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been tried in Germany, and failed. And it may, perhaps, have this aspect in the eyes of those States. That it will first of all be brought before them is practically a necessity, for, notwithstanding the vote of the Reichstag, Germany could hardly ask other countries to accede to a proposition of this kind unless it had previously been accepted by the States forming constituent portions of the German Empire. And several of them are, according to repute, “kittle cattle” to deal with. It is probable, therefore, that some time will elapse before any formal invitation to join the League shall be addressed to Great Britain. As to the reply which might be made to such a proposition by the unknown Government of that future day, we, of course, attempt no forecast. In the meanwhile, it seems to us very evident that Extradition is one of the questions of the day in International Law, and that no labour will be lost which may be given to the study of the many delicate problems involved in it. If, as would appear, our criteria for Extradition are not clearly understood by foreign countries, let us by all means endeavour to make them clear. That there exist doubts under this head is evident. To take but one instance, there is a very recent article in the Rivista Penale (Vol. XIII., p. 587) for March-April, 1881, which contrasts the decisions in the De Tourville and VVilson cases. It is very likely that before anything further comes of the resolution in the German Parliament, the question so keenly and ably discussed at the Oxford meeting of the Institute of International Law will have been taken up again by the meeting of the same body at Turin in the coming autumn. On the discussion which took place at Oxford, and the key-note struck by Professor Bluntschli’s “Avis,” this Review has already passed some criticism (Law Magazine and Review, No. CCXXXVIII., November, 1880), and on those points it is, therefore, unnecessary here to say more than that they demand the very careful Consideration which they are sure to receive at the hands of the Institute. But we may note, and not without satisfaction, that the elements of a good discussion are clearly in existence, and certain to be represented at Turin. For among the points taken up by Professor Brusa, in his interesting criticism of the Oxford meeting of the Institute in relation to this particular question of Extradition (Rivista Penale, Vol. XIII., No. I.), is this crucial point of the definition of Nihil-ism, Socialism, and Communism, as extraditable offences. But Professor Brusa argues, Nihilism, jmce Professor de Martens, however great and terrible an offence, is yet not universal in its character, nor does it need to become such in order to satisfy the aims of its authors. It is, and remains, a Russian evil—and therefore, we may add, to be dealt with by Russia alone—and we are not called upon to erect it into an oecumenical crime against Society, and to assimilate Nihilists to pirates as “hostes humani generis.” Whether it would be possible to frame such a definition of a Nihilist as should satisfy a scientific body—-a “Senate of jurists,” such as the Institute of International Law expressly professes to be— it is not necessary here to discuss, for, like Signor Brusa, we do not profess to be treating the question exhaustively, and we shall probably return to it in a future number. But we may remark that the difficulty would seem to be increased when Communists and Socialists are added to the list. For here fresh nationalities, and fresh national quarrels, come to the surface. But they are internal quarrels, we hold, not problems for the solution of International Law. How far it may be possible to define a Nihilist, a Communist, and a Socialist, to the satisfaction of Russian, French, and German members of the Institute respectively, we must leave to the Institute itself to discover, should it undertake the task. VVhether any such definitions, even if agreed upon, would avail to the salvation of society, is a further question. \Ve have heard before now of Saviours of Society and of Public Order. But it may be doubted whether the effect of their apostolic zeal might not, as a rule, be summed up in one sentence :— “ Solitndinem facinnt, pacem aj>jzellant."
A riparian proprietor having erected a cauld on his own side the medium filu-m for the purpose of improving his salmon fishings: Held, that the opposite proprietor was entitled to insist on its removal, and the alveus returned to its former condition, without proving damage caused to him by its erection. Per Lord justice Clerk (Lord Moncreifi): “ No proprietor of one side of a stream is entitled to alter the flow of the stream without the consent of the proprietor of the other side, or even of those below." Per Lord Gifford: “ Even if such an operation did the pursuer good instead of hurting him, I think he would be entitled to object. Here I think it does injure him; at least, it will most benefit the defenders, and any such operation before it can be looked upon favourably must at least induce equally to the benefit of both parties interested." 18 Feb., 1879. Duke of Roxburgh v. Waldie’s Trustees, 6 S.C., 663.
Public Company—Curator Bonis.
A curator bonis sold part of the stock of his ward, and sent the stock certificate to the company, with instructions to prepare a transfer to the purchasers. The company entered the remainder of the stock in name of the curator without his knowledge. The curator subsequently subscribed a dividend warrant as curator: Held, that as he had never authorised the stock to be transferred from his ward‘s name to his own he was not liable as a partner. Per Lord President (Inglis): “A curator bonis, who sells a portion of his ward’s estate, does not necessarily become the proprietor of that estate in order to enable him to sell. He acts under authority of Court, and the Court
gives him authority because the ward is incapable of giving it himself.-" “ The party who acts under authority does not make himself a partner of the bank, nor incur any personal liability in respect of it. He is acting for another, and having full authority he binds that other and not himself." “As to the entry in name of the curator in the stock ledger, it appears to me that the company had no authority from the curator to make such entry. He did not require an entry of the kind to enable him as curator bonis to deal with the stock.” “ If the fact that he is made curator bonis does not make him a partner, the statement of the fact in the company’s record cannot make him a partner." “And, in like manner, when he receives a new certificate of the remainder of the stock, if there is an inaccurate description in that of what is actually contained in the register, I do not suppose that anybody can be bound by it when we go back to the fact that there is no such entry in the register as the certificate would lead one to suppose. In short, I do not think that a man can be made a partner of a bank by receiving a dividend on a false narrative, or by receiving a certificate of stock with an inaccurate description, the fact being that the orginal owner of this stock, the ward, is down to this day the only man upon the register in respect of that stock.” 21 Feb., 1879. Lindsay's Curator v. City of Glasgow Bank, 6 S.C., 67:.
Public Company and Liability of Trustees.
Trustees, under a marriage contract, five in number, invested part of the trust funds in a bank. Three of the trustees, as a quorum, subscribed the deed of transfer, and all the trustees were entered in the Statutory Register: Held, in liquidation, that the whole of the trustees were liable as contributories jointly and severally, and not merely fro ratai. 21 Feb., 1879. Cunningham v. City of Glasgow Bank, S.C., 679.
Master and Se:-vant—B.epara.tion.
Workmen were brought from England by manufacturers in Glasgow to supply their works on the occasion of a lock-out. The Englishmen soon after their arrival left, in violation of their engagement. The masters sued one of their former servants for having induced the foreign servants to leave by threats, promises, and payment of money: Held, that it was a sufiicient ground of liability that the workmen were enticed or induced to desert the service. Per Lord Ormidalez “ Every master has a legal right and interest in the services of the workmen whom he has under engagement in his employment, and every person who knowingly and designedly entices or induces such workmen to break their engagement and desert their employment to the injury of the master, commits a wrongful act, for which he is answerable in damages, it being always understood that the injury for which reparation is asked must be the natural and necessary consequences of the wrongful acts complained of, and not merely remotely connected with it." But (Lord Justice Clerk dissenting), the Court held that the case was not proved, and the defendant was assoylzied. Many English cases were quoted. 22 Feb., 1879. Coujm 6- Sons v. Macfarlana,
A villa with ground about one-third of an acre was sold by missives without reservations. By the title there was a reservation of minerals to the superior, but who could not work them without the feuar's written consent. In an action to compel the purchaser to take the property : Held, by a majority, that he was not bound to take the property, the seller not being able to convey the whole subject. Per Lord Ormidalez “ The defender in place of obtaining a title to the piece of ground a cmtro ad mlum, as he was entitled to expect and had a right to insist for, in the absence of any stipulation to the contrary, will only do so subject to a reservation in favour of the superiors of the whole coal, stone and other mines, and minerals within the bounds of the piece of ground." Lord Justice Clerk concurred with Lord Ormidale. (Lord Gifford dissenting): “ If this was a mineral estate a reservation of minerals would alter the whole character of the purchase, and might make the subject quite useless for the only purpose for which it was purchased. In the present case, however, I think the reservations and conditions are just such as usually are found to be applied to small plots of building ground in the suburbs of a town." Lord Young, the Ordinary, found the defender bound to accept the title, and his judgment was reversed. 22 Feb., 1879. Whyte v. Lee, 6 S.C., 699.
A. and B., two partners of a firm C. under contract of copartne'ry, were bound to advance the capital,—the third partner