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Blake v Mayor and Corporation of
Boswell v Coaks, 811
Burrows v Holley, 3'79
Burton, Re, Burton v Burton, 660
Ca ital Fire nsuranee Association
(£13 'ted), Re, 94
L saght, Re. Blythe v Banmgartner, 283
Mandamus, In the Matter oi an Appli-
Mairet. Re, Chalmers v Wingfleld. 286
Marshiield, Re. Marshiield v Hutch-
Me ical Attendance Assurance Asso-
Meller's Will, Re, ‘I04
M. Melachrino 8: Co. v Molschrino
Mil s v Mills, 93
Mineral Water Bottle Exchange and
Mééire v Moore, Chadwick, & Griflilhs,
—-— v Morton. 110
Morgan, Re. Owen v Morg an, 462
Murray v Ste henson, 608
Neal v Bsrretg, 428
Neath Harbour Sinelting and Rolling
Neniport (Mon) Slipwny C0 (Limited‘,
The Solicitors Journal.
i adjudications, schemes or compositions ; and fees are added for the
CASES REPORTED THIS \VEEK.
oflicial receiver acting as i'm'eri'm receiver, and for the oificial receiver supervising a special manager, or the carrying on of a 10 debtor’s business. The provisions of the direction as to stamps
r of paid Judicial Committee judges,_and the practical union of
THE Coxsotin,iri:i> Bankruptcy Rules wire published towards 88 the close of last week. They constitute a bulky volume of 200 the Dflges and are in the main an incorporation of the Bankruptcy not
rllptcy Act. We were enabled to point out in advance the only
Monday hat‘ and hmmhgh the hltemtbhh made in the Prevmhs rise though dating so far back as 1871, will still be fresh in the
Rules: 1883, land the rules, subsequently made under the Bank- 8800!1f1 <10l1ble vacancy-
rules are trifling, we think that the profession has some reason to
' iis of our readers. The Judicial Committee Act provided that the erson appointed should be “ specially qualified” by being or having een “judge of one of the superior courts.” Sir R. COLLIER sat a
fin’ few days in the Court of Common Pleas for the mere purpose of gaining a qualification, and the late Lord Chief Justice of England
the close oi 1883 As soon as that order appeared we ' t d - - -
1359~_ Several of the fees to which we then drew particular t
ough, curiously enough, we behcve that he was described in the ' t.
Tue ANXIETY to obtain an allotment of shares in ‘_‘Arthur uiuness, Sou, & Co., Limited,” has led to much discussion
s to the duty of the directors in allotting the shares among he numerous applicants. It has been contended that the (llrH:
rs have no discretion in the matter, but are bound to allot the
hares pro rota‘ among all the applicants. The advocates of this view a ear to rest their contention on the notion that tho
PP . prospectus constitutes an ofl'er of shares, which ofier is acccpgsd; ll I
and a contract constituted, by the application for s ares, _ in Re Riclimoml Hill Hofel C'o., PoIla_tt’c case _(2 Ch. 52:). Lord Calm: said, “ that where an individual applies for shale!
in a company, there being no obligation to let him havenny, there must be a response by the company, otherwise there is no contract.” The prospectus is, in fact, nothing more than an invitation for offers to take shares (see Spencer v. Harding, 5 C. P. 561). It appears to be forgotten that a discretion as to allotment of shares is almost always expressly vested in the directors by the articles of association of a company. The articles of “Arthur Guinness, Son, & Co." provide (article 7 (2) ) that, “ The authorized share capital of the company (and forfeited or surrendered shares) may be issued by the board to such persons, at such times, and on such terms, as to discount or otherwise, and for such purposes of the company, as they see fit.”
Tm; “ OBJECTS ctuusrz” in the memorandum of association of “Arthur Guinness, Son, & Co., Limited ” (perhaps owing to the decision in Guinness v. Land Corporation of Ireland, 22 Ch. D. 349), certainly does not err on the side of restriction. There are no fewer than fifteen “ objects ” specified, in addition to the usual general clause at the close of the specification. They include power to “ act asbankers ” ; to “ undertake, subscribe to, or otherwise aid undertakings for purposes of opening out trade or making experiments or investigations in connection with any of the objects of the company, or any class or department of its business, directly or indirectly’ ; and a clause, the like of which we have not seen before, which provides that one of the objects of the company shall be :—“ To provide for the welfare of persons in the employment of the company, or formerly engaged in any business acquired by the company, and the wives, widows, and families of such persons, by grants of money, pensions, or other payments, and by providing or subscribing towards schools and places of recreation or otherwise, and hospitals, dispensaries, medical and other attendance, aud other assistance as the company shall think fit, and to form, subscribe to, or otherwise aid benevolent, religious, scientific, national, or other institutions or objects which shall have any moral or other claims to support or aid by the company by reason of the locality of its operations or otherwise."
Tris RE'1‘l’RE1\[EN'1‘ of Mr. Arrnnnsoiv, Q,.C., from the office of Oflicial Referee seems to render it open to the authorities to reconsider the number of the Ofiicial Referees. By section 88 of the Judicature Act, 1883, it is provided that “ there shall be attached to the Supreme Court permanent oflicers called official referees, for the trial of such questions as shall, under the provisions of this Act, be directed to be tried by such referees. The number and the qualification of the pcrsons to be so appointed from time to time, and the tenure of their offices, shall be determined by the Lord Chancellor, with the concurrence of the presidents of the divisions of the High Court, or a majority of them (of which _majority the_Lord Chief Justice of England shall be one) and with the sanction of the Treasury"; and by section 84 “all oflicers assigned to perform duties with respect to the Supreme Court generally ”—-which term appears to include official referees-—“shall be appointed by the Lord Chancellor._” When the Act of 1873 came into force there were estabhshed five divisions of the High Court, but on the occasion of the merger of the Common Pleas and Exchequer Divisions into the Queen s Bench _Division under Order in Council of December, 1880, it was provided that tho Lord Chief Justice of England should exercise all the powers formerly exercised by the presidents of the merged divisions. The number and qualification of the ofiicial referees, therefore, seems to rest with the Lord Chancellor, the _Lord Chief Justice, and the President of the Probate,_ &c., Division, with the sanction of the Treasury, while the appointment is to be made by the Lord Chancellor.
by granting a licence for the sale of intoxicating liquors. The question as to how far justices of the peace are justified in refusing to consider whether a discretion ought to be exercised in a particular way upon the ground that they conscientiously believe that to exercise it in that way, though according to law, would be undesirable, appears to be conclusively answered by R3. v. Boteler (12 W. R. 466), in which justices were compell to issue a distress warrant in a case in which they had declined to do so on the ground that the statute (2 & 3 Vict. c. 84) empowering them to act was unjust, Cocrrnurm, C.J., pointing out that the justices had no business to enter into any such consideration. The particular question arising upon the construction of the Licensing Acts, which is not quite so clear, has two branches, that connected with the refusal of (1) the general licence, to which Sir W. L.\wsoN’s more recent declarations apply; and (2) the occasional licence, out of the refusal of which the controversy originally sprung. As to the general licence, this, by section 1 of the Licensing Act, 1828, is granted to such persons as the justices in the execution of the powers of that Act, “ and in the exercise of their discretion, deem fit and proper.” It is clear from Reg. v. Walsall Justices (3 C. L. B. 100) that every applicant for a licence is entitled to a hearing, and that to refuse a licence merely in pursuance of a general resolution to grant no more licences is so far illegal that a mandamus will issue to compel the justices to hear and determine the application at another meeting, but so long as each applicant has a formal hearing, the reasons of the bench for refusing the general licence appear to be quite immaterial in point of law. As to the occasional licence, the words of the statutes (25 Vict. c. 22, s. 13, and 26 & 27 Vict. c. 83, s. 20) are different, and are bare of judicial interpretation. By these enactments “it shall he lawful for the Commissioners of Inland Revenue, whenever they shall think it conducive to public convenience, comfort, and order, and with the consent in writing of a justice of the peace usually acting at the petty sessions for the petty sessional division within which the place of sale is situate," to authorize an excise ofiicer to grant an occasional licence authorizing the holder to sell upon other than licensed premises, and “ upon the occasion of any public dinner or ball ” to sell liquors “during such hours, before or after sunrise or sunset, as shall be allowed and specified in that behalf in the consent” to be given by the justice for the granting of such occasional licence. In this case the Inland Revenue authorities take the initiative, and the justice of the peace has first a veto, and secondly, in the case of a dinner or ball, the power of extending a special privilege. In either case the functions of the justice of the peace appear to be ministerial rather than judicial, and it may be doubted whether, even if the most anti-liquor reasons were avowed by the non-consenting justice, a rehearing could be forced from him, or a selection of ball and dinner hours could be enjoined upon him by any legal proceedings whatever.
Tni-: RECENT CASE before the Liverpool magistrates, in which the sons of a woman, divorced on the ground of her adultery and without any provision for maintenance, were ordered to contribute to the support of their mother, has drawn attention to the provision of 43 Eliz. c. 2, s. 7, that “ the father and grandfather, and the mother and grandmother, and the children of every poor, old, blind, lame, and impotent person, or other poor person not able to work, being of a suflicient ability, shall at their own charges reheve and maintain every such poor person.” The Liverpool bench do not seem to have agreed with Serjeant Sr:Li.oN’s remark (4 East. 79) that the obligation to maintain imposed by the statute is “founded on the law of nature,” and they are reported to have expressed an opinion that the case was a hard one for the sons, probably because the mother had not bestowed on them the usual maternal attention and oversight, and had by her own act forfeited the right to support by the father, who is still living. But it is to be remembered, on the other hand, that the statutory obligation is_mutua.l, and that if the cases had been reversed, and the “1mP°§911t persons” had been the children, the mother, if “of a sufiicient ability,” would have had to contribute to the support of children who might have cast her off. A case of even greater
hardship came before the court in R. v. i1Iandm(1 Stra. 190), where an _order_ had been made by justices to compe a husband to pupport his wife's mother. This iniquitous order was reversed