Sir John Holker in dealing with this argument, referred to it, as one which he should have thought, "would have made the hair of his hon. and learned friend [Sir Wm. Harcourt] stand on end." But Vattel (Bk. II., chap. XVII., sec. 297) expressly states, "If it be certain and manifest that the consideration of the present state of things was one of the reasons which occasioned the promise-that the promise was made in consideration, or in consequence of that state of things-it depends on the preservation of things in the same state."

He admits that the rule ought to be applied with

caution.

Klüber (Droit des Gens, by Ott, sec. 165) adopts the same principle, "Les Traités cessent encore d'être obligatoires, lors du changement essentiel de telle ou telle circonstance, dont l'existence était supposée nécessaire par les deux parties (clausula rebus sic stantibus), soit que cette condition ait été stipulée expressément, soit qu'elle résulte de la nature même du traité."

Heffter (Droit International, sec. 98) also lays down the principle that a party may refuse to fulfil a treaty, "à cause d'un changement des circonstances survenu depuis la conclusion du traité et non prévu, lorsque, d'après l'intention évidente des parties, elles en formaient la condition tacite."

A similar principle is recognised by Wheaton, Phillimore, and other writers.

If, then, the Tripartite Treaty was entered into by England in consideration of circumstances which now no longer exist-circumstances so essential and material as to practically amount to a condition on which the validity of the treaty was to depend, England would on grounds of International Law be justified in treating the treaty if not as void, at least as voidable.

The Tripartite Treaty was supplemental to the Treaty

of Paris. It expressly states that its object was to settle "the combined action" which any infraction of the latter treaty would involve.

The independence and integrity which is guaranteed is not the absolute independence and integrity of Turkey, nor even that independence and integrity subject to any modifications that might be afterwards introduced, but the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire "as recorded in the treaty concluded at Paris on the 20th of March, 1856." The Treaty of Paris not only fixed the limits of the Empire, but curtailed both its independence and integrity. The former was limited by the clauses forbidding the Porte to maintain any vessels of war in the Black Sea, by the restriction of the sovereign rights of the Porte over the Principalities, and by the necessity imposed upon the Porte of consulting the contracting parties before resorting to force in case of any misunderstanding with the Powers. The latter was limited by Moldavia and Wallachia being constituted into separate principalities subject only to the suzerainty of the Porte, and by the grant of a separate administration to Servia, under the guardianship of the Great Powers. It was an independence and integrity with such limitations that England bound itself by the Tripartite Treaty to maintain by the sword.

Have any essential changes occurred since 1854 in the state of things contemplated by the Tripartite Treaty? Without entering into a discussion of this very important question which would be foreign to the object of the present paper, reference may be made to the following events which have happened, and which must be taken into consideration in any answer that may be given :

(1.) The independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire no longer exist, as fixed by the Treaty of Paris; but have been curtailed, and curtailed to a most material extent. The following table taken from the Statesman's

Year Book, shows in a striking manner, the effect of the Treaty of Berlin on the Turkish Empire :

(2.) Two of the three parties to the Tripartite Treaty have, though under treaty stipulations, occupied part of the Turkish territory, the integrity of which was the object of the treaty. Austria has occupied Bosnia and Herzegovina, England has occupied Cyprus.

(3.) When the integrity of the Empire was attacked by Russia, no one of the parties to the treaty took the course of action laid down by the treaty, i.e., considered the action of Russia as a casus belli., or, it should be added, called on any of the other parties to adopt that course.

(4.) One of the parties to the treaty has entered into another treaty of such a character that the strict observance of both treaties by that party is impossible. By the Turkish Convention, England, by herself, undertakes if Russia

attacks the Asiatic dominions of the Porte, to join the Sultan in defending them by force of arms.

But by the Tripartite Treaty, England in such a case would also be bound "to come to an understanding," along with Austria and France, "with the Sublime Porte as to the measures which have become necessary, &c."

(5.) The Porte has systematically violated the Treaty of Paris by not introducing the reforms therein promised, and the introduction of such reforms was one of the considerations which led to the guarantee of the Turkish Empire by the Powers.

If such be some of the characteristics of existing treaties of so-called guarantee, the practical question arises, is a nation ever justified in entering into such a treaty? Looking at the benefits Europe has gained from the establishment of the independence of Greece, and the maintenance of the neutrality of Belgium, the answer must be in the affirmative. It is only by treaties of alliance of such a kind that a concert of European opinion can be brought about to obtain such results. It must, however, be remembered that in these two cases the stability of the treaty lies not so much in the existence of the treaty itself as in the advantages gained by the Signatory Powers in maintaining the treaties intact.

The inherent drawbacks to modern treaties of guarantee

1. Such treaties are liable to be made an excuse for war. A State which under a guarantee has an interest in the affairs of another State may make that a ground for making war. It was in virtue of the guarantee entered into by the Treaty of Westphalia that Austria and Prussia in 1792 took up arms against France for attempting to suppress the rights of the German princes in Alsace-a province over which France had in 1648 obtained sovereign rights.

2. Unforeseen events are always liable to occur and affect fundamentally the circumstances under which the guarantee was given. It might be urged that the treaty then becomes void, but then also, the great difficulty arises of determining what change of circumstances will be sufficient to make void the treaty. No International Tribunal exists to determine such delicate points, and unless the dispute could be arranged by diplomatic correspondence or friendly arbitration, the stronger Power would soon determine in its own favour.

Apart, however, from such an aspect of the principle laid down, there is little doubt that if the changes which have occurred in the Map of Europe could have been foreseen, many treaties which now exist would never have been signed. At the time of the Peace of Westphalia, Sweden and France were two of the great Powers of Europe. Russia was an Asiatic State, and Prussia a German State only. Now Prussia and Russia are two of the greatest military Powers on the Continent. Sweden has ceased to take any active part in the political system, whilst new States and new Nationalities have attained a recognised position in the family of nations.

Such changes in the European family of States expose a guaranteeing power to one of two dangers. (1) It may disregard the treaty and expose itself to a charge of violating its engagements, or (2) it may go to war in defence of a treaty into which it ought never to have entered. In order to avoid the possibility of having to adopt either course, it has been suggested that instead of making treaties of guarantee perpetual they ought to be entered into for a limited time— all parties to be at liberty to renew the treaty if deemed expedient. Such a course undoubtedly would have its advantages, but, on the other hand, would it not invite attack at the expiration of the time agreed upon? It might so happen that the treaty would expire during a European war, and the guaranteed State lose its safeguard at the time it