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For the oflicial receiver acting as interim receiver of the property of a debtor under section 10 in addition to tllig per-centage chargeable on realizations, on every o er . . . . . . . . .
And, in addition, where the order is in force for a longer period than fourteen days, for every seven days, after the first fourteen, and for every fraction of seven days . . . . .
For each notice by an ofiioial receiver to a creditor of a first or any other meeting, or sitting of tho court . .
For each notice by an otficial receiver to a creditor of an adjourned meeting or an adjourned sitting of the court . . . . . . . . .
For the oflicial receiver supervising a special manager or
If the gross assets are estimated by the oilicial receiver
the carrying on of a debtor’s business a fee according to the following s0ale:—
not to exceed £500 . . . . . £1 per week. If to exceed £500 but not to exceed £5,000 . 2 ,, If to exceed £5,000 but not to exceed £10 000
If m exceed £10,000 but not to exceed £20,000 I If to exceed £20,000 . . . . . .
Boom for meeting or adjourned meeting of creditors summoned by oflicial receiver, for each creditor to whom notice has been given of such meeting, but not exceeding in summary administrations £2 for each meeting; and in non-summary administrations not exceeding £5 for each meeting . . . .
Travelling, keeping possession, and other reasonable expenses of otlicial receiver, the amount disbursed .
For otlicial stationery, printing, books, forms, and postages, each estate :
For every ten creditors or fraction of twenty .
or fraction of ten . . . . , 0 2 0
On every payment under section 162 of money out oi the bankruptcy estates account threepence on each 0 d f '
p un or raction of a pound to be charged as follows :—
Where the nione consists f clai
y 0 un med dividends, on each dividend aid out
P 5 Where the money consists of undistributed funds or balances, on the amount paid out.
High bailitf _for attending sittings of the court, under each
receiving order, in summary cases, per case .
High bailiff for attending coiu-t in non-summary cases, per case . . . . . . . _ . Serving every bankruptcy notice, bankruptcy petition, or subpoena or_recciving or other order (not serviceable
by post) within two miles, including aflidavit of service . . . . . . . ,
If serviceable by post . . . . . . . Executing every warrant of scizuvc, or search warrant, or Warrant of apprehension, or order of commitment within two miles of court . . . . . Keeping possession under a warrant, for each day the man is actually in possession ; including ntfidavit of
possession being actually kept , _
We, the undersigned Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, do hereby sanction the foregoing scales of fees and percentages, and do direct that the fees to be taken by stamps _ shall be those mentioned in Table A., and that the fees mentioned in Tables B., 0., D., and E. shall be taken in money, except that _such of the fees and allowances referred to in Table D. as have hitherto been I taken by stamps shall continue to be taken by stamps : the stamps to I be used shall be Bankruptcy fee stamps, with the exception of the penny stamp on every special proxy or voting paper which may be a Postage and Inland Revenue Stamp.
And we further direct that wherever practicable the stamp shall aflixed or the money aid in respect of every fee mentioned in Tables A., B., C., and D., before the proceding is had in respect of which the fee is payable, and that the charge to be made by tho London Gazette for the insertion of each notice authorized by the Act or Rules shall be five shillings.
(Signed) SIDNEY Hnaiinrvr, W. H. WALROXD. Dated the 25th day of October, 1886.
ORDER AS TO STAMPS.
Order as to the fees and per-centages which are required to be taken for bankruptcy proceedings in the High Court of Justice and Court of Appeal by means of stamps, amending the previous order on the same subject, published in the supplement to the Lomlon Gazette.
Whereas by section three of the Public Oflices Fees Act, 1879, it is provided that the Treasury may from time to time make, and when made, revoke, alter, and add to, regulations for all or any of tho following purposes respecting fees in any public otlice—-that is to sa ,—
ll.) Regulating the manner in which the fees taken in money are
to be taken, accounted for, and paid over.
(2.) Determining the use of impressed or adhesive stamps, and the
mode of cancellation of adhesive stamps.
(3.) Regulating the use of stamps and prescribing the application
thereof to documents from time to time in use, and re uirin
q E documents to be used for the purpose of such stamps. Provided that f h
so ar as t ey relate to the oflice of any court of law, they shall be made with the consent of the Lord Chancellor.
Now we, the undersigned, being two of the lords of her Majesty’s I Treasury, do, with the concurrence of the Lord Chancellor, hert-by
give notice and order and direct :——
That from and after the 25th day of October, 1886, in lieu of any regulations on the subject heretofore in force, the stamps used for denoting the fees and per-centages described in the schedule hereto subjoined shall so far as they are payable in re ard t d’ in
, g 0 procee ings the High Court of Justice and Court of Appeal, be of the character and be a lied d th ' “ '
pp an 0 erwise dealt with as rescribed by such schedule. And we do further enjoin that this ordler shall be binding on all courts, oflices, and persons whom such regulations may in any way affect.
The adhesive stamps herein referred to shall be of the description overprinted with the word “Bankruptcy,” except where otherwise } provided. They shall be cancelled by the various court or other
officials by perforation, or in such manner as the Commissioners of Inland Revenue may from time to time direct The im ressed tam s
. p s p also shall be of such character as the said Commissioners may adopt for the purpose.
The ofiicial forms with impressed or adhesive stamps (as tho case b
may e) required in respect of any proceedings herein referred to may be obtained at the Inland Revenue Oflices, Royal Courts of Justice. Persons may, however, in addition, have their own forms stamped at that oflice or at the corresponding oflice at Somerset House.
Every declaration byadebtor Declaration. Impressed. of inability to pay his debts _
Every bankruptcy notice . Notice . Impressed.
Every bankruptcy petition . Petition . Impressed.
Every bond with sureties . Bond . . Impressed.
Every aflidavit (or report) Afidavit . Impressed on filed other than proof of adhesive.
Every subpoana or summons Subpoena or Impressed.
For taking an aflidavit or an Aflidavit . Impressed or
Every proof of debt above , Proof . . Impressed or
£2. l adhesive.
Every petition under section 1 Petition or Impressed.
Every special proxy or voting Proxy or vot- Impressed or} A Postage or In
paper. l mg paper. adhesive. i land Revenue i stamp may be _ I used. Every receiving order under yOrder. . Impressed.
section 103 of the Act. Every application for an iApplication, Impressed. order of discharge. i And for each creditor to 1 Application. Adhesiveex.
be notified. 1 cept where
_ _ ceeds 20. Every application to the Application.,Impressed. Court under sections 18
and 23 to approve s.
Every application to the Application. Impressed.
Every apphcation for search Seardi . Impressed.
Every application to the ;Appl.ication. Impressed.
Min a_csse of Ynuny v. Holloway, before Mr. Justice Butt, on Tuesday,
I-111<1d1@b<>n.on_ the pm of the plaintiff, stated that it would not be lwildssary to_ ask his lordship to make an order on the solicitors who pregiretd the will to attend and be examined concerning their knowledge of ,0: tfismmenmy documents and papers of the deceased, as, since motion an meg: to do so had been placed on the paper, those gentlemen had filed map avit from which it appeared that t ey have handed over the testaacfiniafy papers in question in their possession to another solicitor who was The 81Qr one of the defendants, and that these documents had been filed. matte? “llmfi had. however, been put to considerable expense in the them’! in order to bring it_ before the court, and he (Mr. Middleton) dnco are ézsked for costs against the solicitors for having refused to proyou “H68 lzfumfints when asked todo so. Mr. Justice Butt: When do ton _ Q08" 15 t? whfiltors handed _over the papers in question? Mr. Middlepnpé; Izite me after the notice of motion was given and piit in the when-0 _ 1' Home discussion Mr. Justice Butt declined to condemn the
rs in costs as desired. He would make no order as to costs.
This was an interpleader issue to try the rislht to certain goods seized in execution by the defendant and claimed by a plaintifi under a bill of sale. The ill of sale stated that, “ inconsideration of the grantee having, at the request of the grantor, become guarantee, and having signed El promissory note for the payment of a. sum of £45 obtained by the grantor from W. J. Boyes, of whic £32, or thcreabouts, is now owing, and also
f th tee having at the like request of the grantor, paid" certain
o egran ,
by way of security for the paymen
703). This judgment was delivered on e n 0 .
1882 (la 6: 46 Vici. c. 43), s. - can
This case raised the question as to the meaning of the words in the form in the schedule to the Bills of Sale Act, 1882, “ terms for the maintenance or defeasance of the security." _ The bill of sale, after giving the grantee power to seize and sell (inter aha) _on default in payment by the grantor or on breach of any covenant therein contained and necessary for maintaining the security, provided _that_ “upon any such sale the purchaser should not be bound’ to see or mquire whether any _such default had been marle as aforesaid.‘ The defendant, the execution creditor, contended that this clause was not authorized by the form, and so the bill of sale was void under section 9 of the Bills of_Sa1e Act, 1882. The plaintiff, the bill of sale holder, contended that this was a clause for the "maintenance of the security,” as it helped the_ grantee to obtain his money and facilitated the sale; o_r, at any rate, it was for its "defe_asance," as it promoted the accoinphsliment of the object of the security, the word “defeasance" not being in its strict legabsense. Fry, L.J., before whom the case was tried. without a Jug, gave Judgment for the defendant, holding the bill of sale to be voi on_th_e authority of Blaibery v. I’rn-sons (17 Q. B. D._ 336). On agfil t1118_]l1dgm6D$,W£l8 aflirmed. Lonn Esnsn, M.R., said that a stip tion with regard toa sale, when the power to sell had arisen, could not be one for the defensance ” of the security. It was s stipulation m full accomplishment of the security. The late Master of the Rolls in Er parts Popplewell (31 W. R. 35, 21 _Ch. D. 73), defined a defcassnce _as something which defeated the operation of _a deed, but was contained in some other deed or document , it contained in the same deed it was called a condition. If, therefore, the clause, instead of defeating, the operation of the deed, it could not be a “ defeasance ” or a condition in the nature of _a defeusance. The word “defeasance" in the form meant a condition in the nature of a defsasance-—that was, something which defeated the operation of the deed, and not something which camed it out. The clause here was aufulfllment of the security in favour of the grantee. Then as to the word _mainteuance,” a power to enter_and,sell might be said be for the maiufinasnfie I h urity But this sti ulation only came into effect aftort ti we
1: ' . gt this Xiifiurity when no furtger security was wanted. It could no , e
fore, be said to be for the maintenance of_the security. Accordingly it did not come within the scope of the provisions allowed to be added to the bill of sale by the form. Further, it was not a mere harmless clause, but it gave the bill of sale a legal effect diflerent from that which would result from the form in the schedule. A purchaser who knew that he was buying from a bill of sale holder would ordinarily, if he bought without seeing that default had been made, take the risk, as a remedy would lie in equity against him at the suit of the grantor to recover the goods if 110 default had been made. But here the clause took away any such remedy, and left the gr-antor io sue the grantee on his personal covenant to sell only on default. The case. therefore, came within Er part: Stanford (34 W. R. 507, 17 Q. B. D. 259), and the bill of sale was
A question arose in this case as to the right of a company to appeal from a winding-up order. The application was made in the name of the company for leave to appeal (notwithstanding the expiration of the proper time) from an order for the compulsory winding up of the oomgany made by North, J ., on the 8th of June. An order appointing an 0 cial liquidator had been since made. On behalf of the ofllcial liquidator the preliminary objection was taken that, the company being no longer in existence, and the ofiicial liqiiidator being the only person who was entitled to use its name, the company had no locus stand‘ to appeal from the order. It was also urged that there would be no one responsible for costs. Tl-ll Couiir (BOWEN and Far, L.JJ.) thought the objection a valid one, but suggested that the application might be made in the name of a contributory. It was then arranged that the notice of motion should be amended by substituting the name of a shareholder who had been a director as the applicant, and the application was then heard on its merits. The company was incorporated in outh Australia by a statute of the colony, and was not registered in England. It had carried on businessin Australia, and had also had a branch oilice in London, the business of which was managed by local directors. North, J ., on the 8th of June, 1886, made awinding-up order in the common form, declining to limit the operation of the ordcr to the English creditors and English assets. But he expressed an opinion that the court would have ample power to prevent any injustice being done by the order, and that the winding up in this country ought to be only auxiliary to a winding up which was proceeding in Australia, though the proceedings there were commenced after the En lish etition was presented. An oilicial liquidator was afterwards a poiited hy North, J . On the llth of August the chief clerk directedp that advertisements should be issued for creditors to come in and rove their debts, this direction not being limited to English creditors. it was urged in support of the application that the direction given by the chief clerk was inconsistent with the view which North, J., had expressed as to the mode in which the windinggup order should_be worked out, and that therefore that order ought to expressly limited to English creditors and English assets. Ti-is Gouiir (BOWEN and Far, L.JJ.) refused the application, on the ground that the applicant had failed to shew that any injustice would result to him, or to those whom he represented, by his not being able aim: from the original order, or to explain satisfactorily his d_elay iu _m g the application. If the chief clerk had given any directions which were inconsistent with the view expressed by North, J ., the proper course was to apply to hlI.11.—COUNS3L, Cookaon, Q,.O., and Stock ,Com»-H-miy. Q.C., an E. Burton Buckley ; Garey. Souciroiis, Edwin Andrnv ; Hancock, Sharp, Q Halos.
(Nora:-It should be observed that, in Ra Diamond Fuel 6'0. (13 Oh. D. 404?)» like Court of Appeal (James, Baggallay, and Thesiger, L.JJ.) overruled a similar objection to an appeal presented by a company fromawinding-up order after the appointment of an oficial liquidator, but said that it should be understood for the future that, whenever an order absolute f°1' Wmdmg up a company had been made and that d
y or costs. This case was not cimd on the present occasion.]— Re THE LONDON CELLULOID CO.—C. A., No. 2, 27th October
s of calls should rovide for the rent during’ the riod for which igeniiggiver had liossessiod) of the premises. If the quiddzir had been in possession as such the application would have been right, but he retained the possession in the character of receiver. He, or those for whom he was acting in that capacity, ought to have paid the rent for the time during which the landlord was kept out of possession. It was true that the com
any, as mortgagors, had an ultimate right to the mortgaged property, gut that did not make the receiver's possession of the premises the possession of the company. The persons primd facia benefited by the l'BC6lV8l"8 possession were the moi-tgagees for whom he was acting. The appeal must be dismissed, but without prejudice to any application by the laiidlord to be paid the rent out of the roceeds of the sale of the chattels. Bowen, L.J., concurred. Fur, L.§., said that the application was, i_n substance, that the mortgagors should pay the rent of land of which their mortgagees had retained possession in order to realize their security. It would be as reasonable that the company should pay the rent of any room which the receiver had hired for the purpose of selling the chattels. —Coi"ss2i., J. Charter ; Bramwell Dar-is. Souciroas, W. Start ; Linda.
This was an application by a shareholder named Hale for the removal of his name from the register of shareholders, and, the company being in liquidation, the liquidator opposed such application. Mr. Ha.e alleged two distinct misrepresentations, and the court held that, as to zne misrepresentation, his application was made too late, and the liquidator contended that Mr. Hale was, therefore, precluded from raising any case upon the second misrepresentation (Whit¢b0usc's case, 15 W. R. 892, 3 Eq. 790). Ciii-rrir, J ., said that the general rule of law was that a contract of this kind was avoidable at the option of the person misled, provided he came promptly to the court. Otherwise his casc failed, as the court considered him to have adopted the contract. As regarded the first misrepresentation, there was no doubt that the applicant had delayed too long in coming to the court, for, although the misrepresentation was discovered by Mr. Hale in the month of August, he did not make his application to the court until the following February. But the matter did not end there. Mr. Hale relied on a second misrepresentation in the prospectus. Regarding that second misrepresentation, there was neither any allegation of de ay on Mr. Hale's part, nor any allegation that the second misrepresentation was connected with the first one. Then counsel for the liquidator argued that, because Mr. Hale had failed in the first misrepresentation on the ground of delay, he was, therefore, precluded from raising a case on the second misrepresentation. Whiteh0u.~c's case had been cited, but his lordship declined to assent to the interpretation which counsel had put upon it. It had been cited to prove t at the waiver of one point by a shareholder was ii waiver of all; but, in his lordship’s view, the waiver in Whitvhr»zm’i case was held only to extend to all points of discrepancy between the prospectus and the memorandum and articles of association. Accordingly, Mr. Hale was not precluded from raising a case upon the second misrepresentation, and was, consequently, entitled to have his name remove from the !'6glBi2el‘.—COl‘NSBL, Romer, Q.C. and .lIai'd(aw'
The question in this case was to the remuneration to be allowed to an ofllcial liquidator. The "Regulation" adopted by the Master of the Rolls and the Vice-Chancellors and sanctioned and approved by the herd Chancellor in _1868 (vide 3 Ch., p. 6-1; Palmer's Winding-up I‘0l'!llB, p._ 76), provides that, in fixing the amount of the liquidator's 1‘°1?[1\1!1el'Btl0l1- “the judge will, subject as hereinafter mentioned, be guided by the following sca1e”(i'ntu- aha) :—“Whei1 the assets shall amount to £a,000 and not to £10,000,” “ per day of eight hours£l " ; and “when the assets shall amount to £50,000 and not to £100,000, per day of eight hours £8!’ In the present case the property and assets of the company had been taken over by a new com
pany in consideration of the new company undertaking (1) to Eur; to the silimholders of the old company, on their applying for it, a s are
, _cre i with 15s. paid up, for each fully paid-up £1 share held by them in the old company; (2) to pay the debts of the old company and the expenses of winding it up. Under this agreement the new com
number of shares in the old company having been between 90,000 and 100,000. It was admitted that, at the date of the agreement—viz., December, 1885, the shares of the old company were worth ls. 6d. each, and that, at the date of allotment by the new company, the value was 16s. The debts of the old company and the exfienses of the winding up amounted to between £6,000 and £7,000. The 'quidator contended that the payments by the new company of these debts and expenses and the allotment of the 85,000 shares was equivalent to the payment by the new company of a sum exceeding £70,000 as the price for which the property of the old company was sold; and hc claimed to be entitled to have his remuneration fixed as for assets between £50,000 and £100,000, at the rate of £8 a day. The new company contended that the shares allotted by them should not be taken into account, the agreement having been really a scheme for the resuscitation of the company, entitling the shareholders to retain their shares subject to a further liability for 5s. per share, such of the shareholders as did not choose to take shares in the new company losing all interest inthe assets of the old company; and that the liqui'dator’s remuneration should be fixed as for assets tween £5,000 and £10,000, at the rate of £4 a Chitty, J., decided in favour of the liquidator's contention. Tiia ouar or APPEAL (Corrox, Bowen, and Far, L.-IJ.) affirmed the decision. Oorron, L.J., said that the regulation as to the mode of remunarating official liquidators was not a general order, nor was it binding on the judges by Act of Parliament or otherwise, but it was to be taken as a uide to the judges in the exercise of their discretion. The notes to tiie regulation stated that, in special circumstances, the judge might alter the scale, showing that the regulation was only to serve as a general rule for the guidance of judges in fixing the scale upon which a liquidator’s remuneration should be calculated. Generally, therefore, it would be wrong to depart from the regulation. What was the meaning of the words, “Where the assets divisible among the unsecured creditors shall amount to”? Clearly they did not mean where the assets divided amounted to such and such a sum; they meant assets not mortgaged and free to be paid to unsecured creditors or shareholders. The present case did not come strictly under the regulation, because the assets had not been realized in the ordinary way, but by analogy the amount secured by the agreement between the old and new companies for the old company and for those shareholders who were willing to take advantage of the option, would come within it. The shares allotted ought not to be disregarded. Chitty, J., had decided rightly that, in assessing the liqnidator’s remuneration, there must be taken into account, not what was paid to the llquidator for division, but what went to the shareholders who wished to take advantage of the offer made to all by the new company. Bowrx and Fair, L.JJ., concurred.—Oocsssi., Ilw. Q.C., and G/-owmor Woods ; lllannaglitm, Q.C., and H. Jlurlon Buckley. SOLICITORS, S/nil, Sun, Q Giuenip; H. Mantizyic.
This was an application by the defendants that the plaintiff company might be ordered to give further and better particulars in writing of certain improper, wrong, fraudulent, and false entries, and of misrep)iéesentation alleged by them in their statement of claim. In Septem r, 1883, the plaintiff company purchased from the defendants their busincss of engineers and ship repairers, and an agreement was then entered into between them by which it was agreed that the defendants should take the purchase~money partly in cash and partly in shares of the plaintiff company, and that the defendants, R. E. Paynter and J. Sim-imers, should be employed by the company as general manager and manager of the engineering department respectively for the space of two years, and the agreement contained a guarantee by the two defendants that the net profits of the company for the two years next following should amount to a sum sufllcient to pay a dividend of not less than £7 l0s. per ccnt., and that if they did not the defendants would make good the deficiency. The present action was brought by the plaintiff company for damages for fraud and misrepresentation. The plaintiff company, by its statement of claim, alleged that the defendants had systematically, from the time the company commenced business, caused false entries to be made in the books of the company. The defendants, after delivery of the statement of claim, applied for particulars of the alleged false entries, and an order was made requiring the plaintiff company to give such particulars. In compliance with this order the plaintiff com y delivered particulars consisting of a list of entries from the books, whidh were alleged by it to be fraudulent. The defendants now applied that the com any might be required to deliver further and better particulars. On begalf of the defendants it was contended that it was not sufllcient for the company to give a mere list of entries which they alleged to be false, but that the company Ollghttn go further and say in what respect they were false, and that the court had ample power to require this to be done by ord. 19, rr. 6, 7. l\A\', J., said that the allegation made by the company was that the defendants had designedly made false entries, which were either wholly fictitious or which were fictitious to some material extent. Particulars of these alleged false entries were given. On the part of the defendants it W8-s said that they ought to know in what respect these entries were alleged to be false. But the plea of the plaintiffs was that these entries were false, and unless they were able to prove that they were not merely wrong but false they would not succeed at the trial. The application must be dismissed, with costs.—Coi-xssi, Swm/"en Endg; R. Woorlfnll. 59'-1°"‘°R8,_ Htackm g- Jupp, for Williams Q Co., Newport, llionmoiith; WW s Wluta, for Jwrp/0 mm, Newport, Monmouth.
This was a motion by the tglaintifis that the defendant might be ordered to deposit in court such of e documents mentioned in the schedules to an aflidavit of documents which he had made, and had thereby admitted to be in his possession or power, as he had obtained from the executrix of the late solicitor of the plaintiffs‘ predecessors in title, and all others of the said documents which consisted of original documents relating to the title of the plaintiffs to certain estates mentioned iii the statement of claim in the action. The plaintiffs were in possession of the estates in question, to which the defendant claimed to be the rightful heir. The action was brought to restrain the defendant from trespassin on the estates, from interfering with the plaintiffs in the collection of tghe rents from the tenants, and from issuing or publishing circular letters containing false representations calculated to injure the title of the plaintiffs to the estates. The defendant had given notice tothe tenants of some of the estates to pay their rents to him, and had in other ways interfered with the collection of the rents by the plaintiffs. He had obtained from the executrix of‘ the former solicitor of some of the plaintiffs’ predecessors in title, by representing that he was the true owner of the estates, various documents of title to the estates which had been in that solicitor’s possession. There was also evidence that the defendant was a man in impecunious circumstances. The defendant had delivered a defence and counter-claim for the recovery and possession of the estate. Under these circumstances, the plaintiffs asked that, instead of the common order for production of documents, an order might be made as above stated for the deposit of documents in court. Noivi-ii, J ., said that, under the old practice of the Court of Chancery, the rule was that documents which were to be produced were always ordered to be deposited in court. This was found to be inconvenient, and the modern practice of ordering the documents to be produced at the oifics of the solicitor of the party who was to produce them was substituted. But his lordship thought that the old practice ought still to be followed in any case which called for it. He thought that in the present instance a primri facts case had been made for following the old practice, and he should order the defendant to deposit in court such of the original documents in his possession relating to the title of the plaintiffs as he could not shew that he did not obtain from the executrix of the deceased solicitor in the way alleged.
Another point arose in the case. Rule 27 (54) of order 65 provides that “it shall not be necessary to take an ofllce copy of an aflidavit of discovery of documents, and the co‘p,y delivered by the party filing it may be used as against such arty." hen the case was first opened the copy of the defendant's afliilsvlt of documents delivered by him to the plaintiff was not in court, but the plaintifis’ counsel were only furnished. with a copy of the delivered copy. Although the defendant's coimsel admitted that that copy was an accurate copy of the delivered copy, NORTH, J ., declined to roceed with the hearing of the motion until he was furnished with the delivered copy.-—Covxsiii., C2/o/mm, Q.C., and Ingpm ; Ericlimi. Soircirons. Arnold Q (Io. ; S. J. Wwtlbhuss Smith.
This was u summons by some of the defendants that the next friend of the plaintiff (who was an infant) might be ordered to give security for ts r that he mi ht be removed from the office of next friend. The
cos , o g - I grounds alleged for the application were that the next friend was an h h a erson of
entire stranger to the family of the infant, and t at e was p no means. The action was for the administration of an estate, and the writ alleged that breaches of trust had been committed by three of the defendants. The present application was made by those three defendants. The summons was issued in July, and early in August a statement of claim was delivered by the plaintiff. N 0li1'H, J ., refused the application. He said that the writ had given the applicants full notice of the case which was intended to be raised against them, and the statement of claim was delivered more than two months ago, and yet the applicants had _not l afid "t estin that the case which was to be raised agamst
This was an appeal from a decision of Field J ., in chambers ordering ' Th ti ii was brought to recover £75 for goods
a review of taxation. e ac 0 _ sold and delivered. The defendants pleaded that they were entitled to tract d that none of
return such of the goods as were not equal to con , an _
the goods were equa to contract. _ After the delivery of pleadings a com
promise was arrived at, by which it was agreed that the defendants should
return goods to the value of £29, and pay for the rest. Further proceed
ings having been taken in the action, and the execution of thecompromise dis ted an order was made directing that the question whether
1» - . . tlienfctionplliad, '0; had not, been compromised should be tried by 8 Judas
who should give judgment accordin to the terms of the compromise, or, if he found there had been none, siould treat the hearing as the trial of the action. Under this order the case came before Cavc, J ., who found that the action had been compromised on the terms above stated, and gave judgment for the plaintiffs for £27, with_costs. On taxation it was contended for the defendants that less than £:_>0 had been recovered, and that, consequently, the plaintiffs were only entitled to costs on the county court scale. The master adopted this view. held, J., on_appeal, held that the £29, the value of the goods returned, must be taken into account, and that the plaintiff had, therefore, recovered “ in the action ’ more than £50. Counsel for defendants now contended that the goods had not recovered in the action, the defendants, as to them, having succeeded in their defence, which was that the goods had only been delivered on approval, and that the property had not passed. ‘Tu: Counr (MA'rni-:_w and A. L. Siurii, JJ.) dismissed the appeal, bemg of opinion that in this case more than £50 had been recovered in the acti0n.—Gou.\‘ssi., Asquith; ]I. F. "’i/limn-s', Q.6'.—Tim2s.
Exaiirriox raoii Dis1'aizss—Gss FI‘l"l‘lrXG5—G.\8\\‘0BK8 Ci.Ai'ss.< Acr, 1847 (l0 Vic'i'., c. 15, s. 14).
The defendants, having levied a distress u n the premises of a tenant, seized and sold a gas cooking-stove which the tenant held on hire from the plaintiff company. The 14th section of the Gasworks Clauses Act, 1847, which empowers gas companies to let for hire “ any meter . . . and any fittings for the gas,” provides that “such meter and fittings shall not be subject to distress. In The Gas Light rind Co/cc Co. v. Hardy (30 Soiiciroiis’ JDUIKNAL, 655), it was held that a gas-stove for warming purposes was a “fitting for the gas" within the meaning of these words and the similar provisions of the subsequent statutes. It was now sought to exclude rom this decision the case of a stove for cooking, containing, besides the bumers and the chamber in which the gas was consumed, other chambers, together with grates, hot plates, and such arrangements, for the reception of cooking utensils. s'l‘El'l<lB.\', J ., said he thought the gas-stove clearly came within the judgment of the Court of Appeal. It was not necessary to put such a fine edge on language that it must apply to one thing and could not apply to another. The general use of the term “ gas-fitting " seemed plain enough. If he (the earned judge) had to define it, he should say it was an instrument used to receive or burn gas, and with such accessories as might be necessary in order to obtain the benefit of the combustion. If a distinction were to be drawn between the burners in this stove and the drawers and grates, so that the latter would be taken out and exempted from distress, it would certainly be a most inconvenient distinction. When, however, they came to a machine like a gas engine, it seemed to his lordship that they came to something which was much more than an instrument for receiving and burning gas. This iror. box, with its grates and drawers, was substantially one thing. and as it was used for the reception and combustion of gas, his lordship held it was within the section, and exempt from distress.—Couxsii1., Sir R. Webster, A.G., and Dam-lncerts ; Lumley Smith, Q.C., and Cecil Chapmrm—Ti'mes.
Os Monday last the members of the Royal Historical Society met at the
_ - s, s on ue velvet cushions, and are preserved in so ate glass cases. The first volume is s. folio of th h d ' E"
re_c un red and eig ty-two pages of vellum, fourteen and a-half _by nine and three-quarter inches, with five fly leaves at the beginning and four at the end. The writing is in double column, and of great beauty and legibility. Age, probably, has given the work 5 brown colour; many of the capital and smaller letters are shaded with red inlr; there are some sentences, entries, and words altogether in red, and some entries, both in black and red, have been deleted by a red-ink stroke being drawn through them. This volume contains the survey _of thirty-one conntias,_and_ is a transcript or analysis of the reports supphed by t e I\l!1%E5 Justiciaries _or Commissioners, who were sent mt_o every county_ an_d s ire to ascertam the condition of the Kingdom, with the help of ]I.l1'lBB summoned in each hundred, consisting of the she_riff_s, lords of manors, reeves or ov_erseers of hundreds, bailiffs, and the villeins of the vil1ages—in short, with the help of every grade of society, from the barons to the class immediately above the serfs Three of the leaves are smaller than the others, the reason being that they had been added to complete a portion of the record which could not be got into the space allotted to it. One leaf has a small portion cut ofl but it was so mutilated before the record was written; and a third lea! ié in the wrong place. The second volume is not in folio, but quarto 10.l by 6‘inches, and written, as it were, 1.-urrenle mlamn, and in single colufiiu 1; is far behind the first volume in clerical beauty and finish The three counties of Essex, Norfolk, and Suffolk, which it describes are not included among tho thirty-one counties in the folio volume ’ and the manuscript is believed to consist of the original reports of the Commissioners, and not of abridgments or compilations of their ‘reports like the folio. In neither volume will there be found any acccuntlof Northnmber land, Cumberland, Westmorland and Durh . Y l scripts were exhibited In the eirenin l am Lumen“! other man“.
Domesday or the Domesday period. The earliest of all the documents exhibited dated back to about the year 1000, was a statement of the number of hides of land in the different divisions of England south of the Humber. It is written on a single page of vellum. A Cotton liISS., known as the “ Inquisitio Cantabrigiensis,“ is a copy of _tho original survey of Cambridgeshire as returned by the _]urors to King “I liam. Iii the evening the society met _in Lincoln's-i_nn Hall, where two papers were read on Domesday subgects by Mr. btuart A. Moore and Mr. J . Horace Round.
THE BILLS OF SALE ACT, I882.
I wow come to consider the question, “ What is an accordance with the statutory form f " This is a question of extreme uncertainty and diificulty. I propose to go through the form, discussing its various parts in connection with the decided cases, passmg over_the question as to truly stating the consideration. I do not think there is any real diflicnlty in statiniet e consideration truly, as required by_ the Act. It would, perhaps, thought that no difilculty could arise as to the grantees, but in Jfalrilla v. Stringer (32 W. R. 890), a bill of sale several grantees to secure amounts due to them severally was held void, as not being in accordance with the statutory form, on the ground that the mnrta .mnplm'tas required by that form was destroyed. Bowen, L.J., says, “ A substantial part of the form is that the property must be assigned to the person who finds the moncy, and that to such person repayment is to be made of the money borrowed, and therefore I do not think that a bill of sale is within the Act if the money is lent by one person and made repayableto another person, or if the property is assigned by it to one person and repayment is to be to another, or if the assignment oi the property is to one person to secure repayment to another.” In fact, the Judgment of Bowen, L.J ., goes to the full extent of saying that a bill of sale to several persons not joint creditors is invalid.
Next we come to the plarcels. Here we have to note section 4 of the Act. which requires a sc edule of the goods to be annexed or written on the bill of sale, and provides that, except as against the grsntor, the bill of sale shall be void n reespect of chattels not specifically described in the schedule. Now this sch ule must be not a general schedule or general description, but a “ specific inventory which would put down the number of articles, but not all in one item. There must be a specific inventory of each class of goods, though not of each article in detail " (per Brett, liI.R., in Robrrls v. Roberts, 32 \V. R. 605), in which case a bill of sale was held void as to goods described in the schedule as “ household furniture and effects, implements of husbandry.” The deed need not state where the goods are (E: Wm Hill, L. R. 17 Q. B. D. 74).
Next, by section 4, a bill of sale is void (except as against the grantor) in respect of any chattels specifically described in the schedule, of which the grantor is not the true owner at the time of the execution of the bill of sale. There have not been, so far as I am aware, any cases on the construction of this section ; clearly it prevents the use of the old commonform parcels “ and all other ggods, &c., which shall at any time during the continuance of this security brought into or upon the said premises, either iii addition to or in substitution for the goods, &c., hereby assigned." We shall see presently whether it is possible to make ii bill of sale cover goods substituted for the goods described in the schedule.
Next we come to the words “ by way of security for the payment of the sum of £3 and interest thereon at the rate of £ per cent. per annum ” [or whatever else may be the rate].
Now, on these words, combined with the covenant for t h‘ h
_ paymen w ic immediately follows them, we have a considerable number of decisions. The covenant for a t ' “ ' ' ‘
_ _ p ymen is to pay the principal sum aforesaid, together with interest then due, by equa payments of £ on the
day of " [or whatever else may be the stipulated times or time of payment].
Whatever else must be the rats ” has been held to mean that in any event the interest must berateable. So in the leading case of I)svi.~ v. _1iurton (3% W. R. 423), a bill of sale to secure £300, and £180 as capitalized interest, being at the rate of £60 per cent. per annum," by instalments, yras held void because, m the event of the breach of any of the covenants,
all moneys secured by the bill of sale were immediately to become due, so that in that event the rate ofuuterest would be enormously more than “KW P" cefm It "59; in 180$, Impossible to say from the instrument what the rate of interest might be (see also Er park I’mrre, 32 W. B. 1&7). In Tharp v. Cwgveen (33 W. R: 844), £5 was charged for interest, and the rats was not stated. _The bill of sale was neld good by the Divisional Court; but this was disapproved by the Court of Appeal in Myers v. Elliott (34 \\ . R. 3-$9), where £15 was charged for “ interest and bonus," and the rate was not stated. The bill of sale was held void on the same ground as in Dam v. .BlH’t(r7I—'.IZ:' that the rate of interest was not stated._ interest could not be distinguished from bonus. So in Goldstrom v. Talh-mum (34_W. R._ 45_9), where the bill of sale was held void because, on the construction of it, it was not clear whether the interest (£60 per cent.) was Pflfiblfl by equal instalments with the principal, or by diminishing Pllymelltfl 011 theprincipal for the time being owing. In this bill of sale there was a provision that, if instalments were in arrear, interest should be paid on them; and‘ the bill was held void on this ground also. In fafizg 1: (:r4m\Xfit§i;-, 7?), intirest was made payable at “ the with the form. P , i was eld that this was in accordance