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HINDE. ARTHUR ALIINSON. and Josarn NEI.sEY POCKLIN,(iTONi, Manchester. Gercral Merchants. Dec 29 at 11.30. Oil Rec, Ogden s ch rs, Bridge st,

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Nrcnors, RIcI1.mD, Surlingham, Norfolk, Market Gardener. Norwich. Pet Dec 14. O-d Dee 14

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f Dec.25, 1886. Ti-IE SOLICITORS’ JOURNAL. no

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Woon. Bnxmunv, Bower-by Bridge, Yorks. Cotton Spinner. Halifax. Pet Dec H

. 15. Ord Dec 15
Wnronr, Crunnns. Norton Woodsents, Derbyshire, Potted Meat Purveyor.
Sheffield. Pet Dec 17. Ord Dec 17

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WILLIAMS,~TOHN Euss. Liverpool, Slate Merchant. Jan 4 at 3. Oi! Rec, 36, Victoria st, Liverpool

Woon BENJAMIN, Sowerby Bridge, Yorks, Ootton Spinner. Dec £0 at 11. Oil Rec, 13, Urossley st. Ilalifnx

Woon, Jonx, Nottingham, Music Seller. Dec 30 at 11. Ofl Rec, Nottingham

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Jsoonsou, Lzornar. Marylebone rd, Business T1-ausierAzent. High Court. Pet
Dec 9 Ord be 16

. c
Jsoonn. Josnvn. Kingston rgon Hull, Butchers Manager. Kingston upon
Hull. Pet Dec 10. Ord ec 18

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Tnnon, Joux, Chippenham, Wilts, Baker. Bristol. Pet Nov so. Ord Dec 17

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The following amended notice is substituted for that published in the“ CONTE N-rs.

London Gazette of Dec. 10.
Go-ssr. Rosnmsn, West Btomwich, Beerliouse Keeper. Oldbury. Pet Nov 23-

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Utmr.imrTor1cs.......... -. ----
186
Tm: New Sorimxs Oovnr Buuzs 131
ON rns Power or Bats IN Morr-
oaos Bins or BALE -........... 13'!
REVIEWS .................-. 139
Connssrorrnnxcn ...... .... ..... im
New Ommns ..-.. .. ..._146

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Made instsnumeoisly with miling water, a teaspoonful
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in tins at ls. 6d,, 8s., 5:. 6d., tc., by Chemists and
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ESEGREGY.

SECURITY.

SAFETYf

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T119 5i1"0l1B Rooms and Safes have been constructed by MILNI-2315 COMPANY LIMITED household word for I-‘ire and Burslar Proof boogsifrhlzfifoii Liverpool’ and Manchesterwhose name is a

SAFES from 1 to 5 Guineas. STRONG ROOMS from

'7 to 80 Guineas per Annum.

NIGHTLY GUARDED BY MILITARY PATROL.

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No 10

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Ir is IMPOSSIBLE to over-estimate the importance of the question we touched upon last week—namcly, whether the power of sale conferred by the Conveyancing Act, 1881, applies to mortgages of policies of assurance ; for, as we all know, the amount of money lent on mortgages of this nature is very large, and it has been the practice of conveyancers to omit the express power of sale in reliance on the statutory power. It will be remembered that the argument that the statutory power does not apply is the following: every mortgage of chattels or c/loses m_nction implies a power to sell, independently of the statute; this power arises at a reasonable time after possession has been taken of the property and the mortgage-money has been Called in, and, as this power may be enforceable before the power conferred by the Conveyancing Act could be enforced, the latter cannot be intended to apply. This is the reasoning by means of which Cotton, Lindley, and Bowen, L .IJ., in Re Morrilt (rmfo, p. 143), arrived at the conclusion that the power of sale conferred by the Conveyancing Act does not apply to a bill of sale. It must be» however, remembered that, although the decision of the Court of Appeal that this power of sale does not apply to a bill of sale, must, unless and until it is reversed by the House of Lords, be taken to be conclusive, it does not follow that the reasoning by which the decision was arrived at is correct. Fry, L.J., held that this power did apply. The Master of the Rolls and Lopes, L J ., held that it did apply until the Bills of Sale Act, 1882, came into operation, and that the only reason why it does not apply at the present time is that a new empress powcr of sale is conferred by thclatter Act. We are, therefore, at liberty to discuss the question whether the statutory power of sale applies to mortgages of P°1i_cies and other clzoses in action without being hampered by the decision in Re ill:/rrilf.

The power of sale conferred by the Conveyancing Act, 1881, applies to any property, real or personal, and whether the interest mortgaged is legal or equitable. The three great classes of personal property are (1) chattels personal, (2) chases in action, (3) Personalty transferable at law in some statutory manner or by the law merchant. As we pointed outlast week, a mortgage of personalty of the nature last mentioned is effected by means of a legal transfer, or sometimes by giving the mortgagee the means of makmg 8 legal transfer to himself or a purchaser, either by 11199-I15 °f 9' Power of attorney, or, where the nature of the property

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admits of it, by means of a transfer in blank; the accompanying deed, if any, is not, properly speaking, a mortgage, as it does not operate so as to transfer any int/ercst in the property, and therefore it cannot confer a power of sale under the Conveyancing Act, 1881. We have now arrived at the conclusion that this power does not apply to property of the first or third classes of personal property that we have mentioned; the only remaining class to which it possibly can apply is chases in action, and as, according to the ordinary rules of construction, we must give some meaning to the word “ personal " in the Act, the power must necessarily apply to mortgages of chases in action, including policies.

It will be observed that, if the courts were to hold our reasoning to be incorrect, and to decide, in accordance with the reasoning of Cotton, Lindley, and Bowen, L.JJ., that the statutory power does not apply to mortgages of chases in nclion, they would be driven to hold that the mere fact of the chose in action being mortgaged would confer a power of sale on the mortgagee, and therefore the consequences would not necessarily be disastrous; as, however, thl nature of such a power is not well understood, and as it could probably be prevented from operating by the insertion of an express power, it may be desirable, in mnjori cauleld, until a decision has been obtained, to incorporate the statutory power by adding “ And it is hereby agreed that the power of sale conferred on mortgagees by the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, 1881, shall apply to this security,” but for the reasons above stated we consider this to be unnecessary.

Mr. DILLON is stated to have duly given sureties to be of good behaviour, pursuant to the order to which we referred last week. The question has been raised whether the court can take evidence of misbehaviour, and thereupon estreat the recognizances of the person bound to good behaviour, or whether the verdict of a jury on his conduct is necessary. It is curious that the practice has been recently changed in England by the new Crown Office Rules. Previously to this change a recognizance in the Queen’s Bench Division acknowledged for good behaviour has been, after acknowledgment, transmitted to the Crown Office and filed there. But unless a breach of the condition has taken place in open court, the court has had no power of proceeding summarily upon it. The question was discussed in Dr. Thornton’: case (7 A. 8: E. 583), where the justices at quarter sessions estrcated rccognizanccs on proof of a conviction at petty sessions. In his judgment Lord DENMAN said :—“ No rule is more invariable than that a person shall not be prejudged in any manner without being heard.” And he referred to a passage in Bacon's Abridgmcnt (7 Bac. Abr. 135, 7th ed.); “If a man be bound in a recognizance to the king, upon condition to be of good behaviour, &c., he cannot be indicted for breach of the good behaviour, by which he forfeits his recognizance, without scire facias, for if n scircfaciaa had been brought he might have pleaded a discharge thereof.” Accordingly the procedure has been for :1 writ of scire facias to be sued out at the Crown Oflice stating the recognizance, and suggesting the breach of it. The writ is delivered to the sheriff of the county in which the defendant resides, and he gives notice to the defendant, who enters an appearance at the Crown Office, and may plead any matter in defence ; thus he may traverse the allegations in the scire facias, or ‘plead any special matter which he may deem an answer to the wr1t._ Upon these pleas issue is joined and the matter comes in the ordinary way before a jury. Then if the jury find that the recognizance has been forfeited they find a verdict for the Crown, judgment is entered up, and execution issues for the amount of the recognizance (see Foster on Scire Iiacias, p. 300). It will thus be seen that it is not the verdict of a jury outside the Quecn’s Bench upon any act of misbehaviour which is necessary to enable the court to estreat the recognizances, but the verdict is taken on the actual forfeiture of the recognize ance itself. However, by the new Crown Office Rules, proceedings by scirc facias upon recognizances have been abolished (rul127), and it is provided by rule 126 that whenever it_ has been made to appear to the court or_ a judge that a recognizance has been forfeited, the court or a judge, upon notice to the defendant and his sureties, if any, may order such recognizance to be estreated without issuing any writ of scire foams. It is probable, however» that the procedure in Ireland is still the same as that described

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Tun DOCTRINE aflirmed by the Court of Appeal in Szcznfiell v. Bulkeley (ante, p. 124), is one which probably has not hitherto received much attention from modern practitioners, but it_ will henceforth be necessary to bear it m mind. By a course of decisions extending over about 200 years, it has been established, by an equitable construction of section 4 of ~21‘ J ac. 1, c. 16, that, where a person brings an action for a debt within the six years, but the debtor dies before judgment, the creditor may bring a fresh action against the debtor’s personal representative within a reasonable time, although the six years may have expired. Many of the judges who have confirmed this construction in modem times have denied the possibility of extracting it from section 4 of the Act of Jae. 1 {see the judgments in Curlewis v. Earl of Mornington, 5 W. R. 266; and in Ex. Ch. 6 W. R. 682; also judgment of BRAMwsin, B., in »S'lur_q1's v. Darrell, 7 W. R. 694); and the reason for their adherence to it is to be found in the remark of CROl\IPtron, J ., in Cm-lewis v. Earl of Mmviingion, that “ an old constris--‘ion of the statutes is a thing not to be interfered with.” The original ground for the construction seems to have been the hardship that a plaintiff who sued within the six years should lose his remedy by the death of the defendant. Since actions do not now abate by the death of the defendant, where the cause of action survives, it might be supposed that the reason for the old construction had disappeared; but in the recent case the Court of Appeal unanimously adhered both to the old construction and to the modern reason for such adherence. “The courts,” said the Master of the Rolls, “ could not now alter that old construction of the statute.” The remedy of the creditor under the circumstances supposed is, therefore, now alternative ; he can either continue the proceedings in the former action under R. S. (J., 1883, XVIL, 4, or commence a new action against the personal representative. And it should be observed that in order to entitle the creditor to commence an action against the personal representative after the six years have expired, it is only necessary that the creditor should have issued a writ against the deceased; he need not have served it. The “reasonable time” within which the action against the personal representative must be brought has been supposed to be a year (see Kcnsey v. Hayward, 1 Lord Raym. 432); but as this period runs, not from the death of the debtor, but from the appointment of the personal representative, the result may be to enable an action to be brought long after the expiration of the six years. In C'urlewis v. Earl of Mornington administration was not taken out to the debtor’s estate until nearly four years after his death.

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Ir WILL as nsiiaiiiznsnn that the scale fee in schedule 1, Part 1., of_ the Remuneration Order for “investigating title, and preparing and completing mortgage,” applies only to “freehold, copyhold, or leasehold property,” although the negotiating fee does not seem to be so restricted. It is dilficult to understand why no scale fee was provided by the Remuneration Order for mortgages of all kinds of personalty. The draft order framed by the Council of the Incorporated Law Society, and submitted by them to the “ Tribunal,” contemplated no restriction on the classes of mortgages to which the scale was to apply; and in their observations on the draft order of the “Tribunal” the council suggested the alterption of the words, “freehold, copyhold, or 1easeh°1d"PT°P°TtY,_' to “freehold, copyhold, leasehold, or other P"°P"t;'/ ; but this suggestion _was not adopted. There seems reason to suppose that an intending mortgagor of personalty will not less desire to know beforehand the amount of the costs he will ligvfi to }}ay_ than an intending mortgagor of land. The legal

visers o insurance companies seem to be gradually adopting the scale fee in the case of mortgages of persoualty with certain necessary modifications. The best-considered scheme, we have yet seen is contained in a circular recently issued by the Guardian Fire and Life Assurance Co., which announces that the charges of the cpmpany s solicitors for investigating title and preparing and comP etmg mortgages of personal property will be the some as those al lowed in reference to mortgages of real property under schedul 1and the provisions of the Remuneration Order with addition lf e £2 2s. and disbursements for each DzTstrz'niqas ' the co t u llees of 0_n taxation for each stop order. and an additioiial chargesti if) title deeds are not produced to the company’s solicitor ' L d 1?

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and disbursements “ where registration in a register county is necessary.” And it is added that, “if a loan should not be completed for any reason other than the wilful default of the company, the borrower shall pay the costs actually incurred under schedule 2 and the provisions of” the Remuneration Order. This circular seems to fumish a hint for amendment of the Remuneration Order.

CAN A PERSON WHO CLAIMS ABATEMENT OF INCOME TAX ON THE GROUND OF HIS INCOME BEING LESS THAN £400 A YEAR APPEAL TO THE SPECIAL COI\ll\lISSIONERS?

Mn. Airnsn CHAPMAN, who conducts what should be a useful agency for procuring the return of overpaid income tax, and from whom we, last year, printed a letter upon the subject of “Married Women and Income Tax,” has, it appears by a letter he has written to the Daily News, obtained from the Assistant Secretary to the Inland Revenue, who is himself the author of a standard work upon income tax, the expression of an opinion to the effect that a person who claims abatement of income tax, on the ground of his income being less than £400, has a right of appeal to the special commissioners. This opinion seems to contradict the note printed on notices of assessment under Schedule D, which runs thus: “ If you are assessed under Schedule D, and do not claim exemption cn the ground of your income from every source being less than £l50, or abatement on the yrounrl of su_oh_mcome being less than £400, you can appeal to the special commissioners.” It would certainly seem that the reader of this note is intended to infer that if he claims abatement of income tax, on the ground of his income being less than £400, he cannot appeal to the special commissioners. And we are inclined to think that the note is an accurate statement of the law.

It is clear, by express provision of the Income Tax Act of 1842 (5 & 6 Vict. c. 35, ss. 130, 164), that, in the case of a claim to exemption on the ground of the claimant's income being less than £150, the appeal must be made to the general, and not_to the special, commissioners. But, as that Act contains no provision for an abatement on the ground of income being less than a given sum» the Act makes no provision for the case of a claim to any such abatement.

By the Income Tax Act of 1853 (16 & 17 Vict. c. 34, s. 28), the exemption, which had been granted by the former Act to perflohi whose incomes were less than £150 a year, was restricted in persons whose incomes were less than £100 a year, and it W88 further provided that any person who had been assessed or charged to the duties, or who had paid the same, if he claimed and proved, in the manner provided by the Act of 1842, that his total income derived from every source was less than £150 a year, should be relieved “from so much of the said duties assessed upon, or paid by. him ” as should “exceed the rate of fivepence for every twenty shillings of his profits or gains.” The difliculty that might be anticipated from the requirement that the claimant should make his claim and proof “in the manner provided by the said A_0P»" seeing that “ the said Act,” or the Act of 1842, makes no pr0v1B1°1\ for the case of a claim to abatement, if not removed by the consideration that the words used are a repetition of those just previously used with reference to a claim to exemption, Whwh might be taken as an indication that the claim to abatement innit he made and proved in the same manner as a claim to exemplilofl " removed by the subsequent part of the section, which we shall quote presently. Both the foregoing provisions of this 28th section, as well that relating to exemption as that relating to abatemqllh have been repealed; so that what is now left of the section is B me" fragment. meaningless by itself; but it is in this fragment that we find the authority for, and justification of, the note on the notices of assessment. So far as it is applicable to our present pill‘p_ose it runs thus:—“And all the provisions, rules, and !'¢8“l°' tions, contained in the said Act of the fifth and sixth years of H81’ M9-.le5tin relation to the exemption of persons whose income! fife less than £150 a year, and to the reduction or abatement of 8117' assessment upon such persons, or to the repayment to them of BUY duties or sums of money, shall be observed and applied, so far H8 the same are applicable (mulatis mutamiis), to the exemption of Persons whose incomes are less than £100 a year, and fa the claim

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