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Statute, it must be observed, does not in any manner prohibit or restrict the creation of Uses, but merely operates upon the Use when created by uniting to it the Legal estate, which it invests with the “quality, manner, form, and condition" of the Use. The Statute, therefore, in effect made the Legal estate as malleable as formerly the Use or Equitable estate was, and (speaking generally) enabled the owner of land to deal with the Legal estate therein as freely as formerly he might have dealt with the Use or Equitable estate.

VVith reference to the operation of the Statute in these respects, it may truly be said to have revolutionised the methods of conveyancing.

The operation of the Statute upon dispositions of the Legal estate in land was principally twofold; (zz) in the first place, it had an important effect upon the dispositions which might be made of the Legal estate; and (b) in the next place, it affected the form of the disposition of the Legal estate.

It is proposed to consider the effects of the Statute in these respects in detail.

(a) In the first place, as to the effect of the Statute upon the dispositions which might be made of the Legal estate.

At the common law, all limitations contained in conveyances operating inter vivos of Legal estates of freehold duration, were governed by the following rules :—(I.) That the rigl1t to the seisi_n or feudal possession must never be in abeyance ; and (2) that the right to the seisin must not be shifted about from one person to another without open livery of seisin or other ceremony.

These two rules are of a distinctly feudal origin, their object being to ensure that there shall always be some ostensible tenant of the freehold liable to the lord for the services due in -respect of the feud, and answerable in a real action to all persons claiming right in the land.

The practical operation of the two rules above stated was, that in a conveyance made inter vivos, a Legal estate of freehold duration could only be limited in Possession, that is, so as to confer an immediate power of possession and enjoyment of the land; or in remainder, that is, so as to confer a power of possession and enjoyment of the land upon the regular determination of some preceding particular Legal estate of freehold duration in possession, which the conveying party at the same time parted with. On every conveyance of a Legal estate of freehold duration, therefore, it was necessary that the conveying party should presently part with the freehold in possession ; for, as it was said, every conveyance of the freehold must take immediate effect.

Where the limitation was of an estate in remainder, the limitation might be either an execute:/ili1nitation,that is, a limitation by virtue whereof the estate limited is immediately acquired by, and vests in, the person to whom it is limited; or an executory limitation, that is, a limitation of an estate to be acquired by and to vest in the person to whom it is

limited, not presently, but only upon the happening of some .

future event. A limitation of an estate in possession was necessarily an executed limitation. At the common law, therefore, an executory limitation of a freehold estate was only valid when it was a limitation of an estate in remainder.

A limitation of a Legal estate of freehold to vest in the person to whom it is limited at some future time, if not preceded in the same conveyance by a limitation of a particular Legal estate of freehold, was clearly rendered void by the rules above stated; for if such a limitation were valid, either the right to the seisin would, until the happening of the event specified, be in suspense, which is contrary to the first rule; or upon the happening of the event specified, the right to the seisin would, without any livery

or other ceremony, shift away from the grantor to the grantee, which is contrary to the second rule.

And a limitation of a Legal estate of freehold to take effect in defeasance of a preceding limitation contained in the same instrument was also rendered void by the second of the rules above mentioned; for the effect of such a limitation, if valid, would be that upon the happening of the event specified, the right to the seisin would, without

any livery or other ceremony, shift away from the first grantee to the second grantee. A limitation in defeasance

of a preceding limitation contained in the same instrument was also invalidated by another rule of the common law, namely, that a man may not derogate from his own grant; for at the common law this principle was applied as between several limitations contained in the same instrument. Moreover, not only were all executory limitations of Legal estates of freehold, other than those by way of remainder, void at the common law, but even an executory limitation by way of remainder, though valid in its origin, became void and failed of effect, unless the limitation was executed, and the estate limited thereby was completely acquired by and vested'in the person to whom it was limited, by the happening of the event specified, either during the continuance of the particular estate, or, at the latest, at the instant of the determination of the particular estate. For if the executory limitation had been held valid, notwithstanding the determination of the particular estate before the happening of the event on which such limitation was to become executed, either the right to the seisin would, in the meantime and until the happening of the event, be in abeyance, contrary to our first rule; or it would result to the grantor, and afterwards, upon the happening of the event, without livery of seisin or other ceremony, shift away to the grantee, which is contrary to our second rule. By the determination of the particular estate, therefore,

before the estate limited by the executory limitation became vested, the limitation became void.

Thus stood the common law before the Statute of Uses with respect to limitations of Legal estates of freehold.

It is necessary now to advert to the rules of Equity, which, before the Statute of Uses, governed limitations of Uses or Equitable estates; for, as has been already shown, the effect of the Statute was indirectly to enable the Legal estate to be dealt with in the same manner in which, at the time of the passing of the Statute, the Use or Equitable estate might be dealt with.

It has already been stated that the Use or Equitable estate in land was a right not recognised by the Courts of Law; it was the creature of and was recognised only by the Court of Chancery. The Equitable estate was not the subject of tenure, nor was it of a feudal origin or nature. It, therefore, conferred no right to the seisin or feudal possession.

Now the rules which have been stated above as governing all limitations of Legal estates of freehold, related only to the right to the seisin; they had no relation to estates which conferred no right to the seisin. Limitations, therefore, of Uses or Equitable estates were not affected by these rules.

From this important difference it followed, not only that executory limitations of Uses were valid, though not by way of remainder, but also that no executory limitations of Uses were limitations by way of remainder.

In the first place, then, executory limitations of Uses were valid, though not by way of remainder. The Use or Equitable estate, since it conferred no right to the seisin, might be shifted about at pleasure from one person to another without any ceremony. An Use, therefore, might well be limited to come into existence and to vest in a person upon the happening of some future event, without being preceded in the same instrument by any limitation of

a particular estate. Even a limitation of an Use to arise and take effect in defeasance of some preceding limitation contained in the same instrument was valid ; for the principle that a man may not derogate from his own grant was not, in Equity, applied as between several limitations contained in the same instrument ; a limitation of an Equitable estate was regarded as a mere direction to the trustee in whom the Legal estate was vested, as to the persons for whom and the purposes for which he should stand seised of the land, which might well be, in the same instrument, revoked or varied in any given event.

Uses of the former class were termed Springing Uses; those of the latter class were termed Shifting Uses.

The event upon which an executory limitation of an Use, whether a springing or shifting Use, should take effect, might be the act of the owner of the land, or even of a a stranger. In this manner an Use might be made to spring up at the will of a person designated, who was then said to have a Power over the Use.

Not only were executory limitations of Uses valid, though not by way of remainder, but all executory limitations of Uses were, in effect, limitations not by way of remainder.

Even when a limitation of an Use to arise and to vest in some person upon the happening of a future event was preceded in the same instrument by a limitation of a particular Use or Equitable estate, the subsequent or executory limitation was not really a limitation, by way of remainder. For in order that a limitation may be a limitation by way of remainder, it is essential that it should be so connected with or related to some preceding limitation of a particular estate contained in the same instrument, that the estate limited by the subsequent limitation must necessarily, if at all, take effect in possession immediately upon the regular determination of the particular estate limited by the preceding limitation, and neither sooner nor later; an essential

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