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G lT¥_hofC YOBK.—-TOWN CLERKSHIP. — e 0 oration of York invite a plications for the oflice of]I'own Clerk of that city. Tlie gentleman selected must bea duly qualified solicitor, and will be required to devote tho whole of his time to the duties of his _o11lce and not to engage in private E|'BCi.1CB. In addition to the ordinary duties of a own Clerk he will also have to act as Clerk to the Urbnn_ Sanitméy Authority, the Ouse Navigation Committee, an the Sohoo Attendance Committee. Salary £6(0 per annum._ 'Ihe corporation will provide Offices and the requisite stall of clerks for the depsrtinent. — Applioalions in writing, stating age, qiinhflcotions. and references. with testmonials (not exceeduiir six) to be sent in not later than 12 o'clock at noon on Monday, the 20th December instant, addressed “ Town CLERK'S DEPARTMENT Go11ni£i'i'ri-:15," Town Clerk's Ofllce, York. York, Bth December, 1636.

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To Her Majestg the Lord Chancellor, the Whole oi the Judicial encl Co orntion of London &c.




Law Wigs and Gowns for Registrars, Town Clerks, and Clerks oi the Peace.




The Object of this College is to enable Students at the earliest practicable ago. and at n moderate cost, to take the University Degree in Arts, Law, or Medicine.

Students are admitted at 16, and a Degree may be

k taken at 19.

The College Charges for Lodging and Board (with an Extra Term in the Long Vacnt on), including all necessary expenses oi tuition for the B.A. Degree, are £84 per annum.

For further information apply to the Wannnx, Cavendish College, Cambridge.

SCHORNE COLLEGE, near Winslow.A Church School for One Hundred Sous oi Clergymen, Army and Navy Men, Lawyers, and the like. Masters mostly University Men. Thirty giiiiiens oer anniun; entrance fee, tivo guineas.—-Adess. Rev. Dr. Jaiicas.

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1 Chairman of Colonial Board-—

, The Hon. Sir FREDK. _Wiii'r.ixnii, K.C.M.G., M.L.C., . lato Premier of I\cw Lenland.

i The Directors are issuing Terminable Debentures I bearing interest at 4 per cent. for three years, and E 41 per cent. for five years and upwards. Interest hali1 yearly by Coupons.

V A. M. MITCHISON, Managing Director.

. Leadcnhall-buildings, Leadenhall-st.. ondon, E.C

LAW UNION FIRE and LIFE INSU . RAN CE COMPANY. Esrmusnnn IN THE Ysaa 1354. The only Law Insurance Oflloe inths United Kinglom which transacts both Fire and Lite Insurance usi

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Established 1830.
Lennon 1, Mcorgnte-street, E.C. Asnnns: 1.
INCOME 1: FUNDS uses):-


Fire Premiums ... ... ... 2577.090 Life Premiums ... ... 191,000 Interest... ... ... .. ... 132,000

[Accumulated Funds ,, ,, ,, £3,134,000

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v01.xxx1., No.8. __ THE SOLICITORS’ JOURNAL. 1.9

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Ur ro_Tnr:1isnAY afternoon there was no authority for the statement which appeared inthe morning papers of that day as to the arrangements for the Christmas Vacation, but we believe that one of the Vacation Judges will sit in the Queen’s Bench judges’ chambers pn two days in each week after the oflices are opened on the 28th inst, and that the arrangements for pressing business Ill the Chancery Division will be practically as usual.

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_A mmomi is current, which is believed to be not altogether without foundation, that a proposal has been set on foot for en1”-T$l11g the hours for keeping open some of the oflices in the Royal Courts of Justice. The proposal is said to apply to the oflices of the chief clerks of the chancery judges, and to be that those oflices should be open from 10 to 5, instead of from 10 to 4. It is difficult believe that solicitors in general desire such a change. 4Pl_>°l11tmgnts at chambers which last up to 4 o'clock leave but a llmlted time before the post closes for the necessary work of corresP°lldcnce, and if solicitors, or their clerks, were called upon to attend at chambers so late as 5 o'clock the greatest inconvenience Y0l1ld 87186: Moreover, the oflicials are entitled to some consideralll_- It will be observed that the proposal relates to the time dllflllg which the ofiices are to be open to the public, and not to fihe attendance of the ofilcers. With the oflices closed to the pub

c at 4_o’clocl_:, as at present, the ofl-lcials are able to devote as m11011_ time as is required to finishing up the day’s work, and it is lllltfrlous that they not only remain for a considerable time after 4 °°_1°°k, but that many of them take home work to do in the g°111ngs- This may be gathered from the evidence given before It rd SELao1uvE’s Committee, which was printed early in this year.

the officials have to keep their offices open to the public until 5 ° °l°°k1 the completion of the clearing up of the work of the day must b°_ P°§l?poned. But, putting this question of the ofilcers an °“° ‘"19, It may, we think, be asserted that there is no general

emand for the change stated to be in contemplation.

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Tun Horsn or Loans last week aflirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal and of a divisional court in the important case of Wakelin v. London and .S'outll- Western Railway 00., in which the jury had found for the plaintiff in an action for negligence, but the court had set the verdict aside. The facts were, shortly, that the plaintifl’s husband had been killed by a train on a level crossing late in the evening, the crossing, which was specially dangerous, having been left unguarded; and the grounds for the interference of the court appear to have been that there was no evidence of negligence on the part of the defendants conducing to the accident. We propose to consider the case in detail at some future time, but must at once point out that the rule laid down by Lord Esnna, M. R., in Davey v. London and Soul]:-Western Railway Go. (12 Q. B. D. 70), that in an action for negligence the plaintiff must prove, not only the negligence of the defendant in the afllrmative, but the absence of contributory negligence on his own part in the negative, which was adhered to by that learned judge in Wakelin’a case, and not dissented from by the other two judges of the Court of Appeal, does not appear from the report before us to have been expressly dissented from by any member of the House of Lords, except Lord \Vsrso1v. We cannot think the rule to be a right one, and it will be matter of regret if it should prove that the House of Lords has neither alfirmed it nor disafiirmed it; for judges at Mei Prim: should know how to direct juries in actions for negligence, in which, of course, contributory negligence is the defence most frequently set up. A full report of the judgments may perhaps contain some passages affording a guide in the matter. '

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Mn.J'osr1cn Cnirrr, in deciding the case of Re Lambert, oh Tuesday last, may, at first sight, appear to have carried somewhat far the law as to the admissibility of declarations by deceased witnesses as to questions of pedigree. The question in the case was as to the existence of a marriage between two persons, both of whom were dead, and evidence was admitted of a draft will, in which the alleged husband had described his alleged wife by her maiden name, and as passing as his wife, there being no signature or atiestation. It was contended that this was not a statement by the husband, but only an intended statement. The learned judge’s ruling that the draft was admissible appears, however, to be entirely within well-known decisions of the House of Lords. In Tlw Sussex Peerage case (ll Cl. & F. 85) the question was as to the admissibility of an entry made in a Prayer-book. Lady Auocsn had made an unsigned entry in the book to the effect that it was the Prayer-book by which she was married to the Duke of Suvsnx at Rome on a certain day, the entry itself not being dated; and the House of Lords admitted the entry, not_as proving the marriage, but as a declaration by one of the parties that there had been a marriage. In The Berkeley .P_eer_'agc case (4 Camp. 401), a question was raised as to the admissibility of an entry in a Bible by the deceased father of the person whose illegitimacywas in issue, to the effect that the latter was his eldest son, and born in lawful wedlock on a particular date. Although it was proved that the father had declared that he had made the entry for the express purpose o_f establishing his son’s legitimacy if it should ever come in question, the law lords, after consulting the judges, held that the entry was e_vide_nce of the son’s legitimacy. Chief Justice M.uvsr1nLn, 1!]. delivering the unanimous opinion of the judges, held that the _In0tlv§YV1tl1 which the entry was made did not render it inadmissible, atlhough “its particularity would be a strong circumstance of suspicion ” ; but Lord ELLENBOBOUGH expressed a doubt Wllttllfll‘ “every declaration of a parent, howsoever mlxle» b°f°" "Y dispute appears to have subslsted, is adm1esil_>le._ In the retfint case Mr.Jusfice Cnrrrr pointed out that the objectious to the form of the declaration put in evidence referred to its weight, I105 to ll?! admissibility; and he acted on the general principle that, uponha question of pedigree, any declaration by any member °1 9 9 family is admissible for what it is worth

Tm: QUESTION whether Campbell v. Uampbvll (N°- 2) and


similar cases ought or ought not to be heard in camerd has been


so much discussed of late that it is well to draw attention to a curious distinction in Divorce Court practice. It is settled beyond doubt by C‘. v. C. (1 P. & D. 6-10) that the court has no power to hear a suit for dissolution of marriage in cmnerri ; but the judgment in that case recognizes as lawful the frequent practice of so hearing suits for nullity of marriage, and the reporter’s head-note, though not the judgment, recognizes as equally lawful the not so frequent practice of so hearing suits for judicial separation, of which Campbell v. Campbell (No. 1) furnished an instance. This distinction is based on section 22 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857 (20 & 21 Vict. c. 85), by which “ in all suits and proceedings, other tlum proceeilings to dissolve any marriage, the said court (of Divorce) shall proceed and act and give relief on principles and rules which, in the opinion of the said court, shall be as nearly as may be conformable to the principles on which the ecclesiastical courts have heretofore acted and given relief," and it was a common practice of such courts to hear in camerzi suits for nullity on physical grounds and for divorce a mensd et tlioro (corresponding to judicial separation). Not only does the section expressly exclude suits for dissolution, but, as it appears from 0 v. 6'. (ubi supra), in one of the amendment Bills a clause which had been introduced giving the general power to hear in cameni was rejected by the Legislature, and, as was held in Ii. v. C’. (29 L. J. P. & M. 81) without express power in that behalf, the public cannot be excluded, even by consent of parties, and in the latter case the court, not having its attention called to section 22 of the Act of 1857 (which, it must be admitted, has been rather liberally construed in favour of exclusion), went so far as to refuse to hear a suit for nullity in cameni. We may observe that the customary exclusion of women and boys from trials for rape and the like cannot be legally enforced ( being a mere notification rather than a compulsory exclusion), and that n clause giving the judge power to exclude the public, or some portion of it, from such trials was rejected when the Criminal Law Amendment Act was before Parliament in 1885. As to the general principle, we think that there is only a choice of evils, and that'thc actual exclusion of the public from a trial is a greater evil than the possible contamination of some by becoming acquainted with offensive details.


I1v_rm: RECENT csss of Panlclmrsl v. Sowler the court, and especially Mr. Baron Hnnniasroiv, took occasion to throw doubt upon the correctness of the law of blasphemy as laid down by Lord COLERIDGE in his celebrated and exhaustive exposition in Rey. v. Ramsay and Foole (15 Cox C. C. 231). We have referred to the report of that exposition, and think that passages in it may be open to exception, though, as a whole, it fairly represents the law. But one very material point should not be lost sight of, and that is the distinction between the law of blasphemy, which rests mainly on the common law, and the law of apostacy, which is purely the creature of the statute 9 & 10 Will. 3, c. 32. By this statute “if any person having been educated in, or at any time having made profession of, tlze Christian religion, shall by writing, printing, teaching, or advised speaking deny . . . the Christian religion to be true, or the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testament to be of Divine authority,” and shall be convicted on indictment, such person is for the first offence disabled from having or enjoying any oflice, ecclesiastical, civil, or military, and for the second offence is subjected to further disabilities and also to “imprisonment for the space of three years without bail or mainprize." There are passages in Rey. v. Ramsay and I001; which bear the interpretation that the statute is obsolete and could not_be acted on, and such passages are, we think, beyond doubt, incorrect (see R. v. Uarlile, 3 B. & Ald. 161 ; R. v. Waddmfloni 1 13- & C. 26). But Messrs. RAMSAY and FOOTE were indicted, not as apostates—for the indictment appears to have contained no averment that they had been once Christ' b

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s avc een committedb J M h t whereas the btatutory offence under 9 & lrOaWEiv1'l.or3 d. ?l';1e(l1Hn!Il only be committed by one who has been once a Christian. ,'l‘he question on whom the burden of proof is thrown, whether the prosecutor is entitled to assume that every person 1; b

Christian imtil the contrary is proved or whetheralie iiiiliistmgiavd


afiirinative evidence of any particular defendant having been onc_c 3 Christian, has never to our knowledge been raised, but w_e lllllgllle that the ordinary rule by which the burden of proof is thrown upon a prosecutor would apply, although we think also that very slight evidence would have to be adduced in ordinary cases. The punishment for common law blasphemy is fine or imprisonment 01' both at the discretion of the judge _; whereas it will be observed that the punishment for apostacy is different, and no discretion whatever is left to the court.

Qcasrroxs wiricii ARISE with regard to the payment by executors of death duties become increasingly important as time runs on from the death of a testator, as interest on any unpaid duty can be required to be paid. Attention can hardly be too forcibly drawn to section 6 of 36 Geo. 3, c. 52, the substance of which may be stated as follows :—-“ If an executor retains legacies without paying the duty, or, on payment of legacies, deducts, without paying, the duty, it shall be a debt from him. If he pays legacies without deducting duty it shall be a debt from the executor and from the legatee." In a recent case which has come to our knowledgea residuary account was passed nearly sixty years ago,_ in which account the executors retained a large sum (since distribute_d)_ on which duty was stated to be not then payable. The last undivided portion of the estate being in court and about to be divided, it_was discovered that no duty had been paid on the sum retained sixty years ago, and the persons entitled to the fund in court successfully contended that, as the fund in court was not part of the sum retained when duty was paid on “the I‘68ldlLBJ'y estate,” the duty and interest on the sum retained was a debt due from the executors personally, and could not be required to be paid out of the fund in court.

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OUR attention has been recently called to a pamphlet by Mr. George G. Gray, of the Middle Temple,"‘ the subject of which is the much-vexed question of the right to support for buildings from adjacent land or buildings, and we propose to make a few observations on this topic which have been suggested to us by what he has written. The pamphlet is, in substance, an elaborate and interesting criticism of the decision of Hall, V.C., in Lemaitre v. Daoil (30 W. R. 360, 19 Oh. D. 281), which the author conceives to be wrong, and to have been founded on an erroneous view of the effect of the celebrated case of Angus v. Dallon (27 W. R. 623, 30 ‘V. R. 191, 3 Q. B. D. 85, 4 Q. B. D. 162, 6 App. Cas. 740). The Vice-Chancellor appears to have held that the decision in Angus v. Dalton applied to a case of support to a building from another building. The authorities on the question are reviewed in the pamphlet at considerable length, and the conclusion is arrived at by the author that the right to support for buildings by buildings stands ou a different footing entirely from the right to support for buildings by adjacent land. To discuss at length the arguments used by the author, and his views of the effect of the different authorities respectively, would require a far larger

amount of space than we can command. We should, moreover, be sorry to pronoimce any judgment on the question which he raises without the most careful consideration and research. We think,

however, that his pamphlet makes out a very fair case for the conclusion that that question cannot be considered as finally settled by the decision in Lemaitre v. Davis, which we must admit does seem to assume, in a somewhat offhand way, that the decision in Angus v. Dalton applies to the case of support to buildings by

buildings. What we propose briefly to do is to give the heads of

liisargument as far as possible in his own words, and then to

indicate the points where the chain of argument appears to us to

bc weakest, without pretending to cnunciate any very definite 0011011181011 for ourselves. The question is altogether too big to be

knocked off within the limits of a short article.


The Risht toLateral Support from Land and Bulldln . By ewes G- G"-Y» Barrister-at-Law. V Stevens 8: Sons.) 8’

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Dec. 18, 1886. THE SOLICITORS’ JOURNAL. 12:


The author, at the close of a. long discussion of the cases, for

mulates the following conclusions :—1. The lateral support to land
from the adjacent soil is an inherent right of property. 2. The
right of ownership includes a right to build to the extremity of
one’s land, and the law, after the enjoyment of lateral support for
such building from the adjacent soil during a probationary period
of twenty years, protects such enjoyment as a right of property.
3. The right of support to a building from an adjoining building
is a negative easement. 4. The enjoyment of such easement is
incapable of being reasonably interrupted, and therefore is not
within the Prescription Act, which, except in the case of light,
is confined to positive easements. 5. The circumstances (apart
from contract) under which a building usually requires support are
not such as to call for, or justify, a protection of such encroach-
ment or burden by the law. The result is, as we understand, the
conclusion that the right to support for buildings from adjacent
buildings cannot be acquired by mere enjoyment. The most
important stop in the reasoning is that contained in proposition 2
The author seeks to shew that the right to support for buildings
by land is a right of property, like the natural right of support
for land by adjacent land.
' It will be readily perceived that it is very essential to the
argument that a fundamental distinction should be established
between the character of the right of support for building by
building, and that of support for building by adjacent land. The
author, therefore, endeavours to shew that the latter is a sort of
enhanced natural right, for on perusal of the context it is obvious
that the distinction is between natural rights and easements. It
is vital to make out that one of the rights is a natural or quasi-
natural right of property, and the other an easement, for if they
are both to be considered easements it is somewhat difiicult to
distinguish the one case from the other. The great argument
against the existence of the easement of support from mere enjoy-
ment is the nbsence of any power of resistance to the acquisition of
the right by the owners of the servient tenement. If this con-
sideration is not fatal to the existence, through long enjoyment, of
the easement of support for buildings by adjacent land, it is
difiicult to see how it can be fatal to the existence, through long
enjoyment, of the easement of support for buildings by adjacent
buildings if such right be an easement. So far as we can perceive,
if they are both easements, they stand on much the same footing.
It may be urged that, in the one case, the enjoyment of the right
would generally bc clam, whereas in the other it is not, because
it is more or less obvious that adjacent land supports a building.
But it does not seem to us that the question whether the enjoy-
ment is clam or not can be very material when the easement does
not depend on acquiescence or default in resisting its acquisition.
It is very clear to us, we must say, that the casement of support
for buildings by adjacent land cannot depend on acquiescence.
Therefore it does not seem to us that any sound distinction exists
in this respect.

We must confess that we are not altogether satisfied with the
author’s second proposition, or the arguments by which he defends
It We always imagined that the distinction was between natural
rights mcidental to ownership, which are inherent in the idea of
ownership, and which exist without any necessity for any period
Of enjoyment, and easements, which must be in some way added to
the mcidental rights of ownership and arise from grant or prescrip-
tion. It is well known that originally this distinction was not
clearly drawn by the English law, and that natural rights were
°ft9l1 spoken of as easements. But the distinction is now well-
established, and the essence of it seems to be that the one class of
nghts is natural, the other acquired. In one class or the other
every such right must come, and we have considerable difliculty in
understanding how any particular period of enjoyment can be
necessary for the acquisition of a. natural right properly so-called,
°T,110w a natural right can, as such, be enhanced by enjoyment.
‘F e must confess that we cannot exactly comprehend the classifica-
tion by which the author endeavours to separate the two rights of
“PP°!t 111 question. We doubt whether, in discussing the cases,
the author has quite appreciated another point—viz., that the
P1'°]>€l'1y so-called natural right of support for land by adjacent
hfld may give a right to damages for injury to buildings by the
W1t1ldmwal_of such support when the surface would have been let
down even if there bad been no building upon it. So, when the
action is for damages to buildings, the basis of the claim may be

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the natural right properly so-called. The right to a certain amount of support from adjacent land—i.c., that which would be sufficient to support the surface unbuilt upon—is a strictly natural right. We cannot understand how a right that requires to be acquired, whether by enjoyment or otherwise, can be said to be a. natural right or a right of property in the proper sense of the term.

We pointed out, in commenting on Angus v. Dalian at the time, that to some extent the cases as to support for buildings appeared to involve the idea of the protection of ancient enjoyment, apart from any notion of a right created by acquiescence in a wrong. We would, in passing, point out that the applicability or non-applicability of the Prescription Act, though, of course, material, is not conclusive of the question in general, for, after all, the Prescription Act did not alter the basis upon which easements rest. It only substituted shorter periods for time whereof the memory of man runncth not to the contrary. The prescriptive right of support for buildings by adjacent land, which must now be taken to have been established somehow, must, in our opinion, really rest on the basis of mere length of enjoyment. We are not at present convinced that the same considerations do not apply to support of buildings by buildings, or that, as a matter of justice and expediency, long enjoyment da facfo ought not in that case also to be protected. It is easy to say that an easement ought not to be obtained where there is no power to resist its acquisition ; but, if the matter be carefully considered, we do not so clearly see why the fact of the possibility of resistance makes so much difference. It is difilcult to see how it adds one grain’s weight of merit or justice to the case of the owner of the dominant tenement. The fact that a person has enjoyed an advantage wrongfidly for twenty years does not seem to us to tell more in favour of. his right to protection than if he had enjoyed it for that period lawfully. The only way in which it works is as reducing the hardship involved, to the owners of the servient tenement, because, if a man acquiesces, it maybe presumed he does not object to his neighbours having the right. The philosophical basis of easements seems to, us in truth to be mainly the fact of undisturbed enjoyment by the owner of the dominant tenement, whether rightful or wrongful, rather than the acquiescence of the owner of the servient tenement. We do not say that this is always their legal basis, because in most oases no doubt both elements exist, and the fact of acquiescence has been relied upon as an essential element. But in considering how far a right which cannot depend on acquiescence should be considered to extend, it is admissible to look to the underlying justice and expediency of the case. We cannot undertake to weigh in the balance together the conflicting considerations which exist in practice for or against the conclusion that the easement of support for buildings by buildmgs c_an_be obtained by length of enjoyment. But we cannot help thinking that, where two buildings have existed for a very long time side by side, and the owner of one of them alters the existing state_of things, there is a natural tendency to the conclusion that on him should fall the responsibility for damage thus done to the other. The truth is, that a long-existing state of things approx1mates,_for this purpose, to a natural state of things, and the same considerations appear more or less to apply to both.


II. Tau Monaaiv Law or Junoiiaars (continued).

Lands wifliin the jurisdictions qftlie Palatine Courts of Lancaster and Durham.—By 6 & 7 Will. 4, o. 19, the Durham palatine jurisdiction was severed from the bishoprics of Durham, and vested as a separate franchise and royalty in the Crown. Section 7 of the Act defines the extent of the county of Durham as comprising “the county of Durham and Sadberge, including the detached parts of Craikshirc, Bedlingtonshire, Norhamshire, iallertonshire, and Islandshire, and all other places heretofore within the jurisdiction of the bishopric of Durham in right of the said oounty palatine." . _ _ Lands within the counties palatine are alfe_ote_d—_~/I785, 5.7 J'{d8'

ments ot the High Court of Justice, whose jurisdiction extends into~


the counties palatine'(2 Wms. Saund. 194 ; 1 Jarm. Conv. I10; 1


Cr. M. & R. 597, 848; Dart. V. & P. 486), and, therefore, the like searches in the register of judgments in the Central Oflice are necessary, as in the case of other lands. But by 18 Vict. c._ 15, s. 2, “ no judgment, decree, order, or rule of any court shall bind lands, &c, in the counties palatine respectively,” as against purchasers, unless and until registered with the prothonotaries of the respective palatine courts.

Secondly, they are aflected by judgments and decrees of the palatine courts. The common law courts of Lancaster and Durham have (ante, pp. 105, 106) been abolished; and as to decrees and orders of the palatine chancery courts, we have pointed out above (p. 106) that it appears to be necessary that they should be registered and re-registered in the Central Office in London in order to affect purchasers of “any lands,” including lands in the palatine counties. '

Registration and re-registration with the prothonotaries or deputy-prothonotaries of palatine courts were also required. 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 21, applied the provisions of that Act, as to the operation of judgments, to the common law courts of Lancaster and Durham, and required them to be registered in the palatine registries. The provisions of 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, 2 8: 3 Vict. c. 11, and 3 & 4 Vict. c. 82, as to registration and notice were declared to extend and apply mulalis ‘III ulrmdis to the Chancery Court of Lancaster by 13 & 14 Vict. c. 43, s. 24, and to common law palatinate courts and the Chancery Court of Durham by 18 Vict. c. 15, ss. 2, 3, and 9, so far as regards the lands within their respective jurisdictions, and provision was made for registration in the palatine registries. The terms of the lastmentioned Act (section 3) appear to shew that it is intended to apply its own provisions to the common law and chancery courts of both Lancaster and Durham. The result of this legislation (Prid. on Judgm., 4th ed., App. 2, p. 4n) was to place decrees, orders, and rules of the palatine courts on the footing of judgments of the common law palatine courts; to require them to be registered and re-registered i_n the palatine registries in order to affect purchasers of lands within the palatine counties, with the like protection in respect of notice or absence of notice, in the same manner, and to the same ext/ent, as in the case of judgments of the High_Court of Justice. The 2nd section of 23 8; 24 Vict. c. 38 applied the provisions of that Act (ante, p. 73) in regard to writs of execution and the registry thereof mutatis mulandis to judgments of the common law courts of Lancaster and Durham.

It thus appears that, to affect purchasers of lands in either of 511° Palatine 00l1!1t_1eB, judgments of the High Court must be registered and re-registered both in the Central Olfice and in the respective palatine registnes, and judgments of the palatine courts themselves i_nus_t certainly be registered and re-registered in the palatine registries, and probably also in the Central Office. The palatine registries for Lancaster and Durham are at Preston and Durham respectively (but as to Durham, see mile, p. 1062.

Lands m Middle_.!e.z: nnd_ 1’arl'sIii're.—For an account o the Middlesex and Yorkshire Registry Acts, and of searches to be made in the registers, the reader is referred to the articles in 30 SomerIciis Jovnnat, pp. 750, 760, where it is pointed out that the York. 511119 Registries A011, i884 (section 20), makes provision for official searches, and for the issue of certificates of the results (section 21), which (section 23) protect solicitors, trustees, executors, agents, or other persons in a fiduciary position, from responsibility "for 911?’, 1088 01' damage or injury that may arise from any error in such certificates ; but they are not made conclusive in favour of purchasers. Under these Acts a udgment docs not at _law affect purchasers until it is registered in the local register ; but it was held in equity that the lands are bound in the hands of a purchaser who had notice of an unregistered judgment at the date of his contract—1.e., that notice supplies the want of registration (see 30 Soi.icrroas' Jouimin, p. 751). And notice after contract, but before payment of purchase-money, would, it is apprehended, operate to give the udgment creditor a lien on the pur_ g_1ia5°'m°n°Y (see Mild, pp. 4, 73). But under the Yorkshire Regis

es A_ct,_ 1884 (30 Soiicii-oiis’JooIm.ii., 760) s. 14 no crson ' t

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and, if registered in London only, would affect the lands, as to purchasers, only from the time when it was also registered in the local registry (TVeslbr0ol: v. Blythe, 3 E. & B. 737, 742; Hugllu v. Lumley, 4 E. & B. 274)—i.e., as against purchasers without notice; for notice would supply the want of registration _in the local registry, though not (see anle, _p. 73) of registration in the London Registry under 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110. Rut the former Yorkshire Registry Acts allowed registration, if made within thirty days, as to lands in the W'est and East Ridings, and within twenty days as to the North Riding, operate retrospectively, so as to bind the lands as from signing of judgment. The result was that a purchaser who contracted during those periods was bound, though he had no notice, provided the judgment was registered in the Court of Common Pleas before the contract, and was subsequently, within the twenty or thirty days, registered in the Yorkshire Registry. But, by virtue of 2 & 3 Vict. c. 11, s. 5, the purchaser being without notice, the lands would be liable only to the remedies given by the law before 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110. _ _

Therefore, it would seem that a purchaser iaifli notice (actual, not constructive) would be bound (now as to Middlescx only) by a judgment registered in London but not in _the local registry; but not bound if the judgment was registered in the local registry only and not in London (ante, p. 73); a purchasenwilliout noises would not be bound unless the judgment was registered in both registries, and then would be bound only to the extent of the old law. _

The result as to searches appears to be that a search in the central oflice alone will disclose all judgments which can_aflect lands in the registry counties. The Registry Acts do not provide for re-registration; and, therefore, a search in them would have to extend over the whole period for which it was formerly made in the Common Pleas Register. A purchaser who searched the local register alone would not be safe, for though he would not _be bound by judgments not entered there (provided he had not notice of them) though registered in the London registry, yet it would be diflicult on a resale to satisfy a purchaser of the absence of notice (Prid. Conv., vol. 1, p. 159, 11th ed.).

Under the Yorkshire Registries Act, 1884 (47 & 48 Vict. c. 54), ss 4, 5, any “assurance” may be registered; by B€¢ti0l1 3, “ assurance ” includes “order of a court,” and “ order of a court” means “any judgment, decree, writ of execution, or sequestration, or other order or process of or issuing from a court of competent jurisdiction, whereby any interest in any land is or may be affected.”

As to judgments coming within 23 & 24 Vict. c. 38, and 27 & 28 Vict. c. 112 respectively, those Acts must be applied and fwd together with the Registry Acts.

We alluded above (p. 25) to the statute 17 Cal‘. 2, c. 8, whereby a judgment could be entered up against a defendant who died after verdict and before judgment, provided such judgment was entered up within two terms after verdict. This provision was re-enacted by the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852 (15 & 16 Vict. c. 76), s. 139. The statute 17 Car. 2, c. 8, was repealed by 42 8:43 Vict. c. -59, as to the Supreme Court of Judicature in England» and generally by 46 8: 47 Vict. c. 49 (s. 3), but (section 7) with _a saving so far as it applies, or may have been by Order in Council applied, to the court of the county palatine of Lancaster, or t0 any inferior court of civil jurisdiction. In R. S. C., 1883, XVII-D 1, the provisions of 17 Car. 2, c. 8, above cited, are inserted (bllli without the limitation of two years).

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