicitor on the record, ants then agreed to pay what was due from them, but they discovered but a copy of an affidavit mentioned in the Schotice and intended to that the company had been dissolved by a notice in the Gazette on the lat
of June, 1886, and its name struck off the register, and they refused to the case may require, scheme for the execution of the improvewas found that the registrar had taken the proper proceedings under capital money to be expended is in the hands of trustees, then, section 7, because no returns had been made to him by the company, as after a scheme is approved by them, the trustees may apply that required by section 26 of the Companies Act, 1862, since October, 1878. money in or towards payment for the whole of part of any work The registrar had sent the required notices to the registered office of the or operation comprised in the improvement on Tinter alia)" (iii.) company, but, by reason of the change of office, of which the registrar was an order of the court directing or authorizing the trustees to so ignorant, the liquidator had not received these notices. The liquidator, apply a specified) portion of the capital money." North, J. (in who was a member of the company, now petitioned for the restoration chambers) was of opinion that the approval by the trustees of the scheme of the company's name the register.
ought to have been obtained before the work was executed, and on this NORTH, J., held that sub-section 5 of section 7 applied, though at the ground he dismissed the summons. The tenant for life moved in court to time of the striking off of the company's name, it was carrying on discharge the order made in chambers, and that an order might be made business only for the purpose of the winding up, and he made an order in the terms of the summons. It was urged that if, before expending for the restoration of the name in the form NO. 314 given at page 665 of money in a permanent improvement, the tenant for life was hound, if he Chadwyck-Healey's Company Law.-Counsel, Leigh Bernard; Ingle Joyce. desired to be repaid out of capital money, to obtain the approval of the SOLICITORS, J. IVestcott; W. Murton.
trustees, the immediate execution of a work which was urgently reqnired
-e.g., the construction of a sea or river wall to prevent the flooding of COOKES v. COOKES-North, J., 29th January.
land--would be discouraged, to the possible serious injury of an estate.
NORTH, J., howeeer, adhered to the view which he had already exSETTLED LAND-SALE BY TENANT FOR LIFE-EXERCISE OF OPTION AS TO PAYMENT OF PURCHASE-MONEY INTO Court or to TRUSTEES-SETTLED pressed. He thought that the intention of section 26 was, that the opinion
of the trustees or the court (as the case might be) should be taken in the LAND ACT, 1882, ss. 21, 22.
first instance as to whether the proposed works were of such a nature that In this case the question arose whether a tenant for life of settled land, the cost of them ought to be defrayed out of capital money, and that it who had sold the land, under the power conferred on him by the Settled was only after obtaining the approval of the scheme by the trustees or Land Act, 1882, had exercised the option given to him by sub-section 1 the court that the tenant for life could expend the money with a certainty of section 22 of the Act, as to the payment of the purchase-money either of being repaid. It was very important that the provisions of the Act to the trustees of the settlement or into court. The suit was for the should be complied with. Before the money had been expended the administration of the estate of the testator by whose will the land was trustees might be able to exercise their judgment fairly, but after the settled. The will contained no power of sale, and no trustees were tenant for life had spent the money it might seem an invidious thing for appointed by it who were trustees of the settlement for the purposes of them to refuse to approve what he had done, and thus prevent his the Act. With a view to a sale under the Act, trustees for those purposes obtaining the repayment of the money. The Act did not intend that were appointed by the court. The tenant for life entered intu a contract either the trustees or the court should be placed in such a position. His for the sale of the land, and, there being some questions raised in the lordship, therefore, declined to allow the payment of the money out of suit as to certain charges on the property, the purchaser refused to the capital money in the hands of the trustees. complete his purchase, unless the purchase-money was paid into court Another question arose thus. Counsel appeared for the trustees, and in the suit. The tenant for life consented to an application made by the proposed to address the court in support of the motion. purchaser for an order for the payment of the money into court in the NORTH, J., said that he could not hear the trustees' counsel in support suit, and the order was made and the money paid into court under it. of an application in the interest of the tenant for life. The trustees were The purchase having been completed, the tenant for life presented a
intended to be a check on the tenant for life in the interest of the other petition in the suit and in the matter of the Act, asking that the money persons who were entitled under the settlement, and they ought, at least, might be paid out to the trustees, the object being that they might then to maintain a neutral position.--Counsel, 1. T. Procter; J.'T. Dodd. invest it according to his direction. Section 21 of the Act provides that SOLICITOR, H. P. Cobb. “capital money arising under this Act shall, when received, be invested or otherwise applied wholly in one, or partly in one and partly in another or others, of the following modes - namely" (inter alia)
Re SCHMIDT'S TRADE-MARK—Stirling, J., 17th January. “ (1x.) In payment to any person becoming absolutely entitled or SECURITY FOR Costs-.PAYMENT INTO COURT BY LITIGANT RESIDING IN empowered to give an absolute discharge." By section 22, “(1) Capital GERMANY-REPAYMENT BY PAYMASTER-GENERAL-FORM OF ORDER. money arising under this Act shall, in order to its being invested or applied as aforesaid, be paid either to the trustees of the settlement or into court,
In this case a question arose how repayment from the Paymastera at the option of the tenant for life, and shall be invested or applied General of money paid into court as security for costs should be obtained by the trustees, or under the direction of the court, as the case may be, on behalf of a litigant residing in Germany: Mr. Schmidt, a resident in accordingly"; " (2) The investment or other application by the trustees Germany, had been ordered to pay, and had paid, $200'into court as shall be made according to the direction of the tenant for life, and, in security for costs in respect of an application by him for registration of default thereof, according to the discretion of the trustees, but, in the
a tradc-luark. Upon the hearing of that application, together with last-mentioned case, subject to any consent required or direction given another matter, Mr. Schmidt obtained an order for payment of his costs. by the settlement with respect to the investment or other application by It thus became necessary to obtain repayment of the $200. Mr. Schmidt, the trustees of trust money of the settlement, and any investment shail being in Germany, could not attend in person at the office of the Pay be in the names or under the control of the trustees”; “(3) The invest- master-General, and could not, according to the law of Germany, comply ment or other application under the direction of the court shall be made there with the formalities required by the Paymaster-General in regard to on the application of the tenant for life or of the trustees." It was argued the execution of a power of attorney, but would have to go to Holland or that, notwithstanding the payment into court, the tenant for life was Belgium for that purpose. still entitled to the option given to him by sub-section 1 of section 22 STIRLING, J., directed that Mr. Schmidt should give a power of attorney of having the money paid to the trustees, and that the trustees were in the ordinary form to some person in this country, and upon his signapersons * becoming absolutely entitled" within the meaning of sub- ture thereto being verified, the power should be entered in the order, and section (ix.) of section 21.
the sum in court paid out to Mr. Schmidt's nominee. -Counsel, R. F. NORTH, J., held that the trustees did not come within that description, Norton. SoLICITORS, Ellis, Munday, & Bartrum. and that the tenant for life had exercised the option given to him by section 22 (1) when he consented to the order for the payment of the money into court, instead of insisting on its being paid to the trustees. The money LIMITATION TO CHILDREN AT Twenty-four—REMOTENESS—RULE AGAINST
Re WARDEN, BROWETT ». WARDEN—Stirling, J., 24th January. must, therefore, remain in court, and be invested or applied under the direction of the court, as provided by sub-section (3) of section 22.
PERPETUITIES. Counsel, Cookson, Q.C., and Rashleigh ; Napier Higgins, Q.C., and Speed, Q.C ; Cozens Hardy, m?c., and 1. I.' Wilkinson , Ingle Joyce ; Dauney. a covenant contained in a marriage settlement, and under which the
In this case a question arose whether a gift of a legacy in discharge of Solicitors, Gregory, Rowcliffes, & Co.; Tucker g Lake ; Lidiard & Co.; limitation in default of appointment was to children at twenty-four, was Clarke, Woodcock, & Ryland.
void for remoteness. By his fmarriage settlement, dated the 28th of Re HOTCHKIN'S SETTLED ESTATES—North, J., 31st January.
September, 1867, Joseph Warden covenanted that his executors would,
within twelve months after his death, pay to the trustees $2,000 to be Sertled LAND-PERMANENT IMPROVEMENT-Payment of Cost OUT
held upon trust for the wife for life, and after her death for the children “ CAPITAL Moneys"-APPROVAL OF SCHEME BY Trustees—Settled should attain twenty-four, equally, and, if there should be but one saran, LAND Act, 1882, s. 26.
A question arose in this case as to the jurisdiction of the court to order 1886, having by his will directed his executors to set apart out of thes the cost of making a permanent improvement to a settled estate to be residuary estate and pay to the trustees of the settlement (to the abovebaithe settlement for the purposes of the Settled Land Act. the Fentant his wife, and otherwise upon the trusts of the settlement. The testator's for life had had the work executed at his own expense, without previously Wife predeceased him. There was only one child of the marriage, For the after the work had been completed, approved the scheme, and took out a purpose of determining (inter alia) who was entitled to the legacy, summons, asking that they might pay th: cost out of “capital moneys in desirous that capital money arising under this face shall be applied fin timication by the restlements in the mother of Chinaren, in default of appointe
STIRLING, J., held that the legacy of 42,000 by the will was given fore ior douards payment for an improvement authorized toyhtihis because hechåg minert, was bonito forte e no teness, and the legacy of 182,000, being on the ubmit for approval to the trustees of the settlement, or to the court, as same footing, failed also. The $2,000 accordingly fell into residue, –
235 COUNSEL, W. Pearson, Q.O., and Marcy; 4. Brown. SOLICITOR, G. P. THE COURT OF APPEAL (HANNEN, P., and BOWEN and Fry, L.JJ.) Rogers, for Powell & Brewett and Coley & Coley, both of Birmingham. affirmed the decision. HANNEN, P., said that the point was disposed of
by express authority. He must confess that he was surprised at the JOHNSON v. JOHNSON-Stirling, J., 25th and 29th January. decision that in such a case the relation of debtor and creditor did not MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY Act, 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 93), s. 8– exist within the meaning of section 48. But the point had been solemnly DEED ACKNOWLEDGED.
decided by the Court of Appeal in Ex parte Taylor, and the court was The plaintiff, who was married on November 23, 1870, became entitied, without expressing any opinion of his own. Fry, L.J., also thought that
bound by that decision. Bowen, L.J., concurred for the same reason, in June, 1876, to certain real estate as co-heiress of an intestate. Her rights in such real estate were consequently, regulated by the Married should not have come to the same conclusion as the Court of Appeal'did
the court was bound by the previous decisions. As at present advised, he Women's Property Act, 1870, which, by its 8th section, enacts, in effect, in Ex parte Taylor. Beyond saying that, he would not express any that the rents and profits of descended property shall belong to the opinion. Leave was given to appeal to the House of Lords. --Counsel, married woman for her separate use, and that her receipts alone shall be a good discharge for the same." The plaintiff had purported to settle the
Tindal Atkinson, Q.C., and Sidney Woolf; Herbert Reed. SOLICITORS, property upon certain trusts with the concurrence of her husband, but Hogan & Hughes ; Mossop & Rolfe. not by deed acknowledged. The question now arose, as to this real estate. whether or not, being a deed unacknowledged, the settlement had passed any estate beyond one for the life of the plaintiff and the possible life
CASES AFFECTING SOLICITORS. interest of the husband as tenant by curtesy. STIRLING, J., in giving judgment on January 29, said that the question was,
Ex parte RUSSELL, Re ELDERTON-O. A. No. 1, 28th January. What was the intention of the Legislature in enacting this section of this SOLICITOR-Right QF AUDIENCE-BANKRUPTCY MATTER-COURT OF APPEAL public Act? Was it intended that the separate use should extend to rents and
-BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1883, s. 151. profits 'vhenever they might arise; or that it should be limited to the rents and profits which might be personally enjoyed by the married woman ? court. Section 151 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, provides that nothing
In this case a question arose as to a solicitor's right of audience in At the time of the passing of the Act the consequence of marriage upon the real estate of the wife was this, the husband acquired a freehold inter
in this Act, or in any transfer of jurisdiction effected thereby, shall take est during their joint lives, and on the birth of a child capable of inherit
away or affect any right of audience that any person may have had at the ing under the existing limitations in favour of the wife, that estate right of audience before the Chief Judge in Bankruptcy, shall have the
commencement of this Act, and all solicitors or other persons who had the became, by the curtesy of England, enlarged to an estate for life, but, like right of audience in bankruptcy matters in the High Court.” This subject to this, the freehold remained in the wife and she could pass it by deed acknowledged. Now, the words of the section of the Act
was an appeal from a decision of Cave, J., in a bankruptcy matter, and contained no words of limitation. Again the word "receipts” pointed the appellant's solicitor claimed to be entitled to audience on his behalf. to the meaning of the words "rents and profits" for which they were to right of audience given by section 151 is strictly limited to the High be given, being the rents and profits which she would be capable of Court.-COUNSEL, Cooper-Willis, Q.C., and Kowląski. SOLICITORS, 4. G. giving receipts for, that is the rents and profits during her life, and did Ditton ; Charles Rogers, Sons, f Russeli. not point to the corpus of the property. Further, this must be considered, if “rents and profits” meant "rents and profits for all time," it must have been intended to give her an increased power of disposition, and
Re HERBERT-North, J., 2nd February. yet there was not a word in the Act to enable à married woman to deal SOLICITOR-Costs—TAXATION-COMMON ORDER TO Tax-RIGHT OF CLIENT with the legal estate otherwise than in the ordinary way, that was by a
TO DISPUTE RETAINER, deed acknowledged. If then, the Legislature had intended to confer upon a married woman the unfettered power of disposing of real estate
The question in this case was whether a client, who has obtained the descending upon her, they had conferred it upon her by very indirect of the solicitor in regard to some of the items in the bill. In the present
common order to tax his solicitor's bill of costs, can dispute his retainer means, and that intention might have been effected much more readily case the clients were trustees of a marriage settlement, and they obtained by such a provision as the one inserted in the Married Women's Property Act, 1882. Finally, it was obvious that the whole Act dealt delivered to them. A part of one of the bills was headed, "As to the
the common order to tax two bills of costs which their solicitor had with the property of married women, not in a comprehensive, but in a Willesden Security," and under this heading a number of items were married woman under a deed or will, the preceding section only attached charged. On the taxation, the trustees made affidavits to the effect that the separate use to it if the amount did not exceed £200.
they had never retained him in relation to the matters included under He
that head, and that he had acted contrary to their express instructions. accordingly came to the conclusion that the better view was to hold that on this ground the taxing master disallowed nearly the whole of the the object of the Legislature was simply to remove and put aside that items under that heading. The solicitor objected to the taxation, on the the rents and profits by the wife, and not to give her an enlarged ground that the master had not jurisdiction to enter into the question of
The taxing master replied, dominion over her property. He held, therefore, that the separate use "A client to whom a bill of costs has been delivered by his solicitor, and created by the Married Women's Property Act, 1870, extended only to who obtains a common order to tax it, cannot object to the whole bill, but rents and profits which might come to a married woman so as to be personally enjoyed by her, and that it followed from this that the con
can object to part, it having been incurred without, or contrary to his
directions." This was a summons by the solicitor to review the taxation, tention of the plaintiff was right.-Counsel, Baines ; Willis Bund. Solici. and it was urged on his behalf that the taxing master had no jurisdiction TORS, Hughes & Gleadow.
under the common order to go into the question of retainer, and that the solicitor was entitled to have that question tried by a jury. Re Inderwick
(32 W. R. 541, 25 Ch. D. 279, 28 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 87) and Re Thur. BANKRUPTCY CASES.
good (19 Beav. 541) were cited.
NORTH, J., held that the case was governed by Re Bracey (8 Beav. 266), Ex parte BALL, Re HUTCHINSON-C. A. No. 1, 28th January. in which it was held by Lord Langdale, M.R., that " in equity, the BANKRUPTCY-FRAUDULENT PREFERENCE - VOLUNTARY REPLACEMENT or client, in prosecuting the common order for taxation, may object, on the MISAPPROPRIATED Trust Money-BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1883, s. 48. ground of want of retainer, to any of the items of the bill, except those
as to which he has admitted the retainer by his petition.". On the In this case the question was raised, whether the voluntary replacement authority of this case North, J., dismissed the summons.-COUNSEL, by a trustee in insolvent circumstances of trust money which he has misappropriated can be treated in his bankruptcy as a fraudulent prefer- Neave.
R. G. Glenn ; Herbert Reed. SOLICITORS, F: S. Herbert & Co.; W. Burse ence under section 48 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883. In Ex parte Stubbins (17 Ch. D. 58) and in the recent case, Ex parte Taylor (ante, p. 96), it SOLICITOR STRUCK OFF THE ROLLS. -January 27th, EUSTACE WILLIAM was held by the Court of Appeal that such a payment could not be treated Owles. as a fraudulent preference, on the ground that the relation of debtor and creditor did not exist between a trustee and his co-trustee, cr between a trustee and his cestui que trust, in regard to money due from the trustee by reason of a breach of trust, and that section 48 applies only to the preference of a creditor.
The Solicitor-General will preside at a dinner which is to be given to his co-trustees shortly before his bankruptcy, on the ground that he was hit aside a payment of this nature which had been made byla terusted to Mr. Montagu Williams by several of his friends at the bar in celebration
of his recent appointment as metropolitan police magistrate, which will bound by these decisions of the Court of Appeal.
On behalf of the take place at the Holborn Restaurant on Saturday, February 19. appellant it was urged that those decisions applied to the case of a trustee
Lord Stanley of Preston, the President of the Board of Trade, visited who had committed a fraudulent breach of frust in respect of which the Manchester on Tuesday, and had a conference with the Trade Marks Well liable to criminal proceedings, the knowledge of which facet might Commitee of the Chamber of Commerce as to the working of the Tradeweld have produced an influence on his mind inducing him to replace the opinion, said he would prefer at present to make as few promises as criminal proceedings. Moreover, the claim of a cestui que trust against criministed & breach of trust, had done nothing to expose himself to possible, but in some points he went a long way with the committee.
A smoking concert in connection with the United Law Students' proceedings in a court of equity, and constituted an equitable debe which 23rd next, at 7.30 p.m., Mr. Wynne E. Baxter in the chair. Any memintended to prevent a preference of any person who but for the prefere application to F. B. Moyle, 29, Bedford-row, W.o., or S. A. G. Kempence, would have been entitled to prove in the bankruptcy.
ster, Hastings House, Lavender-hill, s.w.
same objection had been raised, but it had been overruled. The whole thing
was at that time discussed. LAW SOCIETIES.
Mr. C. FORD said that his recollection was that the point of order objected
to was not the same. INCORPORATED LAW SOCIETY.
Mr. W. M. WALTERS said the issue was very simple. It was quite clear GENERAL MEETING.
that a bye-law could not be altered without giving certain notice. But it
was absurd to say that the minute details required for the management of The January general meeting of the Incorporated Law Society took place
What the meeting had to do was on Friday, the 28th ult., at the society's hall, Chancery-lane, the PRESIDENT the club were bye-laws of the society.
simply to comply with the provision that any rules of the club might be (Mr. H. W. Parker) taking the chair.
altered by the society. PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION.
The PRESIDENT: It seems to me that the motion is in order, and we shall The PRESIDENT said : Although not strictly in order, it
proceed. may be agreeable
Mr. MACARTHUR : Then I hand in a written protest, that there may be no to the meeting that I should say a few words with regard to the preliminary mistake about it. examination. The question of the preliminary examination was referred to
Mr. Day said that all the West End clubs had the same rule. This was the Executive Committee of the council in November, 1885, and again in March, 1886, and the subject has been before that committee for a very would be very convenient to have the opportunity of making some of them
the Jubilee year, and many prominent people would visit London, and it say the committee have come to a conclusion on the subject, and the council honorary members of the club.
Mr. PENNINGTON seconded the motion. He thought it would be a great have confirmed the report. The result has been that existing regulations as to the preliminary examination no longer exist. They are repealed, and convenience that it should be passed. It was only asking the society to do a new regulation has been devised. That regulation, in accordance with what it had done upon a former occasion. One of the objects in view was to our statutes, is now before the judges. It was sent to them on the 17th of admit as honorary members the secretary and the assistant secretary. It
was obviously very convenient that they should be members of the club. Of this month, and it will come into full force and effect, if within twentyeight days after it has been so sent to the judges no expression of dissent they should be able to get that refreshment conveniently and close at hand
course they required refreshment, and was much better for the society that is received from them. I must ask the meeting not to press me with any instead of having to go out of the building when they would not be accessible would be inconvenient that any discussion should arise whilst the matter is to gentlemen who wanted to see them, and in other respects it was very before the judges. But I think I may say this much, that the alteration in advantageous. Therefore he hoped the meeting would feel no difficulty in the regulation as to the examination is not in the direction of lowering the agreeing to what was a very convenient and universal practice of clubs, that
of admitting honorary members. standard. MIDDLESEX REGISTRY.
Mr. Ford said he offered a strong opposition to this most monstrous proMr. F. K. MUNTON, in accordance with notice, asked as follows : “ What posal. He called attention to the rather mysterious language in which it
was framed. It was to be by the vote of a general meeting. He was quite steps have been taken by the council in relation to the resolution passed at sure many persons were under the impression that it was to be a general the last annual meeting as to the questions with the Middlesex Registry ?” The PRESIDENT : The council have that subject under consideration, and meeting of the society, but it was nothing of the kind. It was to be merely
a meeting of the club. He thought he was right in saying that Mr. Day have come to the determination that that question shall be raised and deter.
was not a member of the curious institution called a club, and it might be mined by the courts of the country. It is an important question with that he hoped to be rewarded by being made an honorary member. respect to taking the oath before an ordinary London commissioner, instead
Mr. Day rose to order. He had already said that he had spoken merely of compelling the deponent to go to the Middlesex Registry; and the council
as the mouthpiece of Mr. Humphreys. Therefore it was not fair that he had thought it a subject which ought to be determined by the superior (Mr. Day) should be subjected to these remarks. court, and steps will be taken accordingly.
Mr. Ford thought he was right in saying that Mr. Humphreys was one of Mr. MUXTON said that he would forthwith proceed in the matter of a the paid officers of the society. He was a solicitor, very largely employed personal memorial which be had kept by him for the same purpose. The PRESIDENT : It is the desire of the council that you should assist proposition should be brought forward by another member. The club might
by them, and it was on that account he had thought it desirable that the them in the matter, therefore I may ask you to communicate with us, and we bring in fifty or sixty outsiders, because it was financially embarrassed, to will do what is necessary.
keep it going. If the motion was defeated it would be found that within COUNTY COURTS.
twelve months the club would find it necessary to give the society notice that Mr. MUNTON moved, in accordance with notice : -“That the Special Com- they did not require their rooms any longer. Åe regretted that he had mittees' County Court Report be remitted back to such committee for withdrawn the action which he commenced against the society. reconsideration, with the aid of the council's observations thereon, and intend to answer Mr. Ford's remarks, because he did not think this a fitting
Mr. Parker, as a member of the club, supported the motion. He did not especially in conjunction with the official rules and regulations promulgated time or occasion to have made them. since the report was drawn up—the committee to have power (with the con
There were several reasons why the currence of the council) to add to their number."
motion should be passed. The society had this year, in return for the
He said that in 1883 a committee was appointed by the society to consider the question, and, as was
repeated hospitality tendered to them in the provinces, invited the country well known, they made a report to the council thereon. The council took societies to meet in London. Every one would agree that it would be much such report under their consideration, and sent it out to the members with members on their meeting at the society's premises in the summer.
to be regretted that any portion of the building should be closed to those some observations of their own upon it. A resolution was carried at a evident from the resolution being brought forward that there was a doubt the one hand and him (Mr. Munton) on the other, as representing at the hospitality of the society. He remembered in connection with the old club, time the County Court Committee. Two meetings took place, and there was considerable difference of opinion on some of the points. In the meantime a
that during the dynamite scare, the officers of the guards on duty at the Law large number of new rules and regulations had been issued by the authori. Courts were made honorary members, and they appreciated the advantage ties, which, to some extent, dealt with the question. Since that time the late there was now power under them to do this.
very highly. He had looked at the rules at the time, and had thought that
Who could object to the statutes; and it had been publicly announced that the present Lord secretary and assistant secretary being made honorary members ? Did they Chancellor would, during the coming session, bring in Bill to consolidate
agree that to those two gentlemen, for their high ability, their never the county courts' Acts, and he (Mr. Munton) had reason to believe that failing courtesy, and unwearying patience to the members individually and the character of that Bill would be something after the style of the Public collectively, their warmest thanks were due, and when an occasion of this Health Act, 1875, which in effect admitted of a number of new clauses being their valuable services, they should warmly accept it
kind presented itself, and they could extend to them some recognition of inserted in the Bill, and he thought a very excellent opportunity would be found during the next session for any representation being made to the Lord
Mr. G. B. Gregory suggested that the words of the club" should follow Chancellor which will not only deal with the question of more rules, but will
general meeting,” and that the number of honorary members should be result in satisfactory enactments also. That was one reason why he proposed amendment : "" That such honorary members shall at no time exceed fifty in
At the suggestion of the president he moved the following the motion. Mr. WEEKES seconded the motion, which was agreed to.
Mr. REEVE seconded.
Mr. MACARTHUR objected to the amendment on the ground that it was conMr. Samuel Day moved, in accordance with notice, " That the following the rent out of the fees of the students which ought to be expended on their
trary to the previous resolution. He went on to object to the club as taking be added to the existing rules of the Law Society Club: -The committee, education, and out of the general subscriptions of members which might notwithstanding anything to the contrary in these rules, shall have power, have been reduced. He would always protest against the injustice of applicati subject to the approbation of a majority of the members voting at a general ing the general funds of the society to meeting the engagements which had meeting specially called for the purpose, to elect, as honorary member, any been incurred solely to find accommodation for the club.
Mr. MACARTHUR objected to the motion being proceeded with, as being doubtful question of this sort should be forced, even upon a reluctant contrary to the rules of the society. He quoted from the rules to show that minority of the society. He appealed to Mr. Day to withdraw the motina. the necessary notices with regard to the motion had not been given, was the He (Mr. Roscoe should not support it, and he would not be alone in that motion had for its object the alteration of the existing bye-laws, which said respect upon the council. aft. Dava urged that he was quite in order, and that it had been so ruled by surprise. "Eof course, they could respect only opposition from those gener
Mr. Walters said the observations of Mr. Roscoe had rather taken him on a previous secasion. He had proposed a similar resolution on behalf of men who had been consistently upposed to the Pub. Mr. Macarthur had La Prov. Humphreya, who was absent at the mast general meeting, and the given them a long speech upon the double generally, and, if he had been called