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reasons advanced for this opinion by Cotton, Lindley, and Bowen, | Conveyancing Act, 1881, subject to the express restriction imposed L.JJ., differed from those advanced by the Master of the Rolls by section 20, and that the bill of sale was void as attempting and Lopes, L.J.; while Fry, L.J., was alone in his opinion that to do away with these restrictions. the provisions of the Conveyancing Act, 1881, applied to a bill The Master of the Rolls and Lopes, L.J., were of opinion (1) that of sale, and that the insertion of the proviso rendered the bill of before the Act of 1882 came into operation the mortgagee under a sale void. Before we discuss the grounds for the opinions held bill of sale would have been clothed with the power of sale conby the judges, it will be convenient to state the law as to the sale ferred by the Conveyancing Act, 1881 ; (2) that the provisions of of chattels pledged or mortgaged without reference to any statute. the Bills of Sale Act clearly shewed that a bill of sale under the

The law appears to be correctly laid down in Fisher on Act of 1882 was to be complete in itself, and was not to require Mortgages, Chap. V., part 6, in the words following :—“A power reliance on any other Act of Parliament; (3) that the power of of sale incident to his security is vested in a mortgagee sale conferred by the Act of 1881 was repugnant to the provisions or pledgee of a personal chattel or of stock or policy of assurance of the Act of 1882, and, therefore, could not apply to bill of sale ; or other chose in action, who, by virtue of the implied contract (4) that the mortgagee had a power of sale conferred by the 7th that the pledge shall be effectual to discharge the debt, is entitled, and 13th sections of the Act of 1882; (5) that, if no power of sale without any express power, to sell the subject of the security ex is given by the Act, he may seize the goods, and, as assignee, sell, mero motu upon non-payment of the debt, when a day has been subject to any right to the grantee to redeem, which right must be fixed for payment, but only after a proper demand and notice exercised within five days after seizure to prevent a sale. where no day has been fixed.

But the security cannot The results of the decisions are the following:be sold until the debt becomes payable.'

(1) The Master of the Rolls, Cotton, Lindley, Bowen, and Lopes, The principal authorities for the rule above laid down are the L.JJ., held (dissentiente, Fry, L.J.) that the power of sale con. following :

ferred by the Conveyancing Act, 1881, was repugnant to the Act of As to personal chattels : Franklin v. Neate (13 Mee. & Wel. 1882, and, therefore, could not apply to mortgage bills of sale under 481); Martin v. Reid (11 C. B. N. S. 730); Pigot v. Cubley (15 that Act. C. B. N. S. 701).

(2) That the mortgagee under a bill of sale under the Act of As to stocks and choses in action : A dictum of Lord Hardwicke, C., 1882 can sell in Kemp v. Westbrook (1 Ves. sen. 278); Harrison v. Franks (2 (a.) under his common law rights after seizure and waiting a Eq. Cas. A br. 725); Lockwood v. Ewer (9 Mod. 275 ; same case, 2

reasonable time [five days, as mentioned in the Act] (per Atk. 303); Wilson v. Tooker (5 Bro. P. C. Ed. Toml. 193; on app.

Cotton, Lindley, and Bowen, L.JJ.); from same case, sub. nom., Tucker v. Wilson, 1 P. Wms. 261); a (6.) under a power of sale conferred by the Act of 1882 dictum of Wigram, V.C., that the rule applies to a policy of assur

(per the Master of the Rolls and Lopes, L.J.); ance, in Dyson v. Morris (1 Hare, at p. 422); Carter v. Ware (4 (c.) under the power of sale conferred by the Conveyancing Ch. D. 605); France v. Clark (22 Ch. D. 830).

Act, 1881 (per Fry, L.J.). In the principal case Cotton, Lindley, and Bowen, L.JJ., were There remains a question of very great practical importanceof opinion (1) that the power of sale conferred by the Conveyancing namely, Will the decision in Re Alorritt render it necessary, to Act, 1881, on mortgagees cannot be given to å mortgagee where make any change in the forms of mortgages of stocks and of the nature of the security or the provisions of the instrument shew choses in action, such as policies, which, it must be remembered, do that the power of sale given by the Act is unnecessary; (2) that not fall within the provisions of the Bills of Sale Acts ? mortgages of personal chattels, where the possession is retained by There are two cases that must be distinguished :the mortgagor, may provide that, in default of payment, the mort- First, where the conveyance to the mortgagee is made in some gagee may take possession of that which is, until default, withheld statutory manner operating at law and not containing the profrom him; (3) that where there is no express power of sale given visions as to redemption. In this case the mortgagee appears to by the mortgage deed, a mortgagee of

personal chattels who has taken have obtained possession of the property, and can therefore sell possession may, after default in payment, and after he has given a under his common law rights in default of payment on the apreasonable time for payment to the mortgagor, sell the property (at pointed day. It appears very doubtful whether in this case ny common law we presume); (4) that the Bills of Sale Act of 1882 deed of defeasance would be a "mortgage” within the meaning of enabled provisions to be inserted in a bill of sale giving or regulat- the Conveyancing Act, 1881, and, therefore, whether any power of ing a power to enter and seize the chattels comprised therein; (5) sale could be implied by such a deed. It appears to follow from that the combined effect of sections 7 and 13 of the Act of 1882 paragraphs (1) and (6) of the judgment of Cotton, Lindley, and fixes five days after possession taken as the reasonable time" for Bowen, L.JJ., that, even if the deed of defeasance was a mortgage payment; (6) that it follows that a power of sale arises on posses- within the meaning of the Act, the statutory power could not be sion being taken of the goods quite independently of the Act of implied as it might possibly not come into operation till after the 1881–2.6., at a time prior to that on which sale could common law power had arisen ; but the opinions of the Master of be made under the

power conferred by the Act of the Rolls and Fry and Lopes, L.JJ., who agree with each other on 1881 (1882 in the report in the Times newspaper, but this is this point, differ from those of Cotton, Lindley, and Bowen, L.JU. obviously a printer's error); (7) that it would, therefore, be un- Secondly, where the conveyance to the mortgagee is made by reasonabl been in terms conferred by the mortgage deed” (see

the Act of redemption. There is considerable difficulty in seeing what, in a to give the mortgagees a power of sale " as if it had deed operating in equity only, and containing the provisions as to 1881, s. 19); (8) that the proviso relating to the power of sale

, case of this nature, is equivalent to taking possession

of personal erroneously supposed to be incorporated in the bill of sale, does chattels : it may be argued that nothing but actual reduction into Fry, L.J., was of opinion (1) that there was not in the case of the paid off—is sufficient; but this view is probably incorrect, and it is

possession—i.e, having the moneys secured by the chose in action mortgage of chattels a power of sale given by law prior to the Convey- apprehended that giving notice to the persons whose duty it is to ancing Act of 1881; (2) that “mortgage " in that act included a pay the money secured by the chose in action, even if it be payable bill of sale of personal chattels ; (3) that if a bill of sale had been made only at a future time, will be sufficient. If this view is correct

, after the Act of 1881, and before the Act of 1882 had come into the mortgagee can, after default in payment on the appointed day: operation, containing no express power of sale

, the mortgagees sell the equitable 'interest vested in him, exercising an equitable to the restrictions imposed by section 20 ; (4) if, independently of common-law power attached to mortgages of personal chattels; the Conveyancing Act, a mortgagee of chattels had an implied and the reasoning of Cotton, Lindley, and Bowen, L.JJ., would power of sale, such power would be excluded by the express power shew that, as in the case of deeds of defeasance of legal concerna nothing in the statutory form of the bill of sale to exclude the veyancing Act, 1881, could not arise—a conclusion so contrary, to operation of the Act of 1881; (6) that sections 7 and 13 of the the practice of conveyancers that it is hardly conceivable that it is Act of 1882 were negative clauses, not conferring, but imposing correct. incorporated the power of sale conferred on mortgagees by the ment of Cotton, Lindley, and Bowen, L.JJ.

, " is open to the obserIt should also be remarked that the first paragraph of the judg

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vation that where the power of sale given by the Conveyancing tion. To wliat extent, if at all, he may pledge it to give security to Act, 1881, is expressly incorporated in the mortgage deed, the new creditors, except for the purpose of raising money to pay the express power thereby given ought to supersede the implied power composition, may be doubtful. The case of Èx parte Allard, Re arising from the nature of the transaction, according to the maxim, Simons (16 Ch. D. 505), would still seem to be an authority upon this Expressum facit cessare tacitum.

point.” Sufficient weight is not given in this passage to the fact The result appears to be that, whether the instrument is a tion, and therefore, no cessio bonorum. In the case of Ex parte Allard,

that, in cases of composition under section 18, there is no adjudicadefeasance of a legal conveyance of a chose in action transferred at Re Simons, cited by the authors, the composition was preceded by law, or a mortgage, effected by deed, of a chose in action transfer- liquidation under the Act of 1869, and the reference seems, therefore, able in equity only, there can be no objecti to inserting an to be inappropriate. The subject was incidentally considered in Ex express power of sale, which, of course, can be effected by ex- parte Clarke (32 W. R. 775, 13 Q. B. D. 426), where Baggallay, L.J., pressly incorporating the power of sale conferred by the Convey- expressed the opinion that the approval of the scheme by the court ancing Act, 1881; and perhaps it will be the safer course to do would be equivalent to the discharge of the debtor.” Until adjudiso until a decision on the point has been given.

cation the civil status of the debtor is not affected, and it might, we think, be reasonably contended that a compounding debtor under section 18 has no need of a discharge, and is free to acquire and dispose of property from the time when the composition or scheme of arrangement has been sanctioned by the court.

The authors do not seem to have been quite as diligent in ranREVIEWS.

sacking the reports as we should have expected, for we notice some few THE ANNUAL PRACTICE.

conspicuous omissions. Thus the important case of Colonial Bank v.

Whinney, where the House of Lords reversed the decision of the Court THE ANNUAL PRACTICE, 1886—7, BEING A COLLECTION OF THE of Appeal, was reported in the WEEKLY REPORTER so long ago as

STATUTES, ORDERS, AND RULES RELATING TO THE GENERAL last July (see 34 W. R. 705), yet there is no reference to any report,
PRACTICE, PROCEDURE, AND JURISDICTION OF THE CHANCERY AND except that contained in the Weekly Notes. Again, we should
QUEEN'S BENCH DivisioNS OF THE HIGH Court of JUSTICE, AND certainly expected to find, at p. 158, the cases of Phelps, Stokes, & Co. v.
LORDS. By Thomas Snow and HUBERT WINSTANLEY, Barristers. Kough (34 W. R. 2, 29 Ch. D. 848), or, at all events, the case of

Comber (33 W. R. 829, 29 Ch. D. 813), and Brown, Shipley, & Co. v. at-Law. William Maxwell & Son ; H. Sweet & Sons.

Frith v. Forbes, there cited, might have been withdrawn as practically After our notices of this book in previous years it is probably only overruled by the recent cases to which we have referred. necessary to announce the appearance of the new issue; but we On the index we can bestow the highest praise, for we have tested should be sorry to do so without a word of commendation of the care it by many references, and never found it wanting. and accuracy bestowed upon the last issue, to which, from constant use, we can testify. Such testimony, however, is probably little needed, as the array of white backed books on the bar seats and bench on certain days in the Chancery Division is sufficient evidence of the general appreciation of the work. We regret to observe the retire

CORRESPONDENCE. ment from the editorship of Mr. Joseph Walton; but, so far as our observations of the new issue have gone, we see no reason to with - PAYMENT INTO COURT BY DEFENDANT BEFORE DELIVERY draw or modify with regard to it the praise we have bestowed on

OF DEFENCE. previous issues. The Supreme Court Rules of December, 1885, and July, 1886, and the Funds Rules, 1886, are inserted in their proper

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] places, and the diligence with which the decisions of the year have Sir,-You are aware that R. S. C. 1883, ord. 22, r. 1, provides two been collected is shewn by the fact that upwards of 300 cases are different ways in which money may be paid into court by a defendadded in the present issue. The index has been greatly enlarged, ant:although we have never found any difficulty in reference from

the previous indices. The only point on which we have discovered a lack

(a) Payment before or at the time of delivering defence (or, by of information in the book is as to the Order in Council of the 16th of

leave, later), which payment “shall be taken to admit the December, 1880, wbich, we think ought to be printed in full. This,

claim or cause of action in respect of which the payment is

made." however, is matter mainly of historical interest.

(6).“ Payment with a defence denying liability.” On this “ Wilson” has a note :-" It follows from this rule, as read

with rule 5 (a), that a defendant desiring to pay into court and deny BANKRUPTCY.

his liability must wait till he delivers his defence.” THE LAW AND PRACTICE IN BANKRUPTCY, COMPRISING THE BANK

On the expiration of a ninety-nine years' lease, we recently RUPTCY ACT, 1883; THE BANKRUPTCY RULES, 1886; THE DEBTORS brought an action on behalf of the freeholder against the last Acts, 1869, 1878 ; AND THE BILLS OF SALE Acrs,'1878 and 1882. assignee of the lease for rent and dilapidations, and the defendant, Fourth Edition. By ROWLAND VAUGHAN WILLIAMS, WALTER after service of writ, paid a soall eum into court, thus bringing himVAUGHAN WILLIAMS, and EDWARD WILLIAM HANSELL, Barristers- self under the first branch of the rule. at-Law. Stevens & Sons; H. Sweet & Sons.

The sum paid into court was the amount claimed for rent, but the

defendant did not specify any particular part of the cause of action With commendable promptitude the authors of this treatise have in respect of which the payment was made, and we presume, thereseized the opportunity afforded by a new code of rules to bring out a fore, that the payment must be taken to have been made in respect fourth edition of their work In order to accommodate the numerous of the whole cause of action. cases decided since the passing of the Act, they have enlarged their Nearly a month afterwards the defendant put in a defence, denypage from demy to royal octavo; and, by a curious coincidence this ing liability-i.e., denying (among other things) that the term of change has exactly answered the purpose, the number of pages in years had been vested in him, and denying the plaintiff's title as the two editions being precisely the same.

assignee of the lessor. In our notice of the previous edition, while doing justice to the We, therefore, took out a summons to shew cause why the defence clearness of the style of the book and the conciseness with which should not be struck out or amended, as being contrary to the rule the results of the cases were stated, we felt constrained to com- referred to and embarrassing. It appeared to us that a defendant ment somewhat unfavourably on the tendency to retain un- having, by a proceeding in the action, admitted the cause of action, necessary disquisitions on the old law. has not been wholly amended on the present occasion, and the fault

This, we regret to say, could not be allowed afterwards to put in a defence denying it.

Mr. Justice Field, affirming the decision of Master Gordon, disis not one which becomes more venial with passing years. Thus missed the summons, with costs to the defendant in any event. We We are still supplied, in the note to section 28, with some remarks on have been informed that Baron Pollock has given a similar decisicn the law and practice under the Insolvency Acts"; and, under section 47, in chambers. the law relating to voluntary settlements, as laid down by the Act of As far as we understood the ground of Mr. Justice Field's 19:49, still finds

a place. Attention is drawn to an interesting point decision, it was that the plaintiff was not hurt by the course the dewith reference to compositions before bankruptcy in the following fendant had adopted. With great deference, however, we consider passage extracted from the note to section 18: -" There is no express that a plaintiff, whose title has been admitted, is “ hurt” by the deprovision in the Act as to what are to be the powers of the debtor fendant being allowed to change his mind and put the plaintiff to over his estate after a composition resolution has been approved. proof. That he must have power to deal with his estate by realizing it in The decisions seems to us very difficult to reconcile with the ordinary course

of business, for the purpose of enabling himself to language of the rule, and if they are correct the note in “Wilson" pay the composition, would seem to be a necessary practical implica- seems to require considerable modification. At any rate we think it

may be useful to call attention to the matter, and we should be glad registrar who is a practising solicitor shall tax the costs in any such to know the views of yourself and your readers upon the subject. cause or matter. London, Deo. 20.

W. & W.

ORDER XXXV. RULE 12. [See observations under head of "Current Topics."-ED. S.J.] 3. Order XXXV., Rule 12 shall be read as if the following words

were added thereto:

Provided that in any cause or matter proceeding in the District REPORTS OF DIVORCE CASES.

Registry of Liverpool cr the District Registry of Manchester such

reference or appeal may be to any judge for the time being sitting [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.]

either at Liverpool or Manchester. Sir,--Referring to the observations upon the law as to the exclusion of the public from the hearing of cases in the Divorce Court in your

ORDER LXV. RULE 27. last number (the correctness of which cannot probably be gainsaid), 4. Order LXV., Rule 27, Regulation (48), shall be read as if the I for one must beg leave to take exception to the principle enunciated following words were added thereto :in the concluding paragraph-viz., “That the exclusion of the

Provided that in the taxation of costs between solicitor and client public is a greater evil than the possible contamination of some by the taxing officer shall be at liberty to allow larger fees, under becoming acquainted with offensive details." such cases in public, and the publication of the details in newspapers, special circumstances to be stated by hin.

(Signed) HALSBURY, C. is injurious to public morality cannot admit of doubt, and I venture

COLERIDGE, C.J. to submit that the interests of the morals of the people far exceed the

ESTIER, M.R. private interests of the persons who figure in the proceedings in that

JAMES HANNEX, Prest. P.D. and A. court-or any possible good to the public by their publication

NATH. LINDLEY, L.J. besides which, our judges, in the present day, may well be trusted

EDW. FRY, L.J. to administer justice impartially, even with closed doors, in cases

C. E. POLLOCK, B. manifestly unfit to be heard in public. The state of public opinion

H. MANISTY, J. on the subject calls, I believe, for some modification of the present

17th December, 1886. state of the law, and I hope to see the day when such cases as that now before us will not be allowed to contaminate the public mind, and, at most, that a bare statement of the facts with the judgment

PAY OFFICE, SUPREME COURT. will be allowed to be published. It is the details which do the harm, Notice Of Office REGULATIONS FOR THE INFORMATION OF APPLICANTS. and these, I think, ought to be put a stop to-the sooner the better.

S. A. RAM.
[N.B. -The following Regulations will be subject to variation in

exceptional cases.]


For cash, the directions for lodgment will be ready not later than the UNDER PUBLIC HEALTH ACT.

afternoon of the day following the receipt of the schedule or re

quest. LTo the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal. ?

For securities, the directions for lodgment will be ready the second day Sir, --Referring to your recent report of Corporation of Manchester

following the receipt of the schedule or request. v. Hampson (ante, p. 127), may I be allowed to point out that, as a [Note.-Lodgment directions may be applied for and sent by post.] matter of fact, Huddleston, B., is clearly wrong in saying, that “if the InvesTMENTS IN SECURITIES :magistrates had decided on the ground that the street was a highway Government securities purchased wil be placed to the credit of the repairable by the inhabitants at large, Reg. v. Hutchins (27 W. R. suitor's account four days after the money is available. 724, 6 Q. B. D. 300) shewed that they had gone beyond their juris- Instructions for the purchase of other securities will be given to the broker diction." That case clearly implies, as will be seen from a perusal of on the day following that on which the money is available; and the it, that the magistrates have a right to decide on that ground,

securities will ordinarily be placed to the credit of the suitor's account though they have no right to make an actual finding in words that

in about four days afterwards ; subject to any unavoidable delay in the street was a highway repairable, &c., but only a right to dismiss

completing the deeds or in obtaining the particular security: the summons on that or some other good ground. And Eccles v. The

[Note. This will not apply to investments of accumulated dividends.] Wirral, &c., Authority (34 W. R. 412, 17 Q B. D. 107), following

SALES OF SECURITIES :Hesketh v. Atherton Local Board (22 W. R. 58), is a direct decision of

The proceeds of Government securities will be placed to the credit of the a divisional court that the magistrates have a right to decide on this

suitor's account four days after the receipt of the request for the

sale. ground.

A. H.

Instructions for the sale of other securities will be given to the broker Dec. 21.

on the day following the receipt of the request; and the proceeds will ordinarily be placed to the credit of the suitor's account in about four

days afterwards; subject to any unavoidable delay in completing the NEW ORDERS, &c.

deeds or in effecting the sale.

[Note.--Requests for sales may be sent by post.]

TRANSFERS or SecuRITIES Out or Court :-

Transfers of Government securities will, in ordinary course, be comNote.—The following Rules may be cited as the “Rules of the

pleted at the Bank of England in four clear days after the application Supreme Court,” December, 1886, and each rule may be cited

has been left at the pay-office. separately according to the heading thereof with reference to the

Directions for the transfer of other securities will be ready on the second rules of the Supreme Court, 1883. They shall come into operation Deliveny or Bords, Boxes, &c. :

day following the delivery in the pay-office of the completed deed. on the 1st of January, 1887.

Directions will be ready on the second day after the receipt of the apORDER V. RULE 9.

plication (or of the schedule). 1. Order V., Rule 9, shall be read as if the following words were

DELIVERY OF CHEQUES : added thereto:

Cheques for principal moneys will, as a rule, be ready within a week of Subject as aforesaid, every cause or matter in the said division

the receipt of the schedule or other authority, or of the completion of hereafter commenced in the District Registry of Liverpool or the

necessary previous transactions or conditions, if any. District Registry of Manchester shall be marked with the name of

Cheques for dividends on Government securities will be ready on the such judge of the Chancery Division as the Lord Chancellor may by

usual days for payment of dividends on the Bank of England (subject order from time to time direct.

to possible delay on the occasion of first payments). Cheques for dividends on other securities wiil be ready within a week

after the dividends have been placed to the pay-office account at the ORDER XXXV. RULE 6a.

Bank of England. 2. Where a cause or matter hereafter commenced in the Chancery

The hours of delivery, are as under :Division is proceeding in the District Registry of Liverpool or in the

Except in the long vacation :-Daily (Saturdays excepted), 10.30 a. m. District Registry of Manchester, the district registrar shall act in

to 3.30 p.m. Saturdays, 10.30 a.m. to 2 p.m. respect thereof, and throughout all the proceedings therein, as a

In the long vacation :-Daily (Saturdays excepted), 11 a.m. to 3 p.m. chief clerk of the judge of the Chancery Division to whom the cause

Saturdays, 11 a.m. to 2 p.m. or matter is assigned, and as registrar and taxing master according

REMITTANCES by Post:to directions to be given from time to time by such judge: Pro

Cheques sent by post (under rule 48 of the Supreme Court Funds Rules, vided that no order for the payment of money out of court for an

1886) will ordinarily be posted on the day on which the written request amount exceeding £50 shall be made in any such cause or matter,

(or evidence of life, &c., in the case of periodical payments), is received except by the judge in person : and provided also that no district

at the pay-office; provided the application is correct and complete in form.


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Will be ready for delivery on the third day following that on which they

are bespoken. They may be bespoken by a London solicitor, or a Lon-
don banker, or by the grantor (if duly identified).

GOWAN 2. WRIGHT-O. A. No. 1, 16th, 18th, and 20th December. All powers for receipt of funds must be prepared in the and on the prescribed form. No general powers can be accepted for this

DEBTORS Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 62), s. 27-Judge's ORDER MADE BY


This was an appeal from the decision of Huddleston, B., and Manisty, Will be ready on the second day after they have been bespoken; but J., and raised an important point as to the validity of judges' orders merely re-dated certificates (when back-dated not less than one day) made by consent and not registered under section 27 of the Debtors Act, will be ready the day after they have been left.

1869. On the 16th of September, 1884, a judge's order was made by NEGATIVE CERTIFICATES:

consent in the actions of Gowan v. Wright and Wright v. Gowan, by which Will be ready on the second day after that on which they are be the plaintiff in the former action was to sign judgment for £813 13s. 9d. spoken, but will always be back-dated four days.

and costs, but judgment was not to be signed if £200 and taxed costs TRANSCRIPTS OF ACCOUNTS:

were paid in monthly instalments by the defendant to the plaintiff; the Transcripts of accounts will, in ordinary cases, be completed within one cross-action was to be stayed and certain promissory notes and documents week of the day on which they have been applied for; but this period were to be delivered by the plaintiff to the defendant. The plaintiff will be liable to extension when the transcript to be completed covers. handed over the documents, but the defendant made default in the a period of more than two years.

payment of the instalments. The plaintiff thereupon signed judgment Transcripts required for the use of chief elerks and other officers of the and issued execution. The defendant sought to set aside the judgment court will have precedence.

on the ground that it had not been filed in accordance with section 27 of When so requested, the prices at which securities have been purchased the Debtors Act, 1869. The matter was referred by Stirling, J., to the or realized will be inserted in the transcripts.

Divisional Court, and that court held that the section applied and set All transcripts of accounts should be left at the pay-office to be com

aside the judgment. pleted at least once in a year (when possible, during the long vaca- The Court of APPEAL (Lord Eszer, M.R., and LINDLEY, L.J. ; Lopes, tion).

L.J., dissenting) now reversed that decision. They said that, although DORMANT Funds (i.e., funds not dealt with for more than 15 the words of the section were sufficiently wide to cover this case, it was a years) :

principle of law that, unless the wording of the statute expressly forbade Applications for information (with the necessary stamp as below) must such a construction, general words ought to be limited so as to prevent a be in writing, and must satisfy the conditions of rule 101 of the Funds man from being enabled to impair the obligation of his own contract by Rules, 1886.

his own act. They considered that, comparing the section with section Applicants should clearly understand that the only information which 137 of the Act of 1849 (12 & 13 Vict. c. 106) and with the interpretation

it is within the power of this department to furnish is,-(1) the given to that section in the case of Bryan v. Child (5 Ex. 368), the proper amount of a particular fund ; (2) the date of any order dealing there meaning of the section was that such orders, when unregistered, wero with.

void as against creditors, but were not void as between the parties. It VERBAL INFORMATION :

would be an absurdity to allow a man to avoid that to which he had conVerbal information as to funds in court will not be given, except by sented and from which he had derived benefit. Lopes, L.J., considered

special leave of the principal of each branch, or of the paymaster, that the case of Bryan v. Child had no application to the present case, and or deputy-paymaster

held that there was no power to limit the words of the section.-COUNSEL, Forus can be obtained in rooms Nos. 5, 419, and 420. Deviations from Jelf, Q C., and G. Henderson ; Charles, Q. C., and R. O. B. Lane. Solici: the authorized forms cannot be allowed.

Tors, Vennings, Son, & Manning ; Snell, Sons, & Greenip.
The stamps required on pay-office documents are as under :-


December. Certificate of funds 1 0 Impressed on request.

PRACTICE-27 & 28 Vict. c. 27-SIGNING JUDGMENT. Transcript of account.

0 Impressed on each opening. Request to pay, lodge, transfer,

This was an appeal from the decision of the Divisional Court (Denman or deposit in court, or to pay

and Hawkins, JJ.). The plaintiff was the promoter of a Bill in the out funds (except when the

House of Commons which was opposed by the defendants as directors of lodgment, payment, &c., has

the Skegnees, Chapel, St. Leonards, and Alford Tramways Co. The been directed by an order) 1 0

Committee of the House of Commons, before whom the Bill came, held, Request for information as to

under 27 & 28 Vict. c. 27, s. 2, that the promoter had been vexatiously

Impressed on request. dormant funds 2 6 Adhesive or impressed.

subjected to expense by the opposition of the petitioners, and they also Request for other information 0 Adhesive or impressed.

found that the defendants were, in fact, the tramway company, and held Office copy of schedule to affi

them personally liable for the costs to be taxed by the taxing officer of the davit under Trustee Relief Act 1

House. That officer iseued his certificate on November 8, 1886, and the 0 Impressed on office copy.

plaintiff thereupon issued a specially-indorsed writ for the amount under Power of Attorney.-Fee for pre

section 5 of the Act. That section provides that the party entitled to paration* 3 0

such costs may recover them by action of debt, in which it shall be suffi* This stamp is in addition to the Revenue stamp, but is not re

cient for the plaintiff to declare that the defendant is indebted to him in quired in lunacy cases.

the sum mentioned in the certificate, and the plaintiff shall, upon filing Power of attorney.--Revenue stamps :

the declaration and certificate and an affidavit of demand, be at liberty to For receipt of one dividend or

sign judgment as for want of plea by nil dicit. The defendants appeared interest paymentt 10

to the writ and delivered a statement of defence, in which they denied For receipt of more than one

that they had appeared before Parliament or opposed the Bill. The dividend or interest paymentt 5 0

plaintiff proceeded to sign judgment nevertheless, but the officer, on 7 No Revenue stamp is required when

Impressed on power. hearing that a statement of defence had been delivered, declined to do so, the yearly amount is less than £3.

and was upheld by the master and judge at chambers and by the For receipt of principal money

Divisional Court. not exceeding £20,

The COURT (Lord Esher, M.R., LINDLEY and Lopes, L.JJ.) now allowed periodical payments (other

the appeal. They said that although they thought that a defence might than dividends or interest) not

be delivered with leave, if such defence was a denial of the jurisdiction exceeding £10 per annum 5 0

of the Committee of the House of Commons to make the order, they felt For receipt of principal money

clear that without leave it was incompetent to the defendants under the exceeding £20, or of periodical

Act to deliver a statement of defence. The proper course for the defend. payments (other than dividends

ants if they really questioned the jurisdiction was to move to set aside or interest) exceeding £10 per

judgment after it had been signed.- COUNSEL, Littler, Q.C., and T. W. 10 0

Chitty; Greene, Q.C., Kisch, and Fraser McLeod. SOLICITORS, Torr, Jans. W. Henry White, Paymaster.

ways, Gribble, f: Oddie ; W. TVhitfield.

Re NAYLOR AND SPENDLA.-C. A. No. 2, 17th December.

SETTLED LAND-SALE BY TENANT FOR LIFE-COPYHOLDS-Right Or LORD *** Owing to unusual pressure on our space, we are compelled

to Double Fines-SETTLED LAND Act, 1882, s. 20 (3). to leave over till next week the continuation of the articles The question in this case was as to the right of the lord of a manor “Concerning Searches,” with much other matter.

to double fines, on the sale of settled copyhold land by an equitable

tenant for life under the power conferred by the Settled Land Act. By On Saturday last Mr. Justice North gave notice that for the future he sub-section 3 of section 20 of the Act it is provided that: "In case of a Dir. Justice Stirling have recently announced

that they intend
to adopt- be entered on the

court rolls of the manor, and the steward is hereby repiz., to require that in petitions for the payment of money out of court quired, on production

to him of the deed, to make the proper entry; and, claimed shall be set out in inverted commason The eure his to take heffect an eth ar payments, any persona

noset title

under "The deed requires to be from the commencement of the next sittings of the court.

perfected by admittance shall be admitted accordingly ; but, if the

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the scheme. The court had a discretionary power and must see that steward so requires, there shall also be produced to him so much of the settlement as may be necessary to shew the title of the person executing justice was done between the shareholders; on consideration he did not

think that the reduction would work any injustice and he confirmed the the deed, and the same may, if the steward thinks fit, be also entered on

SOLICITORS, Blunt the court rolls." A testator who died in 1885 devised a copyhold estate scheme.-Counsel, Rigby, Q.C., and Phipson Beale. to a trustee, upon trust to pay the net rents to his wife for life, and after f Lawford. her death the property was to go to his children. The widow entered into a contract to sell the copyhold estate under the Settled Land Act.

COLYER v. FERGUSON-Chitty, J., 18th December. The trustee had not been admitted, but the lord was not yet entitled to

PRACTICE-Cost3-ADMINISTRATION–TENANT FOR LIFE AND REMAINDERMEN. seize for want of a tenant. The purchaser, and the lord and the steward

In this case, a testator having devised his real estate upon trust for sale and of the manor, took out a summons under the Vendor and Purchaser Act, asking for a declaration that the vendor was bound to pay upon trusts as to the proceeds thereof for F. for life with remainders over to the lord the fine, and to the steward the fees, which would in strict settlement, and having settled his residuary personal estate upon have been payable if the customary heir or devisee had been admitted the like trusts, an action was instituted by F. for general administration

and also an order obtained by F. on summons in chambers under the The vendor, on the other hand, contended that the only fine payable was that due on the admission of the purchaser, and that the lord was not Settled Land Acts, 1882 and 1864, that F. was entitled to exercise the entitled to the second fine claimed as on the admission of the trustee. powers of tenant for life under section 63 of the Act of 1882, and, Chitty, J., in chambers, held that the lord was only entitled to the fine therefore, not entitled under the Act of 1884 to exercise such powers, on the admission of the purchaser.

except with the sanction of the court, and that the costs of the summons The Court of Appeal (Cotton, Bowen, and Fry, L.JJ.,) affirmed be costs in the action. Upon the drawing up of the order the registrar

A petition was subsequently the decision, Fry, L.J., differing. Cotton, L.J., said that the ques- declined to insert any order as to the costs. tion before the court was only between vendor and purchaser, but brought by F. to wind up the action, and it was asked that costs of, and it was understood that the decision would be accepted by the incidental to, the petition be paid out of a fund in court representing lord and steward of the manor. The question was, whether the the testator's general residuary estate. The petitioner asked for leave to same fines and fees were payable as would have been yable if amend the petition by including in the costs asked for those of the the trustee had been admitted. No customary fines would be actually summons in chambers. payable in respect of admission of the trustee if he was not in fact CHITTY, J., said that, as the summons was for the benefit of the readmitted. The Act gave a new way of passing copyhold estates which maindermen as well as the tenant for life, the costs of the summons were made it unnecessary for the trustee to be admitted." It gave a purchaser properly payable out of the testator's residuary estate, and made an order a right to be admitted on payment of customary fines, but there was no

as prayed.--Counsel, Dundas Gardiner ; s. B. L Druce; Simmonds. reference in the Act to any customary fines which would have been due Solicitors, Gadsden & Treherne; J. W. Marsh; E. A. Neele. if the trustee had been admitted, and no such fine could be called a customary fine when there had been no admission of the trustee. If the

CARDEN v. THE ALBERT PALACE ASSOCIATION-Chitty, J., Legislature had intended to deal with the particular case under con

21st December. sideration in the manner contended for by the appellants, it would have used language, as in the Wills Acts (section 5), expressly giving to the Companies Act, 1862, s. 153—PENDING Petition to Wind Up Company lord of a manor the fines, &c., as if the transfer had been in the ordinary

PROSPECTIVE ORDER AUTHORIZING DISPOSITION OF COMPANY'S PROPERTY. way. The appeal, therefore, failed. The words of the Act did not give In this case an application was made for leave of the court to authorize the lord fines in respect of that which never took place. Bowen, L.J., con

transactions relating to the affairs of a limited company. It appeared curred. Fry, L.J., regretted that he took a different view. The words that the action was a debenture-holders' action, and that subsequently of the section were general. They did not speak of “the” customary thereto a petition to wind up the company was presented and a provisional fines payable on a purchaser's admission, but of " customary fines,” &c. liquidator appointed. All parties desired to raise a sum of money to be There were no customary fines payable on the new form of conveyance a first charge on the company's property, and an order was obtained for given by the statute, and what customary fines were referred to ? Two that purpose. The money was required for the purpose of enabling & answers were possible. The customary fines indicated must be either receiver and manager appointed in the action to carry on the company's those which would have been payable on or before admission if the Act business and also to enable the company to perform covenants contained had not passed, or those which would have been payable on admission if in their building agreements, and thereby to obtain the leases which were the Act had not passed. If the first construction were adopted, the to form the security for the proposed loan. It was objected by the chief rights of the lord would remain intact; the other construction deprived clerk that the parties could not enter into a valid transaction, having him of rights. Was it within the scope of the Act to affect the rights of regard to section 153 of the Companies Act, 1862, which provides that all the lord? His lordship thought not. The Act had quite a different object, dispositions of the company's property, &c., made between the commence. and, as the words were equally open to two constructions, it was pre- ment of the winding up, and the order for winding up shall, unless the court ferable to adopt that which did not prejudice the rights of the lord. If otherwise order, be void. The application was supported by the plaintiff that construction were adopted, it appeared that the lord was en titled on and defendants and also by the petitioner. the admittance of the purchaser to all such payments as would have been Chitty, J., said that, as he was assured that the transaction was for the payable on or before the admittance if the Act had not passed.---Counsel, benefit of all parties, he would make an order both in the action and in Archibald Brown ; Cadman Jones. Solicitors, Mossop & Rolfe, for Mossop the petition, authorizing the parties to enter into the leases, and to hand f Mossop, Long Sutton ; Robinson, Preston, $ Stow, for Sturton, Holbeach. over the leases to the trustees for the debenture-holders, notwithstanding

section 153 of the Companies Act, 1862.-Counsel, Haldane ; Grosvenor KEWNEY v. ATTRILL-Kay, J., 21st December.

Woods. SOLICITORS, Diarmid f Teather; Stretton f Hilliard.
Issue EXECUTION-BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1883 (46 & 47 Vict. c. 52), s. 46,

Re RILEY to STREATFIELD-North, J., 16th December.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER-CONTRACT FOR SALE OF LAND-PAYMENT OF In a partnership action the usual order had been made for a dissolution

INTEREST ON PURCHASE-MONEY AFTER DATE FIXED FOR COMPLETIONand accounts, and a receiver had been appointed. Creditors of the firm

DEPOSIT or PURCHASE-MONEY IN Joint Names. subsequently recovered judgment against the firm for £18 14s. and £8 This was a summons under the Vendor and Purchaser Act, 1874, and costs, and now moved for leave to issue execution against the partnership the question arose, whether a purchaser of land could relieve himself of assets, or that the receiver might be ordered to pay the debt out of such the obligation to pay interest on the purchase-money, after the date fixed assets. Kay, J., made an order giving the creditors a charge on the moneys in

for the completion of the purchase until actual completion, by depositing

the purchase-money in a bank in joint names. The contract contained the hands of, or which might be taken possession of by, the receiver, they condition that, if tạe completion of the purchase should be delayed by any undertaking to deal with them according to any order the court might cause whatever other than the wilful neglect or default of the vendor bamake; the intention of the court being to preserve to the applicants all yond the day fixed for completion-the 15th of February, 1886 – the the rights which they would have had it they had issued execution and purchaser should pay interest at five per cent. on the unpaidl balance of the sheriff had seized and sold the assets on that day.-Counsel, D. L. the purchase-money from that day until the actuai completion. Consider: Alexander ; Whitaker, SOLICITORS, Spyer f: Son; Wm. Easton.

able delay took place in the completion. On the 16th of February, 1886,

the purchaser's solicitors wrote to the vendor's solicitors, “The purchaseRe THE DIRECT SPANISH TELEGRAPH CO. (LIM.)–Kay, J., 11th money is ready, and lying idle” at a bank which they named ; and, on and 16th December.

the 2nd of March, they again wrote to the vendor's solicitors," having COMPANY-REDUCTION OF CAPITAL-COMPANIES Acr, 1867 (30 & 31 Vict. c.

regard to the further delay likely to arise, in consequence of the 131), s. 11.

insufficiency of the power of attorney by L., we wish to avoid the possiPetition for the sanction of the court to a reduction of capital by a

bility of any question arising between us as to the purchaser's liability to company. The nominal capital consisted of £130,000 in 13,000 shares (of to iuform you that he is willing forth with to deposit such

balance in

pay interest on the balance of his purchase-money, and we therefore beg which 12,931 were issued) of £10 each on which £9 per share was paid joint names with any first-class London banker on deposit, pending the dne up, and £60,000 in 6,000 preference shares of £10 each fully paid up and entitled to preferential payment of a dividend of £10 per cent.

execution of the conveyance to the purchaser and collateral deeds.” The ven: articles provided for a reduction and it was now proposed to reduce the interest.”

The dor's solicitors
accepted this offer without

prejudice to any

question as to whole capital to £95,000 by writing off £5 per share from the amcunt paid question whether the delay in the completion of the purchase was due to

This summons was taken out by the vendor to determine the up on each issued share and

from the nominal amount of each unissued his wilful neglect or default, and also the effect of the deposit of the share. This scheme had been agreed to by a special resolution and was supported by a majority of both classes of shareholders.

money Kay, J., said that the creditors of the company were not affected by or default on the part of the vendor, and that the purchaser was bound to

North, J., held, on the evidence, that there had been no wilful neglect


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