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reasons advanced for this opinion by Cotton, Lindley, and Bowen, | Conveyancing Act, 1881, subject to the express restriction imposed L.JJ., differed from those advanced by the Master of the Rolls by section 20, and that the bill of sale was void as attempting and Lopes, L.J.; while Fry, L.J., was alone in his opinion that to do away with these restrictions. the provisions of the Conveyancing Act, 1881, applied to a bill of sale, and that the insertion of the proviso rendered the bill of sale void. Before we discuss the grounds for the opinions held by the judges, it will be convenient to state the law as to the sale of chattels pledged or mortgaged without reference to any statute. The law appears to be correctly laid down in Fisher on Mortgages, Chap. V., part 6, in the words following:-"A power of sale incident to his security. is vested in a mortgagee or pledgee of a personal chattel or of stock or policy of assurance or other chose in action, who, by virtue of the implied contract that the pledge shall be effectual to discharge the debt, is entitled, without any express power, to sell the subject of the security ex mero motu upon non-payment of the debt, when a day has been fixed for payment, but only after a proper demand and notice where no day has been fixed. But the security cannot be sold until the debt becomes payable.' The principal authorities for the rule above laid down are the following:

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As to personal chattels : Franklin v. Neate (13 Mee. & Wel. 481); Martin v. Reid (11 C. B. N. S. 730); Pigot v. Cubley (15 C. B. N. S. 701).

As to stocks and choses in action: A dictum of Lord Hardwicke, C., in Kemp v. Westbrook (1 Ves. sen. 278); Harrison v. Franks (2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 725); Lockwood v. Ewer (9 Mod. 275; same case, 2 Atk. 303); Wilson v. Tooker (5 Bro. P. C. Ed. Toml. 193; on app. from same case, sub. nom., Tucker v. Wilson, 1 P. Wms. 261); a dictum of Wigram, V.C., that the rule applies to a policy of assurance, in Dyson v. Morris (1 Hare, at p. 422); Carter v. Ware (4 Ch. D. 605); France v. Clark (22 Ch. D. 830).

In the principal case Cotton, Lindley, and Bowen, L.JJ., were of opinion (1) that the power of sale conferred by the Conveyancing Act, 1881, on mortgagees cannot be given to a mortgagee where the nature of the security or the provisions of the instrument shew that the power of sale given by the Act is unnecessary; (2) that mortgages of personal chattels, where the possession is retained by the mortgagor, may provide that, in default of payment, the mortgagee may take possession of that which is, until default, withheld from him; (3) that where there is no express power of sale given by the mortgage deed, a mortgagee of personal chattels who has taken possession may, after default in payment, and after he has given a reasonable time for payment to the mortgagor, sell the property (at common law we presume); (4) that the Bills of Sale Act of 1882 enabled provisions to be inserted in a bill of sale giving or regulating a power to enter and seize the chattels comprised therein; (5) that the combined effect of sections 7 and 13 of the Act of 1882 fixes five days after possession taken as the "reasonable time" for payment; (6) that it follows that a power of sale arises on possession being taken of the goods quite independently of the Act of 1881-ie., at a time prior to that on which sale could be made under the power conferred by the Act of 1881 (1882 in the report in the Times newspaper, but this is obviously a printer's error); (7) that it would, therefore, be unreasonable to give the mortgagees a power of sale "as if it had been in terms conferred by the mortgage deed" (see the Act of 1881, s. 19); (8) that the proviso relating to the power of sale, erroneously supposed to be incorporated in the bill of sale, does not invalidate the security.

The Master of the Rolls and Lopes, L.J., were of opinion (1) that before the Act of 1882 came into operation the mortgagee under a bill of sale would have been clothed with the power of sale conferred by the Conveyancing Act, 1881; (2) that the provisions of the Bills of Sale Act clearly shewed that a bill of sale under the Act of 1882 was to be complete in itself, and was not to require reliance on any other Act of Parliament; (3) that the power of sale conferred by the Act of 1881 was repugnant to the provisions of the Act of 1882, and, therefore, could not apply to bill of sale; (4) that the mortgagee had a power of sale conferred by the 7th and 13th sections of the Act of 1882; (5) that, if no power of sale is given by the Act, he may seize the goods, and, as assignee, sell, subject to any right to the grantee to redeem, which right must be exercised within five days after seizure to prevent a sale. The results of the decisions are the following:

(1) The Master of the Rolls, Cotton, Lindley, Bowen, and Lopes, L.JJ., held (dissentiente, Fry, L.J.) that the power of sale conferred by the Conveyancing Act, 1881, was repugnant to the Act of 1882, and, therefore, could not apply to mortgage bills of sale under that Act.

(2) That the mortgagee under a bill of sale under the Act of 1882 can sell

(a.) under his common law rights after seizure and waiting a reasonable time [five days, as mentioned in the Act] (per Cotton, Lindley, and Bowen, L.JJ.);

(b.) under a power of sale conferred by the Act of 1882 (per the Master of the Rolls and Lopes, L.J.);

(c.) under the power of sale conferred by the Conveyancing

Act, 1881 (per Fry, L.J.).

There remains a question of very great practical importancenamely, Will the decision in Re Morritt render it necessary to make any change in the forms of mortgages of stocks and of choses in action, such as policies, which, it must be remembered, do not fall within the provisions of the Bills of Sale Acts?

There are two cases that must be distinguished :

First, where the conveyance to the mortgagee is made in some statutory manner operating at law and not containing the provisions as to redemption. In this case the mortgagee appears to have obtained possession of the property, and can therefore sell under his common law rights in default of payment on the appointed day. It appears very doubtful whether in this case any deed of defeasance would be a "mortgage" within the meaning of the Conveyancing Act, 1881, and, therefore, whether any power of sale could be implied by such a deed. It appears to follow from paragraphs (1) and (6) of the judgment of Cotton, Lindley, and Bowen, L.JJ., that, even if the deed of defeasance was a mortgage within the meaning of the Act, the statutory power could not be implied as it might possibly not come into operation till after the common law power had arisen; but the opinions of the Master of the Rolls and Fry and Lopes, L.JJ., who agree with each other on this point, differ from those of Cotton, Lindley, and Bowen, L.JJ.

Secondly, where the conveyance to the mortgagee is made by deed operating in equity only, and containing the provisions as to redemption. There is considerable difficulty in seeing what, in a case of this nature, is equivalent to taking possession of personal chattels : it may be argued that nothing but actual reduction into possession-i.e, having the moneys secured by the chose in action paid off-is sufficient; but this view is probably incorrect, and it is pay the money secured by the chose in action, even if it be payable only at a future time, will be sufficient. If this view is correct, the mortgagee can, after default in payment on the appointed day, sell the equitable interest vested in him, exercising an equitable power implied from the nature of the transaction similar to the common-law power attached to mortgages of personal chattels ; and the reasoning of Cotton, Lindley, and Bowen, L.JJ., would shew that, as in the case of deeds of defeasance of legal conveyances of choses in action, the power of sale implied by the Conveyancing Act, 1881, could not arise-a conclusion so contrary to the practice of conveyancers that it is hardly conceivable that it is correct.

Fry, L.J., was of opinion (1) that there was not in the case of the mortgage of chattels a power of sale given by law prior to the Convey-apprehended that giving notice to the persons whose duty it is to ancing Act of 1881; (2) that "mortgage" in that Act included a bill of sale of personal chattels; (3) that if a bill of sale had been made after the Act of 1881, and before the Act of 1882 had come into operation, containing no express power of sale, the mortgagees would have had the power conferred by the Act of 1881, subject to the restrictions imposed by section 20; (4) if, independently of the Conveyancing Act, a mortgagee of chattels had an implied power of sale, such power would be excluded by the express power conferred by the Conveyancing Act of 1881; (5) That there was nothing in the statutory form of the bill of sale to exclude the operation of the Act of 1881; (6) that sections 7 and 13 of the Act of 1882 were negative clauses, not conferring, but imposing fetters on, a power of sale; (7) that the statutory bills of sale incorporated the power of sale conferred on mortgagees by the

It should also be remarked that the first paragraph of the judgment of Cotton, Lindley, and Bowen, L.JJ., is open to the obser

vation that where the power of sale given by the Conveyancing tion. To what extent, if at all, he may pledge it to give security to Act, 1881, is expressly incorporated in the mortgage deed, the express power thereby given ought to supersede the implied power arising from the nature of the transaction, according to the maxim, "Expressum facit cessare tacitum."

new creditors, except for the purpose of raising money to pay the composition, may be doubtful. The case of Ex parte Allard, Re Simons (16 Ch. D. 505), would still seem to be an authority upon this point." Sufficient weight is not given in this passage to the fact The result appears to be that, whether the instrument is a tion, and therefore, no cessio bonorum. In the case of Ex parte Allard, that, in cases of composition under section 18, there is no adjudicadefeasance of a legal conveyance of a chose in action transferred at Re Simons, cited by the authors, the composition was preceded by law, or a mortgage, effected by deed, of a chose in action transfer- liquidation under the Act of 1869, and the reference seems, therefore, able in equity only, there can be no objection to inserting an to be inappropriate. The subject was incidentally considered in Ex express power of sale, which, of course, can be effected by ex-parte Clarke (32 W. R. 775, 13 Q. B. D. 426), where Baggallay, L.J., pressly incorporating the power of sale conferred by the Convey- expressed the opinion "that the approval of the scheme by the court ancing Act, 1881; and perhaps it will be the safer course to do would be equivalent to the discharge of the debtor." Until adjudication the civil status of the debtor is not affected, and it might, we so until a decision on the point has been given. think, be reasonably contended that a compounding debtor under section 18 has no need of a discharge, and is free to acquire and dispose of property from the time when the composition or scheme of arrangement has been sanctioned by the court.

REVIEWS.

THE ANNUAL PRACTICE.

THE ANNUAL PRACTICE, 1886-7, BEING A COLLECTION OF THE
STATUTES, ORDERS, AND RULES RELATING TO THE GENERAL
PRACTICE, PROCEDURE, AND JURISDICTION OF THE CHANCERY AND
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISIONS OF THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE, AND
LORDS. BY THOMAS SNOW and HUBERT WINSTANLEY, Barristers-
at-Law. William Maxwell & Son; H. Sweet & Sons.

ON APPEAL THEREFROM TO THE COURT OF APPEAL AND HOUSE OF

use,

The authors do not seem to have been quite as diligent in ransacking the reports as we should have expected, for we notice some few conspicuous omissions. Thus the important case of Colonial Bank v. Whinney, where the House of Lords reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal, was reported in the WEEKLY REPORTER So long ago as last July (see 34 W. R. 705), yet there is no reference to any report, except that contained in the Weekly Notes. Again, we should certainly expected to find, at p. 158, the cases of Phelps, Stokes, & Co. v. Comber (33 W. R. 829, 29 Ch. D. 813), and Brown, Shipley, & Co. v. Kough (34 W. R. 2, 29 Ch. D. 848), or, at all events, the case of Frith v. Forbes, there cited, might have been withdrawn as practically overruled by the recent cases to which we have referred. On the index we can bestow the highest praise, for we have tested it by many references, and never found it wanting.

CORRESPONDENCE.

OF DEFENCE.

After our notices of this book in previous years it is probably only necessary to announce the appearance of the new issue; but we should be sorry to do so without a word of commendation of the care and accuracy bestowed upon the last issue, to which, from constant we can testify. Such testimony, however, is probably little needed, as the array of white backed books on the bar seats and bench on certain days in the Chancery Division is sufficient evidence of the general appreciation of the work. We regret to observe the retirement from the editorship of Mr. Joseph Walton; but, so far as our observations of the new issue have gone, we see no reason to with- PAYMENT INTO COURT BY DEFENDANT BEFORE DELIVERY draw or modify with regard to it the praise we have bestowed on previous issues. The Supreme Court Rules of December, 1885, and July, 1886, and the Funds Rules, 1886, are inserted in their proper places, and the diligence with which the decisions of the year have been collected is shewn by the fact that upwards of 300 cases are added in the present issue. The index has been greatly enlarged, although we have never found any difficulty in reference from the previous indices. The only point on which we have discovered a lack of information in the book is as to the Order in Council of the 16th of December, 1880, which, we think ought to be printed in full. This, however, is matter mainly of historical interest.

BANKRUPTCY.

THE LAW AND PRACTICE IN BANKRUPTCY, COMPRISING THE BANK-
RUPTCY ACT, 1883; THE BANKRUPTCY RULES, 1886; THE DEBTORS
ACTS, 1869, 1878; AND THE BILLS OF SALE ACTS, 1878 and 1882.
FOURTH EDITION. BY ROWLAND VAUGHAN WILLIAMS, WALTER
VAUGHAN WILLIAMS, and EDWARD WILLIAM HANSELL, Barristers-
at-Law. Stevens & Sons; H. Sweet & Sons.

With commendable promptitude the authors of this treatise have seized the opportunity afforded by a new code of rules to bring out a fourth edition of their work In order to accommodate the numerous cases decided since the passing of the Act, they have enlarged their page from demy to royal octavo; and, by a curious coincidence this change has exactly answered the purpose, the number of pages in the two editions being precisely the same.

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.]

Sir,-You are aware that R. S. C. 1883, ord. 22, r. 1, provides two different ways in which money may be paid into court by a defendant:

(a) Payment before or at the time of delivering defence (or, by leave, later), which payment "shall be taken to admit the claim or cause of action in respect of which the payment is made."

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(2) On this "Wilson" has a note:-" It follows from this rule, as read with rule 5 (a), that a defendant desiring to pay into court and deny his liability must wait till he delivers his defence."

Payment with a defence denying liability."

On the expiration of a ninety-nine years' lease, we recently brought an action on behalf of the freeholder against the last assignee of the lease for rent and dilapidations, and the defendant, after service of writ, paid a small sum into court, thus bringing himself under the first branch of the rule.

The sum paid into court was the amount claimed for rent, but the defendant did not specify any particular part of the cause of action in respect of which the payment was made, and we presume, therefore, that the payment must be taken to have been made in respect of the whole cause of action.

Nearly a month afterwards the defendant put in a defence, denying liability-i.e., denying (among other things) that the term of years had been vested in him, and denying the plaintiff's title as assignee of the lessor.

We, therefore, took out a summons to shew cause why the defence should not be struck out or amended, as being contrary to the rule referred to and embarrassing. It appeared to us that a defendant having, by a proceeding in the action, admitted the cause of action, could not be allowed afterwards to put in a defence denying it.

Mr. Justice Field, affirming the decision of Master Gordon, dismissed the summons, with costs to the defendant in any event. We have been informed that Baron Pollock has given a similar decision in chambers.

In our notice of the previous edition, while doing justice to the clearness of the style of the book and the conciseness with which the results of the cases were stated, we felt constrained to comment somewhat unfavourably on the tendency to retain unnecessary disquisitions on the old law. This, we regret to say, has not been wholly amended on the present occasion, and the fault is not one which becomes more venial with passing years. Thus we are still supplied, in the note to section 28, with some remarks on the law and practice under the Insolvency Acts; and, under section 47, the law relating to voluntary settlements, as laid down by the Act of 1849, still finds a place. Attention is drawn to an interesting point with reference to compositions before bankruptcy in the following passage extracted from the note to section 18:"There is no express provision in the Act as to what are to be the powers of the debtor over his estate after a composition resolution has been approved. That he must have power to deal with his estate by realizing it in The decisions seems to us very difficult to reconcile with the ordinary course of business, for the purpose of enabling himself to language of the rule, and if they are correct the note in "Wilson " pay the composition, would seem to be a necessary practical implica-seems to require considerable modification. At any rate we think it

As far as we understood the ground of Mr. Justice Field's decision, it was that the plaintiff was not hurt by the course the defendant had adopted. With great deference, however, we consider that a plaintiff, whose title has been admitted, is "hurt" by the defendant being allowed to change his mind and put the plaintiff to proof.

cause or matter.

may be useful to call attention to the matter, and we should be glad registrar who is a practising solicitor shall tax the costs in any such to know the views of yourself and your readers upon the subject. London, Dec. 20. W. & W. [See observations under head of "Current Topics."-ED. S.J.]

REPORTS OF DIVORCE CASES. [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,-Referring to the observations upon the law as to the exclusion of the public from the hearing of cases in the Divorce Court in your last number (the correctness of which cannot probably be gainsaid), 1 for one must beg leave to take exception to the principle enunciated in the concluding paragraph-viz., "That the exclusion of the public is a greater evil than the possible contamination of some by becoming acquainted with offensive details." That the hearing of such cases in public, and the publication of the details in newspapers, is injurious to public morality cannot admit of doubt, and I venture to submit that the interests of the morals of the people far exceed the private interests of the persons who figure in the proceedings in that court-or any possible good to the public by their publicationbesides which, our judges, in the present day, may well be trusted to administer justice impartially, even with closed doors, in cases manifestly unfit to be heard in public. The state of public opinion on the subject calls, I believe, for some modification of the present state of the law, and I hope to see the day when such cases as that now before us will not be allowed to contaminate the public mind, and, at most, that a bare statement of the facts with the judgment will be allowed to be published. It is the details which do the harm, and these, I think, ought to be put a stop to-the sooner the better. S. A. RAM.

SUMMONS FOR APPORTIONED AMOUNT OF WORKS UNDER PUBLIC HEALTH ACT.

To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.} Sir,-Referring to your recent report of Corporation of Manchester v. Hampson (ante, p. 127), may I be allowed to point out that, as a matter of fact, Huddleston, B., is clearly wrong in saying, that " if the magistrates had decided on the ground that the street was a highway repairable by the inhabitants at large, Reg. v. Hutchins (27 W. R. 724, 6 Q. B. D. 300) shewed that they had gone beyond their jurisdiction." That case clearly implies, as will be seen from a perusal of it, that the magistrates have a right to decide on that ground, though they have no right to make an actual finding in words that the street was a highway repairable, &c., but only a right to dismiss the summons on that or some other good ground. And Eccles v. The Wirral, &c., Authority (34 W. R. 412, 17 Q B. D. 107), following Hesketh v. Atherton Local Board (22 W. R. 58), is a direct decision of a divisional court that the magistrates have a right to decide on this ground. A. H. Dec. 21.

NEW ORDERS, &c.

RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT.

DECEMBER, 1886.

Note. The following Rules may be cited as the "Rules of the Supreme Court," December, 1886, and each rule may be cited separately according to the heading thereof with reference to the rules of the Supreme Court, 1883. They shall come into operation on the 1st of January, 1887.

ORDER V. RULE 9.

1. Order V., Rule 9, shall be read as if the following words were added thereto :

Subject as aforesaid, every cause or matter in the said division hereafter commenced in the District Registry of Liverpool or the District Registry of Manchester shall be marked with the name of such judge of the Chancery Division as the Lord Chancellor may by order from time to time direct.

ORDER XXXV. RULE 6a.

2. Where a cause or matter hereafter commenced in the Chancery Division is proceeding in the District Registry of Liverpool or in the District Registry of Manchester, the district registrar shall act in respect thereof, and throughout all the proceedings therein, as a chief clerk of the judge of the Chancery Division to whom the cause or matter is assigned, and as registrar and taxing master according to directions to be given from time to time by such judge: Provided that no order for the payment of money out of court for an amount exceeding £50 shall be made in any such cause or matter, except by the judge in person: and provided also that no district

ORDER XXXV. RULE 12.

3. Order XXXV., Rule 12 shall be read as if the following words were added thereto :

Provided that in any cause or matter proceeding in the District Registry of Liverpool or the District Registry of Manchester such reference or appeal may be to any judge for the time being sitting either at Liverpool or Manchester.

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PAY OFFICE, SUPREME COURT. NOTICE OF OFFICE REGULATIONS FOR THE INFORMATION OF APPLICANTS. [N.B.-The following Regulations will be subject to variation in exceptional cases.] LODGMENTS IN COURT:

For cash, the directions for lodgment will be ready not later than the afternoon of the day following the receipt of the schedule or request.

For securities, the directions for lodgment will be ready the second day following the receipt of the schedule or request.

[Note.-Lodgment directions may be applied for and sent by post.] INVESTMENTS IN SECURITIES:

Government securities purchased wil be placed to the credit of the suitor's account four days after the money is available. Instructions for the purchase of other securities will be given to the broker on the day following that on which the money is available; and the securities will ordinarily be placed to the credit of the suitor's account in about four days afterwards; subject to any unavoidable delay in completing the deeds or in obtaining the particular security. [Note. This will not apply to investments of accumulated dividends.] SALES OF SECURITIES:

The proceeds of Government securities will be placed to the credit of the suitor's account four days after the receipt of the request for the sale. Instructions for the sale of other securities will be given to the broker on the day following the receipt of the request; and the proceeds will ordinarily be placed to the credit of the suitor's account in about four days afterwards; subject to any unavoidable delay in completing the deeds or in effecting the sale.

[Note.-Requests for sales may be sent by post.]

TRANSFERS OF SECURITIES OUT OF COURT:Transfers of Government securities will, in ordinary course, be completed at the Bank of England in four clear days after the application has been left at the pay-office.

Directions for the transfer of other securities will be ready on the second DELIVERY OF BONDS, BOXES, &c.:day following the delivery in the pay-office of the completed deed.

Directions will be ready on the second day after the receipt of the application (or of the schedule).

DELIVERY OF CHEQUES:

Cheques for principal moneys will, as a rule, be ready within a week of the receipt of the schedule or other authority, or of the completion of necessary previous transactions or conditions, if any.

Cheques for dividends on Government securities will be ready on the usual days for payment of dividends on the Bank of England (subject to possible delay on the occasion of first payments).

Cheques for dividends on other securities wiil be ready within a week after the dividends have been placed to the pay-office account at the Bank of England.

The hours of delivery, are as under:

Except in the long vacation :-Daily (Saturdays excepted), 10.30 a.m. to 3.30 p.m. Saturdays, 10.30 a.m. to 2 p.m.

In the long vacation :-Daily (Saturdays excepted), 11 a.m. to 3 p.m. Saturdays, 11 a.m. to 2 p.m.

REMITTANCES BY POST:

Cheques sent by post (under rule 48 of the Supreme Court Funds Rules, 1886) will ordinarily be posted on the day on which the written request (or evidence of life, &c., in the case of periodical payments), is received at the pay-office; provided the application is correct and complete in form.

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Will be ready on the second day after they have been bespoken; but merely re-dated certificates (when back-dated not less than one day) will be ready the day after they have been left. NEGATIVE CERTIFICATES:

Will be ready on the second day after that on which they are bespoken, but will always be back-dated four days. TRANSCRIPTS OF ACCOUNTS:

Transcripts of accounts will, in ordinary cases, be completed within one week of the day on which they have been applied for; but this period will be liable to extension when the transcript to be completed covers. a period of more than two years. Transcripts required for the use of chief elerks and other officers of the court will have precedence.

When so requested, the prices at which securities have been purchased or realized will be inserted in the transcripts. All transcripts of accounts should be left at the pay-office to be completed at least once in a year (when possible, during the long vacation). DORMANT FUNDS (i.e., funds not dealt with for more than 15 years): :Applications for information (with the necessary stamp as below) must be in writing, and must satisfy the conditions of rule 101 of the Funds Rules, 1886. Applicants should clearly understand that the only information which it is within the power of this department to furnish is, (1) the amount of a particular fund; (2) the date of any order dealing there

with.

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CASES OF THE WEEK. GOWAN . WRIGHT-C. A. No. 1, 16th, 18th, and 20th December. DEBTORS ACT, 1869 (32 & 33 VICT. c. 62), s. 27-Judge's ORDER MADE BY

CONSENT AND NOT REGISTERed.

This was an appeal from the decision of Huddleston, B., and Manisty, J., and raised an important point as to the validity of judges' orders made by consent and not registered under section 27 of the Debtors Act, 1869. On the 16th of September, 1884, a judge's order was made by consent in the actions of Gowan v. Wright and Wright v. Gowan, by which the plaintiff in the former action was to sign judgment for £813 13s. 9d. and costs, but judgment was not to be signed if £200 and taxed costs were paid in monthly instalments by the defendant to the plaintiff; the cross-action was to be stayed and certain promissory notes and documents were to be delivered by the plaintiff to the defendant. The plaintiff handed over the documents, but the defendant made default in the payment of the instalments. The plaintiff thereupon signed judgment and issued execution. The defendant sought to set aside the judgment on the ground that it had not been filed in accordance with section 27 of Divisional Court, and that court held that the section applied and set the Debtors Act, 1869. The matter was referred by Stirling, J., to the aside the judgment.

THE COURT OF APPEAL (Lord ESHER, M.R., and LINDLEY, L.J.; LOPES, L.J., dissenting) now reversed that decision. They said that, although the words of the section were sufficiently wide to cover this case, it was a principle of law that, unless the wording of the statute expressly forbade such a construction, general words ought to be limited so as to prevent a man from being enabled to impair the obligation of his own contract by his own act. They considered that, comparing the section with section 137 of the Act of 1849 (12 & 13 Vict. c. 106) and with the interpretation given to that section in the case of Bryan v. Child (5 Ex. 368), the proper meaning of the section was that such orders, when unregistered, were void as against creditors, but were not void as between the parties. It would be an absurdity to allow a man to avoid that to which he had consented and from which he had derived benefit. LOPES, LJ., considered that the case of Bryan v. Child had no application to the present case, and held that there was no power to limit the words of the section.-COUNSEL, Jelf, QC., and G. Henderson; Charles, QC., and R. O. B. Lane. SOLICI TORS, Vennings, Son, & Manning; Snell, Sons, & Greenip.

MALLETT v. HANLEY AND ANOTHER-C. A. No. 1, 17th

December.

PRACTICE-27 & 28 VICT. c. 27-SIGNING JUDGMENT.

This was an appeal from the decision of the Divisional Court (Denman and Hawkins, JJ.). The plaintiff was the promoter of a Bill in the House of Commons which was opposed by the defendants as directors of the Skegness, Chapel, St. Leonards, and Alford Tramways Co. The Committee of the House of Commons, before whom the Bill came, held, under 27 & 28 Vict. c. 27, s. 2, that the promoter had been vexatiously subjected to expense by the opposition of the petitioners, and they also found that the defendants were, in fact, the tramway company, and held them personally liable for the costs to be taxed by the taxing officer of the House. That officer issued his certificate on November 8, 1886, and the plaintiff thereupon issued a specially-indorsed writ for the amount under section 5 of the Act. That section provides that the party entitled to such costs may recover them by action of debt, in which it shall be sufficient for the plaintiff to declare that the defendant is indebted to him in the sum mentioned in the certificate, and the plaintiff shall, upon filing the declaration and certificate and an affidavit of demand, be at liberty to sign judgment as for want of plea by nil dicit. The defendants appeared to the writ and delivered a statement of defence, in which they denied that they had appeared before Parliament or opposed the Bill. The plaintiff proceeded to sign judgment nevertheless, but the officer, on hearing that a statement of defence had been delivered, declined to do so, and was upheld by the master and judge at chambers and by the Divisional Court.

THE COURT (Lord ESHER, M.R., LINDLEY and LOPES, L.JJ.) now allowed the appeal. They said that although they thought that a defence might be delivered with leave, if such defence was a denial of the jurisdiction of the Committee of the House of Commons to make the order, they felt clear that without leave it was incompetent to the defendants under the Act to deliver a statement of defence. The proper course for the defendants if they really questioned the jurisdiction was to move to set aside judgment after it had been signed.-COUNSEL, Littler, Q C., and T. W. Chitty; Greene, Q.C., Kisch, and Fraser McLeod. SOLICITORS, Torr, Jansways, Gribble, & Oddie; W. Whitfield.

Re NAYLOR AND SPENDLA.-C. A. No. 2, 17th December. SETTLED LAND-SALE BY TENANT FOR LIFE-COPYHOLDS-RIGHT OF LORD TO DOUBLE FINES-SETTLED LAND ACT, 1882, s. 20 (3). The question in this case was as to the right of the lord of a manor to double fines, on the sale of settled copyhold land by an equitable tenant for life under the power conferred by the Settled Land Act. By sub-section 3 of section 20 of the Act it is provided that: "In case of a deed relating to copy hold or customary land, it is sufficient that the deed quired, on production to him of the deed, to make the proper entry; and, on that production, and on payment of customary fines, fees, and other dues or payments, any person whose title under the deed requires to be perfected by admittance shall be admitted accordingly; but, if the

On Saturday last Mr. Justice North gave notice that for the future he should adopt the practice which Mr. Justice Kay, Mr. Justice Chitty, and Mr. Justice Stirling have recently announced that they intend to adopt-be entered on the court rolls of the manor, and the steward is hereby reviz., to require that in petitions for the payment of money out of court the exact words of the will or other instrument under which the money is claimed shall be set out in inverted commas. The rule is to take effect from the commencement of the next sittings of the court.

it was

steward so requires, there shall also be produced to him so much of the settlement as may be necessary to shew the title of the person executing the deed, and the same may, if the steward thinks fit, be also entered on the court rolls." A testator who died in 1885 devised a copyhold estate to a trustee, upon trust to pay the net rents to his wife for life, and after her death the property was to go to his children. The widow entered into a contract to sell the copyhold estate under the Settled Land Act. The trustee had not been admitted, but the lord was not yet entitled to seize for want of a tenant. The purchaser, and the lord and the steward of the manor, took out a summons under the Vendor and Purchaser Act, asking for a declaration that the vendor was bound to pay to the lord the fine, and to the steward the fees, which would have been payable if the customary heir or devisee had been admitted. The vendor, on the other hand, contended that the only fine payable was that due on the admission of the purchaser, and that the lord was not entitled to the second fine claimed as on the admission of the trustee. Chitty, J., in chambers, held that the lord was only entitled to the fine on the admission of the purchaser. THE COURT OF APPEAL (COTTON, BOWEN, and FRY, L.JJ.,) affirmed the decision, FRY, L.J., differing. COTTON, LJ., said that the question before the court was only between vendor and purchaser, but understood that the decision would be accepted by the lord and steward of the manor. The question was, whether the same fines and fees were payable as would have been payable if the trustee had been admitted. No customary fines would be actually payable in respect of admission of the trustee if he was not in fact admitted. The Act gave a new way of passing copyhold estates which made it unnecessary for the trustee to be admitted." It gave a purchaser a right to be admitted on payment of customary fines, but there was no reference in the Act to any customary fines which would have been due if the trustee had been admitted, and no such fine could be called a customary fine when there had been no admission of the trustee. If the Legislature had intended to deal with the particular case under consideration in the manner contended for by the appellants, it would have used language, as in the Wills Acts (section 5), expressly giving to the lord of a manor the fines, &c., as if the transfer had been in the ordinary way. The appeal, therefore, failed. The words of the Act did not give the lord fines in respect of that which never took place. BoWEN, L.J., concurred. FRY, L.J., regretted that he took a different view. The words of the section were general. They did not speak of "the" customary fines payable on a purchaser's admission, but of " customary fines," &c. There were no customary fines payable on the new form of conveyance given by the statute, and what customary fines were referred to? Two answers were possible. The customary fines indicated must be either those which would have been payable on or before admission if the Act had not passed, or those which would have been payable on admission if the Act had not passed. If the first construction were adopted, the rights of the lord would remain intact; the other construction deprived him of rights. Was it within the scope of the Act to affect the rights of the lord? His lordship thought not. The Act had quite a different object, and, as the words were equally open to two constructions, it was preferable to adopt that which did not prejudice the rights of the lord. If that construction were adopted, it appeared that the lord was en titled on the admittance of the purchaser to all such payments as would have been payable on or before the admittance if the Act had not passed.--COUNSEL, Archibald Brown; Cadman Jones. SOLICITORS, Mossop & Rolfe, for Mossop Mossop, Long Sutton; Robinson, Preston, & Stow, for Sturton, Holbeach.

KEWNEY v. ATTRILL-Kay, J., 21st December. PARTNERSHIP-DISSOLUTION-RECEIVER-JUDGMENT CREDITOR-LEAVE TO ISSUE EXECUTION-BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1883 (46 & 47 VICT. c. 52), s. 46, SUB-SECTION 2.

assets.

In a partnership action the usual order had been made for a dissolution and accounts, and a receiver had been appointed. Creditors of the firm subsequently recovered judgment against the firm for £48 14s. and £8 costs, and now moved for leave to issue execution against the partnership assets, or that the receiver might be ordered to pay the debt out of such KAY, J., made an order giving the creditors a charge on the moneys in the hands of, or which might be taken possession of by, the receiver, they undertaking to deal with them according to any order the court might make; the intention of the court being to preserve to the applicants all the rights which they would have had if they had issued execution and the sheriff had seized and sold the assets on that day.-COUNSEL, D. L. Alexander; Whitaker. SOLICITORS, Spyer & Son; Wm. Easton.

Re THE DIRECT SPANISH TELEGRAPH CO. (LIM.)-Kay, J., 11th

and 16th December.

COMPANY-REDUCTION OF CAPITAL-COMPANIES ACT, 1867 (30 & 31 Vicr. c. 131), s. 11.

Petition for the sanction of the court to a reduction of capital by a company. The nominal capital consisted of £130,000 in 13,000 shares (of which 12,931 were issued) of £10 each on which £9 per share was paid up, and £60,000 in 6,000 preference shares of £10 each fully paid up and entitled to preferential payment of a dividend of £10 per cent. The articles provided for a reduction and it was now proposed to reduce the whole capital to £95,000 by writing off £5 per share from the amount paid up on each issued share and from the nominal amount of each unissued share. This scheme had been agreed to by a special resolution and was supported by a majority of both classes of shareholders.

KAY, J., said that the creditors of the company were not affected by

the scheme. The court had a discretionary power and must see that justice was done between the shareholders; on consideration he did not think that the reduction would work any injustice and he confirmed the scheme.-COUNSEL, Rigby, Q.C., and Phipson Beale. SOLICITORS, Blunt & Lawford.

COLYER v. FERGUSON-Chitty, J., 18th December. PRACTICE-COSTS-ADMINISTRATION-TENANT FOR LIFE AND REMAINDErmen. In this case, a testator having devised his real estate upon trust for sale and upon trusts as to the proceeds thereof for F. for life with remainders over in strict settlement, and having settled his residuary personal estate upon the like trusts, an action was instituted by F. for general administration and also an order obtained by F. on summons in chambers under the Settled Land Acts, 1882 and 1884, that F. was entitled to exercise the powers of tenant for life under section 63 of the Act of 1882, and, therefore, not entitled under the Act of 1884 to exercise such powers, except with the sanction of the court, and that the costs of the summons be costs in the action. Upon the drawing up of the order the registrar declined to insert any order as to the costs. A petition was subsequently brought by F. to wind up the action, and it was asked that costs of, and incidental to, the petition be paid out of a fund in court representing the testator's general residuary estate. The petitioner asked for leave to amend the petition by including in the costs asked for those of the summons in chambers.

CHITTY, J., said that, as the summons was for the benefit of the remaindermen as well as the tenant for life, the costs of the summons were properly payable out of the testator's residuary estate, and made an order as prayed.-COUNSEL, Dundas Gardiner; S. B. L. Druce; Simmonds. SOLICITORS, Gadsden & Treherne; J. W. Marsh; E. A. Neele.

CARDEN . THE ALBERT PALACE ASSOCIATION-Chitty, J., 21st December.

COMPANIES ACT, 1862, s. 153-PENDING PETITION TO WIND UP COMPANY

PROSPECTIVE ORDER AUTHORIZING DISPOSITION OF COMPANY'S PROPERTY.

In this case an application was made for leave of the court to authorize transactions relating to the affairs of a limited company. It appeared that the action was a debenture-holders' action, and that subsequently thereto a petition to wind up the company was presented and a provisional liquidator appointed. All parties desired to raise a sum of money to be a first charge on the company's property, and an order was obtained for that purpose. The money was required for the purpose of enabling a receiver and manager appointed in the action to carry on the company's business and also to enable the company to perform covenants contained in their building agreements, and thereby to obtain the leases which were to form the security for the proposed loan. It was objected by the chief clerk that the parties could not enter into a valid transaction, having regard to section 153 of the Companies Act, 1862, which provides that all dispositions of the company's property, &c., made between the commencement of the winding up, and the order for winding up shall, unless the court otherwise order, be void. The application was supported by the plaintiff and defendants and also by the petitioner.

CHITTY, J., said that, as he was assured that the transaction was for the benefit of all parties, he would make an order both in the action and in the petition, authorizing the parties to enter into the leases, and to hand over the leases to the trustees for the debenture-holders, notwithstanding section 153 of the Companies Act, 1862.-COUNSEL, Haldane; Grosvenor Woods. SOLICITORS, Diarmid & Teather; Stretton & Hilliard.

Re RILEY to STREATFIELD-North, J., 16th December. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-CONTRACT FOR SALE OF LAND-PAYMENT OF INTEREST ON PURCHASE-MONEY AFTER DATE FIXED FOR COMPLETIONDEPOSIT OF PURCHASE-MONEY IN JOINT NAMES.

This was a summons under the Vendor and Purchaser Act, 1874, and the question arose, whether a purchaser of land could relieve himself of the obligation to pay interest on the purchase-money, after the date fixed for the completion of the purchase until actual completion, by depositing the purchase-money in a bank in joint names. The contract contained a condition that, if the completion of the purchase should be delayed by any cause whatever other than the wilful neglect or default of the vendor beyond the day fixed for completion-the 15th of February, 1886-the purchaser should pay interest at five per cent. on the unpaid balance of the purchase-money from that day until the actuai completion. Considerable delay took place in the completion. On the 16th of February, 1886, the purchaser's solicitors wrote to the vendor's solicitors, "The purchasemoney is ready, and lying idle" at a bank which they named; and, on the 2nd of March, they again wrote to the vendor's solicitors, "having insufficiency of the power of attorney by L., we wish to avoid the possiregard to the further delay likely to arise, in consequence of the bility of any question arising between us as to the purchaser's liability to pay interest on the balance of his purchase-money, and we therefore beg to iuform you that he is willing forthwith to deposit such balance in joint names with any first-class London banker on deposit, pending the due execution of the conveyance to the purchaser and collateral deeds." The vendor's solicitors accepted this offer without prejudice to any question as to interest." This summons was taken out by the vendor to determine the question whether the delay in the completion of the purchase was due to his wilful neglect or default, and also the effect of the deposit of the

money.

NORTH, J., held, on the evidence, that there had been no wilful neglect or default on the part of the vendor, and that the purchaser was bound to

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