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£ s. d. trustee under the provisions of sections 159, 160, and 161, the fees For the official receiver acting as interim receiver of the
payable shall be :property of a debtor under section 10 in addition to
(1.) For realizations by him, the same scale as in realizations under the per-centage chargeable on realizations, on every
Table B.; order
3 0 0 And, in addition, where the order is in force for å
(2.) For distribution:
On amounts not exceeding £1,000 Two per cent longer period than fourteen days, for every seven
One days, after the first fourteen, and for every
The official receiver shall also be allowed all proper out of pocket fraction of seven days
0 0 For each notice by an official receiver to a creditor of a first
expenses. Where he executes any conveyance or transacts any legal or
other business at the instance of third parties, the parties interested or any other meeting, or sitting of the court For each notice by an official receiver to a creditor of an
shall be required to pay for his time occupied and for that of his adjourned meeting or an adjourned sitting of the
clerks according to such scale as the Board of Trade may from time
to time prescribe, and to pay all legal or other necessary expenses court
0 6 For the official receiver supervising a special manager or the carry
incurred by him.
TABLE E. ing on of a debtor's business a fee according to the following scale :
For every order of administration under section 122, two shillings If the gross assets are estimated by the official receiver
in the pound on the total amount of the debts scheduled from time to not to exceed £500
£1 per week. time, excluding any fraction of a pound in such total. If to exceed £500 but not to exceed £5,000
We, the undersigned Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's If to exceed £5,000 but not to exceed £10,000
Treasury, do hereby sanction the foregoing scales of fees and perIf to exceed £10,000 but not to exceed £20,000
centages, and do direct that the fees to be taken by stamps shall be If to exceed £20,000
those mentioned in Table A., and that the fees mentioned in Tables
£ s. d. B., C., D., and E. shall be taken in money, except that such of the Room for meeting or adjourned meeting of creditors
fees and allowances referred to in Table D, as have hitherto been summoned by official receiver, for each creditor to
taken by stamps shall continue to be taken by stamps : the stamps to whom notice bas been given of such meeting, but not
be used shall be Bankruptcy fee stamps, with the exception of the exceeding in summary administrations £2 for each
penny stamp on every special proxy or voting paper which may be meeting; and in non-summary administrations not
a Postage and Inland Revenue Stamp. exceeding £5 for each meeting
0 1 0 And we further direct that wherever practicable the stamp shall be Travelling, keeping possession, and other reasonable
affixed or the money paid in respect of every fee mentioned in expenses of official receiver, the amount disbursed
Tables A., B., C., and D., before the proceding is had in respect of For official stationery, printing, books, forms, and post
which the fee is payable, and that the charge to be made by the ages, each estate:
London Gazette for the insertion of each notice authorized by the For every ten creditors or fraction of twenty
0 10 0 Act or Rules shall be five shillings. For every cen applications to debtors to an estate,
(Signed) SIDNEY HERBERT, or fraction of ten 0 2 0
W. H. WALROND. On every payment under section 162 of money out of the bank
Dated the 25th day of October, 1886. ruptcy estates account threepence on each pound or fraction of a pound to be charged as follows:
Where the money consists of unclaimed dividends, on each dividend paid out;
ORDER AS TO STAMPS. Where the money consists of undistributed funds or balances, on Order as to the fees and per-centages which are required to be taken the amount paid out.
for bankruptcy proceedings in the High Court of Justice and
Court of Appeal by means of stamps, amending the previous TABLE C.
order on the same subject, published in the supplement to the
£ $. d. London Gazette. High bailiff for attending sittings of the court, under each
Whereas by section three of the Public Offices Fees Act, 1879, it is receiving order, in summary cases, per case High bailiff for attending court in non-summary cases, per
provided that the Treasury may from time to time make, and when
made, revoke, alter, and add to, regulations for all or any of the case
6 Serving every bankruptcy notice, bankruptcy petition, or
o following purposes respecting fees in any public office-tħat is to subpoena or receiving or other order (not serviceable
say, by post) within two miles, including affidavit of
(1.) Regulating the manner in which the fees taken in money are
to be taken, accounted for, and paid over. If serviceable by post
(2.) Determining the use of impressed or adhesive stamps, and the Executing every warrant of seizure, or search warrant, or
mode of cancellation of adhesive stamps. warrant of apprehension, or order of commitment
(3.) Regulating the use of stamps and prescribing the application within two miles of court
thereof to documents from time to time in use, and requiring
0 10 Keeping possession under a warrant, for each day the man
documents to be used for the purpose of such stamps. is actually in possession; including affidavit of
Provided that so far as they relate to the office of any court of law, possession being actually kept
they shall be made with the consent of the Lord Chancellor.
0 4 6 (not less than 38. 6d. of the above sum is to be paid
Now we, the undersigned, being two of the lords of her Majesty's to the man in possession, and his receipt pro
Treasury, do, with the concurrence of the Lord Chancellor, hereby duced.)
give notice and order and direct:High bailiff's or (in the London district) officer's man,
That from and after the 25th day of October, 1886, in lieu of any travelling to place of possession, or to execute a
regulations on the subject heretofore in force, the stamps used for warrant of or order of commitment, or to serve a
denoting the fees and per-centages described in the schedule hereto summons or subpoena, or for any other purpose
subjoined shall, so far as they are payable in regard to proceedings in specially directed by the court, per mile
the High Court of Justice and Court of Appeal, be of the character
0 His time, per day, where distance exceeds 10 miles
and be applied and otherwise dealt with as prescribed by such His expenses, per day
6 schedule. And we do further enjoin that this order shall be binding
6 If high bailiff of a county court or bankruptcy officer of
on all courts, offices, and persons whom such regulations may in Supreme Court directed by the court personally to
any way affect. travel, per mile
The adhesive stamps herein referred to shall be of the description His time, per day
overprinted with the word “Bankruptcy,” except where otherwise His expenses, per day
provided. They shall be cancelled by the various court or other 0 10
o officials by perforation, or in such manner as the Commissioners of TABLE D.
Inland Revenue may from time to time direct. The impressed stamps The fees and allowances payable on proceedings had after the 24th for the purpose.
also shall be of such character as the said Commissioners may adopt day of October, 1886, in respect of any matter which was pending in The official forms with impressed or adhesive stamps (as the case any court having jurisdiction in bankruptcy on the thirty-first day may be) required in respect of any proceedings herein referred to may of December, 1883, shall be the same as if those proceedings had been be obtained at the Inland Revenue Offices, Royal Courts of Justice. taken before such last-mentioned day, and shall be applied to the Persons may, however, in addition, have their own forms stamped at same purposes : Prorided that where the official receiver acts as that office or at the corresponding office at Somerset House.
The Schedule above referred to.
CASES OF THE WEEK.
HUGHES v. LITTLE-0.A. No. 1, 25th and 26th October.
BILL OF SALE-STATEMENT OF CONSIDERATION-FORM IN SCHEDULE-BILL
AMENDMENT Act, 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 43), s. 9-NOTICE OF APPEAL-
R. S. C., 1883, LVIII., 3 of inability to pay his debts Every bankruptcy notice Notice Impressed
This was an interpleader issue to try the right to certain goods seized in Every bankruptcy petition Petition Impressed
execution by the defendant and claimed by the plaintiff under a bill of Every bond with sureties Bond. Impressed.
sale. The bill of sale stated that, “ in consideration of the grantee having, Every affidavit (or report) Affidavit Impressed or
at the request of the grantor, become guarantee, and having signed a filed other than proof of
promissory note for the payment of a sum of £45 obtained by the grantor debts.
from W. J. Boyes, of which £32, or thereabouts, is now owing, and also Every subpoena or summons Subpona or Impressed.
of the grantee having, at the like request of the grantor, paid under section 27. summons.
sums amounting to £40, the grantor assigned to the grantee the chattels For taking an affidavit or an Affidavit Impressed or
by way of security for the payment of the £40, and any moneys the affirmation, or attestation
grantee might be called upon to pay in respect of the guarantee, and interest upon honour in lieu of an
thereon at the rate of £5 per cent. per annum, and the grantor agreed to affidavit or a declaration,
pay to the grantee the principal sum, with the interest then due, by except for proof of debts;
monthly payments of £2 on the first of every month. The execution and in addition thereto for
creditor contended that the bill of sale was void (1) on the ground that each exhibit therein re
the consideration was not sufficiently set forth within section 8 of the ferred to.
Bills of Sale Act, 1878; and (2) on the ground that it was not in accordEvery proof of debt above Proof. Impressed or
ance with the form within section 9 of the Bills of Sale Act (1878) Amend£2.
ment Act, 1882. The Queen's Bench Division (Manisty and Mathew, Every petition under section Petition or Impressed.
JJ.), affirming the judgment of the county court judge in favour of the 125 of the Act and every order.
plaintiff, held the bill of sale valid, but gave leave to appeal (34_W. R. order of administration
703). This judgment was delivered on the 2nd of June. The deunder section 125 (4).
fendant, the execution creditor, gave notice of appeal on the 15th of June Every special proxy or voting Proxy or vot- Impressed or A Postage or In- ought to have been a four days' notice, and so was invalid and out of
A preliminary objection was taken that the notice paper.
stamp may be
time. The Court (LORD ESHER, M.R., LINDLEY and LOPES, L.JJ.) overused.
ruled the objection, and held that the decision of the Divisional Court Every receiving order under Order. Impressed.
was a “final order" within ord. 58, r. 3, and that the fourteen day notice section 103 of the Act.
of appeal was good. On the merits, The Court said that the objection Every application for an Application. Impressed,
that the consideration was not properly set forth because the words order of discharge.
"of which £32, or thereabouts, is now owing ” could not be sustained. And for each creditor to Ap. cation. Adhesive ex.
The consideration was the grantee become guarantee, and there was be notified.
nothing untrue in the statement. As to the objection that the bill of sale number ex.
was void as not being in accordance with the form, the bill of sale came ceeds 20.
within the express terms of section 9, as it was given to secure the payment Every application to the Application. Impressed.
of money by the grantor to the grantee, which the grantee would become Court under sections 18
liable to pay for and at the request of the grantor. The bill of sale, thereand 23 to approve a
fore, came within section 9, and as the time of payment was not stated, and scheme.
so was uncertain, and the sum to be paid also uncertain and contingent, Every application to the Application. Impressed.
the bill of sale was not in the prescribed form, and so was void. No Court under sections 18
doubt it was impossible to bring this transaction within the form, but and 23 to approve a com
that was no reason for declining to apply the plain provisions of section position.
9. The judgment must be reversed, and entered for the execution credEvery application for search Search Impressed
itor, the defendant.--COUNSEL, Sills ; Clay. SOLICITORS, Dodd, Longstaffe, other than by petitioner,
Son, & Fenwick, for C. Heywood & Son, Manchester; Grundy, Izod, f trustee, bankrupt, or officer
Grundy, for Toy & Broadbent, Ashton-under-Lyne. of the Court. Every application to the Application. Impressed.
BLAIBERG v. BECKETT-C.A., No. 1, 27th October. Court except by the official
BILL OF SALE-STIPULATION FOR THE MAINTENANCE OR DEFEASANCE OF THE receiver.
SECURITY–MEANING OF-BILLS OF SALE ACT (1878) AMENDMENT Act,
1882 (45 & 46 VicT. C. 43), s. 9—FORM IN SCHEDULE.
This case raised the question as to the meaning of the words in the
form in the schedule to the Bills of Sale Act, 1882, “terms for the
maintenance or defeasance of the security.” The bill of sale, after giving adhesive.
the grantee power to seize and sell (inter alia) on default in payment by charges, or disbursements.
the grantor or on breach of any covenant therein contained and necessary
for maintaining the security, provided that “upon any such sale the (Signed) SIDNEY HERBERT,
purchaser should not be bound to see or inquire whether any such default W. H. WALROND,
had been made as aforesaid." The defendant, the execution creditor, Two of the Lords of Her
contended that this clause was not authorized by the form, and so the bill
of sale was void under section 9 of the Bills of Sale Act, 1882. The
Majesty's Treasury. Dated the 25th day of October, 1886.
plaintiff, the bill of sale holder, contended that this was a clause for the
s maintenance of the security," as it helped the grantee to obtain his
money and facilitated the sale ; or, at any rate, it was for its “defeas.
as it promoted the accomplishment of the object of the security,
the defendant, holding the bill of sale to be void on the authority of In a case of Young v. Holloway, before Mr. Justice Butt, on Tuesday, Blaiberg v. Parsons (17* Q. B. D. 336). On appeal this judgment was Mr. Middleton, on the part of the plaintiff, stated that it would not be affirmed. " LORD Esher, M.R., said that a stipulation with regard to a necessary to ask his lordship to make an order on the solicitors who pre- sale, when the power to sell had arisen, could not be one for the defeaspared the will to attend and be examined concerning their knowledge of ance of the security. It was a stipulation in full accomplishment of the the testamentary documents and papers of the deceased, as, since motion security. The late Master of the Rolls in Ex parte Popplewell (31 W. R. am afidavit from which it appeared that they have handed over the testa- operation of a deed, but was contained in some other deed or document ; mentary papers in question in their possession to another solicitor who was it contained in the same deed it was called a condition. If, therefore, the acting for one of the defendants, and that these documents had been filed. Clause, instead of defeating, fulfilled the operation of the deed, it could matt plaintiff had, however, been put to considerable expense in the not be a "defeasance" or a condition in the nature of a defeasance. The therefore asked for costs against the solicitors for having refused to pro defeasance—that was, something which defeated the operation of the deed,
om allege the solicitors handed over the papers in question? Mir. Middle of the security in favour of the grantee. Then as to the word “ maintenpaper. After some discussion Mr. Jastice Butt declined to condemn the of the security. But this stipulation only came into effect after the sale solicitors in costs as desired. He would make no order as to costs,
of the security when no further security was wanted. It could not, there.
fore, be said to be for the maintenance of the security. Accordingly it did by means of calls) should provide for the rent during the period for which not come within the scope of the provisions allowed to be added to the the receiver had possession of the premises. If the liquidator had been in bill of sale by the form. Further, it was not a mere harmless clause, but possession as such the application would have been right, but he retained it gave the bill of sale a legal effect different from that which would the possession in the character of receiver. He, or those for whom he was result from the form in the schedule. A purchaser who knew that he acting in that capacity, ought to have paid the rent for the time during was buying from a bill of sale holder would ordinarily, if he bought which the landlord was kept out of possession. It was true that the com without seeing that default had been made, take the risk, as a remedy pany, as mortgagors, had an ultimate right to the mortgaged property, would lie in equity against him at the suit of the grantor to recover the but that did not make the receiver's possession of the premises the posses. goods if no default had been made. But here the clause took away any sion of the company. The persons primâ facie benefited by the receiver's such remedy, and left the grantor to sue the grantee on his personal possessiun were the mortgagees for whom he was acting. The appeal covenant to sell only on default. The case, therefore, came within must be dismissed, but without prejudice to any application by the landEx parte Stanford (34 W. R. 507, 17 Q. B. D. 259), and the bill of sale was lord to be paid the rent out of the proceeds of the sale of the chattels. void. LINDLEY and Lopes, L.JJ., concurred.--Counsel, H. Reed ; Crump, BOWEN, L.J., concurred. Fry, L.J., said that the application was, in Q.C., and Harper. SOLICITORS, R. F. Hill & Co., N. White.
substance, that the mortgagors should pay the rent of land of which their
mortgagees had retained possession in order to realize their security. It Re COMMERCIAL BANK OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA-O. A., No. 2, would be as reasonable that the company should pay the rent of any 25th October.
room which the receiver had hired for the purpose of selling the chattels. COMPANY-WINDING-UP ORDER-Right OF APPEAL.
--COUNSEL, J. Chester ; Bramwell Davis. SOLICITORS, W. Sturt; Lindo. A question arose in this case as to the right of a company to appeal
Re KESWICK OLD BREWERY CO. (LIM.)-Chitty, J., 25th from a winding-up order. The application was made in the name of the
October. company for leave to appeal (notwithstanding the expiration of the proper time) from an order for the compulsory winding up of the company made COMPANY-WINDING-Up Petition-Gen. ORD., NOVEMBER, 1862, R. 3– by North, J., on the 8th of June. An order appointing an official liqui No REGISTERED OFFICE OR PLACE OF BUSINESS SERVICE OF PETITION dator had been since made. On behalf of the official liquidator the pre
-DIRECTIONS OF THE COURT. liminary objection was taken that, the company being no longer in exist
A petition was presented to wind up the Keswick Old Brewery Co. by ence, and the official liquidator being the only person who was entitled to two creditors and two shareholders of the company. The company had use its name, the company had no locus standi to appeal from the order. neither a registered office nor a place of business: an application was It was also urged that there would be no one responsible for costs. The consequently made to the court by the petitioners for directions how to Court (BOWEN and Fry, L.JJ.) thought the objection a valid one, but serve the petition. There were only eight shareholders of the company. suggested that the application might be made in the name of a contribu, Chitto, J., directed the petition to be served on the secretary and two tory. It was then arranged that the notice of motion should be amended principal shareholders, and letters to be sent to the other shareholders by substituting the name of a shareholder who had been a director as the
(not being petitioners) informing them of the petition.— COUNSEL, Ashton applicant, and the application was then heard on its merits. The company | Cross. Solicitors, Speechly, Mumford, & Landon. was incorporated in South Australia by a statute of the colony, and was not registered in England. It had carried on business in Australia, and had Re LONDON AND PROVINCIAL ELECTRIC LIGHTING AND also had a branch office in London, the business of which was managed by POWER CO. (LIM.); HALE'S CASE-Chitty, J., 26th October. local directors. North, J., on the 8th of June, 1886, made a winding-up order in the common form, declining to limit the operation of the order to the COMPANY-FRAUDULENT PROSPECTUS-SHARE REGISTER-CONTRIBUTORY
DELAY-WAIVER-DISTINCT MISREPRESENTATIONS. English creditors and English assets. But he expressed an opinion that the court would have ample power to prevent any injustice being done This was an application by a shareholder named Hale for the removal by the order, and that the winding up in this country ought to be only of his name from the register of shareholders, and, the company being in auxiliary to a winding up which was proceeding in Australia, though liquidation, the liquidator opposed such application. Mr. Hale alleged the proceedings there were commenced after the English petition was two distinct misrepresentations, and the court held that, as to (ne mispresented. An official liquidator was afterwards appointed by North, J. representation, his application was made too late, and the liquidator conOn the 11th of August the chief clerk directed that advertisements tended that Mr. Hale was, therefore, precluded from raising any case upon should be issued for creditors to come in and prove their debts, this the second misrepresentation (Whitehouse's case, 15 W. R. 892, 3 Eq. 790). direction not being limited to English creditors. It was urged in support CHITTY, J., said that the general rule of law was that a contract of this of the application that the direction given by the chief clerk was incon kind was avoidable at the option of the person misled, provided he came sistent with the view which North, J., had expressed as to the mode in promptly to the court. Otherwise his case failed, as the court considered which the winding-up order should be worked out, and that therefore that him to have adopted the contract. As regarded the first misrepresentaorder ought to be expressly limited to English creditors and English tion, there was no doubt that the applicant had delayed too long in coming assets. The Court (Bowen and Fry, L.JJ.) refused the application, to the court, for, although the misrepresentation was discovered by Mr. on the ground that the applicant had failed to shew that any injustice Hale in the month of August, he did not make his application to the would result to him, or to those whom he represented, by his not being court until the following February. But the matter did not end there. able to appeal from the original order, or to explain satisfactorily his Mr. Hale relied on a second misrepresentation in the prospectus. Regard. delay in making the application. If the chief clerk had given any direc- ing that second misrepresentation, there was neither any allegation of tions which were inconsistent with the view expressed by North, J., the delay on Mr. Hale's part, nor any allegation that the second misrepresenproper course was to apply to him.-COUNSEL, Cookson, Q.O., and Stock ; tation was connected with the first one. Then counsel for the liquidator Cozens-Hardy, Q.C., and H. Burton Buckley ; Gatey. SOLICITORS, Edwin argued that, because Mr. Hale had failed in the first misrepresentation on Andrew ; Hancock, Sharp, f. Hales.
the ground of delay, he was, therefore, precluded from raising a case on [NOTE:-It should be observed that, in Re Diamond Fuel Co. (13 Ch. D. the second misrepresentation. Whitehouse's case had been cited, but his 400), the Court of Appeal (James, Baggallay, and Thesiger, L.JJ.) overruled lordship declined to assent to the interpretation which counsel had put a similar objection to an appeal presented by a company from a winding-up upon it. It had been cited to prove that the waiver of one point by a order after the appointment of an official liquidator, but said that it shareholder was a waiver of all; but, in his lordship's view, the waiver in should be understood for the future that, whenever an order absolute Whitehouse's case was held only to extend to all points of discrepancy for winding up a company had been made, and that order was between the prospectus and the memorandum and articles of association. appealed from by the company itself, without anyone else being made Accordingly, Mr. Hale was not precluded from raising a case upon the responsible for costs, the court would be ready to entertain an application second misrepresentation, and was, consequently, entitled to have his for security for costs. This case was not cited on the present occasion.], name removed from the register.-Counsel, Romer, Q.C., and Maidlow; Re THE LONDON CELLULOID CO.-0. A., No. 2, 27th October.
Ince, Q.C., and Ribton. SOLICITORS, Ford Lloyd ; Edward Lee. COMPANY-WINDING UP-LANDLORD-OCCUPATION OF PREMISES AFTER
Re THE MYSORE REEFS GOLD MINING CO.-O. A. No. 2, 24th WINDING-UP ORDER— LEAVE TO PROVE FOR RENT-POSSESSION BY RE
October. CEIVER IN DEBENTURE-HOLDERS' ACTION.
COMPANY-WINDING UP-REMUNERATION OF OFFICIAL LIQUIDATORThis was a claim by the landlord of premises which had been occupied
REGULATION OF 1868. by a company which had been ordered to be wound up, to prove in the liquidation in respect of the rent of the premises since the winding-up official liquidator.
The question in this case was to the remuneration to be allowed to an
The “s order, on the ground that they had been occupied for the benefit of the
Regulation" adopted by the Master of the company; The person who had been appointed liquidator had also been
Rolls and the Vice-Chancellors and sanctioned and approved by the appointed receiver in an action brought by debenture-holders of the Forms, p. 76), provides that, in fixing the amount of the liquidator's
Lord Chancellor in 1868 (vide 3 Ch., p. 64; Palmer's Winding-up company to realize their security. An order had been made in the remuneration," the judge will, subject as hereinafter mentioned, be winding up giving the landlord leave to enter on the premises as against guided by the following scaie” (inter alia) :—“When the assets shall the liquidator. In the debenture-holders' action an order was made that the receiver should sell the chattels comprised in plaintiffs' security which
amount to £5,000 and not to £10,000,' 'per day of eight hours £4"; and
“when the assets shall amount to £50,000 and not to £100,000, were on the premises, and, by a subsequent order, leave was given to him per day of eight hours £8.”. to bring on to the premises, and sell there some other chattels in the
In the present case the property security which were in another place. When these orders were made
and assets of the company had been taken over by a new the landlord did not oppose them, nor did he ask that his rent might be
pany in consideration of the
new company undertaking (1) to provided for out of the proceeds of sale. Bacon, V.C., refused the applica- £1 share, credited with 158. paid up, for each fully paid-up £1 share held
issue to the shareholders of the old company, on their applying for it, & tion, and The Court of APPEAL (Cotton, Bowen, and Fry, L.JJ.) affirmed by them in the old company; (2) to pay the debts of the old company his decision. COTTON, L.J., said that the landlord was asking that the and the expenses of winding it up. Under this agreement the new com; company (that is, the shareholders, for the payment could only be made pany allotted 85,000 shares, credited with 15s. paid up on each, the total
number of shares in the old company having been between 90,000 and
LESLIE v. CAVE—North, J., 26th October. 100,000. It was admitted that, at the date of the agreement-viz., December, 1885, the shares of the old company were worth 1s. 6d. each,
DISCOVERY-PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS—— DEPOSIT IN COURT-AFFIDAVIT and that, at the date of allotment by the new company, the value was
OF DOCUMENTS_COPY DELIVERED-R. S. C., 1883, LXV., 27 (54). 168. The debts of the old company and the expenses of the winding up This was a motion by the plaintiffs that the defendant might be ordered amounted to between £6,000 and 67,000. The liquidator contended that to deposit in court such of the documents mentioned in the schedules to the payments by the new company of these debts and expenses and the an affidavit of documents which he had made, and had thereby admitted allotment of the 85,000 shares was equivalent to the payment to be in his possession or power, as he had obtained from the executrix of by the new company of
exceeding £70,000 as the the late solicitor of the plaintiffs' predecessors in title, and all others of price for which the property of the old company was
the said documents which consisted of original documents relating to the and he claimed to be entitled to have his remuneration fixed title of the plaintiffs to certain estates mentioned in the statement of as for assets between £50,000 and £100,000, at the rate of £8 a day. The claim in the action. The plaintiffs were in possession of the estates in new company contended that the shares allotted by them should not question, to which the defendant claimed to be the rightful heir. The be taken into account, the agreement having been really a scheme for the action was brought to restrain the defendant from trespassing on the resuscitation of the company, entitling the shareholders to retain their estates, from interfering with the plaintiffs in the collection of the rents shares subject to a further liability for 5s. per share, such of the share from the tenants, and from issuing or publishing circular letters conholders as did not choose to take shares in the new company losing all taining false representations calculated to injure the title of the plaintiffs interest in the assets of the old company, and that the liquidator's re to the estates. The defendant had given notice to the tenants of some muneration should be fixed as for assets between $5,000 and £10,000, at of the estates to pay their rents to him, and had in other ways interfered the rate of $4 a day. Chitty, J., decided in favour of the liquidator's with the collection of the rents by the plaintiffs. He had obtained from the contention. The COURT OF APPEAL (Cotton, Bowen, and Fry, L.JJ.) executrix of the former solicitor of some of the plaintiffs' predecessors affirmed the decision. COTTON, L.J., said that the regulation as to the in title, by representing that he was the true owner of the estates, various mode of remunerating official liquidators was not a general order, nor was documents of title to the estates which had been in that solicitor's posit binding on the juuges by Act of Parliament or otherwise, but it was to session. There was also evidence that the defendant was a man in im. be taken as a guide to the judges in the exercise of their discretion. pecunious circumstances. The defendant had delivered & defence The notes to the regulation stated that, in special circumstances, the and counter-claim for the recovery and possession of the estate. judge might alter the scale, shewing that the regulation was only to serve Under these circumstances, the plaintiffs asked that, instead of as a general rule for the guidance of judges in fixing the scale upon the common order for production of documents, an order might be made which a liquidator's remuneration should be calculated. Generally, as above stated for the deposit of documents in court. NORTH, J., said therefore, it would be wrong to depart from the regulation. What was that, under the old practice of the Court of Chancery, the rule was that the meaning of the words, “Where the assets divisible among the un documents which were to be produced were always ordered to be deposited Becured creditors shall amount to"? Clearly they did not mean where in court. This was found to be inconvenient, and the modern practice the assets divided amounted to such and such a sum; they meant assets of ordering the documents to be produced at the office of the solicitor of the not mortgaged and free to be paid to unsecured creditors or shareholders. party who was to produce them was substituted. But his lordship thought The present case did not come strictly under the regulation, because the
that the old practice ought still to be followed in any case which called assets had not been realized in the ordinary way, but by analogy the for it. He thought that in the present instance a prima facie case had amount secured by the agreement between the old and new companies for been made for following the old practice, and he should order the defendant the old company and for those shareholders who were willing to take to deposit in court such of the original documents in his possession advantage of the option, would come within it. The shares allotted relating to the title of the plaintiffs as he could not shew that he did not ought not to be disregarded. Chitty, J., had decided rightly that, in obtain from the executrix of the deceased solicitor in the way alleged. assessing the liquidator's remuneration, there must be taken into account, Another point arose in the case. Rule 27 (54) of order 65 provides that not what was paid to the liquidator for division, but what went to the “it shall not be necessary to take an office copy of an affidavit of disshareholders who wished to take advantage of the offer made to all by covery of documents, and the copy delivered by the party filing it may be the new company.
Bowen and Fry, L.JJ., concurred. --CounsEL, used as against such party.". When the case was first opened the copy Ince, Q.C., and Grosvenor Woods ; Maonaghten, Q.C., and H. Burton of the defendant's affidavit of documents delivered by him to the plaintiff Buckley. SOLICITORS, Snell, Son, f. Greenip; H. Montagu.
was not in court, but the plaintiffs' counsel were only furnished with a
copy of the delivered copy. Although the defendant's counsel admitted THE NEWPORT (MON.) SHIPWAY, &c., CO. (LIM.) v. PAYNTER that that copy was an accurate copy of the delivered copy, NORTH, J., -Kay, J., 28th October.
declined to proceed with the hearing of the motion until he was furnished PRACTICE-STATEMENT OF CLAIM-PARTICULARS OF FRAUD AND MISREPRE
with the delivered copy.-Counsel, Cookson, Q.C., and Ingpen ; Erichsen. SENTATION-R. S. C., 1883, XIX., 6, 7.
SOLICITORS, Arnold & Co.; S. J. Woodhouse Smith. This was an application by the defendants that the plaintiff company
JONES v. EVANS—North, J., 26th October. might be ordered to give further and better particulars in writing of PRACTICE-NexT FRIEND OF INFANT-SECURITY FOR Costs. certain improper, wrong, fraudulent, and false entries, and of misrepresentation alleged by them in their statement of claim. In September, the plaintiff (who was an infant) might be ordered to give security for
This was a summons by some of the defendants that the next friend of 1883, the plaintiff company purchased from the defendants their business
costs, or that he might be removed from the office of next friend. The of engineers and ship repairers, and an agreement was then entered into between them by which it was agreed that the defendants should take the grounds alleged for the application were that the next friend was an
entire stranger to the family of the infant, and that he was a person of purchase-money partly in cash and partly in shares of the plaintiff com
no means. The action was for tbe administration of an estate, and the pany, and that the defendants, R. E. Paynter and J. Summers, should be
writ alleged that breaches of trust had been committed by three of the employed by the company as general manager and manager of the engin defendants. The present application was made by those three defendants. eering department respectively for the space of two years, and the agree
The summons was issued in July, and early in August a statement of ment contained a guarantee by the two defendants that the net profits of
claim was delivered by the plaintiff. NORTH, J., refused the application. the company for the two years next following should amount to a sum sufficient to pay a dividend of not less than £7 10s. per cent., and that if
He said that the writ had given the applicants full notice of the case they did not the defendants would make good the deficiency. The present was delivered more than two months ago, and yet the applicants had not
which was intended to be raised against them, and the statement of claim action was brought by the plaintiff company for damages for fraud and
filed any affidavit suggesting that the case which was to be raised against misrepresentation. The plaintiff company, by its statement of claim, them was not well founded. They did not suggest that the action ought alleged that the defendants had systematically, from the time the com
to be stayed as not being for the interest of the infant plaintiff. There pany commenced business, caused false entries to be made in the books of the company. The defendants, after delivery of the statement of claim, next friend of an infant was not of itself sufficient ground for removing
was, primâ facie, good ground for the action. The impecuniosity of the applied for particulars of the alleged false entries, and an order was made requiring the plaintiff company to give such particulars. In compliance
him or requiring him to give security for costs, nor was the fact that he with this order the plaintiff company delivered particulars consisting of a
was a stranger to the family a sufficient ground for removing him when list of entries from the books, which were alleged by it to be fraudulent. Hardy, Q.C., and Ratcliffe ; Cookson, Q.C., and Daniel Jones. SOLICITORS,
the action was primâ facie for the benefit of the infant.-Counsel, CozensThe defendants now applied that the company might be required to John Nicholls & Co.; Jackson f Wright. deliver further and better particulars. On behalf of the defendants it was contended that it was
not sufficient for the company to give PHOSPHOR BRONZE CO. v. GOSPEL OAK, &c., WIRE CO. a mera list of entries which they alleged to be false, but that the company
Q. B. Div., 25th October. ought to go further and say in what respect they were false, and that the court bad ample power to require this to be done by ord. 19, rr. 6, 7.
RS. C., 1883, LXV., 12-Costs on COUNTY COURT SCALE-RECOVERING
“IN THE ACTION MORE THAN £50. KAY, J., said that the allegation made by the company was that the defendants had designedly made false entries, which were either wholly This was an appeal from a decision of Field, J., in chambers ordering fictitious or which were fictitious to some material extent. Particulars of & review of taxation. The action was brought to recover £75 for goods these alleged false entries were given. On the part of the defendants it sold and delivered. The defendants pleaded that they were entitled to was said that they ought to know in what respect these entries were return such of the goods as were not equal to contract, and that none of alleged to be false. But the plea of the plaintiffs was that these entries the goods were equal to contract. After the delivery of pleadings a com. were false, and unless they were able to prove that they were not merely promise was arrived at, by which it was agreed that the defendants should wrong but false they would not succeed at the trial. The application return goods to the value of £29, and pay for the rest. Further proceedmust be dismissed, with costs.- COUNSEL, Swinfen Eady; R. Woodfall. ings having been taken in the aclion, and the execution of the compromise SOLICITORS, Stocken & Jupp, for Williams's Co., Newport, Monmonth; being disputed, an order was made' directing that the question whether Gibbs & White, for Joseph Gibbs, Newport, Monmouth.
the action had, or had not, been compromised should be tried by a judge,
12 who should give judgment according to the terms of the compromise, or; Domesday or the Domesday period. The earliest of all the documents if he found there had been none, should treat the hearing as the trial of exhibited dated back to about the year 1000, and was a statement of the the action. Under this order the case came before Cavo, J., who found number of hides of land in the different divisions of England south of
A Cotton MSS., that the action had been compromised on the terms above stated, and the Humber. It is written on a single page of vellum. gave judgment for the plaintiffs for £27, with costs. On taxation it was known as the “Inquisitio Cantabrigiensis," is a copy of the original surcontended for the defendants that less than £50 had been recovered, and vey of Cambridgeshire as returned by the jurors to King William. In that, consequently, the plaintiffs were only entitled to costs on the county the evening the society met in Lincoln's-inn Hall, where two papers court scale. The master adopted this view. Field, J., on appeal, held were read on Domesday subjects by Mr. Stuart A. Moore and Mr. J. that the £29, the value of the goods returned, must be taken into account, Horace Round. and that the plaintiff had, therefore, recovered " in the action" more than £50. Counsel for defendants now contended that the goods had not been recovered in the action, the defendants, as to them, having succeeded in their defence, which was that the goods had only been delivered on approval, and that the property had not passed. THE COURT (MATHEW
THE BILLS OF SALE ACT, 1882. and A. L. SMITH, JJ.) dismissed the appeal, being of opinion that in
BY JAMES WHITE, LL.D. this case more than 650 had been recovered in the action.-COUNSEL,
II. Asquith ; B. F. Williams, Q.C.-- Times.
I now come to consider the question, “What is an accordance THE GAS LIGHT AND COKE CO. v. HERBERT SMITH & CO.- with the statutory form?” This is a question of extreme uncer. Q. B. Div., 26th October.
tainty and difficulty. I propose to go through the form, discussing its EXEMPTION FROM DISTRESS-GAS FITTINGS-GASWORKS Clauses Act, 1847 various parts in connection with the decided cases, passing over the ques(10 VICT., c. 15, s. 14).
tion as to truly stating the consideration. I do not think there is any real
difficulty in stating the consideration truly, as required by the Act. It The defendants, having levied a distress upon the premiees of a tenant, would, perhaps, be thought that no dificulty could arise as to the seized and sold a gas cooking-stove which the tenant held on hire from grantees, but in Melville v. Stringer (32 W. R. 896), a bill of sale to several the plaintiff company. The 14th section of the Gasworks Clauses Act, 1847, grantees to secure amounts due to them severally was held void, as not which empowers gas companies to let for hire " any fittings for the gas," provides that such meter and attings shall being in accordance with the statutory form, on the ground that the
sancta simplicitas required by that form was destroyed. Bowen, L.J., says, In The Gas Light and Coke Co. v. “A substantial part of the form is that the property must be assigned to Hardy (30 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 655), it was held that a gas-stove for the person who finds the money, and that to such person repayment is to warming purposes was a “fitting, for the gas" within the meaning of be made of the money borrowed, and therefore I do not think that a bill these words and the similar provisions of the subsequent statutes. It of sale is within the Act if the money is lent by one person and made was now sought to exclude from this decision the case of a stove for repayable to another person, or if the property is assigned by it to one cooking, containing, besides the burners and the chamber in which the person and repayment is to be to another, or if the assignment of the pro such arrangements, for the reception of cooking utensils. STEPHEN, J., judgment of Bowen, L.J., goes to the full extent of saying that a bill of said he thought the gas-stove clearly came within the judgment of sale to several persons not joint creditors is invalid. the Court of Appeal. It was not necessary to put such a fine edge on Next we come to the parcels. Here we have to note section 4 of the language that it must apply to one thing and could not apply to another. Act, which requires a schedule of the goods to be annexed or written on The general use of the term “ gas-fitting" seemed plain enough. If he the bill of sale, and provides that, except as against the grantor, the bill (the learned judge) had to define it, he should say it was an instrument of sale shall be void in respect of chattels not specifically described in the used to receive or burn gas, and with such accessories as might be schedule. Now this schedule must be not a general schedule or general necessary in order to obtain the benefit of the combustion. If a distinc. description, but a “specific inventory which would put down the number tion were to be drawn between the burners in this stove and the drawers of articles, but not all in one item. There must be a specifio inventory of and grates, so that the latter would be taken out and exempted from each class of goods, though not of each article in detail” (per Brett, M.R., distress, it would certainly be a most inconvenient distinction. When, in Roberts v. Roberts, 32 W. R. 605), in which case a bill of sale was held however, they came to a machine like a gas engine, it seemed to his void as to goods described in the schedule as “ household furniture and lordship that they came to something which was much more than an effects, implements of husbandry." The deed need not state where the instrument for receiving and burning gas. This iror. box, with its grates goods are Ex parte Hill, L. R. 17 Q. B.D. 74). and drawers, was substantially one thing, and as it was used for the
Next, by section 4, a bill of sale is void (except as against the grantor) reception and combustion of gas, his lordship held it was within the in respect of any chattels specifically described in the schedule, of which section, and exempt from distress.--Counsel, Sir R. Webster, A.G., and the grantor is not the true owner at the time of the execution of the bill Danckwerts ; Lumley Smith, Q.C., and ecil Chapman-Times.
of sale. There have not been, so far as I am aware, any cases on the construction of this section; clearly it prevents the use of the old common.
form parcels “ and all other goods, &c., which shall at any time during the DOMESDAY BOOK.
continuance of this security be brought into or upon the said premises,
either in addition to or in substitution for the goods, &c., hereby assigned." On Monday last the members of the Royal Historical Society met at the We shall see presently whether it is possible to make a bill of sale cover Record Office to view the two volumes of the Domesday Book and to hear goods substituted for the goods described in the schedule. a lecture by Mr. Hubert Hall on their history. The books, says the Next we come to the words “ by way of security for the payment of the Standard, are bound in thick steel-mounted boards, rest on blue velvet sum of £
and interest thereon at the rate of £
per cushions, and are preserved in separate glass cases. The first volume is a cent. per annum " (or whatever else may be the rate). folio of three hundred and eighty-two pages of vellum, fourteen and Now, on these words, combined with the covenant for payment which a-half by nine and three-quarter inches, with five fly leaves at the immediately follows them, we have a considerable number of decisions. beginning and four at the end. The writing is in double column, and of The covenant for payment is to pay “the principal sum aforesaid, together great beauty and legibility. Age, probably, has given the work a brown with interest then due, by equal payments of £ colour; many of the capital and smaller letters are shaded with day of " (or whatever else may be the stipulated times or time of red ink; there are some sentences, entries, and words altogether payment]. in red, and some entries, both in black and red, have been " Whatever else must be the rate has been held to mean that in any deleted by a red-ink stroke being drawn through them. This volume event the interest must be rateable. So in the leading case of Davis v. contains the survey of thirty-one counties, and is a transcript or analysis Burton (32 W. R. 423), a bill of sale to secure £300, and £180 as capitalized of the reports supplied by the King's Justiciaries or Commissioners, who interest, “ being at the rate of £60 per cent. per annum," by instalments, were sent into every county, and shire to ascertain the condition of the was held void because, in the event of the breach of any of the covenants, Kingdom, with the help of juries summoned in each hundred, consisting “all moneys secured by the bill of sale were immediately to become due, so of the sheriffs, lords of manors, reeves or overseers of hundreds, bailiffs, that in that event the rate of interest would be enormously more than and the villeins of the villages-in short, with the help of every grade of sixty per cent. It was, in fact, impossible to say from the instrument what society, from the barons to the class immediately above the serfs. Three the rate of interest might be (see also Ex parte Pearce, 32 W. R. 187). In of the leaves are smaller than the others, the reason being that they had Thorp v. Cregveen (33 W. R. 844), £5 was charged for interest, and the been added to complete a portion of the record which could not be got rate was not stated. The bill of sale was held good by the Divisional into the space allotted to it. One leaf has a small portion cut off, but it Court, but this was disapproved by the Court of Appeal in Myers v. Elliott was so mutilated before the record was written; and a third leaf is in the (34 W. R. 339), where £15 was charged for“ interest and bonus," and the wrong place. The second volume is not in folio, but quarto, 101 by 61 rate was not stated. The bill of sale was held void on the same ground inches, and written, as it were, currente calamo, and in single column. It is far behind the first volume in clerical beauty and finish. The three interest could not be distinguished from bonus.
as in Davis v. Burton--viz., that the rate of interest was not statedcounties of Essex, Norfolk, and Suffolk, which it describes, are not
So in Goldstrom V.
Tallerman (34 W. R. 459), where the bill of sale was held void because, on included among the thirty-one counties in the folio volume, and the the construction of it, it was not clear whether the interest (£60 per cent.) manuscript is believed to consist of the original reports of the Commissioners, and not of abridgments or compilations of their reports like the payments on the principal for the time being owing. In this bill of sale
was payable by equal instalments with the principal, or by diminishing folio. In neither volume will there be found any account of Northumber. there was a provision that, if instalments were in arrear, interest should be land, Cumberland, Westmorland, and Durham. Numerous other manu. paid on them; and the bill was held void on this ground also. In scripts were exhibited. In the evening a lecture was delivered by Canon Lumley v. Simmons (34 W. R. 759), interest was made payable at the Isaac Taylor on " Early English Village Life.” On Tuesday the society rate of 1s. in the $ per month"; it was held that this was in accordance visited the British Museum to view the manuscripts there relating to with the form,